Third Edition Spring 2013 - Institute of East Asian Studies, UC ...

Editorial CommissionAlison YeeKelsi MacklinStephanie ChamberlainChristopher RobertsonTara YarlagaddaAdvisorsMartin BackstromSharmila ShindeBonnie WadeProfessor ReviewersCo-Chair and CoordinatorCo-Chair and Editor-in-ChiefDirector of Publicity and LayoutGraduate EditorPublicity and Editing AssistantInstitute of East Asian StudiesGroup in Asian StudiesGroup in Asian StudiesBERKELEY STUDENT JOURNAL OFASIAN STUDIESEDITION 3 - SPRING 2013Robert P. GoldmanJunko HabuT.J. PempelAlexander von RospattDarren ZookSouth & Southeast Asian StudiesAnthropologyPolitical ScienceSouth & Southeast Asian StudiesInternational & Area Studies,Political ScienceFunded By The National Resource Center at the Institute of EastAsian Studies and the Group in Asian Studies.Institute of East Asian Studies and the Group in Asian Studies,University of California Berkeley

TABLE OF CONTENTS1 How Does Ethnicity Affect CurrentcHINA-Malaysia Relations?Kankan Xie First Year Graduate, South and SouthEast Asian Sudies26 Constructing “Culture”Mark Portillo Undergraduate Senior, Political Science41 The Success of Environmental NGOs inSuharto’s IndonesiaRachel Phoa Undergraduate Junior, Political Scienceand Enviornmental Science55 The Relevance of Kautilya’sArthashastraRamanathan Veerappan Undergradaute Sophomore,Physics and South Asian Studies MinorSpecial Thanks: The Berkeley Student Journal of Asian Studies wouldlike to thank Martin Backstrom, Sharmila Shinde, Bonnie Wade, RobertP. Goldman, Junko Habu, T. J. Pempel, Alexander von Rospatt, DarrenZook. Your support and contributions have been invaluable. Thisjournal would not be possible without the effort, energy, and supportyou have provided us.Logo: Image credits to the followng web entities via CreativeCommons, archnophobia, Indo Dreamin, www.nimpscher.de70 Ainu and the Metaphors of Indigeneity:Land, History, Science, Law and BodiesValerie Black First Year Graduate, Group in AsianStudies87 Not so Singular: Laicization in JapaneseBuddhism and Parallels in South AsiaRobert Bowers Curl First Year Graduate, Group InAsian Studies

Dear Reader,We are pleased to present the third volume of the BerkeleyStudent Journal of Asian Studies. The journal developed as an effortto provide a forum to showcase, connect, and enrich youngscholars studying issues related to Asia at UC Berkeley.In this volume, Valerie Black uses metaphor to explore thestatus of the Ainu in Japan, as well as the relationship of metaphorto perception. Robert Bowers Curl examines some unique characteristicsof Japanese Buddhism as it shifted away from a TheravadaBuddhist model towards a Newar Buddhist model. Rachel Phoalooks at the role environmental non-governmental organizationsplayed under the regime of Suharto in Indonesia as a result ofinternational pressure and environmental damage. Mark Portillouses photography as a tool to analyze how a government garnerspower and uses that power to create cultural memory, specificallyregarding the Vietnam War. Ramanathan Veerappan sheds lighton the themes found in the ancient Indian text Arthashastra byKautilya, its relevance to modern institutions, as well as the text’seconomic and political strategies echoed in later Western schoolsof thought. Kankan Xie looks at the role of ethnicity in China andMalaysia’s bilateral relationship, and its impact on politics andeconomics.The journal strives to serve as a platform to encourage theemergence of student scholarship on Asia. It is a unique bridgebetween undergraduate and graduate scholars, and we hope tocontinue this tradition through your future submissions and support.-The Editors

How Does Ethnicity Affect CurrentChina-Malaysia Relations?Kankan XieAbstractThis paper aims to analyze the current China-Malaysia bilateral relationshipfrom the perspective of ethnicity by drawing attention to Malaysia’sethnic-based domestic politics. Unlike in many other countries where Chinesediasporic communities account for only a relatively small portion of the totalpopulation, the proportion of ethnic Chinese in Malaysia represents a sizableminority of 24.6%. In order to take care of Chinese interests domestically whilereducing the country’s dependence on its ethnic Chinese minority in dealing withChina-related issues, the Malay-controlled Malaysian government has activelyadopted a series of implicitly pro-China policies in both bilateral and multilateralspheres. This paper first examines how the Chinese diaspora fits within theMalaysian domestic political climate in general. Based on a survey conducted in2009, this paper discusses how Malaysian people’s perceptions of China vary accordingto their ethnic background. Following this, it demonstrates the ways inwhich economic and cultural issues affect China-Malaysia relations as the country’sdomestic political struggles proceed. This study concludes that there is amismatch between Malaysian Chinese’s relatively high economic status and theirsubordinate role in Malaysia’s patronage system. On the one hand, this allowsthem to benefit tremendously from close China-Malaysia bilateral ties and thusgain substantial leverage in domestic politics, but on the other, makes them furthermarginalized in inter-governmental dialogues.Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1974, thebilateral relationship between China and Malaysia has been developingsmoothly and steadily. The friendly ties between the twocountries have become increasingly close over the subsequent 38years. According to data published by China’s Ministry of ForeignAffairs in 2011, bilateral trade rose by 42.8% and its total amountreached $74.2 billion USD in 2010, which was the highest amongall ASEAN countries. China’s imports from Malaysia reached $50.4billion USD and its exports to Malaysia totaled $23.8 billion, an increaseof 55.9% and 21.3% respectively compared to the 2009 data.As of the same year, Malaysia had directly invested $5.6 billion USDin China. By comparison, China’s direct investment in Malaysia was$440 million. Driven by this vibrant economic cooperation, bilateralexchanges of people are also more frequent than before. Morethan one million people from each country visited the other in2010. 1 For Malaysia, China has become a major source of tourists.The two countries have signed a number of agreements aimed atdeepening bilateral cooperation in various fields, including technology,culture, education and military. Despite minor issues, suchas a territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands in the South ChinaSea, the development of the China-Malaysia relationship is generallyquite positive, and is expected to continue improving into theforeseeable future.Among many important factors contributing to the stabledevelopment of bilateral ties, the ethnic composition of Malaysiansociety is one that influences their bilateral engagement in manyareas. According to the 2010 census, 24.6% of Malaysia’s total populationis Chinese. 2 Unlike in many other countries where Chinesediasporic communities account for only a relatively small proportionof the total population (Singapore is the only exception), thepercentage of ethnic Chinese in Malaysia is high and represents asizable minority.Politically, Beijing does not openly support the political organizationsof Malaysian Chinese outside of the ruling United Ma-1 Kankan XieIntroduction1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Zhongguo Tong Malaixiya De Guanxi(China-Malaysia Relations), updated on 8/9/2011, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/cgb/zcgmzysx/yz/1206_20/1206x1/t5702.htm (accessed 11/5/2012)2 Department of Statistics, Malaysia, Population and Housing Census, Malaysia2010, http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1215&Itemid=89&lang=en,(accessed 10/26/2012)Ethnicity And China-Malaysia Relations 2

lays National Organization (UMNO). In fact, the Communist Partyof China (CPC) maintains close contact with both the UMNO andthe Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), the UMNO’s most importantally in domestic political campaigns and the largest Chinesepolitical party in Malaysia. Economically, Malaysian Chinesehave played critical roles in promoting bilateral trade and stimulatinginvestment both into and from China. Especially during theearly days of China’s reforms and opening up, Malaysian Chinesebusinessmen were among the first investors from overseas Chinesecommunities who first entered the still largely undevelopedChinese market. For obvious reasons, cultural affinities have to begiven serious consideration in explaining this quick embrace. TraditionalChinese culture has been well preserved in Malaysian Chinesesociety. Chinese language and Chinese education, althoughexperiencing various hardships, have survived decades of politicalstruggles. Such cultural linkages have not only played importantroles in maintaining Malaysian Chinese identity, but they also significantlycontributed to the development of China-Malaysia relationshipby facilitating channels of communication through personaland group connections.Ethnicity is always a central issue in Malaysian domesticpolitics. As early as the colonial era, ethnic tensions emerged dueto imbalances between the political and economic strength of differentethnic groups. After the Second World War, the introductionof the Emergency Regulation against the insurgency of the MalayanCommunist Party (MCP)—a predominantly Chinese leftwing politicalparty—greatly deepened existing racial tension. For a longperiod of time, China had openly supported the outlawed MCP infighting the guerrilla war against the Malay-dominated Malayan/Malaysian government. On 13 May 1969, a severe riot broke outin Kuala Lumpur, in which 196 people died because of interracialviolence. This incident further exacerbated the conflicts betweenMalays and Chinese. As a result, the Malaysian government adoptedmore stringent affirmative action policies in order to ease racialtension. 3 In 1974, with the establishment of diplomatic relations3 “Preparing for a Pogrom”, Time, 18 July 1969. Retrieved 14 May 2007.http://web.archive.org/web/20071116082658/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,901058-1,00.html(accessed 2/28/2013)between the two countries, Beijing severed its connections withthe MCP and China-Malaysia relations were normalized. Due tothis significant shift occurring after 1974, the ways in which ethnicityinfluences China-Malaysia relations will focus only on thepost-1974 era.Ostensibly, much inter-governmental engagement in multilateraldialogues has very little to do with issues related to ethnicity.But I believe the evidence shows that ethnicity does affect Malaysia’sforeign policy towards China. Specifically, in order to protectChinese interests domestically while reducing its dependence onethnic Chinese for dealing with China issues, the Malay-controlledMalaysian government has actively adopted implicitly pro-Chinapolicies, both bilaterally and multilaterally.To elaborate on these points, I will first discuss how ethnicitybecame a central issue in Malaysian society and how the Chinesediaspora fits into the Malaysian domestic political climate ingeneral. In the third section, I will discuss Malaysian perceptionsof China based on a survey I conducted in 2009. Following this, Iwill underscore the mismatch between Malaysian Chinese’s heavyinvestment in China and their limited roles in domestic politics,which on one hand allows them to economically benefit from closeChina-Malaysia ties, but on the other hand, marginalizes this groupin inter-governmental dialogues. Finally, I will discuss how culturalissues affect China-Malaysia relations by examining the cases of thenewly founded Confucius Institute at the University of Malaya andMalaysia’s government fellowship program for students studyingin China.Ethnicity and Malaysian Domestic PoliticsDirectly influenced by British colonial rule that segregatedpeople along ethnic lines, Malay and its successor state Malaysia,since the colonial era has been described as a plural society parexcellence. Bumiputera is a politically constructed category, whichmeans “indigenous people,” literally a “son of soil.” It includes both3 Kankan Xie Ethnicity And China-Malaysia Relations 4

the Malays and other indigenous peoples of Malaysia. 4 Throughthis categorization, Bumiputera has become the dominant majorityof the country to the exclusion of ethnic Chinese and Indians.As of 2010, bumiputera accounted for 67.4% of the country’s totalpopulation, followed by Chinese at 24.6%, Indian (7.3%) and others(0.7%). 5As I have mentioned previously, the Chinese represent thesecond largest ethnic group in Malaysia with a population of nearlyseven million, 6 and their presence is significant by any measure.With a handful of active forces representing their communal interests,ethnic Chinese have played indispensible roles in the Malaysianpolitical arena. On the other hand, Malaysian politics is stillpredominantly ethnic-based and largely Malay-dominated.The Barisan Nasional (BN), along with its predecessor, theAlliance—largely comprised of ethnic-based political parties suchas the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the MalaysianChinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress(MIC)—has been the only ruling party coalition since the country’sindependence. 7 While ostensibly functioning as a multi-ethnic politicalparty coalition, the BN has been predominantly controlledby UMNO. Over the past five decades, the country’s prime ministersand the heads of the key ministries have always been members(Malays) of UMNO. Despite an official consensus of pursuingracial harmony, to a large extent, each constituent party of the BNprimarily works in accordance with their respective ethnic interestsin hope of securing and maximizing votes from their own community.In fact, the origin of Malaysia’s communal politics can be4 According to the 2004 CIA World Factbook, Malays account for 50.4% of thetotal population, followed by Chinese 23.7%, indigenous 11%, Indian 7.1% and others7.8%. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html (accessed 10/24/2012).5 Department of Statistics, Malaysia, Population and Housing Census, Malaysia2010, http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1215&Itemid=89&lang=en,(accessed 10/26/2012)6 ibid.7 The Barisan Nasional (also historically known as National Front) was formedin 1973 as the successor to the Alliance. Besides UMNO, MCA and MIC, participants ofthe BN also include other constituent parties such as Malaysian People’s MovementParty (GERAKAN) and People’s Progressive Party (PPP).traced back much earlier when Malayan/Malaysian people werefighting for independence. Although there was a wide range of politicaloptions advocated by different interest groups, the centralissues were always concentrated within the debate between twomajor camps: the bumiputera, who advocated the revival of Malaysovereignty as it existed in the pre-colonial era, and the non-Malayimmigrants, who struggled for equal rights and permanent citizenshipwithin the new country. In many Malay extremists’ view,“immigrants formed an inextricable part of the colonization process”and thus, the realization of the decolonization must be conductedwith an emphasis on the fact that “the land belongs to theMalays.” 8 In contrast, the Chinese and Indians were particularlyanxious to end colonization through popular sovereignty, includingthe participation of immigrants by granting them rights equalto the indigenous. As Muhammad Ikmal Said argued, “(The Malay’sspecial position or equal rights) is an open question and is an objectof struggle. Such a struggle, of course, would not occur if theimmigrant communities in question are small, as they could be accommodated,that is, ‘controlled’, easily. On the other hand, if theyform a large proportion of the population, an economically strongermajority as in the Malayan case, the implications are very different.”9 In this sense, each ethnic group was big enough to contestthe others, but no single group had the absolute strength necessaryto take the lead without making compromises. This fact also ensuredthat almost all political issues in Malaysia are approached ascommunal struggles, or at least in most circumstances, communalinterests must be taken into account as a primary consideration.As of 1961, there were 7.19 million people living in Malaya,3.57 million of whom were Malays and were accounted the majorityof the population; whereas within a Chinese population of2.63 million, only 880,000 had citizenship. 10 Despite the economicadvantages the ethnic Chinese enjoyed, they were politically un-8 Kahn, Joel S., and Francis Kok-Wah Loh, 1992, Fragmented vision: culture andpolitics in contemporary Malaysia. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press. P2619 ibid. P276.10 Sabah and Sarawak were not incorporated into Malaysia until 1963. BarisanSocialis Malaysia, “Malaixiya De Yiyi He Qiantu 马 来 西 亚 的 意 义 和 前 途 (The Meaningand Prospect of Malaysia: Lim Kcan Siew’s Speech in Johor),” Huo Yan Bao (Nyala), KualaLumpur: She Zhen, Vol. 3, Issue 10, May, 1963.5 Kankan Xie Ethnicity And China-Malaysia Relations 6

derprivileged due to a lack of eligible voters when the country’sindependence was achieved. By working closely with the dominantUMNO, the MCA successfully helped the vast majority of ethnicChinese obtain citizenship and secured its own position withinthe ruling party coalition. In exchange, however, the special rightof bumiputera became legally acknowledged in the country’s constitution.11In the following decades, the UMNO-dominated federal governmentimplemented a series of policies that favored bumiputera,not only in hope of narrowing the economic gap between ethnicMalays and Chinese, but also to create a large and politically powerfulMalay middle class that would continuously support the UM-NO’s rule. In 1970, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was officiallyimplemented by the Mahathir administration in order to ease thetension provoked by the May 13 Incident of 1969, the most notoriousinterracial riot in the country’s history. Based on Article 153of the Constitution, the NEP specified the special rights enjoyed bybumiputera, including subsidies for real estate purchases, quotasfor public equity shares, and general subsidies to bumiputera businesses.As a result, ethnic Malays (elites in particular) became thelargest beneficiaries of such policies. The Chinese community, bycontrast, although not always content with the compromises theMCA made with the UMNO, usually had no better alternative thanrelying on this kind of political arrangement in order to make theirvoices heard. While primarily focused on the interests of the Malaycommunity, the UMNO also must help the MCA take care of Chineseinterests, and thus secure Chinese votes for the BN. Although sucha political structure has a very limited effect on alleviating tensionsbetween different ethnic groups domestically, it is helpful in maintaininga generally peaceful and stable environment in plural societieslike Malaysia.11 Also refers to “Ketuanan Melayu”, which is commonly translated as MalaySpecial Position, Malay Special Right, Malay Privilege, Malay Supremacy, etc., which wasrecognized by Article 153 of the Malaysian Constitution: “It shall be the responsibilityof the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the head of state of Malaysia) to safeguard the specialposition of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and thelegitimate interests of other communities in accordance with the provisions of thisArticle.”Malaysian Perceptions of ChinaBoth the Malaysian Chinese community and the Malaysiangovernment have played very important roles in improving theChina-Malaysia relationship, but their respective incentives arequite different. Beyond economic considerations, I believe that ethnicChinese in Malaysia have favorable perceptions of China largelydue to ethno-racial connections. In contrast, for the UMNO-controlledMalaysian government, in light of its major concern withmaintaining the status quo in Malaysian domestic politics, it seeksto make the Chinese community happy by maintaining friendlyties with China.To test this hypothesis, I conducted a survey of Malaysianperceptions of China in 2008. I collected data from 131 participantsfrom both Chinese and non-Chinese communities in Malaysiaand investigated their perceptions from three different angles,namely “China and Chinese,” “China-Malaysia Relationship,” and“Culture and Communication” (Table 1).Table 1Responses Frequency PercentageEthnicity Chinese 63 48.1%Non-Chinese 68 51.9%Age 15-24 105 80.2%24+ 26 19.8%Gender Male 44 33.6%Female 87 66.4%Student 102 77.9%OccupationBusinessmen 8 6.1%Staff 14 10.7%Farmer 5 3.8%Worker 2 1.5%7 Kankan Xie Ethnicity And China-Malaysia Relations 8

EducationSecondary 6 4.6%Diploma 17 13.0%Bachelor 105 80.2%Post-graduate 3 2.3%Regardless of ethnic background, the majority of respondentsexpressed positive views of China’s national image (71%)and China’s efforts in dealing with global and regional issues(69.2%), reflecting Malaysian people’s generally positive impressionsof China. The differences between ethnic groups are not statisticallysignificant (Table 2 and 3).Table 2How do you view China’s national image?Ethnic Group Responses PercentagePositive 77.9%Non-Chinese Negative 5.9%Neutral 16.2%Positive 63.5%Chinese Negative 8%Neutral 28.5%Table 3How do you view China’s efforts in dealing with global and regionalissues?Ethnic Group Responses PercentagePositive 75%Non-Chinese Negative 14.7%Neutral 10.3%Positive 62.9%Chinese Negative 16.1%Neutral 21%On other issues, however, there were huge divergences betweenethnic Chinese respondents and their non-Chinese counterparts:Table 4Which one of following countries is Malaysia’s most importantpartner?Ethnic Group Name of Country PercentageJapan 35.80%Non-Chinese China 31.30%The United States 20.90%Others 11.90%China 60.30%ChineseThe United States 23.80%Japan 11.10%Others 4.80%In this survey, I asked the participants to answer the question:which country is Malaysia’s most important partner, and listed“The United States,” “Japan,” “China” and “Others” as options.The Chinese respondents demonstrated a significant preferencefor China, with 60.3% of them selecting China as Malaysia’s “mostimportant partner.” In comparison, non-Chinese respondents didnot show any particular preference for any single country. Amongthree options, Japan ranked first, accounting for 35.8%, while Chinaand the US had slightly smaller proportions, namely 31.3% and20.9% (Table 4).Table 5Free trade between China and Malaysia will damage Malaysia’s interests.Ethnic Group Responses PercentageAgree 82.10%Non-Chinese Disagree 14.90%Do not Know 3%9 Kankan Xie Ethnicity And China-Malaysia Relations 10

ChineseAgree 15.90%Disagree 73%Do not Know 11.10%As high as 82.1% percent of the non-Chinese respondentsbelieve that China-Malaysia free trade will damage Malaysia’s interests,whereas only 15.9% of Chinese respondents shared thesame concern (Table 5).In general, the development of economic collaboration hasdemonstrated strong momentum in recent years. China-Malaysiabilateral trade has been growing by double digits annually sincethe end of the Cold War. By the year 2002, Malaysia surpassed Singaporeto become China’s primary international trading partneramong ASEAN countries. As mentioned earlier, bilateral trade totaled$74.2 billion USD in 2011. 12 Significantly, Malaysia has longbeen running a bilateral trade surplus with China, making clearthat its economic position is by no means that of inferior partner.Furthermore, it is unsurprising that Malaysian Chinesedemonstrate greater satisfaction towards the bilateral economicrelationship due to close and frequent China/Malaysian-Chineseinteraction. While being the biggest beneficiaries of bilateral trade,the Malaysian Chinese also act as investors who contribute mostsignificantly to the bilateral collaboration. It is hard to find an accuratepercentage of their share of investment in Malaysia’s overallinvestment to China, 13 but Malaysian Chinese investors have surelyplayed major roles: As of 2009, Malaysian Chinese were running4,189 investment projects in China, which translates into a total of$4.53 billion USD Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 14Table 6How do you feel about China’s foreign policy towards Malaysia?Ethnic Group Items PercentageSatisfied 25.40%Non-Chinese Dissatisfied 64.20%Do not Know 10.40%Satisfied 91.90%ChineseDissatisfied 6.40%Do not Know 1.70%Similarly, the overwhelming majority of ethnic Chinese respondentsfeel satisfied with China’s current policies towards Malaysia.Among the non-Chinese, however, 64.2% expressed dissatisfaction(Table 6).In general, both ethnic Chinese and non-ethnic Chinesehold positive views of China’s national image and its role in dealingwith regional and global issues. However, the survey also demonstratedthat China was more positively perceived among MalaysianChinese, who had good impressions of China regardless of whetheror not they had visited the country personally. Contrarily, China’simage needs improving among Malaysia’s non-Chinese citizens, asthese respondents expressed mostly negative feelings about theircountry’s current relationship with China. For the Malaysian government,it believes that maintaining a good relationship with Chinais a helpful strategy for taking care of the domestic interests ofethnic Chinese.12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Zhongguo Tong Malaixiya De Guanxi(China-Malaysia Relations), updated on 8/9/2011, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/cgb/zcgmzysx/yz/1206_20/1206x1/t5702.htm (accessed 11/5/2012)13 According to the data released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC,Malaysia’s FDI to China reached 5.6 billion US dollars in 2009.14 Zheng Da, Direct Investment in China from Chinese Malaysian Businessmensince the Reform and Opening up,P85-92 Mar. ,2009 Vol.16 No.2 Contemporary China History StudiesThe Dilemma of Being Malaysian ChineseAt the risk of oversimplifying, Malaysian Chinese occupyeconomically advantageous, but politically underprivileged, positionswithin Malaysian society. Rich ethnic Chinese businessmenrely heavily on Malay elites in securing their economic interests.11 Kankan Xie Ethnicity And China-Malaysia Relations 12

Similarly, Chinese business tycoons’ strong financial support iscritical to the ruling Malay upper class. This situation has formeda typical patronage system, in which the powerful and the wealthyexchange resources effectively at the top, in spite of racial segregationon the lower rungs of society.In Malaysia, class divisions are systematically manipulatedwithin prevailing ethnic-based communal politics. Voices of thelower class are ignored or intentionally superseded by discoursesof racial inequalities. The UMNO and the MCA, both largely representingthe elites in their respective ethnic groups, often use requestsfrom the lower classes as bargaining leverage against oppositionparties. To fully take advantage of ethnic Chinese citizens’favorable perceptions of China, both the UMNO and the MCA haveeagerly developed a close relationship with Beijing, as a way toshow their commitment and capability to take care of ethnic Chineseinterests in Malaysia.One of China’s most consistent policies towards Malaysiasince the establishment of diplomatic relations has been themaintenance of friendly ties with both the UMNO and the MCA.According to the records of the International Department, CentralCommittee of the CPC, in the past ten years the two sides have exchangedhigh-level delegations on an annual basis, without the involvementof the Malaysian opposition parties, regardless of ethniccomposition. 15Of course, it is also worth noting that the Malaysian Chinesewho have been making investments in China are of the same groupof people who rely the most on the domestic patronage system. 16During the early years of China’s “Reform and Opening Up” policies,“overseas Chinese” was no doubt a very lucrative identity. On the15 International Department, Central Commitment of CPC, Foreign Affairs of theCPC, http://www.idcpc.org.cn/dongtai/index.htm (accessed 20 November 2012)16 By the mid-1990s, almost all the major Malaysian Chinese enterprises hadinvested in China, include Robert Kuok Hock Nien’s Kuok Brothers Sdn Bhd, WilliamCheng Heng Jem’s Lion Group, Lim Goh Tong’s Genting Group, Vincent Tan’s BerjayaCorporation Berhad, etc. Zheng Da, “Shixi Malaixiya Huashang Dui Hua Touzi De Fazhan,Wenti Yu Duice 试 析 马 来 西 亚 华 商 对 华 投 资 的 发 展 、 问 题 与 对 策 (Malaysian Chinese’sInvestment in China: Development, Problems and Policies),” Southeast Asian Affairs, No.32009 No. 139. Also see Gomez, Edmund Terence, and Jomo K. S. 1997. Malaysia’s PoliticalEconomy: Politics, Patronage, and Profits. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.one hand, people in China were eager to access the resources theMalaysian Chinese had in hand: capital, technology, and access toforeign markets and overseas networks. On the other hand, beingethnically Chinese meant they could get things done easily in Chinaby using their Chinese networks when investors elsewhere werestill suspicious of China’s prospects. Being politically vulnerableand dependent, it was believed that the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia(as in other politically unstable countries) had stronger incentivesto put their eggs in other baskets. Afraid of losing their mostimportant financial resources, the Malay-dominated governmentalso became more generous in offering profitable deals to thesewealthy Chinese businessmen as long as they remained active inthe domestic patron-client relationship.Despite knowing that it is very dangerous to let a powerfulcountry like China intervene in its domestic politics by forgingclose ties with the Malaysian Chinese, visionary Malay leaders decidedto take the initiative to engage Beijing directly by refusingto allow Malaysian Chinese to act as middlemen, and by keepingthem out of state-to-state interactions. The Malaysian governmenthas actively adopted an implicitly pro-China policy in both bilateraland multilateral dialogues. In fact, Malaysia is not only the firstASEAN country that established diplomatic relations with China,but also the first country that initiated the China-ASEAN Dialogueand hosted the China-ASEAN Summit. 17 At the regional level, Malaysiahas also been playing an important role in pushing forwardmultilateral cooperation between ASEAN and China as well as otherplayers from across the Pacific. Within the framework of regionalinstitutions such as ASEAN Plus Three, the Asia Cooperation Dialogue(ACD), and the East Asian Summit (EAS), China and Malaysiahave been working quite closely with each other. 18 Nonetheless,both China and Malaysia claim overlapping territorial waters withinthe South China Sea. But unlike Vietnam and the Philippines, the17 Xinhua News Agency, “Xi Jinping Huijian Malaixiya Fuzongli Maoxiding (XiJinping Met Muhyiddin Yassin, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia)”, 21 September2012, (http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-09/21/c_123747237_2.htm) (Accessed2/24/2013)18 “Joint Communique Between the People’s Republic of China and Malaysia”,30 May 2004, People’s Daily, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200405/30/eng20040530_144795.html (accessed 2/20/2013)13 Kankan Xie Ethnicity And China-Malaysia Relations 14

tension between Malaysia and China has rarely escalated. Armedconflict between the two countries has never occurred since theestablishment of diplomatic relations. 19 In dealing with territorialdisputes, both sides have agreed to follow the United NationsConvention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Declaration onthe Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and the principleof “shelving disputes and seeking joint development.” 20 The ethnicChinese in Malaysia usually do not play any substantial role in suchinter-governmental interactions.How Chinese Language Education MattersOther than the general improvement in terms of politicalengagement and economic cooperation, the close China-Malaysiarelationship has boosted a high volume of cultural exchange betweenthe two countries. Due to the sharp imbalance of powerbetween the two countries, China’s cultural influence on Malaysiais far stronger than vice versa, is similar to the situation faced byother Southeast Asian countries. In addition, because of the largepercentage of ethnic Chinese, Malaysian society is not only moreaccommodating of Chinese culture, but there is also high demandto develop it locally.In societies where the Chinese presence is not significant,“Chinese culture” usually functions as a medium to showcase China’simage. In Malaysia, however, vaguely defined “Chinese culture”has multiple layers of meaning. First, it is an integral part of Malaysianculture itself, on which the identity of the Malaysian nationhas been politically constructed. Therefore, being recognized as an19 “Review: Disputes in the region”, Global Times, http://www.globaltimes.cn/SPECIALCOVERAGE/SouthChinaSeaConflict.aspx (accessed 2/17/2013)Also see “TIMELINE: The roots and present status of the WPS disputes”, The ManilaTimes, 02 September 2012, http://www.manilatimes.net/index.php/special-report/30222-timeline-the-roots-and-present-status-of-the-wps-disputes(accessed2/17/2013), “Timeline: Disputes in the South China Sea,” The Washington Post, 8 June2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/special/south-china-sea-timeline/index.html(accessed 2/18/2013)20 Deng Xiaoping, Speech at the Joint Press Conference of the State Visit to Japan,“Ge Zhi Zheng Yi, Gong Tong Kai Fa”, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn/gxh/xsb/wjzs/t8958.htm (accessed 12/05/2012)indispensable pillar in Malaysia’s plural society, Chinese cultureplays an important role in maintaining racial harmony and mutualrespect amongst different ethnic groups. Secondly, Chinese cultureis extremely important for the Chinese community in Malaysia.More specifically, it is both a powerful weapon that ethnic Chinesewield in domestic political struggles against the non-Chinese dominantpowers, as well as representing an ultimate goal that they intendto achieve, namely preserving their cultural identity. Althoughless explicit than these first two layers, a third layer is equally important:Chinese culture (Indian culture is similar in this case) isconstantly manipulated as a label that reflects the “foreignness” ofthe ethnic Chinese in Malaysia, which distinguishes them from thepolitically more privileged “local” and “indigenous” bumiputera.Consequently, while preserving their cultural identity by keepingthis “foreignness” and “otherness,”ethnic Chinese have preventedthemselves from accessing political resources that exclusively belongto the bumiputera.Therefore, the term “Chinese culture” is very ambiguous inMalaysia, conveying the meaning of both Chinese culture from Chinaand the culture of Malaysian Chinese themselves. Despite thefact that there are many differences between the two, they are alsoclosely connected to one another. Under the banner of preservingcultural identity, ethnic Chinese in Malaysia engage themselvesactively in cultural exchanges with China, including activities suchas ancestor worship, education cooperation, and joint festival celebrations.In respect to culture, the Chinese community benefitsmore from the close China-Malaysia bilateral relationship thanother ethnic groups.As the guardian of both the interests of the state and moreimportantly, the bumiputera community, the UMNO-controlledgovernment often plays seemingly contradictory roles in promoting—andsimultaneously curbing—the development of Chineseculture. As previously mentioned, the Malaysian government hasimplemented a series of economic policies that favor the bumiputerain terms of subsidies for real estate purchases, quotas for publicequity shares, and land ownership, etc. In fact, the government’sfavorable treatment of the bumiputera has gone far beyond therealm of purely economic interests. In the field of education, for in-15 Kankan Xie Ethnicity And China-Malaysia Relations 16

stance, there are constant controversies amongst different ethniccommunities related to what the ethnic Chinese see as educationaldiscrimination.In Malaysia, there are basically two types of public elementaryschools. One is the Malay-medium national schools whereMalay (Bahasa Melayu) and English are the recognized languagesof instruction. 21 The other type is the national-type schools whereethnic languages such as Chinese and Tamil are taught, while Malayand English courses remain compulsory. 22 Although ethnicChinese enjoy the freedom to send their children to either type ofschool at the primary level, students have few options but to attendMalay-medium high schools so that they can further their studiesat the country’s public universities. 23 Otherwise, they may chooseto attend private Chinese-medium schools outside of the publiceducation system, though the graduates of these schools can onlygo abroad for higher education and have absolutely no chance ofenrolling in domestic public universities. Such education policiesresult from the 1956 Razak Report, in which the Malaysian governmentestablished the goal of making Malay the dominant mediumof instruction by assimilating Chinese and English national-typeschools into the Malay-medium national school system. 24 Throughvarious types of political campaigns and fund raising projects, theMalaysian Chinese have exerted every effort to protect their owneducation system. To this day, however, the government does notrecognize the Chinese-medium independent schools. Due to thefavorable treatment of bumiputera, it is also far more difficult forChinese and Indian students who attend Malay-medium nationalschools to get in to public universities, not to mention the paucityof financial aid available to non-bumiputera students.One of the consequences of such education policies is atrend among ethnic Chinese students to study abroad. Traditionally,Singapore and Taiwan have been two major destinations for Ma-21 Sekolah Kebangsaan.22 Sekolah Jenis Kebangsaan23 Chow Kum Hor, Battle to save Malaysia’s Chinese dropouts, Asia One, TheStraits Times, 31 Jan 2008 http://www.asiaone.com/News/Education/Story/A1Story20080130-47357.html(Accessed 11/29/2012)24 ibid.laysian students of Chinese background, not only because of theirgeographical proximity and their close linguistic and ethno-racialties with the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia, but also due to their ownrespective policies of attracting ethnic Chinese students from overseas.25 Boosted by the rapid development of the China-Malaysia bilateralrelationship in recent years, however, there is an increasingnumber of Malaysian Chinese students who choose to study in China,owing to the fact that China has a wider range of schools at arelatively lower cost. As of 2011, there were approximately 4,000Malaysian students studying in China. 26 Unsurprisingly, these studentsare predominantly self-financed ethnic Chinese, althoughthe exact number is unknown.In the name of continuously promoting the development ofthe bilateral relationship, in 2007 the Ministry of Education of Malaysia(KPM) launched a government scholarship program to trainMalaysian Mandarin teachers. Selecting students from nationalhigh schools across the country, the KPM has since sent out fivebatches of students to Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU)to pursue bachelor degrees in teaching Mandarin as a second language.27 Following the KPM program, the Majlis Amanah Rakyat(MARA), a government-run bumiputera development agency, hasalso signed an agreement with BFSU to train Mandarin teachers. Asof 2012, there have been 175 Malaysian students studying at BFSUthrough these two programs. Like many other government educationprograms in Malaysia, the recipients of these two scholarshipsare predominantly Malay. According to an unpublished documentfrom BFSU, out of the 175 students, there are only two ethnic Chinese,one ethnic Indian, and three indigenous Kadazans. 28In addition to helping Malaysia train its non-ethnic Chinese25 Lim Mun Fah, More expensive to study in China than Taiwan, SinchewDaily, 22 July 2010, http://news.asiaone.com/News/Education/Story/A1Story20100722-228336.html(accessed 12/03/2012)26 Premier Wen Jiabao’s speech at the Malaysia-China Economic, Trade, andInvestment Cooperation Forum in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 28 April 2011.27 Program Pendidikan Ijazah Bahasa Mandarin, Zhao Wanzhen, “Speech at theOpening Ceremony of the 2012 Malaysian Mandarin Teacher Training Program at BFSU”(unpublished document), September 2012.28 Beijing Foreign Studies University, “2012 nian 9 yue yingjie malaixiya jiaoyubu”(Welcoming the KPM Delegation in September 2012), (unpublished document), September201217 Kankan Xie Ethnicity And China-Malaysia Relations 18

Mandarin teachers in China, Beijing is also expanding its own educationnetwork in Malaysia. As part of China’s global strategy inadvancing its “soft power,” a Chinese government-sponsored networkof educational organizations named the “Confucius Institute”has been established to teach Chinese language and promote Chineseculture worldwide. 29 In contrast to most countries where thename “Confucius” represents a school of philosophical thought, inMalaysia the word is closely associated with the religious beliefsof a certain fraction of the ethnic Chinese community in Malaysia,distinguished from ethnic Chinese Buddhists and Taoists. As a result,the Confucius Institute has experienced several unexpecteddifficulties in getting approval from the UMNO-controlled governmentto establish its branch in Malaysia, as many conservativeparty members were concerned that the institution would play arole in promoting the religion of a particular segment of ethnic Chinese.30 As a compromise, the first Confucius Institute in Malaysiahas changed its name into “Kong Zi Institute for the Teaching ofChinese Language” (KZIUM), to rid itself of the religious implicationsof “Confucianism.” 31More importantly, the “Kong Zi Institute” is specially tailoredto serve the non-Chinese community in Malaysia. Accordingto an unpublished document of the institute, 1104 students enrolledin its Chinese language courses in the first year (2011) ofoperation. 32 Malays accounted for approximately 80% of the totalnumber, whereas the percentage of Chinese and Indian studentswas 15% and 5% respectively. 33 This situation is distinct from otherChinese language training institutions in Malaysia such as thenon-Chinese government-sponsored Global Hanyu & Culture Collegeand the Mandarin Journey Language Center run by MalaysianChinese, where ethnic Chinese account for the overwhelming ma-29 The Economist, China’s Confucius Institutes: Rectification of Statues, 20 Jan2011. http://www.economist.com/node/17969895 (accessed 12/05/2012)30 Zhao Wanzhen, interview by author, 12/05/2012. Zhao Wanzhen worked as alanguage lecturer at the KZIUM from 2011 to 2012.31 “Kong Zi” is the exact Chinese pinyin spelling of “Confucius”.32 Kong Zi Institute For the Teaching of Chinese Language at University ofMalaya, “Ma Da Kong Yuan PPT” (Introduction to the KZIUM), (unpublished document),06/23/201233 ibid.jority of their respective student bodies.On top of offering courses to the public, the KZIUM activelyengages in special language training programs for Malaysiangovernment employees by cooperating with the Institute of Diplomacy& Foreign Relations (IDFR), the National Defense University(UPNM) and the Royal Malaysia Police College (RMPC). 34 Directlyinfluenced by the ethnic composition of personnel in the Malaysiangovernment, most of the participants of these programs are Malays.For example, out of 184 IDFR students who registered for languagecourses, only two were ethnic Chinese and eight were ethnic Indians.Similarly, 54 out of 55 students from the RMPC were Malays. 35According to Zhao Wanzhen, a language lecturer who worked atthe KZIUM from 2011 to 2012, there is virtually no connection betweentheir institute and local ethnic Chinese organizations whatsoever.36ConclusionMalaysia’s domestic politics is highly ethnic-based. Due toimbalances of political and economic status between the bumiputeraand non-bumiputera communities in this plural society, differentethnic groups have engaged in constant struggles to securetheir respective communal interests. Although tensions betweendifferent ethnic groups are sometimes politically manipulated, ethnicityremains a central issue in the domestic politics of Malaysia.As the second largest ethnic group in Malaysia, the Chinesecommunity plays indispensable roles in the country’s political arena.Their resilient linguistic and ethno-racial ties with China havemeant that the engagement between China and Malaysia is not aconventional state-to-state relationship. The basic pattern of Malaysia’sdomestic politics has strongly influenced its foreign policytoward China. Due to the favorable perceptions of China amongMalaysian Chinese, the Malay-controlled government has been cautiousin developing its bilateral relationship with Beijing. It needs34 Maktab Polis Diraja Malaysia35 Zhao Wanzhen, interview by author, 12/05/2012.36 Ibid.19 Kankan Xie Ethnicity And China-Malaysia Relations 20

to maintain and improve this relationship in order to satisfy theethnic Chinese, especially business tycoons who have made largeinvestments in China and play critical roles in its domestic patronagesystem. Conversely, it has to prevent Malaysian Chinese fromgetting too close to a powerful Beijing, consequently jeopardizingthe country’s own security. To do so, while taking the initiative toengage Beijing in both bilateral cooperation and multilateral dialogues,the Malaysian government has simultaneously marginalizedethnic Chinese Malaysians in intergovernmental interactions.The high volume of cultural exchanges between China andMalaysia should not be regarded as simply the combination of closegovernment-to-government engagement and increasingly developedpeople-to-people interactions. Rather, it is a very complexnetwork, in which the two governments and people with differentbackgrounds play distinct and variable roles. The ethnic Chinese inMalaysia rely heavily on the ethno-racial ties with China in orderto protect their cultural identity in their political struggles againstthe dominant Malay majority. The Malaysian government, by contrast,usually plays a contradictory role in both promoting andcurbing “Chinese culture.” Specifically, it restrains the developmentof Malaysian Chinese culture by prioritizing the interests of the bumiputeracommunity in most of its political agendas. At the sametime, however, it is also very active in improving bilateral ties withBeijing by promoting “Chinese culture from China” in its non-Chinesecommunities in order to encourage racial harmony among itsconstituent ethnic groups. In return, while benefiting tremendouslyfrom a momentum driven, in large part, by its close interactionwith ethnic Chinese in Malaysia, Beijing has tactically maintaineda good relationship with the Malay-controlled Malaysian governmentby acquiescing to their demand to respect the interests ofthe bumiputera, and by excluding ethnic Chinese Malaysians fromcertain sectors of inter-governmental cooperation.The basic pattern of Malaysia’s ethnic composition is unlikelyto change in the foreseeable future. Therefore, ethnicity willcontinue to play an important role in shaping the bilateral relationshipbetween China and Malaysia. This does not mean, however,that the current relationship is not subject to change. In fact, theUMNO-led Barisan National is facing an unprecedented challengein the upcoming election from the opposition party coalition PakatanRakyat, consisting of the self-proclaimed non-ethnic-basedPeople’s Justice Party, the Chinese-led Democratic Action Partyand the deeply conservative Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Malays).Regardless of the election’s final results, it is widely believed thatthe country’s domestic politics may be undergoing a major paradigmshift away from a largely ethnic-based arrangement. If thishappens, it is unclear whether the China-Malaysia relationship willcontinue to follow its current trajectory.21 Kankan Xie Ethnicity And China-Malaysia Relations 22

References“Joint Communique Between the People’s Republic of Chinaand Malaysia”, 30 May 2004, People’s Daily, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200405/30/eng20040530_144795.html(accessed2/20/2013).“Preparing for a Pogrom”, Time, 18 July 1969. Retrieved 14May 2007.http://web.archive.org/web/20071116082658/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,901058-1,00.html(accessed 2/28/2013).“Review: Disputes in the region”, Global Times, http://www.globaltimes.cn/SPECIALCOVERAGE/SouthChinaSeaConflict.aspx(accessed 2/17/2013).“Timeline: Disputes in the South China Sea,” The WashingtonPost, 8 June 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/special/south-china-sea-timeline/index.html (accessed2/18/2013).“TIMELINE: The roots and present status of the WPS disputes”,The Manila Times, 02 September 2012, http://www.manilatimes.net/index.php/special-report/30222-timeline-the-rootsand-present-status-of-the-wps-disputes(accessed 2/17/2013).“Xi Jinping Huijian Malaixiya Fuzongli Maoxiding (Xi JinpingMet Muhyiddin Yassin, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia)”,Xinhua News Agency, 21 September 2012, (http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-09/21/c_123747237_2.htm) (Accessed2/24/2013).Barisan Socialis Malaysia, “Malaixiya De Yiyi He Qiantu 马来 西 亚 的 意 义 和 前 途 (The Meaning and Prospect of Malaysia: LimKcan Siew’s Speech in Johor),” Huo Yan Bao (Nyala), Kuala Lumpur:She Zhen, Vol. 3, Issue 10, May, 1963.Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html (accessed 10/24/2012).Chow Kum Hor, Battle to save Malaysia’s Chinese dropouts,Asia One, The Straits Times, 31 Jan 2008 http://www.asiaone.com/News/Education/Story/A1Story20080130-47357.html (Accessed11/29/2012)Deng Xiaoping, Speech at the Joint Press Conference of theState Visit to Japan, “Ge Zhi Zheng Yi, Gong Tong Kai Fa”, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn/gxh/xsb/wjzs/t8958.htm (accessed 12/05/2012)Department of Statistics, Malaysia, Population andHousing Census, Malaysia 2010, http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1215&Itemid=89&lang=en,(accessed 11/7/2012).Gomez, Edmund Terence, and Jomo K. S. 1997. Malaysia’sPolitical Economy: Politics, Patronage, and Profits. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.International Department, Central Commitment of CPC,Foreign Affairs of the CPC, http://www.idcpc.org.cn/dongtai/index.htm(accessed 20 November 2012).Kahn, Joel S., and Francis Kok-Wah Loh, 1992, Fragmentedvision: culture and politics in contemporary Malaysia. Honolulu,HI: University of Hawaii Press.Lim Mun Fah, More expensive to study in China than Taiwan,Sinchew Daily, 22 July 2010, http://news.asiaone.com/News/Education/Story/A1Story20100722-228336.html (accessed12/03/2012).Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Zhongguo TongMalaixiya De Guanxi (China-Malaysia Relations), updated on8/9/2011, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/cgb/zcgmzysx/yz/1206_20/1206x1/t5702.htm (accessed 11/5/2012).Premier Wen Jiabao’s speech at the Malaysia-China Economic,Trade, and Investment Cooperation Forum in Kuala Lumpur,Malaysia on 28 April 2011.The Economist, China’s Confucius Institutes: Rectification ofStatues, 20 Jan 2011. http://www.economist.com/node/17969895(accessed 12/05/2012).Zheng Da, “Shixi Malaixiya Huashang Dui Hua Touzi DeFazhan, Wenti Yu Duice 试 析 马 来 西 亚 华 商 对 华 投 资 的 发 展 、 问 题与 对 策 (Malaysian Chinese’s Investment in China: Development,Problems and Policies),” Southeast Asian Affairs, No.3 2009 No.139.Zheng Da, Direct Investment in China from Chinese MalaysianBusinessmen since the Reform and Opening up, Contempo-23 Kankan Xie Ethnicity And China-Malaysia Relations 24

ary China History Studies, P85-92 Mar., 2009 Vol.16 No.2.Unpublished DocumentBeijing Foreign Studies University, “2012 nian 9 yue yingjiemalaixiya jiaoyubu” (Welcoming the KPM Delegation in September2012), (unpublished document), September 2012.Kong Zi Institute For the Teaching of Chinese Language atUniversity of Malaya, “Ma Da Kong Yuan PPT” (Introduction to theKZIUM), (unpublished document), 06/23/2012.Zhao Wanzhen, “Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the2012 Malaysian Mandarin Teacher Training Program at BFSU” (unpublisheddocument), September 2012.InterviewZhao Wanzhen, interview by author, 12/05/2012.Constructing “Culture”Mark PortilloAbstractDespite the vast amount of research surrounding Western photojournalist’srole in the Vietnam War, little is known about photography and its uses bythe Vietnamese communist leadership during and after the war. Western photojournalistsaimed to highlight the unnecessary suffering of the GI and the brutalviolence occurring overseas, but what were the Vietnamese aiming to achievewith their images? To answer this question, I conducted a comparative historicalanalysis of communist leadership relationships to modes of culture production,specifically photography. Through this comparative analysis I demonstrate howphotographs have served the nation’s Communist leadership by aiding in theconstruction of a cultural memory and consequently, a politicized identity. Thisresearch is part of a growing body of research on memory, culture production,and their role in politics. By utilizing photography and drawing attention to its importantrole in struggles for power, it is my hope that this research will contributeand promote future related projects.IntroductionHow can the culture of an entire country be constructed?The answer lies in cultural memory. In this essay I will discussmemory, what it means for a culture to remember, how that culturalmemory is constructed, produced, and for what purpose. I willlook specifically at the changing Vietnamese cultural memory beginningfrom the Vietnam War to the present. Through a comparativehistorical analysis of communist leadership relationships to25 Kankan Xie Constructing “Culture” 26

modes of culture production I will demonstrate how photographshave served to construct cultural memory. It is through this constructedcultural memory that a heroic Vietnamese national identityhas been constructed and exploited in Vietnam’s political sphereboth in the past as well as the present.It is important to understand that there is a definite tensionbetween the uses of the past as a legitimizing device, as a meansof constructing community, as well as its repackaging as a marketablecommodity. 1 Thus, the struggle over the past is an aspect ofcontrol over the future. Photography in Vietnam serves to reflectthese tensions in the nation of Vietnam. The relationship betweenphotography and the nation had not been substantially developeduntil 1945 and not fully realized until the Vietnam War. 2 From theVietnam War to present day, photography has served as a socialmirror reflecting an image to the nation’s inhabitants. The “imagein the mirror” comes from memory, more specifically culturalmemory. This memory is constructed through re-writing the pastto reflect the interests of those in power. To understand how thisfeat is accomplished it is important to understand memory andmore importantly, memory’s relationship to identity.Cultural Memory and National IdentityMemory establishes life’s continuity; it gives meaning to thepresent, as each moment is constituted by the past. As the means bywhich we remember who we are, memory provides the very coreof identity. 3 This understanding of memory can be extended to answerbigger questions of what it means for a nation to rememberand the importance of constructing cultural memory. A nation’smemory of what their culture is can often appear similar to that ofan individual. Memory serves as a tool for an individual to shape1 Tai, Hue-Tam Ho. The Country of Memory: Remaking the past in Late SocialistVietnam. Berkeley: University of California, 2001.2 Lê, Phức, and Thành, Chi. Ảnh Việt Nam Thế Kỷ XX = Vietnamese Photographyin the 20th Century = La Photographie Du Vietnam Au 20e Siècle. Hà Nội: Nhà Xuất BảnVăn Hoá Thông Tin, 2002.3 Sturken, Marita. Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, andthe Politics of Remembering. Berkeley: University of California, 1997.their identity and remember “who they are,” and in this way a collectivecultural memory serve to shape the identity of a nation. Thedevelopment of cultural memory is complex because it is boundto various political stakes and meanings. Cultural memory servesto both define culture and is the means by which its divisions andconflicting agendas are revealed. 4To define memory as culture is, in effect, to enter into a debateabout what that memory means because the cultural memoryprocess does not efface an individual, but rather involves the interactionof individuals in the creation of cultural meaning. 5 Culturalmemory is a field of cultural negotiation through which differentstories vie for a place in history. To summarize, the term “culturalmemory” is to be understood as a memory that is shared outsidethe avenues of formal historical discourse yet is entangled with culturalproducts and imbued with cultural meaning. 6 Cultural memoryis produced in various forms, such as memorials, public art, popularculture literature, commodities, and activism. Understandinghow individual memory leads to a collective cultural memory allowsfor the significance of cultural memory to be ascertained.Importance of Memory in PoliticsMemory is a political force. Foucault asserts that “sincememory is actually a very important factor in struggle, if one controlspeople’s memory, one controls their dynamism.” Culturalmemory draws its significance from the ability to serve as a core ofidentity for a nation and political force that a core identity carrieswith it. Identity is an important political tool because leaders useidentity to legitimize their questionable agendas in multiculturalcountries, to further undermine opposing voices, and to marginalizediffering opinions. The process whereby identities becomepoliticized as well as mobilized are in wars and their many differentrepresentational contexts (i.e. monuments, etc.), in order to4 Ibid.5 Ibid.6 Ibid27 Mark Portillo Constructing “Culture” 28

produce political resistance, social solidarity, and civic virtue. 7 InVietnam’s history there are many examples of each of these politicalevents as leaders have utilized a constructed identity to anchortheir legitimacy to power. With this being understood I draw attentionto the process by which a culture memory is produced.Production of Cultural MemoriesIn Destination Culture, Barbara Gimblett discusses how cultureis produced. Her focus is on heritage as the new mode of cultureproduction in the present and how it has recourse in the past.Gimblett emphasizes how:Heritage is not lost and found, stolen and reclaimed. Despite a discourseof conservation, preservation, restoration, reclamation, recovery,re-creation, recuperation, revitalization, and regeneration, heritageproduces something new in the present that has recourse to thepast. Such language suggests that heritage is there prior to its identification,evaluation, conservation, and celebration. By production, I donot mean that the result is not “authentic” or that it is wholly invented.Rather, I wish to underscore that heritage is not lost and found, stolenand reclaimed. It is a mode of cultural production in the present thathas recourse to the past.Gimblett’s analysis of culture production serves as a tool for understandingphotography in Vietnam.As Gimblett’s writings stress, culture is neither lost norfound. Culture is ubiquitous and takes on various forms. Vietnamis comprised of an ethnically diverse people, however the governmenthas promoted one cultural identity, namely the identity constructedby the Communist party. At no point in Vietnam’s historyhas a constructed culture been so clearly produced than of thatsurrounding the Vietnam War. This identity is remarkably visiblein the photography of the Vietnamese during this period, and iseven more identifiable when compared with that of the Americans.7 Tai, Hue-Tam Ho. The Country of Memory: Remaking the past in Late SocialistVietnam. Berkeley: University of California, 2001.Contrasting FocusesUnlike Westerners who were primarily in Vietnam on a “voluntarybasis and could walk away if they so desired, the freedom toleave their country and the war was not an option for Vietnamesephotographers.” 8 The war was at home for Vietnamese photographersand their contingence to the domestic suffering of war permeatedthe meanings and subjects that Vietnamese photographerschose to capture, as well as into the images that the National LiberationFront promoted. In addition, Vietnamese photojournalismwas not predicated on violence and disaster alone, but upon theplacement of suffering within a broader spectrum of wartime experiencesand subjectivities, and it thus produced a more extensiveand informative visual history. 9 As explained in Schwenkel’s writings,culture played a huge role in what was photographed by theVietnamese during the war.Unlike reporters working for the Western press, most of whomwere independent of the war effort and thus regarded as “objective”outside observers, Vietnamese correspondents were consideredcultural soldiers of the revolution, whose weapons consistedof pencils, paper, and in the case of photojournalists, cameras. Ininterviews and conversations, photographers stressed the importanceof photography to serve the country, denounce the war tonational and international audiences, and transmit and propagateinformation from the front. But they also emphasized their multivalentroles as cultural producers immersed in the social worlds ofthe people who comprised their subject matter. They endeavoredto show the crimes, destruction, and techniques of war, as well asthe cooperation, compassion, and social interactions among soldiersand villagers.Despite the variety of cultural messages captured by Viet-8 Schwenkel, Christina. Exhibiting War, Reconciling Pasts: Photographic Representationand Transnational Commemoration in Contemporary Vietnam. Journal ofVietnamese Studies 3.1, 2008.9 Ibid29 Mark Portillo Constructing “Culture” 30

namese photographers, only those that shared the cultural wartimepurposes of the National Liberation Front were widely circulated.Constructed Cultural Memory during the WarThe communist cultural message is characterized by are-written past that reflected a heroic narrative and ultimately triumphantstruggle against foreign domination, while inscribing thefuture as a vision of communist utopia achieved through the inexorableworkings of History, Marxist style. 10 Images circulated typicallycaptured enthusiastic soldiers, crowds of joyous people (toconvey popular support), and moments of victory. These messagesare encapsulated in the subjects and circulations of what have nowbecome iconic photos taken by Vietnamese photographers. Themost widely circulated photo is that which captured the shootingdown of an American F-105D during a raid on Hanoi. Another famousphotograph is that of a young woman carrying a rifle whileescorting a captured American pilot. Another is of a group of youngsoldiers smiling and an image capturing Northern Vietnameseforces towering over enemy corpses to solidify an image victory.Constructed Cultural Memory of the War TodayToday the Vietnam War is portrayed in a different, but veryfamiliar way. Contrary to the graphically violent photographs thatin the United States narrate the history of the war as a moral andpolitical failure, images displayed in Vietnamese museums depictthe virtues, hopes, labors, and triumphs of the revolution to producea narrative of progressive and total victory. 11 Images typically10 Tai, Hue-Tam Ho. The Country of Memory: Remaking the past in Late SocialistVietnam. Berkeley: University of California, 2001.11 Schwenkel, Christina. Exhibiting War, Reconciling Pasts: Photographic Representationand Transnational Commemoration in Contemporary Vietnam. Journal ofVietnamese Studies 3.1, 2008.contain “themes of joy, play, enthusiasm and even love. Images inVietnamese museums regularly show acts of labor and preparationfor war, providing a visual testimony to Vietnam’s historical andheroic ‘spirit of resistance to foreign aggression in action.’ 12 Furthermore,Schwenkel emphasizes how these images re-inscribethe centrality of discourses of unity and solidarity to the war effort,as evident in photographs taken during or immediately after combatthat foreground action and victory rather than casualties. Evenwhen injured troops are present, the emphasis is on camaraderie(such as tending to their wounds) rather than on their pain andsuffering . 13Evidence of Constructed Cultural MemoryAs previously stated, American War photography served toconstruct a culture memory that starkly contrasts with that of theVietnamese. The memory is one of a moral and political failure. Famousphotographs that helped to sway American public opinionwere aimed at capturing the unnecessary suffering of the AmericanGI and the atrocities that occurred during the war. The Vietnamesegovernment has taken these famous photos from Western cultureand re-written their meanings to serve their interests. The Ministryof Culture takes this action because there are “political-ideologicalmotivations for utilizing photography insofar as the state regularlyinvokes memories of war through images to commemorate andkeep the spirit of the revolution alive, as well as to teach the youthabout the past, (so that) there is political interest in emphasizingvictorious achievements and collective acts of solidarity.” 14Gimblette’s process of cultural production and Schwenkel’snotes about the significance of utilizing photography as a politicaltool is exemplified by the book Vietnamese Photography in the20th Century. The book, released by Vietnam’s Ministry of Culture,features over 2,000 photos that are “closely linked to Vietnam12 Ibid1314 Ibid31 Mark Portillo Constructing “Culture” 32

and its people through many historical ups and downs.” 15 Amongthe numerous images, the book contains famous photos taken byWestern photojournalists. The Ministry of Culture has taken theseimages and has explicitly re-captioned them in order to promotethe Vietnamese government’s constructed cultural memory of thewar. 16Walter Cronkite wrote in LIFE, “correspondents and photographersin Vietnam could, accompany troops to wherever theycould hitch a ride, and there was no censorship . . . That system—or lack of one—kept the American public well informed of our soldiers’problems, their setbacks and their heroism.” Capturing imagesthat highlighted the factors Cronkite mentioned was a maingoal for American photojournalists. An example of this type ofpowerful imagery that came out of the Vietnam War is the photo“Reaching Out” taken by Larry Burrows. This iconic photo has beentaken by the Ministry of Culture and re-captioned with the message“US troops died at the battlefields in Central Vietnam”. Thiscaption demonstrates a stark contrast with the interpretation ofthe war offered in the original LIFE caption that reads “a woundedMarine desperately trying to comfort a stricken comrade after afierce firefight.”Purposes of Constructed Cultural MemoryThe combination of the circulation of chosen images and their captioningby the Vietnamese government serves as a visual insightinto the strategies and workings of constructing the cultural memoryof a people’s war. 17 Through a strategy of publicizing imagesthat capture citizens of different ages and genders participatingin the war effort, the government helped legitimize its claims towaging a “people’s war.” After the war, the re-captioning of famous15 Lê, Phức, and Thành, Chi. Ảnh Việt Nam Thế Kỷ XX = Vietnamese Photographyin the 20th Century = La Photographie Du Vietnam Au 20e Siècle. Hà Nội: Nhà Xuất BảnVăn Hoá Thông Tin, 2002.16 Ibid17 Schwenkel, Christina. Exhibiting War, Reconciling Pasts: Photographic Representationand Transnational Commemoration in Contemporary Vietnam. Journal ofVietnamese Studies 3.1, 2008.photos helped the government hold on to this inherited right topower. The constructed historical narrative promotes the idea thatthe government in the past had fought and won the “people’s war,”and that the current government now continues to uphold its pastgoals and aspirations. The stake in maintaining this cultural memoryof a “glorious war” lies in the power the memory has in legitimizingthe government. Legitimacy is the main concern for thecommunist government of Vietnam.The government’s concern with legitimacy manifests itselfin the severe curtailment of civil and political rights in the hopeof maintaining the one-party system that is seen as essential forthe unity and prosperity of the country. 18 These limitations stemfrom general anxieties about state independence, territorial integrity,and social cohesion. 19 Vietnam extends this curtailment of civiland political rights to photographers and their photographs. Thetension between government anxieties and the photographer’sartistic expressions are encapsulated in the significant changes inculture production following the Doi Moi reform periods.The Doi Moi Reforms and Culture ProductionAfter political reunification in 1975 the Communist leadershipof Vietnam decided to pursue a second five year plan whichaimed to integrate the North and South Vietnam economies as rapidlyas possible with the socialist transformation of Vietnamese societybeing the ultimate goal. 20 The term ‘‘socialism’’ held a particularmeaning in Soviet-type economies, basically consisting of (i)allocation of resources through central planning and eliminationof markets for goods and labor; (ii) ownership of all major meansof production by the state, representing the whole society, and theelimination of private enterprise; and (iii) distribution of income18 Logan, William. Protecting the Tay Nguyen gongs: Conflicting rights in Vietnam’scentral plateau. Cultural Diversity, Heritage and Human Rights, 2010.19 Ibid20 Duiker, William J. “Vietnam: the challenge of reform.” Current History 88, no.537 (1989): 177-178.33 Mark Portillo Constructing “Culture” 34

according to labor input and the elimination of wage differentialsbased on labor markets. 21 The centralization of industry resultedin major economic problems such as high rates of inflation andunderproduction of crops. As a result, Vietnam’s Communist Partymade a decisive step to abandon the central planning model of socialismand to adopt a “market-oriented socialist economy understate guidance,” also known as the Doi Moi reforms, at its 6 th NationalCongress in December 1986. 22Only fifteen years after the country was unified under communistrule, the leadership committed itself to implementing amarket economy governed by the ethos of social Darwinian competition.23 The economic reforms known as Doi Moi are thought tohave been a catalyst for the political liberalization of the country,which has allowed more open space for revisiting the past. 24 TheDoi Moi reforms have also led to the development of an art marketand a growing tourism industry. Both of these markets havecaused significant changes in the culture production of the country.As the politics of the country have been liberalized and the spacefor revisiting the past has become more open, photographers havebeen allowed to pursue themes that were once viewed as counterrevolutionaryor decadent.Focus of Cultural Production Pre-Doi MoiPrior to the Doi Moi reforms photography typically containedSocialist Realist themes. This was because “historically, (thistype of) artistic and cultural production (was) thought to embodyand represent the spirit of the people and this was deemed centralto the Vietnamese revolution and to the project of constructing anew socialist society.” 25 In addition, prior to the politicization of DoiMoi aesthetics in Vietnam it “was the duty of the artists to supportthe war effort (while) anything else was seen as unacceptably decadent.”26 The communist leadership described photography priorto the Doi Moi reforms as “using a lens to serve the struggle for theright. The representative of the right and interest of the nation atthat time was the Viet Minh.” 27 Today the country views“such images as a necessary means to educate and motivate the youth.Photography is thus imagined to bridge the widening gaps betweenthe past and the future: between generations who experienced warand generations born in its aftermath, which grew up in an era ofincreasing capitalist consumption and presumably no longer understandthe sacrifices of their elders.’” 28Despite the continued use of photography as a cultural productiontool in education that follows this heroic narrative, overall thecountry’s relationship with photography has dramatically changedfollowing the advent of the Doi Moi reforms.Focus of Cultural Production Post-Doi MoiThe Doi Moi reforms saved the Vietnamese communist leadershipfrom irrelevance at a time when socialist regimes throughoutEurope toppled, but the reforms also led to the integration ofthe country into the global economy. 29 This integration producedthe emergence of a private art market, which forced the communistleadership to re-think its relationship to photography. The reinterpretationof photography post-Doi Moi no longer emphasizedits use as a tool for supporting the revolution and teaching aboutits victories, but changed its identity altogether. Photography todayhas been redefined by the communist leadership as a means of21 Beresford, Melaine. Doi Moi in review: The challenges of building market socialismin Vietnam. Journal of Contemporary Asia Vol. 32, 200822 Ibid23 Tai, Hue-Tam Ho. The Country of Memory: Remaking the past in Late SocialistVietnam. Berkeley: University of California, 2001.24 Ibid.25 Schwenkel, Christina. Exhibiting War, Reconciling Pasts: Photographic Representationand Transnational Commemoration in Contemporary Vietnam. Journal ofVietnamese Studies 3.1, 2008.26 Tai, Hue-Tam Ho. The Country of Memory: Remaking the past in Late SocialistVietnam. Berkeley: University of California, 2001.27 Ibid.28 Schwenkel, Christina. Exhibiting War, Reconciling Pasts: Photographic Representationand Transnational Commemoration in Contemporary Vietnam. Journal ofVietnamese Studies 3.1, 2008.29 Ibid.35 Mark Portillo Constructing “Culture” 36

political struggle for the working class and laborers. 30 In addition,the communist leadership has refined the meaning of photographyto the state as serving to “highlight the atmosphere of enthusiasm,happiness, and the devotion of their work (Vietnamese photographers),the goal of which is to contribute forces for the constructionand development of the fatherland.”” 31Evidence of New Relationshipto Culture ProductionThe 25th National Photographic Exhibition captures Vietnam’schanged mode of culture production. This exhibition eventwas jointly organized between the Ministry of Culture, Sports andTourism in Vietnam and the Vietnam Association of Art Photographersin welcoming the 63rd anniversary of the National Day of theSocialist Republic of Vietnam. 32 The topic chosen was “The Beautyof the Vietnamese Land and People.” This topic choice reflects thecountry’s new aim of highlighting a “timeless beautiful landscape”that is attractive to tourists, as well as its effort to establish the nation’sphotography in the international arena. 33The government’s efforts to promote its beautiful landscapeand to establish itself as a force in the international photographyarena are also exemplified in the creation of the International ArtPhoto Contest. This contest was created and hosted in Vietnamin 1996 and is regularly held in the country every few years. Thecompetition attracts over a thousand photographers from over 36different countries with photos being judged by an internationaljury, while the event has been selected as one of the top ten outstandingcultural events of the year. 34 The photos that are often30 Lê, Phức, and Thành, Chi. Ảnh Việt Nam Thế Kỷ XX = Vietnamese Photographyin the 20th Century = La Photographie Du Vietnam Au 20e Siècle. Hà Nội: Nhà Xuất BảnVăn Hoá Thông Tin, 2002.31 Triển, Lãm and Thứ, Nghệ. The 25th National Photographic Exhibition. Bộ VănHóa, Thể Thao Và Du Lịch, 2008.32 Ibid.33 Tai, Hue-Tam Ho. The Country of Memory: Remaking the past in Late SocialistVietnam. Berkeley: University of California, 2001.34 Phuc, Le. Vietnam 2002: The Second International Art Photo Contest in Vietnam.awarded medals in the competition capture landscape, wildlife,portraits, and are sometimes simply aesthetically pleasing . Whilethe competition is an exhibition that could never have existed beforeDoi Moi, after only ten years of reform, the contests highlightsthe nation’s new efforts of culture production both domesticallyand internationally. The photos themselves are no longer aimedat supporting post-revolutionary aspirations following formulaichistorical narratives, but are aimed at engendering internationalinterest.ConclusionPhotographs serve as powerful evocations of historical experiencesbecause of the way they leave an imprint on their viewersat the visual, psychological, and political levels. 35 This powercan serve governments well when constructing a national identity,as photos chosen can be used to evoke identity. In Vietnam the useof imagery to evoke historical memories has been demonstratedby the proliferation of selected photos during and after the VietnamWar. The images chosen were aimed at promoting a heroichistorical narrative of a nation that fought off foreign invaders.The Vietnam War has been frequently referred to as the“television war” in the United States, though it may be more accurateto describe it as the celluloid war due to the significant impactphotos had in shifting public opinion, as well as photography’savailability to both sides in the war, as very few Vietnamese ownedtelevisions. 36 This “celluloid war” should continue as Vietnam’spolitics continue to liberalize. As Vietnam’s integration into the internationalarena begins to solidify following the Doi Moi reforms,photography will play an increasingly prominent role in politicalcritique. As an art market develops and tourism beckons, internationalforces will create a much more open space for revisitingthe past. The communist heroic narrative will become increasing-Ed. Vu Huyen. Ho Chi Minh City: ITXA, 2002.35 Kuhn, Annette, and McAllister, Kristen. Locating Memory: Photographic Acts.New York: Berghahn, 2006.36 Ibid.37 Mark Portillo Constructing “Culture” 38

ly challenged as the opportunities to revisit the past are utilizedto provide competing historical narratives. Vietnam’s leadershipcontinues to curtail civil and political liberties, but as globalizationbegins to further influence the communist leadership, it can be expectedthat modes of culture production will continue to shift topreserve the nationally constructed cultural memory of the past inorder to keep rightful claims to power in the present.referencesBeresford, Melaine. Doi Moi in review: The challengesof building market socialism in Vietnam. Journal of ContemporaryAsia Vol. 32, 2008.Cosgrove, Ben. LIFE. Aug.-Sept. 2012. Web. 10 Nov. 2012..Duiker, William J. “Vietnam: the challenge of reform.” CurrentHistory 88, no. 537 (1989): 177-178.Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Barbara. Destination Culture: Tourism,Museums, and Heritage. Berkeley:University of California Press, c1998 1998. .Kuhn, Annette, and McAllister, Kristen. Locating Memory:Photographic Acts. New York: Berghahn, 2006.Langfield, Michele, Logan, William, and Craith. Nic. Protectingthe Tay Nguyens Gongs- Conflicting Rights in Vietnam’s CentralPlateau. Cultural Diversity, Heritage and Human Rights: Intersectionsin Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, 2010.Lê, Phức, and Thành, Chi. Ảnh Việt Nam Thế Kỷ XX = VietnamesePhotography in the 20th Century = La Photographie DuVietnam Au 20e Siècle. Hà Nội: Nhà Xuất Bản Văn Hoá Thông Tin,2002.Logan, William. Protecting the Tay Nguyen gongs: Conflictingrights in Vietnam’s central plateau. Cultural Diversity, Heritageand Human Rights, 2010.Phuc, Le. Vietnam 2002: The Second International Art PhotoContest in Vietnam. Ed. Vu Huyen. Ho Chi Minh City: ITXA, 2002.Schwenkel, Christina. Exhibiting War, Reconciling Pasts:Photographic Representation and Transnational Commemorationin Contemporary Vietnam. Journal of Vietnamese Studies 3.1,2008.Sturken, Marita. Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, theAIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering. Berkeley: Universityof California, 1997.Sullivan, Robert 100 Photographs That Changed the World.Life. November 13 2012. .Tai, Hue-Tam Ho. The Country of Memory: Remaking thepast in Late Socialist Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California,2001.Triển, Lãm and Thứ, Nghệ. The 25th National PhotographicExhibition. Bộ Văn Hóa, Thể Thao Và Du Lịch, 2008.Zook, Darren. Vietnam : Film. Le Conte, Berkeley. November11 2012.39 Mark Portillo Constructing “Culture” 40

The Success of Environmental NGOs in Suharto’sIndonesiaThe Success of EnvironmentalNGOs in Suharto’s IndonesiaRachel PhoaAbstractDespite the abundant research on non-governmental organizations(NGOs) during Suharto’s authoritarian regime in Indonesia, little research has focusedspecifically on environmental NGOs (ENGOs) during this period. However,given the relative success of ENGOs compared to many other NGOs under the Suhartoregime, understanding why ENGOs succeeded can help us in understandingwhy or how NGOs succeed in authoritarian regimes. By means of an extensivesurvey of secondary literature on ENGOs in Indonesia as well as reports fromprominent international NGOs and inter-governmental organizations, I concludethat the fundamental cause for the ENGOs’ success was international pressureon the Suharto regime to address the environmental damage that its extractiveeconomic policies had caused. This pressure, combined with increasing governmentdebt in the 1980s as a result of falling oil prices, worked to constrain theSuharto regime’s suppression of ENGOs through two main mechanisms: 1) theregime was forced to rely on ENGOs’ resources to address the extensive environmentaldamage and thus could not afford to suppress them completely, and2) support from foreign governments and international NGOs for the work ofIndonesian ENGOs made it harder for Suharto to suppress these ENGOs, even ifhe had wanted to. Thus, on the whole, this study adds to our understanding ofhow NGOs in authoritarian regimes may enjoy differing types of leverage againstthe government depending on the sector they operate in.Mention of Suharto’s Indonesia often conjures up imagesof a country ruled by an iron-fisted dictator. However, even afterSuharto’s regime implemented laws that restricted the activitiesof non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to nation-building andset limits on the amount of foreign funding that they could receive,environmental NGOs (ENGOs) continued to flourish in Indonesia.This paper investigates this unexpected phenomenon in the contextof the strong international concern that existed at the timeover the environmental destruction occurring in Indonesia.After wresting power from Sukarno in 1966 and becomingthe president of Indonesia, Suharto implemented economic policiesthat led to Indonesia rapidly becoming an economic “Asiansuccess story.” 1 These policies secured his legitimacy, but only atthe expense of the environment. 2 Throughout Suharto’s reign, Indonesia’sforest-based industries like plywood, paper production,and logging ranked second only to its petroleum industry in termsof contribution to the Gross National Product (GNP). 3 This resultedin significant ecological damage to Indonesia’s forests and otherecosystems that caught global attention. 4 In addition, although Suharto’sgovernment did introduce some environmental regulationswhen domestic and international concern over environmentaldegradation increased, it often failed to enforce these regulationsbecause the main beneficiaries of the extractive policies were eliteownedcompanies connected to the government. 51 Hall Hill, “The economy,” in Indonesia’s New Order, ed. Hal Hill (Honolulu:University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 54.2 Ronnie Lipschutz, Global Civil Society and Global Environmental Governance(New York: State University of New York, 1996), 169. From the chapter “EnvironmentalOrganizing in Indonesia.”3 Christopher Barr, Banking on sustainability: Structural Adjustment and ForestryReform in Post-Suharto Indonesia (Bogor, Indonesia: Center for International ForestryResearch, 2001), 19.4 Craig Thorburn, “Regime Change -- Prospects for Community-Based ResourceManagement in Post-New Order Indonesia,” Society and Natural Resources 15 (2002):617.5 Robert Cribb, “More Smoke than Fire: the 1997 ‘Haze’ crisis and other envi-41 Rachel Phoa Environmental NGOs in Indonesia 42

At the same time, Suharto’s rule, and in particular the latterhalf of his rule(1980s – 90s), was characterized by a “strengtheningof state power” and a “steady weakening of… society-basedforces” like NGOs. 6 Although civil society actors were relatively activein the first half of Suharto’s regime (mid 1960s-70s), beginningin the 1980s, Suharto’s government engaged in a series of actionsaimed at the “de-ideologisation” and “de-politicisation” of NGOs,in an attempt to curtail their political activities. 7 For example, itestablished the principle of perwadahkan tunggal (the only, rightfulplace) 8 whereby all NGOs were required to form an umbrellaorganization through which the government would carry out its“duties” of pembinaan (guidance) and pengembangan (development).9 This effectively meant that the government was able tomonitor and curtail the activities of NGOs as it pleased. The governmentalso passed the Law on Social Organizations (No. 8/1985) in1985, which further increased its ability to control NGOs. This lawrequired all NGOs to register with the government, placed restrictionson foreign funding that an NGO could receive, and gave thegovernment the ability to dissolve any NGO that disrupted “publicorder and security.” Significantly, the vagueness of this last phrasegave the government wide rein to revoke the license of any NGO atwill. 10However, even during this period, Indonesian ENGOs hadsome success in publicly advocating for more environmental regulationand stricter enforcement of these regulations by the Suhartoregime. For example, in 1989, WALHI (the Indonesian NongovernmentalForum for the Environment, the umbrella organizationfor ENGOs in Indonesia) took Indorayon, one of the largest government-backedpulp and paper companies, to court for allegedlyronmental issues in Indonesia,” in Ecological Change in Southeast Asia, ed. AnnamariAntikainen-Kokko (Turku, Finland: Abo Akademi University, 1998), 8.6 Jamie Mackie and Andrew MacIntyre, “Politics,” in Indonesia’s New Order, ed.Hal Hill (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994): 3-4.7 Bob Hadiwinata, The Politics of NGOs in Indonesia (New York, NY: Routledge-Curzon, 2003), 94.8 Joseph Gordon, “NGOs, the Environment and Political Pluralism in New OrderIndonesia,” Explorations in Southeast Asian Studies 2 (1998): 5.9 Hadiwinata, Politics of NGOs, 94.10 Gordon, “NGOs, the Environment and Political Pluralism” 13.violating the environmental regulation that environmental impactassessments must be carried out before beginning development. 11Although WALHI lost the court case on a technicality, through thecase it managed to establish the right of NGOs to sue the governmentto force it to implement or enforce its own laws.Moreover, there is evidence that the Suharto governmentwas actually constrained by the advocacy of ENGOs. For example,in June 1990, the government decided to establish an EnvironmentalControl Agency (Bapedal) that subsequently went on to enforceindustrial pollution regulations in an unprecedentedly aggressivemanner. The reason for this became clear when the IndonesianAssistant Minister for the Environment admitted that “increasingNGO pressure” was one of the main reasons for the zeal shown byBapedal in prosecuting hundreds of companies. 12So why were ENGOs able to exist and function in Indonesiaeven though they often worked against the Suharto regime? I arguethat the fundamental cause for the ENGOs’ success was internationalpressure on the Suharto regime to address the environmentaldamage that its extractive economic policies had caused. This pressure,combined with increasing government debt in the 1980s as aresult of falling oil prices, worked to constrain the Suharto regime’ssuppression of ENGOs through two main mechanisms: 1) the regimewas forced to rely on ENGOs’ resources to address extensiveenvironmental damage and thus could not afford to suppress themcompletely, and 2) support from powerful foreign governmentsand international NGOs for the work of Indonesian ENGOs made itharder for Suharto to suppress ENGOs. My argument will focus onthe mobilization and activities of ENGOs in Indonesia in the 1980sand 1990s, up to Suharto’s resignation in 1998, because during thisperiod NGOs were the most constrained by the Suharto regime.11 Lipschutz, Global Civil Society, 199.12 James Riker, “Linking Development From Below to the International EnvironmentalMovement: Sustainable Development and State-NGO Relations in Indonesia,”Journal of Business Administration 22-23 (1994): 160.43 Rachel Phoa Environmental NGOs in Indonesia 44

Why Environmental NGOs in particular?The mechanisms that I highlight in my thesis could also applyto other NGOs in Indonesia, especially those engaged in supportservices or development work. However, I argue that thesemechanisms were especially significant for ENGOs’ compared toother types of NGOs’ because of the unusually high internationalconcern for the environment in Indonesia. Correspondingly, therewas exceptional pressure on Suharto to address these environmentalproblems.International concern about the environment in Indonesiawas unusually high mostly because Suharto’s policies had majorglobal environmental effects, such as the haze from forest fires,and the destruction of globally significant biodiversity-rich forests.An example of this international concern can be seen in the WorldWide Fund for Nature’s (WWF) report on the 1997 haze. The DirectorGeneral of the WWF wrote in the preface of the report thatthe WWF had “watched in horror” as the forest fires “rage[d] out ofcontrol in Indonesia,” and called the fires a “planetary disaster.” 13At the same time, in a separate report, the WWF identified theSuharto government’s overly-permissive policies on logging andplantation concessions and failure to enforce its own environmentalregulations as the main causes for these fires. 14 Other internationalagencies also showed concern over Indonesia’s environmentalproblems. Indeed, even the World Bank, when it began to paymore attention to environmental concerns in the 1990s, identifiedIndonesia as one of 20 countries where tropical forests were “seriouslythreatened” by government policy, and thus pursued a conservationagenda within the country. 15 Thus, we can see that thesevere environmental impacts caused by Suharto’s economic poli-13 Claude Martin, preface to The Year The World Caught Fire, by Nigel Dudley,Jean-Paul Jeanrenaud and Sue Stolton (Gland, Switzerland: World Wide Fund for NatureInternational, 1997).14 Rob Glastra, Eric Wakker and Wolfgang Richert, Oil Palm Plantations andDeforestation in Indonesia (Dreieich, Germany: World Wide Fund for Nature Germany,2002), 4-5.15 World Bank, Indonesia: The Challenges of World Bank Involvement in Forests(Washington D.C.: Operations Evaluation Department, 2000), 52.cies did indeed spark high international environmental interest inIndonesia.Suharto’s Reliance on ENGOs domesticallyInternational pressure on Suharto’s regime to deal with theenvironmental problems in Indonesia, combined with a decline inoil prices that hurt the government financially, led to two distinctmechanisms that constrained the regime from completely suppressingENGOs. First, in addressing the extensive environmentaldamage that it had caused, the Suharto government was requiredto rely on ENGOs’ resources and thus could not afford to eliminatethem. On the other hand, international support for these ENGOsfrom foreign governments and organizations that the Indonesiangovernment relied on for aid made it increasingly difficult for Suhartoto suppress these ENGOs. In this section, I present evidencerelating to the first mechanism.In the 1980s, as the result of a decline in oil prices, the Indonesiangovernment saw its debt burden increase significantly from6.7% of total expenditures in 1980 to 33.2% in 1988. As a result,it was forced to cut spending, and reduced non-aid developmentexpenditures from 38.3% of total expenditure in 1980 to just 13%in 1988. 16 This drastic cut in expenditure meant that relying onNGOs to provide services became an attractive alternative. 17 Thus,although the government “deeply distrust[ed]” ENGOs because oftheir advocacy activities, it could not completely suppress themdue to its reliance on their help in tackling environmental problems.18 Statements and actions by the Suharto government provideevidence that it came to realize that its own agencies could notsufficiently implement programs aimed at solving environmentalproblems without assistance from “intermediary organizations.” 1916 Hadiwinata, Politics of NGOs, 92-93.17 Philip Eldridge, Non-Government Organizations and Democratic Participationin Indonesia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 30.18 Gordon, “NGOs, the Environment and Political Pluralism,” 17.19 Hadiwinata, Politics of NGOs, 92.45 Rachel Phoa Environmental NGOs in Indonesia 46

Suharto himself had requested the “assistance and participation ofthe whole Indonesian people” because his government could notimplement all of its development programs alone. 20 However, hisgovernment only formalized this request for assistance in the environmentalsector, perhaps because of the especially severe environmentalproblems in the country. The government passed theUndang Undang Lingkungan Hidup (Law of the Protection of theEnvironment) in 1982, which guaranteed a greater role for NGOsin environmental management and development. 21 Indeed, followingthe passage of this law, the number of ENGOs in Indonesia grewrapidly as “policy change catalyzed NGO formation.” 22Further evidence for my argument that Suharto’s governmentdid not completely suppress ENGOs because it relied on themcomes from several actual cases where the government activelyenlisted ENGOs to carry out government environmental programs.One prominent case was the government’s 1989 showcase Prokasih-ProgramKali Bersih (clean river program). 23 This programwas aimed at cleaning up, within two years, the 24 most pollutedrivers in Indonesia. Initially, the Environment Ministry, along withthe various provincial government authorities, took the lead inimplementing the program. However, when it realized that it hadinsufficient resources to implement the program fully, it “activelyencouraged” ENGOs to work with local community groups to monitorpollution levels and the activities of polluting companies. 24 Anothernational environmental program where the Suharto governmentenlisted the help of ENGOs was its Pengendalian PenghijauanNasional (National Conservation and Reafforestation Programme).In this case, WALHI carried out most of the education aspects ofthe program, thus eliminating the need for the government to pay20 Andrew Pinney, “Partners in Development?: Government and NGOs in Indonesia,”Prisma 12 (1983): 40, quoted in Hadiwinata, Politics of NGOs, 93.21 Hadiwinata, Politics of NGOs, 92-93.22 David John Frank, Wesley Longhofer and Evan Schofer, “World Society, NGOsand Environmental Policy Reform in Asia”, International Journal of Comparative Sociology48 (2007): 283.23 Philip Hirsch and Carol Warren, “Introduction: Through the EnvironmentalLooking Glass,” in The Politics of Environment in Southeast Asia, ed. Philip Hirschand Carol Warren (New York: Routledge, 1998): 20.24 Colin MacAndrews, “Politics of the Environment in Indonesia,” Asian Survey 34(1994): 376-77.for such activities. 25 Lastly, Suharto’s regime also relied heavily onthe WWF to maintain its national parks system. It delegated themanagement of 17 of its 32 national parks to the WWF, which inturn provided U.S. $5 million of its own funds and 15 staff to assistin the running of these parks. 26The Suharto government even publicly acknowledged itsreliance on ENGOs to tackle environmental problems. For example,Suharto once presented a national award to a Yogyakarta-basedNGO, Bethesda CD, for working to ensure that surrounding communitieswere able to access unpolluted drinking water. 27 On occasion,government officials also offered wary praise for the supportof ENGOs. For example, in 1994, Djon Sani, the head of the Sub-Directorateon Development and Guidance within the Office of Socialand Political Affairs commented that domestic ENGOs were “quitepromising in terms of becoming a national asset, in their efforts toimprove the quality of life and the welfare of the people,” althoughhe still criticized ENGOs that he claimed had become involved in“opposition activity.” 28Thus, we can see that Suharto’s regime actually relied significantlyon ENGOs to address the environmental problems thathad been created by its economic policies. This helps explain whythe government did not want to suppress these ENGOs too strongly.Influence of International ActorsThe high level of international concern for Indonesia’s environmentalproblems indirectly contributed to Suharto’s needto rely on ENGOs to provide environmental services. However, itwas also, in itself, an important factor that constrained Suhartofrom suppressing ENGOs. Foreign governments and internationalgroups concerned about the environment in Indonesia often sup-25 Eldridge, Non-Government Organizations and Democratic Participation inIndonesia, 134.26 Frank et al, “World Society, NGOs and Environmental Policy Reform in Asia”292n.32.27 Gordon, “NGOs, the Environment and Political Pluralism” 10.28 Gordon, “NGOs, the Environment and Political Pluralism,” 10.47 Rachel Phoa Environmental NGOs in Indonesia 48

ported the advocacy activities of Indonesian ENGOs, and were ableto exert pressure on Suharto in a way that domestic political actorscould not. Again, one important factor behind their positionof power was a decrease in oil prices. As I noted earlier, the dropin oil prices resulted in a severe decline in government revenueand a rise in government debt. This not only had the effect of constrainingdomestic government expenditure, but also reduced Indonesia’sfinancial independence, leaving the government muchmore dependent on the good will of foreign donors. Indeed, at thetime, the Suharto government was receiving financial assistancefrom several foreign governments as well as international organizationslike the World Bank. 29 This left it susceptible to pressurefrom these governments and organizations, and enabled these actorsto significantly constrain the Suharto regime with regard tothe suppression of Indonesian ENGOs.A stark illustration of how international actors were able toconstrain the Suharto regime can be seen in the Suharto government’sreaction to the perennial Southeast Asian “haze” problemcaused mostly by forest fires in Indonesia. 30 In 1995, when Suharto’sown environment minister tried to take action against threeplantation companies that had set fires contributing to the haze,he was stopped by the agriculture ministry, which was backed bySuharto. 31 In contrast, during the especially severe 1997 haze, bothSingapore and Malaysia were upset enough to publicly expresstheir displeasure over the failure of Suharto’s regime to controlthe forest fires that had caused haze in their countries. Perhapsbecause of the aid these countries had provided to Indonesia tocombat the haze, among other problems, Suharto was concernedenough to apologize publicly twice, his first public apologies. 32 Inaddition, the environment minister was empowered to enforceregulations that prohibited the use of fire to clear land, while theforestry minister was even able to revoke the logging licenses of176 concessionaires. 33 Thus, we can see the significance of internationalactors in constraining the Suharto government.Powerful international actors also directly worked againstthe Suharto regime’s suppression of ENGOs by providing concreteassistance to these groups. One major way in which this happenedwas when foreign actors used their own leverage to provide fundsto Indonesian ENGOs, even in the face of government displeasure.Through the 1985 Law on Social Organizations, the Suharto governmenthad placed restrictions on the ability of NGOs to receivefunding from foreign sources. 34 The Suharto government was warythat foreign funding would increase the power of domestic NGOs.However, powerful foreign organizations were still able to pressurethe Suharto government into allowing domestic ENGOs to receiveforeign funding. An example comes from the case of WALHI, whichvariously received funds from the US Agency for International Development(USAID), as well as the Canadian, Dutch, Swedish andJapanese Ministries of Foreign Affairs. 35 There is evidence that theU.S. government was pressuring Suharto by implying that it wouldonly continue supplying Indonesia with high-tech military equipment,such as F-15 aircraft, in return for the government’s acceptanceof USAID funding for NGOs like WALHI. 36 This demonstratesone way in which support from powerful international actors wasimportant in helping Indonesian ENGOs survive despite the restrictivelaws placed on them.Other evidence for the importance of international leveragecomes from the decision of Indonesian ENGOs to consciouslyenlist the help of powerful international actors in their advocacyagainst the Suharto government. One example was when WAHLI29 Eldridge, Non-Government Organizations and Democratic Participation inIndonesia, 198.30 James Cotton, “The “Haze” over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN Modeof Regional Engagement,” Pacific Affairs 72 (1999): 331-332.31 Benedict Anderson, “Elections and Democratisation in Southeast Asia:Thailand, the Philipines and Indonesia,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio 24Hours, radio program, 1992, quoted in Gordon, “NGOs, the Environment and PoliticalPluralism,” 17.32 Cribb, “More Smoke than Fire,” 6.33 Cotton, “The “Haze” over Southeast Asia,” 336.34 Robert Cribb, “The Politics of Pollution Control in Indonesia,” Asian Survey 30(1990): 1132.35 Joseph Molyneux, “Years of Living Dangerously: NGOs and the Development ofDemocracy in Indonesia” (paper presented at the 41 st annual convention of the InternationalStudies Association, Los Angeles, CA, March 14-18, 2000.)36 Millidge Walker, “NGO Participation in a Corporatist State: The Example of Indonesia,”Institute of Urban & Regional Development Working Paper No. 678 (Berkeley:University of California at Berkeley, 1996), 18.49 Rachel Phoa Environmental NGOs in Indonesia 50

publicized an exchange of correspondence between twelve IndonesianENGO representatives and the president of the World Bank.The ENGO representatives had demanded that the World Bankwithhold funding until the Indonesian government could provethat the “large scale resettlement of farmers to the outer Indonesianislands is ecologically sustainable,” and would not “adverselyaffect primary tropical forests, important wetlands, and other keywildland areas.” 37 Another example involves the International NGOGroup on Indonesia (INGI), a network of Indonesian NGOs includingWAHLI. In 1995, INGI conducted interviews with several donorgovernments and the World Bank in order to educate them aboutthe environmental impact of the Kedung Ombo dam. As a result,several European countries pulled funding from dam projects inIndonesia, significantly angering the Suharto regime. 38 Overall, thedecision by Indonesian ENGOs to leverage foreign governmentsand international organizations that the Suharto regime dependedon, and the success of their efforts, provide further evidence thatthese actors were effective in supporting Indonesian ENGOs advocatingagainst Suharto regime policies.WAHLI, in particular, was especially successful in leveragingpowerful international actors to boost its domestic stature. Indeed,Joseph Molyneux argues that during the Suharto era, WALHI wasforemost in prominence among Indonesian NGOs and wielded significantpower in the Indonesian domestic political scene becauseof its global “web of influential contacts” that included foreign governments,international NGOs and intergovernmental organizations.39 For example, senior WALHI staff received invitations fromseveral Western governments, such as the U.S. and Sweden, to participatein all expense paid trips similar to those offered by the U.S.State Department for senior foreign government officials. Thesetrips enabled WAHLI to form solid links with these governments,and gave them influence in the relationships of those governmentsand the Indonesian government. 40 Since the Suharto government37 Eldridge, Non-Government Organizations and Democratic Participation inIndonesia, 137.38 Hadiwinata, Politics of NGOs, 99.39 Molyneux, “Years of Living Dangerously.”40 Molyneux, “Years of Living Dangerously.”depended on assistance and goodwill from these Western governments,this tremendously increased the political power that WAH-LI enjoyed within Indonesia, and provides another explanationwhy the Indonesian government did not shut it down.ConclusionIn this paper, I have argued that ENGOs were able to operateand advocate openly in Indonesia in the 1980s and 1990sas a result of two main mechanisms: 1) Suharto’s reliance on EN-GOs to provide environmental services, which made him reluctantto fully suppress them, and 2) international support and fundingfor Indonesian ENGOs constrained Suharto’s ability to suppressthem, even if he had wanted to. However, I also highlight that theunderlying causal factor was actually Suharto’s extractive economicpolicies, coupled with a fall in oil prices in the 1980s. As a resultof the high level of environmental degradation caused by hiseconomic policies, Suharto faced strong international pressure toresolve Indonesia’s severe environmental problems. However, hisability to do so was hampered by a fall in oil prices in the 1980s,which increased his government’s debt and reduced the level ofexpenditure it could afford. Consequently, he was forced to rely ondomestic ENGOs as well as international aid, leaving him unableto completely suppress ENGOs despite the existence of laws thattechnically empowered him to do so.REFERENCESAnderson, Benedict. “Elections and Democratisation inSoutheast Asia: Thailand, the Philipines and Indonesia.” Radioprogram by Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio 24 Hours,1992. Quoted in Joshua Gordon, “NGOs, the Environment and PoliticalPluralism in New Order Indonesia,” Explorations in SoutheastAsian Studies 2 (1998): 17.51 Rachel Phoa Environmental NGOs in Indonesia 52

Barr, Christopher. Banking on sustainability: Structural Adjustmentand Forestry Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia. Bogor,Indonesia: Center for International Forestry Research, 2001.Cotton, James. “The “Haze” over Southeast Asia: Challengingthe ASEAN Mode of Regional Engagement.” Pacific Affairs 72(1999): 331-351.Cribb, Robert. “The Politics of Pollution Control in Indonesia.”Asian Survey 30 (1990): 1123-1135.Cribb, Robert. “More Smoke than Fire: the 1997 ‘Haze’ crisisand other environmental issues in Indonesia.” In Ecological Changein Southeast Asia, edited by Annamari Antikainen- Kokko, 1-13.Turku, Finland: Abo Akademi University, 1998.Eldridge, Philip. Non-Government Organizations and DemocraticParticipation in Indonesia. New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1995.Frank, David John, Wesley Longhofer and Evan Schofer.“World Society, NGOs and Environmental Policy Reform in Asia.”International Journal of Comparative Sociology 48 (2007): 275-295.Glastra, Rob, Eric Wakker and Wolfgang Richert, Oil PalmPlantations and Deforestation in Indonesia. Dreieich, Germany:World Wide Fund for Nature Germany, 2002.Gordon, Joshua. “NGOs, the Environment and Political Pluralismin New Order Indonesia.” Explorations in Southeast AsianStudies (1998): 1-26.Hadiwinata, Bob. The Politics of NGOs in Indonesia. NewYork: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.Hill, Hal. “The economy.” In Indonesia’s New Order, editedby Hal Hill, 54-122. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994.Hirsch, Philip and Carol Warren. “Introduction: Throughthe Environmental Looking Glass.” In The Politics of Environmentin Southeast Asia, edited by Philip Hirsch and Carol Warren, 1-28.New York: Routledge, 1998.Law of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 8 of 1985. The StateGazette of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 44, 17 June 1985.Lipschutz, Ronnie. Global Civil Society and Global EnvironmentalGovernance. Albany, NY: State University of New York,1996.MacAndrews, Colin. “Politics of the Environment in Indonesia.”Asian Survey 34 (1994): 369-380.Mackie, Jamie and Andrew MacIntyre. “Politics.” In Indonesia’sNew Order, edited by Hal Hill, 1-53. Honolulu: University ofHawaii Press, 1994.Martin, Claude. Preface to The Year The World Caught Fire,by Nigel Dudley, Jean-Paul Jeanrenaud and Sue Stolton, 3. Gland,Switzerland: World Wide Fund for Nature International, 1997.Molyneux, Joseph. “Years of Living Dangerously: NGOs andthe Development of Democracy in Indonesia.” Paper presented atthe 41st annual convention of the International Studies Association,Los Angeles, CA, March 2000. http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/moj01/index.html.Pinney, Andrew. “Partners in Development?: Governmentand NGOs in Indonesia.” Prisma 12 (1983): 33-45. Quoted in BobHadiwinata, The Politics of NGOs in Indonesia (New York: RoutledgeCurzon,2003), 93.Riker, James. “Linking Development From Below to the InternationalEnvironmental Movement: Sustainable Developmentand State-NGO Relations in Indonesia.” Journal of Business Administration22-23 (1994): 157-188.Thorburn, Craig. “Regime Change -- Prospects for Community-BasedResource Management in Post-New Order Indonesia.”Society and Natural Resources 15 (2002): 617 – 628.Walker, Millidge. “NGO Participation in a Corporatist State:The Example of Indonesia.” Institute of Urban & Regional DevelopmentWorking Paper No. 678, University of California at Berkeley,Berkeley, CA, 1996.World Bank. Indonesia: The Challenges of World Bank Involvementin Forests. Washington D.C.: Operations Evaluation Department,2000.53 Rachel Phoa Environmental NGOs in Indonesia 54

THE RELEVANCE OF KAUTILYA’SARTHASHASTRARamanathan Veerappan55 Rachel PhoaAbstractThis paper demonstrates that Kautilya’s Arthashastra, the great ancientIndian political and economic treatise, is relevant today for its similarities toclassical economics, its practical applications to the modern corporate world,and the importance of Kautilya as a cultural icon. Before discussing Arthashastra’scontemporary relevance, some background information on the treatise—especially the issue of its authorship—will be provided. Focus will then shift tothe usefulness of Kautilya’s strategies for the modern corporation. The relevanceof the Arthashastra to business and economics does not lie entirely in its applicationto the corporate world; Kautilya’s text is important for its striking similaritiesto later Western schools of thought. In this paper, the specific Westernschool of thought that will be examined is classical economics. Because Kautilyawas able to anticipate important political and economic ideas that individualsin the West would not conceive of until many centuries after his death, Kautilyahas become an iconic figure in India and his ideas have become a source of greatpride. This pride, when combined with the timely rediscovery of the Arthashastrain the early 1900s, allowed Kautilya to become a figure that nationalists usedto place Indian culture and thought on par with Western culture and thought.This paper will show that Kautilya and his famous treatise are relevant to themodern world for a variety of reasons and that Arthashastra deserves a placeamong the world’s greatest texts, ensuring that it will never again be lost to theworld.Kautilya, also known as Chanakya or Vishnu Gupta, was thechief advisor to the first Mauryan emperor—Chandragupta Maurya—andthe legendary author of one of India’s foremost politicaland economic texts, the Arthashastra. 2300 years ago his ideashelped build the Mauryan Empire, which at its height was one ofthe world’s largest empires and one of the most extensive empireson the Indian subcontinent. Kautilya’s theories were ahead of histime and could had been an important influence on later systemsof thought, such as classical economics and Machiavellian politics,had Arthashastra not been lost from the end of the Gupta Dynasty(c. 500 CE) until the early 20th century. Kautilya’s work hasreemerged and scholars are examining its significance in light ofmodern politics, economics, and society. Although the Arthashastrais considered to be “an ancient system of thought designed forfeudal states which were often, if not constantly at war,” 1 “its preceptsabout social, political and economic structure are relevanteven today.” 2 India’s National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menonhas recently acknowledged the importance of Kautilya’s textstating “Arthashastra is a serious manual on statecraft, on how torun a state, informed by a higher purpose, clear and precise in itsprescriptions, the result of practical experience of running a state.It is not just a normative text but a realist description of the art ofrunning a state.” 3 As men like Shiv Shankar Menon continue to discoverand embrace Kautilya’s Arthashastra as one of India’s mostimportant treatises, it has the potential to emerge on the forefrontof modern economic thought for its striking similarities to classicaleconomics and its relevance to the corporate world. Similarly,Kautilya himself has the potential to enter the pantheon of India’sindigenous “politico-cultural” icons not only for the contribution ofhis ideas, but also for his role as a figure used by the Indian independencemovement to place Indian thought on par with Western1 Timothy Starzl, and Krishna Dhir, “Strategic Planning 2300 Years Ago: TheStrategy of Kautilya,” Management International Review, 26, no. 4 (1986), 75.2 Kautilya’s Arthashastra: Its Contemporary Relevance, (Pune: Indian Merchants’Chamber & Indian Merchants’ Chamber Economic Research and Training Foundation,2005), 143 “India needs to develop its own doctrine for strategic autonomy: NSA”Kautilya’s Arthashastra 56

thought. 4I will first discuss the Arthashastra’s main ideas, and willthen shift my focus to the all-important topic of the Arthashastra’sauthorship. In my discussion of the treatise’s ideas and authorship,I will provide background information on the Mauryan Empire andthe political and economic environment of northern India at Kautilya’stime. The Arthashastra is a political treatise that is focusedon realpolitik, which refers to a set of political and diplomaticstrategies focused on power, practicality, and material gains as opposedto strategies that are based on ideological, moral, and ethicalpremises. Perhaps the best known treatise on realpolitik is NiccolòMachiavelli’s The Prince, and for this reason the Arthashastra hasoften been compare to that work. However, scholars often regardKautilya’s work as even more radical than Machiavelli’s text. Germansociologist Max Weber compares the two texts, stating that“truly radical ‘Machiavellianism’, in the popular sense of that word,is classically expressed in Indian literature in the Arthashastra ofKautilya (written long before the birth of Christ, ostensibly in thetime of Chandragupta): compared to it, Machiavelli’s The Princeis harmless.” 5 Weber’s acknowledgment of the Arthashastra as anolder and far more radical version of Machiavelli’s text has had aprofound impact on its legacy. For now it is important to note thatthe text’s primary focus is on promoting a forceful style of politicalpragmatism. However, Kautilya doesn’t just outline harsh strategies;he also provides justification for using them. Roger Boescheclaims that “Although Kautilya proposed an elaborate welfare statein domestic politics … he proved willing to defend the general goodof this monarchy with harsh measures.” 6 Kautilya only consideredusing extreme tactics if they were employed for the good of thestate as a whole. He explains that the primary task of a king applyingthe Arthashastra’s strategies is promoting the welfare of thepeople. In Book I of the Arthashastra he states that for a king “In4 Gautam, P.K. Endogenous Politico-Cultural Resources: Kautilya’s Arthashastraand India’s Strategic Culture5 Eric Matthews, Weber: Selections in Translation, (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1978), 212-225.6 Roger Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in AncientIndia,” The Journal of Military History, 67, no. 1 (2003): 9-37.the happiness of his subjects lies his happiness; in their welfare hiswelfare; whatever pleases himself he shall not consider as good,but whatever pleases his subjects he shall consider as good.” 7 Theideal Kautilyan king exists to promote the welfare of his subjects,an idea I will explore in more detail when I apply the Arthashastra’sideas to the corporate world, specifically to the concept of value-basedmanagement. Having discussed the Arthashastra’s mainideas, I will now shift my focus to the treatise’s authorship.The text of the Arthashastra itself refers to its legendary authorby the name of Kautilya; however, Kautilya did not write theArthashastra based solely on his ideas. Instead, Kautilya built uponthe preexisting political and economic ideas present in ancientnorthern India and consolidated them into a single text. WhileKautilya’s predecessors may have independently developed manyof the Arthashastra’s ideas, Kautilya himself receives the most portionof credit for writing the text. This is likely due to the successthat Kautilya had in implementing the Arthashastra’s ideas. Kautilyaand Chandragupta Maurya used the political and economicideas of ancient India to build the Mauryan Empire, which wasto become the first pan-Indian empire. Before the advent of theMauryan Empire, smaller regional kingdoms dominated the subcontinent.Using the strategies outlined in the Arthashastra, Kautilyaand his king were able to establish an extensive empire in aregion dominated by these smaller kingdoms. Therefore, Kautilyareceived credit for writing the Arthashastra because he was thefirst to successfully use the treatise’s ideas of realpolitik to build aand vast state spanning northern India. Kautilya also takes creditfor the Arthashastra’s authorship in part due to the need of Indiannationalists to have an iconic figure to place on par with Machiavelliand the other great European political theorists. The practicalnecessity of a single individual who could rival great Westernthinkers spurred the recognition of Kautilya as the primary authorof the Arthashastra.Admittedly, Indian nationalists did this largely out of convenience,however, and a variety of scholars have downplayed Kau-7 Kautilya. Arthashastra. Translated by R. Shamasastry. Bangalore: GovernmentPress, 1915, 1-50.57 Ramanathan Veerappan Kautilya’s Arthashastra 58

tilya’s importance. For example, Thomas R. Trautmann believesthat the Arthashastra is actually a compilation of several texts bymultiple authors—of which Kautilya was probably one—and thatKautilya himself was neither the final author nor editor of the textbecause it “was probably not composed until the post-Mauryan period,”a few centuries after Kautilya’s death. 8 To further marginalizeKautilya’s role, Thomas Burrow has argued that the legendary authorKautilya is not the same as the historical figure Chanakya, thechief political advisor to Chandragupta Maurya. 9 If Burrow’s claimis correct, it means that the two biggest accomplishments ascribedto the legendary Kautilya—writing the Arthashastra and helpingbuild the great Mauryan Empire—were actually performed bydifferent people. Although the arguments of Trautmann, Burrow,and others downplay the centrality of Kautilya himself, the rest ofthis paper shows that this legendary figure—who may in fact be acombination of historical figures, including the Arthashastra’s variousauthors and Chandragupta Maurya’s political advisor—stillhas the potential to emerge as one of India’s great politico-culturalicons, joining the ranks of Ashoka, Buddha, Akbar, Gandhi, andNehru. Out of convenience and due to the importance of Kautilya’siconicity to the Indian nationalist movement, Kautilya shall henceforthbe referred to as the sole author of the Arthashastra and thechief minister to Chandragupta Maurya, although many claim thatthe legendary figure is actually a combination of multiple people.Despite the Arthashastra’s authorship being subject to considerabledebate, there is no question as to the significance of its ideas,both for their similarities to later Western schools of thought andtheir relevance to modern corporate structures and value-basedmanagement. I will first examine the text’s relevance to moderneconomics, and then shift my focus to Kautilya’s role during theIndian independence movement, and finally to the legacy of the Arthashastraand its legendary author.At first glance, it may seem far-fetched to be able to applythe Arthashastra’s ideas to the modern corporate world. On the8 Thomas Trautmann, India: Brief History of Civilization, (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, Inc., 2011), 99.9 Thomas Burrow, “Kautilya and Chanakya,” Annals of the Bhandarkar OrientalResearch Institute (1968): 48-49,surface, Kautilya’s Arthashastra and its concepts of realpolitik appearmost relevant to expansionist regional states. In discussing hisideas on the ideal state, Kautilya writes from “the point of view thatkingship is the normal and desirable form of government,” whilestressing the need for a hierarchy of advisors to assist the king. 10Thus, Kautilya’s ideal state is structured along monarchical feudallines, so that the Arthashastra’s strategies seemingly apply bestto systems of this type. Kautilya outlines the structure of his idealstate in Book VI of the Arthashastra, suggesting that “The king,the minister, the country, the fort, the treasury, the army and thefriend are the (fundamental) elements of sovereignty.” 11 Similarly,Timothy W. Starzl and Krishna S. Dhir argue that a feudal systemis still to be found in modern corporate structures. They point outthe strikingly similar features that corporations share with feudalstates, such as a “head of state” in the form of a CEO, who dependsheavily on a set of “ministers”— VP’s and division heads—whocontrol different areas of the CEO’s domain in the name of their“ruler.” 12 Also important is the fact that in corporations and feudalstates alike, no individual’s position is secure. 13 The modern CEOdemands success from the firm’s employees; if an individual doesnot meet certain standards, he or she may face punishment for hisor her failures. Likewise, Kautilya also suggests that no individuals’sposition is secure, stating in Book VII of the Arthashastra:it is verily the king who attends to the business of appointing ministers,priests, and other servants, including the superintendents ofseveral departments, the application of remedies against the troublesof his people, and of his kingdom, and the adoption of progressivemeasures; when his ministers fall into troubles, he employsothers; he is ever ready to bestow rewards on the worthy and inflictpunishments on the wicked. 1410 Thomas Trautmann, India: Brief History of Civilization, (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, Inc., 2011), 98.11 Kautilya. Arthashastra. Translated by R. Shamasastry. Bangalore: GovernmentPress, 1915, 319-325.12 Timothy Starzl, and Krishna Dhir, “Strategic Planning 2300 Years Ago: TheStrategy of Kautilya,” Management International Review, 26, no. 4 (1986): 75.13 Ibid., 7614 Kautilya. Arthashastra. Translated by R. Shamasastry. Bangalore: GovernmentPress, 1915, 391-409.59 Ramanathan Veerappan Kautilya’s Arthashastra 60

Thus, the Arthashastra remains as relevant today as duringthe era of feudal states because “There is probably no place or systemof controlling the world today that more closely resembles thehighly competitive, dangerous, and fast moving world of the feudalstate, with the accompanying great rewards for success, andgreat punishment for failure than the modern business or corporation.”15 Kautilya’s treatise is focused primarily on forming andthen controlling of a very particular type of organizational structure.He provides a practical way for managing these specific structures.Due to the inherent similarities between the structures ofthe political states described by Kautilya and the modern corporation,Starzl and Dhir claim that “the mapping of the structure ofa corporation onto the structure of feudal states is not too difficultto do, and thus the application of the Arthashastra to the moderncorporate world should be no more difficult to accomplish.” 16 AsStarzl and Dhir have shown, the Arthashastra is relevant to the corporateworld and its strategies can be applied to the managementof corporate structures. There is certainly potential for Kautilya’sstrategies to have a significant impact on the formation and maintenanceof corporations, which are—from a purely organizationaland structural standpoint—the modern day equivalent of feudalstates.Following Starzl and Dhir demonstrating that the strategiesof the Arthashastra are applicable to the corporate world due tothe similarities in structural organization between the ideal Kautilyanfeudal state and the modern corporation, scholars beganto apply Kautilyan strategies to business. One such example is N.Siva Kumar and U.S. Rao’s derivation of value-based managementguidelines from the Arthashastra. Value-based management refersto the management approach that ensures corporations are managedconsistently on value, usually with the focus of maximizingshareholder value. Kumar and Rao’s approach for developing a“value based management framework” focused on five key components:“organizational philosophy, valued based leadership, inter-15 Timothy Starzl, and Krishna Dhir, “Strategic Planning 2300 Years Ago: TheStrategy of Kautilya,” Management International Review, 26, no. 4 (1986): 76.16 Ibid.nal corporate culture, accomplishment of corporate purpose andfeedback from stakeholders.” 17 Kumar and Rao show that Kautilya’sArthashastra provides guidelines for each component of themanagement framework, thus displaying the relevance of the Arthashastrato the world of modern corporations.I will now examine these five components, in both the strictKautilyan sense and the application of Kautilyan strategies to value-basedmanagement, in order to demonstrate specific applicationsof the Arthashastra to modern business and economics. Indiscussing the organizational philosophy—or purpose of existence—ofthe state, Kautilya believed that a welfare state exists forthe benefit of its people, as shown in Book I of the Arthashastrawhere Kautilya writes that the king’s welfare lies in the welfare ofhis people. When applying these guidelines to value-based management,it translates into corporations or businesses existing forthe benefit of its stakeholders and society. 18 Kumar and Rao thengo on to discuss Kautilya’s guidelines for value-based leadership,the second component of their framework. “The leader’s primarygoal according to the Arthashastra is to fulfill the philosophy ofthe organization.” 19 Thus, a good leader exists solely for the benefitof those he leads. In order to realize the goals of an organization,the Kautilyan leader must be virtuous and selfless, and hemust lead by example. 20 The next component of Kumar and Rao’sKautilyan model of value-based management is an organizationalculture that promotes value-based management. The two scholarsmention that a major problem in modern corporations is thelack of a moral corporate culture that promotes ethical behavioramong its employees. 21 Unlike many modern corporations, Kautilya’sArthashastra does promote a moral culture by requiringcertain values from the organization’s members, only appointingofficials based on character and conduct, rewarding righteousbehavior, and punishing unethical behavior. 22 The application of17 N. Siva Kumar, and U.S. Rao, “Guidelines for Value Based Management in Kautilya’sArthashastra,” Journal of Business Ethics, 15, no. 4 (1996), 41518 Ibid., 41619 Ibid.20 Ibid., 416-41721 Ibid., 41922 Ibid., 419-42061 Ramanathan Veerappan Kautilya’s Arthashastra 62

these Kautilyan guidelines would, in theory, benefit corporationsinstitutionally deficient in ethical behavior. The fourth componentof Kumar and Rao’s framework for value-based management is theaccomplishment of organizational purpose. This component of theframework builds off of the previous three components becausean organization can easily achieve its goals if it has a well-definedorganizational philosophy, a capable leader who exists primarilyfor the accomplishment of organizations goals, and an organizationalenvironment that promotes ethical behavior. The final componentKumar and Rao discuss in their framework on Kautilyanvalue-based management is feedback on performance. Because thecentral tenet of both value-based management and the Arthashastra’sdefinition of the ideal king is that a leader and organization existprimarily for the benefit of stakeholders, getting feedback fromthese stakeholders is essential. Kumar and Rao claim that “throughsuch feedback, the leader is supposed to sustain various activitiesand thus fulfill the organizational philosophy.” 23 The concept offeedback from stakeholders not only completes the Kautilyan totalframework for value-based management, but synthesizes theother components and applies them directly to the main principleof value-based management. Kumar and Rao have shown that theArthashastra’s strategies do indeed have practical applications, soKautilya’s ideas remain as relevant to the modern corporate worldas they were to the world of ancient Indian kingdoms.The Arthashastra’s contemporary relevance does not, however,lie solely in its potential for application to the world of themodern corporation. The treatise is also important for its similaritiesto the classical economics school of thought developed in theeighteenth and nineteenth centuries primarily by European economistsAdam Smith, John Stuart Mill, David Hume, Thomas Malthus,David Ricardo, and Jean-Baptiste Say. Although Kautilya hadno influence on these economists because his work was lost duringthe 18th and 19th centuries, his work is significant in what CharlesWaldauer, William J. Zahka, and Surendra Pal call a “neglectedprecursor to classical economics.” 24 Kautilya’s text was centuries23 Ibid., 42124 Charles Waldauer, William Zahka, and Surendra Pal, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra:A Neglected Precursor to Classical Economics,” Indian Economic Review, 31, no. 1ahead of Western economics and anticipated many of the ideas ofthe great European classical economists. As Waldauer, Zahka, andPal point out, the three principal economic ideas contained in theArthashastra are (1) the value of international trade and recognizingthat imports are just as important—if not more important—than exports, (2) a fair and efficient tax system that supplies thestates with income, but does not stifle economic growth, and (3) a“just” wage system rewarding workers for the economic value theycreate, while paying them based on the amount of time put in andthe skills necessary for their work. 25 All three of these ideas arenot only central to Kautilya’s Arthashastra, but to the classical economicsschool of thought developed over two thousand years afterKautilya’s death. The Arthashastra was clearly ahead of its time,and anticipated the ideas that Smith, Hume, Ricardo, Mill and othersdeveloped independently of Kautilya. If Kautilya’s work had notbeen lost, it may have had a huge influence on classical economics.One can only speculate that trade theory, principles of taxation,and the labor theory of value associated with classical economicthought might have evolved much earlier (perhaps in thefourteenth or fifteenth century) if Kautilya’s views had been knownto scholars such as St. Thomas Aquinas in the late middle ages orearly Mercantilists in the Renaissance. 26Unfortunately, Kautilya’s work remained lost for a great periodof time, so the Arthashastra was never able to realize its possiblecontribution to world economic thought. However, India stillfinds great pride in the fact that it “beat” the West to many of thepolitical and economic concepts laid out in Kautilya’s text.Because his political and economic ideas were well aheadof his Western counterparts like Niccolò Machiavelli and AdamSmith, Kautilya earned a special place among Indian nationalistsduring the Indian independence movement of the first half of the20th century. The timely discovery of the Arthashastra by Sanskritscholar-librarian R. Shamasastry in 1904 allowed Kautilya’s text toattain prominence in the independence movement. Various viewsdeveloped regarding the salience of Kautilya for India’s indepen-(1996), 101.25 Ibid., 10226 Ibid., 10763 Ramanathan Veerappan Kautilya’s Arthashastra 64

dence leaders, most notably India’s first prime minister, JawaharlalNehru. As the German political scientist Michael Liebig pointed outin a recent presentation, one view “contends that the Indian independencemovement needed Kautilya vis-à-vis the colonial powerin order to demonstrate that the ancient Arthashastra was at parwith, or even superior to, the ancient and medieval works of Europeanpolitical theory, for example, Machiavelli’s The Prince.” 27 Thediscovery of indigenous political and economic ideas dating backto the third century BCE—long before Western scholars wouldindependently develop similar ideas—became a great source ofpride for Indians. As Liebig stated in his presentation, Kautilya is“present in the Indian public mind as a ‘metaphor’” for “(1) thecunning politician getting the job done, and (2) the historical personalitywho unifies India.” 28 Thus, Kautilya is part of the “broadspectrum of Indian politico-cultural icons” 29 consisting of such figuresas “Buddha, Asoka, Akbar, Aurobindo, Gandhi, and Nehru,” 30who helped unify, metaphorically or literally, India.As Liebig demonstrated, Kautilya’s importance to the Indiannationalists of the 20th century lay in his iconicity and in theArthashastra’s incredible political and economic ideas. This is notthe entire extent of Kautilya’s significance to the nationalist movement,however, as the nationalists were also drawn to his idea ofa pan-Indian state. As mentioned earlier, the Mauryan Empire thatKautilya and Chandragupta built was the first state to span the Indiansubcontinent. Kautilya himself writes of his desires for the kingto be a world conqueror, stating that only after “Having conqueredthe earth with its people of distinct castes and divisions of religiouslife, should [the king] enjoy it by governing it in accordance withthe duties prescribed to kings.” 31 Thus, the Arthashastra’s legendaryauthor believed that the ideal king would be a world conqueror.While world conquest and the creation of a pan-Indian statemay appear to be entirely different ideas, Roger Boesche claims27 Gautam, P.K. Endogenous Politico-Cultural Resources: Kautilya’s Arthashastraand India’s Strategic Culture28 Ibid.29 Ibid.30 Ibid.31 Kautilya. Arthashastra. Translated by R. Shamasastry. Bangalore: GovernmentPress, 1915, 475-493that the two are in fact synonymous. Boesche claims that “Kautilyaapparently meant by the phrase ‘conquering the world’ somethinglike conquering up to what Indians regarded as the natural bordersof India, from the Himalayas all the way south to the IndianOcean, and from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal.” 32 In fact,Kautilya mentions in Book IX of the Arthashastra that “Country(space) means the earth; in it the thousand yojanas of the northernportion of the country that stretches between the Himalayasand the ocean form the dominion of no insignificant emperor.” Thisregion described as the “world” simply refers to the extent of theIndian subcontinent, bound in the north by the Himalayas and inthe south, east, and west by water. Therefore, Kautilya believes thata true world conqueror needs only control the region of India, asopposed the entire world.This makes Kautilya one of the earliest—if not the earliest—proponentsof a pan-Indian state. This was of particular importanceto the Indian nationalists, who were fighting to establishan Indian-controlled state spanning the entire subcontinent. Thenationalists saw the Arthashastra as a potential source of historicalsupport for their idea of a single Indian nation. Kautilya and theArthashastra were, thus, significant to the Indian nationalists forthree reasons: (1) the legendary Kautilya’s iconicity; (2) the Arthashastra’spolitical and economic ideas, which preceded its Westerncounterparts; and (3) the Arthashastra’s envisioning of a singlestate spanning the Indian subcontinent.Although Kautilya and the Arthashastra were important tothe Indian nationalist movement, their significance faded immediatelyafter India and Pakistan gained independence. However,Kautilya’s importance as an icon is once again on the rise. MichaelLiebig believes that Kautilya and his fellow Indian politico-culturalicons have the potential to have a huge impact on the modernworld, provided India can promote its diverse, yet cohesive culturalresources in a manner similar to China’s promotion of Confucianism.33 This means that India can make Kautilyan thought as well32 Roger Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in AncientIndia,” The Journal of Military History, 67, no. 1 (2003): 9-37.33 Gautam, P.K. Endogenous Politico-Cultural Resources: Kautilya’s Arthashastraand India’s Strategic Culture65 Ramanathan Veerappan Kautilya’s Arthashastra 66

known and as relevant as it deserves by making resources aboutthe Arthashastra more widely available in the world, and by encouragingresearch and discussion on Kautilya and the Arthashastra.Perhaps this discussion may expand the Arthashastra’s reachbeyond the scope of Indian nationalism, Western business, and theschools of Western thought with which it shares many similarities.Kautilya and the Arthashastra certainly have the potential make asignificant impact upon a variety of fields not directly addressed inthis paper.Unfortunately, as of today Kautilya and his famous Arthashastraare still little known outside of South Asia and South AsianStudies. This is despite the fact that Kautilya not only anticipatedthe ideas of Western thinkers like Machiavelli and Adam Smith, butcombined the concepts of realpolitik and classical economics intoa single text distinct from its European counterparts. In fact, Kautilya’slinking of politics and economics is perhaps the greatest aspectof the Arthashastra. In discussing the concept of good governanceby the ideal state “Kautilya equates political governance with economicgovernance” where “the end is economic governance whilepolitical governance is a means.” 34 Just as in Machiavellian politics,the concept of the “end justifies the means” is a basis for Kautilyanthought. Good governance in a Kautilyan sense, then, whether politicalor economic, is about “justifying the ends and means as thesocio, economic, and political conditions demand.” 35Because the Arthashastra is distinct from its Western counterpartsin its synthesis of the ideas of realpolitik and classical economicsinto the single concept of good governance, Kautilya’s textdeserves a place among the world’s great political and economictreatises. More importantly, the works of Starzl and Dhir, Kumarand Rao, and a number of other scholars have shown that the Arthashastrais neither outdated, nor strictly theoretical; it does infact have applications to the modern world of corporations and bigbusiness. However, as Kautilya’s work is still relatively unknown—especially in comparison to other Eastern texts that have beeninfluential in business, such as The Art of War and the BhagavadGita—most CEOs have yet to employ Kautilya’s strategies. Withmore research on the Arthashastra’s relevance and more time forthe text to gain popularity, the Arthashastra may become more influentialin the corporate world. When the Arthashastra does earnits rightful place in the personal libraries of political theorists,economists, world leaders, and CEO’s alike for its ideas on statecraftand economic policy and its applicability to modern corporations,the Arthashastra will finally be recognized for its contributionto human knowledge. Only then will the legacy of Kautilya andhis famous treatise be permanently cemented in history, ensuringthat the Arthashastra will never again be lost to the world.34 Kautilya’s Arthashastra: Its Contemporary Relevance, (Pune: Indian Merchants’Chamber & Indian Merchants’ Chamber Economic Research and Training Foundation,2005), 73.35 Ibid.67 Ramanathan Veerappan Kautilya’s Arthashastra 68

REFERENCESBoesche, Roger. “Kautilya’s Arthashastra on War and Diplomacyin Ancient India.” The Journal of Military History. 67. no. 1(2003): 9-37.Burrow, Thomas. “Kautilya and Chanakya.” Annals of theBhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. (1968): 48-49.Gautam, P.K. Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, “EndogenousPolitico-Cultural Resources: Kautilya’s Arthashastra andIndia’s Strategic Culture.” Last modified 2012. Accessed November10, 2012. http://www.idsa.in/event/KautilyasArthashastraandIndiasStrategicCulture.“India needs to develop its own doctrine for strategic autonomy:NSA.” The Economic Times, October 18, 2012. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-10-18/news/34555557_1_strategic-autonomy-shiv-shankar-menon-india-today.Kautilya. Arthashastra. Translated by R. Shamasastry. Bangalore:Government Press, 1915.Kautilya’s Arthashastra: Its Contemporary Relevance. Pune:Indian Merchants’ Chamber and Indian Merchants’ Chamber EconomicResearch and Training Foundation, 2005.Kumar, N. Siva, and U.S. Rao. “Guidelines for Value Based Managementin Kautilya’s Arthashastra.” Journal of Business Ethics. 15.no. 4 (1996): 415-423. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25072765.Matthews, Eric. Weber: Selections in Translation. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1978.Starzl, Timothy, and Krishna Dhir. “Strategic Planning 2300Years Ago: The Strategy of Kautilya.” Management InternationalReview. 26. no. 4 (1986): 70-77.http://www.jstor.org/stable/40227819.Trautmann, Thomas. India: Brief History of Civilization.New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2011.Waldauer, Charles, William Zahka, and Surendra Pal. “Kautilya’sArthashastra: A Neglected Precursor to Classical Economics.”Indian Economic Review. 31. no. 1 (1996): 101-108. http://www.jstor.org/stable/29793735.Ainu and the Metaphor of Indigeneity:History, Science, Law, and BodiesValerie BlackAbstractDrawing on Max Black’s interaction theory, this paper explores thetransformative properties of metaphor, and its ability to alter the perception ofits original components through the interaction of comparison itself. Identifyinga metaphoric underpinning to conceptions of indigeneity, I examine past andrecent shifts of the status of Ainu in Japan in order to show the power of thisunexamined metaphoric relationship in impacting Ainu perceptions, includingself-perceptions. The metaphor of indigeneity does not operate exclusively tothe detriment of the populations it symbolically links. By examining the role ofmetaphor in constructing and reconstructing Ainu identities, and establishing therelationship between these identities and Ainu history, science, law, and bodies, Iseek to show the potency of metaphor in shaping, as opposed to merely reflecting,reality.Introduction: Indigeneity as MetaphorI seek to call attention to the mechanisms of how indigenousidentities (including self-identities) are constructed, andby whom. By examining the role of metaphor in shaping Ainu indigenousidentities, and analyzing the corresponding productionof Ainu identities within history, science, law, and ethnography, Isuggest it is possible to uncover the function of metaphor, and todetect unexamined pathways through which power is both soughtand subverted.69 Ramanathan Veerappan Kautilya’s Arthashastra 70

Does the formation of a global indigenous identity implythat the similarities shared by indigenous populations outweighthe significance, or even the existence, of any corresponding differences?As the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of IndigenousPeoples demonstrates, there is increasing power, in theform of international legal precedent, in conceiving of contemporaryindigenous populations as similar—as populations more alikethan different in terms of the rights to which they are entitled. Isuggest that this comparison derives its power to link distinct populationsfrom a framework of colonization. In other words, it is ofthe knowledge and mindset of a particular and relatively recentperiod world history, and a corresponding manner of dividing populationsalong the lines of colonized and colonizer, that producesthe framework for establishing this connection. Yet, the perceptionof indigenous populations as analogous has arguably provided abasis by which Ainu have gained significant rights and recognitionin the past decade.There is no ‘neutral’ formation of metaphoric understanding;metaphors are by definition highly contextualized modes ofperception. Detection is imperative, for as metaphors become increasinglyfamiliar, they shed their metaphoric encasement andbecome regarded as self-evident ‘fact.’ 1 If the connections forged bya metaphor appear obvious, this is because the metaphor has become“so woven into our cultural and linguistic system as to havelost its obviously metaphorical quality and to [instead] seem partof ‘nature.’” 2 Similarity is actively produced, not passively discovered,but in order to effectively create similarity, metaphors mustdiscard information that does not uphold the link they construct. 3These similarities emerge firmly bound to preexisting systems ofhierarchy. The very arbitration of what does and what does not getincluded suggests an underlying authority—a center, rather than aperiphery, about which these metaphors orbit.According to Max Black’s “interaction” theory, both compo-1 Nancy Leys Stepan, “Race and Gender: The Role of Analogy in Science” inThe “Racial” Economy of Science: Toward a Democratic Future, ed. Sandra Harding.(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), 359-376.2 Ibid., 368.3 Ibid., 368, citing Stanley Fish, 369.71 Valerie Blacknents of a metaphor are transformed by their interaction, and renderedmore alike. 4 Indigeneity, when understood as a metaphoricinteraction, implies stagnant and timeless human populations locatedin an exalted pre-colonized past that is forever beyond reclamation.Indigenous groups are symbolically bound to conceptionsof time and place, even long after land and other resource accesshas been systematically appropriated from them. A metaphoricunderpinning accounts for the ways in which indigenous identitiesare collectivized and condensed—impacting, in turn, how legalrights, and thus recognition, take shape.The question of whether Ainu are ‘more’ indigenous thanWajin has been long disputed in Japan—Ainu were not officiallyrecognized as an indigenous population by the Japanese governmentuntil 2008. To speak of Ainu and Japanese as discrete categoriessuggest that Ainu are not Japanese, and excludes those ofmixed heritage. Yet to call ‘ethnic’ Japanese ‘Wajin’ upholds theidea that there is an ethnically ‘pure’ form of Japanese identity. Togain legal and political leverage, indigenous populations, and thusindividuals, must fall neatly into contemporary national borders,and exist in the context of a nation-state. When an Ainu leaves Hokkaidofor Los Angeles, or for Tokyo for that matter, does this diminishthe source of power behind a collective indigenous identity? 5Should Ainu rights in Japan follow an international model, and besituated first and foremost in indigenous identity? How might perceptions,including self-perceptions, of indigenous groups be impactedby unexamined metaphoric relationships? The metaphorof indigeneity does not operate exclusively to the detriment of thepopulations it symbolically links. By examining the role of metaphorin constructing and reconstructing Ainu identities, and establishingthe relationship between these identities and Ainu history,science, law, and bodies, I seek to show the potency of metaphor inshaping, as opposed to merely reflecting, reality.4 Max Black, “More About Metaphor” in Metaphor and Thought, ed. AndrewOrtony. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 19-43.For a discussion of M. Black’s interactive theory metaphor in relation to the productionof scientific knowledge, see: Stepan, “Race and Gender: The Role of Analogy in Science,”359-376.5 Mark L. Watson, “Diasporic Indigeneity: Place and the Articulation of AinuIdentity in Tokyo, Japan,” Environment and Planning A42:2 (2010): 268-284.Ainu Indigeneity 72

Maps, Histories, and OwnershipMaps themselves are metaphors: they reveal our orientationto land and water, and convey, through the portrayal of boundaries,the underlying organization of power over the resourcesthey depict. Often, what is not included reveals as much as what is.Pre-modern Japan’s relationship with the waters that surroundedit could be characterized as ambivalent. On the one hand, theoceans were rich in life-sustaining resources. At the same time, theopen sea was a source of great risk and uncertainty. Accordingly,the earliest known maps of Japan as a unified realm, from theeighth century, show the three large islands of Honshu, Shikoku,and Kyushu surrounded by water. No other lands, such as the Koreanpeninsula, the vast continental China, or the large island to thenorth of Honshu known today as Hokkaido, were depicted. In fact,Hokkaido wasn’t included on national maps until the early modernperiod. Though widely considered to be the ancestral home ofAinu, Hokkaido is not the only historical Ainu land. In addition toHokkaido, Ainu occupied northern Honshu, the Kuril Islands, andthe disputed island of Sakhalin. The necessary simplification of informationrequired to create maps demonstrates the difficulty ofshowing a relationship between land and people that extends beyonda single, dominant narrative. By definition, indigenous statuslinks people to land, but at the same time, renders them subject toa defining authority. Maps, in short, reveal an intense ambiguity ofownership.The question of ownership is similarly applicable to the productionof historical narratives. Is Ainu history Japanese history?David Howell asks this essential question in his eponymous article.6 Just as maps are ill suited to display conflicting narratives, so,too, are national histories; the power to author one’s own historyis not freely bestowed. Howell states that Ainu history must be toldin the context of Japanese history, even though this limits the typesof questions that can be asked and the ways they can be answered. 7He identifies three barriers preventing the emergence of an Ainuhistory apart from Japanese history: 1) The broader acceptance ofAinu history within academia; 2) the expansion of viable sourcematerials (reflecting a bias against oral tradition within ‘official’historical narratives); and 3) the political tensions surrounding thestudy of Ainu.In regard to the obstacle of acceptance, Howell observesthat, “Ironically, it will be hard for Ainu history to establish itself asa field until historians of Japan come to incorporate the Ainu routinelyinto their narratives, for that is the only way to overcome thecurrent near invisibility of the Ainu in scholarly discourse.” Speakingto the issue of Ainu history as politically fraught, Howell notesthat, “scholars who do not position themselves as impassioned defendersof the Ainu risk being tarred as crass assimilationists. This[…] has parallels in the politics of indigenous studies elsewhere inthe world. It helps to account for the tendency of many studies ofthe Ainu to include denunciations of discrimination past and presentas a framing device.” In other words, the present production ofAinu history is at once contained by and resistant to a dominantJapanese narrative; as a product of resistance, it draws either supportor denial, and thus does not yet ‘exist’ in its own right.Howell overtly suggests a relationship between Ainu history anda broader narrative of indigenous colonization that transcends Japan.8 Maps and histories both function as currencies of dominantpowers, constructed to convey selective information. Symbolicallycontained within their boundaries, indigenous lands, histories, andthus, people, become enfolded and obscured rather than included,or even identified.Producing Scientific RacismIn 2005, Taro Aso (now the former prime minister of Japan,then the internal affairs and communications minister) gave6 David K. Howell, “Is “Ainu History” “Japanese History”?” Journal of NortheastAsian History Vol. 5:1 (2008): 121-142.7 Ibid.8 Ibid.73 Valerie Black Ainu Indigeneity 74

a speech in which he referred to Japan as “one nation, one civilization,one language, one culture and one race. There is no othernation (that has such characteristics).” 9 This statement met withsome criticism, but the fact that Aso went on to become prime ministerdemonstrates that his sentiments were by no means rejectedacross Japan at the time.The theme of homogeny is part of a larger nationalist discoursein Japan in which a distinct Japanese ethnicity is tied tobeliefs about Japan’s past and present orientation to the world. 10To openly acknowledge a heterogeneous Japanese populationthreatens that identity; to openly acknowledge an extant Japanesepopulation pre-dating the so-called ‘ethnic Japanese’ thoroughlyundermines it. Unlike the West, theories of evolution in Japanwere not regarded as particularly controversial, something that isrecognized in Japan as a point of distinction. 11 Yet, theories of theancient settlement of the Japanese archipelago are tied to the notionof an unchanging ethnicity in which biological and cultural aspectsof Japanese identity necessarily coincide. 12 The formation ofAinu Studies in Japan corresponded to the establishment and earlydevelopment of anthropology and archeology in Japan, with Ainuserving as a counterpart to other indigenous, ‘uncivilized’ populations,and thus providing the opportunity for Japanese to asserttheir relative superiority by means of the ‘race science’ prevalentin the 19th and early 20th centuries.For centuries, Ainu were regarded as an uncivilized ‘other,’and Japanese military campaigns against them may have begunas early as the eighth century; the Nihon Shoki refers to “Emishi,”or barbarians, which is thought to be a possible reference to theancestors of contemporary Ainu, though this connection is not es-9 “Aso Says Japan is Nation of ‘One Race,” Japan Times, October 18, 2005, 2012,accessed November 1, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20051018a7.html.10 For an overview of the relationship between Japanese nationalism and sciencein the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see: Joan H. Fujimura, “Future Imaginaries:Genome Scientists as Sociocultural Entrepreneurs” in Genetic Nature/Culture: Anthropologyand Science Beyond the Two-Culture Divide, ed. Alan H. Goodman, et al. (Berkeley,CA: University of California Press, 2003), 176-199.11 Ibid.12 See: Mark J. Hudson, Ruins of Identity: Ethnogenesis in the Japanese Islands(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1999).tablished. The hierarchy of power between notions of civilizationversus barbarism was not a concept introduced to Japan by way ofWestern colonialism—it was instead very much a part of pre-modernChinese culture. Japan effectively spent centuries acquiringand developing a strong sense of what it was to be civilized so asnot to be considered barbaric in the eyes of the neighboring Chineseand Korean kingdoms. The later word, “Ezo,” by which Ainuwere called for centuries, is simply a modified pronunciation of thesame Chinese characters—‘barbarians.’ However, though regardedas an uncivilized other, Ainu identity did not become racialized asother until the advent of ‘race science.’ Western science played a directrole in making race scientific in Meiji and Taisho Japan (1860-1926).Japanese accounts of Ainu predate those of Western travelers,and Western science was known in Japan since the 18th centuryby way of Dutch contact, but it was Western ethnographers inJapan who first unified these approaches and viewed Ainu withinthis scientific framework. 13 The highly contextualized Westerntrope of the ‘noble savage’ thus entered Japan, and was received byan audience of academics, the first generation of Japanese scholarstrained in Western scientific disciplines, who were eager to establisha scientifically-verified Japanese identity. 14 This was a period ofintense change in Japan, accompanied by the equally intensive formationof a nation-state, or nation-civilization, identity. 15 Followingcenturies of relative isolation, the selective acquisition of Westernculture, including science, was identified as a means of gaining aplace at the table with ascendant Western colonial powers (andthereby avoiding a colonized fate). Under the privileged status ofscience, the debate over Ainu origins continued, and a biologicalsupremacy of Japanese over Ainu was constructed. Just as in theWest, bodily measurements were sought to “prove” this hierarchy. 1613 Richard Siddle, Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan. (New York: Routledge,1996), 78.14 Ibid., 81.15 See: “A Point Of View: Making sense of China,” BBC News, October 12, 2012,accessed November 1, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19929620. ThoughJapanese history is strikingly different from Chinese history, the idea of civilization-stateas opposed to merely a nation-state is relevant when examining Japanese identity.16 Stepan, “Race and Gender: The Role of Analogy in Science,” 368-371. Stepan’s75 Valerie Black Ainu Indigeneity 76

Thus, the metaphors of scientific racism and racial hierarchieswere directly shaped by Western conceptions of indigenous populations.The Laws of Expansion and the Expansion of LawsProtection is an ethically nebulous concept. Entities thatview themselves capable of bestowing protection frequently justifytheir actions as unequivocally ‘beneficial’ to the populations theyact upon. For example, Japanese colonization of Taiwan was openlydeclared by Japanese as beneficial to Taiwanese, while across theocean a few decades later, US internment of Japanese-Americansduring WWII was deemed beneficial to those interred. 17 , 18 Additionally,‘protection’ establishes an unmistakable hierarchy of power.Accordingly, ‘protection’ of Ainu under Japanese law alignedprimarily with the interests of Ainu colonizers.Political advocacy of legal protection for Ainu began in thelate 19th century, following centuries of Ainu-Japanese interaction,and beginning in the 17th century, official trade relationships viaJapanese outposts in Hokkaido. Prior to the introduction of protectionlaws, the settling of Hokkaido by the Japanese governmentwas openly referred to as colonization. 19 In present-day Japan, thispast is now referred to as ‘development’ instead of colonization,implying that the occupation of Hokkaido was instead a ‘natural’extension, and a periphery settled rather than taken. Arguably,this orientation obscures the violence underpinning the process ofland and resource annexation, and the corresponding exploitationof Ainu inhabitants.discusses how physical measurements, such as brain weight and skull shape, wereemployed as ‘evidence’ of racial and gender inferiority, observing that metaphor “generatesdata that conform to [the nature it constructs], and accommodates data that are inapparent contradiction to it, so that nature is seen via the metaphor and the metaphorbecomes part of the logic of science itself.” (Stepan 371)17 Siddle, Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan, 82.18 See: Colleen Lye, “A New Deal for Asians,” in America’s Asia: Racial Form andAmerican Literature, 1893-1945 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,2005), 141-203.19 Siddle, Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan.Reacting to the threat of Russian encroachment, Japaneseassimilation of Ainu strengthened the Japanese claim on Hokkaido,as did the enforced annexation and control of selective land, andremoval of Ainu inhabitants. Competition between Japan and Russiato claim Hokkaido was driven by the desire to claim the wealthof natural resources, including coal, timber, and fish, and to exploitthe agricultural potential of the land. Following the Meiji Restoration,the colony of Ezochi (Ezo, or Ainu, land) was renamed Hokkaido.Settlement functioned to legitimate Japanese rule. Accordingly,a rapid movement of Japanese settlement and agriculturaldevelopment was incentivized by land grants. Though there wasan emphasis in the language of official policy promoting a visionof kindness and harmony with ‘natives,’ the Japanese governmentsimultaneously declared Ainu residency as non-ownership, andpassed laws to legally uphold this belief. 20Not all inland Ainu lands were seized at first, but when resourceswere sought by Japanese, such as hunting access, the Ainuwere forced to relocate, and laws were passed to ban Ainu huntingtools and techniques. Following the introduction of hunting riflesby Japanese, deer herds approached extinction within a fewyears. 21 Similarly, bans on Ainu fishing and appropriation of fisheriesimpeded Ainu autonomy, while unrestrained Japanese consumptionled to sudden and dramatic resource depletion. Withoutaccess to their conventional foodways, Ainu began to die of starvation.22 Some attempts at amelioration were made by the Japanesegovernment, such as the granting of small plots of land for agriculturalproduction to Ainu, but ultimately, only small amounts of landwere given to few individuals. 23 Meanwhile, Ainu settlements wereincreasingly relocated to land ill-suited to agricultural productionin order to make prime land available to Japanese settlers. Ainurelocation settlements were deliberately scattered in an attemptto separate and weaken Ainu communities. Ironically, the surveyingand mapping of lands to be sold or distributed by the Japanesegovernment relied heavily on Ainu knowledge and labor; after all,20 Ibid.21 Ibid.22 Ibid., 63.23 Ibid.77 Valerie Black Ainu Indigeneity 78

this ‘frontier’ was for them already known, named, and traveled. 24Assimilation policies were first informally, and later, formally adopted.The call for protection was directly impacted by knowledgeof other colonized populations, particularly the U.S. Dawes Act,which allotted land to Native Americans with the goal of assimilation.Consequently, decisions about assimilation were shaped byJapan’s conception of a metaphoric relationship between indigenousand colonizing populations.In 1893, a Protection Act was proposed before the Diet. Argumentsopposing it centered upon the notion that there was littleneed to protect Ainu, as they were already ‘dying out,’ a view rootedin social Darwinism and the scientific racism it produced. OtherDiet members argued against formal legal protection, citing thedestitution of Ainu as emblematic of their deserved decline. 25 Accordingly,this proposal ultimately failed, as did a second attemptthree years later. In 1898, another proposal, again framed in thelanguage of a cultural and biological ‘survival of fittest,’ still projectedthe demise of Ainu as inevitable while stating it was the dutyof the government to protect them in the interim. Notably, whilethis proposal spoke of Ainu as an ancient part of the Japanese empire,it did not explicitly recognize them as indigenous.The Protection Act was enacted in 1899. Its objective was,first and foremost, assimilation. Ainu in Japan acquired a status of‘former natives,’ and among the protections granted were limitedland grants (without the full rights of ownership), elementary educationin separate village schools, and access to limited health care(the effect of tuberculosis on Ainu populations, introduced withsettlement, was devastating). These initiatives were designed totransform Ainu into subjects through the eradication of Ainu language,culture, and lifestyle, with an emphasis on agriculture as theprimary means of achieving ‘civilization.’ 26 Yet even under these‘protections,’ Ainu were unsuccessful in transitioning to an agriculturallifestyle, due to a lack of agricultural knowledge and training,and insufficient land size and quality. Additionally, there was nocorresponding protection against exploitation by competing Japa-24 Ibid., 60.25 Ibid., 88.26 Ibid.nese landowners. 27The failures of the Protection Act to adequately ‘protect’ signifiedto Japanese that they couldn’t stop the extinction of the Ainu‘race,’ which continued to be regarded as inevitable; the decreasingAinu population was deemed further evidence of the principle of‘survival of fittest’ in action. Still, Japanese viewed themselves asobligated to provide a measure of welfare to the Ainu, though notto the extent of attempting to defy the laws of ‘nature’ by trying to‘save’ them. 28 This opinion was directly influenced by the perceivedcorrelation between Ainu and Native Americans; an Ainu educationcommittee member wrote in 1901 that, while Native Americanswere thought to be “violent and vengeful,” Ainu were instead“mild and servile,” and Japanese should show their compassion tothis “dying race.” 29 Notably, this noblesse oblige positioned Japaneseas equivalent to Western colonizers in power, but superior tothem in virtue. Cultural, and eventually biological, assimilation wassoon advocated as the basis of providing this ‘support’: “Throughthe mixing of blood and assimilation they are fusing into the broader[ethnic Japanese] race and can be said to be developing.” 30Opposition to this viewpoint continued, as many arguedthat Ainu should not be granted any protection, and that instead,their “survival or extinction should be left to nature.” 31 Furthermore,conceptions of ‘racial purity’ were invoked, as supposed inherentracial inferiority became the basis of legal inequality. The hierarchicalbiological admixture of Ainu and Japanese identity was constructed,by way of standardized testing, to show ‘pure’ Japaneseas intellectually superior, Ainu as abjectly inferior, and ‘half-breed’Japanese-Ainu as in-between these two poles. 32 Ironically, observationsof the continued disadvantages experienced by Ainu furtherfueled belief in the need to increase, rather than reduce or alter,27 Ibid., 71.28 Ibid.29 E. Iwayya, “Hokubei Dojin Hogoho o Ronjite Ainu Jinshu Hogoho ni oyobu (2),”Hokkaido Kyoiku Zasshi, Vol. 88 (May 1901): 1-3.Translated and discussed by Siddle, Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan, 90-91.30 Siddle, Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan, 95.31 Ibid., 92.32 Ibid.79 Valerie Black Ainu Indigeneity 80

existing measures of Japanese supervision and control. 33 The ProtectionAct was revised in 1937 with even greater focus on culturalassimilation, and the ideology of protection continued, largely unchallengeduntil the later half of the 20th century. It was poweredby the myth of a dying population, believed by both Ainu and Japanese,until activists directly confronted this narrative.Law provided the basis for the seizure of Ainu land and resources,and the carefully controlled displacement of Ainu people.Law was an instrument of, not an obstacle to, expansion. Yet lawhas remained the basis of challenging this expansion, within Japanand globally. 34 Through a collectivized identity as indigenous, Ainuhave transcended national space and moved to an internationalspace in which to seek legal protection. The UN itself has authoredthe discourse of what constitutes “indigeneity.” 35 , 36 Within this legalmodel, indigenous identity at once subverts and operates withinan existing conception of nation-states as legal entities. As nonstateactors, rights granted to indigenous groups are arguably acontinuation of protection, which seemingly undermines the veryprinciple of self-determination sought by these indigenous populations.The fusion of indigenous identity constructed by the UNdraws heavily on the metaphor on indigeneity as a claim to virtue,which in turn merits protection. The virtue of an abstracted indigeneityis increasingly rooted in indigenous ecology, which ultimatelyis yet another iteration of the narrative of protection. What mustnot be ignored is that shifting ideologies of virtue formed the veryfoundation upon which laws were constructed in order to displace,assimilate, and ‘protect’ Ainu.33 Ibid., 96.34 Georgina Stevens, “Subject, Object and Active Participant: The Ainu, Law, andLegal Mobilization,” 2008.35 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 61/295, “Declaration on theRights of Indigenous Peoples,” Sept. 13, 2007.36 Ann-Elise Lewallen, “Bones of Contention: Negotiating Anthropological Ethicswithin Fields of Ainu Refusal,” 2007.Ethnography, Bodies, and ResistanceThe relationship between Ainu Studies and Ainu activismreveals the complexity of the politics of indigeneity, particularlythe ambiguous division of academics and activism. Howell suggeststhat a ‘neutral’ perspective is not only possible, but ideal. Yet, thedynamic of positioning academia as separate and removed fromthe sphere of activism originates in the production of cultural hierarchies.As anthropology and other social sciences contemplatemodels of ‘engaged’ or ‘applied’ studies, it is important to ask, whatconstitutes an ‘unengaged’ model? Arguably, the myth of neutralitythat permeated the early formation of social sciences continuesunchecked. Instead, the ownership of knowledge, and of perceivedsources of knowledge, bear close resemblance to patterns of colonization,and the assumed privilege of studying the inferior ‘other.’The disputed ownership of this knowledge and the formation ofAinu as subjects make past and present Ainu Studies a site of activistresistance.In Bones of Contention: Negotiating Anthropological Ethicswithin Fields of Ainu Refusal, anthropologist Ann-Elise Lewallendescribes the history of Ainu scholarship itself in relation to Ainuas subjects. 37 She addresses the interaction of activism and scholarship,including the logistical issues of conducting ethnographic researchrequiring written consent within a culture where oral communicationis dominant, and where written communication bearsovertones of exploitation and oppression. 38 She also observes thelegacies of Ainu mistrust produced within Ainu Studies, includingthe extraction of cadavers from Ainu burial sites, and the history of‘scientific’ testing on living Ainu subjects. Quite literally, the bodiesof Ainu were employed to uphold the scientific racism promoted inthe 19th century.Drawing on her experiences of being rejected by Ainu communitiesdue to her identity as an anthropologist, Lewallen con-37 Ibid.38 Ibid.81 Valerie Black Ainu Indigeneity 82

tributes to the question of whether neutrality between researcherand subject is possible, by framing Ainu Studies as necessarily collaborative.39 What, aside from a claim to neutrality, authorizes thestudy of Ainu as subjects, particularly without producing a directbenefit for Ainu? Further, who then maintains ownership of thisknowledge?Because of the formative role that Ainu subjects played inproducing anthropology in Japan, anthropologists were (and are)viewed as directly complicit in perpetuating the enduring myth ofAinu as a dying race. Impacted by nineteenth-century Western ethnographers,Ainu iconography, made scientific and framed in Darwiniandiscourse, gained attention in Japan as a vehicle of nationalism.Ainu were perceived as vital to understanding the biologicalracial origins of Japanese. Thus, their protection was, in part, explicitlymotivated by the desire to maintain an available Ainu populationsample for testing and study. 40Resistance to this role as voiceless scientific fodder did notgo unrecognized or unchallenged by Ainu. Writing in the 1930s,Ainu poet Iboshi Hokuto produced an article entitled “We Must NotBe Just Material for Scholars Forever,” in which he declared, “We arehuman beings, not physical specimens.” 41 Resistance to scholarlyexploitation was also at the core of Ainu activism during the 1970sand 1980s. The first reparation of skeletal remains was made byHokkaido University in 1984, though many remains have yet to berelinquished to Ainu communities. The complexity of this situationis exacerbated by Ainu protestors who believe it is in the best interestof Ainu to leave some remains unclaimed, with the understandingthat these comprise the sole source of evidence that Ainuare physically descended from prehistoric Jomon populations, andcould therefore help further Ainu claims of indigeneity, eventuallycontributing to greater Ainu political self-determination. 42 In seekingautonomy from a colonized past, the body itself becomes a siteof resistance. Even when ‘properties’ of past subjugation, includingAinu bodies and knowledge, are reclaimed by Ainu, they remain39 Ibid.40 Siddle, Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan.41 Lewllan, “Bones of Contention.”42 Ibid.the currency by which power and self-determination are won.The metaphor of indigeneity suggests there is a trajectorythat Ainu Studies, as a form of Indigenous Studies, currently follows.Yet, the assumption of neutrality, and a necessary distinctionbetween academics and activism, is itself a legacy of colonialism.ConclusionDoes the recognition of Ainu rights by means of a global indigenousidentity address the legacies of colonization, or merelyperpetuate them? By asking this question, I do not suggest thatAinu political activism and organization is either futile or disempowered.The conspicuous absence of legal recognition accordedto other minority groups in Japan suggests that Ainu identity asindigenous supersedes Ainu identity as Japanese, as the source ofpower behind this identity is not produced within the Japanesestate. It is important to consider the possibility that the processthrough which these modes of engagement gain power may reproducethe underlying dynamics of colonization, including the mythologyof a timeless and cohesive culture irreversibly diminishedby contact with colonizing powers, as opposed to creating a futurein which national and cultural identities are not discrete and hierarchical.This outcome is neither wholly good nor wholly bad;breaking away from the myth of colonization necessarily meansdiscarding a belief in the myth of progress.The metaphor of indigeneity is empowering to indigenousindividuals and groups where these individuals and groups areable to willingly invoke this identity to direct change. Yet, the existenceof international laws of protection for indigenous populationssuggests that ‘protection’ is granted, or bestowed, by a powerunquestionably positioned to do so. Where rights and powers attainedarise directly or indirectly from the metaphor of indigeneity,it is important to consider the power of this metaphor in shapingand reshaping identities, including self-identities as indigenousand colonizing respectively, at the expense of other, potentiallymore integrated, identities.83 Valerie Black Ainu Indigeneity 84

REFERENCESBlack, Max. “More About Metaphor” in Metaphor andThought, edited by Andrew Ortony, 19-43. New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1979.Fujimura, Joan H. “Future Imaginaries: Genome Scientistsas Sociocultural Entrepreneurs” in Genetic Nature/Culture: Anthropologyand Science Beyond the Two-Culture Divide, editedby Alan H. Goodman, et al. (Berkeley, CA: University of CaliforniaPress, 2003), 176-199.Howell, David L. “Is “Ainu History” “Japanese History”?”Journal of Northeast Asian History Vol. 5:1 (2008): 121-142.Hudson, Mark J., Ann-Elise Lewallen, and Mark K. Watson(eds.). “Introduction,” in Beyond Ainu Studies: Changing Academicand Public Perspectives. Honolulu: University of Hawai’I Press, inpress.Lewallen, Ann-Elise. “Bones of Contention: Negotiating AnthropologicalEthics within Fields of Ainu Refusal.” Critical AsianStudies Vol. 39:4 (2007): 509-540.Lewallen, Ann-Elise. “Indigenous at Last! Ainu GrassrootsOrganizing and the Indigenous Peoples Summit in Ainu Mosir.” TheAsia-Pacific Journal Vol. 48-6-08 (2008).Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. “Creating the Frontier: Border, Identity,and History in Japan’s Far North.” East Asian History Vol. 7(1994): 1-24.Siddle, Richard. Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan. NewYork: Routledge, 1996.Stepan, Nancy Leys. “Race and Gender: The Role of Analogyin Science,” in The “Racial” Economy of Science: Toward a DemocraticFuture, edited by Sandra Harding, 359-376. Bloomington, IN:Indiana University Press, 1993.Stevens, Georgina. “Subject, Object and Active Participant:The Ainu, Law, and Legal Mobilization.” Indigenous Law JournalVol. 7:1 (2008): 127-167.United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 61/295, “Declarationon the Rightsof Indigenous Peoples,” Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf.Walker, Brett L. The Conquest of Ainu Lands: Ecology andCulture in Japanese Expansion, 1590-1800. Berkeley, CA: Universityof California Press, 2001.Perspectives. Honolulu: University ofHawaii Press, In Press.Watson, Mark K. “Diasporic Indigeneity: Place and the Articulationof Ainu Identity in Tokyo, Japan.” Environment and PlanningA42:2 (2010): 268-284.85 Valerie Black Ainu Indigeneity 86

Not So Singular:Laicization in Japanese Buddhism andParallels in South AsiaRobert Bowers Curl87 Valerie BlackAbstractModern Japanese Buddhism has a unique problem: its priests get married.Compared with other East Asian Buddhist traditions, this is a source of concernas one of the major prohibitions on priestly behavior is sexual relationships.Considering that Japanese Buddhist priests not only have sex (and children)but engage in other transgressions of lay life, it is a wonder that they have notbeen cast away by their lay parishioners as poor religious figures. Yet, JapaneseBuddhism is not so unique, with its married priesthood of religiously powerfulfigures, within the context of the greater Asia region. This paper investigatesthe historical context of Japanese clerical marriage and compares relationshipmodels between the state, the Buddhist sangha, and parishioners in JapaneseBuddhism with models in the Sri Lanka Theravada tradition and the Newar Buddhisttradition of the Kathmandu Valley. The paper posits a number of similaritiesbetween the models and suggests that in the course of modernization, Japanmoved from a model resembling that of Theravada Buddhism to one resemblingNewar Buddhism.IntroductionModern Japanese Buddhism is occasionally marked as beingunique or singular in its expression, especially in the context of the“problem” of its almost completely married priesthood. While it iscertain that Japanese Buddhism is a unique tradition with its ownadaptations to its particular culture like any form of Buddhism, itis possible to find patterns within its history that appear similar tothose of other regions in Asia. This paper explores the pressuresJapanese Buddhism confronted during the Meiji period and positsthat the massive changes brought on by government programsof modernization that Japanese Buddhism experienced caused itto shift from a pattern resembling the Theravada tradition of SriLanka and Thailand to a pattern more closely resembling NewarBuddhism in the Kathmandu Valley. Specifically, the state/sangharelationship that used to be defined by state intervention in sectarianissues and attempts by government to control the Buddhistcommunity, along with deep clerical involvement in governmentaffairs, gave way to the state having a much weaker relationshipwith the sangha. Additionally, there was a marked change in parishionerexpectations of monk behavior resulting in a laity preferencefor monks that marry and engage in everyday life.In order to demonstrate these links, I will first provide backgroundon the relationship between state, society, and monks in theTheravada traditions of Sri Lanka and Thailand and in Newar Buddhism.Next, I will provide a narrative of Meiji-era Buddhist historybased heavily on the account provided by Richard Jaffe in his bookNeither Monk Nor Laymen: Clerical Marriage in Modern JapaneseBuddhism. Finally, I will compare the pre-Meiji state of JapaneseBuddhism with the Theravada tradition, and the current state ofJapanese Buddhism with the Newar tradition, while suggestingthat the shift Japanese Buddhism experienced in the Meiji periodcan be construed as movement away from a Theravada model towardsa Newar model. Additionally, I will attempt to demonstratethat the claim that Buddhism is in decline in Japan must be reexaminedand understood by virtue of its altered relationship withsociety and government.Theravada in Sri Lanka and ThailandFrom the legendary conversion of the Sinhalese by Mahendra,son of Emperor Asoka, the tradition of Theravada Buddhism inSri Lanka has been linked closely with the identity of Sri Lanka asLaicization in Japanese Buddhism 88

a cohesive nation. It should come as no surprise that, despite theBuddhist ideal of detachment, Sri Lankan Buddhism has found itselfburied deeply within the secular concerns of the world. Nowhereis this more evident than in the great land holding monasteries ofSri Lanka, which at times behaved more like noble landlords thana community of ascetics. Michael Carrithers, in the 1984 book TheWorld of Buddhism, in a section appropriately titled “They will beLords upon the Island,” details the extensive connection betweenthe Sri Lankan sangha and their roles as landlords. According toCarrithers, “…it was the Sangha’s involvement with productive agriculturewhich set the seal on the monk’s entanglement as landlordsin Sinhalese society.” 1 The monasteries could order irrigationtrenches to be dug, withhold water from people who missed rentpayments, and generally behave as a conventional noble who hadbeen granted land by the king. But the power of the monasteriesto control the lives of the peasants did not wane with the end ofthe growing season. As Carrithers states, “the real strength of thisvast edifice of landholding is revealed in its…possession of legalpower.” Evidence found in Sri Lanka “…sometimes also includedclauses implying that monastery functionaries were responsiblefor the administration of justice as well, if not for capital punishment.”2 The Sri Lankan Buddhist sanghas that had control over thelife and death of their attendant followers can certainly be said tohave been endowed with great secular power.Thus, the holding of land was a practical expression of the Sri Lankansangha’s power, while the sangha acted as the guardians of SriLanka morality and law. Carrithers writes:In other words, over the political realm, the monks reign both as exemplarsand as preachers. The precedence awarded the Sangha betokensthe precedence of their moral principles, so that the king rules by theGood Law…and under his moral sovereignty, backed by the sangha’smoral sovereignty, Sri Lanka is the Island of the Good Law… 3In other words, without the sangha the king has no moralauthority to govern. Without a sangha to bestow legitimacy on1 Carrithers p. 1152 Carrithers p. 1163 Carrithers p. 118everything from coronation rituals to merit-making opportunities,wherein the entire kingdom of Sri Lanka was symbolically givenover to the sangha (and then promptly returned), 4 the king’s claimto rule was baseless. This relationship, however, is not to be understoodas one sided, as the king had the responsibility of protectingthe sangha and keeping it cleansed. “Much of later Sri Lankan historyconcerns the efforts of kings to keep the sangha ‘pure’ and welldisciplined…and even the prosperity of the nation depended on itsmorality.” 5 The takeaway from this is that one of the ways to characterizethe Theravada tradition in Sri Lanka is by its close sangha/state connection, to the extent that both were mutually dependenton the other, even while jostling for the position of primacy.The Sri Lankan sangha is still firmly entrenched as a majorpower group within Sinhalese society and government. “The secularengagement of the Sri Lankan sangha with the state is seenin monks in modern times moving towards political engagement,even so far as to guide their parishioners politically.” 6The tradition of strong state/sangha connection is alive notonly in Sri Lanka but in Thailand as well. “A distinctive feature oftraditional Buddhism in Thailand…is the organization of the Sanghaas a national institution virtually under state control.” 7 As in SriLanka, the modern nation of Thailand continues to have a strongconnection between the Buddhist sangha and the state. This particularmodern relationship had its beginnings in the 19th centurywhen a king undertook a cleansing and reorganization of the sangha.“After that, state and religion in Thailand became even moreclosely associated than before, and attempts have been made tojustify government policy by Buddhist principle.” 8 The sangha in SriLanka and Thailand, both in the distant past and in modern times,not only served their society’s religious needs, but more concretesecular needs such as supporting a particular political ideology.4 Carrithers p. 1185 Carrithers p. 1106 Carrithers p. 1227 Bunnag p. 1888 Bunnag p. 18789 Robert Bowers Curl Laicization in Japanese Buddhism 90

Newar Buddhism in KathmanduWedged between India and Tibet, the Kathmandu Valley ishome to a form of Buddhism closely resembling late Indian Buddhismbefore its disappearance. Mixed with elements of Hinduismand the caste system, Newar Buddhism has several contrasting elementswith the Theravada tradition. The primary one being that“The monks are not celibate, renunciatory monks who out of vocationhave abandoned their families. Rather they are hereditarymarried monks who live outside the monastery, have professions,and live within society.” 9 In other words, the Newar monks would,according to Theravada definitions, not be considered monks at all,despite having undergone similar ordination rituals and occupyinga similar place in Newar society. From a Theravada perspective,these are not monks but householders who have given up anascetic life. From the Newar perspective, however, they are seen as“householder monks.”The tradition of householder monks is not a recent developmentin Kathmandu; “The institution of householder monks wasprobably already well established…by the 11th century.” 10 Yet itwas not the only local tradition, as “at that time there was a coexistingtradition of celibate monasticism.” Indeed, a system of celibatemonkhood coexisted with the married monkhood in Kathmandu.Thus, this type of householder monk (whom Theravadans wouldnot consider a monk) has existed for almost a thousand years, attimes in concert with the celibate monkhood. It cannot be seen asa recent development in response to some sort of doctrinal challenge.By what means does a Newar become a householder monk?The ordination requirements are quite different from those of theTheravada traditions. Newar ordination is only open to youngprepubescent boys who are the sons of other monks. These adultmonks are in turn members of one specific caste the Śākya or Va-9 Von Rospatt p. 28210 Von Rospatt p. 294jrāchārya. The boys are welcomed into the fold of monkhood overa four-day period, beginning with an ordination rite. At the endof the ordination rite, the boys become fully ordained and truemonks. Over the next three days, the new monks participate in awide variety of rituals. At the end of the fourth day, the boys disrobeand return to their normal existence. However, for the rest oftheir lives, they are able to act and are treated as if they are fullfledgedmembers of a Buddhist sangha. The vast majority of theboys will never become household priests and be initiated into thesecret esoteric traditions of true clerics. Indeed, most grow up, getmarried, have children, and retain their day jobs. However, duringany period of ritual worship that requires them to act in their rolesas monks, they are able to do so and are treated as if they had neverrenounced their vows. “Thus, Newar Buddhism is not a ‘Buddhismwithout monks’ as some observers have held, but a Buddhism withmonks who have turned householders without giving up theiridentity as monastics.” 11 This identity is on full display during theNewar worship of the Primordial Buddha (Dīpaṃkara). The monksof the Newar sangha act as “merit fields” for people, receiving donationsjust as a renunciatory monk with an alms bowl would.While these householder monks are most certainly “Buddhist”in a Newar context and participate in ritual festivals, theydo so with some reluctance. During several of the major festivalswhere they are required to act in their role as a fields of merit forpeoples’ donations, on occasion they will not appear in person butrather send their children to receive donations, citing feelings ofdiscomfort with receiving gifts from members of lower castes. Thereluctance to fulfill their monastic roles also makes them a poorchoice for tending to the ritual needs of the laity. Therefore, it isimportant to reiterate that the majority of (sometimes reluctant)householder monks do not perform the services typical of actualpriests. The reasons for this are twofold. First, only those of the Vajrāchāryasubcaste are able to act as priests. Second, only a handfulof those in the Vajrāchārya subcaste actually go on to take thenecessary additional esoteric ordination rites that allow them toperform as priests. This role is usually hereditary since the roles of11 Von Rospatt p. 29291 Robert Bowers Curl Laicization in Japanese Buddhism 92

the clients (yajamāna, Newari: jajmān) these priests serve are likewisehereditary. Nevertheless, the role of the priest is extremelyimportant, as the priests perform the day-to-day rituals of NewarBuddhist religious life, including life-cycle rituals, funerary rites,and the very important fire ritual (homa). 12 It is important to keepin mind that the actual priests who perform rituals for their clientsare, just as the householder monks, married individuals who gaveup their monastic vows as children. This means that, from a differentBuddhist perspective, householder priests are living contradictions;on the one hand, they are fully capable of acting as monkpriests,but on the other they have ceased being monks officially.Yet the Newar lay community does not appear to consider themincapable of performing their duties as priests and does not considerthem unusual.Despite having given up their vows, the relationship thesemonks have with their parishioners as figures with religious poweris just as real as in the Theravada tradition. However, NewarBuddhism’s relationship with the state stands in stark contrast tothe Buddhism of Sri Lanka and Thailand. Nepal has, to put it mildly,suffered a series of challenges since the 1950s and is just nowbeginning to take steps toward stability, along with the recent introductionof Internet technology and other conveniences. It is notsurprising that in this context, Newar Buddhism has struggled tofind its place. The modern state has done little to protect NewarBuddhism from challenges to its religious existence; “Most of theland endowed for religious purposes over the centuries has comeunder governmental control or been misappropriated, therebyeffectively depriving Newar Buddhism of the material basis thattraditionally secured the continuation of its cultures and practicesand upkeep of its monasteries.” 13 While it would perhaps beoverstating things to view this as a direct state-sponsored threatto Newar Buddhism, it is certainly indicative of a larger trend. Inshort, rather than having a strong state/sangha relationship asin Sri Lanka or Thailand (where the modern state and the sanghacontinue to have a tight relationship that extends into the political)12 Von Rospatt p. 29313 Von Rospatt p. 296the Newar tradition does not maintain such a close relationship.While it is certainly true that the former king of Nepal engaged inthe ritual celebrations of the Buddhist community and it was possibleto see a kind of jostling for position between the king and thesangha during these rituals, the king was not granted any “moralauthority” from the Newar sangha to govern the country. The Nepaleseking’s duty was to protect all the religions of the KathmanduValley, rather than just Buddhism. In this context, it is importantto note that the king himself was not Buddhist, but rather Hindu.Thus, unlike the Theravada traditions from which the identity ofthe state and the religious identity of Buddhism are almost inseparable,there does not appear to be such a deep connection betweenthe former Hindu monarchy of Nepal and Newar Buddhism. NewarBuddhism’s defining qualities do not include a rooted relationshipto the state.Japanese Buddhism in the Late Edo and Meiji PeriodsThe story of Japanese Buddhism’s evolution into its currentform cannot be understood without first exploring its form in theEdo period.Buddhism arrived in Japan in the 6th century and spreadfrom a practice of elites in the court to the entire country. Buddhistsanghas grew in power, and were even considered threats by secularleaders interested in power. Oda Nobunaga’s rivalry with thewarrior monks of the Tendai sect, resulting in his famous destructionof their Mt. Hiei temples and the killing of almost 3,000 peoplein 1571, is probably the best-known example of this type of antagonism.14 However, with the defeat of Tokugawa’s enemies and thebeginning of the Edo period’s political stability, Buddhism enteredinto a long and productive partnership with the Japanese state.The first part of this partnership was based on the Tokugawagovernment’s attempts to take a census of the nation’s populationand its efforts to control population movement. In order to accomplishthese goals, the Tokugawa government enlisted the help14 Bowring 200593 Robert Bowers Curl Laicization in Japanese Buddhism 94

of Buddhist temples. Each individual living in a Japanese town wasrequired to register with their local priest, while a ledger of thisregistry was kept in the local temple. If an individual moved, theirmove would be recorded and their new domicile would be enteredinto the record of their new local priest. Whenever a family experienceda birth or a death, this too would be recorded in the templeledgers.The second part of this partnership involved the Tokugawagovernment’s attempts to police sectarian law by providingsecular punishments for sectarian law violations. If a priest werecaught breaking one of their precepts (especially the ones regardingsexual conduct with women) he was to be beaten, strippedof his robe, forcibly laicized, and quite literally thrown out of thetemple. The punishment for these crimes sometimes changed, sothat one recorded forced laicization involved the convicted monkbeing forced to crawl around his temple three times on his handsand knees while practically naked, and another speaks of crucifixion.15 The purpose, however, was always the same, namely to keepthe sangha free of individuals who would break their vows whileenjoying their elevated social status. At first, the secular punishmentsfor sectarian crimes may appear harsh. However, becominga priest in Edo Japan was no small matter. Indeed, once one wasordained, the initiate’s name was changed to a Buddhist name, andall connections to their previous life were wiped away, includingclass affiliation. They ceased to use their secular names and wererecorded in a second, separate register unconnected to the registerof common subjects. Jaffe writes of the special privileges affordedthe clergy:When in attendance at the local magistrate’s office, Buddhistclerics were allowed to sit one level higher than commoners. …Theywould be allowed to have an assigned seat at the daimyo’s residenceduring his New Year celebration. In recognition of their role outsideof secular society, the clergy were placed primarily under the controlof their…head temple. 1615 Jaffe p. 2316 Jaffe p. 17Thus, Buddhism was brought into the administrative circleof the Tokugawa regime. This high status and deep connection tothe state was visible on many levels besides the temple registry dutiesof monks. Sect power was measured, in part, by the respect andstatus bestowed upon by the shogunate. Leaders of sects wouldgrudgingly compare notes on how each of them were received bythe shogun, taking offense if they were required to walk certaindistances rather than being allowed to ride in the palanquins to theentrance of the shogun’s chambers.During this long period of stability, the Buddhist communitywas often the subject of harsh edicts from the bakufu, especiallyregarding the problem of secret marriages resulting in hereditarypassing of temple abbothood. Dubbed nikujisaitai ( 肉 食 妻 帯 , literally“meat eating and marriage”) due to its connection to the breakingof the vow against meat eating, it was considered a problem byboth Buddhist leaders and the shogunate. The concern of Buddhistleaders revolved around doctrinal matters, while the shogunatewas concerned primarily with the abuse of inheritance laws. Theshogunate took great pains to try and prevent the passing of abbothoodfrom father to son, and the Buddhist leadership was morethan happy to accommodate.The fall of the shogunate government in 1868 signaled aquick end to the favored status of Buddhism. Due in part to theideological underpinnings of the Meiji Restoration, Buddhism soonfound itself under attack from both the laity and members of thegovernment as an “old evil” of the past, with the understandingthat Shintoism would replace it. Jaffe writes:The Meiji Restoration temporarily brought…hard line Shinto andNativist scholars…to positions of power in the newly established Departmentof Rites. Seeking to provide an ideological foundation forthe new government, Meiji leaders distanced themselves from theBuddhist institutions that had given support to the Tokugawa government.17Indeed, the fact that Buddhism had been a pillar within theTokugawa government’s power structure was a key reason that the17 Jaffe p. 5895 Robert Bowers Curl Laicization in Japanese Buddhism 96

new Meiji government turned on the sangha. However, this was notthe sole reason, as Nativist scholars sought to expel Buddhism asa “foreign” influence (because of its Chinese origin) while raisingShintoism (seen as a proper “native” Japanese religion) to greaterheights. The entire construction of the new religion of “state Shinto”is beyond the scope of this paper, but Jaffe and other authorshave covered this extensively. It is sufficient to note that for thepurposes of constructing a new “Japanese” national identity, leadersof the Meiji government felt it important to construct an all-inclusivereligious identity that united the people under a single banner.Shintoism, with its supposed connection to the imperial linestretching back to the mythological beginnings of Japanese history,was the perfect candidate to take the place of Buddhism.Because of the push to marginalize Buddhism, the religionfound itself under attack from the state rather than being supportedby it. The Meiji government quickly did away with the templeregistration system, severing the main connection Buddhist leadershad day-to-day government administration. Instead, the newcentral bureaucracy implemented a new citizen registration systemknown as the koseki ( 戸 籍 ,literally “housedoor registration”),while the place of registration moved from Buddhist temples toShinto shrines under the purview of the new bureaucracy. TheMeiji government did not stop with the removal of the Buddhist’spower over the census; in addition, the new government passeda law eliminating the special registry for Buddhist priests, forcingthem to register under the new koseki system as commoners (oras nobles, according to their previous class status). In essence, thegovernment engaged in a campaign of forced laicization againstthe Buddhist clergy. Buddhist clerics became liable for carrying aprotection charm from their local Shinto shrine marking them asa citizen. They became susceptible to the military draft. They alsolost their Buddhist names gained in ordination. By the time theMeiji government had completed these tasks, the only thing legallyseparating a monk from a commoner was his affiliation with a particularsect. 18As if the forced laicization of monks were not a severe18 Jaffe p. 95enough blow to traditional Buddhist orders, shortly after theforced laicization of monks, in 1872 the government issued a proclamationdeclaring that nikujikisaitai was not only legal, and thusno longer subject to harsh punishments, but it encouraged monksaround the country to marry. This caused a massive uproar withinthe Buddhist hierarchy and many sect leaders spent long periodsof time in Tokyo pleading with the government to rescind theorder. 19 While the government did bend slightly to accommodatesectarian desires, complete cancelation of the order was not forthcoming.The Meiji leaders at the Ministry of Doctrine saw sectarianrestrictions on marriage as backward, and in their race to showWestern powers that they were a modern nation, vigorously encouragedclerical couplings.The reader is likely to be amazed at what appears to be acomplete 180-degree turn in Japanese Buddhism’s fortunes. Whileduring the Edo period the sangha was a protected and cherishedmember of the state’s order, the Meiji government cast Buddhismout and forced numerous changes upon the sangha that did notappear to be in its best religious interests. Instead of helping policethe sangha, as it had in the past, the state endeavored to changeand even destroy it. In fact, at some points the state actually preventedthe sangha from policing itself, citing the national interestin modernization. 20Without the state’s support of the sectarian code of disciplineit enjoyed in the Edo period, clerical marriage spread inexorablythrough the ranks of the Buddhist priesthood. Sect leaderscould do little more than issue proclamations and watch helplesslyas the number of temple families living openly increased. In time,the conversation about clerical marriage changed from the needto eliminate it as an evil, to a conversation centered on what theBuddhist sects could do to recognize and care for the pitiable stateof temple families. By the year 1900, there were calls not only fromnew Buddhist lay organizations to encourage, and in some casesdemand marriage, but there were also internal pressures fromwithin Buddhist sects to integrate temple families into Buddhist19 Jaffe p. 14820 Jaffe p. 15297 Robert Bowers Curl Laicization in Japanese Buddhism 98

clerical life. The first call for Buddhist clerical marriage normalizationin Japan was written in 1887 by a former monk, and soonthereafter members of the clergy joined his call for marriage normalization.21 By 1937, almost all monks were married. 22Today, Japanese temple families are, by and large, the normfor Buddhist clergy. Approximately 90% of monks are married, andthese monks continue to engage in temple practice and are consideredby parishioners to be as capable in their religious dutiesas unmarried clerics. It is interesting to note, however, that 73%of Japanese people express a preference for married over unmarriedclerics. 23 Moreover, clerics engage in family life while still takingvows of chastity at ordination, despite the fact that marriedclerics will likely go home that very evening to share a bed withtheir spouse. This means that, in a different sense than the householdermonks and priests of Newar Buddhism who officially “giveup” their role as monks but continue to serve, married JapaneseBuddhists are nonetheless living contradictions doctrinally. Varioussects provide different answers to these questions, from explanationscentered around modern Buddhists living in the LastAge of the Teaching and being therefore unable to live up to thehigh standards of monkhood laid out during the time of Siddhartha,to claims based on the necessity of their founder’s marriageto a woman who stood in for a Bodhisattva. In addition, Buddhistclerics are now assured that their son can legally and officially inherittheir temple and position should they choose to do so, anotherradical change from the Edo period.This is a massive and complete reversal from lay preferencesand expectations during the Edo period, where clerics convicted ofviolating their precepts were considered outcasts. In essence, thepractice of Buddhism as a religious device for lay members has notchanged, though the sectarian machinery behind it has. Buddhistmonks are still called upon to officiate funerary services, go on retreatsto Mt. Koya, and provide consultations on difficult mattersjust as their predecessors did for a thousand years. Yet nowadaysthey often do it with the help of a temple wife and look forward to21 Jaffe p. 16822 Jaffe p. 23423 Jaffe p. 2their sons officially (and legally) inheriting their roles. To reiteratethe two main points of our discussion: 1) The Meiji state engagedin a campaign of forced laicization, in which the Buddhist clergywere stripped of their special legal status and made to registerwith local authorities as commoners or other class of layperson. 2)After the campaign of forced laicization, the state decriminalizedmeat eating and clerical marriage, which had been punishable bysecular proceedings under the Tokugawa state.ConclusionAt this point several things should have been clear: Japanesemonks are not the only Buddhist monks in Asia to practicemarriage; and there is a clear distinction between the relationshipof Buddhism to the state in Theravada and Newar traditions; reflectsthe massive shift in the relationship between Japanese Buddhismand the Japanese state in the late 19th century.These three facts make clear that Japanese Buddhism duringthe Edo period enjoyed a relationship with the state resemblingTheravada Buddhism’s relationships with the Sri Lankan and Thaistates, with strong connections between the government and sangha.These relationships resulted in significant secular power andsecular status for the sangha, as well as occasional government interventionto “cleanse” the sangha. Additionally, monks who broketheir precepts were not considered able religious figures by the laity.In contrast, after the Meiji Restoration and its subsequent seriesof laws that amounted to forced laicization, Buddhism transitionedto a model that resembled Newar Buddhism. The links to the stateweakened to the point where it provided little to no protection forthe sangha, breaking down discipline in the sangha, yet withoutan accompanying loss of status as figures with religious power. Inthe same way as the householder monks (and more specifically,the householder priests) of Newar Buddhism, Japanese monksare free to engage in lay life and continue their role as religiousfigures despite their existence as living doctrinal contradictions.Moreover, their sons are entitled to inherit their temple and clientbase should they chose to, just as in the Newar tradition. To wit, it99 Robert Bowers Curl Laicization in Japanese Buddhism 100

appears that Japanese monks are not so singular in their ability toget married and at the same time be regarded as having religiouspower by their parishioners.The illusion that Japan’s married clerics are somehow singularin Asia is a popular myth that continues to the present. Examplesin both the popular press 24 and in scholarly writing 25 pointto a persistent belief that Japan’s phenomenon of monks who aremarried is a very “Japanese” tradition, consistent with a unique,long past. The historical genealogy of this belief can be seen in thelate Meiji period, when apologists from both the lay context andpriestly context began to build their case that married monks werefully in line with the “Japanese” spirit. While this spirit of nationalismcan be understood in its historicized context of the projectof building a kokutai ( 国 体 , national body or national identity), itseems suspect to repeat these notions in the current age when anample body of evidence rshows that married monks in Nepal areconsidered full and proper members of the sangha by their society.What is unique in the Japanese context, beyond the non-trivialfact that the monks in Japanese Buddhism continue to take vows ofcelibacy during their ordinations, is the fact that this widespread“problem” of nikujisaitai combined with the pressures of modernizationduring the Meiji period resulted in rapid change in the relationshipbetween the sangha, government, and society.This doctrinal contradiction related to marriage is not asmall matter, as pushes to eliminate nikujikisaitai from JapaneseBuddhism continue to the present day. It also may be confusing toconsider that Newar monks do officially give up their vows of celibacywhile Japanese monks never disrobe and “officially” returnto lay life. However, I urge the reader to focus on the similarities ofhow the monks are perceived in both cultures. In both the Newartradition and in the Japanese tradition these figures are consideredmonks. It appears, then, that the married Japanese Buddhist monk(despite the breaking of his vows of chastity) is every bit as religiouslypowerful and Buddhist as his Newar counterpart (despitethe Newar having given up his robes officially). Rather than a re-duction in status that should come with “giving up” renunciatedlife, modern Japanese Buddhists appear to have the same status asreligious figures for their parishioners, just as Newar householdermonks and priests continue to do.Japanese Buddhism is still in a state of transition, as the doctrinalfights over nikujikisaitai have still not been entirely resolved.However, it seems unlikely, with a majority of the clergy havingfamilies, that there is any way to recork the bottle. It is up to thereader to decide if Japanese Buddhism’s transition to a Newar-esquemodel has left it in a stronger position to answer the religiousconcerns of 21st century laity or if it has done irreparable damageto the integrity of Buddhism.24 Sueki 2012; Inoue 201225 Nakamura 2011101 Robert Bowers Curl Laicization in Japanese Buddhism 102

GlossaryDīpaṃkara – Sanskirt name of the Primordial Buddha,a Buddha that existed before the commonly known historicalŚākyamuni Buddha. In an age before the historical Buddha attainedhis enlightenment, Dīpaṃkara Buddha gave the historical Buddhaa chance to begin his spiritual journey towards Buddhahood.Śākya – The name of the original historical Buddha’s tribe,contained within his name of Śākyamuni. This name has been takenby one of the two householder monk castes in Newar Buddhism torefer to itself.Vajrāchārya – The second of the two castes involved in thehouseholder monk system of Newar Buddhism, and the only casteable to take additional esoteric ordination to become full priestsable to perform the fire ceremony for their client parishioners.yajamāna, Newari: jajmān – A Newar Buddhist term that refersto a Vajrāchārya priest’s collection of client parishioners thatis typically inherited patrilineal.homa – The original Sanskrit name of an important fire ceremonyconnected with Esoteric Buddhism, performed for clientparishioners in the Newar tradition by their Vajrāchārya priest.This practice continues within Japan in the Shingon tradition ofMount Koya, where it is known as goma ( 護 摩 ).sangha – The term for the Buddhist community, traditionallyencompassing practicing monks.nikujisaitai – Literally “meat eating and marriage”, a wordthat was coined during doctrinal debates in the Edo period to describethe transgressive practices priests were engaging in despitetheir vowsbakufu – Literally “tent office” ( 幕 府 ), used to describe thegovernment of the Japanese shogunate.REFERENCESBowring, Richard J. The Religious Traditions of Japan, 500 -1600. Cambridge, UK. 2013.Bunnag, Jane. The Way of the Monk and the Way of theWorld: Buddhism in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia. in The World ofBuddhism: Buddhist Monks and Nuns in Society and Culture, editedby Heinz Bechert and Richard F. Gombrich, New York: Facts onFile. 1984.Carrithers, Michael. “They Will Be Lord upon the Island”:Buddhism in Sri Lanka. in The World of Buddhism: BuddhistMonks and Nuns in Society and Culture, edited Heinz Bechert andRichard F. Gombrich, New York: Facts on File. 1984.Jaffe, Richard M. Neither Monk nor Layman : Clerical Marriagein Modern Japanese Buddhism. Honolulu, Hawai’i: Universityof Hawaiʻi, 2011.Kashiwahara, Yusen and Koyu Sonoda. Shapers of JapaneseBuddhism. Tokyo. 2013.“Konjaku Monogatarishū.” University of Kyoto. Last modified2003. Accessed March 28, 2013. http://edb.kulib.kyoto-u.ac.jp/exhibit/konjaku/kj_top.html.Nakamura, Ikuo. Nikujiki Saitai Kō: Bukkyō No Hassei. Tokyo:Seidosha. 2011.Nobutaka, Inoue. “An Introduction to Religion at Workin the World - Article #2 of a Series - East Asia in Japanese Buddhism.”Weekly Toyo Keizai, 11 Feb 2012,.Sueki, Fumihiko. “Study of Buddhist Scripture -1000 Yearsof Japanese Wisdom - The Chronicle of Eizon.” Asahi Shinbun, 30Jul 2012.Sugimoto, Yoshio The Cambridge Companion to ModernJapanese Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2009.Ury, Marian. Tales of Times Now Past: Sixty-Two Storiesfrom a Medieval Japanese Collection. Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1979.von Rospatt, Alexander. “Contemporary Buddhism Class103 Robert Bowers Curl Laicization in Japanese Buddhism 104

Lectures.” University of California – Berkeley. Kroeber Hall, BerkeleyCA. August – December 2012.von Rospatt, Alexander. The Transformation of the MonasticOrdination (pravrajya) into a Rite of Passage in Newar Buddhism.in Words and Deeds: Hindu and Buddhist Rituals in SouthAsia, edited by Jorg Gengnagel, Ute Hüsken, and Srilata Raman.Wiesbaden:Harrassowitz. 2005.von Rospatt, Alexander. The Survival of Indian Buddhismin Nepal. in Blackwell Companion to South and Southeast AsianBuddhism, edited by Michael Zimmermann,:Blackwell. Forthcomming.105 Robert Bowers Curl Laicization in Japanese Buddhism 106

Contact the Berkeley Student Journal of Asian Studies if you areinterested in submitting for future editions, or if you are interestedin becoming involved with the Editorial Commission. Emailberkeleysjas@berkeley.edu, or visit our website at ieas.berkeley.edu/gas/sjas/.