Using Economic Sanctions to Prevent Deadly Conflict Elizabeth S ...

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main points are relevant to this criticism. First, while the injury to innocents is a drawback to sanctionsuse, the cost should be compared to the benefits that sanctions provide. The value of avoiding harm toinnocents is not absolute, and should give way if the benefits of sanctions are greater . 33 Second, thelikely alternative policy instrument--force--usually also risks harm to innocent civilians.B. Sanctions Efforts Since the End of the Cold WarThe previous section established the limitations of directly extrapolating from the past sanctionsrecord and literature to predict the effectiveness of economic sanctions in the post-cold war era. Thissection explores a more revealing indicator of future sanctions' success: the effectiveness of U.S.-ledeconomic sanctions since 1989. Post-1989 cases are more comparable to possible future sanctionsefforts than pre-1990 cases because they occurred in an international environment free of Soviet-American competition. Arguably, the end of the cold war brightens the prospects for success, since theperennial cold war black knight problem has disappeared. On the other hand, without the alarmingspecter of an enemy superpower, it may be more difficult to build and maintain coalitions that caneffectively impose sanctions. 3433 Sanctions' harm to innocents is an injury that the innocents may welcome when they share the sanctions' goals.For example, Claudette Antoine Werleigh noted the paradox of "seeing the poor in Haiti, although hurt and deeplyaffected by the embargo, stand by it and exert pressure for strengthening its enforcement, while other groups in theHaitian society who were well-off and far less hurt by its impact press for its end." Werleigh, "The Use of Sanctions inHaiti: Assessing the Economic Realities," in Economic Sanctions, 161. See also, Pamela Constable, "Dateline Haiti:Caribbean Stalemate," Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 92/93): 175-176, 183; "Still Embargoed," The Economist, 10 October1992, 54. Nevertheless, sanctions should of course be targeted as much as possible at the government and its primarysupporters.34 I thank Sam Huntington for suggesting this argument.
Which view is right? The post-1989 record is brief but it does shed light on the answer, andsupports the optimistic view. In the eighteen sanctions efforts the United States has initiated since 1990(see Table I), no country has tried to frustrate international sanctions efforts; nor have any newproblems disarrayed sanction coalitions. Forcefully applied U.S.-led sanctions have succeeded at a highrate.Three of the post-cold war sanctions efforts – Iraq (1990-), Haiti(1991-1994), and Yugoslavia(1992-1995) – are examined below. These cases were selected for two reasons. First, these casesrepresent forceful rather than half-hearted efforts to bring sanctions to success. The breadth of thetactics reveals the senders’ seriousness of purpose in these three cases. In each case a broadinternational coalition was organized in support for the sanctions effort, used all available economicsanctions (trade cutoffs, aid cutoffs, and financial sanctions), and used sanctions in conjunction withother policy instruments (for example, force or threat of force). Hence these are the cases that showwhat can be accomplished when the sender states are serious.Second, I focus on Iraq, Haiti, and Yugoslavia because the goals included dampening conflict.One involved conflict resolution and the other two, conflict prevention. Yugoslavia is an example ofsanctions used to resolve a deadly conflict. 35 In Iraq, Saddam Hussein has previously attached twoneighboring states –Iran and Kuwait. Through scud missile attacks on Israel he also demonstrated hiswillingness to widen conflicts. In addition, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction would likely be targetedat Israel. Thus, while the sanctions against Iraq35 Ending a war (conflict resolution) is of course a different task from preventing the outbreak of fighting in thefirst place. However, success at conflict resolution means that lives will be saved as deadly conflict is stopped andfuture conflict prevented.
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Using Economic Sanctions to Prevent Deadly Conflict Elizabeth S ...

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