Using Economic Sanctions to Prevent Deadly Conflict Elizabeth S ...

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targeted at the Haitian elites until January 1994. 49 This was a serious omission since the coup that oustedAristide was sponsored by the Haitian elites. Thus, sanctions would have to be targeted against these elitesin order to bring about a policy change. Moreover, the early sanctions contained loopholes that allowed U.S.businesses to continue operating in Haiti, were prematurely loosened during the crisis before Haiti fullycomplied with U.S. and UN demands, and were accompanied by weak official American rhetoric and signsof U.S. irresolution. 50 Hence, it is not surprising that the sanctions were initially ineffective. 51In the end, however, the sanctions did make a positive contribution to the outcome in Haiti, largelybecause they were finally toughened and targeted at Haiti's economic and49 Most strikingly, the assets of the Haitian military in the United States were not frozen until January 1994, morethan two years into the crisis. "U.S. Extends Economic Sanctions on Haiti," New York Times, 28 January 1994, A7.50The half-hearted and tentative nature of U.S. sanctions is revealed by the slow and meandering chronicle of theirimposition. Not until May/June 1994 were forceful sanctions imposed by a broad international coalition.Shortly after Aristide's overthrow, in September 1991, the United States suspended aid, trade, and all transactionswith the Haitian government. OAS sanctions followed shortly. But in February 1992 the Bush administration createdexemptions for U.S. businesses operating in Haiti. Only in June 1992 was the embargo broadened to deny U.S. portaccess to ships engaged in commerce with Haiti. Only in June 1993, nineteen months into the confrontation, did theUN finally impose an oil embargo on Haiti. This embargo was suspended two months later in August after the Haitianjunta signed the Governors Island Agreement, but before they complied with it. The oil embargo then was re-imposedin October 1993 when the junta reneged on that agreement. Also in October 1993-two years into the confrontation-theUnited States finally froze the assets of forty-one government supporters. Only in January 1994 did the United Statesfinally freeze the assets of members of the Haitian military and prohibit transactions with them. Commercial air servicewith Haiti was banned and financial transactions further restricted only in June 1994. Erin Day, Economic SanctionsImposed by the United States Against Specific Countries: 1979 Through 1992 (Washington DC: CongressionalResearch Service, CRS Report for Congress, 10 August 1992, 513-514, 523-525; Paul Lewis, "U.N. Again ImposesSanctions on Haiti After Pact Fails," New York Times, 14 October 1993, Al; "U.S. Extends Economic Sanctions onHaiti," New York Times, 28 January 1994, A7; Heather M. Fleming, "Give Sanctions Time To Bite, Gray TellsLawmakers," CQ Weekly Report, 11 June 1994, 1540.51 Arguing that U.S. mixed signals and lack of resolve unnecessarily prolonged the Haitian crisis is Werleigh, "TheUse of Sanctions in Haiti," 170.
military elites. No doubt the junta's September 1994 decision to step aside was triggered by the U.S.forces airborne for Haiti, but economic sanctions helped set the stage. Once the sanctions weretoughened to include a total trade embargo and asset freezing, they crippled the Haitian economy andcaused economic suffering for the elites. 52 This helped convince the elite to accept Aristide's returnleaving the military rulers without their base of support, and in no mood to resist the U.S. invasionforce. 53 Hence, they were more willing to leave power peacefully when the United States threatenedforce.Thus, despite being poorly implemented at first, the economic sanctions against Haiti eventuallyinjured the Haitian elites and thereby eased Aristide's restoration to power. The damage to the Haitianeconomy also may deter other military leaders from considering antidemocratic coups.Yugoslavia. The United States and the UN imposed aid, trade, and financial sanctions onYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) during May-June 1992 to persuade it to reign in its Bosnian Serbclients and thus bring an end to the war that erupted in Bosnia Herzegovina in April, 1992. 54 Thesesanctions were lifted in late 1995 following the Dayton Accords that halted the war in Bosnia.The sanctions devastated the Yugoslav economy and helped persuade Yugoslav PresidentSlobodan Milosevic to end his war for a greater Serbia. In late 1995, Milosevic52 Howard W. French, "Haiti's Poor Feeling the Pinch As Sanctions Ruin Economy," New York Times, 15November 1993, A7; and "Tightening the Stranglehold," The Economist, 6 August 1994, 35.53 "Sanctions Work," The Economist, 4 September 1993, 41; Rick Bragg, "Many of Haiti's Elite ResignThemselves to Aristide's Return," New York Times, 25 September 1994, 16.54 Day, Economic Sanctions Imposed by the United States Against Specific Countries, 425-428; "Wide-rangingSanctions Imposed Against Yugoslavia," UN Chronicle 28, no. 3 (September 1992): 5-12.
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Page 8 and 9: Moreover, the cost of imposing econ
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