Lenin, Trotsky, Germany and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk The ...

Lenin, Trotsky, Germanyand the Treaty of Brest-LitovskThe Collapse of the World Revolution,November 1917-November 1918Yuri Felshtinsky®2012Russell Enterprises, Inc.Milford, CT USA1

Lenin, Trotsky, Germany and the Treaty of Brest-LitovskLenin, Trotsky, Germany and the Treaty Of Brest-Litovsk:The Collapse of the World Revolution, November 1917-November 1918by Yuri FelshtinskyISBN: 978-1-936490-48-6© Copyright 2012Yuri FelshtinskyAll Rights ReservedNo part of this book may be used, reproduced, stored in a retrieval systemor transmitted in any manner or form whatsoever or by any means, electronic,electrostatic, magnetic tape, photocopying, recording or otherwise,without the express written permission from the publisher except in thecase of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews.Published by:Russell Enterprises, Inc.P.O. Box 3131Milford, CT 06460 USAhttp://www.russell-enterprises.cominfo@russell-enterprises.comCover design by Janel LowrancePrinted in the United States of America®We invite you to “like” Russell Enterprises on Facebook!2

Table of ContentsIntroduction 5Chapter 1: The Bolsheviks and Germany 16Chapter 2: The Birth of the Bolshevik-Left SR Coalition 31Chapter 3: The Formation of the Soviet Government 47Chapter 4: The Beginning of Peace Talks in Brest-Litovsk 65Chapter 5: The Convocation and Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly 85Chapter 6: The Problem of Revolutionary War 103Chapter 7: Trotsky’s Middle Way (Neither War nor Peace) 119Chapter 8: Lenin’s Middle Way (The Respite) 131Chapter 9: The Peace that Never Was: The Transcaucasus 150Chapter 10: The Peace that Never Was: Ukraine 160Chapter 11: The Strategy of Desperation 168Chapter 12: On the Way to a One-Party Dictatorship, April-June 179Chapter 13: Count Mirbach’s Mission 198Chapter 14: The Assassination of Mirbach 206Chapter 15: The Destruction of the Left SR Party 223Chapter 16: The Breakdown of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty 251Epilogue 266Chronology 275Abbreviations 284Bibliography 285Endnotes 303Index 345About the Author 3523

IntroductionThis book is devoted to the history of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed onMarch 3, 1918 by the Soviet government and the Central Powers 1 . In all of Sovietforeign policy, there was probably no agreement more fragile than this one: lastingfor slightly more than nine months, the Brest-Litovsk treaty was annulled bythe German and Soviet governments, and subsequently, following Germany’scapitulation in World War I, also repealed by the 116th article of the Treaty ofVersailles. Nonchalantly characterized as a “respite” by Vladimir Lenin, the agreementmet with criticism and resistance from an overwhelming majority of revolutionaries,on the one hand, and of Russian patriots, on the other. The former claimedthat the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was a stab in the back of the German revolution.The latter called it a betrayal of Russia and its allies. Both were, in their own way,correct. However, for reasons that no one could fathom, Lenin insisted on theTreaty of Brest-Litovsk and finally saw it ratified.The evolution of Lenin’s views after he came to power in November 1917*, andthe aims that Lenin set for himself before and after the takeover, are crucial issuesfor the study of the history of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk – and crucial issues, aswell, for the history of the world revolution. It would be a mistake to believe thatLenin’s views changed with changing circumstances. It would be more correct tosuppose that in any situation he found the best means of achieving his goals. Theclaim can be made that Lenin’s whole adult life was devoted to struggle – andbeginning around 1903, to a struggle for power. It would be difficult to say whetherhe needed power in order to secure victory for the revolution or whether therevolution was for him a means to obtain power.Since until 1917 Germany appeared to be the leader of the revolutionary movement—itsSocial Democratic Party was the most powerful in the world – a worldrevolution naturally presupposed a revolution in Germany. The revolution did——————————————————* Until February 1, 1918, Russia was on the Julian calendar, which differed by 13days from the Gregorian calendar used in Western Europe. Thus, the Bolshevikcoup, which took place on October 25 according to the Russian calendar, happenedon November 7 according to the Gregorian calendar. Consequently, in Russiathe Bolshevik Revolution is called the October Revolution, while in WesternEurope it is known as the November Revolution. On January 26, 1918, the Sovietgovernment officially announced a transition to the Gregorian calendar, and February1 in the Old Style became February 14 in the New Style. Trying to minimizethe confusion that inevitably arises when Russian historical dates prior toFebruary 1 (14), 1918 are mentioned, historians in Russia often gave both datesor specified whether a date was given in the Old Style (O.S.) or the New Style(N.S.). In the present publication, all dates are given in the New Style, accordingto the Gregorian calendar.5

Lenin, Trotsky, Germany and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsknot necessarily have to begin there, but its victory in Germany seemed to allrevolutionaries to be a prerequisite of success. The Social Democratic rhetoric ofthe time did not allow for any other conception of the world revolution. And theRussian revolutionary Lenin, prior to March 1917, saw no greater role for himselfthan that of the leader of the extremist wing of Russia’s Social Democraticmovement, which was unquestionably secondary and subsidiary to the Communistmovement in Germany.In the days leading up to the war, it was to Germany’s Social Democratic movementthat the eyes of all the socialists in the world were turned. It seemed that byvoting against giving the government war credits in the Reichstag, the GermanSocial Democratic Party could stop the impending tragedy. The German socialists,however, voted in favor of the war credits, in part because they hoped thatthe war would topple the monarchy in Russia, which they regarded as the principalenemy of the international socialist movement. 2By voting for the war credits, Germany’s socialists gave a free hand to the socialistsof other countries. A Social Democratic newspaper owned by Menshevikdefencists commented on these events as follows:The International has turned out to be weak. Germany’s Social Democracy, theInternational’s most powerful component, not only did not oppose its governmentwhen the government declared war on Russia and France and threw its army atsmall, neutral Belgium, but used all its strength to support its Kaiser... It is ridiculousand naive, therefore, to count on a German revolution. The socialists ofRussia, France, England, Italy, Belgium, and so on, must, therefore, take part inthe defense of their countries and struggle for victory over the central empires. 3However, if the Menshevik defencists (whose newspaper was French-funded andpublished in France) became disillusioned with Germany’s Social Democracy,most of the Menshevik Party still continued to pin its hopes on nothing other thanthe German revolution. These hopes were so great that when the prominent SwedishSocial Democrat Karl Branting arrived in Petrograd in the spring of 1917, 4 hecould only warn the Mensheviks against being overly optimistic in expecting thatthe German workers would arise “under the influence and in support of the Russianrevolution,” … while German soldiers stick their bayonets in the ground.”Branting believed that as long as the German army was winning, hopes of a revolutionaryexplosion were utopian.Branting was regarded as someone who was well acquainted with the views ofthe leaders of the German Social Democratic Party. And what he said came asunpleasant and unexpected news for the Mensheviks. At a meeting convenedduring Branting’s visit, Irakli Tsereteli read an impassioned speech, calling on“the European socialist proletariat” to “rescue the Russian revolution” by “activelyseeking to put an end to the war as soon as possible by means of a demo-6

Introductioncratic peace treaty.” But Branting had nothing comforting to say and could promiseno support. 5In any event, the Mensheviks were misguided in hoping to find in Branting anobjective judge of the unfolding situation. Branting, who like most socialists hadbeen raised to revere German Social Democracy, had at the beginning of the wartaken a sharply anti-German stance, advocating the need to fight against Germanyand sympathizing with the Triple Entente, above all England (not withoutpersonal pecuniary motives, it was said). In Petrograd, he called on Social Democraticinternationalists to abandon their own position and to support the call tofight against Germany until it was defeated, 6 rather than idly waiting for the startof the German revolution.In assuring the Mensheviks of the weakness of the German Social DemocraticParty, Branting was pursuing a specific objective: to prevent the formation of acoalition between German and Russian Social Democrats (directed against theTriple Entente); to keep the Provisional Government of Russia, formed after March1917, in the anti-German camp; and to neutralize the efforts being made to bringabout a separate peace agreement between Russia and Germany.The Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party believed – just as theMenshevik wing did – in the eventual triumph of socialism around the world.This seemed as obvious then as, say, the inevitable demise of colonial empiresdoes today. The answer to the question: “Will the world revolution come?” wasinvariably positive, built entirely on faith in its ultimate victory. After November1917, however, this once-theoretical question had to be re-examined from a morepractical angle. What was more important: to preserve Soviet rule in Russia –where the revolution had already taken place – at any cost; or to try to organize arevolution in Germany, even at the price of losing Soviet rule in Russia?In 1918, the answer to this question was not as obvious as it might seem today.The consensus among Europe’s socialist leaders was that in backward Russia itwould be impossible not only build socialism, but also to hold on to power forany extended period of time without support from European socialist revolutions,if only because (as the Communists believed) Russia’s “capitalist encirclement”would consider it imperative to overturn its socialist regime. In this way,the revolutionaries believed that only a revolution in Germany could guaranteethat the Soviet government would remain in power in Russia.Lenin thought otherwise. In November 1917, breaking out of oblivion in Switzerlandand seizing power in Russia with lightning speed, he showed his manyopponents how much they had underestimated this singular individual – the leaderof a small extremist sect. Bolshevism not only seized the reins of power in Russia,but created a real and unique staging ground for launching a world revolution7

Lenin, Trotsky, Germany and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk– for organizing a Communist coup in Germany itself, on which, as everyoneassumed, the ultimate victory of socialism in the world would depend.Now Lenin began to assign a completely different role to himself in the worldCommunist movement. It was important for him to bring about a world revolutionunder his own direct leadership and to preserve his position of leadershipwithin the International. For Lenin, the German revolution took second place tothe already victorious revolution in Russia. Even more than that: the revolutionin Germany must not happen too quickly, since when it did, the center of gravityof the Communist world would shift to the industrialized West and Lenin wouldbe left behind as nothing more than the head of the government of an “underdeveloped,”“backward,” and “uncultured” country.It is in the light of Lenin’s changed views about the revolution in Germany thatone must examine the whole history of the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk betweenDecember 1917 and March 1918, which concluded with the formation of a peacetreaty between Russia, on the one hand, and Germany and the other Central Powers,on the other.Lenin’s position at these negotiations – his insistence on forming a “Tilsit truce”for the sake of a respite from war with Germany – seems so reasonable that onecan only marvel at the adventurism, naiveté, and carefree idealism of all of hisopponents, from the Bukharin-led Left Communists to Trotsky with his formula“neither war nor peace.” To be sure, Lenin’s position seems correct mainly becauseit appeals to notions that most people find familiar: a weak army cannotfight against a strong one; if resistance is impossible, a peace treaty must be signedin the face of an ultimatum. But this is an ordinary person’s way of thinking, nota revolutionary’s. Such a way of thinking would not have made it possible toseize power in November 1917 and to hold on to it against a coalition of socialistparties as Lenin had done, with Trotsky’s help, in the days following the takeover.Indeed, such a way of thinking would have made it impossible to be a revolutionary.For some reason, the entire core of the party, with the exception ofLenin, was against signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; in fact, a large number ofparty functionaries supported Trotsky. And no one viewed the state of things aspessimistically as Lenin. What were all of these people thinking, then? Whatwere they counting on?The revolution and the revolutionaries were subject to their own special laws.These laws were perceived by the majority of the population as incomprehensible,deranged, and irrational. But when it abandoned these laws, the revolutionperished. In them lay its only source of power and its only hope for victory. Leninstepped back from these laws for the sake of preserving his personal power andleadership in the world Communist movement. From the point of view of absoluteCommunist interests, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was a catastrophe. It unequivocallydestroyed any chance of an immediate revolution in Germany, and8

Introductionconsequently, of a revolution in Europe. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, formedagainst the wishes of the majority of the revolutionary party, became the firstopportunistic step taken by the Soviet government.Ironically, it turned out that in order to secure a victory for the revolution inRussia, a potential revolution in Germany had to be sacrificed – while in order tosecurity a victory for the revolution in Germany, it might have been necessary tosacrifice Soviet rule in Russia. This was the choice represented for the Sovietgovernment by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk – the first clash between the interestsof the international revolution and the need to cement the power of the CommunistParty in Russia.” 7 A peace treaty with Germany gave the German governmenta certain respite from fighting and improved the general state of the country.As the Left SRs wrote at the time, “the formation of this peace treaty sloweddown the work of the International: bread from regions occupied by Germanyreconciled hungry German workers and soldiers with the German government,” 8while the fact that Russia had “thrown itself on the mercy of the winning sidestrengthened German imperialism not only materially, but spiritually as well.” 9By contrast, the Soviet government’s refusal to sign a treaty would have worsenedGermany’s military and political situation and increased the chances for aGerman revolution. This, at least, was the view shared by the German Communists,on the one hand, and the German government, on the other. As early asDecember 1917, German leftists had tried to prevent the formation of a separatepeace between Russia and Germany. They distributed a declaration which statedthat any peace negotiations would have a ruinous effect on a likely revolution inGermany and must be aborted. 10The positions of Karl Liebknecht, the leader of the German Communists, andLenin, the head of the Soviet government, were unequal. The German Communistsdemanded a revolution in Germany for the sake of a world revolution. Leninstood for the preservation of the Soviet government in Russia at any price, so thathe might preserve power in his own hands and, in time, come to reign over theinternational Communist movement. 11If Liebknecht did want to save the top position in the future Comintern for himself,then this did not go against the interests of the European revolution. Lenin wasunlucky: by signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk for the sake of his own power, hedestroyed any chance (however slight it had been) of a victory for the Communistrevolution in Germany and in Europe.It was initially believed that the Bolsheviks were engaging in peace talks with theGerman government exclusively for the purpose of propaganda and in order togain some time, not in order to sign an actual treaty. Liebknecht emphasized thatif the negotiations “did not lead to peace in the spirit of socialism,” it would benecessary “to curtail the negotiations, even if their [Lenin’s and Trotsky’s]9

Lenin, Trotsky, Germany and the Treaty of Brest-Litovskgovernment should fall because of this.” 12 Lenin, however, was playing his owngame in the negotiations and seeking to obtain a temporary truce with the Germanimperial government, seeing in this his only means of preserving power in hisown hands and of splitting up the unified capitalist world, i.e., his aim was toform an alliance with Germany against England and France.Liebknecht saw the promise of victory in a German revolution. Lenin saw it inplaying on the contradictions between the Central Powers and the Triple Entente.Liebknecht was interested in seeing Germany lose the war as quickly as possible.Lenin, in signing a separate peace, wanted to see Germany avoid losing the warfor as long as possible. He feared that Soviet rule in Russia would be overthrownby the joint efforts of Germany and the Triple Entente as soon as a peace treatywas signed on the Western Front. 13 But in signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk anddelaying Germany’s defeat, Lenin was doing exactly what Liebknecht hadeffectively accused him of doing: sabotaging the German revolution. 14 It is notsurprising that the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty led to a split within theBolshevik Party and within the Soviet government and to the formation of a leftopposition – an opposition that, for the first and last time, operated openly andofficially within the Bolshevik Party as an autonomous organization and evenhad its own newspaper. Meanwhile, Lenin, who had emerged nominally victoriousand forced the party to agree to the peace treaty, began losing his power over theparty. Decisions carried out by the Bolshevik leadership were made more andmore often against his will. His own brothers-in-arms could not forgive him soeasily for the “rotten compromise” with the Kaiser’s government and the lostchance for a quick revolution in Germany.The theoretical and ideological defects of Lenin’s Brest-Litovsk policy, however,were far less noticeable than the practical ones. Despite imposing extremelydifficult conditions on Russia and the Bolshevik Party, the Treaty of Brest-Litovskhad resulted neither in the coveted armistice, nor in the “respite” promised byLenin. From the point of view of the German leadership, the Brest-Litovskagreement was a “military measure and served merely as a means of aiding theWestern Front, by eliminating the Eastern front and strengthening the Westernfront, while simultaneously using the Eastern districts for economic purposes inorder to continue the war.” 15 This being the case, the deterioration of Germany’sposition in the West had to increase its appetite in the East. After the peace treatywas signed, military activity did not stop for a single day on most of the territoryof the former Russian empire. Germany continued presenting new ultimatumsand occupied entire districts and cities located to the east of the demarcation lineestablished by the Brest-Litovsk treaty. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk turned out tobe merely an agreement on paper precisely because the two main partners in thepeace talks – the Soviet and German governments – did not take the agreementseriously, did not consider it final, and most importantly, signed it not in order tosecure a peace, but only in order to continue the war, but under conditions thatwere more favorable to them. The Bolsheviks were thinking of a revolutionary10

Introductionwar, the Germans of a war for a stable peace. As it turned out, even if the Treatyof Brest-Litovsk did provide a respite, then it was only for Germany, and onlyuntil November 1918.There is no point in arguing that Lenin could have foreseen the consequences ofthe Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. But it is evident that the majority of the party’s activistssaw the worst of their apprehensions realized. They had supported Trotsky’sformula “neither war nor peace” before the peace treaty was signed. By therevolutionaries’ standards, Trotsky’s position was moderate. He did notcompromise Russian Bolsheviks in the eyes of the “German proletariat” by signinga peace treaty with the Kaiser’s imperialist government, but he also did not rushinto Bukharin’s impetuous adventurism, lacking the necessary strength. Like theLeft Communists, Trotsky believed that signing a peace treaty would not guaranteethe cessation of military operations, that the revolutionaries had no reason to trustthe “imperialists,” that Germany would continue to take offensive action when itcould. And under such circumstances, it was better to sign no documents at all,but to appeal to the proletariat of all countries and even to make use of the TripleEntente’s assistance.During those months there was a widespread view in revolutionary circles thatGermany was in no condition to take offensive action, and that even if it didmanage to launch an offensive, it would not be able to hold on to occupiedterritories without paying for this with an uprising in Berlin. The Bolsheviksbecame even more confident of this after the assassination of the Germanambassador, Count Wilhelm von Mirbach, in Moscow on July 6, 1918: after theGerman ultimatum that was received in response to the killing was categoricallyrejected by the Soviet government, the whole incident was consigned to oblivionby the Germans themselves. Subsequently, until the Brest-Litovsk treaty wasannulled first by the German government (October 5, 1918), and then by theSoviet government (November 13, 1918, two days after Germany’s capitulationin the First World War), a legal truce endured between Russia and Germany. InOctober-November, the truce was terminated, although Germany and Russia didnot declare war on each other. The two countries thus established formal relationswith one another that looked a great deal like Trotsky’s formula – “neither warnor peace.”Such a state of affairs, according to Trotsky’s plan, was of course nothing morethan a respite, preparing the Bolshevik Party for its next move: revolutionary war(except by contrast with Lenin’s respite, Trotsky’s respite did not have to be paidfor by the Bolsheviks with an agreement with “imperialists”). This revolutionarywar began on November 13, 1918, when the Bolsheviks launched a decisivewestward offensive. It was more than successful, and by February 1919, Soviettroops had passed through Vilno and reached the border of Eastern Prussia. Bythis time, Soviet republics had already been proclaimed in a number of northernand central German cities.11

Lenin, Trotsky, Germany and the Treaty of Brest-LitovskDuring these days, Lenin was effectively marginalized. All of the key decisionspertaining to the revolution in Germany were made by the Central Committee ofthe Bolshevik Party without him. Even the decree terminating the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was published as a decree of the Soviet parliament – the All-RussianCentral Executive Committee (VTsIK), signed by Yakov Sverdlov – and not as adecision of the government – the Soviet of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom),which was headed by Lenin. The revolution in Germany was still only beginning,while Lenin was already losing his power. With Rosa Luxemburg and Trotsky incharge of the theoretical side of things, and with Liebknecht and Sverdlov incharge of the practical side, Lenin was ceasing to be irreplaceable. Possibly, itwas precisely for this reason that he never took the risk of convening the Cominternwhile Liebknecht and Luxemburg were still alive. Only in March 1919, two monthsafter the leaders of the German Communist Party and Lenin’s rivals for leadershipin the International were murdered, and immediately following the mysteriousdeath of Sverdlov – Lenin’s rival for leadership in the Bolshevik Party in Russia– did Lenin convene the first Comintern congress, initiating the practice of breakingup Western Communist parties and handpicking delegates to suit Soviet ends. Ashead of the Communist International, he appointed the Bolshevik GrigoryZinoviev, who had not written a single theoretical article, but who was a skillfulparty operator. And since the German revolution had suffered an obvious defeat,Soviet Russia became officially and definitively established as center of the worldCommunist movement; and even those who refused to concede to it a position ofideological leadership were forced all the time to contend with it.* * *The German problem was the most important problem confronting the Russianrevolutionaries, but not the only one. The Soviet state and Lenin’s governmentalso had internal enemies. In November 1917, Lenin had to defend the BolshevikParty’s right to form the Soviet of People’s Commissars, and he had to hold ontopower in a standoff with a bloc of socialist parties that fought for the formation ofa multiparty “homogeneous socialist government.” In this conflict, Lenin cameout victorious thanks to the fact that, at the crucial moment, he was supported, onthe one hand, by Trotsky, and on the other hand, by the Left SR Party, politicalcollaboration with which became the dominant factor of party politics during thefirst half of 1918.In November 1917, anarchy reigned in Russia. The Provisional Government, whichhardly controlled the course of events even during the best moments of its existence,ceased to be a political force. In this vacuum, the Bolshevik coup was moreof a paper declaration than a factual takeover of the country’s government by theBolsheviks. No one understood this better than the leaders of Russia’s politicalparties. Naturally, the replacement of the unreal Provisional Government with anequally unreal Bolshevik government had little effect on the general chaos inwhich Russia was submerged.12

IntroductionBut, it seems, the one thing that made the Bolsheviks different from other politicalgroups and parties was the fact that the Bolshevik Party was headed by Lenin,who had a clear vision of the next goal that he had to achieve: a governmentunder his own leadership. It is impossible to understand the Russian Revolutionwithout understanding Lenin’s psychology and goals. And the personality of thisindividual, which in many respects remains a riddle for historians, requires aseparate study. For the purposes of the present work, we must focus on Lenin asa person with a maniacal manner of thinking, absolutely convinced that he isright, and in addition a brilliant tactician in political struggles. It is fair to say thatwithout Lenin, the Bolshevik Party would not have become the leading socialistpolitical faction. Only Lenin’s authority within the narrow circle of the Bolshevikleaders who comprised the Central Committee, only their recognition of Lenin’sunsurpassed political talent, assured him ultimate victory at first within the party’sCentral Committee, and then in collisions with the Bolsheviks’ political adversariesor sympathizers. As a tactician, Lenin outweighed not only the entire BolshevikParty, but the entire bloc of Russian socialist parties as well.After daring to seize power in Petrograd in November 1917 and winning thestruggle within his own Central Committee on the issue of the formation of a onepartyBolshevik government, Lenin – who had little sympathy for the principlesof bourgeois parliamentarism – had no intention of going into retirement, althoughin a year it was clear to everyone, from the Bolsheviks’ opponents to theirallies, that the period of Bolshevik rule had left Russia in a catastrophic condition.Lenin and the Bolsheviks did not have many options open to them duringthe first year of the Russian revolution. They could either cede power to the blocof socialist parties or they could destroy these parties, establishing a one-partydictatorship. The Bolsheviks chose the latter path. The question of whether theymade this choice freely or under constraint is purely academic. Apparently, whatdrove everything was Lenin’s relentless desire to preserve power for himself inorder to implement his political program. And since the Bolshevik Party wasalone in being willing to acknowledge Lenin’s authority – sometimes with caveats– he was forced to choose the path of repressions, already during the very firsthours of the revolution, which led him very quickly to a one-party dictatorship.The chapters that deal with the collaboration between the Bolsheviks and the LeftSRs are not aimed at examining their work in local governments. This work hadno direct connection with the political life of the party leadership in Petrogradand Moscow. Far more significant during this period was the ability of the LeftSR leadership to conduct a tactical struggle for power. By contrast with the Bolsheviks,who had Lenin as an acknowledged unsurpassed leader, the Left SRswere not able to find a leader capable of uniting the party through his authorityand will. The prominent Russian revolutionary Mark Natanson, one of the leadersof the left wing of the SR Party, always preferred to remain in the shadowsand did not aspire to the role of party leader. And Valentin Karelin or Boris Kamkov,minor figures, did not have enough weight for such a role. Maria Spiridonova,13

Lenin, Trotsky, Germany and the Treaty of Brest-Litovskthe acknowledged leader of the Left SR Party, was only a symbol, whose namewas successfully used for propaganda among the bottom ranks. As a party workerand tactician, however, Spiridonova could stand no comparison with Lenin.As we find nothing surprising about the rivalry between the Bolsheviks and theMensheviks, who had initially belonged to a Social Democratic Party, we shouldnot be surprised by the split between the left wing of the SR Party and the SRParty itself. The first signs of this split appeared in 1915 in connection with differingattitudes toward the war. However, these were not the same Left SRs – orat least, these were not always the same Left SRs – who later formed the Left SRParty. Evidently, a party that included such dissimilar individuals as the Right SRMark Vishniak, on the one hand, and the extreme leftist Prosh Proshyan, on theother, could not survive the tumultuous events of 1917 and remain united. “Thehistorical cause of the split... lies far beyond the boundaries our of party,” Kamkovwrote at the time. “It cannot be explained by the details of party politics. We aredealing with a specific, concrete instance of a broader, international phenomenon.The war vividly revealed the fact that contradictory elements had ended upwithin the same party, and they could not but come apart.” 16The present work therefore touches only superficially on the causes for the departureof the left wing from the SR Party. Theoretical disagreements, if we believethat any such disagreements existed, had little relation to the factual splitthat followed the fight for power waged by Left SR functionaries in the local andcentral governments in 1917-18. And it was not an accident that it was preciselythe Left SRs’ recognition of the legitimacy of convening the Second Congress ofSoviets (that is, the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power) that made the split between theLeft SRs and the SR Party final. The struggle waged by the left wing of the SRParty for a place in the revolution and for power made the split inevitable.Nor does the present study investigate factors that might be characterized as “constants.”Among these may be included Russia’s economic collapse, which grewworse with every month under Bolshevik rule; the anarchy due to the absence ofa stable government in the country; the complete defenselessness of the peacefulpopulation in city and village before any armed force, as a result of the anarchy;and the famine and unemployment that spread as a result of the economic collapse.To this list might be added also the danger of engaging in counter-revolutionaryspeech. To a lesser degree before the Bolsheviks and the Left SRs came topower, and to a greater degree after they did so, these phenomena accompaniedthe Russian Revolution (just as they had once accompanied the French Revolution)and were unlikely all that unexpected for Russian revolutionaries. Rather, itmight have seemed that all of these perils should have united Russia’s socialistparties, forcing them to form a “homogeneous socialist government” (which wasadvocated by the SRs, the Mensheviks, and the labor unions, and opposed socategorically by Lenin and Trotsky). However, what Lenin cherished most wasnot the socialist revolution in general, but the socialist revolution under his own14

Introductionleadership. And this is one more reason why the present work does not deal withthe “constant factors of the revolution”: Lenin’s struggle for a one-party dictatorshipin the country was not provoked by these problems, but only exacerbatedthem by putting a greater and greater distance between the ruling minority andthe majority of Russia’s population.Yuri FelshtinskyBelmont, MassachusettsJune 201215