Book Review - Australian Army

Last modified: Friday 31 May 2013 — 8:05 PMBook ReviewPeter Williams, The Kokoda Campaign 1942: Myth and Reality,Cambridge, Melbourne, 2012, 304 ppReviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Gavin Keating, SO1 Amphibious Development,Deployable Joint Force HeadquartersMythology plays an important role in the way that societies frame theirhistories and this is particularly true for the profession of arms. Australia’smilitary history offers numerous examples of this phenomenon —Breaker Morant, the landings at Gallipoli, the Rats of Tobruk and the Battle of LongTan have all been mythologised to varying degrees. This process can play a usefulpart in developing national pride. However, as Redgum’s popular song I Was OnlyNineteen puts it, ‘the Anzac legends didn’t mention mud and blood and tears.’Peter Williams’ The Kokoda Campaign 1942: Myth and Reality seeks to tackle oneof Australia’s most mythologised military events. He focuses on the period betweenJuly 1942, when the Japanese first landed in Papua, and November when they werecomprehensively defeated at Oivi-Gorari. The book’s central thesis holds that theconstant retelling of the story of the campaign has distorted its realities in a waythat makes it very difficult to accurately understand the campaign itself. Williamsassesses that the core of the Kokoda myth lies in the belief that it was ‘the largeJapanese numerical superiority that enabled them to advance as far as they didtowards Port Moresby.’ In his view, the unquestioning acceptance of this belief hasserved to conceal other reasons for the series of defeats suffered by the Australiansduring the first stages of fighting. Moreover, it has served to support other myths,such as that the Australians inflicted high casualties on their advancing enemies,which have only further confused the historical record.While many Australian historians are now using Japanese sources to cover thiscampaign, Williams has made a particular effort to exploit these sources. As he notesin his introduction, ‘if we try to explain an historical event involving two belligerentsusing sources from only one of them, then we should hardly expect to get it right.’He makes extensive use of the records of the Japanese units comprising the NankaiAustralian Army Journal • Volume X, Number 1 • page 99

Book Review • Gavin KeatingShitai (South Seas Detachment), particularly manning and casualty reports. Theseallow him to demonstrate that the Australian forces on the Kokoda Track were neveroutnumbered to the extent that they believed, or which later became accepted asfact. During the opening skirmishes they were outnumbered by one and a half toone and, at the first major battle, at Isurava in late August, the numbers were even.At their last major defeat, at Ioribaiwa in mid-September, the Australians withdrewfrom a strong defensive position despite outnumbering the Japanese almost twoto one. Thereafter, when the Australians went on the offensive, they maintainednumerical superiority for the remainder of the campaign.Much of the book attempts to explain the real reasons for the Nankai Shitai’ssuccesses during the first half of the campaign. In doing so Williams tackles anumber of the related myths surrounding the fighting. The Japanese were actuallywell informed on conditions on the Kokoda Track thanks to a comprehensiveintelligence collection program which had begun in the 1930s. They supplementedtheir own reconnaissance with information provided by German sympathisersliving in New Guinea and open source material purchased in Australia. Manypopular accounts of the campaign highlight the supply problems encountered bythe Japanese as a major factor in their final defeat. The Japanese supply system,while austere by Western standards, was actually well organised and optimised tosuit light forces operating in difficult terrain. There was a supply crisis during thecampaign, but it lasted for less than six weeks, was caused by massive flooding inSeptember, and impacted on only a small part of the total Japanese force, albeit withsignificant consequences. Similarly, the Japanese medical system proved effectiveand illness had more of an impact on the Australians, at least until December, whenthe Japanese had been pushed back to the Buna-Gona beachheads. Williams creditsthe Japanese superiority in firepower as a significant contributor to their successes.They had considerable experience in employing mountain artillery and used their37mm, 70mm and 75mm guns to consistently outmatch the Australians, whose lightmortars and machine-guns were inferior in range and firepower.Perhaps the most valuable contribution made by this book is to place thecampaign within its wider strategic context. The single most important factor thatinfluenced the Japanese conduct of the Kokoda campaign was the US invasion ofGuadalcanal in August 1942. Within days of this development Major General HoriiTomitaro, commander of the Nankai Shitai, was ordered to maintain the bulk of hisforces north of the Owen Stanley Range and delay his advance on Port Moresby.The four infantry battalions that continued to advance south from Isurava were onlyever intended to secure a favourable position on the southern side of mountainsin preparation for the moment Horii was released to resume the offensive. Thediversion of large numbers of Japanese troops to reinforce the ultimately futiledefence of Guadalcanal meant that this never eventuated. Williams concludes thatpage 100 • Volume X, Number 1 • Australian Army Journal

The Kokoda Campaign 1942: Myth and Realityit is more accurate to argue that it was the US Marines at Guadalcanal who weremost important in Port Moresby’s salvation rather than the Australians fightingalong the Kokoda Track.Early in the book the author asks whether it was the qualitative superiority ofthe Japanese which accounted for their early successes. His detailed examination ofthe fighting provides examples of tactical flair and ineptitude on both sides. Whilethe Japanese generally outmanoeuvred their opponents during their initial advance,they fell far short of being ‘super jungle soldiers’. On at least two occasions entireJapanese battalions became badly lost trying to outflank the Australians; during thefirst major battle along the Kokoda Track this enabled the defenders to escape whatwould otherwise have been a severe defeat. It was not until the victory at Oivi-Gorarithat clear evidence of the Australians achieving a qualitative superiority over theirenemy emerged. By this time most of the Australians involved in the early fightinghad been replaced with fresh troops.Military mythology may well play an important role in the way societies thinkabout their wartime histories. However, by obscuring some of the less glorioustruths about war, it can act as a double-edged sword. Distorted history does littleto assist today’s military professionals to study the past as they prepare themselvesfor future conflicts. The Kokoda Campaign 1942: Myth and Reality provides a moreaccurate and nuanced understanding of a campaign that has a great deal to teachthose willing to look beyond popular misconception and understand what reallyoccurred during those difficult days.Australian Army Journal • Volume X, Number 1 • page 101