Fighting Crime with a Little Help from my Friends ... - Sciences Po

More documents

Recommendations

Info

nificantly lower homicide rates in the years following the election. This effect is sizeable -25 to 40% reduction in murder rates - robust to various specifications and independent fromthe identity of the party in power in the neighboring municipalities. Furthermore, politicalalignment appears to have no impact on murder rates prior to the election, confirming thatthe treatment variable is not correlated with pre-election crime incidence. Finally, our findingsdo not provide support for alternative explanations based on the importance of politicalalignment with the ruling party at the state or federal levels further confirming the importanceof horizontal over vertical cooperation.Our research contributes to the crime literature by providing novel evidence that the effectivenessof decentralized law enforcement systems may crucially depend on the degree of interjurisdictionalcooperation that can be supported under decentralization. It also contributesto the broader debate on decentralization by raising awareness that a thorough evaluationof the costs and benefits of decentralization should not only take into account the potentialinefficiencies due to the presence of geographic spillover effects, but also the potential synergiesfrom horizontal cooperation. Indeed, if the gains from cooperation are large enough, acentralized system which might be superior to a non-cooperative decentralized system maynot be preferred to a cooperative decentralized one. Finally, our research provides new insightswith regard to the role of political parties in democratic systems by documenting howparty discipline may foster inter-jurisdictional cooperation and mitigate the inefficiencies ofpoorly designed decentralized systems.18
REFERENCESBrollo, F. and T. Nannicini (2011). Tying your enemy s hands in close races: The politics offederal transfers in brazil. IZA Discussion Paper No. 5698.Caughey, D. and J. S. Sekhon (2011). Elections and the regression discontinuity design:Lessons from close us house races, 1942–2008. Political Analysis 19(4), 385–408.Dal Bó, E., P. Dal Bó, and J. Snyder (2009). Political dynasties. Review of EconomicStudies 76(1), 115–142.Davis, D. E. (2006). Undermining the rule of law: Democratization and the dark side ofpolice reform in mexico. Latin American Politics and Society 48(1), 55–86.Dell, M. (2011). Trafficking networks and the mexican drug war.Gonzalez-Navarro, M. (2008). Deterrence and geographical externalities in auto theft. Technicalreport, mimeo, Princeton University, Princeton.Guerrero-Gutiérrez, E. (2010). Security, drugs and violence in mexico: A survey. In SanMiguel de Allende. Prepared for the Sixth North American Forum.Guillén López, T. (2006). Democracia representativa y participativa en los municipios deméxico: Procesos en tensión. Andrew W. Selee and Leticia Santín del Río. Democraciay Ciudadanía: Participación Ciudadana y Deliberación Pública en Gobiernos LocalesMexicanos. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.Imbens, G. and K. Kalyanaraman (2012). Optimal bandwidth choice for the regressiondiscontinuity estimator. The Review of Economic Studies 79(3), 933–959.Imbens, G. and T. Lemieux (2008). Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice.Journal of Econometrics 142(2), 615–635.Inman, R. P. (2007). Federalism’s values and the value of federalism. CESifo EconomicStudies 53(4), 522–560.Inman, R. P. and D. L. Rubinfeld (1997). Rethinking federalism. The Journal of EconomicPerspectives 11(4), pp. 43–64.Knight, B. (2011). State gun policy and cross-state externalities: Evidence from crime guntracing. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.Lee, D. and T. Lemieux (2009). Regression discontinuity designs in economics. Technicalreport, National Bureau of Economic Research.Lee, D., E. Moretti, and M. Butler (2004a). Do voters affect or elect policies? evidence fromthe us house. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(3), 807–859.19
Page 1: Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d'
Page 4 and 5: «[Mexican] municipal police forces
Page 6 and 7: political alignment with state or f
Page 8 and 9: on the functioning, priorities, and
Page 10 and 11: immediate re-election; hence, they
Page 12 and 13: 4. EMPIRICS4.1. EMPIRICAL STRATEGYO
Page 14 and 15: Our empirical specification is then
Page 16 and 17: from zero. This confirms that polit
Page 18 and 19: α 4 captures whether the effect of
Page 22 and 23: Lee, D. S. (2001). The electoral ad
Page 24 and 25: Figure 2: Municipalities by Mayor
Page 26 and 27: Figure 4: RDD Graphical Analysis% o
Page 28 and 29: Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (Ov
Page 30 and 31: Table 4: Non-Parametric (local line
Page 32: Table 8: OLS Regression ResultsOLS

Fighting Crime with a Little Help from my Friends ... - Sciences Po

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?