Behind the Scenes, Kenya IDP Report - Danish Refugee Council

Chapter 3: The Role of the PWGID: Added Value of a National Coordination MechanismFifth, the absence of accurate and up-to-date dataon the number and status of IDPs caused majorprotection gaps in the group’s work. The processand outcome of the government profiling exercisewas rejected by IDPs as flawed and not credibleas a significant number of affected personsclaimed they were left out arbitrarily. There werealso allegations of corruption against the provinwasconverted to the Advocacy Sub-WorkingGroup (ASWG) and mandated to publicise andlobby for the adoption and implementation of thepolicy and other legal frameworks on the protectionof IDPs. 563.3. Key Achievements of thePWGIDSome remarkable achievements by the PWGIDwere identified by the respondents in this study.First, the PWGID as a coordination forum broughttogether a strong, vibrant and resilient coalitionof state and non-state actors giving prominenceto the issue of IDPs. This sense of shared purposewas created through regular meetings, sharing ofinformation and development of joint strategies.These actors played varying roles in the processlargely depending on their institutional mandates,the technical expertise and personal commitmentof individual PWGID members and the financialresources available from their respective organisations.Indeed, the PWGID managed to enlist the participationof the State in the working group throughthe KNCHR, MoSSP and MoJNCCA. At the fieldlevel, personnel from the Provincial Administrationchaired the field-based PWGID meetings.This elevated the status of its work and gave it theassurance of government support, and to a greatextent allowed the government to recognise its coordinationand intervention mechanisms.The involvement of UN agencies in the workinggroup also enhanced its political standing. ByJanuary 2008, the Government had sanctionedthe establishment of 11 UN clusters, which playeda critical role in the management of the post-electionviolence crisis. This cooperation has sinceevolved from the emergency response phase tomore long-term goals, like formulating a policyand legal framework on internal displacement.The UN agencies involved in the working groupwere UNHCR, UNICEF and UNOCHA.Another remarkable achievement is the fact thatthe PWGID has advocated for the achievement ofdurable solutions for IDPs by monitoring and supportingthe provision of assistance to the affectedcommunities and lobbying for the recognitionof other categories of IDPs (in addition to thosedisplaced by 2007/2008 post-election violence).Stakeholders have also managed to identify theircommon interests through the PWGID, therebybringing consensus and commitment and helpingbuild a common front in intervention. The grouphas thrived despite the diversity of competenciesand expertise dictated by their mandates.The PWGID has also facilitated timely gatheringand dissemination of information on the protectionof IDPs. 57 A case in point was the collectionof data on the number and condition of IDPs afterthe 2007 post-election violence. This process wasundertaken by the MoSSP, in collaboration withthe Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and theUNHCR.In addition, the state and non-state actors broughttogether under the PWGID have enhanced awarenessand carried out capacity-building for variousstakeholders on the protection, provision of assistanceand other mechanisms for durable solutions.Since 2007, the Government has acknowledgedthe need for training of its officers on the rights ofIDPs in order to effectively provide assistance andprotection to IDPs. It has availed officers at differentlevels to attend training sessions, mostly conductedby members of the PWGID. 58Furthermore, the working group promoted the establishmentof child-focused initiatives in its advocacyand dissemination of information on internaldisplacement. In Molo, such initiatives weresuccessful in raising awareness on and advocatingfor child rights and the need for child protectionmechanisms in the area. This resulted in thedeployment of a district children’s officer to assistwith case management of the violations of childrights. In other parts of the country, child-focusedDisaster Risk Reduction was piloted throughschools where children were responsible for cultivatingcrops to mitigate climate change disasters.The group also managed to highlight the protectionneeds of other categories of IDPs beyondthose resulting from the 2007/2008 post-electionviolence. For instance, it undertook a fact-findingmission to Turkana County with respect todrought-induced displacement. The main motivationbehind this mission was to find ways ofextending the mandate of the PWGID beyond theprotection of IDPs displaced by the post-electionviolence to include IDPs resulting from naturaldisasters. 59Finally, the group supported the development ofthe draft Policy and Bill on the protection of andprovision of assistance to IDPs in Kenya. This wasdone as envisaged within the terms of referencegiven to the Working Group in 2009 which was reaffirmedannually and helped the group to engagein long-term interventions beyond responding tothe short and medium-term needs arising from the2007/ 2008 post-election violence.3.4. Key ChallengesThe PWGID did meet some challenges. First wasthe lack of effective local level participation inagenda-setting of the work of the PWGID. Onerespondent lamented that the group’s agenda waswritten in Nairobi without any consultation withthe field-based groups. This affected the linkagebetween the work of the national and field-basedgroups and undermined feedback channels onprotection work as well as advocacy on the policyframework. 60 Even though the advocacy sub-groupof the PWGID remained the most active unit inpolicy work, it lacked representation at the fieldlevel and had to rely on reports from field officersto inform its advocacy interventions 61 . Consequently,field-based stakeholders were concernedabout the poor participation of IDPs at the meetingsdue to inadequate facilitation. They were alsoconcerned about the failure by key state actors toattend their meetings so as to respond to emergingissues.Secondly, limited financial resources coupled withbureaucratic processes, both at the national andfield levels, affected the extent of participation anddecision-making within the group. The burden offacilitating meetings and related activities wasoften left to a few organisations, thereby limitingcollective ownership of projects within the group.This often affected working relationships betweenparticipating organisations and prevented somefrom taking positions on vital issues. Tied to thiswas the “politics of visibility” which sometimesencouraged unhealthy competition amongst themembers.Thirdly, the group suffered from a problem of coordinationat the national and local levels, whichcould be attributed to the lack of a full-time secretariatto run the working group. Additionally, thelack of a definite policy on internal displacementto inform such coordination led to occasional conflictsbetween the MoSSP and other governmentministries. This was particularly apparent in theemergency phase of the post-election violenceas the Ministry of Provincial Administration andInternal Security and the MoSSP jostled for controlof the resources directed to humanitarianresponse and in the resettlement phase betweenthe MoSSP and the Ministry of Lands in regard tofunds for the purchase of land to resettle IDPs.Fourth, the high turnover of persons seconded fromparticipating organisations to participate in themeetings of the working group affected the leadershipand continuity of operations. Some memberstook time to familiarise themselves with thegroup’s agenda, and as such could not participateoptimally in the work of the working group, whileothers did not stay long enough to have impact ondecision-making within the group. This affectedthe output of the group especially on matters thatrequired prompt and effective decision making. 6214Behind the Scenes – Lessons Learnt from Developing a National Policy Framework on Internal Displacement in Kenya 15