1 STATE OF MICHIGAN IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE ...

STATE OF MICHIGANIN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF OAKLANDHEATHER (LUFKINS) ROBINSON,Plaintiff,v. Case No. 06-075909-CZMICHAEL MALIK SR. and JR PROPERTYHOLDINGS, LLCDefendants.______________________________________________________________________/OPINION & ORDER GRANTINGJR PROPERTY HOLDINGS, LLC’SMOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITIONAt a session of said Court, held in the Court Housein the City of Pontiac, Oakland County, Michiganon November 23, 2006PRESENT: HONORABLE MICHAEL WARRENCircuit Court Judge___________________________________________________________________/OPINIONIBefore the Court is a Motion for Summary Disposition pursuant to MCR2.116(C)(8) and (10) filed by Defendant JR Property Holdings, Inc. The Motion,which constitutes this Defendant’s first responsive action to the Complaint,argues that Count I of the Plaintiff’s Complaint - “Action to Quite Title” - must1

e dismissed because the Plaintiff has no right, in equity or otherwise, to thesubject property - a house located at 1907 W. Houstonia, Royal Oak, Michigan(the “Houstonia Property”).November 15, 2006.Extensive oral argument was conducted onIIThe core issue facing the Court is whether the Plaintiff, who haspreviously testified in another action that she had no interest or claim in theHoustonia Property, can subsequently file a lawsuit claiming an interest in thesame property, based on her concession that her prior testimony was perjury.Stated another way, can an admitted perjurer be allowed to use the court systemto file a cause of action in direct contradiction to her prior perjury when theperjury relates to very core of new action? The Court finds that the Plaintiff’scase must be dismissed because to hold otherwise would reward the Plaintiff forcommitting perjury, committing criminal contempt of court, engaging inwrongful conduct, offering contradictory affidavits, and committing fraud on thecourt. Furthermore, the Court must invoke its inherent constitutional authorityto bar the action as means to prevent the perversion of the administration ofjustice and the integrity of the court system.IIIAA motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of thecomplaint. All well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true. Maiden vRozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120 (1999). Thus, a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) maybe granted only where the claims alleged are “so clearly unenforceable as a2

matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.” Id.,quoting Wade v Dep’t of Corrections, 439 Mich 158, 163 (1992). When deciding amotion brought under this court rule, a court considers only the pleadings. MCR2.116(G)(5); Maiden, supra.BA motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests thesufficiency of the factual basis underlying a claim. See, e.g., Radtke v Everett, 442Mich 368, 374 (1993); Quinto v Cross & Peters, Co, 451 Mich 358, 362 (1996).Accordingly, “[i]n evaluating a motion for summary disposition brought underthis subsection, a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions,admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in thelight most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Where the profferedevidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, themoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Maiden v Rozwood, 461Mich 109, 119-120 (1999), citing MCR 2.116(C)(10) and (G)(4); Quinto, supra. 1Substantively admissible documentary evidence “must” be submitted by boththe moving and non-moving parties. MCR 2.116 (G)(3) – (G)(6); Smith v Globe LifeIns Co, 460 Mich 446, 454 (1999). The moving party “has the initial burden ofsupporting its position by affidavits, depositions, admissions or otherdocumentary evidence. The burden then shifts to the opposing party to establisha genuine issue of disputed fact.” Quinto, supra at 362. In so doing, the nonmovingparty must go beyond the pleadings to “set forth specific facts at the time ofthe motion showing that a genuine issue of material fact” exists. Id. (emphasissupplied). The Supreme Court has elaborated:1 Thus, it is within this context of analysis that a court must be satisfied that it is impossible forthe claim to be supported at trial because of some deficiency which cannot be overcome.3

A litigant’s mere pledge to establish a fact at trial cannot survivesummary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The Court ruleplainly requires the adverse party to set forth specific facts at thetime of the motion showing a genuine issue for trial. . . . . [Maiden,supra at 121 (emphasis added).]Accord, MCR 2.116(G)(4) (“When a motion under subrule (C)(10) is made andsupported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon mereallegations or denials of his or her pleading, but must by affidavits or asotherwise provided in this rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is agenuine issue for trial”).Thus, the reviewing court should evaluate a motion for summarydisposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) by considering the substantively admissibleevidence actually proffered in opposition to the motion. A reviewing court maynot employ a standard citing the mere possibility that a claim may be supportedby evidence produced at trial. A mere promise is insufficient under the Rules ofCourt. Maiden, supra 121.IVthat:Count I of the Complaint (Action to Quiet Title) alleges, in relevant part31. Robinson (Plaintiff) is at all time herein mentioned the owner and/orentitled to possession of the property located at 1907 W. Houstonia,Royal Oak, Michigan.32. Robinson is informed and believes and thereupon alleges thatDefendants [JR Property Holdings, Inc. and co-Defendant MichaelMali, Sr.], and each of them claim an interest in the property adverseto Robinson [Plaintiff]. However, the claim of said Defendants, if any,is without any right whatsoever, and said Defendants have no legal or4

equitable right, claim, or interest in said property. [Complaint, 31-32.]Attached to the Complaint is a handwritten statement apparently signed by co-Defendant Malik Senior on May 29, 2002, which states, in relevant part, “IMichael Malik, Sr., give to Heather Lufkins a home located at 1907 W.Houstania.” The Complaint also alleges that the Plaintiff and Malik Seniorengaged in intimate romantic relations while Malik was married. The Complaintomits any specific factual allegation specifically directed against JR PropertyHoldings, Inc. as to why or how the Plaintiff’s claim is superior.In its instant Motion, JR Property Holdings, Inc. (hereinafter “JR Property”or the “Defendant”) argues that the Plaintiff cannot substantiate her claim ofsuperiority. To support this position, the Defendant attaches a Land Contractreflecting that its manager is Michael Malik Junior (not Senior) (Defendant’s ExA); notes that, per the date of the Land Contract – 8/1/01 – JR Propertypurchased the Houstonia Property from MJM Royal Properties 8 months prior tothe statement attached to the Complaint (Id.); attaches a property transferaffidavit filed by Malik Junior, on behalf of JR Properties, with the City of Royaldated August 31, 2001 – almost 7 months prior to the prior to the 2002 statementattached to the Complaint; and attaches a tax statement issued by the City ofRoyal Oak to JR Property in 2002 (Defendant’s Ex C.)Additionally, there is no factual dispute that the Plaintiff, herself, testifiedunder oath in a prior proceeding, Malik v Malik, that the Houstonia Property isowned by Michael Malik, Junior, principal of JR Property. (Reply, Exs 1-2; Ex 2:Q: “With regard to the house on Houstonia, who owns that house? A: MichaelMalik, Jr.”) She also testified that she came to live in the house by way of an“offer” by co-Defendant Malik Senior under which he (Malik Senior) stated that5

“he was buying some property for his son [Malik Junior] and that if I [Plaintiff]was interested, I could occupy it and make … improvements” (she agreed to fixproblems with the home like any problems, electrical and painting). (Reply, Ex3.)Furthermore, on September 17, 2003, more than one year after herdeposition testimony, the Plaintiff signed a handwritten statement before anotary public specifically acknowledging that “Michael Malik owes me nothingand never did.” (Reply, Ex 4.)Based on all of the foregoing evidence, JR Property argues that thePlaintiff cannot sustain her claim to the Houstania Property on the basis of thegratuitous, un-notarized writing attached to her Complaint signed by co-Defendant Malik Senior. More specifically, JR Property argues that the LandContract predates the gratuitous statement (by more than 8 months); as such, theDefendant acquired equitable title to the Property as vendee upon execution ofthe land contract thereby precluding delivery of any gift evidenced by thestatement attached to the Complaint; 2 the Plaintiff cannot contradict her priortestimony or notarized concession; and the Complaint is devoid of any factualallegation which could possibly substantiate the Plaintiff’s claim in light of theLand Contract, the public records of ownership, or the Plaintiff’s prior testimony.The Defendant also argues that, to the extent the Plaintiff is arguing fraud ormistake, she has failed to plead such a claim with specificity as required by MCR2.112(B)(1). Accord Huron Tool and Engineering Co v Precision Consulting Svcs, Inc,209 Mich App 365 (1995) (recognizing that the pleading party must actually setforth specific facts showing the time, place, contents of the misrepresentation, or2 Citing Bowen v Lansing, 129 Mich 117 (1901) (“in equity the land belongs to the vendee, and maybe sold, devised or encumbered by him and on his death will descend to his heirs”).6

nature of the misleading act, facts misrepresented and identification of whatresulted as a consequence).The Plaintiff’s briefing does not challenge the case law cited by theDefendant regarding land contracts (i.e., that the vendee obtains equitable title)or concerning the elements of a valid gift (i.e., that unconditional delivery is anecessary element to finding an inter vivos gift valid and without such delivery,the gift fails). 3 Rather, the Plaintiff argues that the Land Contract is a sham tohide Malik Senior’s actual ownership and/or control over the Property from hisformer wife. (Response at 2). The Plaintiff also argues that summary dispositionis premature and that her affidavit confirms there is a genuine issue of materialfact.However, at oral argument, the Plaintiff admitted that she committedperjury in Malik v Malik when she disclaimed any interest in the HoustaniaProperty, and that her allegations in the instant cause of action conflict with herperjury. Moreover, she did so in the context of directly or indirectly aiding MalikSenior’s fraudulent attempt to prevent the Houstonia Property from beingconsidered his property (as opposed to his son’s property) during his divorceproceedings. 4 Now that the divorce proceedings have ended, the Plaintiff has3 Regarding gifts, JR Property cites unchallenged authority to support its position that, evenassuming that the writing attached to the Complaint evidences an intention by co-DefendantMalik Senior to make a gift (of the Property), the pre-existing Land Contract precluded delivery ofthat gift. Delivery is an event required by law to make an inter vivos gift effective. Ford v Ford,270 Mich 487 (1935) (an inter vivos gift is not effective unless there is both a present intent toimmediately divest oneself of title and an unconditional delivery either to the donee directly, orto someone acting for and on behalf of him); Loop v Des Autell, 294 Mich 527 (1940) (unconditionaldelivery is and always has been an essential element to the validity of a gift: there must beunconditional delivery and the right to any subsequent disposition must be wholly and totallybeyond the donor’s power or the gift fails).4 As noted supra and revealed by other portions of deposition testimony attached to the Reply,the Plaintiff previously clearly, intelligently, and unequivocally testified under oath at adiscovery deposition in Malik v Malik that Mike Malik Junior owns the Houstania Property; thatMalik Senior told the Plaintiff he was buying property for his son; that the terms of the “offer” forher to ”occupy” the premises was to pay for improvements; that no one gave her gifts to pay for7

eversed her position and has filed suit to obtain an interest in the HoustoniaProperty.VGiven the concession at oral argument that she lied under oath in Malik vMalik, the overarching issue in this case is whether an admitted perjurer – whocommitted perjury in a prior action directly involving the subject matter at issue– may nevertheless initiate and prosecute a cause of action that hinges onpleadings and an affidavit that directly contradict the prior perjury. The answeris simple: no. To hold otherwise would turn the system of justice topsy-turvy.The purpose of the justice system is to seek the truth. When the Plaintiffpurposefully committed perjury, she subverted the truth seeking function of thejustice system. She cannot use perjury as her shield and the purported truth as asword.The Courts will not allow her to abuse and denigrate the system of justiceto foil the truth in one case and turn a blind eye to her conduct in another.those improvements; and that at the time – 2001 - she did not look at any property in Royal Oak(where the Houstonia Property is located). (Reply, Exs 1-4.) By contrast, the Plaintiff’ssubsequent affidavit attests, inter alia, that Defendant Malik Senior “told me if I moved to theDetroit area he would buy me house;” that she “selected a house located at 1907 W. Houstonia,Royal Oak, Michigan, which Malik [Senior] purchased for me, but he told me that he could notput it in my name because he did not want his wife to find out about our relationship;” that“Malik [Senior] further told me he was going to hide the transaction from his wife by transferringit to his in a paper transaction;” and that “at all times from 2001, Malik [Senior] alwaysrepresented to me that he owned or controlled the subject property.” (Affidavit, 4-5.)The dates, even viewed most favorably to the Plaintiff, are revealing: the Malik Senior statementattached to the Complaint and relied upon by the Plaintiff is dated 5-29-02. Exactly three monthslater, the Plaintiff provided deposition testimony under oath in the Malik v Malik matter expresslyacknowledging that Malik Junior (not Senior and not the Plaintiff) owned the Houstonia Property.The Plaintiff’s notarized statement just over one year after her deposition testimony is consistentwith her non-ownership: “Mike Malik owes me nothing and never did.” (The Plaintiff does notcontend and did not assert that the “Mike Malik” referenced in her notary affirmation is anyoneother than Malik Senior.8

Otherwise, she would be unjustly rewarded for her original perjury andpotentially in the instant cause of action. This travesty of justice is abhorrent toall standards of fair play, truth, and fairness. In effect, the Plaintiff would berewarded for committing the felony of perjury, 5 criminal contempt of court, 6engaging in wrongful conduct, 7 offering contradictory affidavits, 8 and fraud on5 “Any person who, being lawfully required to depose the truth in any proceeding in a court ofjustice, shall commit perjury shall be guilty of a felony, punishable, if such perjury wascommitted on the trial of an indictment of a capital crime, by imprisonment in the state prison forlife, or any term of years, and if committed in any other case, by imprisonment in the state prisonfor not more than 15 years.” MCL 750.422.6 A party who through act, omission, or statement, “impede[s] or disturb[s] the administration ofjustice,” is considered in contempt of court. Ex Parte Gilliland, 284 Mich 604, 611 (1938), cert den306 US 643; 59 S Ct 583 (1939), rehearing den 306 US 669; 59 S Ct 641 (1939). False testimony underoath constitutes criminal contempt of court. See, e.g., People v Wolfson, 264 Mich 409 (1933); In reScott, 342 Mich 614 (1955).7 See, e.g., Orzel v Scott Drug Co, 449 Mich 550, 558 (1995). In fact, this case is remarkably similarto the situation faced by the Court in Pantely v Garris, Garris & Garris, P.C., 180 Mich App 768(1989), in which the plaintiff sued her former law firm for legal malpractice in her divorce case.Even assuming that the plaintiff had been advised by her counsel to commit perjury in theunderlying case and was under stress to do so at the time, the Court held that her own complicityin committing perjury barred her ability to sue the law firm:We can readily envision legal matters so complex and ethicaldilemmas so profound that a client could follow an attorney’sadvice, do wrong and still maintain suit on the basis of not beingequally at fault. But perjury is not complex; and telling the truthposes no dilemma. Even against the backdrop of a moralrelativism that passes for intellectual sophistication incontemporary America, perjury is wrong. More pointedly, it is acrime. MCL 750.422; MSA 28.664. A law degree does not add toone’s awareness that perjury is immoral and illegal, any morethan an accounting degree adds to one’s awareness that taxfraud is immoral and illegal. . . .Likewise, we fully appreciate the stress Ms. Pantely was forcedto cope with during the divorce proceedings. But we cannotadopt her view that this renders her conduct less wrong thanthat of her lawyers. If stress provided an excuse for perjury, wewould do well to abolish the oath and the hypocrisy it wouldfoster. [Id. At 776-777.]8 Michigan jurisprudence has long established that a party may not raise an issue of fact bysubmitting an affidavit that contradicts the party’s prior clear and unequivocal testimony. Gametv Jenks, 38 Mich App 719, 726 (1972); Peterfish v Frantz, 168 Mich App 43 (1983); Kaufman & Peyton,PC v Nikkila, 200 Mich App 250 (1993); Palazzola v Karmazin Products Corp, 223 Mich App 141 154-155 (1997). The rule is equally applicable to nonparty witnesses. Kaufman, supra; Palazzola, supraat 155. Stated in other words, Michigan law simply does not permit a party to contrive factual9

the court. 9 To protect the integrity of the judicial process, the Plaintiff must beestopped from eschewing her perjury as the very basis for a future lawsuit. 10 In aparallel fashion, the doctrine of unclean hands and/or the wrongful conduct ruleeach bar the Plaintiff’s claim for relief. Although not vigorously pursued in theinstant Motion, the Courts have independent constitutional duty and authorityto maintain the integrity of the judicial process and confidence in the system ofjustice and to halt gamesmanship, perversion, and subversion of the legalprocess.In the event none of foregoing doctrines neatly fit the instantcircumstances (which they clearly do), the time has come for a new doctrine. Nowitness should be free to commit perjury about a material issue in one case andissues merely by asserting the contrary in an affidavit after having given damaging testimony ina deposition. Kaufman, supra at 257. Thus, the affidavit should be disregarded. Id.Similarly, the Plaintiff’s notarized statement, one year after her deposition testimony, clearly andunequivocally stating that “Mike Malik owes me nothing and never did” constitutes a rebuttablepresumption of truth which cannot be overturned absent clear, positive and credible evidence inopposition. Vriesman v Ross, 9 Mich App 107 (1967); MCL 55.307. At no time has the Plaintiffalleged or asserted that the “Mike Malik” referenced in her notarized statement is any one otherthan Malik Senior. The Plaintiff’s affidavit is silent regarding any fact or potential fact that couldalter, change or modify her notarized statement. Moreover, she should be estopped from doingso.9 Fraud on the court exists when “a party has set in motion ‘some unconscionable schemecalculated to interfere’ with impartial adjudication.” Kiefer v Kiefer, 212 Mich App 176, 183 (1995)(citation omitted). Similarly, “A fraud is perpetrated on the court when some material fact isconcealed from the court or some material misrepresentation is made to the court.” Matley vMatley, 242 Mich App 100, 101 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).10 “Estoppel in pais operates to prohibit a person who has made a knowing misstatement of factfrom later denying the truth of that statement.” Detroit Savings Bank v Loveland, 168 Mich App163, 172 (1911). Similiarly, judicial estoppel prohibits parties from subsequently taking positionsinconsistent with prior arguments that they successfully argued in order to “impede[] thoselitigants who would otherwise play ‘fast and loose’ with the legal system.” Paschke v RetoolIndustries, 445 Mich 502, 509 (1994). Accord Michigan Gas Utilities v Public Svc Comm’n, 200 MichApp 576, 583 (1993). See also Bessman v Weiss, 11 Mich App 528 (1968); Opland v Kiesgan, 234 MichApp 352, 362, 364 (1999); Edwards v Aetna Life, 690 F2d 595 (CA 6, 1982). The purpose of judicialestoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial process. Opland, supra at 365. Thus, “[i]ndeciding whether to apply judicial estoppel courts consider ‘”each case . . . upon its ownparticular facts and circumstances.” Id. (citations omitted). See also Johnson v Oregon, 141 F3d1361, 1368 (CA 9, 1998) (“judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, invoked by a court at its owndiscretion, and driven by the specific facts of a case”).10

then bring a cause of action based in direct contradiction of the original perjury.Such action is detestable in the eyes of the law. To allow the perjurer to proceedto invoke the aid and assistance of the court and legal system would makeavailable to the perjurer “the full coercive power of the government . . . .” Shelleyv Kraemer, 334 US 1, 19; 68 S Ct 836 (1948). By permitting such a case to proceed,the Court would in essence become an instrumentality of injustice. This doctrineof estoppel in odium bars any such plaintiff (or counter plaintiff) from pursuing aclaim in direct contradiction to prior perjury that relates to the core issues of thecase.VIEven if this Court were to find that the Plaintiff has the right to file theinstant lawsuit, it is fatally flawed and should be dismissed on the merits.AThe main thrust of the Plaintiff’s argument is that summary disposition isinappropriate because the underlying property transaction was a “scam.” First,as a threshold matter, the Plaintiff cites no law to support her assertions. Thisfailure constitutes abandonment of the issue. See, e.g., Mitcham v City of Detroit,355 Mich 182, 203 (1953) (“It is not enough . . . to simply announce a position orassert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize thebasis for his claims, or unravel and rationalize the basis for his arguments, andthen search for authority either to sustain or reject his position”); Wilson v Taylor,457 Mich 232, 243 (1998) (“A mere statement without authority is insufficient tobring an issue before this Court”); Houghton v Keller, 256 Mich App 336, 339-340(2003) (“[A party] may not merely announce his position and leave it to thisCourt to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims . . . nor may he give11

issues cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority”);People v Jones (On Rehearing), 201 Mich App 449, 456-457 (1993) (failure toprovide cogent argument or supporting authority constitutes abandonment ofthe issue on appeal); Settles v Detroit City Clerk, 169 Mich App 797, 807 (1988) (“Astatement of position without supporting citation is insufficient to bring an issuebefore this Court”); MCR 2.119(A)(2) (“A . . . response to a motion that presentsan issue of law must be accompanied by a brief citing the authority on which it isbased”). Likewise, the Plaintiff cites no authority to support her bald assertionthat if she can prove the Land Contract is a sham, she has a viable claim. Assuch, the issue is deemed abandoned. Id.Second, the Plaintiff’s affidavit is not credible evidence. See, e.g., n 4 and8. It therefore must be disregarded. Kaufman, supra. Bald statements in theaffidavit that the “land contract between Michael Malik Sr., and Michael Malik,Jr., is nothing more than a device to commit fraud upon Malik Sr.’s x-wife andme” also are deficient because they assert nothing more than a legal conclusion.Even if true as to Malik Senior’s wife, the Plaintiff undeniably contributed to thescheme by testifying as she did in the divorce proceeding. Thus, she is in paridelicto, has unclean hands, submitted contradictory affidavits, participated inwrongful conduct, and should be estopped from her challenging her prior factualstatements under oath – all prohibiting her from offering the affidavit incontradiction to her prior testimony. See above discussion.Third, while the Plaintiff’s Response baldly claims duress, she again citesno authority to support this position, thereby abandoning the position. See, e.g.,Mitcham, supra; Wilson, supra; Settles, supra; Houghton, supra. Nor does she offerany evidence to substantiate this bald claim. Even her affidavit is devoid of sucha claim (duress is not even mentioned). Accordingly, this theory cannot salvagethe Plaintiff’s affidavit or her cause. Argument without evidence is pure12

speculation that must be disregarded. See, e.g., Maiden, supra at 121. In anyevent, the Plaintiff’s assertions are also insufficient to reasonably infer thatDefendant Malik Senior controlled or owned JR Property. The proper evidencebefore the Court infers otherwise. See Defendant’s Exhibits.Fourth, the Plaintiff’s Complaint nowhere pleads sham, duress, or fraud.Moreover, such an amendment would be futile as revealed by the analysisinvolving the evidence and law (or rather, lack of law) before the Court. Seediscussion supra.BIn addition, based on the Plaintiff’s prior inconsistent testimony andbecause the Plaintiff’s deficient briefing constitutes abandonment of hersham/fraud and duress theories, the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how theLand Contract constitutes the requisite “independent evidence” required todemonstrate that summary disposition would be premature. Bellows v DelawareMcDonald’s Corp, 206 Mich App 555, 561 (1994) (“if a party opposes a motion forsummary disposition on the ground that discovery is incomplete, the party mustat least assert that a dispute does indeed exist and support that allegation bysome independent evidence”). The Land Contract between an entity owned byMali Senior (MJM Royal Properties) and an entity owned by Mali Jr. (JRProperties, the instant Defendant) is consistent with and otherwise supports thePlaintiff’s own prior deposition testimony that the Houstania Property waspurchased for and owned by Malik Junior. The Plaintiff also conceded, undernotary affirmation, that Malik Senior owes her nothing and never did. 11 Nosubstantively admissible evidence before the Court indicates or infers duress onthe part of the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff cites no authority regarding the issue of11 There is no factual dispute that Malik Senior, not Junior, is the “Mike” referenced in the affirmation.13

duress. Likewise, there is no independent evidence or pleading to support herbald assertion that Malik Senior, not Junior, is the alter ego of JR Properties.Given these circumstances, not the least of which is the Plaintiff’s own priordeposition testimony, the Plaintiff cannot now contrive factual issues – especiallywhen she fails to cite legal authority to support her positions. 12Even if the Land Contract is a sham, based on the authorities before theCourt supra, the Plaintiff’s arguments and subsequent affidavit are insufficient toreasonably infer that she can state a viable claim for title to the HoustonianProperty.VIIThe Court declines to address the Defendant’s MCR 2.605 argument as itis unnecessary and was not raised until the Reply.ORDERBased on the foregoing Opinion, the Defendant’s Motion for SummaryDisposition is GRANTED pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Further, summarydisposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) is GRANTED to the extent the Plaintiffis relying on fraud (and, thus, any alter ego theory) because her Complaint failseven to allege such a theory and certainly fails to plead such a claim with thefactual particularity required by MCR 2.112(B)(1). Finally, based on the legaldoctrines and constitutional authority addressed in this Opinion, because thePlaintiff is barred from proceeding with any cause of action based on hereschewing her prior perjury, the entire case is HEREBY DISMISSED. THIS12 No authority before the Court indicates that an entity owned by a father cannot validly transferreal property to another entity owned by a son.14

ORDER HEREBY RESOLVES THE LAST PENDING CLAIM AND RESOLVESTHE CASE._______________________________________/HON. MICHAEL WARREN,CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE15