Luther's Doctrine of Imputation: Nominalism vs. Aristotelian Realism

48Broaden Journal of Undergraduate Reseachwww.jbu.edu/academics/journal49Luther’s Doctrine of Imputation:Nominalism vs. AristotelianJoshua PriceRealism History & Bible MajorThe theology of German reformer Martin Luther has had a profound impact on Christian history. His doctrine of the imputation of Christ’srighteousness to the believer is no different. This study examines the philosophic underpinnings that support and inform Luther’s doctrineand describes the extent to which Luther is influenced by medieval Nominalism. This study then proposes two methods by which Luther’sdoctrine of imputation might be reconciled with a philosophic commitment to metaphysical Realism.Since the Reformation, scholars of Martin Luther have debated the extent to which his philosophywas influenced by Nominalism. Certain of his doctrines seem inherently nominalist—such asconsubstantiation and the hidden God—and others are opposed to Nominalism, such as Luther’sdoctrine of human will. With some doctrines, it is more difficult to ascertain the extent to whichLuther’s beliefs reflect a Nominalist influence. One such example is Luther’s doctrine of the imputationof Christ’s righteousness to the believer. In this paper, I will explore the extent to whichLuther’s doctrine of imputation was influenced by Nominalism. Next, I will explore the methodsby which an Aristotelian Realist might reconcile the doctrine of imputation with Realism. I arguethat Luther’s doctrine of imputation represents a break from the traditional Nominalist doctrine. Ifurther argue that the best way to reconcile the doctrine of imputation with Aristotelian Realism isby understanding it as a forensic act that provides the grounds for the justification of the believerbefore God.Before delving into the argument, it will be useful to define Nominalism and AristotelianRealism and explain the significance of these positions for the doctrine of imputation. AristotelianRealism refers to the metaphysical position that everything that exists is a composite of form andmatter. Aristotle argued in Book VII Chapter 17 of hisMetaphysics that the form or substance of a thing guides andforms the matter. 1 Thus, universals such as redness exist innature in individual red things, and these individual things arered because they possess the form of redness. This is significantfor the debate concerning imputed righteousness becauseRealism holds that righteousness is a universal that canbe recognized by the accidents that inhere in righteousness.Nominalism is the philosophic position opposed to Realism.William of Ockham, a proponent of Nominalism, asserted inEpistemological Problems that universals do not actually existin nature, but are merely concepts that the mind invents todescribe individual objects. 2 To give an example, the Nominalistsees a dog as a dog not because it has the characteristics of“dog-ness;” instead, he thinks a dog is merely an individualthing to which the human mind ascribes a name. This is significantfor imputed righteousness because it means that, for theNominalist, one could conceivably possess the accidents ofsinfulness and yet, at the same time, be considered righteous.So, a philosophic commitment to Realism or Nominalism hasan important effect on one’s doctrine of imputation.Luther was clearly influenced by Nominalism in some significantways, and it affected his understanding of imputation.One manifestation of this influence is found in his beliefconcerning the nature of the divine will. In Bondage of theWill, Luther defended a voluntaristic conception of God’swill, arguing that no cause or ground determines His will,but that His will is the self-determining rule for all things. 3Thomas Aquinas, an Aristotelian Realist, believed that God’swill proceeds directly from God’s nature, which is used toexplain why God cannot sin. Luther, contra Aquinas, arguedthat the goodness of God’s actions is not determined by theinherent goodness of His nature, but out of His declarationthat His actions are good. 4 For Luther, goodness proceedsout of God’s will rather than His nature, so that the divinewill is separated from the divine nature. In other words, God’swill determines what the term “goodness” means rather thanhis nature being consistent with a particular conception ofgoodness. In Bondage of the Will, Luther wrote that becausepower is part of God’s nature, His will cannot be impeded. 5In this sense, God can do whatever he wants—even if it appearsto be evil to humans—because His will is supreme.This voluntaristic conception of the divine will is seenclearly in the tradition of Nominalism, which is associatedwith William of Ockham. According to Heiko Oberman, anhistorian who specialized in the Reformation, Luther’s voluntaristicconception of God stems directly from this Nominalisttradition. 6 In The Two Reformations, Oberman points outthe medieval distinction between the potentia absoluta andthe potentia ordinata as evidence of Luther’s connection toNominalism. 7 The potentia absoluta defines God’s ultimatenature, while the potentia ordinata describes God’s nature as itis revealed in Scripture. In Bondage of the Will, Luther wroteof the importance of distinguishing between the revealedGod and the hidden God, as though the two have differentcharacteristics. 8 Luther’s distinction between the potentia absolutaand the potentia ordinata is essential for understandingthe influence medieval Nominalism had on his conception ofGod.However, Luther employed the terms differently than did medievalNominalists. Gordon Rupp, a Luther scholar, points outthat Nominalists like Ockham appealed to potentia absolutato speculate on and explain supernatural occurrences, whereasLuther used the distinction to cut off speculation and focuson God as He has revealed himself in Scripture. 9 Rupp arguesthat Luther rejected the Aristotelian tendency to explain God’snature with reference to a hierarchy of being. 10 Luther viewedthe Aristotelian view as a Pelagian fallacy, because he thoughtit gave too much credit to human reason. 11 Instead, as Ruppaptly states, Luther understood God as an entirely unpredictablebeing. 12 Rupp interprets Luther’s attempt to place Godbeyond human understanding as a reflection of his theocentricapproach to theology. 13 Despite the semantic distinction,both Luther and the medieval Nominalists used the potentiaabsoluta and potentia ordinata distinction to support theirvoluntaristic understanding of God’s will, namely, that Hiswill is distinct from His nature. So, Nominalism’s influenceon Luther is apparent in his attempt to insulate God from anyrational attempt to comprehend His being. As with Ockham,this resulted in a voluntaristic understanding of God.Despite the influence Nominalism had on Luther’sdoctrine of the divine will, he rejected Ockham’s view of thehuman will in favor of an Augustinian view. As Obermanpoints out, Ockham—and the Nominalist tradition in the viamoderna—asserted the priority of the will over the priorityof the intellect. 14 In contrast, Augustine argued in Confessionsthat men are corrupt from birth, and this corruptiontaints their ability to make decisions. 15 In Bondage of the Will,

52Broaden Journal of Undergraduate Reseachwww.jbu.edu/academics/journal53of transubstantiation. Turretin claimed that accidents cannotbe separated from substance or subsist separately from thesubstance in which they inhere. 32 Oderberg counters this argumentin his book, Real Essentialism, appealing to the fact thatthe metaphysical independence of accidents and substance arerequired for essentialism. 33 Oderberg agrees with Turretin thataccidents can never exist without a substance in which to inherein the order of nature. Oderberg appeals to the possibilityof transubstantiation by observing that if God suspendedthe laws of nature in a particular location, an accident couldexist while inhering in a substance other than the one in whichit normally inheres. Oderberg defends this suspension of thelaws of nature by asserting that God can suspend the lawswithout actually breaking them. 34 So, Oderberg would respondto Turretin’s arguments by appealing to a possible circumstancein which God suspends the laws of nature to separatethe substance and accidents.Oderberg’s argument seems convincing. However, I think he ismistaken for two reasons. The first reason is that his conclusionseems to destroy the reliability of the senses. If Oderbergis correct, then it is impossible to perceive—at least withcertainty—the substance of a thing by perceiving its accidents.If Oderberg is correct, there is no certainty in knowledge offorms and the very concept of substance seems to lose itsmeaning. The senses become unreliable because there is nonecessary connection between accidents and substance. Togive a brief example, if the accidents that I perceive to be abook were under God’s suspension of the laws of nature, theycould actually inhere to the substance of a cow. Oderberg’stheory undermines the possibility of certainty with respect toknowing the substance of a thing through the perception ofits accidents.Second, Oderberg’s argument is invalid because it resultsin a contradiction. Oderberg defends transubstantiation byappealing to the possibility of God’s miraculous suspensionof the laws of nature. Oderberg asserts that a suspensionof the laws of nature is distinct from breaking those laws. Ithink this assertion is false. Oderberg gives the example ofa state that has suspended traffic laws for a month (meaningthose who “break” the law are unpunished because thelaw did not apply when the laws were “broken”). However, Ithink this is an inaccurate analogy. There is nothing in humannature that constrains us to obey human decrees. However,the nature of substance and accidents do constrain them tobehave in ways consistent with their nature. In other words,an accident can only be an accident insofar as it behaves as anaccident—inhering in a substance. Thus, a suspension of thelaws of nature is very different than a suspension of humantraffic laws. A suspension of the laws that constrain accidentsand substance would necessarily involve a contradiction. Thenature of an accident is to inhere in a substance. If, as Oderbergargues, an accident can be present in the order of naturewithout a substance in which to inhere, it is no longer an accident,since accidents are defined as such by their inherence ina substance. Due to the law of noncontradiction, we see that itis impossible for an accident ever to exist without a substancein which to inhere. Thus, Oderberg’s argument for transubstantiationis invalid.With these arguments in mind, it is apparent that the first optionfor accepting imputed righteousness fails. An AristotelianRealist cannot reconcile imputed righteousness by an appealto the separability of a substance and its accidents; the essenceof righteousness cannot be present in a person along with theaccidents of sinfulness. The second option available for anAristotelian Realist is to adopt an understanding of imputationas a forensic act that serves as the foundation for justification.In order to explain how imputation might be understoodin this way, it will be necessary to prove two things.First, that justification should be understood in a forensicsense, and secondly, that imputation is the meritorious causefor this justification. Scripture clearly teaches that justificationis a forensic act. In Romans 3:24-26 Paul explained, “they arenow justified by his grace as a gift, through the redemptionthat is in Christ Jesus, whom God put forward as a sacrifice ofatonement by his blood, effective through faith. He did thisto show his righteousness, because in his divine forbearancehe had passed over the sins previously committed” (NRSV).Here Paul specifically appealed to justification as a forensicact in which God deals with sin as worthy of punishment. Perhapseven more persuasive is Paul’s statement to the Romansin 8:3. Paul wrote, “For God has done what the law, weakenedby the flesh, could not do: by sending his own Son in the likenessof sinful flesh, and to deal with sin, he condemned sin inthe flesh.” Paul observed that God punished sin in Christ inorder that sinful men might be justified because the law couldnot justify men. Turretin further points out that if justificationis not a forensic act, but rather a moral and substantial act—asthe Roman Catholic Church claimed—it is indistinguishablefrom sanctification. 35 Furthermore, Turretin argued, a personcannot be justified on the basis of his inherent righteousnessfor two reasons. First, inherent righteousness is imperfect, andcannot satisfy God’s requirement for perfect obedience to thelaw. 36 Second, justification consists in the remission of sinsand the removal of guilt. Since inherent righteousness cannotremove guilt or the offense to God, it cannot be the basis ofthe remission of sins (and thus, justification). 37 So, justificationcannot be based on inherent righteousness, but must be aforensic act.Given this understanding of justification, it is apparentthat sinners are in need of a perfect righteousnessby which they can be declared righteous before God. Theimputation of Christ’s righteousness serves this very purpose.Luther argued for an understanding of imputation that wassubstantive in nature. Turretin modified Luther’s doctrine,asserting that imputation can be understood in two ways. Hestated that Christ’s righteousness serves a twofold purpose,namely, as a forensic imputation that acts as the grounds forjustification and as a moral infusion that forms the basis ofsanctification. 38 Second Corinthians 5:21 represents the understandingof imputation as a forensic act: “For our sake hemade him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we mightbecome the righteousness of God.” This understanding ofimputation is actually necessary for an Aristotelian Realist. AnAristotelian conceives God’s nature as being perfectly unified.This means that every act of God must be consistent with allhis attributes. So, in justification, God must be both mercifuland just. Thus, God demands a perfect righteousness thatcan only be fulfilled by Christ’s perfect obedience. Turretinexplained how this obedience is reckoned as the possessionof the Christian. He argued that no one could stand beforethe rigor of God’s court by his/her own works. However,the perfect obedience of Christ is reckoned as the believer’s,and it is by his righteousness that believers are forgiven andcounted righteous. 39 Thus, the conception of imputation thatis most faithful to Aristotelian Realism is that of imputation asa forensic act that justifies the sinner before God rather thana substantive act that changes a sinner’s essence. A personjustified by Christ’s imputed righteousness remains essentiallya sinful person, but his/her standing before God has changed.To summarize, it is apparent that Martin Luther’s theologywas influenced by Nominalism. This influence manifestsitself particularly in his voluntaristic conception of the divinewill. However, Luther disagreed with the Nominalist traditionin his doctrine of human will and imputation of Christ’srighteousness. Luther understood the imputation of Christ’srighteousness in the positive sense, rather than in the negativesense described by Nominalists. In this way, his doctrine isrescued from the accusation of Nominalism. An AristotelianRealist can reconcile Luther’s doctrine of imputation in oneof two ways. The attempt to reconcile it by appealing to aseparation of substance and accidents is infeasible because itis contradictory and undermines the testimony of the senses.The other option is to adopt a conception of imputation andjustification as forensic acts that alter the believer’s standingbefore God rather than his/her essence. This is the view advocatedby Francis Turretin and the Reformed tradition, and itis the best way to reconcile Aristotelian Realism with Luther’sdoctrine of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness.

54Broaden Journal of Undergraduate Reseachwww.jbu.edu/academics/journal55EndNotes1 Aristotle. “Metaphysics,” in The Basic Works of Aristotle,ed. Richard McKeon, (New York: The Modern Library,2001), 810-811.2 William of Ockham. “Epistemological Problems,”in Readings in the History of Philosophy, ed. Michael Strantzand Maureen Staudt, (Mason, Ohio: Cengage, 2009), 205-207.3 Luther, Martin. “The Bondage of the Will,” in MartinLuther: Selections from his Writings, ed. John Dillenberger,(New York: Anchor Books, 1961), 196.4 Ibid.5 Ibid., 181.6 Oberman, Heiko. The Two Reformations: TheJourney from the Last Days to the New World. Ed. DonaldWeinstein. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003, 24.7 Ibid.8 Bondage of the Will, 191.9 Rupp, Gordon. The Righteousness of God. Cambridge:Hodder and Stoughton, 1953, 91.10 Ibid., 30.11 Ibid.12 Ibid.13 Rupp, 248-9.14 Oberman, 29.15 St. Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 197.16 Bondage of the Will, 184.17 Bruce, Gustav Marius. Luther as an Educator.Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1963, 117.18 Rupp, 152.19 Ibid.20 Luther, Martin. “Disputation Against ScholasticTheology,” in Martin Luther: Selections from his Writings, ed.James Atkinson, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1962),267.21 Bondage of the Will, 187.22 Rupp, 90.23 Luther, Martin. “Commentary on Galatians,” inMartin Luther: Selections from his Writings, ed. John Dillenberger,(New York: Anchor Books, 1961), 111.24 Ibid.25 Disputation Against Scholastic Theology, 270.26 Bruce, 119.27 Luther, Martin. “Two Kinds of Righteousness,” inMartin Luther: Selections from his Writings, ed. John Dillenberger,(New York: Anchor Books, 1961), 86-88.28 Ibid.29 Augustine was a proponent of Platonic Realismrather than Aristotelian Realism, but the distinction betweenthe two systems of thought is not germane to the presentdiscussion.30 Turretin, Francis. Institutes of Elenctic Theology.Ed. James T. Dennison, Jr. Vol. 3. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&RPublishing, 1997, 490.31 Ibid., 491.32 Ibid.33 Oderberg, David. Real Essentialism. New York:Routledge, 2007, 155.34 Ibid., 148.35 Turretin, Francis. Institutes of Elenctic Theology.Ed. James T. Dennison, Jr. Vol. 2. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&RPublishing, 1997, 635.36 Ibid., 643.37 Ibid.38 Ibid., 647.39 Ibid., 648.Hebrew Exogesis: Hebrews4:14-5:10: Jesus, The GreatPatton ShinallHigh Priest Theology MajorThis paper attempts to answer what the author of Hebrews offered to teach in Hebrews 4:14-5:10. Through exegetical hermeneutics thispaper shows what the message of this passage is and how Christians are to live in light of this Scripture.In Hebrews chapter 4, verse 14 through chapter 5, verse 10, Jesus is exalted as the great high priestof the Church. Within this text are some of the most important truths regarding Christ’s office asthe exalted priestly intercessor on behalf of Christians as well as his atoning work accomplishedthrough his ministry. As a result, this passage truly is a treasure within the Book of Hebrews andthe New Testament as a whole, and because of this persistent dedication should be implemented inorder to understand God’s holy and transcendent will and grace spoken within this text.Historical Context.One cannot begin to understand the interpretation of any biblical text without first understandingthe historical context of the book in question. Donald A. Hagner, author of Encounteringthe Book of Hebrews writes:Given the central importance of grammatico-historical interpretation, the starting pointfor the interpretation of any book of the Bible is the determination of its situation inhistory: its author, approximate date, and place of origin, its addressees and their background, its intended purpose, its dependence upon literary and oral sources, and so on(Hauger, 20).