Moral Rules and Moral Maxims - The University of Texas at Austin

More documents

Recommendations

Info

always to keep promises," moral maxims,and shall distinguish these sharplyfrom moral rules.I shall use "moral maxim" in a broaderand a narrower way. In the broader sensea maxim is a pronouncement serving toindicate what it is to be moral. Besidesexamples cited, maxims, in the broadsense, will include principles of impartiality,universality, and the like. Learningthe very language of "right" and"wrong" is conjugate with learning maxims.Functioning as they do, maximswant no moral justification, for they setthe boundaries of moral justification.They are, as we say, a priori; they are,broadly conceived, logical principles. Weestabish them by exhibiting in detailwhat morality is, i.e., in what manner weemploy what we all recognize to be thelanguage of morals."Maxim," in this broad sense, doesnot tie up a neat bundle, the principlessubsumed thereunder being multiform inthe extreme. Maxims may be used tomark purely formal relationships ("Whatis wrong is not right"); or more complicatedrelations between the concepts ofmorality (" 'Ought' implies 'Can' ";"One should be punished only when responsible");the relations of reason toaction ("Do what is right"); or the relevanceof reasoning in certain ways (principlesof impartiality); the rationale ofmorality (the principle of utility); thepoint of the language of morals (to bringone to act or to forbear); the point ofview of morality (the Categorical Imperativeand principles of equity).All of these have been construed andmisconstrued as moral rules. Like rules,they are often formulated in the languageof "right" and "wrong," "do" and"don't." But, found in maxims, thesewords do not tell us what is right andwrong, what we ought or ought not toMORAL RULES AND MORAL MAXIMS 275do; rather they signal relationships (forexample) between saying that somethingis right and saying we ought to do it.It is tempting and common enough tojustify one's awareness of maxims by anappeal to "intuition," and to docket theinformation thus garnered as synthetic apriori. These principles are, so it has beensaid, the moral ultimates, so fundamentalas to elude justification; they arewhat we cannot help but recognize inmorality; yet they say something, andare clearly not analytic. These moves allhave their point, but are still misleadingjust because they tend to misplace statementsabout morals as moral statements.There is no call to do this once we clearlysee that the concept of morality is lacedup out of many strands-reason, action,choice, desert, and the like-and it iseasy enough to get the criss-crossingswrong; to talk falsely as well as trulyabout morality. But this is still quite anotherthing than talking truly or falselyabout the rightness of particular acts, orclasses of particular acts. Within moralitymaxims function as formulas-logicalprinciples-pointing the relevance of certainconsiderations. As statements, theyalways apply to moral discourse, tomorality. There is no need to confusethese roles, to misplace maxims as deliverancesof intuition and to appeal tosynthetic a priori knowledge, if only wedo remain clear on this difference betweenmoral statements and moral formulasand recognize how we alter ourposition by converting formulas intostatements. In no case are maxims ultimatemoral axioms from which all othermoral rules may be drawn.What interests me most in this paperare maxims in a narrower sense, principlessuch as "Keep promises," whichallude to a fairly specific mode of action.It will be obvious that I have these pri-This content downloaded on Thu, 21 Feb 2013 11:18:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
276 ETHICSmarily in mind when speaking of "maxims."These really are maxims, whosechief function is to delimit an area of humanbehavior as susceptible to moralappraisal and regulation. Working in thisway, they do not prescribe or proscribeparticular actions in particular circumstances,as do moral rules. There can beno moral questions whether we ought orought not to murder, as there can be agenuine and difficult moral question overwhether this or that is a case of murder.The heart of the maxim is what Nowell-Smith calls a "gerundive word." Thesewords are designed to place instances ofa specifiable kind of behavior as morallydesirable or undesirable. The maxim,then, simply reiterates, but with somedirection: we ought (or ought not) to dothose actions of this kind which we oughttor ought not) to do.While they do not prescribe or proscribeaction, maxims do play a role inmoral discourse, serving as formulas delimitingmoral questions. For the moment,it makes little difference whetherwe are deciding upon, appraising, or simplyclassifying actions as morally right orwrong. Indeed, we might better see howmaxims fit into moral discourse by noticinghow they might be employed by acultural spectator.How is it that an anthropologistknows what to investigate when he setsout to learn something of the moral customsof a tribe? How does he formulatehis results? After all, he turns up suchenormous differences.Perhaps he asks himself such questionsas, "What counts as murder here?"; thatis, what kinds of killing are subject tomoral disapproval? Or he might inquirewhat customs regulate sexual behavior,and will then tell us that such and suchpractices are accounted promiscuous.This shows how maxims may figure in theformulation of questions and answers.The maxim says, "Do no immoral actionof a certain kind"; and the question is,"When is this kind of action immoral?"In principle, any mode of human behaviorwhich affects others living infairly close and continual proximity issubject to moral regulation. The modesof behavior generally subject to moralregulation, thus earning an interculturalmaxim, will perhaps depend upon man's"nature" as a consuming, competing, socializingcreature, with a long childhood.I suspect that these "facts" are inextricablybuilt into our conceptions of"man" and "society." For instance, it ishard to think what a human society withoutlanguage could be and, man and languagebeing what they are, hard to imaginea society without some idea of thedeceitful use of language. However thatmay be, whatever the "natural foundationof morality," certain areas of humanbehavior will invariably be subject tomoral regulation, and these may bepointed by maxims.It is important, of course, that maximsusually work in one direction only. Thus,it is wrong to murder and right to keeppromises. Maxims allude to actionswhich human beings do have some tendencyto do or not to do, with results normallyunfortunate or unpleasant toothers. Killing, damaging, or failing tokeep a promise to another would generallybe regarded as unfortunate by him;facts, I think, also built into our conceptsof "kill," "damage," "promise."Anthropologists' discoveries are occasionallysurprising for showing that in acertain society a certain kind of behavioris or is not subject to moral regulation.We cannot expect that all our maximswill apply in all societies. It is barely conceivable,for instance, that certain groupsare without the institution of promise-This content downloaded on Thu, 21 Feb 2013 11:18:02 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Page 1 and 2: Moral Rules and Moral MaximsAuthor(
Page 3 and 4: 270 ETHICSer this is a blond child;
Page 5 and 6: 272 ETHICSAlterations in the moral
Page 7: 274 ETHICStion, we are almost bound
Page 11 and 12: 278 ETHICSwhat we should call moral
Page 13 and 14: 280 ETHICSresponses are sufficientl
Page 15 and 16: 282 ETHICSdifferent facts: On the s
Page 17 and 18: 284 ETHICSwe can do it because of o

Moral Rules and Moral Maxims - The University of Texas at Austin

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?