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Solution: Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF)Are embedded interpreters really secure?ip*src*net*not*(18.26.5.0/24*or*18.0.0.0/24)kernelUntrustedinputInputs tobytecodeHostsystemtcpdump********ldh****[12]********!@#S****[238472398]********jeq****#ETHERTYPE_IP,*L1,*L4*********$&$s****#934deadL1:*****ld*****[26]L1:*****@#&#$(&@#$*#@$********and****#0xffffff00********kill****[xxx]********jeq****#0x121a0500,*L4,*L2********#@!&#*@#**!*&#$*$*#L2:*****jeq****#0x12010200,*L4,*L3L2:*****...L3:*****ret****#TRUE********ret*****#deadbeafL4:*****ret****#0*********#(@&*&*$#!@&(&UntrustedbytecodeBytecodeprogram*****packets*****BPF interpreterFilteredpackets
Solution: Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF)Are embedded interpreters really secure?ip*src*net*not*(18.26.5.0/24*or*18.0.0.0/24)kernelUntrustedinputInputs tobytecodeHostsystemtcpdump********ldh****[12]********!@#S****[238472398]********jeq****#ETHERTYPE_IP,*L1,*L4*********$&$s****#934deadL1:*****ld*****[26]L1:*****@#&#$(&@#$*#@$********and****#0xffffff00********kill****[xxx]********jeq****#0x121a0500,*L4,*L2********#@!&#*@#**!*&#$*$*#L2:*****jeq****#0x12010200,*L4,*L3L2:*****...L3:*****ret****#TRUE********ret*****#deadbeafL4:*****ret****#0*********#(@&*&*$#!@&(&UntrustedbytecodeBytecodeprogram*****packets*****BPF interpreterFilteredpackets
Page 1 and 2: Security Bugs inEmbedded Interprete
Page 3 and 4: Embedded interpretersHost systemByt
Page 5 and 6: Embedded interpretersHost systemByt
Page 7 and 8: Prevalence of embedded interpreters
Page 15 and 16: Our contributions• Studies of 10
Page 17 and 18: A packet filtering example• Monit
Page 19 and 20: A packet filtering example• Monit
Page 21 and 22: A packet filtering example• Straw
Page 23 and 24: A packet filtering example• Straw
Page 25 and 26: Solution: Berkeley Packet Filter (B
Page 35: Solution: Berkeley Packet Filter (B
Page 39 and 40: Security of embedded interpreters
Page 45 and 46: INET DIAG infinite loop vulnerabili
Page 51: INET DIAG infinite loop vulnerabili
Page 56 and 57: ClamAV signed division vulnerabilit
Page 64 and 65: FreeType arbitrary code executionJa
Page 66 and 67: FreeType arbitrary code executionpu
Page 74 and 75: Security guidelines
Page 76 and 77: Security guidelines• A better sol
Page 78 and 79: Pitfall 1: complex feature sets•
Page 80 and 81: Pitfall 1: complex feature sets•
Page 82 and 83: Pitfall 2: resource consumption•
Page 84 and 85: Pitfall 3: calls to the host system
Page 86 and 87:
Research Opportunities
Page 88 and 89:
Research Opportunities• Testing e
Page 90 and 91:
Research Opportunities• Testing e
Page 92 and 93:
References• BPF: S. McCanne and V
Page 94:
Q & ASecurity Bugs inEmbedded Inter
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