slides - PDOS - MIT

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Security guidelines
Security guidelines• A better solution: process isolation• Running interpreter in a separate OS process• Can prevent bugs in the interpreter from affecting thehost system• Example: Chrome browser
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Security Bugs inEmbedded Interprete
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Embedded interpretersHost systemByt
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Embedded interpretersHost systemByt
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Prevalence of embedded interpreters
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Page 11 and 12:
Page 13 and 14:
Page 15 and 16:
Our contributions• Studies of 10
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A packet filtering example• Monit
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A packet filtering example• Monit
Page 21 and 22:
A packet filtering example• Straw
Page 23 and 24: A packet filtering example• Straw
Page 25 and 26: Solution: Berkeley Packet Filter (B
Page 39 and 40: Security of embedded interpreters
Page 45 and 46: INET DIAG infinite loop vulnerabili
Page 51: INET DIAG infinite loop vulnerabili
Page 56 and 57: ClamAV signed division vulnerabilit
Page 64 and 65: FreeType arbitrary code executionJa
Page 66 and 67: FreeType arbitrary code executionpu
Page 76 and 77: Security guidelines• A better sol
Page 78 and 79: Pitfall 1: complex feature sets•
Page 80 and 81: Pitfall 1: complex feature sets•
Page 82 and 83: Pitfall 2: resource consumption•
Page 84 and 85: Pitfall 3: calls to the host system
Page 86 and 87: Research Opportunities
Page 88 and 89: Research Opportunities• Testing e
Page 90 and 91: Research Opportunities• Testing e
Page 92 and 93: References• BPF: S. McCanne and V
Page 94: Q & ASecurity Bugs inEmbedded Inter
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slides - PDOS - MIT

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