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Somaliland-Djibouti RelationshipGelle: The Tireless Crusader Against Somaliland 2012the UN, the EU, and other organizations have to make a choice between working for something thatpurportedly could lead to a reunification of Somalia, or to go on working with increasingly minusculelocal administrations, the choice will be rather easy.”However, as the Professor went on to emphasize, immediately after Gelle and the UN had formed theso-called Transitional National Government (TNG) in Djibouti in 2002—just like the similarly institutedTransitional Federal Government (TFG) in Nairobi in 2006 and Somali National ReconciliationGovernment (SNRG), again in Djibouti in 2008—such arrangements were doomed to failure and evenmade matters worse. He argued that Somalia had no longer been a “uniform structure merely lackingsome key persons whose appointment would end the conflicts and mend the Somali state.”The horrific events as well as the facts on the ground that respectively had led to and followed thecollapse of the Somali Republic; the complicating foreign meddling in Somali affairs all along; and theundesirable characters and appalling incompetence of those who routinely ended up as the ‘presidents’and cohorts imposed on Somalia all together have conspired to activate, rather instantly and invariably,ordinary Somalis’ outright and unflinching rejection of these projects.Instead of imposing on Somalis foreign-formed and -serving governments like the TNG (andsubsequently the TFG and the SNRG), Professor Helander and many other scholars of Somalia believethat the “The Building Bloc” approach is the only way that stability and effective governance can bereturned to Somalia. The building of blocs themselves, they feel, should best be left to Somalisthemselves without foreign interference.They think that the IC should assist with institutions building and developmental programs to thoseregions that managed to establish peace and effective administrations on their own. There is no betterincentive than this to other slacking regions to follow suit.Later, these blocs could come together willingly to form a genuinely representative, acceptable andshared government in a process all dimensions of which is entirely owned by Somalis alone.Fully and insightfully aware that the IC in general and Djibouti’s Gelle in particular had been beatingabout the bush, Professor Helander answered his own question. “The short answer to the peacequestion,” he rather emphatically said, “is no.” Amazingly, he also raised fears that only a sage couldforesee about the future problems that such misguided or shortsighted endeavors could create.“Unfortunately, the more serious issue that observers all over the world now confront” he lamented, “ishow to limit the damage done in Djibouti. Will the effects of this latest disastrous move simply go awayas the name of the new ‘president’ is forgotten in the coming months?”The name of the ‘president’ appointed with Gelle’s and IC’s help in Arta in 2002 certainly challengesone’s recollection. He was the ‘president’ who had been the object of the Professor’s concern. As if toprovide further vindication to the scholar, the name of the IC-imposed ‘president’ in Embagathi in 2006could also easily fail one’s faculty of reminiscence. At Arta’s time, this Embagathi ‘president’ had beenin no one’s long view except perhaps the sage. How long the current ‘president’ Sharif’s name will beremembered remains to be seen though most observers would advise you not to bet your boots on itsendurance.AIH Page 6

Somaliland-Djibouti RelationshipGelle: The Tireless Crusader Against Somaliland 2012It certainly is a heart breaking turn of events, but witness how “the damage[s] done in Djibouti” that theProfessor had been bemoaning actually came true. In 2002, when he had raised these fears, no AlShabab and other like-minded extremists existed. Suicide bombings and gross terrorist acts against softtargets were still alien to the Somali conflict culture. The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2008 wasunthinkable. The Somalis now categorized as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) or languishing in theneighboring countries’ refugee camps are over three million, not the still unfortunate but fraction of thatnumber classified as such in 2002. At that time, the piracy pestilence that gave all Somalis such a badname, the world’s maritime trade such a bedeviling headache and desolate places like Eyl on thePuntland coast such notoriously a global name recognition had been nonexistent.Like history, Professor Helander’s prophecy in 2002 and its conversions to realties could repeat itself atenormous costs to both Somalis and other nations alike as long as the IC and leaders like Gelle continuesimply not getting it.Paying Lip Service To Pan-Somalism When ConvenientMr. Gelle’s fondness to shed tears for Pan-Somalism and for the restoration of the unity (nay, as herefuses to accept its already undeniable demise, for him the preservation of the unity) betweenSomaliland and Somalia would shame a crocodile to hold on its own. This self-styled passion is Gelle’sboth first and last line of defense in the conduct of his fanatical anti-Somaliland policies. But is not onesupposed to practice what one preaches?The five-pointed star of the flag of the erstwhile Somali Republic denoted the five regions in East Africain which ethnic Somalis made the sole or vast majority of the population. They were the BritishSomaliland; the Italian Somaliland; the French Somaliland; Ethiopia-ruled The Haud and Reserved Areaand Ogaden; and the Kenya-administered Northern Frontier District.There undoubtedly was a time when Somalis everywhere aspired to form a country encompassing all theabove mentioned regions under the white starred blue flag.Historians will long debate who, what, how and when this idealistic Pan-Somalism dream turned into anightmare. At any rate, the amazing irony is that Somalilanders, who had been more any other ethnicSomalis the most ardent advocates and promoters of Pan-Somalism; who sacrificed so selflessly for itsrealization; and who paid most in ultimate prices when its partial realization had been attempted arenowadays being demonized as anti-nationalists or as secessionists or as rejectionists.On the other hand and as equally amazing those, Gelle prominent amongst them, who could not claimmaking any tangible contribution towards the cause or those whose actions and behavior caused itsignoble demise, are posing as its tireless champions.It was in June 1960 when the newly independent Somaliland threw common sense and prudence, naysanity, to the wind and, without conditions, reservations and assurances, took its freedom, assets andsoul to Mogadishu in pursuit of Pan-Somalism. So shocking a folly was it that one London newspaperran a crying headline, “The Colony That Rejected Freedom iv ”AIH Page 7

Somaliland-Djibouti RelationshipGelle: The Tireless Crusader Against Somaliland 2012The Somalians v would not condescend to display the least magnanimity in waiting for a least minimumof a grace period before they abundantly demonstrated their brazen contempt and disrespect forSomalilanders’ amazing altruism.In forming the first government of the Union Republic, the Somalians had the insolence of taking all thetop positions of government: the presidency; the prime ministership; the ministries of defense, interior,and foreign affairs; the commands of the army and police and every other important post of the levers ofpower. It was as if the Northerners were a vanquished people and the Somalian victors were sharing thespoils of victory amongst themselves.What followed this blatant greed and arrogance in those first days of the Union until Somalilandmanaged to regain its independence in 1991 need not be described here anew. It would suffice to saythat for Somalilanders, the price paid for this cardinal blunder in “Reject[ing] Freedom” in 1960 for thesake of Pan-Somalism is nothing short of catastrophic.Thankless though it turned out to be, it had been partly on account of Somalilanders’ timely and selflesscounsel, citing their grave experiences, that Djibouti avoided plunging into the same pitfall. In early60’s, a remorseful Somalilander crooned:Adoo guri barwaaqo ah;Geedi lama lalaba oo;Anigay isku geystoo;Wixii ila garaadow;Geel dhalay ku haysta;Abaar looma guureey;Galabsaday xumaantee;Gobonimo ha tuurina.While in a plentiful land; You possess newly nursing camels vi ;Do not embark on a journey;And depart to drought stricken place;This is all self-inflicted;So he who shares my wisdom;I caused these woes on myself;Throw away not your freedom.Later, another Somalilander’s song was more explicit in cautioning Djibouti on the dangers of therudderless Pan-Somalism fervency of the time:Naa hooy! ka joog;Anagaa jabney;Ka joog Jabuutay;O!, avoid it:Look how broken we are;Do not do it, Djibouti;Naa hooy Jabuutay, ka joog;ka joog;ka joog.O Djibouti, avoid it [Joining Pan-Somalism];Avoid it;Avoid it.Djibouti quite sensibly took those warnings to heart but without so minimum a gratitude towards thosewho had so unselfishly rendered such great kindness. When it gained independence in 1977, Djiboutieven erased any reference to "Somali" from its country's name, hitherto known as French Somaliland.AIH Page 8

Somaliland-Djibouti RelationshipGelle: The Tireless Crusader Against Somaliland 2012Today, it would consider any suggestion to be part of the Pan-Somalism concept such so preposterous aproposition.Now put aside gratitude. Forget that they, themselves, unceremoniously spurned Pan-Somalism. Nevermind their complacency in—and arguably their compliancy with—the miscarriage of the creed’s firstattempt at realization. But for the Djibouti ‘president’ to call on others to remain devoted to Pan-Somalism is nothing less than the height of hypocrisy.Somalilanders would be the least to find fault with Djiboutians in exercising self-determination on anyissue under the sun that concerns them, including on Pan-Somalism. Thus, what justification couldDjibouti evoke in denying Somalilanders the exercise of the same self-determination?Yet Djibouti’s Gelle has left no stone unturned to nip Somaliland’s right to self-determination andindependence in the bud—exactly the same right he and his predecessors had exerted to its fullest extentwithout any fear or expectation of reproach and, in the opinion of most Somalilanders, rightfully so.To mind comes a Somali saying: “There is he whose shoes you are mending while he is mending yourdeath body cloth” (Nin aad kabahiisa toleeso ayaa kafantaada vii toleeya.) It seems that, as strangely as itmight sound, Somaliland and Djibouti have been playing these roles, one benevolent and the othermalevolent, respectively on each other.In every contentious issue that cropped up between Somaliland and Somalia, Djibouti’s leaders havesided with the Southerners.Another Somali adage pertinent here as well: “Neighborliness is closer to one than kinship” (Owdi ab kadow). It is incomprehensible to most Somalilanders why Djibouti leaders have always been and still ismore favorably disposed to the Southerners with whom they share neither neighborhood nor kinshipthan to the Northerners with whom they boast both common ancestry and land.There is no shortage of theories of the real motives behind Gelle’s callous antagonism towardsSomaliland. Like all theories, some would seem rather farfetched. Others are more plausible. Aselect spectrum of these hypotheses, fluidly classifiable either way, might be worthwhile to bementioned here.Berbera: A Maddening Thorn In Gelle’s SideLike a jealousy stricken lady who, though he is devotedly faithful to her, can’t stand the mere sight ofanother woman within six miles of her husband, Djibouti wishes to possess the only functioningSeaport between the Suez and Mombasa. Berbera, the only fairly operational seaport in Somaliland,particularly invokes in Djibouti’s psyche a maddening fit of hysteria.To them, Berbera is a direct threat to their vital economic interests. Djibouti fears that not only wouldSomalilanders cease using its port’s facilities but also that Berbera would compete with Djibouti in thetransit trade of landlocked Ethiopia.AIH Page 9

Somaliland-Djibouti RelationshipGelle: The Tireless Crusader Against Somaliland 2012more easily doable rather than wishing for the disappearance of a geographical fixture. For, Berbera willbe there till the end of the world and its port would be used as much as its operators’ professionalismand competence would permit.A Syndrome Not Unique To EgyptFor the last two decades, Egypt has been one of the sternest opponents of Somaliland’s reclamation ofits independence. To the Egyptian leadership, the mere mention of the Somaliland name has been asmuch an anathema as it has been to Mr. Gelle. Accordingly, Egypt exerted extraordinary efforts thatsought the restoration of the erstwhile unitary Somali Republic and an all authoritative governmentruling it.Like Gelle’s, the Egyptian intense dislike of Somalilanders’ just aspirations should not be mistaken forgenuine concern or disinterested support for Somalis’ Unity—though, of course, that is the façade theypublicly present their intentions. As far as the Egyptians are concerned, the unadvertised motives behindtheir Somali policies could be summed up in just two words: The Nile.About 90% of that river’s water is utilized by Egypt while Ethiopia, from where a great deal of the wateroriginates, uses meaningfully none of it. It is a situation which Egypt is adamant to see it continued—somuch so that it has on many occasions overtly threatened to go to war with any country that disrupts thecurrent Nile Waters’ utilization status quo.Things have not yet fortunately come to war. Nonetheless, Egypt has been employing every other trickin the book in order to keep Ethiopia on edge and thus its focus off the Nile Waters. That is where, in theEgyptian scheme of things, a united and strong Somali Republic with a highly central government thatcan easily be manipulated would be immensely useful just as it had been before this Somalilandphenomenon turned things irritably upside down.From its inception in 1960 until it crumpled in 1991 following Somaliland’s withdrawal from it, theerstwhile Somali Union had been effectively useful as a most gullible proxy for Egypt’s struggles withEthiopia over the Nile Waters. The spectacle of Somalia and Ethiopia on perpetual war footing againsteach other to the exclusion of sense and their peoples’ interests and well-being had been servingEgyptian purposes quite nicely, thank you.To the Egyptians’ utter delight, the ever present and credible Somali menace had been consuming muchof Ethiopia’s national priorities, public policy concentration and state resources. It was a situation thatleft Ethiopia with little leeway and wherewithal to focus on any other national undertaking ofmonumental scale. Such as the huge effort and treasure that would inevitably be required to develop itsNile River resources.Clearly, both the Ethiopian and Somali nations were making equally crippling sacrifices in lives, limbs,wealth, lost opportunities and misplaced national priorities for the mutually hostile fixations at eachother. Whether the Somalis’ doggedly nationalistic pursuit of Greater Somalia and the Ethiopians’uncompromising persistence in holding on to dubiously acquired and colonialism-assisted hegemonyover a large part of Somali populace and land justified either nation’s respective sacrifices was and stillAIH Page 11

Somaliland-Djibouti RelationshipGelle: The Tireless Crusader Against Somaliland 2012is hotly debatable. As is either nation’s failure or reluctance to consider more peaceful means inresolving its problems with the other.For the Egyptians part, any debate on the wisdom, root causes, rationalizations and conduct of theSomali-Ethiopian conflict was neither here nor there. The quarrel’s only important and desirable aspectswere its intractability and propagation—a situation that conveniently facilitated Egyptian desiredconsequential effect of keeping the Nile Water off the Ethiopian radar.Paradoxically, it took certain unfortunate, internal inter-Somali events, policies and misbehavior tochange the very dynamics of the Somali-Ethiopian relationship. The national strength of Somalia andconsequently its stamina against Ethiopia had been contingent on its unity and national cohesion.However, not only had the advent of the unity in 1960 been so inequitably haphazard, but alsosubsequently, successive governments’ misrule in general and selective injustices in particular had beensteadily eroding both the national unity and cohesion. The events that had culminated in attemptedgenocide, communal cleansing and mass displacement of the Northern Somalis (read Somalilanders)served as the straw that broke the camel’s back.Finally, 1991 ushered the demise of the Union of the Somali Republic and the rebirth of an independentSomaliland. And with that development, one side of the Somali-Ethiopian dispute’s equation suddenlydisappeared—to the dismay of some stakeholders, not least of whom the Egyptians. It is this loss of theunquestioning Somali proxy that the Egyptians cannot come to terms with; that they are striving torestore it to its pre-1991 status; and that is driving their intense hostility towards Somaliland.Djibouti is also somewhat apprehensive about an Ethiopia without a belligerent counterbalancing powerin the region. Like a kitten that has to sleep beside an elephant prone to tossing in slumber, it is enoughfor tiny Djibouti to feel uncomfortable being a neighbor to the Horn of Africa’s most populous andpowerful country. It could hypothetically get worse than mere discomfort since that country is in direneed of Djibouti’s greatest asset i.e. its seaport.Traditionally, it was the Erstwhile Somali Republic that had filled the role of posing the only crediblechallenge against overpowering Ethiopian hegemony in the region. That certainly was fine withDjibouti. That Somalis and Djiboutians shared common ethnicity was reassuringly a bonus.Thus, though the causes may differ, both Egypt and Djibouti are beset by this same mental syndrome. Itis a syndrome that requires a Somali Republic in the manner of prior to 1991 and an Ethiopia that are atloggerheads to infinity.However, there always is one dimension of this phenomenon which everyone has been conferring nodue consideration. Has anyone ever bothered to ask the question: “What do the Somalis themselves—whether in a Union à la the erstwhile Somali Republic or as separate states as now they are—reallythink about the whole damn thing?”Are they willing to fight proxy wars for anyone, especially for two countries which can offer them closeto nothing in any sphere? Especially for one i.e. Egypt that has been continually showing its utterdisdain for their intelligence by taking them for granted. Have the Egyptians ever condescended to askAIH Page 12

Somaliland-Djibouti RelationshipGelle: The Tireless Crusader Against Somaliland 2012themselves the question “What remotely do Somalis have to do with the Nile Waters, for Heaven’ssake?”And, indeed, have the Somalis ever asked themselves the same question.As for Djibouti, their expectations of assistance from the Somalis against a potential foreign threatsmacks like eating the cake and wishing to have it at the same. The surest way Djibouti could havecounted on Somalis’ defense in adversity was by joining the Union formed in 1960, in due course, aspan-Somalism had presumed. Now that it has chosen not to, well, tough luck!One thing both countries are paradoxically missing is that now, fortunately, the Somalis seem to havecome of age in as far as their relationships with Ethiopia are concerned. Naivety, ignorance, amateurism,irrationality, dogmatism, stereotyping and myths are no longer as seminal factors as they used to be informing their perceptions towards that country. Besides since, in retrospect, there is nothing to be proudof the 1960 Union formed by two Somali regions and given that a third, Djibouti, in time went its ownway, it would seem eminently pointless to tread the war path in order to liberate the fourth and the fifth.Whatever shape and form such relationships may take, there is now a somber realization by wellinformed Somalis anywhere and of any political persuasion that they should be based on considerationsof purely national interests and pragmatism.Whether or not Egypt and Djibouti are aware of these subtle changes in the Somali political acuities areentirely different and uncertain matters. But who cares?One Man’s Meat; Another’s PoisonIt has been now over two decades since Somalia has been reeling under relentless turmoil andSomaliland languishing in the punishing non-recognition wilderness. The political, economic andsocial losses which both nations have consequentially been sustaining are nothing short of devastating.Consequently also but inversely, the Somalis’ bust have been proving to be an economic and politicalboon for quite a few countries—Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda amongst others.Djibouti, Kenya’s Nairobi or Ethiopia’s Addis Ababa invariably host the all too numerous SomaliReconciliation Conferences, frequent high level multinational meetings on Somali related issues andthousands other Somali-specific events, gatherings, seminars, workshops, briefings, policyannouncements, training sessions, research study release forums and other mind-boggling occasions.They, too, are the coronation capitals where Somalian ‘governments’ are instituted and their ‘leaders’assembled before transplanting them in Mogadishu. The ‘leaders’ are required to shuttle to and fro thesecities so that their foreign minders could dispense with policy guidance, issue orders and designateassignments; could debrief them when desirable and as incentive or reward for good behavior treat themto an occasional well-earned rest and recreation. Another recurrent occasion for the “leaders’” summonsis when their characteristic squabbles typically get out of hand and their sponsors have to reinstall sanityto their heads or, failing that, dump them and simply appoint replacements.AIH Page 13

Somaliland-Djibouti RelationshipGelle: The Tireless Crusader Against Somaliland 2012Naturally, the costs of holding these endless conferences and of ‘government’ formation endeavors arepretty high. While the hosts willingly host, they are never as generous with their purse strings wherefinancing them is concerned. Accordingly, it is the UN and the donor countries that carry the financialburdens. The hosts, though, manage the funds. Great news for them and their cities’ economiesespecially the hotels, convention centers and other services providers—the regular infusion of suchfunds, that is.As a more important result of the above situation, these countries cast a long shadow of pervasivepolitical influence in Somalia and to, a not an inconsiderable extent, in Somaliland. They are literally theelectors and appointers of the internationally recognized Somali ‘governments’ and ‘leaders’. They caninvade and occupy Somalian territory at the snap of the thump and the middle finger as Ethiopia andKenya habitually, repeatedly and, indeed, at the time of writing, presently do. It is no secret that theEthiopian security services can cross over into Somaliland at their pleasure to carry out operations ofdubious nature without consideration of how that might fare with Somalilanders and with internationallaw.Not only do these countries enjoy a free hand in having their way with the Somalis, they also serve asconvenient proxies for other countries’ dirty work in Somalia. The US and most Western nations haveserious and credible security concerns which have arisen from the Somali disorder. Yet, with “BlackHawk Down” images still unforgotten or perhaps stubbornly unforgettable, most are reluctant to showtheir own footprints in Somali territory.Thus, when apprehensions, investigations, interrogations, ‘renditions’, eliminations etc of Somaliterrorism suspects are required, the tasks are outsourced to the neighboring countries’ security services.When a certain Somali group or a faction is deemed to be posing a threat, real or imagined, the job ofneutralizing them—inside Somalia, mind you—is contracted out to the military forces of Ethiopia,Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and Djibouti. While for the involvement Uganda, Burundi and Djibouti, acover of legitimacy is provided as AU-mandated and UN-endorsed AMISOM peacekeepers, Ethiopiaand Kenya need not be bothered with such nuisances.Needless to say, these services come at a cost and the contractor-country’s leaders milk it for all it isworth. There is certainly more to AMISOM than African fraternity. There is also a great deal of moneyin play. Of which the poor Ugandan, Burundian and Djibouti foot soldiers dodging Al Shabab’s pulletsand suicide bombers in Somalia are said to be the least beneficiaries. Though not the source, thepresidents of the soldiers’ countries are the dispensers of AMISOM’s substantial operationalexpenditure. As usual, if a president of a country, especially an African country, is unaccountable to hiscountry’s laws or citizenry (Usually here the president, in effect, is the law and citizenry all in one) asUganda’s Musaveni and Djibouti’s Gelle can arguably be qualified to be, the president must take his cutbefore any dispensing to the soldiers dodging the ….can take place. The cut, except on some occasions,is usually all of the funds.At any rate, now that they are its reliable and ready allies, the West can only, in the spirit of give andtake, be expected to be amenable to a few reasonable reciprocities in the leaders’ favor. It would not beentirely improper if one of the leaders presented his requests as simply and as straightforwardly as in thefollowing terms:AIH Page 14

Somaliland-Djibouti RelationshipGelle: The Tireless Crusader Against Somaliland 2012No disrespect here, but please look the other way or at least mute your criticisms if—in your opinion,which anyway always differs from ours—we misgovern our own countries or commit human rightsabuses or our activities in Somalia go astray or disproportionate.Foot the all the bills of our expeditions in Somalia; after all, it is our boys who are in harm’s way andbetween you and another “Black Hawk Down” incident as well as between you and all those Somaliterrorists who are determined to wreck havoc in your countries.We should not as well be any weaker on account of our Somali preoccupations, having also otherinternal and external problems. So please be more literal with your military aid both quantitatively andqualitatively viii .And as befits loyal allies of meager means, we can only expect your substantially increased andgenerous economic assistance. Thank You.It seems that the West, likewise, deems the foregoing requests generally quite reasonable under thecircumstances.Though, of course, Somalia exercises no jurisdiction over it, Nairobi, to all intents and purposes, isthe Capital extraordinaire of Somalia. It is the seat of the real government of Somalia, even ifdisguised as the United Nations Political Office on Somalia (UNPOS) and of its head and, in point offact, Somalia’s President extraordinaire, Mr. Augustine Mihiga, otherwise answering to the deceptivelyformal title of the UN Secretary General Special Representative to Somalia (UNSGSRS).President extraordinaire Mihiga is ably supported by full-fledged ministries and departments, fromdefense to foreign affairs; from interior to finance; from education to health; from development torelief… Only in this particular case, these ministries are outwardly known by such acronyms as UNDP,UNISEF, WFP, WHO, UNHCR… The President extraordinaire, his ministries and departmentsadditionally maintain offices and/or staff in Djibouti, Addis Ababa, Kampala… Don’t chuckle if theyare whisperingly referred to as embassies because that is what they effectively are. In all, he presidesover a pool of civil servants and security personnel—superficially designated as UN staff—knowledgeably estimated to be higher than ten thousand.The President extraordinaire’s government keep only token presences in Somalia and Somaliland—thecountries which he, in point of fact, lords over to various degrees and he is supposed to serve in equalmeasure. Nonetheless, this needs cause anyone neither incredulity nor dismay nor disgust. Presidentextraordinaire Mahiga and his subordinates have at their deposal and command a fleet of executive jetsto whisk them from Nairobi or Djibouti to Mogadishu, Garowe or Hargeisa as and when duty calls andsecurity permits. And, after a few hours’ tedious toil in these hellholes, whisk them back to base—mission accomplished and all in one piece safe, thank heavens!Besides the above-sampled multitude of the UN’s familiar agencies, though presently engaged inuniquely unconventional roles as Somalia’s government extraordinaire, Nairobi and Djibouti are homesto a myriad of International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs). Some are household names,some hitherto unheard of; some of good repute and accomplishments, some of infamy and no trackAIH Page 15

Somaliland-Djibouti RelationshipGelle: The Tireless Crusader Against Somaliland 2012record; some somewhat active, some just a name on a door. Their exact number is not reliablydeterminable. So is the number of people they employ, though thousands are cited.The INGOs, like their kindred UN counterparts, assert to be rendering essential humanitarian aid anddevelopmental programs to the unfortunate Somalis. Reinforcing this fellowship further is the seriousquestions that have been raised with regards to the INGOs’ operations, modus operandi, finances,objectives, effectiveness…indeed, their very value to the Somalis.It is nearly impossible to tell how much money the IC has spent on Somalia and Somaliland since 1991.This is because those who can do the telling are determined to keep it that way. What is known beyonddoubt, however, is that every cent that was earmarked for the Somalis has been channeled through theabovementioned UN agencies and INGOs. If there is any endeavor in which IC has been remarkablysuccessful in Somalia and Somaliland, it is in seeing to it that no Somalis or their administrations, goodor bad, get any role whatsoever in the management of the aid funds.Anyway, the “How much money?” question cannot be easily dismissed and it is not only Somalis whoare wondering aloud about it. However, in the absence—or perhaps in the light of the premeditatedsuppression—of the transparency that could have provided definitively convincing facts, one can beexcused to scour around for informed guesses and use them in arguments. Thus, excludingappropriations for special circumstances such as last year’s famine in Somalia, estimates of allocationsranging one to two billion Dollars annually are repeatedly mentioned.If we took the lower figure, that would add up to $20 billion plus since 1991. No pocket money, this.But, if anything, the “How much money?” question breeds yet more vexing questions: How has all thismoney been spent? What can we—rather what can this treasure trove’s distributors, namely the UNagencies aka Somali government extraordinaire and INGOs—show for it? Has it been wisely andappropriately spent? Come to think of it, has it been spent at all? And if so, on Somalis? And if not onSomalis, then on whom?As in the mystery that shrouds the fund’s size, there is no readily available public records that wouldenlighten us on the questions posed above. This writer cannot pretend to be of help to the reader in citingany improvements in people’s wellbeing that have been an outcome of the IC aid in Somalia providedthey, in deed, existed. But he can point to one or two observations and facts in Somaliland that couldserve as food for thought.In 1991, Somaliland was a thoroughly broken country. Its cities, towns and villages were total ruins. Itsinfrastructures, schools, hospitals and public utilities were in utterly derelict condition.The Somalis’ UN government extraordinaire claims that 30% of the aid funds for Somalia are allocatedto Somaliland. If so and sticking with the $20 billion figure, it would mean that over $6 billion havebeen available since 1991 to improve matters in Somaliland.Admittedly, some improvements have been achieved and with outside help. Regular vaccinationcampaigns against communicable and disabling diseases have been conducted and have been extensiveas much as they have been largely successful. Some demining INGOs especially from Denmark andBritain have done highly commendable work in making Somaliland, one of the most heavily minedAIH Page 16

Somaliland-Djibouti RelationshipGelle: The Tireless Crusader Against Somaliland 2012countries in the world, a safer place. But that is pretty much the only tangible and meaningful benefitsthat the $6 billion have visibly conferred Somalilanders.Unless, that is, if one is counting the odd well dug in an odd village or the old water pump installed in anexisting well; the odd toilet or classroom or clinic built somewhere or added to an existing facility; theodd one-room shelter usually made of corrugated aluminum sheets built for a IDP family or tarpaulinsprovided to others or the runaway capacity building seminars and workshops conducted in Hargeisa’spremier hotel with amazing frequency and zest.At any rate, one needs not be a CPA to fail easily concluding that there is unmistakably a glaringdisconnect between substantial funds ostensibly available and the value of the beneficial programsactually implemented.Six billion Dollars can do wonders. Yet, no intercity new road has been built or an existing onerenovated. No full-fledged hospital or school or communal public utility for a city or town has beenconstructed. The only two public hospitals still serving Hargeisans, now 1.2 million strong, are Britishcolonial vintage, when only some 50,000 people called it home. The city’s water distribution system isthe same built with Chinese assistance in early seventies when Hargeisa had a population of some120,000 residents. Government planners reckon that as little as $50 million is required to enable thesystem cover the city’s entire water needs; that is merely 0.83% of the supposedly utilizable $6 billionwar chest.One final question: Where has all this money gone? Well, ask the UN government extraordinaire and itskindred INGOs. But certainly a great deal of it has been spent in Djibouti, Nairobi, Addis Ababa andother locations which should have as little to do with Somalia and Somaliland as possible. Great news,again, for these fortunate cities’ economies; for the UN government extraordinaire and its kindredINGOs and their staff.The IC activities with pertinence to Somalia and Somaliland that are executed from Djibouti, Nairobiand Addis Ababa do not end there. Many nations’ embassies in these capitals additionally serve asnon-resident embassies to Somalia or house diplomats on Somaliland assignments. Not to forget thatthese cities are the end destinations of high level world leaders, say, US Secretary of State HilaryClinton, when they venture closest to Somalia on business pertaining to that country.Furthermore, in the fight against piracy and in its wider War On Terror, the United States maintains asizable military base in Djibouti—the only one of its kind in Sub-Saharan Africa. The navies of scoresof other countries similarly contribute to the antipiracy efforts and their warships make regular port callsto Djibouti.As a result, Gelle have been reaping attractive political and economic dividends. Politically, theAmerican and Western appreciation tends to have outweighed whatever misgivings they might have ofGelle dictatorial antics. They have watered down or done away with any rebukes they would havenormally thrown his way.AIH Page 17

Somaliland-Djibouti RelationshipGelle: The Tireless Crusader Against Somaliland 2012Economically, the Americans and others have substantially increased their direct aid to the Djiboutiangovernment. The local economy as well hugely benefits from the free spending US military personneland from catering to some of the supplies required to sustain them as well as from other countries’ navalport calls.It is widely believed that before these windfalls miraculously rescued its economy, Djibouti had been inreal danger of economic meltdown with all its dire social and political consequences. It is also suspectedthat because of these consequential political and economic benefits, Djibouti is not entirely adverse tosee the Somali mayhem prolonged.Pursuant to this scenario, it might make some sense that Gelle is in the habit of convening the numerousSomali conferences whose outcomes invariably tend to make matters worse for the Somalis; thuskeeping Somalia in perpetual chaos and Somaliland in eternal political non-recognition limbo.Still Hankering For Siad’s Unbelievable GiveawaysIn the dying days of his regime when he was being consumed by preoccupations of self-preservationand in defeating the Somalilanders’ freedom struggle at any cost, Siad Barre certainly had committedsome unbelievably strange things. He had capitulated to both Kenya and Ethiopia by officially foregoingPan-Somalism. In the National Archives of Kenya and Ethiopia are kept the respective treaties he hadsigned with these nations in which he had formally disavowed any Somali territorial claims againstthem.In the case of Ethiopia, his only condition had been the expulsion of the SNM freedom fighters fromtheir bases in Ethiopia so that he could subsequently annihilate them. Given the longstanding bad bloodbetween them and the Somalis, it was a condition to which the Ethiopians actually could only happilyaccede. The spectacle of Somalis slaughtering each other should not have particularly dismayed theEthiopians, should it?Some say that Djibouti had been yet another beneficiary of Siad Barre’s disproportional giveaways toforeigners. In return for agreeing to hand over any real or imagined opponent of his regime who hadsought refuge in its country, Siad Barre was said to have been overly generous in offering Djiboutiattractive incentives.Amongst this concessional largesse, Siad Barre reassured Gelle that no competition with Djibouti’s portwould come from that dreaded Berbera port. In fact, Somalia would be a significant user of the Djiboutiport. The oil that had been expected to be found in the Zeila area, just across the border would, in duecourse, be piped through Djibouti for export. Actually, come to think of it, why not take full ownershipof three or four oil wells and their productions outright? Gratis with compliments from Siad Barre, thatis. Gelle, my buddy, be my guest!Not only had Siad Barre been amazingly liberal with his giveaways, he had also been meticulouslyformal in rendering them. So Gelle is said to be in possession of an official document with all the dottedlines duly signed by Siad Barre no less and, for good measure, the presidential stamp neatly affixed in itsproper place in the paper.AIH Page 18

Somaliland-Djibouti RelationshipGelle: The Tireless Crusader Against Somaliland 2012Though Siad Barre had been long gone without achieving the purpose for his exceptional donations tohis country’s neighbors, Gelle wouldn’t obviously contemplate parting with the said importantdocument. The only grounds for this keen possessiveness could only be that Gelle believes it wouldcome on handy at some point in the future.Admittedly this, on the face of it, seems to be ridiculously outlandish. However, when you consider thecentral characters associated with this scenario i.e. Siad Barre and Gelle, let us not be so sure.Anyway, whatever thoughts Mr. Gelle has been entertaining in the matter, he must have realized thatsuch an eventuality could materialize only over Somaliland’s dead body, so to speak. And there lies oneof the reasons Mr. Gelle would be more than happy to see Somaliland simply dead—so to speak again.Dictators Hate Democracyelle's most compelling fear of Somaliland stems, more than anything else, from any dictator'snatural loathing of anything remotely democratic. Witness one of Gelle’s recurrent nightmares:GSomaliland is a democracy. It is the only truly democratic country in the Horn of Africa. It is aneighbor. It is also Djiboutians' second country where many of them live in during a part of the year.Djiboutians could get some funny ideas from Somalilanders. They may get an inspiration fromSomaliland—inspiration of the democratic kind. They may demand political reforms right here in myrealm. My God, they may demand DEMOCRACY.I know most Djiboutians do not like what I do inside or out. Though I have succeeded in amending theconstitution in order to get myself a third term as president and seem to have gotten away with it for themoment, what, with this Somaliland omnipresent infection and Arab Spring and suchlike, is in store forme? And what shall I be? Will I still continue to be president of Djibouti for as long as I desire?And, God, certainly I do desire to be president for as long as possible. And the day that desire wanes oris cut short by, say, old age or disabling illness, or God forbid untimely natural death or God doublyforbid too not so natural a death, I would certainly love to see my son or some other close relativesucceed me. Just like I inherited the presidency from my own uncle, Hassan Gulaid Aptidon, bless hissoul. That how I would certainly love things to proceed. It is my natural God-given right, isn’t it?This Somaliland democracy is bad news, no doubt about that. Djibouti might catch that dreadfulinfection from them. Then they might decide to throw me out or worse! Therefore, I must stopSomaliland! I must! I MUST! I MUST!There are times when exercises in futility turn to blessings in disguise. Somaliland is nothing theworse for Gelle, in spite of as well as perhaps because of his spite. Somalilanders have learned toexpect no favors from anyone. Besides, since those, like Gelle and clique who are close to them inkinship, history and habitation can, as chronicled above, harbor undue malice towards them, theirvigilance and on-guard instincts against enemies of all sorts and from wherever quarter can only besharpened.AIH Page 19

Somaliland-Djibouti RelationshipGelle: The Tireless Crusader Against Somaliland 2012Djibouti governments’ current and past misdeeds notwithstanding, Somalilanders and Djiboutianssensibly remain the closest of peoples. Like brothers or sisters, goodwill, love and care for each otherwill endure. These are mutual sentiments that will certainly outlive Gelle and anyone else who mightchoose to follow his soiled footsteps by sowing discord between the two fraternal nations.Ahmed I. Hassanahmedihass@hotmail.comNotesi For a look at Somaliland’s relationship with another country in the neighborhood, Google recently published “Somaliland-Ethiopia Relationship” or ahmedihass@hotmail.com for the writer’s earlier contributions.ii In 2010, Somaliland held its second presidential election. As the world watched in wonderment, power was constitutionallyand peacefully transferred for a third time. Going with the wind, Gelle invited Somaliland newly elected President Silanyo toDjibouti and accorded him full state visit reception, including leading the welcoming party at the airport. Any agony he mighthave felt on account of eating his own “No Somaliland” words was something he must have cleverly kept to his consciencealone. He was all smiles as if that is how he all along felt about Somaliland. This man is, no doubt, an expert in keepingstraight faces under all circumstances.iii At some stages during the 2002 Arta Conference, Gelle and his cohorts were faced with the unsightly spectacle of many soempty chairs in the section of the venue allotted to the Northern Somalis delegation. No problem. Gelle’s bullies raidedDjibouti’s watering holes and forcefully drafted their known northern regulars (some alcoholics) to fill in the chairs.Confronted with unpalatable alternatives, the poor guys who had only meant to quench their habitual thirsts had to acceptoffers which neither had any relation with their normal preoccupations nor they could refuse.iv The newspaper was the Daily Herald Newspaper of London. The article appeared on 29th June 1960. Some copies of thatissue may be available for the public in the British Library.v In the book and in deference to facts and clarity, a citizen of Somalia is referred to as Somalian; one from Somaliland is aSomalilander. Somali is a common ethnic attributive and also denotes one from Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti.vi In the Somali lore, plentiful, lush land and nursing camels are the optimum of nomadic life. A Somali nomad’s idea ofparadise on earth is “Nabad iyo Caano” meaning Peace and Milk. The preferred milk is the camel’s.vii Kafan is the Somali Language name of the stretch of plain white cloth which Muslims wrap on a fellow Muslim’s deadbody before it is buried.viii It is no secret that not only was the 2008-09 Ethiopian invasion and occupation of Somalia bankrolled by the West, butalso Western military and economic aid to that country has been on the rise. The AMISON mission is financed by the IC.Kenya is the only African country to which the hi-tech American drones are being sold or perhaps donated. The US has evendeployed some of its military personnel to help Uganda’s president Musaveni defeat rebels operating in certain areas of hiscountry. It is the appreciation of these countries’ activities in Somalia that have made West’s such unusual generositiespossible.AIH Page 20