Mini-UAVs for Convoy Protection - HLJones

VOLUME 22 NO. 3, MAY/JUNE 20042700 South Quincy Street, Suite 400, Arlington, VA 22206PUBLISHED BY AUVSI FOR THE UNMANNED SYSTEMS INDUSTRYIn This Issue:Coping with IEDsUAV TrainingUnmanned Systems Europe 2004

UnmannedSystemsPUBLISHED BY AUVSI FOR THE UNMANNED SYSTEMS INDUSTRYFeatures846News Briefs• Return to the Titanic• RoboCopPeople/CalendarContentsVOLUME 22, NUMBER 3, MAY/JUNE 2004Departments12Company News/New Products• ScanEagle Sea Legs• Fire Scout Finds a Home4850On the Horizon• Mobile Agents• Legend of IcarusWashington Watch• HALE ROA Launched• Dragon RunningBats to the Rescue, page 13.Training for the Real Thing, page 21.1332Handling IEDsUAV Sensors2136UAV Special TrainingRobotic RescuePreviewJuly – August 2004 Issue• UCAV Update38Unmanned SystemsEurope 200443UAVs ‘Down Under’Association News547From the PresidentInternational Success.Chapter NewsChecking in with theAUVSI Chapters.7Executive Director’s ReportThe Role of the MemberOn the cover: A scene of a U.S. Army convoy, used to illustrate the need for the use of UAVsfor protective purposes.SAIC’s Jon Sells working in support of the Advanced Prototyping & eXperimentation Labs, Redstone Arsenal, AL, developed the visual scene.MLB Bat images from Steve Morris of the MLB Company in Mountain View, CA.Taking Care of Business, page 13.Unmanned Systems — MAY/JUNE 2004 3

Special Report: Coping with IEDsMini-UAVsforConvoy ProtectionBy Hank JonesA U.S. Marine is killed and two others are wounded in an attack on theirre-supply convoy traveling east of the Iraqi town of Falluja, an U.S. militaryspokesman said. Insurgents detonated a crude bomb close to the truckconvoy before pouring rocket propelled grenades and small arms fire onthose who survived the roadside bombing.The news stories are now all too familiar — American groundtroops killed during convoy or patrol operations due to mortarattack, small arms fire, and detonation of rocket propelledgrenades and roadside Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).Hundreds of truck convoys are on the move every day in Iraq, andthe growing number of fatalities has not gone unnoticed at thePentagon and in cities and towns across the nation.Operational experiments conducted by MLB Company and othersindicate that mini-UAVs can help protect the soldiers traveling thedangerous dusty roads of Iraq.Three Types of Convoys Require Protection• Bulk transport. Up to one hundred large transport vehicles(semi trailers or their military equivalent) that may stretcha few miles in a lightly protected convoy at speeds from50 to 65 mph.• Unit convoys. Ten to twenty-five military logistics vehicles forbrigade support, or five to twenty vehicles for battalion support,moving at 60 to 75 mph. These convoys are a high prioritytarget for the insurgents. Aerial and ground protection issometimes available, but the primary defense mechanism forthese convoys is speed.• Special purpose convoys. Two to five non-tactical vehicles(often converted civilian SUVs) traveling at 85 to 90 mph actas fast couriers of personnel and materiel.Typical routes for all three convoy types vary in length from thirtyto three hundred miles, last from four to six hours between convoystop times, and take place almost always during daylight hours andin sand-blown conditions. Speed is the best way of staying alive.The interest in transforming standard operational proceduresfor protecting convoys has reached the highest commandlevels of the services, and formal doctrinal and organizationalchanges are being proposed.Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are among the technologies beingconsidered in these new operational scenarios. Detailed operationalplans for UAVs in convoy protection are being formed throughfield trials.The most publicized threat to convoys is roadside IEDs, and someform of IED plays a part in the majority of attacks. Sensors suitablefor detection of IEDs, which can be very small (see Figure IED)and can be hidden in common objects (e.g. brush, garbage, rockpiles, culverts, animal carcasses), are not available.UAVs may best contribute to convoy protection by maintaining apersistent presence over known areas of activity and detecting theenemy bombers when they are installing the devices. As muchof this activity is at night, adequate low-light and IR sensors forthe task are required for the UAV platform.Concepts of OperationsThe biggest open question for UAV operations for convoy protectionis that of ownership — are the UAV assets organic to the convoys, orare they managed by a centralized organization? This issue is beingaddressed by a variety of experiments underway throughout the U.S.armed services.One of the lead advisors on this topic, Dr. Jeff Cerny, AdvancedSystems/Army Missile Research and Development at RedstoneArsenal, says “We are working the question of how to deploy smallUAVs through a combination of spiral development with industryand live field experiments of systems that are working today.”Unmanned Systems — MAY/JUNE 2004 13

The decision criteria arecomplicated, and it islikely that an array ofUAV capabilities willbe needed to addressthe variety of particularmission requirements.For centralized operation,the UAV resources arecontrolled, operated,and maintained from acentral location and theirsensors are monitored atthis location as well.Deployed UAV assetssuch as the AAI Shadow200 tactical UAV andFigure IED: Example IED at ground level.the Northrop GrummanHunter UAV are ableto carry out this task inthe current environment. However, the day-to-day coverage ofconvoys by these existing UAV assets has been intermittent andof varying utility.Two different applications are possible given a centralized operationen route surveillance and convoy escort.For route protection, the primary use of UAVs is as a persistentpatrol platform that covers as much of the route for as much timeas possible. This is ideally conducted by multiple UAVs for a singleroute, working together to provide the most effective coverage.Depending on route size and UAV capability, this may beaccomplished by sending UAVs along the entire routes, or bygiving individual UAVs responsibility for certain Named Areasof Interest (NAIs) where they then loiter.In the route protection role, existing UAVs appear to be mostuseful for detection of large groups of people, blocked routes,and significant changes in infrastructure (e.g. bridge closures).A persistent and visible UAV presence may also be the bestdeterrent for IED installation.The second application of centralized UAV operations is as a directconvoy escort. In this use, the convoy commanders must be inUAV Operations TypeCentralizedOrganicTable A: UAV Operations Types.Positives■ Concentration ofinterpretation capability.■ Easier airspacedeconfliction.■ Straightforward repairand maintenance.■ Short communicationranges.■ Real-time informationloop times.■ Coordinated directlyby convoy.Negatives■ Non-LOS communicationrequired.■ Longer informationloop times.■ Difficult coordination.■ Limited interpretationcapability.■ Minimal airspacedeconfliction.■ Limited repair andmaintenance.constant contact with the UAV operators. This requirement is asignificant one, as current convoys have struggled to maintainuninterrupted communication for existing needs and are unlikelyto get better equipment to make communication to a central basemore reliable.Consequently, the level of coordination between convoys and UAVsshould not be expected to exceed the current levels possible forcoordination with manned air assets. In addition, most line-of-sightcommunication uses satellite systems, and this bandwidth is scarceenough to make ubiquitous convoy protection via a centralizedhub unlikely.As shown in Table A, there are significant positives and negativesfor centralizing operations. UAV control from a single point enablesactive airspace deconfliction, an issue that has the potential to greatlyrestrict all in-theater UAV operations. The necessary operational,maintenance and repair expertise and resources can be developedmore aggressively due to dedicated personnel and facilities.On the other hand, centralization will require UAVs that arecapable of safe operation beyond the line of sight of their operators,which has a tendency to significantly increase the cost of operation.Centralization will also increase the total information loop timeas sending centrally-controlled UAV data directly to the convoy isunlikely without tools to place the UAV data in context for propersituational awareness.An alternative to centralized operation is organic convoy deploymentof the UAV assets. Such a setup reverses the positives and negativespresented by centralized operations.Two roles are apparent for organic deployments in convoy protectiveescort and convoy coordination aid. For protection, the UAV wouldfly out ahead of the convoy, providing a look ahead at the routebefore the convoy arrives. As potential attackers are likely to havespotters on the route, low signatures are not particularly important.Given the time constraints and current sensor processing ability, theUAV would be mostly useful for spotting obstructions, groups orpeople, or infrastructure changes. For any scenario in which videois sent directly to the convoy, the final product should includesubstantial hardware or software stabilization to minimize motionsickness for the sensor user.The oft-overlooked role for organic UAVs is as an eye in the skyfor the convoy commander to monitor the whereabouts andintegrity of his convoy. Communications breakdowns and confusionduring route reporting can undermine the convoy commander’ssituational awareness.A UAV patrolling the convoy can aid the commander when enroute and when under attack. Commanders must currently drivetheir vehicle among the convoy, sometimes turning back againstthe direction of travel, to get eyes on potential problems. An organicUAV could be directed to the problem faster and with less impacton the commander.The value of short communication ranges, given the communicationsdifficulties currently faced by convoys in Iraq, cannot be overstated. AnUAV beaming data directly and only to the convoy can carry a smallerand simpler communications system than one required to use asatellite link. The direct connection also reduces the information14 Unmanned Systems — MAY/JUNE 2004

loop delay time down to almost zero, but at the cost of requiringpersonnel in the convoy to do the data interpretation.The UAV operator for a convoy is unlikely to be fully trained inairspace issues, so in the near term there will likely be a restrictionon convoy UAV flight areas to reduce airspace confliction.In the future, deployed forces should begin to think of convoys inthree dimensions and recognize that a convoy may have a “littlebird” over it at 500 or 1,000 feet. The UAV can always be landed,crashed, or sent home if a serious airspace conflict arises. As a finalobstacle to organic convoy operation, someone in the convoy mustbe responsible for maintaining the UAV amongst a set of alreadylengthy equipment maintenance tasks.Convoy Protection ExperimentationThe MLB Company has been conducting experiments with a mini-UAV, the MLB Bat, in a variety of convoy protection scenarios,concentrating on centralized route patrol and organic deployments.The Bat is a small UAV with a six-foot wingspan, 15-pound takeoffweight, six-hour endurance, three-axis automatically aimed gimbaledvideo camera, and bungee-powered catapult.A centralized real-time route protection capability is greatlysimplified when an automatically aimed three-axis gimbaled camerais available. Otherwise, the operator task load is too high for toolong for manual aiming and fixed cameras require a stabilization/mosaicking software suite that cannot ensure complete data overthe area of interest. In addition, the automatic aiming allows theoperator to specify NAIs that the UAV can then spend extradwell time on without requiring operator intervention each timeit passes over.An alternative to live video of the route is the collection ofhigh-resolution still imagery (see Figure HR) that can be processedon the ground to look for potential hazards. A mosaic of the routecreated from these images (see Figure M) can be provided to theconvoy commander for planning.Mini-UAVs like the MLB Bathave very small operationalfootprints even when comparedto slightly larger UAVs like theShadow. Mini-UAVs do notrequire a runway for takeoffand only need a road or smallfield for recovery, yet canmaintain extended flight timesand a range of a couple hundredmiles. These qualities allowthe centralized operation to bemoved to the battalion level ifso desired.Mini-UAVs compete withlarger-class UAVs and mannedaircraft to carry out the routeprotection mission. The mainbenefit of mini-UAVs is theiroperational footprint andlow cost while they sufferfrom limited sensors due topayload constraints.Mini-UAVs appear to bewell suited for organicdeployment due to theirsmall ops footprint, low cost,and capable endurance andrange. Figure FP shows thefull extent of equipmentnecessary to operate the Batfrom a convoy vehicle.The UAV is launchedfrom a convoy vehicleand is commanded to loiterabout a GPS point sentup by the UAV commandFigure M: Mosaic of still images in the desert.vehicle. This point movesat some distance ahead ofthe convoy on its route to provide an early warning of troubleahead (e.g. 30 seconds warning at 60 km/h = 500 meters in front).The calculation of this point may vary in complexity from ananalysis of the entire route beforehand to simply slaving the UAVto the motions of a convoy vehicle.Most mini-UAVs can be re-tasked at any point during their flight,and a UAV operator within the convoy would be able to alter theUAV mission to achieve the best information. Video from the UAVcan be sent to any number of vehicles in the convoy as in-vehicleresources permit.Figure HR: Sample still imagery resolution of IED area in the desert.MLB has demonstrated a “zero operator” mode of convoyprotection in which the Bat mini-UAV is put in an autonomousflight mode that coordinates UAV motion and camera aiming withconvoy movement. The aircraft flies at a specified lead and offsetdistance from the convoy commander’s vehicle location andautomatically alters its flight path to an appropriate loiter trajectorywhen the convoy is moving slower than the UAV’s stall speed.Unmanned Systems — MAY/JUNE 2004 15

Special Report: Coping with IEDsDimensionsWeightRangeDurationSpeedVideo SensorsStill SensorsOperationOperators6.0 x 4.7 x 2.0 feet16.0 to 19.0 lb200 Miles (Fuel Limit)6 Hours Maximum30-60 mphSony Blockcam EO, Indigo Omega IRCanon Digital EO (2.5" per Pixel Resolution at 500')Fully Autonomous Vehicle FollowingOneTable B: MLB Bat Specifications.Figure FP: Photo showing the small ops footprint of the Bat.A 3-axis gimbal camera system with EO and IR sensors isautomatically steered to the specified aim point by the UAV’sflight computer throughout the entire mission, thus eliminating theneed for a full-time sensor operator. The UAV focus point is thencontrolled by the convoy commander’s vehicle direction and velocity,effectively making the ground vehicle’s steering wheel the UAVoperator interface. From launch through landing, the UAV requiresno input from the operator and thus achieves a large amount ofutility in a fully autonomous manner.A dial or keypad could be added to change the offset distance whilethe UAV is in flight without requiring a full operator control station.The experiments to this point have proven very successful, withsignificant increases in ease of use and situational awareness for theconvoy commander.What Next?Pending further experimentation with organic deployments,centralized operations are likely to be the norm for UAVs inthe field. The route patrol mission, rather than close supportof individual convoys, appears to be the best fit for currentUAV capabilities.Mini-UAVs will be a part of this mix, though they will have to findtheir place among the larger UAV platforms and manned aircraft.Organic deployments are a new paradigm for UAV operations inconvoy operations, and more proof of the concept will be requiredbefore they are sent into the field.The low cost of mini-UAVs and potential for ubiquitouscoverage makes this paradigm attractive, but requirementsfor low maintenance, very low operator involvement, and safelaunch/recovery operations must all be addressed. The goal for allsystems is to make the convoy personnel feel safer and be safer.According to Dr. Cerny, the Army is working the problem to closethe gap between possibilities and capabilities. “Small UAVs havegreat potential to provide an eye in the sky over our transportationlines with reliability and persistence in a small footprint and at acost that is acceptable. We are beginning toexperiment to determine the best methodof employment,” he says.A draft Operational RequirementsDocument (ORD) would be the nextstep, but that is months if not years away.For the troops on the road — fielding ofmini-UAVs designed to locate and neutralizeIEDs and other roadside threats — wouldbe a welcome sight indeed.Hank Jones works for MLB Company. He canbe reached at hjones@spyplanes.com.To learn more about the Bat mini-UAV,click on www.spyplanes.com.MLB Bat ready for launch.16 Unmanned Systems — MAY/JUNE 2004