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924 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 31:919maining the specified exception. Moreover, frequently—though not systematically—the specialized tribunals are subjectto the control of the higher instances of the judicial system.On the international level, there is no such clear distributionof functions. Indeed, we still have two unrelated, henceoverlapping, modes of exercising general or plenary jurisdiction(albeit both on a consensual basis): the ICJ and arbitration.Though not wholly satisfying intellectually, this situationwas tolerable in practice as long as the use of these modes remainedso sparse that the probability of their collision (conflictof jurisdiction, contradictory decisions, etc.) seemedmoot. The situation resembled an exploded constellationcomposed of one star and the occasional rare meteor in anotherwise vast and empty universe. But with the proliferationof specialized tribunals, which necessarily tread on part of thegrounds covered by tribunals exercising plenary jurisdiction(e.g., the law of the sea), such danger becomes imminent, asdo the threats to the cohesion and unity of international law.This is the more so considering that almost all of these tribunalsare of one—first and last—instance, with no possibility forappeal or cassation which make for the unity of interpretationof the law.It is true that occasionally <strong>some</strong> vague lineaments of astructure become perceptible. For example, during the interwarperiod, appeals from decisions of the Mixed ArbitralTribunals established pursuant to the peace treaties could belodged with the PCIJ. 2 Similarly, appeals from judgments ofthe Administrative Tribunals of the United Nations (UN) andthe International Labor Organization (ILO) can be lodgedwith the ICJ, albeit through the awkward procedure of requestingan advisory opinion.It is to be noted, however, that, in both instances, the possibilityof appeal (with the ensuing hierarchical structure) isprovided for in the statutes of the “lower” tribunal itself anddoes not emanate from general international law or the inher-2. See, e.g., Appeals from Certain Judgments of the Czechoslovak-HungarianMixed Arbitral Tribunal (Czech. v. Hung.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)No. 56 (May 12); Appeal from a Judgment of the Czechoslovak-HungarianMixed Arbitral Tribunal (Czech. v. Hung.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 61(Dec. 15).
1999] CONCLUDING REMARKS 925ent powers of the International Court. In the same vein, arbitralawards can be attacked before the ICJ, as they were twice. 3But here again these appeals were introduced, like any othercase, on the basis of a specific jurisdictional title rather thanon the basis of unity and continuity of the adjudicative system.III. BACK TO THEORYAs mentioned earlier, the prodigious development of internationallaw in the last few decades, reflected in the greaterdensity, complexity, and diversity of its normative content, hasalso led to the multiplication of specialized mechanisms of implementation,including tribunals. This confirms what I considerto be a law of legal physics, which can be formulated asfollows: “To each level of normative density, there correspondsa level of institutional density necessary to sustain thenorms” (i.e., which makes it possible to manage and applythem). 4 In other words, in these circumstances, the multiplicationof specialized tribunals is, by itself, a healthy phenomenon.Its description by the term “proliferation,” with its negativeconnotations, is misleading. Of course, proliferation is extremelydangerous when we speak of lethal weapons of massdestruction. But it is a totally different matter when we speakof tribunals or other law-determining agencies in a system thathas notoriously suffered, throughout its existence, from thedearth (not to say lack) of objective determinations.Pierre Teilhard de Chardin has defined evolution as complexification-conscience,a process of conscious complexification.As things become more complex, they reflect a higher degreeof division of labor, or specialization, which is a higher stage ofevolution. But the participants in this process must be consciousof its direction and requirements. The further the divisionof labor and specialization, the greater the need for thepreservation of the unity of the whole that makes specializationpossible and meaningful, but which becomes harder tomaintain because of the centrifugal effects of specialization.3. See Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spainon 23 December 1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 I.C.J. 192 (Nov. 18); CaseConcerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991I.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12).4. Cf. Georges Abi-Saab, Cours général de droit international public, 207RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 93 (1987).
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