Country Guidance Note - Afghanistan - Department of Immigration ...

COUNTRY GUIDANCE NOTE 

AFGHANISTAN 

MARCH 2011 

Country Guidance Unit 

Onshore Protection Branch 

Department of Immigration and Citizenship 

30.03.2011

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. HOW TO USE THIS COUNTRY GUIDANCE NOTE...................................................4 

2. OVERVIEW .................................................................................................................5 

3. RACE – TREATMENT OF HAZARAS ........................................................................6 

3.1 Claims ..................................................................................................................................6 

3.2 Country information.............................................................................................................6 

UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines ....................................................................................................6 

Historic discrimination and persecution under the Taliban .........................................................7 

Situation for Hazaras after the fall of Taliban .............................................................................7 

The Taliban Insurgency ...............................................................................................................7 

Deteriorating security situation....................................................................................................9 

Situation in Hazara-dominated provinces (See also Jaghori/Travel section) ..............................9 

3.3 Framework for assessing claims ........................................................................................11 

4. RELIGION – SHI’A MUSLIMS ..................................................................................13 

4.1 Claims ................................................................................................................................13 

4.2 Country information...........................................................................................................13 

UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines ..................................................................................................13 

Afghanistan’s official position...................................................................................................13 

Apostasy ………………………………………………………………………………………14 

Situation for Shi’a Hazara..........................................................................................................14 

Different views on the Taliban’s attitude towards Shi’a Hazaras.............................................15 


5. POLITICAL OPINION................................................................................................18 

5.1 Claims ................................................................................................................................18 



Political participation by Hazaras (see also State Protection) ...................................................18 

Politically-motivated violence by anti-government insurgents .................................................19 


6. STATE PROTECTION ..............................................................................................23 

6.1 Claims ................................................................................................................................23 



Efforts at a political solution......................................................................................................23 

Ability of the State to provide protection ..................................................................................24 

Other sources of protection........................................................................................................24 


7. JAGHORI DISTRICT, INCLUDING TRAVEL TO AND AROUND JAGHORI ...........27 

7.1 Claims ................................................................................................................................27 


2


Ghazni Province and Jaghori District ........................................................................................27 

Economic and social situation ...................................................................................................28 

Security situation since 2008 .....................................................................................................28 

Travel and possible alternate travel routes.................................................................................30 

Other possible causes of violence ..............................................................................................31 


8. LAND DISPUTES......................................................................................................35 

8.1 Claims ................................................................................................................................35 



Land disputes between Hazaras and Kuchis..............................................................................36 

Different perspectives on factors contributing to land disputes.................................................36 

Attempts at resolving land disputes ...........................................................................................37 


9. INTERNAL RELOCATION........................................................................................40 

9.1 Claim..................................................................................................................................40 



Other country information .........................................................................................................40 

UNHCR voluntary returnees......................................................................................................41 


10. ASSOCIATION WITH THE WEST ............................................................................45 

10.1 Claim..................................................................................................................................45 



Returnees from the West............................................................................................................45 

Other Targets .............................................................................................................................46 


11. AFGHAN HAZARAS IN PAKISTAN AND IRAN.......................................................48 

11.1 Claims ................................................................................................................................48 


Afghans in Pakistan ...................................................................................................................48 

Hazaras in Pakistan ....................................................................................................................49 

Incidents involving Hazaras.......................................................................................................49 

Hazaras in Iran ...........................................................................................................................50 


12. Map ...........................................................................................................................52 

3

1. HOW TO USE THIS COUNTRY GUIDANCE NOTE 

Purpose 

The purpose of this Country Guidance Note is to assist case officers 1 by synthesising 

relevant country information; identifying critical issues; and providing guidance relating to 

the caseload. This Country Guidance Note does not replace case-by-case assessment 2 

and is not to be used as the sole basis for consideration of claims. It is intended to provide 

context only and does not purport to be comprehensive. It is not intended to dictate the 

results in individual cases, nor does it address every claim presented in the caseload. The 

wide range of country of origin information must be considered in assessing individual 

claims. 

This Country Guidance Note draws on a range of sources including organisations, media 

outlets, and individual journalists and academics, based on relevance, credibility and 

currency of the information. No descriptions for organisations or individuals have been 

provided in the text. Case officers must consult the original source documents to form 

their own opinions in relation to an individual case and, where considered necessary, other 

available evidence should also be taken into account. This Country Guidance Note is not 

provided for direct quotation. 

The issues for consideration and related questions included at the end of each section 

derive from the country information. Case officers should consider these issues (and 

others they identify) in their assessments, including where necessary an explanation of 

their assessment of conflicting information as it may relate to the individual claim. 

Policy and legal context 

It is essential that this Country Guidance Note is used in conjunction with the Refugee Law 

Guidelines, and where appropriate the Protection Visa Procedures manual, the Refugee 

Status Assessment manual, the Protection Obligation Evaluation manual, and any other 

relevant information. Those provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (the Migration Act) that 

relate to refugee status determination and the case law bearing upon those provisions 

must be applied. 

The sections of this Country Guidance Note have been prepared to respond to specific 

issues relevant to the Australian caseload. This document acknowledges the ongoing 

conflict and high level of insecurity in Afghanistan. In considering persecution, it is 

important to differentiate between the issue of a person’s relative safety and security, and 

whether the person is a refugee as defined by the Refugees Convention. 3 

Updates and input 

This Country Guidance Note is based on current information at date of publication, and will 

be updated regularly to reflect significant changes in country situation, relevant case law, 

or policy. Feedback and input in relation to this Country Guidance Note can be provided 

by email to: CGNfeedback@immi.gov.au. 

1 

Note “case officers” refers to Protection visa decision makers, Refugee Status Assessment officers and Protection 

Obligation Evaluation officers. 

2 

Note the term “assessment” has been used in this document in a generic sense, and does not refer to the Independent 

Assessment Process. 

3 

http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=3b66c2aa10&query=convention and 

protocol relating to the status of refugees. 

4

2. OVERVIEW 

The current Australian caseload of Afghan asylum seekers predominantly consists of 

ethnic Hazaras who are Shi’a Muslims. The claims and issues covered in this Country 

Guidance Note are based on those typically raised by asylum seekers. Common 

Convention grounds include race, religion and political opinion. This Country Guidance 

Note also considers issues which are relevant to claims based on such grounds, including: 

the situation in Jaghori in Ghazni Province; travel within Afghanistan; land disputes; state 

protection; association with the West; and the possibility of relocation. 

Hazaras are a distinct ethnic group, making up approximately nine per cent of 

Afghanistan’s population (as compared to the two largest ethnic groups, Pashtuns and 

Tajiks who make up 42 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively). 4 Most Hazaras follow Shi’a 

Islam. The Asiatic physical features of the Hazaras distinguish them from other ethnic 

groups in Afghanistan. The majority of the Hazaras live in the mountainous central region 

of the country, known as the Hazarajat. Economic conditions in these provinces are 

generally poor, owing to the terrain, isolation and harsh climate. Outside of the Hazarajat, 

a significant proportion of Hazaras now lives in Kabul city. 5 

According to an anthropological study, since 1978 Hazaras have regularly travelled back 

and forth between Afghanistan and Pakistan and Iran to seek work, escape drought and to 

flee war. 6 A 2009 report commissioned by the UNHCR also noted the economic 

motivation for Afghans travelling to Pakistan. 7 

Conflict is ongoing in Afghanistan and civilians continue to suffer at the hands of non-state 

agents. Attacks by anti-government forces have increased in recent years. 8 According to 

a 2010 survey of the Afghan people, insecurity is seen as the biggest problem in 

Afghanistan while corruption is also reported as a major concern. 9 

4 These statistics, from the online CIA World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/af.html, 

are cited in various sources including CIS18317: Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of 

Reconstruction and Security in Post 9/11 Afghanistan, Ian S Livingston, Heather L Messera and Michael O'Hanlon, 

Brookings, 28 February 2010, p22. Another source puts the Hazara population at 10-15 per cent of Afghanistan’s total, 

CX239852: Hazaras hustle to head of class in Afghanistan, The New York Times, 3 January 2010. 

5 For proportion in Kabul see CX239852: Hazaras hustle to head of class in Afghanistan, The New York Times, 

3 January 2010. 

6 CIS18419: War and Migration: Social Networks and Economic Strategies of the Hazaras of Afghanistan, Alessandro 

Monsutti, Routledge, New York and London, 2005, see in particular pp27-30 and pp123-127. 

7 CIS17942: Study On Cross Border Population Movements Between Afghanistan And Pakistan, Altai Consulting, 

UNHCR, June 2009. 

8 See for example CIS18312: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of 

human rights in Afghanistan and on the achievements of technical assistance in the field of human rights, United 

Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 11 January 2010, p4. 

9 CIS19421: Afghanistan in 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People, The Asia Foundation, 9 November 2010, p8, p10. 

See also CX249584: Factbox: Key facts and figures about Afghanistan, Reuters, 16 September 2010 and 

CX246760 Envoy says corruption helps Taliban win recruits, The New York Times, 28 July 2010. 

5

3. RACE – TREATMENT OF HAZARAS 

3.1 Claims 

Applicants may claim that they are Hazara and fear persecution by the Taliban or other 

Afghans due to being physically identifiable as members of the Hazara race. Claims may 

relate to personal experience or the experiences of family members occurring recently or 

some years ago. Key claims referring specifically to race include: 

• fear of being harassed or killed by the Taliban 

• fear of being attacked by Kuchi nomads (see also Land Disputes) 

• fear of being attacked and/or discriminated against by the general Pashtun population. 

3.2 Country information 

UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines 

The 2010 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of 

Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan (UNHCR Guidelines) make numerous references to the 

situation of ethnic minorities. The UNHCR Guidelines note that “since the fall of the 

Taliban regime in late 2001 ethnically-motivated tension and violence have diminished 

markedly”. The UNHCR Guidelines also note that, notwithstanding this and despite 

Afghanistan’s constitutional guarantees of equality among all ethnic groups, certain 

concerns remain regarding ethnic discrimination and clashes, particularly in relation to land 

use/ownership rights. 10 

The UNHCR Guidelines state that “a member of an ethnic group constituting a minority at 

the national level is not likely to be at risk in areas where the ethnic group represents the 

local majority.” 11 

Citing other sources including the US Department of State, the UNHCR Guidelines note 

that “the Hazara community continues to face some degree of discrimination, despite 

significant efforts by the Government to address historical ethnic tensions.” 12 

The UNHCR “considers that members of ethnic groups, including, but not limited to those 

affected by ethnic violence or land use and ownership disputes, particularly in areas where 

they do not constitute an ethnic majority, may be at risk on account of their 

ethnicity/race…depending on the individual circumstances of the case. However, the 

mere fact that a person belongs to an ethnic group constituting a minority in a certain area 

does not automatically trigger concerns related to risks on the ground of ethnicity alone. 

Other factors including, inter alia, the relative social, political, economic and military power 

10 CIS19678: UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers From 

Afghanistan, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 17 December 2010, p29. 





6

of the person and/or his and her ethnic group in the area where fear is alleged may be 

relevant”. 13 

Historic discrimination and persecution under the Taliban 

Traditionally, the Hazaras have been marginalised politically and economically and have 

been treated as the underclass of Afghan society, working in the most menial jobs. 14 

At different times throughout Afghanistan’s history, the Hazaras have been the target of 

discrimination and violence. 15 During the Taliban regime from 1996 to 2001, the Hazaras 

were subject to severe ethnically-motivated violence, with one of the worst incidents 

occurring in 1998 when the Taliban massacred approximately 4500 Hazara in retaliation 

for Taliban losses during a failed attempt to take Mazar-e-Sharif in 1997. 16 

Situation for Hazaras after the fall of Taliban 

According to the United States of America Citizenship and Immigration Services, two years 

after the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, following the invasion by the US led international 

coalition, the Hazaras faced little overt persecution from remnants of the Taliban, although 

they continued to face some harassment in Pashtun dominated areas. 17 

According to a Los Angeles Times report in July 2004, the Hazaras in Bamyan province 

believed that the new constitution which guaranteed equal rights to minority groups, 

provided them with an opportunity “to grasp some power and lift themselves from the 

bottom of Afghan society.” 18 

The Taliban Insurgency 

By 2006, the Taliban insurgency was well under way. 19 Views differ as to the nature and 

motives of the Taliban. A September 2006 assessment by the Senslis Council, referred to 

the insurgent movement as the “neo-Taliban”, comprising a loose collection of antigovernment 

groups which operate somewhat independently of each other.” 20 While both 



14 See for example, CIS18171: Afghanistan: Minorities, Conflict and the Search for Peace, Peter Marsden, Minority 

Rights Group International, November 2001; and CX221185: Ethnic Identity in Afghanistan, Naval Postgraduate 

School - Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, no date. 

15 See for example CX206128: World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples: Hazaras, Minority Rights Group 

International, 2008, no page numbers. 

16 CX221185: Ethnic Identity in Afghanistan, Naval Postgraduate School - Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, no 

date; CX231475: Afghanistan: Ethnically-Motivated Abuses Against Civilians, Human Rights Watch, October 2001; 

see also CIS19746: Taliban - Chapters 5-6, Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, I.B.Tauris and Co Ltd, 2010. Rashid noted that the 

Taliban massacre of Shia Hazara in 1998, was “genocidal in its ferocity, as the Taliban took revenge on their losses the 

previous year” p73. 

17 CX228170: Information on situation of Hazaras in post-Taliban Afghanistan, United States of America, Citizenship 

& Immigration Services, 4 April 2003. 

18 CX98477: Afghan Minority Revels in Power to Vote, The Los Angeles Times, 26 July 2004. 

19 CX182667: Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 

17 November 2006, p6. 

20 CIS14971: Afghanistan Five Years Later: The Return of the Taliban, Senslis Afghanistan, The Senslis Council, 

September 2006, p53; see also CX224540: Briefing: Who are the Taliban?, The Christian Science Monitor, 16 April 

2009. 

7

the Taliban and the “neo-Taliban” followed an extreme interpretation of Sunni-Islam, the 

“neo-Taliban" adopted high-impact terrorist tactics, and indiscriminately targeted civilians, 

rather than specific groups of people like the teachers, criminals and Hazara people 

targeted by the Taliban. 21 

According to a 2009 report by Gilles Dorronsoro, since its re-emergence the Taliban has 

been characterised as either a cohesive group driven by a conservative Islamic ideology 

with organised tactics and strategy to defeat the international coalition in Afghanistan, or 

an “umbrella movement” of loosely connected, local and unorganised groups. 22 

Dorronsoro, who argues the former case, noted that the Taliban was described as “the 

dominant political force in numerous regions of Afghanistan, including Pashtun-majority 

provinces in the East and the South”. 23 Dorronsoro considers that the Taliban’s aim is to 

drive out the international coalition and re-establish the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan 

(IEA) governed by Sharia law. 24 

A February 2010 report for the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment quoted the 

IEA’s official spokesperson as saying in 2008 that “the struggle in Afghanistan is the 

struggle of the Afghans,” and that “Afghanistan is a religious country and a homeland … 

for all its inhabitants, regardless whether they are Pashtun, Uzbek, Hazara or others.” 25 

According to an April 2010 report by the United States Department of Defense, the 

“insurgency is comprised of multiple groups pursuing various short- and longer-term 

goals”. 26 The report listed the insurgency’s strengths, including their ability to establish 

“shadow governance” in areas under their control and their use of improvised explosive 

devices. 27 Other reports indicate the Taliban are utilising more modern information 

strategies and technologies to support their goals. 28 

According to Professor William Maley, the Taliban have every reason to engage in violent 

acts against longstanding targets such as the Hazaras to undermine the state’s claim to 

legitimacy by illustrating its inability to offer basic protections to ordinary citizens. 29 Maley 

21 

CIS14971: Afghanistan Five Years Later: The Return of the Taliban, Senslis Afghanistan, The Senslis Council, 

September 2006, p55. 

22 

CIS18632: The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan, Gilles Dorronsoro, Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, 2009. See also CIS18943: Negotiating with the Taliban: Issues and Prospects, Antonio Giustozzi, 

The Century Foundation, 2010. Giustozzi tends to agree with Dorronsoro as to the nature of the Taliban, see pp14-15. 

23 

CIS18632: The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan, Gilles Dorronsoro, Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, 2009, p24. 

24 

CX235520: Who Are the Taliban?, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 22 October 2009. 

25 

CIS18534: The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan – organization, leadership and worldview, Anne Stenersen, 

Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 5 February 2010, p56. 

26 

CIS18554: Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining 

the Afghanistan National Security Forces, United States Department of Defense, April 2010, p22. 

27 

CIS18554: Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining 

the Afghanistan National Security Forces, United States Department of Defense, April 2010, p21. 

28 

See for example CIS18534: The Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, organization, leadership and worldview, Anne 

Stenersen, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 5 February 2010 and CIS16308 Taliban Propaganda, winning 

the war of words, International Crisis Group, 5 August 2010. 

29 

CX245777: Afghanistan’s Hazara minority is in mortal danger at the hands of a resurgent Taliban, says William 

Maley, The Australian, 2 July 2010. 

8

has also been quoted as saying that “there is no reason to believe that the underlying 

factors (both ethnic and sectarian) fuelling hostility towards the Hazaras have dissipated”. 30 

Deteriorating security situation 

According to a UN envoy “the security situation in Afghanistan has worsened to its lowest 

point since the toppling of the Taliban a decade ago”. 31 

In September 2010, Reuters reported that violence had “surged to the highest levels since 

U.S. and Afghan forces ousted the Taliban in late 2001”. 32 

According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan’s mid year report, in 

the first six months of 2010, civilian casualties - including deaths and injuries of civilians 

increased by 31 per cent over the same period in 2009. Three quarters of all civilian 

casualties were linked to anti-government forces, an increase of 53 per cent from 2009. 33 

On 16 June 2010, the UN Secretary General noted that the “overall security situation has 

not improved. Indiscriminate anti-Government element attacks against civilian targets, 

Government representatives and international forces continued. The alarming trend of 

increased improvised explosive device incidents and the occurrence of complex suicide 

attacks persisted.” 34 

News reports in May and June 2010 referred to Taliban insurgents beheading up to 

11 Hazara men in Oruzgan Province. 35 

Situation in Hazara-dominated provinces (See also Jaghori/Travel section) 

In October 2010, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) reported that the 

Hazara-majority province of Bamyan was widely regarded as secure, and there were no 

significant protection challenges facing Hazaras, though movement to and from the 

province had become more challenging. According to DFAT, Bamyan was moving in a 

positive direction in terms of development and governance. But the slow (albeit steady) 

30 

CX252215: Refugee groups say government advice on Hazara asylum-seekers is wrong, The Australian, 

1 October 2010. 

31 

CX259175: Afghan security at worst state since Taliban: UN, Agence France Presse, 24 February 2011. 

32 

CX249584: Factbox: Key facts and figures about Afghanistan, Reuters, 16 September, 2010; see also CIS19198: The 

situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security - Report of the Secretary-General, UN 

General Assembly Security Council, 14 September 2010, pp 4-5. 

33 

CIS19727: Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Mid Year Report 2010, UN Assistance 

Mission in Afghanistan, pi. See also CIS19787: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and 

Policy Issues, Rhoda Margesson, United States Congressional Research Service, 27 December 2010, p17; CX256412: 

Over 10,000 died in Afghan violence in 2010 , Agence France Presse - France, 2 January 2011; CIS18318: Annual 

Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2009, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 

January 2010. 

34 

CIS18880: United Nations Security Council Report of the Secretary-General: Activities of the United Nations 

Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the United Nations Country Team, United Nations Security Council, 

16 June 2010, p16. 

35 

CX243426:Taleban detain 12 for alleged spying in Afghan east, Pajhwok Afghan News website, 9 May 2010; 

CX245774: Bodies found beheaded in Afghanistan; 4 troops die, Associated Press, 27 June 2010; CX245508: Police 

find 11 beheaded bodies in Afghan south, Reuters, 25 June 2010; CX245566: Taliban Kill 9 Members of Minority in 

Ambush, The New York Times, 25 June 2010. See also CX245777: Afghanistan's Hazara minority is in mortal danger 

at the hands of a resurgent Taliban, says William Maley, The Australian, 2 July 2010. 

9

pace of progress, perceptions of neglect by Kabul and limited opportunities were 

encouraging migration and inhibiting returns. 36 

A September 2010 DFAT report noted that the Hazaras were making the most of the 

opportunities now open to them, reflected in typically high levels of education and active 

involvement in the political process. It was also reported that Hazaras in Ghazni, 

particularly in Jaghori district, enjoyed better educational and health facilities than 

neighbouring provinces. Due to their better security environment, Hazara districts in 

Ghazni have greater access to these services than Pashtun-dominated districts. The 

report also noted that Hazaras continued to have limited employment opportunities, faced 

security challenges and had a perception of discrimination, as well as frustration over the 

slow rate of progress, all of which were encouraging migration from Afghanistan. 37 

A September 2010 article in Foreign Policy noted that Bamyan was peaceful and stable. 

Although in August 2010 there was some Taliban violence in the province in the lead up to 

the September parliamentary elections, and in May 2010 Deutsche Presse Agentur quoted 

Bamyan residents who feared the return of the Taliban. 38 

In June 2010, DFAT reported that in the Hazara-majority province of Daikundi, while 

ethnically motivated targeting of Hazaras was not practised, the province did experience 

violent clashes from time to time. 39 

A February 2010 DFAT report, based on interviews with UN officials, Afghan human rights 

organisations and Hazara advocates, noted that while there were “strong perceptions of 

discrimination” and a sense that development needs in the Hazarajat were being 

neglected, the Hazara do not live in fear of “systemic persecution as they did under the 

Taliban” and currently Hazaras, in particular, were not being persecuted on any consistent 

basis. 40 Refugee groups have since disagreed with this advice and academics have also 

been reportedly sceptical. 41 

A February 2010 report in The New York Times indicated that the situation for Hazaras 

had continued to improve as they now enjoyed greater social, political, cultural and 

economic rights and opportunities. 42 

A September 2009 fact finding mission by the Finnish Immigration Service described the 

Jaghori region in particular as relatively stable and peaceful as opposed to the rest of the 

country; however, travel to and from Jaghori remained a key concern. 43 

36 CX251970: The Hazara Community in Bamyan, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 

24 October 2010. See also CIS20082 Province: Bamyan, Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, Naval Postgraduate 

School, undated. 

37 CX250180: AFG10736: The Hazara, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 28 September, 2010. 

38 CX249792: The Vote Comes to Afghanistan’s Peaceful Heartland, Foreign Policy, 20 September 2010. See also 

CX256377: Soldier's death won't prompt Afghan pullout, Stuff (New Zealand), 4 August 2010; and 

CX244308: Bamyan residents fear return of Taliban, Deutsche Presse Agentur, 30 May, 2010. 

39 CX245097: CIS Request No.AFG10334 Sayyed Hazara, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 

16 June 2010. 

40 CX249511: Situation of the Hazara Minority, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 

17 September 2010. 

41 CX252215: Refugee groups say government advice on Hazara asylum seekers is wrong, The Australian, 

1 October 2010. 

42 CX239852: Hazaras hustle to head of class in Afghanistan, The New York Times, 3 January 2010. 

10

According to the Cooperation for Peace and Unity, in locations where Hazaras constitute a 

majority, such as Jaghori and Malistan districts of Ghazni Province, and elsewhere in the 

Hazarajat, the Taliban does not have control and the Hazara community appears to be 

able to prevent Taliban incursions. 44 

Several reports in 2007 and 2008 stated that Hazaras were, at that time, enjoying greater 

peace and prosperity than ever before in Afghanistan. 45 

3.3 Framework for assessing claims (for more information see The Refugee Law 

Guidelines) 

An individual with a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of Race (one of the five 

grounds in Article 1A of the 1951 Refugees Convention) may be eligible for protection. 

In order for a Hazara asylum seeker to be assessed as having a well-founded fear of 

persecution on the basis of race, there will need to be evidence that: 

• the persecution involves serious harm to the person (s91R of the Migration Act 

refers and may assist in determining what is serious harm); 

• the persecution involves systematic and discriminatory conduct; and 

• that the applicant’s race is the essential and significant reason for the persecution 

(noting that there may be more than one Convention ground for persecution). 

Applicants may claim that as Hazaras they are denied access to education and work 

opportunities. These claims will need to be explored carefully to assess whether or not 

they can be classed as serious harm to the person constituting persecution. 

Note: Case officers need to specify that claims about ethnicity relate to the Convention 

ground of Race. 

Issues for consideration 

While acknowledging the diversity of views represented in the country information, which 

need to be taken into account, the following issues for consideration are based on the 

December 2010 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Afghanistan, as well as reports by DFAT, 

the Finnish Immigration Service, and the Afghanistan based organisation, Cooperation for 

Peace and Unity. 

The UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines indicate that the Hazara community continues to face 

some degree of discrimination. A case-by-case analysis is required to assess whether any 

harm feared by the individual can be considered persecution as per s91R of the Migration 

Act. While some acts alone may not equate to “serious harm” to a person, it must be 

43 

CIS18216: Situation Report: The Current Situation in the Jaghori District of Ghazni, Finnish Immigration Service, 

10 December 2009. 

44 

CIS17321: Conflict analysis: Jaghori and Malistan districts, Ghazni province, Gina Bergh with Christian Dennys and 

Idrees Zaman, Cooperation for Peace and Unity, 27 April 2009, p11-13. 

45 

CX182348: Afghanistan's success story: The liberated Hazara minority, The Christian Science Monitor, 

6 August 2007; CX228176: The outsiders, National Geographic, 2/08; see also CX245804: Taliban and peace: A 

former Hazara associate of the Taliban explains, Kabul Center for Strategic Studies, 1 November 2007. 

11

considered if the act, combined with other evidence of ill-treatment, amounts cumulatively 

to persecution. 

Afghan Hazaras, although a minority in Afghanistan as a whole, do not constitute a 

minority in the region of the Hazarajat. According to various reports by DFAT, the 

Cooperation for Peace and Unity and the Finnish Immigration Service, Afghan Hazaras 

residing in the Hazarajat region currently have access to education, the ability to earn a 

livelihood, health services and representation in government, although economic 

conditions in these provinces are reportedly poor. As noted, violence in these areas can 

still occur. Whether this amounts to persecution for a Convention reason is matter for 

case-by-case assessment based on the circumstances of the individual. 

Clear reasoning must be provided to illustrate how claimed persecution relates to the 

Convention ground of race and differs from the generalised, indiscriminate violence 

common to the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. The application of s91R(1)(a) and the 

requirement that the relevant Convention ground is the “essential and significant” reason 

for the persecution must be noted. This is in addition to the requirements that the 

persecution involves serious harm (as defined in s91R(2)) and that the persecution 

involves “systematic and discriminatory conduct.” Conduct that is not targeted for a 

Convention reason (for example, random acts of thuggery) will not satisfy the requirements 

in s91R of the Act. 

Whether or not a ‘real chance’ of persecution exists if the client were to return to 

Afghanistan must also be considered. 

Questions for consideration 

The following types of questions should be considered to support a well-evidenced, 

transparent and robust assessment, regardless of the result: 

• What evidence supports the applicant’s claims of persecution for the Convention 

ground of race? 

• Much of the population is affected by the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. How does 

the claimed persecution differ from generalised violence? What evidence supports 

this? 

• Reports indicate that acts of violence may be perpetrated by criminal and insurgent 

elements in Afghanistan. Who is the agent of harm and how does the claimed harm 

amount to persecution? 

• Certain acts of discrimination may of themselves not constitute serious harm. How is 

the discrimination or harm claimed of sufficient seriousness to be considered 

persecution? 

• How will the applicant, based on their race, be denied access to education, the ability 

to generate a livelihood or representation in government? What evidence supports 

this? 

12

4. RELIGION – SHI’A MUSLIMS 

4.1 Claims 

Applicants may state they are Shi’a Muslim, and fear persecution because of their religion 

(among other reasons). Claims may include, for example: 

• a generalised fear of persecution based on religious belief and associated historic 

events 

• fear of being forced to change religion or leave the country 

• being unable to practise religious ceremonies due to the presence of the Taliban. 


According to the United States Department of State International Religious Freedom 

(USDSIRF) Report 2010, 80 per cent of the population of Afghanistan is Sunni Muslim, 

19 percent Shi'a Muslim, and other religious groups constitute less than one percent of the 

population. 46 


UNHCR considers that persons perceived as contravening Shari’a law, including persons 

accused of blasphemy and converts from Islam, as well as members of minority religious 

groups, may be at risk on the ground of religion, depending on the individual 

circumstances of the case. 47 

The 2010 UNHCR Guidelines reported that “in the Kajran District of Daykundi province, 

armed anti-Government groups engage in propaganda against Hazaras and Shi’a Muslims 

allegedly on the ground of religious differences”. 48 

Afghanistan’s official position 

Under Afghanistan’s 2004 Constitution, Islam is the religion of the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan. Followers of other faiths are free within the bounds of law in the exercise and 

performance of their religious rituals. Afghanistan accords both Shi’a and Sunni Islam 

equal recognition. 49 

The Constitution provides that Shi’a law will be applied in cases dealing with personal 

matters where all parties are Shi’a. As noted in the USDSIRF 2010 Report, in July 2009 

President Karzai signed a revised law implementing this provision of the constitution to 

recognise the right of the Shi'a minority to adjudicate personal and family matters 

46 CX255620: Afghanistan - International Religious Freedom Report 2010, United States of America: Department of 

State, 17 November 2010, no page numbers; see also CIS18034: Core document forming part of the reports of States 

parties: International Human Rights Instruments – Afghanistan, United Nations International Human Rights 

Instruments, 26 August 2009, p5 and p8 about difficulty in obtaining data. 




Afghanistan, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 17 December 2010, p30-31. 

49 CIS18034: Core document forming part of the reports of States parties: International Human Rights Instruments – 

Afghanistan, United Nations International Human Rights Instruments, 26 August 2009, p8. 

13

according to their own school of jurisprudence. (Although, also according to the USDSIRF 

2010 Report, it revised some of the controversial articles in the original version, the revised 

version continued to attract criticism for conflicting with women’s constitutionally protected 

rights and international treaties and conventions to which Afghanistan was a signatory.) 50 

The USDSIRF 2009 Report also noted that Shi’a are represented on the Ulema Council 

advising the President on Islamic moral, legal and ethical issues, and both Sunnis and 

Shi’as are permitted to go on the Hajj. 

Apostasy 

The USDSIRF 2010 Report noted that conversion from Islam is considered apostasy and 

is punishable by death under some interpretations of Islamic law in Afghanistan. The 

USDSIRF 2010 Report outlined the relevant provisions in Afghanistan’s criminal code, 

Constitution and penal code in respect of apostasy and blasphemy. According to the 

USDSIRF 2010 Report, in recent years neither the national nor local authorities have 

imposed criminal penalties on converts from Islam, and no death sentence has been 

carried out for blasphemy. 51 

Since the publication of the USDSIRF 2010 Report, there have been media reports about 

individual Afghanis charged and detained for converting from Islam to Christianity. 52 

Situation for Shi’a Hazara 

News reports in December 2010 in The Los Angeles Times, and in January 2011, in The 

Age, noted that the Shi’a community in Kabul openly commemorated Ashura in December 

2010. Acccording to The Los Angeles Times report, a high ranking Shi’ite cleric called 

upon the Shi’a community to tone down their commemorations. 53 

According to the USDSIRF 2010 Report, “[r]elations between the different branches of 

Islam remained somewhat strained. Historically, the minority Shi’a faced discrimination 

from the Sunni population. Since Shi'a representation has increased in government, overt 

discrimination by Sunnis against the Shi'a community decreased. Sunni resentment over 

growing Shi'a influence was expressed widely and often linked to claims of Iranian efforts 

to influence local culture and politics.” The USDSIRF 2010 Report also noted that the 

Afghanistan “government made significant efforts to address historical tensions affecting 

the Hazara community. Although there were reported incidents of unofficial discrimination, 

and treatment varied by locality, Shi'a generally were free to participate fully in public life.” 54 

50 

CX255620: Afghanistan - International Religious Freedom Report 2010, United States of America: Department of 

State, 17 November 2010, no page numbers. 

51 


State, 17 November 2010, no page numbers. 

52 

CX259319: Afghani Convert Musa Released: Another Christian Still in Prison, Compass Direct, 24 February 2011; 

CX256895: Afghan Christian faces trial for alleged conversion from Islam, Cable News Network (CNN), 

21 November 2010. 

53 

CX257086: A formerly persecuted minority gains clout in Afghanistan, The Los Angeles Times, 16 December 2010; 

CX256915: A nation mired in corruption and scarred by war, The Age - Australia, 22 January 2011. 

54 


State, 17 November 2010. 

14

The USDSIRF 2009 Report cited an incident in May 2009 in which the Ministry of Culture 

and Youth Affairs destroyed 1000 books on Shi’ism, which had been printed in and 

ordered from, Iran. Although there are no legal restrictions on the import of religious texts, 

the Ministry stated that the books were “dangerous to the unity of Afghanistan” and were 

offensive to Sunni Muslims. 55 

However, the USDSIRF 2009 Report also stated that the Shi’a community has been able 

to openly celebrate key religious events, and, unlike in previous years, observations of the 

Shi’a holy day of Ashura in January 2008 and 2009 were widespread and peaceful. 

According to the USDSIRF 2009 Report, “[s]ince Shi'a representation has increased in 

government, overt discrimination by Sunnis against the Shi'a community decreased. 56 

The USDSIRF 2008 Report stated that “[t]he active persecution of the Shi'a minority, 

including Ismailis, which occurred under the Taliban regime, ended. Although there were 

reported incidents of discrimination and treatment varied by locality, Shi'a generally were 

free to participate fully in public life.” 57 

According to the 2008 Freedom of the World Country Report for Afghanistan, while 

“relations between the two sects [Sunni and Shi’a] remain somewhat strained...conditions 

have vastly improved under the Karzai administration”. 58 

Different views on the Taliban’s attitude towards Shi’a Hazaras 

A June 2010 article in the Foreign Policy journal, noted that the Taliban had moderated its 

position on Shi’a Muslims and that the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar “declared repeatedly 

that the movement would not tolerate any ‘sectarian’ bias. This can be interpreted as an 

attempt to woo the Hazara population that feels neglected by the central government in 

Kabul”. 59 

A July 2010 DFAT report, however, quoted an Afghan Member of Parliament who thought 

that the instructions from Mullah Omar and the Taliban leadership not to conduct attacks 

along sectarian lines were empty political rhetoric and that the Taliban in the area 

remained anti-Shi’a. 60 

In a July 2010 report, Antonio Guistozzi considered that the “Afghan Taliban never openly 

attacked Shiism per se, particularly after 2001, and even in the 1990s their mass attacks 

55 

International Religious Freedom Report 2009 - Afghanistan, United States Bureau Of Democracy, Human Rights, 

And Labor, 26 October 2009, no page numbers (on CISNET under Other Government Resources). 

56 

International Religious Freedom Report 2009 - Afghanistan, United States Bureau Of Democracy, Human Rights, 

And Labor, 26 October 2009, no page numbers (on CISNET under Other Government Resources). 

57 

International Religious Freedom Report 2008 – Afghanistan, United States Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 

and Labor, 19 September 2008, no page numbers (on CISNET under Other Government Resources). 

58 

CX205514: Freedom of the World Country Report Afghanistan 2008, Freedom House, 2 July 2008, no page 

numbers. 

59 

CX245353: A new, new Taliban front?, Thomas Ruttig, Foreign Policy, 21 June 2010. 

60 

CX246263: Situation in Ghazni Province - views of Member of Parliament, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs 

and Trade, 15 July 2010. 

15

on Shiites were reprisals for attempts to resist the regime rather than ideologically 

driven.” 61 

Ahmed Rashid, however, writing about the civil war in the late 1990s, considered that the 

“sectarian enmity between the Sunni Pashtuns and the Shia Hazaras went back a long 

way, but the Taliban had brought a new edge to the conflict for they treated all Shias 

as…beyond the pale of true Islam.” 62 

4.3 Framework for assessing claims (For more information see The Refugee Law 

Guidelines) 

An individual with a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of religion (one of the 

five grounds in Article 1A of the 1951 Refugees Convention) may be eligible for protection. 

In assessing claims by Afghan applicants, race and religion should be considered as 

separate grounds, although both may be raised by an applicant as grounds for 

persecution. 

Applicants may claim they are targeted due to their religion and that they are subject to 

restrictions on practising their religion, or that they suffer discrimination because of their 

religion. The details of applicant’s claims need to be explored in order to assess whether 

the harm feared amounts to persecution. 

In order for a case officer to be satisfied that an asylum seeker is suffering persecution on 

the basis of religion, there must be evidence that: 

• the harm feared involves serious harm to the person (s91R of the Migration Act 

refers and may assist in determining what is serious harm); 

• the persecution involves systematic and discriminatory conduct; and 

• the applicant’s religion is the essential and significant reason for the persecution 

(noting that there may be more than one Convention reason for persecution). 


There is a diversity of views in the country information, which should be considered. In 

particular, reports differ as to the Taliban’s current attitude towards Shi’a Muslims. 

The following issues for consideration draw on the USDSIRF 2010 report, the latest 

UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Afghanistan and UN Human Rights Instruments (UNHRI). 

It should be noted that whilst many sources acknowledge the historical persecution of 

Shi’a Muslims by the Sunni majority in Afghanistan, this information is not necessarily an 

indication of the applicant’s current circumstances. 

61 CIS18985: The Taliban beyond the Pashtuns, Antonio Giustozzi, Centre for International Governance Innovation, 

July 2010, p5; see also CIS19650: The Taliban’s Evolving Ideology, Alia Brahimi, LSE Global Governance, July 2010, 

p11. 

62 CIS19746: Taliban - Chapters 5-6, Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, I.B.Tauris and Co Ltd, 2010, p69. Rashid also noted that 

the Taliban massacre of Shia Hazara in 1998, was “genocidal in its ferocity, as the Taliban took revenge on their losses 

the previous year” (p73). 

16

For several years the USDSIRF reports have indicated that Shi’a Muslims are now able to 

practise their religion openly as well as being able to observe religiously significant 

holidays. 

The USDSIRF and UNHRI also suggest the current administration now formally 

recognises Shi’a Islam and has made provisions within the legal system to reflect Shi’a 

beliefs and the Shi’a system of justice. 

Claims of persecution involving serious harm (s91R) perpetrated for reasons of religious 

belief must be investigated and assessed. 

Consideration must also be given to whether such claims of persecution are related to any 

other Convention grounds. For example religious leaders may be at risk for the 

Convention ground of political opinion due to their influence in the community and/or 

support for the current administration rather than being targeted because of their religious 

beliefs. 






• Country information indicates that Shi’a Muslims have been able to openly practise 

their religion. How does the applicant’s claim of persecution relate to the Convention 

ground of religion? What evidence supports this? 

• How is the claimed agent(s) of persecution responsible for a restriction of religious 

observance? What evidence supports this? 

• How is the claimed harm targeted and discriminatory, and how are the claimed 

agent(s) of persecution responsible for the harm feared? 

17

5. POLITICAL OPINION 

5.1 Claims 

Applicants may claim that: 

• they, or a family member, have had links to political parties, non-government 

organisations or foreign troops, which have policies that are in opposition to the Taliban 

• they have had employment such as providing assistance to the above organisations in 

the form of goods or services or involvement in activity which contravenes the views of 

the Taliban, such as teaching, education of females or journalism 

• they, or a family member, fear persecution by the Taliban or associated groups as a 

result of an actual (or imputed) political opinion. The applicant and/or family members 

may or may not have had direct contact with the Taliban or other insurgent groups. 

Fear of persecution for the above reasons includes fear of being killed or seriously harmed 

by the above insurgent groups. 



UNHCR considers that persons associated with, or perceived as supportive of, the 

Government and the international community and forces, including Government officials, 

Government-aligned tribal and religious leaders, judges, teachers and workers on 

reconstruction/development projects, may, depending on the individual circumstances of 

the case, be at risk on account of their (imputed) political opinion, particularly in areas 

where armed anti-Government groups are operating or have control. 63 

The UNHCR 2010 Guidelines note that the “August 2009 Presidential and Council 

elections took place against the backdrop of heightened insecurity and were marred by 

allegations of fraud and irregularities. The 18 September 2010 parliamentary elections, 

which also took place amid significant security challenges, attracted a low voter turnout 

and criticism relating to electoral violations and irregularities, including voter intimidation 

and fraud.” 64 

Political participation by Hazaras (see also State Protection) 

In a February 2011 briefing, the International Crisis Group noted that in the September 

2010 parliamentary election Hazaras won all eleven seats in Ghazni Province and that “the 

failure of a single Pashtun candidate to win in the province has unsurprisingly spiked 

ethnic tensions“ and that “Ghazni emerged as the ticking time bomb of ethnic politics in 

Afghanistan”. 65 




Afghanistan, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 17 December 2010, p5. See also 

65 CIS20071: Afghanistan’s Elections Stalemate, International Crisis Group, 23 February 2011, p10. 

18

A January 2011 article in The Christian Science Monitor, reporting on the election outcome 

in Ghazni, considered the result was because Taliban intimidation and propaganda urging 

people to not participate in the election was most effective among the Pashtun 

population. 66 

In September 2010, DFAT reported that Hazaras were actively involved in the political 

process, and contacts pointed to a significant turnout among the Hazara population. 67 

A September 2010 article in Foreign Policy reported on the involvement of Hazara women 

in Bamyan province in the parliamentary elections. 68 

According to a news report, one fourth of the country’s 17 million registered voters took 

part in the parliamentary elections. Although voter turn out was lower than in the August 

2009 presidential elections, the UN special envoy to Afghanistan noted significant 

improvements compared to the 2009 election. 69 

In the lead up to the August 2009 presidential election The Washington Post reported that 

the Hazaras had greater political freedom than previously. 70 

In February 2009 DFAT reported that residents in Ghazni were able to participate in the 

provincial, parliamentary and presidential elections, and the central government was able 

to appoint local authorities and deploy Afghan National Police and Army forces. DFAT 

also reported that the Nasr faction of Wahdat party, a Hazara political group, was 

maintaining its influential government positions at the district level. 71 

Politically-motivated violence by anti-government insurgents 

According to the UNAMA Mid Year Report 2010, in the first half of 2010 anti-government 

forces, in particular the Taliban, greatly intensified their intimidation campaign against 

supporters, or those perceived to be supportive of the Government and the international 

community. The campaign included abductions, assassinations and executions of civilians 

and Government officials. Anti-government insurgents “targeted community and tribal 

elders, Government officials, civilians working for the international military as interpreters, 

construction workers, and those civilians perceived to be supporting or associated with the 

Government. They also targeted teachers, health care workers, shopkeepers and staff of 

Afghan and international NGOs.” 72 

66 CX256917: Karzai worried about electoral fraud... really?, The Christian Science Monitor, 19 January 2011; see also 

CX258155: After standoff, Karzai opens newly assertive Afghan parliament, The Christian Science Monitor, 

26 January 2011; CX254146: Final Afghan election results show Hazara minority trumped dominant Pashtuns, The 

Christian Science Monitor, 24 November 2010; and CIS19759: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for 

international peace and security, General Assembly Security Council, United Nations, 10 December 2010, p2. 

67 CX250180: AFG10736: The Hazara, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 28 September 2010. 

68 CX249792: The Vote Comes to Afghanistan’s Peaceful Heartland, Foreign Policy, 20 September 2010. 

69 CX250302: UN says Afghan election a positive sign, Associated Press, 30 September 2010. 

70 CX230824: Hazaras may play key role in Afghan vote, The Washington Post, 26 July 2009. 

71 CX219955: CIS Request No. AFG 9509; Situation for Hazaras in Ghazni, Uruzgan and Dai Kundi Provinces, 

Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 3 February 2009. 

72 CIS19727: Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Mid Year Report 2010, United Nations 

Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, August 2010, p6. For more on attacks on NGOs see CIS19813: ANSO Quarterly 

Data Report Q4 2010, The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, 2010 and CIS19805: ANSO Quarterly Data Report Q.3 

2010, The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, October 2010. 

19

In 2010, there were numerous news reports about attacks on government targets and on 

people perceived by Taliban insurgents as working for the government or the international 

coalition. According to a July 2010 report in The Long War Journal, the Taliban’s supreme 

leader, Mullah Omar, ordered his forces to kill or capture any civilians, including women, 

who cooperate with Coalition forces. 73 In May 2010 there were reports of the Taliban 

detaining people on charges of spying for the government in Ghazni Province, and in 

June 2010 the Taliban beheading up to 11 Hazara men in Oruzgan Province. 74 In 

December 2010 to March 2011, news reports included attacks on Afghan soldiers, officials 

from Afghanistan’s intelligence agency and individuals working as de-miners. 75 

Reports of ‘night letters’, kidnappings and executions of targets such as doctors, teachers, 

students, journalists, government aligned elders and civil servants as well as civilians 

linked to local, national and foreign security forces are prevalent. 76 

The US Department of State 2009 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 

Afghanistan (USSD HR 2009) stated that insurgents deliberately targeted government 

employees and aid workers. 77 

The USSD HR 2009 reported that in a campaign to destabilise the country in the lead up 

to the August 2009 presidential elections, the Taliban were responsible for the bombing of 

businesses suspected of being linked to foreign organisations, bombing the Ministry of 

Transportation, bombing the Indian Embassy, an attack on a UN guesthouse, the 

assassination of National Directorate of Security Deputy Director and the execution of a 

man suspected of spying for foreign troops. 78 

A November 2009 report by CARE Canada described attacks on education targets in 

Afghanistan. This report cited and agreed with a 2006 Human Rights Watch assessment 

that there were three main groups responsible for attacks on education targets: the armed 

73 CX255422: Mullah Omar orders Taliban to attack civilians, Afghan women, The Long War Journal, 28 July 2010. 

74 CX243426: Taleban detain 12 for alleged spying in Afghan east, Pajhwok Afghan News website, 9 May 2010; 

CX245774: Bodies found beheaded in Afghanistan; 4 troops die, Associated Press, 27 June 2010; CX245508: Police 

find 11 beheaded bodies in Afghan south, Reuters, 25 June 2010; CX245566: Taliban Kill 9 Members of Minority in 

Ambush, The New York Times, 25 June 2010; CX245777: Afghanistan's Hazara minority is in mortal danger at the 

hands of a resurgent Taliban, says William Maley, The Australian, 2 July 2010. 

75 CX255309: Afghan soldiers killed in attacks by Taliban militants, Guardian (UK), 19 December 2010; CX256681: 

‘Two killed, 32 wounded' in Kabul suicide attack , Agence France Presse - France, 12 January 2011; CX256976: 

Deminers in the firing line, Integrated Regional Information Network, United Nations, 18 January 2011; CX259518: 

Taliban bomber kills 30 civilians at Afghan militia meeting, Guardian (UK), 21 February 2011. 

76 For accounts of the Taliban’s use of “night letters”, see CX256842: Chilling ‘night letters’ from Taliban intimidate 

Afghans, Stars and Stripes, 30 November 2010; CIS17458: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary 

or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, United Nations Human Rights Council, 6 May 2009, p15; see also The United 

States 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Afghanistan, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 

Labor, 11 March 2010, no page numbers (on CISNET under Other Government Resources). See also CIS16308: 

Taliban Propaganda, winning the war of words, International Crisis Group, 24 July 2008; CX227105: Amnesty 

International Annual Report Afghanistan 2009, Amnesty International, 28 May 2009; CIS16874: A Campaign of 

Murder and Intimidation: Insurgent Abuses against Afghan Civilians, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights 

Commission, December 2008. 

77 The United States 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Afghanistan, Bureau of Democracy, Human 

Rights, and Labor, 11 March 2010, no page numbers (on CISNET under Other Government Resources). 



20

opposition; regional warlords and militia commanders not loyal to the central government; 

and criminal gangs, mostly involved in the narcotics trade. 79 

Since the Taliban were removed from power, there have been numerous news reports of 

the Taliban targeting people they allege were spying for the Afghan government and/or 

foreign forces. 80 


Guidelines) 

An individual with a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of political opinion (one 

of the five grounds in Article 1A of the 1951 Refugees Convention) may be eligible for 

protection. 

When assessing whether a person is persecuted on the basis of political opinion, it is 

important to note that the person does not need to hold a particular political opinion – it is 

enough that a person is imputed to hold a political opinion. 

Whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution needs to be considered. It 

should be noted that the harm feared must involve serious harm, be systematic and 

discriminatory in nature and that the applicant’s political opinion is the essential and 

significant reason for the persecution (there may be more than one Convention reason for 

persecution). 

Applicants may also claim that while they had not experienced persecution in Afghanistan, 

they fear it upon return due to their political opinion (imputed or held). The requirement in 

s91R of the Act to discount any conduct engaged in by a claimant in Australia for the sole 

purpose of strengthening refugee claims needs to be taken into account. Further 

information on assessing claims relating to ‘association with the West’ can be found later 

in this Country Guidance Note. 


Information provided in the 2010 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines, the UN Human Rights 

Council Special Rapporteur and reports by the US State Department indicates that it is 

likely that individuals connected, or perceived to be connected, with the Afghan 

Government, local and national security forces, foreign and aid organisations and foreign 

troops may experience persecution. 

Consideration should be given to whether or not individuals claiming persecution on the 

basis of (imputed) political opinion are able to provide adequate detail to demonstrate that 

they have been, or will be, perceived to be actively engaged in activities where they are 

identifiable as having this profile. 

79 CIS18038: Knowledge on Fire: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan: Risks and Measures for Successful Mitigation, 

CARE Canada, 23 November 2009, pp19-20; see also CX240050: Education under Attack 2010 - Afghanistan, United 

Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 10 February 2010. 

80 CX89228: Taleban claim responsibility for killing Afghan intelligence official, Afghan Islamic Press news agency, 

11 February 2004; CX238202: Taliban Kill Man On Spying Charges In Nangarhar Province, Middle East Media 

Research Institute, 28 December 2009; see also CIS19723: Treatment by the Taliban in Afghanistan of persons believed 

to be suspected spies for the government, Refugee Documentation Centre Ireland, 19 November 2010. 

21

Consideration should be given to any possible links between imputed political opinion and 

religious belief, as a large number of political parties and factions gain support by being 

religiously motivated. Whether or not an applicant’s (imputed) political opinion is the 

‘essential and significant’ reason for the harm feared must be assessed. 






• Country information indicates that only certain groups are being targeted for their 

political opinion. Is the applicant able to be identified as belonging to one of these 

groups? 

• How is the applicant considered to have been politically active, or to be currently 

politically active thereby making them a target? 

• Reports indicate that indiscriminate violence is prevalent in Afghanistan. How are the 

claimed agent(s) of persecution targeting the applicant? 

• Is relocation (see section on Relocation) an option for those at risk? Does a ‘real 

chance’ of persecution exist if the applicant was to return to his/her home region or any 

other region? 

Sur place claims 

The applicant’s claims regarding inability to return to Afghanistan due to spending time in a 

western country can be considered in the context of a ‘sur place’ claim (see also 

Association with the West). 

22

6. STATE PROTECTION 

6.1 Claims 

Applicants may state that they believe the Afghan authorities are unable or unwilling to 

protect them, including that: 

• the police cannot provide security 

• the police protect the Taliban and it is not possible to make a complaint 

• the local authorities have been unable to do anything 

• the applicant is not safe anywhere in Afghanistan. 



Although they do not specifically refer to state protection, the UNHCR Guidelines note that 

the high levels of corruption, ineffective governance, a climate of impunity, lack of official 

impetus for the transitional justice process, weak rule of law and widespread reliance on 

traditional dispute resolution mechanisms that do not comply with due process standards, 

contribute to the deteriorating human rights situation in the country. 81 

Efforts at a political solution 

In June 2010 the UN Secretary General reported on the Consultative Peace Jirga (or 

council) hosted by the Government of Afghanistan from 2 to 4 June 2010. According to 

the UN Secretary General, the aim of the jirga was to establish “an intra-Afghan dialogue” 

and facilitate “discussions on the mechanisms for the peace process”. The jirga was 

attended by 1600 delegates including “members of Parliament, provincial governors, 

members of provincial councils and district representatives, as well as representatives of 

women’s groups, civil society, academic and cultural institutions, the clergy, ethnic 

communities including Kuchis (nomads) and Hazaras and refugee groups from Pakistan 

and the Islamic Republic of Iran”. 82 

In December 2010, the UN Secretary General provided an update on the outcome of the 

Consultative Peace Jirga, in particular the establishment of the High Peace Council. 83 

A range of media reports have suggested that the Karzai Government’s attempt through 

the jirga to reintegrate Taliban and other anti-government elements could fuel inter-ethnic 

divisions between Pashtuns and ethnic minorities including the Tajiks, Uzbeks and 

Hazaras. 84 


Afghanistan, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 17 December 2010, p3-5. 

82 CIS18880: United Nations Security Council Report of the Secretary-General: Activities of the United Nations 


16 June 2010, pp1-2. 

83 CIS19759: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, General Assembly 

Security Council, United Nations, 10 December 2010, p5. 

84 see for example CX245605: Overture to Taliban Jolts Afghan Minorities, The New York Times, 26 June 2010; 

CX245601: Who's afraid of talking to the Taliban? Many Afghans, The Christian Science Monitor, 28 June 2010; 

CX244783: Karzai’s isolation worries Afghans and the West, The New York Times, 7 June 2010; CX246378: White 

23

According to a survey of the Afghan People, conducted in June 2010, confidence in both 

formal and informal representative bodies was relatively high and the majority of 

respondents were satisfied with their Member of Parliament. The Survey also found that 

support for the government’s approach to negotiation with and reintegration of armed 

opposition groups was significantly higher in 2010 than in 2009, suggesting an increasing 

proportion of the population favoured a political, rather than just a military, solution to the 

ongoing conflict. 85 

Ability of the State to provide protection 

The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission September 2010 report on the 

conflict between the Kuchis and the Hazara in two districts in Maidan Wardak province, 

was critical of the attitude of the central government and considered that this attitude 

contributed to the repetition of this armed conflict. 86 (See also section on Land Disputes.) 

According to a July 2010 DFAT report, the Afghan National Security Forces in Ghazni 

province were weak and due to threats by the Taliban, Hazara communities were fearful 

they might be targeted by the insurgency. 87 (See also the Jaghori / Travel Section.) 

In its March 2010 report, the US Department of State noted the deteriorating security 

environment “posed a major challenge for the central government, hindering its ability to 

govern effectively, extend its influence, and deliver services, especially in rural areas” and 

that “[i]n some areas certain individuals, some of whom reportedly were linked to the 

insurgency, maintained considerable power as a result of the government's failure to 

assert control.” 88 

A 2008 report to the United Nations Security Council stated that despite the enhanced 

capabilities of both the Afghan National Army and the international forces, the security 

situation had deteriorated markedly, with the influence of the insurgency expanding 

beyond traditionally volatile areas. 89 

Other sources of protection 

According to a November 2010 joint briefing paper by 29 aid organisations operating in 

Afghanistan, there is a growing reliance on quick fixes in transition to Afghan responsibility 

for security that could have “disastrous consequences for civilians”. 90 The report lists 

numerous concerns in relation to community defence forces, such as the Afghan Local 

House shifts Afghanistan strategy towards talks with Taliban: Senior Washington officials tell the Guardian of a 'change 

of mindset' over Obama administration's Afghanistan policy, Guardian (UK), 19 July 2010. 

85 

CIS19421: Afghanistan in 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People, The Asia Foundation, 9 November 2010, p9, p11. 

86 

CIS19336: Report on the Case of Conflict between Kochies and the Local People in Behsood (Hessa-e-Awal, Hessae-Dowm) 

and Diamirdad districts of Maidan Wardak province, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, 


87 

CX246263: Situation in Ghazni Province - views of Member of Parliament, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs 


88 

The United States 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Afghanistan, Bureau of Democracy, Human 


89 

CIS16562: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, United Nations 

General Assembly Security Council, United Nations, 23 September 2008, p2. See also CIS15577: The State of the 

Afghan Insurgency, Seth G Jones, The Rand Corporation, December 2007, p4. 

90 

CIS19549: Nowhere to Turn, a joint briefing paper by 29 aid organisations working in Afghanistan, 

19 November 2010, p6. 

24

Police, which is supported primarily by US Special Forces, under the auspices of the 

Ministry of Interior. 91 

According to an October 2010 DFAT report, in Bamyan province security is communitybased 

and therefore highly-resilient and the Taliban would find it difficult to infiltrate the 

Hazara-majority province without detection. 92 

According to a 2009 report by the Cooperation for Peace and Unity, “[d]espite the risk of 

future ethnic conflict between the Taliban and Hazara, the risk of this is likely to be lower in 

Jaghori than elsewhere in the Hazarajat. This is because in the past the people and elders 

of this district demonstrated unique negotiation and proactive peacebuilding strategies 

towards the Taliban in the 1990’s.” 93 

According to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) the primary role of the 

International Security Assistance Force is to support the Afghan authorities in bringing 

peace and security to the people. 94 

6.3 Framework for assessing claims (For more information see The Refugee Law 

Guidelines) 

It is accepted that ‘persecution’ within the Convention definition of ‘refugee’ can exist 

although the relevant harm is (or may be) inflicted, for a Convention reason by non-state 

actors. This may be because the State condones or tolerates the ‘persecution’ in a 

discriminatory manner or it may be because the State is unable to provide protection from 

such ‘persecution’. 

In cases where the State does not itself actively condone or tolerate persecution, the 

question will be whether the protection it offers is sufficient by international standards. 

Measures giving such protection would include an appropriate criminal law, and the 

provision of a reasonably effective and impartial police force and justice system. Complete 

protection of its citizens from harm is not expected of a country of nationality. It is 

sufficient that the protection provided meets international standards. If this standard of 

protection is met there will be no justifiable unwillingness to seek the protection of the 

country of nationality, and the applicant will not come within the Convention definition of 

“refugee”. 

In assessing whether an applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution, decision-makers 

may take into account the fact that protection is afforded by surrogate authorities other 

than those of the Afghan government, for example international forces. 

91 

CIS19549: Nowhere to Turn, a joint briefing paper by 29 aid organisations working in Afghanistan, 

19 November 2010, p15. 

92 

CX251970: Country Reporting: The Hazara Community in Bamyan, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and 

Trade, 24 October 2010. 

93 



94 

CIS17216: Afghanistan Report 2009, North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Council on Foreign Relations, 

31 March 2009, p6. 

25


The Cooperation for Peace and Unity, the US State Department and the 2010 UNHCR 

Eligibility Guidelines suggest that the Afghan Government, associated security forces and 

the International Security forces in place throughout the country are significantly restricted 

in their ability to provide adequate protection to the civilian population. 

Consideration should be given to the level of protection available in association with the 

possibility of relocating to areas where protection can still be ‘effective’ if provided by militia 

or tribal leaders. 

Consideration must be given as to why relocation to an area where effective protection is 

available is not considered a reasonable option. 




• Some level of protection is reportedly available from surrogate authorities. Is this 

protection considered to be sufficient, reliable or available for the applicant? Why/why 

not? 

• Given the availability of some protection afforded by surrogate authorities in some 

areas, is it reasonable for the applicant to relocate to these areas? Why/why not? 

26

7. JAGHORI DISTRICT, INCLUDING TRAVEL TO AND AROUND JAGHORI 

7.1 Claims 

Applicants may claim that they are Shi’a Hazara from, or born in, the district of Jaghori, 

and fear persecution if they were to return to Jaghori District in Ghazni Province. 

Applicants may have recently departed the district or have been living in another place for 

some time (for example long term residence in Pakistan). Claims may relate to recent 

incidents or those occurring many years ago. Key claims referring specifically to return to 

Jaghori include: 

• fear of being harassed or killed by the Taliban 

• fear of being attacked on the roads leading into and out of Jaghori 

• fear of being denied a livelihood due to lack of freedom of movement. 



Drawing on country information, the 2010 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines note that 

“[n]otwithstanding the comparatively stable security situations in provinces and districts 

where the Hazara constitute a majority or a substantial minority, such as Jaghatu, Jaghori 

and Malistan districts in Ghazni province, the security situation in the remainder of the 

province, including on access routes to and from these districts, has been worsening. 

Although not able to launch widespread operations in Jaghori, there are some reports of 

Taliban attacks in the district. Jaghori district is increasingly isolated given that some 

access routes to and from the district, including large stretches of the strategic Kabul- 

Kandahar road, are reportedly under Taliban control.” 95 

Ghazni Province and Jaghori District 

The population of Ghazni Province comprises 48.9 per cent Pashtun and 45.9 per cent 

Hazara, with Tajiks comprising 4.7 per cent. 96 Ghazni Province has 16 districts. 

According to an April 2009 report by the Afghanistan-based Cooperation for Peace and 

Unity, Jaghori and Malistan (in the south west of the province) “are the only districts in 

Ghazni almost entirely populated by the Hazara.” This report also notes that on the 

outskirts of Jaghori other ethnic groups, including Pashtuns, live in enclaves of villages. 97 

Jaghori’s population has been estimated at 250 000. According to a September 2009 fact 

finding mission by the Finnish Immigration Service (FIS), “only about 10 [per cent] of the 



96 CIS16955: Ghazni, Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, Naval Post Graduate School, September 2007; see also 

CX256469: Ghazni Province, Understanding War, no date provided. 

97 CIS17321: Conflict analysis: Jaghori and Malistan districts, Ghazni province, Gina Bergh with Christian Dennys and 

Idrees Zaman, Cooperation for Peace and Unity, 27 April 2009. 

27

population are estimated to be returnees. However, one fourth of the population lives 

abroad and travels regularly, mainly to Iran for work.” 98 

Economic and social situation 

A September 2010 DFAT report noted that the Hazara community in Ghazni, particularly in 

the Jaghori district, enjoys better educational and health facilities than that available to 

residents of neighbouring provinces. The report also noted that the Hazara districts in 

Ghazni, due to their better security environment, have greater access to these services 

than Pashtun-dominated districts. 99 

The report by the Cooperation for Peace and Unity noted that “[c]ompared with other 

districts of Ghazni, Jaghori has high levels of productivity, and is responsible for a 

proportionately high output of goods and farm produce including handicrafts, industrial 

crops, herbal products and fruits. It also yields a high proportion of Ghazni’s subsistence 

crops, vegetables, and animal products. In addition animal husbandry plays an important 

role in livelihoods in the district.” 100 

According to the FIS report, “[i]n general, the threats to schools elsewhere in Ghazni have 

not affected the availability of education in Jaghori where the public opinion is very much 

pro-education”, including for females. 101 

The FIS report noted that medical facilities in Jaghori are the best in the central highlands 

and, according to a returnee doctor interviewed by the FIS, all women in the district give 

birth in hospital. 102 According to the Cooperation for Peace and Unity, “Jaghori is also a 

seat of Islamic cultural and religious practice, and is home to the second highest number 

of mosques in Ghazni.” 103 

Security situation since 2008 

According to a December 2010 report by The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, in 2010 

Ghazni province experienced 1540 attacks by anti-government forces, more than any 

other province, and representing a 234 per cent increase compared to 2009. 104 

A September 2010 DFAT report noted that security had deteriorated in some Hazara 

areas in central Afghanistan in recent years but affected all religious and ethnic groups. 

Security challenges in Ghazni were not specific to the Hazara community. Hazara districts 

98 CIS18216: Situation Report: The Current Situation in the Jaghori District of Ghazni, Finnish Immigration Service, 

10 December 2009, p1. 

99 CX250180: AFG10736: The Hazara, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 28 September, 2010. 


Idrees Zaman, Cooperation for Peace and Unity, 27 April 2009, p10. 







104 CIS19813: ANSO Quarterly Data Report Q4 2010, The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, 2010, p12. 

28

- including Jaghatu, Jaghori, Malistan and Nawur - were relatively stable compared to 

Pashtun districts. Insurgents in Ghazni controlled most Pashtun districts. 105 

The September 2010 DFAT report also noted that, according to their contacts, the 

possibility of wholesale violence against the Hazara community in Ghazni was unlikely. 

This was attributed to the Hazara commanders' strength and the flexibility of their 

relationships with other factional and insurgency networks - including the Taliban. 106 

A July 2010 DFAT report referred to the views of an Afghan Member of Parliament (MP) 

familiar with Ghazni Province that “the Hazara districts in Ghazni (such as Jaghori) are 

currently safe but have come under increasing pressure recently”. The pressure included 

attacks on roads into Jaghori by insurgents or criminal elements, strong Taliban presence 

in Ghazni’s Pashtun areas, and attacks on Hazaras in mixed Pashtun-Hazara districts 

such as Qarabagh. According to the MP the Afghan National Police in Jaghori was weak 

and the Hazara had disarmed, in accordance with disarmament programs, which meant 

the Taliban could capture the Hazara areas of Ghazni relatively quickly if they chose to go 

on the offensive. 107 

A June 2010 report by Professor William Maley considered that “[n]o part of Ghazni can 

realistically be considered safe for Hazaras, even in districts where they seem numerically 

predominant.” 108 

Halima Kazem, a researcher with Amnesty International has recently been reported as 

stating that the Taliban is present in almost every province in Afghanistan with the 

exception of just a few. 109 

In 2008, the Ghazni representative to the Afghan Parliament, Shah Gul Rizaie, said that 

Ghazni’s security situation was “worse than ever” but the Hazara dominated district of 

Jaghori was the most secure in the province. 110 

A report by the Cooperation for Peace and Unity in April 2009 on the situation in Jaghori 

noted the extremely low government presence in Jaghori, and cited a survey which 

indicated that villagers of Jaghori district feared the Taliban most out of all districts in 

Ghazni. 111 



107 CX246263: Situation in Ghazni Province - views of Member of Parliament, Australia: Department of Foreign 

Affairs and Trade, 15 July 2010; see also CX245353: A new, new Taliban front?, Thomas Ruttig, Foreign Policy, 

21 June 2010. 

108 CIS18933: On the position of the Hazara minority in Afghanistan [position paper], Professor William Maley, 

27 June 2010, paragraph 9. 

109 CX252216: Amnesty slams advice on Afghanistan, The Sydney Morning Herald, 7 October 2010. 

110 CX241963: Current trends in Ghazni Province: An interview with Shah Gul Rizaie, Kabul Center for Strategic 

Studies, 1 July 2008. 



29

The report cited evidence that “[t]he Taliban is also infiltrating the outskirts of this region, 

including in the border areas of Jaghori district where villages are home to both Hazara 

and Pashtun communities.” 112 

However, while the report noted that the “Taliban presence in Ghazni has become a factor 

for serious consideration [and] the group has effectively consolidated its control of all 

Pashtun-dominated areas[,] Jaghori and Malistan districts both remain out of the reach of 

Taliban control due to the military and political power of Hizb-i Wahdat Khalili / Nasr which 

seems to be robust across the Hazarajat.” 113 

The report considered that, “[d]espite the risk of future ethnic conflict between the Taliban 

and Hazara, the risk of this is likely to be lower in Jaghori than elsewhere in the Hazarajat” 

owing to the effective negotiation and peace building between people and elders of the 

district and the Taliban during the 1990s. 114 

A February 2009 DFAT report stated that the situation in Jaghori district was “peaceful” 

owing to the “absolute majority” Hazara population in the district. The report also stated 

that the Nasr faction had “control over armed individuals, who [were] ready to counterattack 

or prevent possible attacks by the [insurgents].” 115 

Travel and possible alternate travel routes 

As the UNHCR 2010 Guidelines note, citing other sources, travel into, around and out of 

Jaghori remains a key concern. 116 According to a September 2010 DFAT report, travel is 

dangerous for all ethnic groups and Pashtuns and Hazaras are both limited in their ability 

to move through districts dominated by the other. Access to Jaghori has also become 

more difficult. There are three routes connecting Jaghori to Ghazni city. The most 

frequently used road passes through Nawur district, and is considered secure. Another 

route through Muqur is insecure due to a Taliban presence, with occasional checkpoints 

and security incidents. The third route through Qarabagh district is very insecure. There 

are secure (although rough) routes from Bamyan to Jaghuri, and Behsoud to Nawur. 117 

A July 2010 DFAT report, quoted an Afghan MP who considered that Hazara who were 

kidnapped while travelling might have difficulty in negotiating their release if they did not 






Idrees Zaman, Cooperation for Peace and Unity, 27 April 2009, p11. For an earlier account from 2003 of conflict 

prevention in Jaghori see CIS18323: Strategies and Structures in Preventing Conflict and Resisting Pressure: A study of 

Jaghori District, Ghazni, Afghanistan, under Taliban control, Mohammaad Suleman and Sue Williams, Cooperation for 

Peace and Unity, March 2003. 

115 �CX219955: CIS Request No. AFG 9509; Situation for Hazaras in Ghazni, Uruzgan and Dai Kundi Provinces, 

Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 3 February 2009. 



117 CX250180: AFG10736: The Hazara, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 28 September 2010; see 

also CX219955: CIS Request No. AFG 9509; Situation for Hazaras in Ghazni, Uruzgan and Dai Kundi Provinces, 


30

have direct communication channels with key figures in the Pashtun community that could 

influence the insurgents. 118 

News reports in June 2010 stated that the Taliban had closed the road between Jaghori 

and Qarabagh and distributed “night letters” to warn residents not to travel on the road. 119 

A September 2009 fact finding mission by the Finnish Immigration Service (FIS) noted 

that, “the road to Jaghori through Ghazni is unsafe according to all sources. If available, it 

would take four hours to reach Kabul. The most unsafe section of the highway to Kabul is 

the distance between Ghazni City – 2 hours from Jaghori – and Qarabagh. 120 

A report from June 2009 noted that insurgent activity in Ghazni had “essentially cut off 

Jaghori and Malistan from the provincial capital”. 121 

An October 2008 report in The Guardian indicated the motivation for roadside violence 

was robbery and ransom as well as violence perpetrated against those perceived as 

working for foreign organisations or the government. 122 

With regard to other possible travel routes, the September 2010 DFAT report noted that 

alternative travel routes from Kabul to Ghazni involve several days of travelling. 123 

The 2009 FIS report interviewed a returnee development worker who advised that the 

section of road between Ghazni and Qarabagh could be “avoided by taking a detour 

through Jaghatu.” Other interviewees advised the FIS, that an alternate route to the 

“infamous” Kabul-Kandahar Highway was a 9 hour detour through the Hazarajat province 

of Bamyan, although snow closed this road from November to May. 124 

Other possible causes of violence 

A July 2010 DFAT report, quoted an Afghan MP who said that in addition to the Taliban 

the main sources of insecurity on the roads in and out of Jaghori were petty thieves and 

organised criminals. 125 

118 CX246263: Situation in Ghazni Province - views of Member of Parliament, Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs 


119 

CX245402: Afghan Taliban blocks important road in Ghazni, Central Asia Online, 17 June 2010; see also 

CX245353: A new, new Taliban front?, Thomas Ruttig, Foreign Policy, 21 June 2010. For earlier reports on travel in 

and around Ghazni see CX213274: What started as the road to recovery has turned into a highway of terror in 

Afghanistan, Guardian (UK), 20 October 2008. 

120 



121 

�CIS17493: Trends in Local Afghan Conflicts, Christian Dennys and Idrees Zaman, Cooperation for Peace and Unity, 

June 2009, p30. 

122 CX213274: What started as the road to recovery has turned into a highway of terror in Afghanistan, Guardian (UK), 

20 October 2008; see also CX241963: Current trends in Ghazni Province: An interview with Shah Gul Rizaie, Kabul 

Center for Strategic Studies, 1 July 2008. 

123 CX250180: The Hazara, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 28 September 2010. 


December 2009, p1. 

125 CX246263: Situation in Ghazni Province - views of Member of Parliament, Australia: Department of Foreign 

Affairs and Trade, 15 July 2010. 

31

The Cooperation for Peace and Unity April 2009 report noted that during the period of 

severe drought and food shortages in 2008, Taliban attacks on “vehicles and seizure of 

goods persisted, severely hampering food aid programmes in [Ghazni] province and 

elsewhere in the country.” 126 

The same Cooperation for Peace and Unity report provided a detailed account for the 

period from January 2005 to March 2008 of the nature and likely causes of violence in 

Malistan (the report suggested that patterns of violence might be similar in neighbouring 

Jaghori). This period was marked by economic hardship and food shortages due to 

extreme weather conditions. The report suggested that “many disputes over resources in 

Malistan [occurred] within an otherwise culturally cohesive community, the population 

being almost entirely Hazara, following Shi’a Islam.” 127 

7.3 Framework for assessing claims 

Claims which relate to travel around Jaghori should be considered carefully. The issue of 

safe travel may impinge on an applicant’s livelihood or lifestyle but this may not, in itself, 

be enough to constitute persecution. 

Claimed incidents may constitute persecution where they: 

• involve serious harm to the person (s91R of the Migration Act refers and may assist 

in determining what is serious harm); 

• involve systematic and discriminatory conduct; and 

• are carried out for a Refugees Convention reason and that this is the essential and 

significant reason (i.e. the incidents are due, for example, to race or imputed 

political opinion rather than simply criminal opportunism). 

A restriction in relation to travel (and travel related employment) should only be considered 

persecution in and of itself where the restriction is such that it amounts to serious harm to 

the person (s 91R of the Migration Act refers and must be applied). 

Whether the fear of persecution is well-founded should also be considered by assessing 

whether the applicant is reasonably able to avoid the claimed persecution by travelling on 

viable alternate, albeit more difficult, routes. 





32


There is a diversity of views represented in the country information, which must be 

considered. 

The Cooperation for Peace and Unity and the Finnish Immigration Service both describe 

the Jaghori district in particular as relatively stable in comparison to elsewhere in the 

country. However, as DFAT and other reports note, travel on the major roads, including to 

Jaghori, is dangerous. The Cooperation for Peace and Unity reported that NGOs, 

including the UN, avoid using the main travel routes entirely to reduce the risk to their staff. 

Some of the violence appears to be indiscriminate and for material gain. 

It may be that violence is perpetrated against Hazaras as it is assumed by the perpetrators 

that such action will not result in any recriminations. Consequently, the actions could be 

interpreted as being targeted for a Convention reason. This will depend upon the 

particular circumstances of the case, remembering that the real chance of persecution is a 

forward thinking test. 

The 2010 UNHCR Eligibility guidelines and the USDS reports support the claim that the 

current insurgency is likely to target civilians with perceived links to foreign organisations 

or the current administration due to their imputed political opinion. (See section on 

Political Opinion.) 

Whilst such violence may be considered ‘serious harm’ as per s91R (2) of the Migration 

Act, all other elements of the definition of persecution need to be met. 

It has been noted that a restriction on travel or the need to use alternate routes to avoid 

violence has been described as impacting on lifestyle, on the distribution of food aid, 

access to health and education facilities, on the ability to earn a livelihood and as a 

modification of behaviour. Evidence suggests that there is a limited availability of alternate 

routes, and that there are no specific restrictions on gaining alternate employment. 

Whether this amounts to persecution is matter for case by case assessment based on the 

circumstances of the individual and their travel requirements. 

In regards to the distribution of food aid, the Cooperation for Peace and Unity suggests 

that the ongoing conflict and violence on the roads has disrupted the activity of NGOs and 

prevented their ability to reach remote areas. Although this aid would undoubtedly assist 

the population of the Hazarajat, there may be other options for subsistence and 

employment within this area. 

It should be noted that the class of lifestyle or how meaningful life is conceived to be for an 

applicant is not relevant to fulfilling the requirements of the definition of a refugee. 

Whether or not travel related claims, in conjunction with other claims of harm (for a 

Convention reason) cumulatively amount to persecution, should also be considered. 

33




• There is evidence of indiscriminate violence on the roads in Afghanistan. How does 

the persecution feared relate to a Convention ground? What information is available to 

support this? How is the persecution claimed systematic and discriminatory? 

• There are a number of different criminal gangs as well as insurgent groups active on 

the roads in Afghanistan. How are the claimed agent(s) of persecution responsible for 

the harm feared? 

• Is the applicant able, or unable, to use alternate, safe routes for travel? Why? 

• There is evidence indicating that the Hazarajat is relatively stable. Is the claimant able 

or unable to earn a livelihood that does not involve frequent travel? Why/ why not? 

34

8. LAND DISPUTES 

8.1 Claims 

Applicants may state that Kuchi nomads visit their village and confiscate livestock, beat 

people and destroy crops, and that the authorities are unable to protect them. They may 

claim they are specifically targeted for persecutory treatment over grazing rights with 

attacks on villages occurring where the residents are Shi’a Muslims and Hazaras. Claims 

may include: 

• gradual and increasingly violent encroachment on pasture lands owned by Hazaras 

• villagers being killed, houses looted and burned down and women sexually assaulted 

• Kuchis, with support or encouragement from the Taliban, becoming more violent. 



The UNHCR 2010 Guidelines make a number of references to land disputes, including 

noting that the issue of ethnicity may feature more prominently in certain circumstances, 

including in tensions over access to natural resources (such as grazing land and water). 128 

The UNHCR 2010 Guidelines note that “land disputes, particularly where ethnic 

differences arise or claims involve the illegal occupation of land by persons in positions of 

authority, are sometimes resolved by resorting to violence or threats.” 129 

The UNHCR 2010 Guidelines refer to violent clashes over grazing rights and land disputes 

between Hazaras and Kuchis, an ethnic Pashtun nomadic group, which occurred in 

Wardak province in May 2010, and in Kabul in August 2010. 130 

The UNHCR 2010 Guidelines also note that Pashtuns, where they constitute an ethnic 

minority, have been subject to discrimination, arbitrary arrests, violence and reprisal 

killings by non-Pashtun militias and that formerly displaced Pashtuns may be unable to 

recover their land and property upon return to their area of origin. 131 

Finally, the UNHCR 2010 Guidelines refer in a footnote to the Kuchis as reportedly one of 

the poorest and most marginalized communities in Afghanistan. 132 


Afghanistan, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 17 December 2010, p30 









35

Land disputes between Hazaras and Kuchis 

A September 2010 report by DFAT noted that clashes between Hazaras and Kuchis were 

generally related to disputes over land and access to natural resources. 133 

In September 2010 the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) 

issued a report based on eyewitness accounts of the May 2010 violence between the 

Kuchis and Hazara (the report refers to the Hazara as “local people”) in Behsood and 

Diamirdad districts of Maidan Wardak province. The report lists the number of killed, 

wounded, displaced families and destroyed buildings. The AIHRC considered that the 

“conflict once again has been intensified during the recent years through interventions of 

some political circles and has gained more tribal and political nature.” 134 

Other reports, including the US Department of State 2009 Country Report on Human 

Rights Practices – Afghanistan, also note the long running disputes over access to grazing 

land between the Kuchis and Hazaras. 135 

Different perspectives on factors contributing to land disputes 

Different perspectives held by Hazaras and Kuchis, respectively, on the land disputes, 

have been reported for several years, including for example: a May 2010 report by the 

Afghanistan Analysts Network; a June 2009 news article by the UN’s Integrated Regional 

Information Network; an August 2008 article in the UAE-based newspaper, Khaleej Times; 

and a 2007 article in The Economist, among others. 136 

As The Economist 2007 article noted, the Hazaras claim that the Kuchis are allied with the 

Taliban, who want to exploit inter-ethnic and sectarian tensions whereas the Kuchi leaders 

contend that Hazaras forcibly exclude the Kuchi from pasturelands to which they have 

previously had access and that Hazaras receive support from Iran. 137 

133 CX249511: Situation of the Hazara Minority, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 

17 September 2010. See also CX246263: Situation in Ghazni Province - views of Member of Parliament, Australia: 

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 15 July 2010. 

134 CIS19336: Report on the Case of Conflict between Kochies and the Local People in Behsood (Hessa-e-Awal, Hessae-Dowm) 


24 September 2010, p2. 


Rights, and Labor, 11 March 2010, no page numbers (on CISNET under Other Government Resources). See also 

CX224319: Afghanistan's new militias, The Economist, 8 April 2009; CX246426: The Behsud conflicts in Afghanistan: 

A blueprint to avoid further clashes in 2009 and beyond, Eurasia Critic, June 2009; and CIS17320: Conflict analysis: 

Chak and Sayedabad districts, Wardak province, Sonya Merkova, Christian Dennys and Idrees Zaman, Cooperation for 

Peace and Unity, 27 April 2009. 

136 For 2010, CX244333: The Kuchi-Hazara conflict, again, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 20 May 2010; see also 

CX245045: Dark truth behind Afghan conflict, The National (UAE), 13 June 2010. For 2009, CX228143: US military 

aid thwarts grazing land clashes, Integrated Regional Information Network - United Nations, 16 June 2009; and 

CX227038: Nomads make a stand for their land, The National (UAE), 27 May 2009. For 2008, CX213242: Afghan 

settlers, nomads fight over grazing land, Khaleej Times, 6 August 2008; and CX218911: Threat of ethnic clashes over 

grazing land, Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) - United Nations, 7 April 2008. For 2007, CX244352: 

Fighting for land and water, The Economist, 26 July 2007. 

137 CX244352: Fighting for land and water, The Economist, 26 July 2007. 

36

Reports which refer to the Taliban’s support for the Kuchis include: a June 2010 article 

published by the Atlantic Community; a June 2010 opinion piece by Professor William 

Maley; and the May 2010 report by the Afghan Analysts Network. 138 

According to a June 2009 report published by the United Nations Environment Program “it 

cannot be safely asserted that either Iranian or Taliban interests direct events in the southeastern 

foothills of the central highlands”, but it is certain that the “dispute in these areas is 

militarised”. 139 

A December 2004 report by the Afghan Research Evaluation Unit, detailed the history of 

Hazara and Kuchi conflict in Bamyan province in particular (as well as other land rights 

issues between other ethnic groups in Afghanistan). 140 

Attempts at resolving land disputes 

As noted in the section on State Protection, the AIHRC September 2010 report on the 

conflict between the Kuchis and the Hazara in two districts in Maidan Wardak province, 

was critical of the attitude of the central government and considered that this attitude 

contributed to the repetition of this armed conflict. 141 

According to a June 2010 UN Secretary General report, in response to the May 2010 

violence between Kuchis and Hazaras in Wardak Province, an Afghan Government 

delegation, with support from UN agencies, established an agreement between the parties 

in which the Kuchis were ordered to leave the contested areas, and arranged for 

compensation for both the villagers and the Kuchis. 142 

According to a November 2010 report by the United Nations news service, there was no 

violent conflict between the Hazara and Kuchis in 2009 in the central highlands because 

the government secretly paid US$2-3 million to an influential Kuchi militia commander to 

ensure Kuchis did not enter Hazara areas in the lead up to the 2009 presidential 

election. 143 

138 CX244594: Violence between Kuchi-Taliban and Hazara a new cause for concern, Atlantic Community, 

3 June 2010; CIS18933: On the position of the Hazara minority in Afghanistan [position paper], Professor William 

Maley, 28 June 2010, paragraph 9; and CX244333: The Kuchi-Hazara conflict, again, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 

20 May 2010. 

139 CIS19276: Recommended Strategy for Conflict Resolution of Competing High Pasture Claims of Settled and 

Nomadic Communities in Afghanistan, Liz Alden Wily, United Nations Environment Program, June 2009, p38; see 

also CX227038: Nomads make a stand for their land, The National (UAE), 27 May 2009. 

140 CIS14511: Looking for Peace on the Pastures: Rural Land Relations in Afghanistan, Liz Alden Wily, Afghanistan 

Research and Evaluation Unit, December 2004, in particular pp52-60. 

141 CIS19336: Report on the Case of Conflict between Kochies and the Local People in Behsood (Hessa-e-Awal, Hessae-Dowm) 



142 CIS18880: United Nations Security Council Report of the Secretary-General: Activities of the United Nations 


16 June 2010, p11. 

143 CX254012: Kuchi minority complain of marginalization, Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) - United 

Nations, 23 November 2010; see also CX244333: The Kuchi-Hazara conflict, again, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 

20 May, 2010; CX225158: Afghan MPs urge action to avert renewed conflict between nomads, villagers, Tolo TV, 

24 April 2009, BBC Monitoring service; CX227038: Nomads make a stand for their land, The National (UAE), 

27 May 2009; and CX228143: US military aid thwarts grazing land clashes, Integrated Regional Information Network - 

United Nations, 16 June 2009. 

37

Two reports - an October 2010 study by the Cooperation for Peace and Unity and a June 

2009 report by the United Nations Environment Program - outlined efforts which began in 

2006 to introduce conflict resolution and negotiation skills to settled and nomadic 

communities. 144 

A May 2010 report by the Afghan Analysts Network noted that the people displaced by 

violence that month were unhappy with the deployed security forces and that the Afghan 

National Police kept a low profile as they were outnumbered by the Kuchi fighters. 145 

Also in May 2010, the Pajhwok Afghan News reported that the Kuchis had urged the 

government to find a legal solution to the land dispute and noted some efforts by Afghan 

President Karzai to address the issue. 146 

A May 2009 report by the United Nations news service noted that the UN Assistance 

Mission in Afghanistan has supported attempts to resolve the land disputes, but the 

apparent absence of clear government policy on land tenure and pasture rights has 

contributed to ongoing conflict. 147 


Losing access to land, and as such, being denied the capacity to earn a livelihood of any 

kind, can be considered serious harm. Whether or not such harm constitutes persecution 

for a Convention ground needs to be assessed. 

The issue that needs to be resolved is whether the land disputes affecting Hazara land 

holders are for a Convention reason (generally argued as Hazara race) or whether the 

incidents are primarily aimed at resolving arguments around access to land, regardless of 

who currently inhabits it. 

For the actions to constitute persecution, systematic and discriminatory conduct against 

the applicant must also be demonstrated. 


Information contained in reports by the UNHCR, the Cooperation for Peace and Unity and 

DFAT suggest that the immediate causes for land disputes include the desire for access to 

grazing land and other resources. The UNHCR and other sources have also indicated that 

ethnicity, or ethnic tension, may be a feature of land disputes. 

144 

CIS19687: Fractured Relationships: Understanding Conflict between Nomadic and Settled Communities in 

Wardak's Pastureland, Khibar Rassul, Cooperation for Peace and Unity, October 2010, see in particular pp20-23; and 

CIS19276: Recommended Strategy for Conflict Resolution of Competing High Pasture Claims of Settled and Nomadic 

Communities in Afghanistan, Liz Alden Wily, United Nations Environment Program, June 2009, in particular pp30-38. 

145 

CX244333: The Kuchi-Hazara conflict, again, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 20 May 2010. See also CX247617: 

Karzai names panel to look into rising ethnic Afghan violence, The Washington Post, 14 August 2010. 

146 

CX244340: Kuchis seek legal solution to meadow dispute, Pajhwok Afghan News - Afghanistan, 25 May 2010. 

147 

CX226283: UNAMA supporting efforts to end dispute over grazing land, Integrated Regional Information Network - 

United Nations, 13 May 2009. 

38

Though the parties involved are of differing races and disputes between the two in the past 

have been violent, case officers should thoroughly explore the claims and consider 

whether or not any of the five Convention grounds are the ‘essential and significant 

reason’ for the feared harm. It may help to consider whether or not the persecution 

claimed would exist independently of the dispute over resources. 

Where the harm feared is attributable to a number of motivations, the Convention reason 

must be the ‘essential and significant reason’ above other reasons. Case officers must 

weigh the information against the particular circumstances of the client to determine if this 

is the case. 

Inter-ethnic conflict for a land dispute may relate to a Convention ground if, for example, a 

domestic law was discriminatory in application for a Convention reason. If one group was 

favoured by a law relative to another in punishment for a crime, then that could possibly 

constitute targeted persecution. It will still be necessary to determine whether the 

discriminatory application of the law would result in serious harm, if the conduct is 

persecution or a justifiable action because it is appropriate and adapted to achieving some 

legitimate object of the country, and whether there was a real chance of serious harm 

occurring for the claimant. The position remains, however, that persecution must amount 

to “serious harm” (see S91R(2) of the Act) and the essential and significant reason for the 

persecution must be a Convention reason. Generalised lawlessness which does not 

attract a Convention nexus, does not automatically give rise to a well founded fear of 

persecution (see the Refugee Law Guidelines). 

If it is considered that an applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention 

reason, whether or not relocation to an area free of Kuchi nomads is a viable option also 

needs to be considered. 

Given the evidence of harm caused by both sides of land disputes, case officers must also 

consider if Refugees Convention exclusion clauses apply – see Article 1F(b). 




• The difficulties over land and resources between Kuchi nomads and Hazaras are long 

standing. Is a Convention ground the essential and significant reason for the harm 

feared? What evidence supports this finding? 

• Some sources support the view that land disputes are motivated by the need for, and 

defence of, farm land or natural resources. Does the persecution involve ‘systematic 

and discriminatory’ conduct for a Convention reason? 

• There is evidence of regular and sporadic clashes between these two groups over a 

number of years. Is the claim of targeted, race-related violence in areas where the 

Pashtun/Kuchi population constitutes a minority credible? What evidence supports 

this? 

39

9. INTERNAL RELOCATION 

The definition of a ‘refugee’ in Article 1A of the Refugees Convention requires that an 

applicant’s fear of persecution for a Convention reason must be well-founded. Depending 

on the circumstances of the case, it may be reasonable for the applicant to relocate in the 

country of nationality to a region where there is no appreciable risk of occurrence of the 

feared persecution. 

9.1 Claim 

The applicant may claim that there is no internal flight alternative (IFA) or internal 

relocation alternative (IRA) available. 



UNHCR “generally considers internal flight as a reasonable alternative where protection is 

available from the individual’s own extended family, community or tribe in the area of 

prospective relocation. Single males and nuclear family units may, in certain 

circumstances, subsist without family and community support in urban and semi-urban 

areas with established infrastructure and under effective Government control. Given the 

breakdown in the traditional social fabric of the country caused by decades of war, 

massive refugee flows, and growing internal migration to urban areas, a case-by-case 

analysis will, nevertheless, be necessary.” 148 

The UNHCR note that owing to the “wide geographic reach of some armed anti- 

Government groups, a viable IFA/IRA may not be available to individuals at risk of being 

targeted by such groups.” 149 

The UNHCR also notes that “in urban centres, the IDP population and growing economic 

migration are putting increased pressure on labour markets and resources, such as 

construction materials, land and potable water”. It notes that “widespread unemployment 

and underemployment limit the ability of a large number of people to meet their basic 

needs”. 150 

Other country information 

In March 2011, The Australian reported that Professor Maley has called for a moratorium 

on the deportation of failed Afghan asylum-seekers and quoted Professor Maley as saying 

that the targeting of returnees is “more likely now than in 2008.” 151 







151 CX261708: ‘Stop deporting Afghans to be killed’, The Australian, 30 March 2011 

40

A September 2010 report by DFAT noted the view of a Hazara human rights contact as 

stating that the Hazara had a cohesive community in Kabul and it would be relatively easy 

for new arrivals to integrate into the city. 152 

A June 2010 DFAT report noted that individuals returning to any part of Afghanistan, 

including Daikundi and Uruzgan, where they no longer have a family, land or social 

network would face difficulties. The report states that such cases would be rare as few 

people in Afghanistan are without networks. 153 

A September 2009 fact finding mission by the Finnish Immigration Service described the 

Jaghori region in particular as relatively stable and peaceful as opposed to the rest of the 

country and may be considered a viable relocation option. 154 (See also Jaghori / Travel 

Section). 

According to an August 2009 report by the International Crisis Group, social networks in 

part determined the destinations where Afghan refugees travelled, and social networks 

were also facilitating reintegration by helping Afghan refugees to resettle in their original 

communities in Afghanistan. 155 

According to an April 2009 report by the Cooperation for Peace and Unity, in locations 

where Hazaras constitute a majority, such as Jaghori and Malistan districts of Ghazni 

Province, and elsewhere in the Hazarajat, the Taliban does not have control and the 

Hazaras appear to be able to prevent Taliban incursions. 156 

A 2008 report for the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration on Norway’s voluntary return 

program noted that Norway only returns to Kabul individuals who have links to Kabul. 157 

A 2008 report in The National Geographic described the relative progress for a growing 

Hazara middle class in Kabul. 158 

UNHCR voluntary returnees 

Most returns of Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran occurred in the initial wave in 

2002. 159 In the case of Hazaras, between March 2002 and June 2008, 345,289 Hazaras 

residing in Pakistan and Iran participated in the UNHCR’s Assisted Voluntary Repatriation 

152 

CX250180: AFG10736: The Hazara, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 28 September 2010. 

153 

CX245097: CIS Request No.AFG10334 Sayyed Hazara, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 

16 June 2010. 

154 


10 December 2009. 

155 

CIS18774: What now for refugees?, International Crisis Group, 31 August 2009, pp5-6. 

156 



157 

CIS19151: Return in Dignity, Return to What? Review of the Voluntary Return Programme to Afghanistan, Arne 

Strand et al, CHR Michelsen Institute, June 2008, p7. 

158 

CX228176: National Geographic: The outsiders, 02/2008. See also CX239852: Hazaras hustle to head of class in 

Afghanistan, The New York Times, 3 January 2010. 

159 

See for example CIS18025: Assisted Voluntary Repatriation of Afghans from Pakistan: Statistical Overview: 

Repatriation of Registered Afghans (with POR Cards) 01 April - 31 July 2009, UNHCR Data Management Unit, 

Islamabad, p3, p7; see also CIS17585: Finding Durable Solutions in Contested Transitions: The Case of the Afghan 

Refugee Population in Protracted Displacement in Asia: No Place to Call Home, Susanne Schmeidl and William Maley, 

Ashgate Publishing Limited, 29 March 2008, p29. 

41

program, making up 8 per cent of the total number of returns. 160 According to a report from 

DFAT, in 2007 Hazaras constituted 2.5 per cent of the Afghan refugees registered in 

Pakistan. 161 

According to the December 2010 report of the United Nation’s Secretary General, in 2010, 

returns increased to over 100 000. The report stated that “[d]ifficult economic conditions 

and alleged harassment, as well as fear of arrest and deportation in countries of asylum, 

have been cited as key factors in the decision to return. More positively, improvements in 

security in some parts of Afghanistan, employment opportunities, UNHCR assistance 

packages and the Government’s land allocation schemes have also been cited as reasons 

for returning by those interviewed.” 162 

The number of total Afghan returns in 2009 was considerably lower than in 2008, due in 

part to a suspension of returns from Pakistan from July 2009 to March 2010, because of 

the security situation in Pakistan. 163 

According to the UNHCR, between March and June 2010, 2534 Hazaras returned from 

Pakistan to Afghanistan as part of the UNHCR’s Assisted Voluntary Repatriation program, 

which was 3.1 per cent of total returns for this period. Eighty per cent of these Hazaras 

intended to return to central Afghanistan, primarily to Wardak province, but also to Parwan, 

Ghazni and Kabul. 164 

A 2008 report co-authored by Professor William Maley, raised questions about the 

sustainability of the UNHCR’s voluntary return program. 165 

(See also below, Situation for Afghan Hazara Refugees in Pakistan and Iran.) 


Guidelines) 

Case officers need to consider whether or not the applicant’s fear of persecution for a 

Convention reason is well-founded in relation to the country as a whole. Where it would 

160 

CIS18139: Map of Assisted Voluntary Repatriation to Afghanistan - Return by Province of Destination - Ethnicity - 

March 2002 - June 2008, UNHCR, June 2008. 

161 

CX246371: Conditions for asylum caseloads: Afghan refugees, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 

19 July 2010; according to CX133002: Census report reveals over three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, 

Associated Press of Pakistan News Agency, 24 August 2005, Hazaras made up one per cent of Afghan refugees in 

Pakistan. 

162 

CIS19759: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security - Report of the 

Secretary-General, UN General Assembly Security Council, 10 December 2010, p10. See also CIS19755 Afghanistan, 

UNHCR Global Appeal 2011 Update, UNHCR, 1 December 2010; and CX248227: Number of voluntary returns to 

Afghanistan this year tops 100,000, UNCHR, 27 August 2010. 

163 

CIS18170: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the 

Secretary-General 28 December 2009, UN General Assembly Security Council, 28 December 2009, p9. 

164 

CIS19116: Assisted Voluntary Repatriation of Afghans from Pakistan (22 March – 30 June): Monthly Statistical 

Overview: Repatriation of Registered Afghans (with POR Cards), UNHCR, August 2010, p17. For the similar period in 

2009 see CIS18025: Assisted Voluntary Repatriation of Afghans from Pakistan: Statistical Overview: Repatriation of 

Registered Afghans (with POR Cards) 01 April - 31 July 2009, UNHCR, November 2009. 

165 

CIS17585: Finding Durable Solutions in Contested Transitions: The Case of the Afghan Refugee Population in 

Protracted Displacement in Asia: No Place to Call Home, Susanne Schmeidl and William Maley, Ashgate Publishing 

Limited, 29 March 2008, see in particular p14, pp34-37. 

42

e reasonable in all circumstances to expect an applicant to internally relocate to another 

part of the country to avoid persecution, then the fear is not well-founded. 

Whether or not it is reasonable to expect an applicant to relocate must be considered. 

What is ‘reasonable’ will change from case to case, so each individual’s circumstances 

and the impact relocating would have on them should also be considered. Relocation may 

not be reasonable if the applicant will be required to significantly alter their behaviour to 

avoid persecution in the new location. 

The primary consideration is whether the applicant is able to avoid persecution in the new 

location and can reasonably relocate there. In this context the ability of the state or 

surrogate authorities, to protect applicants in the alternative location should be assessed. 


The UNHCR guidance is not necessarily indicative or compliant with Australian law on the 

issue of internal relocation. The Australian position, and the one to be used, is that a well 

founded fear must be held with regard to the relevant country as a whole. Australian case 

law also necessitates a consideration of the practicalities of internally relocating; these are 

in the Refugee Law Guidelines. 

It must be noted that Australian policy differs from the UNHCR guidelines particularly on 

the principles of relocation, the availability of protection and who provides it. The Refugee 

Law guidelines and relevant case law support the position that as long as an area is safe 

for an applicant to return to, it does not matter whether that safety is provided by state or 

surrogate authorities. 

It should also be noted that the UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines state that although there is 

limited state protection available throughout Afghanistan, internal relocation may still be an 

option for Afghan asylum seekers. 

In particular, where persecution appears to be linked to race and/or being part of an ethnic 

minority, there may be options for internally relocating to other areas of Afghanistan where 

this persecution is absent. 

The Cooperation for Peace and Unity and DFAT indicate that the Hazarajat may be an 

area of relative safety and stability for Afghan Hazaras. Whether or not the applicant’s 

claims of persecution (for a Convention reason) are well-founded for these areas must be 

thoroughly assessed and clear reasoning provided if this is not considered a viable option. 

The practicality of internal relocation and (given the individual’s circumstances) whether 

the applicant is able to reasonably get to a place where they will not be persecuted for a 

Convention reason should also be considered. 




43

• There is evidence of availability of protection in certain areas. Is the applicant’s fear of 

persecution well-founded for the country as a whole? What evidence supports this? 

• Given the availability of some protection by surrogate authorities in certain areas, is it 

reasonable, or unreasonable, for the applicant to safely relocate to those areas? 

• Is it reasonable or unreasonable for the applicant to relocate to another part of 

Afghanistan where they would be able to earn a livelihood? 

• If the applicant were to relocate, what is the likely future risk of persecution in the new 

location? 

44

10. ASSOCIATION WITH THE WEST 

10.1 Claim 

The applicant may claim, if returned to Afghanistan, to have a well-founded fear of 

persecution by non-state agents on the basis of a perceived affiliation with the West due to 

travel abroad, including to Australia. 



The 2010 UNHCR Guidelines do not specifically address the issue of association with the 

West. 

Returnees from the West 

A September 2010 DFAT report noted that contacts in Afghanistan did not believe 

Hazaras would be targeted because they had sought asylum in the west. 166 

A March 2009 report prepared for the UK government, interviewed involuntary Afghan 

deportees from the UK who had acquired western lifestyles, and noted that 30 per cent of 

respondents believed they would find it difficult to integrate back into Afghanistan. 167 

According to a February 2009 DFAT report, there have been several cases of returnees 

and deportees coming from western European countries being targeted by state and nonstate 

agents of persecution in Kabul and its suburban areas. These cases involved 

individuals being: 

• targeted by unknown individuals, being beaten up and having valuable items including 

cash, national ID card, and passport stolen; 

• followed by a familial enemy and injured as a result of gunfire; 

• kidnapped for ransom and released after payment; or 

• killed during a suicide attack. 168 

The same DFAT report also noted that returning Afghans could not stay in areas controlled 

by anti-government elements “as they would be targeted primarily as a result of their 

residence in a western country”. Returnees would be approached for a 'financial 

contribution' to the jihad, and returnees are more likely to be accused of spying for foreign 

troops. 

166 

CX250180: AFG10736: The Hazara, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 28 September 2010. 

167 

CIS18235: Understanding the Return and Reintegration Process of Afghan returnees from the UK, Altai Consulting, 

March 2009, pp24-25. 

168 

CX219955: CIS Request No. AFG 9509; Situation for Hazaras in Ghazni, Uruzgan and Dai Kundi Provinces, 


45

Other Targets 

Other media reports in 2009 and 2008 indicated the Taliban and/or conservative Islamic 

leaders have targeted those working in television, working as journalists, promoting music 

or engaged in activities the Taliban consider “un-Islamic” (regardless of whether or not the 

people targeted had travelled to the ‘West’). 169 

According to an anthropological study, since 1978 Hazaras have regularly travelled back 

and forth between Afghanistan and Pakistan and Iran to seek work, escape drought and to 

flee war. 170 


A claim that an applicant would be harmed on their return based on ‘association with the 

West’ should generally be considered against the Convention ground of political opinion. 

When assessing whether a person is persecuted on the basis of political opinion, it is 

important to note that the person does not need to hold the political opinion – it is enough 

that a person is believed to hold a political opinion, (for example, the person is considered 

to have an imputed political opinion of affiliation with the West). 

In assessing whether there is a real chance of the applicant being subjected to persecution 

on their return to Afghanistan (on the basis of imputed political opinion), it must be 

considered whether the harm that an applicant may be subjected to would constitute 

persecution. Of particular concern should be whether it can be determined that any such 

actions are being carried out for the essential and significant reason of imputed political 

opinion or whether the actions are random and the profile of the victim irrelevant. 

The possibility of a ‘sur place’ claim should also be considered particularly if the inability to 

return forms the sole basis for the claim to refugee status. 

The requirement in s 91R(3) of the Migration Act to discount any conduct engaged in by a 

claimant in Australia for the sole purpose of strengthening refugee claims should be noted. 

The act of seeking protection should, by itself, not be considered in this context. However, 

other actions or conduct by the applicant may be worthy of consideration. 


Given Afghanistan’s porous borders, mobile workforce and the cultural expectation for 

Hazaras to move out of the local area for employment, and assuming that it is possible to 

identify returnees from a Western country, whether or not there is a real chance that an 

individual returning voluntarily or involuntarily would be at risk of serious harm must be 

assessed. 

169 CX231759: Kandahar dreamers test Taliban edicts, British Broadcasting Corporation, 16 August 2009; CX193400: 

A Young Life Hangs in the Balance in Afghanistan's Cultural War, The Washington Post, 15 February 2008; 

CX193399: Afghan journalist jailed for translating Koran, The Independent (United Kingdom), 15 February 2008. 

170 CIS18419: War and Migration: Social Networks and Economic Strategies of the Hazaras of Afghanistan, Alessandro 

Monsutti, Routledge, New York and London, 2005, see in particular pp27-30 and pp123-127. 

46

How the harm feared is considered persecution for a Convention reason, rather than 

random crime must be thoroughly established. 




• There is evidence of indiscriminate violence associated with the ongoing conflict, 

including the activities of gangs as well as the activities of the insurgency. How is the 

harm feared persecution for a Refugees Convention ground? What evidence exists to 

support this? 

• Given the porous borders and mobile workforce travelling to and from neighbouring 

countries: 

- how would the applicant be readily identified as returning from a western 

country as opposed to these neighbouring countries? 

- how would the applicant be perceived as ‘westernised?’ 

• Is the period and nature of the applicant’s stay in a western country considered 

sufficient for the person to be identifiable and imputed as being ‘westernised’? 

Why/why not? 

47

11. AFGHAN HAZARAS IN PAKISTAN AND IRAN 

11.1 Claims 

Applicants may claim that prior to arriving in Australia, they left Afghanistan and resided 

illegally in Pakistan for periods of time ranging from months to many years. They may 

claim that in Pakistan they experienced harm, for example: 

• mistreatment by the Pashtun and Baluch 

• violence at the hands of Wahabis linked to the Taliban 

• lack of police protection and lack of state investigation of complaints 

They may claim that they are unable to return to both Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

Applicants may also claim they have lived in Iran prior to coming to Australia and are 

unable to return to Iran. 


Over three decades, millions of Afghans have fled Afghanistan. Most settled in Pakistan, 

followed by Iran. Approximately 1.6 million registered Afghans remain in Pakistan and 

935,000 in Iran. 171 Between 2002 and 2009, the UNHCR, in the largest voluntary 

repatriation program in its history, has assisted more than 4.3 million refugees to return to 

Afghanistan - 3.5 million Afghans have returned from Pakistan alone. 172 In 2010, the 

UNHCR assisted over 100 000 refugees to return from Pakistan. 173 

Afghans in Pakistan 

In July 2010 DFAT reported that unregistered Afghans may be arrested and deported at 

any time and that Pakistani officials regularly blame Afghan refugees for terrorist attacks. 174 

In March 2010 the UNHCR stated that the government of Pakistan had endorsed a new 

‘Strategy for the Management of Afghans in Pakistan’, which included the extension until 

the end of 2012 of Proof of Registration Cards, allowing Afghan refugees to remain in 

Pakistan for another three years. According to the UNHCR, the extension would 

accompany the ongoing gradual repatriation of Afghans in safety and dignity and in line 

with the security situation and capacity of Afghanistan to absorb returning refugees. 

The strategy also included support for refugee hosting areas in Pakistan and 

arrangements for some unregistered Afghans in Pakistan. 175 

171 


19 July 2010; CX247378: Reports of Afghan asylum seekers currently being deported from Iran. Treatment of Afghan 

asylum seekers in Iran, Ireland: Refugee Documentation Centre, 28 July 2010; see also CIS19678: UNHCR Eligibility 

Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers From Afghanistan, UNHCR, 


172 

CX252757: Increased number of returnees from Pakistan, Integrated Regional Information Network - United 

Nations, 4 November 2010. 

173 

CIS18850: UNHCR Global Report 2009 – Afghanistan, UNHCR, 1 June 2010. See also CIS19759 : The situation in 

Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, General Assembly Security Council, United 

Nations, 10 December 2010, p10. 

174 


19 July 2010. 

48

Hazaras in Pakistan 

The July 2010 DFAT report noted that as of 2007, 2.5 per cent of Afghan refugees 

registered in Pakistan were Hazara (more than 80 per cent were Pashtun). 176 

A May 2010 DFAT report stated that Hazaras from Afghanistan have crossed the border 

into Pakistan (then India) for more than a century in order to flee persecution in 

Afghanistan. In the early 1960s, Pakistan began to treat Hazaras the same as other 

indigenous tribes in Pakistan. As a result, the City Magistrate in Quetta declared the 

Hazaras to be a local tribe of the Quetta Division, and these Hazaras therefore became 

citizens of Pakistan. DFAT noted that Hazaras from Quetta hold positions in the provincial 

government of Baluchistan, in the federal government, and the police force. Hazaras in 

Pakistan are often in business and have generally high education levels. 177 

According to a 2006 report by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 

most Hazara refugees arrived in Quettain 1996 when the Taliban regime in Afghanistan 

began to persecute Hazaras. They were able to avoid the refugee camps and settled in 

the city under the protection of local Pakistani Hazaras. 178 

Incidents involving Hazaras 

In November 2009, the Pakistan Daily Times reported the arrest of a terrorist wanted for 

the murder of 28 members of the Shi’a-Hazara community in target killings in Quetta. 179 

This report stated that around 200 people in Quetta have fallen victim to targeted killings 

over the last six years. 

In February 2009, the Daily Times noted that Hazara tribesmen in Baluchistan, numbering 

around 300 000, were living under unprecedented terror, uncertainty and insecurity. The 

report stated Hazaras had been targeted since 1985, but also reported a view that recent 

killings were religiously motivated, rather than Hazara specific. 180 

On 3 June 2008 the Daily Times reported the Balochistan Liberation Army claimed it was 

involved in the murder of six youths from the Hazara community on charges of spying. 181 

In March 2008, the Frontier Post 182 and in June 2008, the Daily Times, 183 reported the 

killing of members of the Hazara community. 

175 CX241632: UNHCR welcomes Pakistan’s decision to extend validity of registration cards for Afghan refugees, 

UNHCR, 25 March 2010. 

176 CX246370: Conditions for asylum caseloads: Afghan refugees, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 

19 July 2010. 

177 CX243899: The Hazara Community, Australia: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 20 May 2010, no page 

numbers. 

178 CIS16949: Afghans in Quetta: Settlements, Livelihoods, Support Networks and Cross-Border Linkages, Afghanistan 

Research and Evaluation Unit, January 2006, p4, p8. 

179 CX236470: ‘Mastermind’ of sectarian killings held in Quetta, Daily Times, Pakistan, 13 November 2009. 

180 CX220054: Hazara tribesmen under attack in Quetta, Daily Times, Pakistan, 6 February 2009. 

181 CX219099: Target killings bring BLA support into new focus, Daily Times, Pakistan, 3 June 2008. 

182 CX222283: 2 Hazara men killed in target killing, The Frontier Post, Pakistan, 9 March 2009. 

183 CX228651: Shutter-down strike in Quetta over murder of Hazaras, Daily Times, Pakistan, 24 June 2009. 

49

Hazaras in Iran 

In April 2010 the International Displacement Monitoring Centre (quoting the UNHCR and 

Brookings Institution), noted that in addition to the substantial economic migration of 

Afghans to neighbouring countries, there were also 980,000 Afghan refugees in Iran. 184 

An August 2009 study commissioned by the UNHCR found that high unemployment, low 

wages and widespread poverty in Afghanistan were pushing single men to migrate to Iran 

in search of work. According to the study, average wages in Iran were four times those in 

Afghanistan. Some Afghans went to Pakistan looking for work as seasonal labourers, 

while others went to Iran, with the vast majority moving back and forth irregularly and 

without documents. The report cited the example of an ethnic Hazara from Bamyan 

province seeking to work in Iran to support his fiancé and family in Afghanistan. 185 

A 2008 report co-authored by Professor William Maley noted that the bulk of Afghan 

refugees in Iran were Hazaras (over 40 per cent). According to a source cited in this 

report, up to August 2005 Hazaras returning from Iran were underrepresented due both to 

greater economic opportunities in Iran for Hazaras, and perceptions of continued prejudice 

against Shi’as in Afghanistan. In 2007, Iran began to pursue a policy of enforced 

returns. 186 

An Agence France Presse report from February 2008 confirmed that Iran had previously 

sparked international concern by embarking on a drive to expel around one million Afghan 

refugees residing without registration papers. 187 

A Radio Free Europe report from May 2007 included claims by Afghans that Iranian 

authorities had confiscated and destroyed their registration cards before expelling them 

from the country as well as claims of other difficulties for those who were legally 

registered. 188 


Under s36(3) - (5) of the Migration Act, Australia is taken not to have protection obligations 

to non-citizens who: 

• have the right to enter and reside in a country (whether temporarily or permanently); 

and 

• have not taken all possible steps to avail himself or herself of that right; and 

184 

CIS18499 not CX242240: Armed conflict forces increasing numbers of Afghans to flee their homes, Internal 

Displacement Monitoring Centre, 15 April 2010. 

185 

CX234286: Hard times lure Afghans to Iran, deter some refugees from returning, United Nations High Commission 

for Refugees, 11 August 2009. 

186 

CIS17585: Finding Durable Solutions in Contested Transitions: The Case of the Afghan Refugee Population in 


Limited, 29 March 2008, p19 and p33; on return up to 2005 see p33; on enforced returns see p9. 

187 

CX194271: UN voices concern over Afghans in border province, Agence France Presse, France, 27 February 2008; 

see also CIS17585: Finding Durable Solutions in Contested Transitions: The Case of the Afghan Refugee Population in 


Limited, 29 March 2008. 

188 

CX176706: Afghan Refugees Allege Abuse from Iran Repatriation, Radio Free Europe, 4 May 2007. See also 

CX182563: Iran still expelling Afghans but at a slower pace: UN refugee agency, Times of India, 7 August 2007. 

50

• do not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason in that 

country; or 

• do not have a well-founded fear of being returned to another country where they will be 

persecuted for a Convention reason. 

In all cases, the right to enter and reside must include an element of enforceability, in that 

the applicant would be able to assert the legal status of the (as yet unrevoked) right, 

against the authorities of the third country involved. 

Authority on the operation of s36(3) indicates that an enforceable right to enter and reside 

must exist at the time of decision and not be a lapsed right. Accordingly, the existence of 

a 'legally enforceable right' should be considered with reference to the facts and 

circumstances of each application. 

The fact that an applicant has resided in Pakistan or Iran for a long period does not 

necessarily mean that they have a current right to enter and reside lawfully either of those 

countries. 


The majority of Hazaras have so far claimed that whilst having spent time in Pakistan or 

Iran they are not nationals of those countries and/or do not have the right to enter and 

reside there. Those Afghan nationals who were lawfully registered as refugees in Pakistan 

or Iran are likely to have lost their right to reside once they departed the country. 

Whilst the presence of Afghan Hazaras may have been tolerated, this prior tolerance does 

not necessarily confer the right to enter and reside in a future sense. 

Whether or not the applicant holds Pakistan or Iranian citizenship should be investigated 

before being satisfied that the applicant has no right to enter and reside in those countries. 

Hazara applicants with the right to enter and reside in Pakistan or Iran and who claim to 

fear persecution in Pakistan or Iran must be thoroughly assessed against the relevant 

country as if it were the country of origin. 

It must be established whether or not any claims of harm are likely to be at a level that 

accords with the definition of persecution provided for in s91R of the Act as well as the 

persecution being for the purposes of a Convention ground. 




• Does the applicant have a (current) right to enter and reside in Pakistan or Iran? 

• Assuming the applicant has a right to enter and reside, does the applicant have a well 

founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason in Pakistan or Iran? 

51

12. Map 189 

189 

CIS19787, CIS19736, CIS19670. (The Jaghori, Ghazni District is situated to the South West of the city of Ghazni, West of the city of Qarah Bagh) 

See also: CX19666 for an interactive map of Afghanistan Provinces. 

52

Country Guidance Note - Afghanistan - Department of Immigration ...

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