Chapter 1 - South African Human Rights Commission

4) The marginal position of certain groups of non-nationals
in their communities can prevent them from obtaining
assistance from police during times of social conflict
(section 2.4).
5) Common to areas affected by the violence of 2008 is (a)
the poor quality of relationships between local residents
and key officials involved in the democratic governance
of informal settlements, and (b) the related prevalence
of indifferent, corrupt and/or authoritarian leaders in the
fundamental structures of local democracy (section 2.5).
6) Vulnerability to public violence is exacerbated by the
lack of interventions to manage and formalise informal
settlements which receive large numbers of internal and
international migrants (section 2.6).
7) Prior awareness-raising and anti-xenophobia campaigns
did not prevent hatred and resentment of foreigners from
reaching unprecedented levels in 2008 (section 2.7).
8) Weaknesses in intergovernmental coordination and
institutional processes hindered the response to the
2008 crisis (section 2.8).
9) Police were unable to protect displaced persons’ property
during the May 2008 attacks, leaving many individuals
destitute – their homes and belongings appropriated by
South Africans (section 3.1).
10) The Disaster Management Act 2002 (DMA) was not fully
implemented, which most likely exacerbated problems
of leadership, coordination and funding that led to lapses
in protection and/or service provision to displaced
persons (section 3.2.1).
11) Abuses of process were evident in the treatment of
refugees and asylum seekers who refused to register
for temporary immigration status at the Glenanda site in
Gauteng (section 3.2.2).
12) Other weaknesses in the engagement of the Department
of Home Affairs (DHA) with displaced persons may have
resulted in administrative injustices against displaced
persons (section 3.2.3).
13) There were inconsistencies across provinces in the
approach taken to “voluntary repatriation,” and little
effort by the DHA to curb constructive refoulement
(section 3.2.4).
14) “Reintegration” of displaced persons into South African
society and communities from which they were displaced
did not occur in a consistent or sustainable way and is not
being adequately monitored (section 4.1).
15) There was a lack of consistency on the eligibility
principles and value of reparations to victims of the
2008 attacks (section 4.2).
16) Negative perceptions of and attitudes to justice and the
rule of law abound at the level of affected communities,
indicating a poor relationship between communities and
the police and wider judicial system (section 4.3).
17) Judicial outcomes for cases arising from the 2008
violence have limited the attainment of justice for
victims of the attacks and have allowed for significant
levels of impunity for perpetrators (section 4.4).
18) Instances of misconduct by public officials and police
during the 2008 violence and displacement may not
have resulted in disciplinary measures, due to failure to
report such incidents (section 4.5).
19) The right to effective remedy is being undermined by
problems of capacity within the institutions that exist
to provide access to an effective remedy and promote
access to justice (section 4.6).
20) Progress has been made in some areas in acknowledging
and preparing for the contingency of future xenophobic
attacks. However, further effort will be required to
maintain this progress (section 4.7).
21) The SAHRC encountered difficulty in responding within
the boundaries of its mandate and on the scale required
during the 2008 disaster. Continued commitment is
needed to ensure that it is better able to respond in the
event of a recurrence (section 5.1).
Summary of Recommendations
The SAHRC makes recommendations in relation to the following
general principles and specific organs of state (in alphabetical
order):
Recommendations to Department of Cooperative
Governance and Traditional Affairs (DCoGTA)
Recommendations and/or information pertaining to DCoGTA
are found in the following sections of this report: 2.1; 2.5;
2.6; 2.8.
1) Through the National Disaster Management Centre
(NDMC), develop a national-level evaluation and action
plan to address obstacles to local, provincial and
national responses to social conflict disasters. This
should draw on existing local and provincial evaluations
and evaluative reports by civil society organisations,
as well as “lessons learned” reports and related action
plans to be submitted by municipalities and provinces
affected by violence in 2008.
2) Through NDMC reviews of existing reports and of the
successes and failures of prior reintegration or mediation
activities, begin to develop best practice guidelines on
reintegration.
3) Through NDMC, develop a set of guidelines on response
to social conflict disasters to promote consistency in the
nature and quality of disaster response.
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REPORT ON THE SAHRC INVESTIGATION INTO ISSUES OF RULE OF LAW, JUSTICE AND IMPUNITY ARISING OUT OF
THE 2008 PUBLIC VIOLENCE AGAINST NON-NATIONALS