A-10s over Kosovo

A-10s OVER KOSOVO
three very different aircraft performed the AFAC mission quite
differently. For target acquisition, F-16s and F-14s used targeting
pods that provided a magnified in-the-cockpit picture of the
target area while A-10 pilots flew with gyrostabilized 12- or 15-
power binoculars, which they often called “binos.” In much of the
weather conditions during OAF, binos had much better visual
resolution than targeting pods.
A-10s flew more than 1,000 AFAC missions during the 78
days of the OAF air campaign. Thousands of allied aircraft, representing
practically every attack aircraft in the NATO inventory,
were controlled by A-10s. The specifics of how A-10s performed
the OAF AFAC mission are discussed in chapter 2.
Combat Search and Rescue
CSAR—possibly the most audacious Air Force mission—is
made possible by airmen who dare to penetrate bad-guy land
and recover recently shot down aviators from under the very
nose of the enemy—an enemy who has many reasons for
wanting to capture hapless aviators and is all too eager to do
so. Those aviators are usually downed in combat and in the
course of expending ordnance on the enemy’s troops. The
enemy knows that the potential prize can be exploited for intelligence
(intel), propaganda, and other political ends—not to
mention the pleasure of retribution. For example, during the
Gulf War, Saddam Hussein tried to use photos and videos of
captured aviators to negatively affect allied public support for
the air campaign.
With the increased use of airpower as the first instrument
for coercion and peacemaking, the capture of an airman becomes
more likely and could provide an enemy with a method
of influencing public opinions, especially within allied democracies.
An enemy may try to force “confessions” and intel disclosures
from captured aviators. Dictators have demonstrated
a willingness to subject helpless and, perhaps, wounded air
warriors to public ridicule for political advantage without regard
to the prisoner-of-war protections afforded by the Geneva
convention. With the desire to support and maintain the high
morale of allied airmen—and deny the enemy any opportunity
for a propaganda advantage—the United States and its NATO
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