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Inside the Cold War

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THE SOVIET COLD WARRIOR<br />

warrant officer to bridge <strong>the</strong> gap between <strong>the</strong> enlisted grades,<br />

but <strong>the</strong> program was defeated because junior officers usually<br />

“adopted” <strong>the</strong> ensigns as menservants ra<strong>the</strong>r than fitting<br />

<strong>the</strong>m in <strong>the</strong> chain of command. The ensigns also were given<br />

officer privileges, which fur<strong>the</strong>r removed <strong>the</strong>m from <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

intended use.<br />

Russia and <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union have had a sea service through -<br />

out <strong>the</strong>ir history, and it remains an honorable service. The<br />

Soviet Navy’s SSBN operations suffered along with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

services in procuring quality recruits to serve aboard <strong>the</strong><br />

highly technical nuclear submarines. The Soviet Navy<br />

normally consists of 20 percent officers, 10 percent warrant<br />

officers, and 70 percent conscripts. The officers and warrant<br />

officers have lengthy service commitments, but <strong>the</strong> Navy<br />

receives <strong>the</strong> lowest priority in recruit selection. The “brawn<br />

over brain” syndrome for Russian sailors dates back to <strong>the</strong> old<br />

sailing days. There has been evidence, however, that emphasis<br />

has shifted in recent years toward high-quality enlisted<br />

technicians for SSBN operations. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> manning<br />

ratio of officers to enlisted men on Russian SSBN submarines<br />

remains far greater than that of SSBNs in <strong>the</strong> US Navy and<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r Western navies. Although a firm ratio cannot be<br />

determined for today’s Russian SSBNs, <strong>the</strong> Sverdlovsk story<br />

indicates that <strong>the</strong> Soviet Navy had real manning problems in<br />

its SSBN force.<br />

It also appears that <strong>the</strong> navy suffered <strong>the</strong> greatest personnel<br />

turnover of all Soviet services—an estimated 70 percent every<br />

three years, with one-sixth of those leaving every six months.<br />

One can only guess at <strong>the</strong> Soviet Navy’s training load and <strong>the</strong><br />

concern for proficiency and war-fighting ability that may exist<br />

among its leaders. Consistent documentation has reflected<br />

that <strong>the</strong> Soviet sailor lived “under conditions not seen in<br />

Western navies in over fifty years,” with miserable pay,<br />

unusually harsh discipline at sea, and <strong>the</strong> traditional overabundance<br />

of communist indoctrination.<br />

Finally, I think it is interesting to review <strong>the</strong> military personnel<br />

force structure of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union during <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cold</strong><br />

<strong>War</strong>, placing it in perspective with what “we thought we knew”<br />

versus what “<strong>the</strong>y wanted us to know.” At <strong>the</strong> peak of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cold</strong><br />

<strong>War</strong>, <strong>the</strong> United States had approximately 2.2 million men<br />

147

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