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New arbitration options in Bahrain<br />
BAHRAIN<br />
The start of this year saw the launch of the Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution – a joint<br />
venture between the Bahrain Ministry of Justice and the American Arbitration Association. Phillip<br />
Landolt, a partner at Charles Russell in Geneva, explains the two forms of arbitration the centre<br />
will offer, and considers the unique circumstances in which it excludes review of awards (with<br />
thanks to Hassan Ali Radhi for his invaluable input and Reem Al Mahroos of Charles Russell’s<br />
Bahrain office for additional research)<br />
<strong>Known</strong> as the BCDR-AAA, the new<br />
centre builds upon Bahrain’s history<br />
of arbitration extending back to the<br />
19th century. Bahrain was one of the<br />
first Gulf countries to adhere to the New York<br />
Convention, and since 1994 has had an arbitration<br />
law based on the (1985) UNCITRAL Model<br />
Law.<br />
Under a memorandum of understanding<br />
signed with the Bahraini government in<br />
December 2008, the AAA said it will “provide<br />
technical advice, administrative and systems<br />
know-how and staff training to the Bahrain<br />
Ministry of Justice, as well as […] neutralskills<br />
training to Bahraini arbitrators and<br />
mediators”.<br />
It will also help design a programme to<br />
impart ADR knowledge to the Bahraini judiciary,<br />
and business and legal communities throughout<br />
the region.<br />
The memorandum of understanding also<br />
provides for the BCDR-AAA board of trustees to<br />
issue its own set of arbitration rules – the BCDR-<br />
AAA rules.<br />
Statutory arbitration<br />
A legislative decree (number 30 for the year 2009)<br />
was passed on 29 June 2009, establishing that<br />
the BCDR-AAA will administer not just classic<br />
arbitrations by agreement but what was orginally<br />
referred to as “statutory arbitration” (although the<br />
final draft if the decree refers instead to “judicial<br />
discipline resolution proceedings” to comply with<br />
an opinion of the Bahrain Constitutional Court).<br />
“Statutory arbitration” establishes a unique<br />
system for resolving high-value international<br />
commercial disputes – which amounts to a fusion<br />
Left to right: Ali Al Aradi (chief registrar for mediation), BCDR-AAA board members Yousif Khalaf, Richard Naimark<br />
and Hassan Radhi, Shaikha Haya Al Khalifa (chair of board of trustees), BCDR-AAA board members Khalid Al Khalifa,<br />
William Slate and Abdulla Al Boainain, CEO James McPherson and Ahmed Husain (chief registrar for arbitration)<br />
Global Arbitration Review 25
BAHRAIN<br />
between classic arbitration by agreement and<br />
ordinary court proceedings.<br />
Under this system, tribunals have compulsory<br />
jurisdiction over all international commercial<br />
claims exceeding 500,000 Bahraini dinars (about<br />
US$1.3 million at current exchange rates). A<br />
dispute is considered international if one of the<br />
parties, or the place where a substantial part of the<br />
obligations under the contract is to be performed,<br />
is outside Bahrain, or if the location most closely<br />
connected with the dispute is outside Bahrain.<br />
It is considered commercial if its subject matter<br />
concerns relationships of a commercial nature,<br />
whether contractual or non-contractual.<br />
The legislative decree provides that a number<br />
of specifics in its application to statutory arbitration<br />
are to be settled by a regulation similar to those<br />
issued in relation to procedural matters before the<br />
courts. On 17 December 2009, this procedural<br />
regulation came into force.<br />
The legislative decree states that, in statutory<br />
arbitration cases, the BCDR-AAA will appoint the<br />
members of the tribunal – the majority of which<br />
must be Bahraini judges from a panel selected by<br />
the Bahraini judicial authorities. The procedural<br />
regulation goes a step further towards traditional<br />
arbitration, in providing that, if the parties so<br />
agree within two months, they may each appoint<br />
a member of the tribunal but that the chairman<br />
must be a member of the Bahraini judiciary.<br />
There is no requirement for the one or two<br />
party-appointed arbitrators to hold judicial office<br />
– they may be academics, lawyers, former judges or<br />
professionals of other backgrounds.<br />
Although non-Bahraini counsel may represent<br />
the parties, they must be accompanied by a Bahraini<br />
lawyer admitted to the Bahrain Court of Cassation.<br />
The default language of proceedings is Arabic – the<br />
language of the ordinary Bahraini courts – but,<br />
as in other arbitrations, the parties may agree to<br />
use another language. Since, however, the chair of<br />
the tribunal will be a Bahraini judge, the parties<br />
choice of an alternative language may be restricted<br />
– although English is likely to be an option.<br />
Like the courts, the tribunals will apply a<br />
conflict of laws regime; this one resulting in the<br />
application of Bahraini substantive law unless<br />
the parties agree otherwise. The procedure will<br />
be that of the ordinary courts, except when it is<br />
incompatible with the nature of the BCDR-AAA.<br />
As in classic arbitration, the tribunal’s fees will<br />
ordinarily be payable in advance. They will be<br />
calculated as a percentage of the amount in dispute<br />
(to be set by the government but not exceeding 5<br />
per cent).<br />
The system is also close to arbitration in<br />
allowing challenges to the tribunal’s decision on<br />
the merits on only a limited number of specified<br />
grounds, similar to the New York Convention<br />
grounds for refusing enforcement. They include<br />
the characteristic arbitration ground of ultra petita.<br />
Interestingly, challenges may also be brought<br />
on grounds traditionally associated with the<br />
revision of arbitral awards, for example evidence<br />
of fraud or the emergence of new facts that have<br />
been suppressed by the other side. The remedy,<br />
annulment of the award, is the same in all cases.<br />
The tribunals will be supervised by the<br />
government body supervising the activities of<br />
the ordinary courts. Tribunals have the power<br />
to determine their own jurisdiction – although<br />
the Bahrain Court of Cassation can review their<br />
decisions. As under the UNCITRAL Model<br />
Law, tribunals are also empowered to continue<br />
proceedings and issue decisions even if their<br />
jurisdiction is challenged.<br />
Arbitration by agreement<br />
The legislative decree also lays down basic rules<br />
for arbitration by agreement, although most of<br />
the procedure is contained in the BCDR-AAA<br />
arbitration rules.<br />
Arbitration agreements under this system must<br />
be in writing. Parties can choose the substantive<br />
law to govern their case and the language of the<br />
arbitration – with the tribunal deciding both issues<br />
in default. Non-Bahraini counsel can represent the<br />
parties, unaccompanied by Bahraini lawyers.<br />
As has been indicated, the BCDR-AAA<br />
arbitration rules govern the procedure for classic<br />
arbitrations by agreement. They apply both when a<br />
party selects the BCDR-AAA rules explicitly and<br />
when the parties choose arbitration administered<br />
by the BCDR-AAA.<br />
The rules are in virtually all regards identical in<br />
substance to the International Arbitration Rules of<br />
the American Arbitration Association/International<br />
Centre for Dispute Resolution – except that the<br />
administrator is the BCDR-AAA. Unlike the<br />
AAA-ICDR rules, however, the BCDR-AAA<br />
rules do not expressly indicate that they apply<br />
only to “international arbitrations”. It would<br />
appear that, unlike statutory arbitrations under the<br />
legislative decree, classic arbitrations need not be<br />
“international” or “commercial”.<br />
The one way in which the BCDR-AAA rules<br />
depart from the AAA rules is in requiring awards<br />
to be registered at the BCDR-AAA and any place<br />
of arbitration where it is required by the lex arbitrii.<br />
Challenges to the arbitral award are permitted<br />
on limited grounds, all of which are grounds<br />
for refusing enforcement in the New York<br />
Convention. It is interesting to see that lack of<br />
arbitrability and the improper composition of<br />
the arbitral tribunal are not express grounds for<br />
challenging a decision.<br />
When it comes to decisions on jurisdiction,<br />
the same system of review applies as in statutory<br />
arbitration. So there is both positive Kompetenz-<br />
Kompetenz, and limited negative Kompetenz-<br />
Kompetenz, in that the arbitral tribunal may<br />
continue its procedure while a review is pending<br />
before the court that will ultimately decide<br />
jurisdiction.<br />
Importantly, in a classic arbitration by<br />
agreement all recourse against awards set out in<br />
the legislative decree can be excluded if the parties<br />
choose non-Bahraini law “to govern the dispute”.<br />
This will be discussed in greater detail later.<br />
26 Volume 5 • Issue 1
BAHRAIN<br />
COMMENTARY<br />
STATUTORY ARBITRATION<br />
Is “statutory arbitration” international arbitration?<br />
It has been widely claimed that the statutory arbitration created by the<br />
legislative decree is “the world’s first statutory arbitration”. It may be more<br />
precise to say that it appears to be the world’s first “statutory arbitration”<br />
applying widely to “commercial” matters. Certainly there already exist a<br />
multitude of instances of “statutory arbitration”<br />
in specific legal relationships (eg, employment<br />
relationships and investor protection) and business<br />
sectors (eg, sports).<br />
The question arises whether statutory arbitration<br />
under the legislative decree is international arbitration<br />
at all, a question that is particularly pertinent given<br />
the formal change of its name to Judicial Dispute<br />
Resolution Proceedings. Whatever it is called,<br />
the process does present a number of important<br />
arbitration features – such as stringently limited<br />
challenges and a general exclusion of appeals on the<br />
merits. But it would appear that statutory arbitration<br />
is not international arbitration at all when it comes to<br />
the crucial area of enforcing arbitration awards under<br />
the New York Convention.<br />
If the New York Convention is interpreted as<br />
extending only to arbitration awards arising from<br />
arbitration agreements (as seems to be correct),<br />
Bahrain’s system of statutory arbitration obviously<br />
cannot engender a New York Convention award.<br />
Indeed, a number of the grounds for refusing recognition of an award under<br />
the New York Convention presuppose that the arbitration took place upon<br />
party agreement.<br />
On the other hand, each country that is signatory to the New York<br />
Convention is free to interpret the instrument as it sees fit within the limits<br />
of good faith.<br />
If a country refuses to enforce a Bahraini statutory arbitration award<br />
under the New York Convention, however, it is doubtful whether Bahrain<br />
could punish it by treating it as a non-contracting state, despite having<br />
entered the reciprocity reservation relating to application of the convention.<br />
The pros and cons<br />
While it remains to be seen how statutory arbitration will work in<br />
practice, certain of its essential features appear, on the face of it, to be most<br />
attractive to business. For example, the possibility of having international<br />
commercial judges, academics, or legal or other practitioners as part of the<br />
panel of adjudicators promises to import significant expertise, and would be<br />
particularly useful in cases where the substantive law is not Bahraini law, but<br />
some foreign law.<br />
The fact that the parties can agree on the language of the dispute is<br />
also an important pro-business feature. Such an advantage is rare in civil<br />
proceedings around the world, although it is not infrequent that parties are<br />
spared having to translate documents in English or another widely used<br />
language in the country.<br />
The limited grounds of challenge, and the exclusion of appeals on the<br />
merits, also make statutory arbitration decisions, at least on paper, a good<br />
deal more final than most first instance decisions in legal systems around<br />
the world. The requirement that challenges are decided by the Court of<br />
Cassation, Bahrain’s last-instance court, would indicate that such decisions<br />
are very final indeed.<br />
One might criticise as unduly conservative, however, the provision in<br />
the legislative decree stating that Bahraini law applies on the merits unless<br />
the parties agree otherwise. Still, since the BCDR-AAA’s jurisdiction is<br />
The immediate<br />
attractiveness of<br />
statutory arbitration<br />
will promote an<br />
accretion of<br />
commercial law<br />
decisions under<br />
Bahraini law<br />
limited to high-value disputes, one can expect the parties will have the<br />
foresight to stipulate any preference they have regarding the applicable law.<br />
Moreover, there may be a vital functional reason for the provision.<br />
If, as seems to be the case, the Bahraini legislator is seeking to harmonise<br />
commercial litigation and arbitration, upon the model of the latter, it is<br />
necessary to foster the development of Bahraini commercial law in a public<br />
forum before it starts being used in private and perhaps even confidential<br />
dispute settlement.<br />
An evolving concept?<br />
Nominally, statutory arbitration falls under the<br />
jurisdiction of the BCDR-AAA. But the reality<br />
is that it will be overseen by the ordinary judicial<br />
authorities in Bahrain, and it is not altogether clear<br />
from the legislative decree what role the BCDR-<br />
AAA will have beyond appointing the panel of<br />
arbitrators.<br />
Since, however, the system is being presented as<br />
arbitration – and especially if the BCDR-AAA has<br />
significant powers over the process – it may be that in<br />
time statutory arbitration will evolve to share features<br />
of classic arbitration under the legislative decree. Is<br />
this the Bahraini legislator’s far-sighted intention? The<br />
proposition is not impossible. Certainly the essential<br />
structure of the legislative decree would support<br />
this and, practically speaking, this evolution could<br />
be translated into binding law merely by amending<br />
the implementing regulation. The administrative<br />
fee structure – ad valorem up to 5 per cent of the<br />
amount in dispute – is distinctly reminiscent of<br />
arbitration and appears to portend such a development.<br />
In the meantime, the immediate attractiveness of statutory arbitration<br />
will promote an accretion of commercial law decisions under Bahraini law,<br />
since, as seen above, Bahraini law will apply in the absence of any party<br />
stipulation to the contrary.<br />
ARBITRATION BY AGREEMENT<br />
Advantages, and some questions<br />
Classic arbitration under the legislative decree and the BCDR-AAA<br />
Arbitration Rules is as modern as one might hope. Since the BCDR-<br />
AAA Arbitration Rules are a virtual carbon copy of the AAA International<br />
Arbitration Rules, they present the advantages of proven effectiveness and<br />
high predictability. Predictability in particular is assured since the AAA is<br />
advising the Bahrain Ministry of Justice, and the BCDR-AAA board of<br />
trustees and its secretariat include persons familiar with the workings of the<br />
AAA and its international arbitration rules.<br />
There is a question as to whether the material jurisdictional limitations<br />
applying to statutory arbitration apply to classic arbitration upon agreement<br />
of the parties under the legislative decree. Those limitations are enunciated<br />
in the chapter applying, exclusively it would appear, to statutory arbitration<br />
– confining it to commercial and international matters of a certain value.<br />
Certainly there are no such restrictions on arbitrations by agreement under<br />
the BCDR-AAA rules (an absence that is particularly conspicuous in light<br />
of the fact that the AAA International Arbitration Rules themselves limit<br />
their application to “international disputes”).<br />
The remarkably broad possibility of excluding all recourse against such<br />
awards before the Bahraini courts (discussed below) perhaps supports the<br />
idea that they should relate to a limited category of parties and subject<br />
matters. It would, however, appear the better view that the legislative decree<br />
and the BCDR-AAA rules should apply to all arbitrations by agreement,<br />
irrespective of the amount in dispute and of whether or not the dispute is<br />
commercial or international.<br />
Global Arbitration Review 27
BAHRAIN<br />
If, however, as is provided for under the legislative decree, another set<br />
of arbitration rules or other sets of arbitration rules are promulgated, the<br />
material scope of the BCDR-AAA rules will be constricted.<br />
When it comes to challenging awards arising from classic BCDR-AAA<br />
arbitrations, it is noteworthy that the list of grounds is so short that it does<br />
not expressly include lack of arbitrability and the improper composition of<br />
the arbitral tribunal. The explanation is probably that these two grounds are<br />
nonetheless bases upon which a challenge can be made, but they are simply<br />
assimilated to aspects of jurisdiction. As has been noted, the arbitral tribunal’s<br />
jurisdiction can be challenged before the Bahrain Court of Cassation. It<br />
seems clear that this includes post-award challenges to jurisdiction.<br />
It is also possible that the composition of the arbitral tribunal is treated<br />
as a matter of jurisdiction, as under English<br />
arbitration law, whereas arbitrability is treated as<br />
a matter of public policy. An award’s repugnance<br />
to public policy is indeed a stipulated ground of<br />
challenge. Much the better approach, practically if<br />
not conceptually, is to treat lack of arbitrability as a<br />
matter of jurisdiction and not public policy, so that<br />
it can be raised at an early stage, and there is no<br />
need to wait till the award to attack it.<br />
The exclusion of challenges: how does it<br />
work?<br />
Perhaps the most important issue arising from<br />
the legislative decree is how its exclusion of all<br />
challenges to the award in an agreed (classic)<br />
arbitration functions. The English translation of<br />
the relevant provision (article 25 of the legislative<br />
decree) says the exclusion applies when “the parties<br />
have agreed in writing to choose a foreign law<br />
concerning the dispute”. The question is what<br />
law is being referred to: the law applying to the<br />
arbitration clause, the substantive law, the procedural<br />
law, or even the lex arbitrii more broadly?<br />
The original Arabic is apparently of no greater<br />
determinacy, by accident or design.<br />
The law applicable to an arbitration agreement is of little significance in<br />
attaching an arbitration to a legal order. Moreover, it serves the precise and<br />
circumscribed purpose of aiding the interpretation of the arbitration clause.<br />
It therefore seems unlikely that the choice of a foreign law to govern the<br />
arbitration clause determines whether or not the right to challenge an award<br />
is excluded.<br />
As for the law of the contract – that is, the law applicable to substantive<br />
matters – this is functionally distinct and isolated from aspects of the award<br />
which might cause a state to make a challenge available. In arbitration there<br />
is notably little concern with the substantive accuracy of the award, which is<br />
why appeals on the merits are almost universally excluded. This too, then, is<br />
unlikely to be the law referenced in the exclusion clause.<br />
It would be incoherent to read the provision as referring to a choice<br />
of lex arbitrii in a broad sense – since, if none of the Bahraini lex arbitrii<br />
applies then the legislative decree, with its exclusionary rule, does not itself<br />
apply.<br />
Götaverken<br />
What the legislator may be contemplating in excluding parties’ jurisdiction<br />
to review arbitral awards in this way is the Paris Court of Appeal’s line of<br />
thinking in the famous Götaverken decision of 21 February 1980. In that<br />
decision the Paris court refused to accept jurisdiction to review an ICC<br />
award rendered in Paris on the basis that there was nothing linking the<br />
arbitration to France (the stipulated place of arbitration being insufficient for<br />
these purposes). According to the court, it is only when French law is the<br />
law of the arbitration proceedings (la loi de la procédure arbitrale) that French<br />
Perhaps the most<br />
important issue<br />
arising from the<br />
legislative decree is<br />
how its exclusion of<br />
all challenges to the<br />
award in an agreed<br />
arbitration functions<br />
courts will accept jurisdiction to review arbitral awards. The mere choice<br />
of France as the place of arbitration creates no more than a rebuttable<br />
presumption that French law is the law of the arbitration proceedings.<br />
It is true that it does not necessarily follow from the parties’ choice of<br />
place of arbitration that they have selected the law of that place to govern<br />
the arbitration. Indeed, the text of the New York Convention (article<br />
V(e)) seems to make a distinction between the two. To admit and apply<br />
this distinction, however, sacrifices the legal predictability that comes from<br />
equating the place of arbitration and the law governing the proceedings.<br />
If the law excluding review has been understood correctly in this<br />
article, Bahrain appears not to be plagued by this concern. Unless the<br />
parties expressly stipulate a foreign law to govern their arbitration, then it is<br />
assumed, from their choice of Bahrain as the place of<br />
arbitration, that Bahraini law governs the procedure.<br />
Therefore actions for review of the award lie with<br />
the Bahraini court.<br />
Review available somewhere else?<br />
Götaverken raises a second concern relating to<br />
the Bahraini exclusion of review of awards. If a<br />
foreign law may be chosen to govern an arbitration<br />
proceeding taking place in Bahrain, how much<br />
Bahraini arbitration law will continue to apply? And<br />
at what point do you cease to apply one and start to<br />
apply the other?<br />
Because only the (written) choice of a foreign<br />
law to govern the arbitral proceedings will exclude<br />
Bahraini review of the award, it will almost always<br />
be the case that review will be available at the place<br />
of that foreign law, as well as at the enforcement<br />
stage. Consequently, this provision of the legislative<br />
decree does not appear straightforwardly to exclude<br />
all review of arbitration awards as Belgian law<br />
automatically did for a time, and as parties to Swiss<br />
arbitration can still do by unambiguous agreement.<br />
Moreover it does not appear possible, under<br />
this Bahraini provision, to exclude some but not<br />
all grounds of review – unless, for example, the parties chose Swiss law to<br />
govern their arbitration and then expressly excluded certain grounds of<br />
review under Swiss arbitration law.<br />
BCDR-AAA: THE ENDURING IMPACT?<br />
What is most striking about the new Bahraini instruments relating to<br />
arbitration is how confidently and maturely they embrace the quintessential<br />
non-interventionism of modern arbitration. Comparisons will certainly be<br />
made with the DIFC-LCIA system, and it is true that there are similarities.<br />
In both cases, Gulf states have created structures which will deliver expertise<br />
on the practical workings of state-of-the-art modern arbitration. In Dubai,<br />
there is the immediate advantage of the finest judicial supervision of<br />
arbitrations and review of arbitration awards available around the globe.<br />
In Bahrain, on the other hand, experienced local judges will continue to<br />
supervise classic arbitrations by agreement, and will only review awards<br />
proceeding from them if there is no exclusion of all review at the place of<br />
arbitration because of a certain detachment of the award from the Bahraini<br />
legal order.<br />
Local Bahraini judges will also benefit from deciding substantive<br />
commercial matters alongside leading international lawyers. And it appears<br />
that, in reviewing statutory arbitration awards, they will also gain familiarity<br />
with the process of reviewing arbitral awards – because of the similarities<br />
between this procedure and modern review of arbitration awards upon<br />
agreement. Perhaps, ultimately, it will be this that has the most enduring<br />
constructive impact in the country.<br />
28 Volume 5 • Issue 1
Brazil breaks traditional stance on BITs<br />
BRAZILIAN BITS<br />
In its recent Brazil focus (Volume 4, issue 6 ) GAR explained how Brazil has traditionally given<br />
investment treaties a wide berth. Since then, we’ve learnt that Brazil has started negotiations<br />
with Chile for a treaty to protect and promote mutual investments. Alison Ross reports<br />
Brazil hasn’t signed a BIT in nearly 20<br />
years. But, early in 2010, that changed.<br />
In an interview for Global Arbitration<br />
Review, Welber Barral, foreign trade<br />
secretary at Brazil’s Ministry of Development,<br />
Industry and Foreign Trade, confirmed that<br />
meetings have taken place between Brazilian<br />
and Chilean officials to discuss something that<br />
very much resembles a BIT, as part of a series of<br />
negotiations on expanding Chile’s engagement<br />
with the Mercosur free-trade agreement and<br />
guaranteeing social security benefits for those<br />
who cross the border to work.<br />
Barral said that the “precise contours”<br />
of the treaty are yet to be agreed but it will<br />
ensure “stable and predictable rules” to govern<br />
investments. In other words, it will work like a<br />
BIT.<br />
Change in attitude<br />
Suzana Medeiros Blades, an associate in the<br />
international arbitration group of Arnold & Porter<br />
LLP in Washington, DC, who closely follows<br />
Brazil’s stance on BITs and has co-written an<br />
article with partner Jean Engelmayer Kalicki on<br />
the topic, is enthusiastic about the development.<br />
But, she says, it remains to be seen whether Brazil<br />
will abandon its traditional reluctance towards<br />
investment arbitration and accept an investorstate<br />
arbitration clause, or insist on a state-state<br />
arbitration clause following Mercosur’s dispute<br />
settlement model.<br />
A state-state clause would mean that<br />
disgruntled investors in either country must rely<br />
on their government to bring a claim on their<br />
behalf – a system that does not differ greatly<br />
from looking to the government for diplomatic<br />
protection.<br />
Nevertheless, Blades says the negotiations<br />
mark a positive change in Brazil’s traditional<br />
attitude to BITs that coincides with increased<br />
investment flows between the two countries and<br />
President Lula’s drive to strengthen ties with other<br />
Latin American countries. As a country that has a<br />
good record of complying with treaty obligations,<br />
she says, Brazil no doubt sees Chile as the perfect<br />
partner for a treaty.<br />
Brazil’s state-run energy producer Petrobras,<br />
in particular, has made significant investments in<br />
Chile in the past year – including the acquisition<br />
of ExxonMobil’s stakes in Esso Chile Petrolera<br />
and associated companies. Brazil also reportedly<br />
wants Chile to invest more in the ethanol industry<br />
and Brazilian technology companies.<br />
Chile, for its part, has investments in Brazil<br />
worth some US$8.4 billion.<br />
Brazil’s BIT record<br />
Although Brazil signed BITs with several<br />
countries – including Chile – in the early 1990s,<br />
it has yet to ratify any of them. Brazil is also one<br />
of the few countries in Latin America that has still<br />
to sign the ICSID Convention. Chile, in contrast,<br />
has signed and ratified both the convention and<br />
some 50 BITs containing investor-state arbitration<br />
provisions.<br />
BITs: which way will Brazil go?<br />
Global Arbitration Review 29