Guyana Historical Journal Volume II, 1990

11olnme

GUY ANA HISTORICAL JOURNAL
IllE GUY ANA HISTORICAL JOURNAL is an interdisciplinary journal of Guyanese
History, published annually by the History Society and the Department of History of the
University of Guyana. The aim of the JOURNAL is to provide a forum for
disseminating historical and related information about Guyana. The JOURNAL also
seeks to publish original source materials, reports and current research and
bibliographic information under its 'Notes and Documents' section. Articles in the
humanities, social sciences and other disciplines, in so far as they possess a hist'orical
dimension, are welcome for publication. Only articles in English will be accepted. They
should be typed double-spaced on white quarto-sized paper, and should be of
reasonable length. Notes, also double-spaced, should be included all together at the
end of the paper.
FUNDING. The Editors gratefully acknowledge the generous grants for the publication
of Volume 1 (1989) from the· following organizations:
* University of Guyana Research and Publications Committee (UGRPq
* Canadian Organisation for Development through Education (CODE).
EDITORIAL BOARD. Winston Mc Gowan, Hazel Woolford and David Granger.
BOARD of TRUSTEES. Joycelynne Loncke,M. Noel Menezes, Winston Mc Gowan
and David Chanderbali.
COMMITTEE of MANAGEMENT. Terrence Simmons, Gillian Bristol, Davika
Sukhari and Jean La Rose.
PRODUCTION SERVICES. This JOURNAL is published by the History Society,
University of Guyana and Printed by A & P Enterprise, Georgetown. Typesetting and
Layout by the Institute of Applied Science and Technology (IAST) and Shirley Seaforth,
typewriting by Merle Thompson, and photography by Edward Rodway.
CORRESPONDENCE. General correspondence, contributions and enquiries about
subscriptions should be addressed to the Editors, GUY ANA HISTORICAL JOURNAL,
Department of History, University of Guyana, P.O. Box 101110, Georgetown,
Guyana. Cheques, money drafts, banker's orders, etc., for subscriptions should be
made payable to the HISTORY SOCIETY. The cost of each issue of the JOURNAL
is US$9.00, including postage.
COVER. The Cover shows a nineteenth century print of a "Street Scene in
Georgetown, Demerara" by the artist, Melton Prior, as published in the
ILLUSTRATED LONDON NEWS of 17 April 1888. The view looks westward at the
intersection of the (present) Avenue of the Republic and Company Path. On the left is
the Hand-in-Hand Insurance Company building; in the background is the tower of the
Post Office building, and on the right is the building called the "Assembly Rooms", the
site of which is now occupied by the Bank of Guyana. The scene shows Africans,
Asians and Europeans, who comprised contemporary Georgetown society.
© 1990 COPYRlGHT DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

1{ournal
:53 6 O··O 0
iiotume l 1
®rornrtown
CONTENTS
l990
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
(i)
(ii)
ARTICLES
Education in the Pre-:Emancipation Period (with Special Reference to the
Colonies which later became British Guiana).
by M.K. Bacchus .... - ............. ·-····················........... l - 28
East Indian Political Representation in British Guiana During the Latter Part
of Indenture, 1890-1917.
by Tyran Ramnarine................................................. 29 - 46
The Coming of Crown Colony Government to British Guiana in 1928.
byJamesRose .......................................... ·-··········· 47 - 67
" ... And So They've Captured Demerara .... " A Preliminary Investigation of
United States of America - Guiana Relations During the Second World War.
by Roberta Walker-Kilkenny.:........................... 68 - 79
DOCUMENTS
A Bibliography of Works by Walter Rodney
compiled by Laurette Telford ......................... ,~ ....... . 80 - 88
Goldstone Hall Estate, Berbice. 1845: Correspondence Between An Absentee
Proprietor and Attorney. ·
with an introduction by M. Noel Menezes..................... 89 - 105
REVIEW
Basdeo Mangru, Benevolent Neutrality: Indian Government Policy and Labour
Migration to British Guiana 1854-1884, (London: Hansib Publishing Limited,
1987),pp,287.
by Tota Mangar ..................................... Y••• ••• ••• •• • •• 106 - 110
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS ...................................... .
(i)
AV r-l L ASL.E
NS
l},!,~4. 1

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The publishers gratefully acknowledge the contributions of the following
organizations and corporations towards the printing of the History Gazette and
the Guyana Historical Journal in 1990:
Air Services Limited
Associated Industries Limited
Canadian Organization for Development through Education
Demerara Distillers Limited
Demerara Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited
Demerara Tobacco Company Limited
Dharamdeo Sawh Limited
Wm. Fogarty Limited
T. Geddes Grant (Guyana) Limited
Georgetown Seafoods Limited
Goodwood Racing Services
Guyana Bank for Trade and Industry
Guyana Cooperative Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank
Guyana Cooperative Insurance Services
Guyana Cooperative.Mortgage Finance Bank
Guyana Geology and·Mines Commission
Guyana National Cooperative Bank
Guyana National Cooperative Bank Trust Corporation
Guyana National Engineering Corporation
Guyana Pegasus Limited
Guyana Refrigerators Limited and Industrial, Domestic & Electrical Appliances
Limited
Guyana Rice Export Board
Guyana Stores Limited
Guyana Telecommunications Corporation
Guyana and Trinidad Mutual Fire & Life Group of Companies
Hand-in-Hand Mutual Fire & Life Insurance Company Limited
National Bank of Industry and Commerce
National Insurance Scheme
New Building Society
Office of the President of the Republic of Guyana
Sanata Tex.tiles Limited
Shell Antilles and Guianas Limited
University of Guyana Research and Publications Committee r::-:-::-:-----­
A V ,4 L
{ii)
NS
8,Jl; Jiv
li',,

EDUCATION IN THE PRE-EMANCIPATION PERIOD
(With Special Reference to the Colonies which later became British Guiana)
by
M,K. Bacchus
The challenge to the Spanish monopoly of the New World led to efforts by other
European nations to explore,trade,and establish settlements in the Caribbean
region. One of the most well-known of these was the attempt by Sir Walter Raleigh
to find the Golden City of El Dorado,somewhere up the Orinoco River ,an effort
which eventually led to exploration of the area that later became part of British
Guiana,now Guyana. This was followed by the establishment of settlements in the
area bythe Dutch. Despite the general lack of interest in education by these early
settlers, those in Essequibobrought in a teacher around 1685 to provide for the
religious education of their children. Some years later a clergyman, along with a
clerk and schoolmaster ,arrived in Berbice to minister to the educational and
religious needs of the young in that settlement. But such educational activities were
directed mainly at the children of a few whites.
The rise of the sugar industry saw a dramatic change in the ethnic composition
of the population,with the arrival in the region of large numbers of slaves from
Africa. Between the 1660's and 1670's, blacks in the region outnumbered whites
by two to one and by 1791, the ratio had risen to over eight to one,while later,in
British Guiana, there were twenty black slaves to each white man. The changed
composition of the population resulted in a stratificatory system based mainly on
legal status and shades of colour and the distribution of educational opportunities
on the same basis:
The most powerful members of these societies were the "primary" whites,
among whom were the sugar planters who wielded almost absolute authority over
almost every aspect of life and every other group in these colonies. The primary
whites dominated the local legislative assemblies and the electoral roll comprised
those who largely depended on the plantocracy for their livelihood. As late as
1850,British Guiana still had only 916 registered voters in a population of 128,000.
This led Clementi to condude·that the electorate then "consisted almost exclusively
of the adult male population of the European race who formed 11 % of the total
adult male population of the Colony" . 1 1

In commenting on the position which these primary whites held in Guiana,Dalton
observed that:
the other elements of society moved around the planter as their centre ... his power was
most general .... The few tradesmen who there existed ... looked up to him for employment
and pay. The merchants were but too happy to partake of his patronage. The professional
man had no other prospect of subsistence or of acquiring wealth except through his
influence;and civil officers appointed to administer the public functions of the Colony found
his hospitality so tempting and agreeable, that they were studious of keeping on the best
possible tenns with him.2
Below these were the "secondary" whites who consisted of clerks, book-keepers,
and artificers of various kinds, such as millwrights, carpenters, masons, and
coppersmiths. They constituted the lower stratum of white society and many were
engaged, with the help of the slaves, in the maintenance and construction work on
the sugar estates. Among the whites there was little demand for education, one of
the reasons being that those who were ambitious and hard-working,and the not
too morally scrupulous,had opportunities for upward social and economic
mobility, even though they might not have been formally educated. Nevertheless,
some of the primary whites did send their offspring to Europe to receive an
education.
This situation changed but slowly and there continued to a be a "'general apathy
of col~nis~.1'2~~!:2~,~,oo~~J:i ot~r~tt1r~," This, ~sJ~i:~~r.noteg-t~WaSev1oon{:ea
botn 6ylfie paucity of6ook . ... rs . in the Caribbea,nand byJhe successiv~J[11\lre
o~t;~wnettr~r in?a1'nait 0 ;B?rbados,Anfigua~

the social and economic acceptance and integration which logically derived from his
education and culture. [HisJ was a demand to enjoy all the rights and privileges of the
planter class on equal terms in view of his education, his cultural attainments and his
evident industry . 5
In some cases, the white fathers of some coloured offspring also had their
mulatto children educated in Europe. For example, Wolfert Katz,a large property
owner in Berbice,was reported to have sent one of his illegitimate coloured sons to
attend an English university, while another was living in Norfolk,England, studying
agriculture. In fact,all the members of the Council of Government in that Colony
were said to have had illegitimate coloured children receiving an education in
Britain in order that they might qualify for positions in Berbice on their return. 6 ".
Initially, the attempts by the coloureds at status improvement through education
were often rebuffed by whites. Dalton,writing at a much later historical period
about this problem in British Guiana.observed that:
Many young men and women of colour were sent to Europe and brought back again with
an excellent education and polished manners.in the hope of meeting the reception to
which theinespectability entitled them. Their expectations were frequently frustrated and
disappointment and mortification were the only results of their effort to improve their
condition. They found, to their dismay that,in spite of their high connections,and the
refinements they had acquired,they were still excluded from what was considered the 'first
society' and thus deomed to solitary sedusion or to descend to inferior intercourse. 7
In the colony of Berbice, the coloureds even petitioned the Governor to protest
their exclusion from the commissioned ranks of the militia. They argued that
neither their education, their attainments, nor their efforts had succeeded in
elevating them tothe same level as their fellow colonists who were white. But when
the Governor tried in 1822 to improve this situation by appointing three coloured
men to the commissioned ranks in the coloured Companies of the local militia, the
whites protested vigorously against the move. This situation,however,gradually
changed and the position of the free coloureds began to improve. By 1823,
marriage between whites and free coloureds in Ber bite was said to be a "not
uncommon event" and mixed partners were even introduced and admitted into
"first" society. 8 Therefore,in 1845,the Governor of British Guiana could report that
in the colony:
There are a few rich men among the coloured race;marriages between Europeans and
coloured women are not infrequent... One of the members of the College of Kiezers is a
coloured man;there have been coloured men in the financial body;several are members of
the Town Council;[others have been] made Justices of the Peace, fully in proportion to
their positions;there are medical men, regular and Ucentiates. One of my aides-de-camp is
coloured, well educated and with such advantages of manners and wealth as entitled him to
that distinction. I selected him voluntarily [for his present position] ... There are coloured
men among the Commissaries of Taxation,in the Registrar's Office.and office of the
Government Secrelary;there are coloured attorneys-at-law; the bar is open to them,the
Church also,if qualified ... The public and private offices give employment to many persons;
the gaolers at New Amsterdam arid Capoey are coloured. 9
Education among the Slaves
The planters generally did not want their slaves to receive an education and there
were many reasons for this. First,while education primarily performs the
3

conservative function ofhelping to maintain the status quo,it also can have a
liberating or potentially destablizing effect on the thinking of some who benefit
from it. Thus,in addition to passing on the values, belief systems,and attitudinal
dispositions which are needed to give support to an existing social order,education
can also open up new horizons among its recipients. Bearing in mind that "fear of
revolt was a brooding omnipresence in the daily lives of the planter class, " 10 they
considered it dangerous to allow slaves to acquire ideas which were likely to lead
them to chafe more heavily under their existing conditions of bondage. It was
therefore not surprising that they were unwilling to allow their slaves to receive any
kind of formal schooling.
In Guiana,the Rev: John Smith noted that the planters considered the teaching
of slaves to be "an impolitick measure", and one of the reasons why,they objected
to the slaves being taught to read was the realisation that reading provokes thinking
and this was dangerous in a slave society 11 • Hence,·education or knowledge and
slaverywere deemed incompatible. Ignorance, on the other hand, was Hkely to
prevent the·aspiration of slaves.from rising and their feelings of deprivation from
increasing,
Secondly, slave owners' objections to the education of their slaves were also
artly due to the fear that, once they had acquired literacy 'skills, e~JI.Y in
ish it would become even more difficult to m9nitgrJb~iracc~ssi~tnW,g)Urces
, . fean1ed'Jo'''ieacf?i~ . '"~tf~~YtJR!t}{a:~:t;~d~
oftlie'aoo .. 1
''"'efforts
.. 1on1s. s .1.n .. ng and! ~n9 sl~veiy :. s!11

· and also allow them to communicate more readily with each other,thereby making
it easier for them to plan any uprising. There were Mandingo slaves who were
educated in Arabic and one of them was reported by Edwards to be able to
write, "with great beauty and exactness,the Arabic alphabet" and read passages
from the Koran 15 • There must have been others like him, but this did not bother
the slave owners very much because it was not a language shared by many other
slaves on an estate.
A fourth reason for the planters' objections to the general or religious education
of slaves was that most of them had a great distrust for the work particularly of the
evangelical missionaries, who were becoming active in this field. They felt that if
some checks were not put on their activities they could prove "subversive to good
order." Therefore, while the teaching of Christianity to slaves was not forbidden, it
was often "violently resisted" by the slave owners. The planters realised the
potential dangers of introducing slaves to the concept of" equality of all men" in
the sight of God because they felt that this might eventually lead them to question
not only the gross inequalities in these societies, but also the moral right of one
individual to own and exploit others who were their spiritual equals. The Colonist,
a newspaper which was published in British Guiana, exQressed the concerns of the
planters when it observed that: "It is not a matter of surprise that a Negro slave
who is taught that all men are equal from a religious point of view should wish the
same principle to prevail in politics. " 16
The missionary societies were aware that some of the owners of slaves were, to
say the least, "unfriendly" to the instruction provided by their agents and felt that
such preaching might be "endangering the public peace and safety." So they
usually instructed their missionaries to say nothing that would make the slaves
displeased with their masters and become discontented with, or hope for an
amelioration of, their existing conditions,not to mention emancipation. But despite
the cautious approach adopted· by most missionaries, the planters still held strongly
to the vie':V that their work, especially that of the "dissenting" missionaries, was a
threat to social order and stability. The planters tended to believe that "the
preaching and teaching of the religious sects ... had the effect of producing in the
minds o,! the slaves a beliefthat they could not serve both a spiritual and a temporal
master. 17
The leaders of the 19th century slave rebellions indeed tended to be from among
the more.educated and religiously active members of the slave community. For
example., the 1823 East Coast Demerara Slave .Jnsurrection was spearheaded by
some of the senior and trusted members of Rev. John Smith's Bethel Chapel.
where it was .said that the "mischief" was plotted. The 1831 Slave Revolt i~
Jamaica was le

advocates of missions and educatiori for the sla':.es. He pointed out that these
aatocales should fiave been fo@that the missionary system is,in fact,underminin~
I
the institutions and endangering the political existence of the colonies.
Continu. ing,the. edit.or i icated the need to keep the Africans ung_ducate·d ..• and
su ested th"' "while w no esir · m \ · n · our ... we
cannot be i norant Io t t t ower v,:>r them can exist only solon as
W • , ·. 18
Coleridge,in his six-month visit to the WesUndies in 1825, summed up the
planters' dilemma ln the matter of the education of the slaves thus:
If the planters attempt to educate the slave, they do little for their own safety in persisting
to debar him from the privileges to which he would soon fee! that he has acquired an
equitable right. It will be impossible to march Negroes on the road to kno•..vledge and
compel them to stand at ease within the old entrenchments of ignorance. 19
He was very perceptive about the planters' concern that the education of the
slaves was likely to add another disequilibrating element to the social order, since it
would raise their levels of aspirations which, if not met,would have serious
disruptive effects on the society.
Finally, the planters also had a direct economic interest ifl not wanting slave
children to attend school. Even at the early age of six, slave children were already
workingin.the grass gangs, making an economic contribution which was probably
enough to cover the expenses involved in their upkeep. If they were sent to school,
the planters would have to bear that part of the cost of their education which would
havetresulted from their lost contribution to production. Also, since every effort was
made to inculcate "'good work habits" among these young slaves, it was thought
that sending them to school might have had the opposite effect. As Gordon noted:
Keeping slaves busy was one of the most reliable means of keeping them acquiescent. The
principle was applied early in the life of a slave born child;schooling would have been a
contradiction of the whole system. 20
But it is not quite accurate to say that the planters were totally opposed to any
instruction to the slaves,if this was in their own economic interest. Sugar
production required a more skilled Jabour force than tobacco or cotton cultivation,
and most of the trained artisans needed by the plantations were at first recruited
fromabroad.Not only was it becomin~ more difficult to obtain a sufficient supply of
these skilled artisans at a "reasonable cost,but as early as the seventeenth century
plantation owners,"for the reason of economy,convenience and having an assured
labour supply at hand," encouraged the training of slaves in a variety of skilled
occupations. In fact, it was noted that many planters had com~ "to prefer blacks
from Africa to whites from the British Isles,not just to work in ltie fields but for all
kinds of labour, " 21
The Educational Work of the Missionary Societies
Despite the opposition to their work,the missionary societies became increasingly
involved in the education of the black population,including the slaves. By the
1820's, there was a spate of missionary activities in the West Indies ·which--

contributed to a §.ubstao1;iahncrease in ~tio..n~Jlscili!i£~Jhr2;1gi;!9_ut the region.
The number of Anglican cha~ols within~djQc.~~g,.Q[6arbados, which
i.,tfoded tl1~~~~ncreased
from 2 in 1812 to 34 in
1825,and thento 405 by 1834 - an increase of nearly 122 per cent per annum
duringlhese nine years.
Following their initial efforts,the Moravians expanded their activities to Antigua
(1756), Barbados (1765), St. Kitts(1777),Tobago(l 789),and St. Thomas. Two
Moravian brothers were also invited to Berbice in 1738,but they were regarded
with such distrust by the planters and the Directors of the Berbice Association,who
were particularly fearful of slave insurrections, that they moved to a more remom
location to work among the Amerindians. This was despite the fact that their
educational activities were focussed simply on the teaching of the catechisms and
Bible studies.
The London Missionary Society (LM.S.), founded in 1795, considered the
' establishment of a "mission for the poor blacks" a few years after being formed and
in 1808 sent out the Rev. John Wray to Demerara and Richard Elliot to Tobago to
start their missionary work, especially among the slaves. Later,other missionaries
were sent to Guiana,induding the Rev. John Davies wno helped to establish an
Indian village up the Essequibo River and was in charge of a school which had an
enrollment of over 40 pupils, including the children of the soldiers and Government
slaves.
Wray, with the support of the Dutch planter Hermanus Poi;t, soon established a
school for black children at Le Ressouvenir, where the daily attendance was about
20. But despite his advocacy for better treatment of slaves, Post, like other
planters, did not want them to be taught to read. Five years later, Wray was
transferred to Berbice to start another mission, and the school he established there
soon had an enrollment of 80 students, mainly slaves. Mrs. Wray also was engaged
in teaching, devoting some time each day to instructing the children of the
wealthier class. In this she was later assisted by her daughter who had returned
from attending a "respectable boarding school" in England.
The Rev. John Smith succeeded Wray in Demerara and worked actively among
the slaves, even teaching them how to read. But he was later accused of, and
court-martialled for, complicity in the East Coast Slave Insurrection of 1823.
Following this incident, members of the white community in Georgetown passed a
resolution which stated that they considered it their "bounded duty ... to· oppose
and resist, ... the establishment in this Colony, of sectaries of any description, and
more particularly those of the London Missionary Society. " 22 The Rev. Elliot, who
worked for the Society on the West Coast of Demerara, was also forced to flee the
country because of the persecution he experienced fo1lowing the insurrection. After
this incident, which ended in Smith's incarceration and death in prison,no
representative of.the Society was left in the Colony.
The L.M.S. waited for a few years before it began sending out new missionaries
to Guiana. Possibly as a result of Rev. Smith's fate, these agents were even more
cautious than their predecessors in their educational work among the slaves,
refraining from teaching them to read and concentrating on their moral and
spiritual development. Nevertheless.the work of the L.M.S. continued, though
7

without any spectacular success. It had a limited number schools in the colony
and four chapters,one each in Georgetovm and Le Ressouvenir, another elsewhere
in the Essequibo/Demerara colonyand a fourth in Berbice. By 1833, there were
five LM.S. missionaries in the country and inthat year one of them ,the Rev.
Joseph Ketley, was noting that progress with his work was slow, with membership
of the Society in his district being only 230. However in 1834, John Wray, who
continued to work in the colony until his death in 1837, had 401 children attending
his chapel school in New Amsterdam, 66 adults in Sabbath school, 20 children at
infant schools, 40 at the Winckel day school. The LM.S. was also operating
two boarding schools for Aboriginal Indians. The children there were given "a plain
education" and later the boys were apprenticed to various trades of their choice,
while the girls were instructed in plain needlework, cookery, washing, and other
household duties,probably in preparation for domestic service. In 1837, Mr.and
Mrs. Parrish arrived in New Amsterdam,Berbice,to work as a team in a new
school-the British School- which admitted pupils of different sects.
In 1799, the Anglicans also established the Church Missionary Society (C.M.S.}
to work specifically among the stave population,.which the S.P.G., the established
evangelical annof the Church of England,had failed to do. It)ater sent catechists
to Demerara/Essequibo and by the turn of the nineteenth ~entury it had begun to
work in places like Jamaica where. it built schools and churches for the lower
classes. In 1788, the Methodists began operating in Barbado'S with the primary
intention also being to work with slaves. They established their first chapel in
Jamaica aroµnd 1790, and by 1820 had over 59 missionaries stationed
throughout most of the West Indian islands stretching from Jamaica to Trinidad
and Tobago. The first Methodist missionary who went to Demerara in 1805 was
refused permission to stay when he informed the Governor that he intended to
instruct the slaves in Christianity. But three years later they succeeded in starting
their work in this colony also.
The Changing Attitude of Planters to the Education of the Slaves
One of the obsery~!>le deYel9.P~~.t1!s -~~rJ11Kth~Jhe period.Just prior. to
~ation~~c'!S.~-.cbangm~lp.mfµqgcif spmeplante~ .. to the .. edµ

ical
- ... JJSr, .lJ~. d Of
,. . . . . < - . , " e!:l,J~uiredof,Jhe.~slac\1.es. There was growing evidence
7
lfiafmany o tHose"'wJio"were given a "good"Christian education tended to become
docile and to develop a more positive attitude to their work
A few estate owners even began requesting the use of Harte's Lectures which
were to be read to their slaves. These lectures were originally delivered by the Rev.
William Marshall Harte to the Negro population in Barbados and published in
1824. In them, he argued that poverty was no proof that God did not care for the
poor and urged them,particularly the poor Negroes,to "submit yourselves to all
your governors, spiritual pastors and masters and order yourselves lowly and
reverently to all your betters," as a matter of duty, since this would please God. He
continued by suggesting that;"we are, all of us,placed in different stations of life,and
we must do the duties of those stations, whether they be high or low. In the next
world we shall receive reward. or punishment,according as we behave here. " 24
In addition to the obseivations by individual clergymen,missionary societies were
themselves beginning to comment on this attitudinal change among the
planters,observing that:
The advantage resulting to the planters from the Negroes being instructed in the Gospel
and becoming 'truly converted to God' seems to be gradually acknowledged and the
proprietors who formerly disliked our work and even opposed their slaves going to
church.now encourage them to attend. 25
This gradually changing attitude to the education of slaves on the part of some
planters was also reflected in the colonial legislatures. For example,ir.i 1827, the
Governor of Berbice put forward to the Legislative Council a proposal for the
establishm(}nt of a free school. It involved the granting of 6,000 guilders "out of the
ordinary revenue of the Colony"and to this sum were to be added the private
donations which were solicited from inhabitants in the colony. The concern of the
Council in approving this requestfor a grant towards education was the
"ignorance"which pervaded among the "lower ranks" in the society,and the school
was seen as a means of "extending the blessings of education to them, at a price to
reach all but the poorest and to them also, with assistance from those of better
conditions. " 26 But while these provisions were meant to extend to the lower
classes,they were not specifically made available for the slave population.
However,when it became evident that Abolition was on the horizon,some planters
started to place even more reliance on the religious education of the slaves as one
means by which they could be inculcated with the virtues of obedience, discipline,
and respect for property.
A number of factors brought about this changing attitude on the part of the
planters and legislatures. First, it was becoming clear to them that the British
9

Government was moving inexorably toward the emancipation of the slaves and
that they were powerless to prevent it,especiaHy in the view of the growing support
for such a move in Britain itselL Some more far-sighted planters, therefore,began
to direct their attention to the question of how to maintain most of the basic
economic and social relationships which characterized slave society and which
were buttressed by a legal system that sanctioned the raw use of coercive power as
the major means ofmaintaining social order,when the legal support which
buttressed the system was withdrawn.
The importance of the support provided by the coercive mechanisms of the
State to ensure stability or social order in these societies was well
recognized.especially by the planters. As Professor Goveia noted, since most
slaves:
were regarded as property rather than persons ... every effort was made by use of the
sanctions of force, law and.habit to ensure that they were kept subservient to the master
class of whites. 27 \
To help cope with whatwa\; seen as an emerging problem,that is,controlling the
black. population· without the legal sanctions which the State could enforce, the
planters took a number of measures aimed at preventing tbe Negro population
from severing their links with, and their dependency on, the the sugar estates, even
after they were emancipated. For example, they began to destroy the provision
grounds and fruit trees which belonged to the plantations and which might have
been a source of food supplies for those who we.re emancipated. Further, in
territories where land was available, the planters either refused to seil some of it to
the ex-slaves for agricultural purposes or charged them very high.prices,making it
difficult for an economically vibrant peasantry to' develop. Adamson,writing about
the situation British Guiana,observed that:
What the planters really feared was a peasantry independent of the sugar economy .... As
early as 1833 Viscount Howick proposed to discourage a drift of free slaves to provision
grounds by taxing lands not producing for export. Three years later Lord Glenelg,then
secretary of state.for war and colonies,laid down a policy to regulate the labour market by
controlling the sale of crown iands. These were to be alienated in minimum parcels of 100
acres only and at a price that wouk:I discourage peasant settlement. 28
There were other steps taken, also before slavery was formally abolished, to help
ensure this continued dependence of the black population on the white sugar
planters. One of these,as Coleridge indicated, was an attempt to create a "moral
cause"for labour which would make it easier to abandon the "physical cause"on
which itthen rested. It was in pursuit of this goal that the planters saw the
possibility of using religion and education to build up voluntaristic support among
the black masses for the possible emergence of a new social order which they
hoped would rest on much the same economic and social foundations as slave
society.
While there was this obvious shift in the attitudes of the planters toward the
education of the Negro population, there was a certain amount of consistency in
the overall objective which they shared both before and after this seeming
attitudinal change. At first, the planters tried to denyJhe slaves access to education
because it was felt that the outcome was likely to produce social instability, which
10

Outcomes of the Education Offered by the Missionaries
The outcomes of the work ofthe missionaries were not always predictable. The
slaves did not abandon their hopes of freedom as a result of the religiol:Js education
they received, but it was more likely that the opposite development took place. The
teach1ngs of the missionaries were made somewhat more credible to the slave by
tlie fact that they came from a class "superior to hims,elf," but this sometimes
caused hlm to chafe more heavily under his own yoke. Even though the
missionaries continued to stress to the slaves the importance of duty and obedience
to their masters,slavery "began gradually to be felt {by them) as a wrong and an
opprobrium, a yoke too hara to be borne patiently. " 2 • Despite denials to the
contrary,one of the latent outcomes of the education provided by the missionaries
was to rai;;e the slaves' aspirations and hope for freedom.
A more balanced assessment of their work would be that, in cases where
religious education was provided,it was fairly, though not altogether,effective in
socializing the slaves to accept their existing place in society and restraining them
from rebelllng against the system. As Bums suggested:
there is little doubt ... that it was the influence of these missionaries which restrained the
slav. es, during the pre-emancipation revolts in Demerara and Jamaica,and ensured that
emancipation in 1834,and the abolition of apprenticeship in 1838,were free from serious
disturbances. 30
Nevertheless,many planters continued to be negative to the religious education
provided by the missionaries. The planters always believed that they were virtually
sleeping on the edge of a volcano," and this was reflected in their reaction to any
attempt to >disturb the status quo,including the efforts by the missionaries to
educate the slaves about the teachings of Christiatlity. One can almost say that Rev.
John Smith's fate in the local courts was \ealed"because of the fact that the leaders
of the East Coast Slave Insurrection were the chief men in Bethel Chapel, where he
preached. After the uprising of 1823,thefeetings of the colonists against the
missionaries ran so high that at a public meeting it was resolved "that the Court of
Policy,be forthwith petitioned to expel all missionaries from the colony,and that a
law be passed prohibiting the admission of any missionar:y preachers into this
colony for the future. " 31 11

Despite the fact that the planters' feelings against the missionaries ran
high.Dalton was nevertheless correct when he indicated that the colonists were
misguided in calling for a prohibition of all missionaries from the colony of
Demerara/Essequibo on the assumption that:
by exduding the missionaries,they could succeed in extinguishing the desire for knowledge and freedom
amongst the negroes. The desire once awakened is not to be 3
'1fpressed by penal enactments ... the slave
needed no teacher to make him aspire to the blessings of liberty.
The Content of Education Prior to Emancipation
The next question to which attention will be directed is "what was taught to the
black population prior to ?mancipation?" The majorobj~ctiveof the educsttion

slave owners in this matter. example,the London Missionary Society's
instruction to its field personnel, such as the Rev. John Wray and the Rev. John
Smith, involved a strict injunction not to teach reading and writing to the slaves,
and the Shipman's Catechism was specifically designed to promote Christianity
without the need for reading skills. The Church of England also told its missionaries
that if the planters disapproved of their young slaves being taught to read, ~it must
be given up and you must endeavour to instruct them in the rudiments of
Christianity without that advantage [i.e., of reading] in the best manner you can. " 33
But despite the official stance taken by the parent societies,a number of the
missionaries did not abide by their instructions and continued with their efforts at
teachin~ the slaves to read. For example,the Rev. John Wray of the L.M.S.taught ft'·
reading by stealth"and in 1820,he reported that out of a total school enrollment of
84,he had 60 slave chikiren to whom he was teaching reading. In 1833, Charles
Thwaite sent Wray' s school a supply of reading and other educational materials and
apparatus,no doubt to help with his task of teaching reading to his pupils. In
1810,one John Davies had requested a shipment of Murray Spellers,indicating that
he too was engaged in teaching pupils to read,slnce spelling was considered a
prerequisite for reading. In 1814,he made a request for copper plates for
teaching"the Layford System of Writing" and also produced the first set of printed
materials in Georgetown for teaching Negroes and slaves-materials which
consisted of detailed reading lessons.
Additional evidence that reading was taught fairly regularly by the missionaries
comes from the information pertaining to requests for reading -materials which
were. constantty·being. made by missiona~-The Bible Socie coo _@!~:~L~gively
~~~fil~~lli~~;t;,,f~~-iAii~Jica,fibds~~~
of'~ibJes,pame.
~~,~~~t;!!~~i~:
~on:i_,~L · . · , tq WhichJhe ~i~ty. n~spo~d~ ~tfi alac~t~CAU
watched too closely by the slave owners,had to use oral means of instruction only.
But others who did not face this fredicament still provided religious instruction by
oral means because of the lack o an adequate supply of books and partlv because
teaching all students to read presented an" Herculean task",which could not have
been undertaken With the limited amount of human resources available.
()'.)
\ i1
The ible became not on the ideal sour · cial, "' r ~
~were ·- b~ \ fJ;\~
~~~=ts~~:=~OOto~;~~ \
this was usually followed by their copying of such· "scripturally based exhortations"
as "Six days may work be done," and "See that ye fall not out by the way." All these
. exercises helped to develop and consolidate the reading skills of the students. In
13

,~.· instances where reading was not directly taught, individuals caught it almost by a
look-and-say method. Having learned parts of the scripture by oral instruction,
they began to match words with the corresponding symbols in the Bible, and by
putting sound and symbols together taught themselves to read. As a result of these
various efforts, literacy was said to have been on the increase among the black
\ population in the West Indies.
The Focus of the Educational Materials Used in Schools
The major aim of the missionaries was to secure the moral elevation and spiritual
salvation of the slaves, to teach them to accept unquestioningly their present
position, and to work conscientiously in whatever tasks they were assigned by their
masters. These goals were therefore usually reflected in the educational materials
which were chosen or prepared for use in the schools. In other words, the
education that was to be given was to be in the perceived spiritual interest of the
slaves and the economic interest of their masters. The teachers therefore tended to
focus on such topics as were considered necessary and suitable for those who were
enslaved. This was generally in accordance with the then dominant views about
education for the poor, which stated that "the working poor's knowledge ought
never to be extended beyond what relates to their calling. " 36 Because of the
overriding concern for the moral rehabilitation of the slaves, the teaching of secular
subjects was frowned upon by the planters as a waste of time and resources. The
materials used for instructional purposes therefore usually contained
scripturally-based themes with strong moral exhortation to the students to work
hard, practice virtue and abstain from vice. They also posed practical problems
which the students were likely to face in everyday life and indicated how these
could be resolved by the application of sound Christian principles.
The sentences and passages selected for teaching students~Jo.iea4"we-i:Et
thereforetnose· writch werecon.S1dered a pnontrufhs~and .they were .. usually
~~~rfa~~~:~~'J·J!1;~~~~~~~~~~~~~iiij~~~~:~fil~s~~
~~~~~.;1~~1uf!~~~~ofuRiW:~=d~~~s~~o6n .. ~1ow.~e
A high look and a proud heart is sin.
Buy the truth and sell it not.
Lord make me know mine end that
I ay know how frail I am. 37
Th catechism was one of the most popular of those used in the region
and w e was developed for the children of the poor in England,it was
considered useful for both young and adult slaves. It f0t..-...issed on providing answers
to such complex issues as the origin of man and his moral obligations, the aim
being to "wed religious,social·and moral truths"into a "necessary order." Shipman's
Catechism, which was used by the Wesleyans,gives an idea of the questions raised
and the answers provided.
I )
14

Question: What sort of place is hell?
Answer: A dark bottomless pit full of fire and brimstone
{for the transgressors).
Question: Will both souls and body be tormented?
Answer: Yes, every part of them at once.
Question: How will their bodies be tormented?
Answer: By lying and burning in flaming fire.
Question: How long will this torment last?
Answer: Forever. 38
A few attempts were made to overcome the question of inelevance of the
materials used by produdng some of them locally. But even these, such as the
materials produced by the Rev. John Davies in.GeorgetG>wn, had a heavy religious
and moral. orientation and stressed both the benefits of Christianity to the slaves
and the importance for them to abide by the wishes of their masters. The Rev.
John Wray produced a booklet which attempted to give answers to questions
which were considered relevant to the slaves. The section dealing with The Duties
of Servants and Slaves to Their Masters and Mistresses and Managers indicates
that the missionaries tried to inculcate in the slaves complete obedience to their
owners and respect for their property. The following are two questions and
answers from the· booklet:
Question: Suppose a servant or slave meets with an
unfeeling master does that lessen the duty of respect?
Answer: By no means for it is the command of God,
1 Peter 2:18-19, "Servants shall be subject to
their masters with all fear·.
Question: What is the duty of servants as to the
property of their masters?
Answer: To keep from and watch against the sin of
theft, waste and. negligence.and to be as careful
of their master's property as if it were
their own: 39
While the content of most of the teaching materials used locally was often
outside the experience of the students, one of the latent functions of some
materials used was to develop among the black population a sense of respect for,
and even awe at, the superior achievements of the whites, thereby reinforcing
15

eliefs abouttheir own inferiority. Therefore, when aspects of life in England were
mentioned in the reading materials,·they usually focussed on developments which
made the locals marvel at the performance of the English and the whites in general.
For example, after hearing of the railways,locomotives and steamships then new in
the world one student expressed the view, which was no doubt shared by many
others , th~t "For true ' buckra (whites} have a right to be master, for buckra know
, ,,
everything; but we poor negers know nothing. 40
Other Subjects in the Curriculum
While religion and occasionally reading were all that were taught in mo~tpart-time
~ho~-tQ~tJ~gul~rday
~J'*
schools, in which fllan~JrnilJlQ~:.~h!t'fS-Were enro1Jed,
offered a curriculum wh.icl'fWaS'US(Ici:tfJlIDQJ~ji;~ried_,iboughJJ:ifi.gipencted:cmi:he
e
~mrrrattorfaTo~~ntJ:nwfJJm-s.ometimes Jncluded.tfat?[Jt1?:. 3religion,
~'1rdit'19,~~~meiif." Very rarely did the instructional programme go
b yo nese limits, exceptthat needlework and housecraft for girls, and singing
were sometimes included, if suitable teaching staff could be found. Where singing
was qff ered, it was mainly hymns and patriotic songs that were taught.
In some of the schools in which children of a somewhat higher socio-economic
background enrolled,geography was sometimes included in the curriculum, though
the subject was said to have.been offered to·slaves in a school supported by the
British and.foreign Schools Society (BFSS). Here again,emphasis was·~laced on
the religious significance of the subject and attention was focussed on the historical
geography" of the Holy Lands in order to better explain to the students where
some of the events mentioned in the Scriptures occurred. W11en other areas of
ge~~ywere included,the·leaching ~smsisted mainly ilitude~rtmn:rori:Zing:fhe
names o~ntfiefilr!rsrrTs!es"a. nsJ t6e g~_.Qgf9cpl1. jc::?J."powers·or oosero~!!(;)J'i:ttrt:he:stoc(ei)ts.
l~h~ttonalsu15jects
.9ey9ndthe 4R'LwasnotasyeLcommonjn.Jhe
day~.,J1utille,.~~g}s:n1?aj:ft~Q2Ve were not isolateci ~}{ampl~s.
'Little or no mention was made ofpradlcatinstrucUofi as·part of the educational
programme offered in schools during this period. This was partly because the type
of work for which practical or industrial training might have been useful was already
being done mainly by slaves,and the plantations provided their own training
programmes to produce such skilled workers. Further, the number of
teachers,including the clerics, who were competent to teach any of these subjects
was very limited.
The Language of Instruction
1 ~- --~ --~~·~:r~~~~lfu

effectively with the slaves and even the free blacks, due to the gap in their levels of
education and the differences in their language of communication. This point was
also mentioned in the 1824 Report of the Society for the Conversion of Slaves,
which noted.thatwhile "our clergy, educated at our universities" had reached the
educational level which was
necessary for the due performance of their regular functions to EuropeanJiudience,[they] are raised too far
above the level of the oomprehension and reasoning of the heathen Negro.
Despite the implicitly racist overtones of this statement, it was nevertheless true
that these clergymen, especially those newly arrived from Britain, were not able to
explain the Scriptures in an idiom that could readily be grasped by slaves who had
a background of experience unfamiliar to these missionaries. A few of them did
attempt to learn the tribal languages of some of the African slaves:
But this was not an easy task if their ultimate aim was to communicate with the
slaves in their native tongues. Many languages were spoken on each estate as a
result of the practice by planters of mixing slaves from different tribes so that it
would not be easy for them to communicate with each other and thereby conspire
to plan a revolt. In addition,an increasing number of locally-born slaves hardly
knew their native tongues and spoke creole,which was a language with which these
more highly educated clerics were notvery familiar.
Partly to .overcome this. protJlem, propos~ls were ma

knowledge of the local situation, were in a better position to pass on more
effectively the lessons which the missionaries were trying to teach.
A somewhat similar problem of communication arose with foreign teachers and
this pointed to the need to train local teachers and religious workers. The 1824
Report of the Society for the Conversion of Slaves supported the idea of training
free coloureds to serve as catechists because they were better acquainted with the
peculiarities of the Negro character and those modes of speech which the Negroes
understand {and] ... can with far more efficiency and expedition, than a white
person, impress upon his mind the general principles of Christianity." 45
The Supply.of Teachers
In addition to the lack of suitable school buildings, insufficient finance,and the
limited time which fhe slaves had to attend classes,the educational efforts of the
missionaries·prior to emancipation were also adversely affected by the shortage of
qualified or competent teachers. The teaching staff in schools often comprised the
schoolmaster and, under the monitorial system, his assistants. At first, when there
were few schools, the missionaries and their wives did nearly all the teaching, but
later,as the provision of educational facilities increased, others were recruited
locally to assist. The academic background of those selected was usually not
considered very important, though they were expected to have a knowledge of
"such things as they were required to teach."
The two principal criteria used for recruiting teachers were theirwillingness to
teach,provided they had a little more knowledge than their pupils.and their moral
standards. This meant that they generally had·to be of a "pious and devout" frame
of mind.· Latimer also noted that teachers in the West lndies in general came from
"a strange variety of groups",including missionaries and their wives,proprietors and
their families,some employees on the sugar estates,old slaves who had acquired a
smattering of knowledge by various means,young slaves who passed on fragments
of their learning to their parents and other adults in the community,including a few
free blacks and coloureds. The 1835 Report of the S.P.G. also gives a further
glimpse ofthis strange variety of persons who were also in teaching in the West
Indies at the time of emancipation and they included white catechists,the rector's
wif e,coloured women· and black apprenticed· labourers. 46
Many teachers received some form of remuneration for their work,but their
general level of income was low and a number of them even gave their services free
of charge. The Methodists indicated that a considerable number of their teachers
were not paid, while a few others received a small fee directly from their students.
But despite their low levels of pay,it was observed that in many cases,"so much do
they love their employment that they continue their labours without a cent of
reward." However, most of them, though "devoted and faithful," were ill-qualified
for their duties,having obtained "all the learnin.1g they possess in the Sabbath
School." 47 The efforts to meet this increasing demand for education,though
laudable,were said to be "all spontaneous" and "mostly inefficient" in consequence.
With the poor educational background of instructors, the quality of teaching
therefore left much to be desired, even if the teachers' enthusiasm for the job
18

C
partially compensated for the insufficiency of their are'"doorood to
~~~~i~ir~\V;~~H~t1i~~Qid~
"ffie1r
concern was'toraisethe-..moral
e .. 1t necessary onTy'lc,Jeacntnemtoreacr:but
.tig&~rsystem a~:;:;:~:"~~;=~:~;~:::;,,:;~,~:~::::~ be
reduced to a mffflmum, it obviously did not encourage the development of a spirit
of enquiry among the children. This would have been inconsistent with the
subservient roles they were expected to occupy, especially in a slave society. In
fact, it was a very useful method for teachingstudents to be obedient, follow orders
without question, and "speak or be silent on the instant of the command being
l9

given."• It was one reason why the mling elite in the West Indies found this method
of instructing non-whites, especially their slaves,. the least objectionable one.
Finally, and quite exceptionally, some missionaries are said to have introduced
info the. West· Indies, particularly .in. the colonies. which later became British Guiana,
the Infant .. o& The introduction of this method·. in the early 1830s,
even ·.. .·... .......... de a~ignificanfimQ

Immediately below the primary and secondary whites on the status hierarchy
were the free coloureds, some of whom were sent by ijieir '1.'hite fathers tq Brjtain
to atten~ .. !ch,22~,k~tiI\',~rsi~es and the Inns of Courts, . There ffierefore erri~ged in
~· ana in the Britis:~~!~JrMfnh{i~ lff~~£

compelled·to make their labour available to them. In other words.there seems to
have been a clear distinction bei:t.veen the "exploiters" and the "exploited", with the
former group being mainly white andthe latter mainly black.
In such a context.a Marxist $ociology of knowledge would assert that.since
inteHectual production has no autonomy but is rooted in the economic base of
society, those who control the means of production would also determine what
would count as legitimate knowledge. In other words, the classwhich dominates
· the material production base would also control the means of mental production,
with the result that the ruling ideas of the times would continueJo be the ideas of
the ruHng groups. Further, the assumption would be that they would use the
schools and other institutions which form part of the ideological apparatus of the
State, such · as the churches, to pass on their view of the world, including the type
of knwledge which would tend to reinforce and consolidate the existing social
order structured mainly in their interests.
But while this description ·realistically represented what was happening to the
education of the black population in.slave society,such a dualistic division of
societies into a white. "explgiter". and a· black \ixplpit~". group,would pimplify what
was.· in fact a much. more inµi~te system qf stratificatiqn in which~ol?Ur ,Cilsfe and
class, tvefe"alr~impoJ!arifelelneots .. ,.Tuernf2r~. fue $Qdological th~C>ry
22

Within the context of the West Indies, the major aim ofthose who were involved
in providing education for the black population/was therefore to "reproduce the
type," that is, to produce the kind of individuals who would accept a subservient
role,partly by continuing to acknowledge the superiority of the whites,particularly
the British,and the relationship of dominance and submission which existed
between them andthe blacks, and be willing to continue pursuing their traditional
roles as agricultural labourers.
There is no 4oubt that the education providedinthe West Indies, especially in
prEt-emancipation times,.played a crucial and positive role in helping to achieve
these social, economic, and political objectives. This was largely done by the ttie
transmission and reproduction ofthe values of the dominant-group through the
content of the formal,and the practices which characterized the hidden,curriculum
of schools:~The outcomes helped to ensure that both the pupils and their teachers
devel9pecf.an understandi11g of the type of society into which they had to fit or to
which·ffiey had to adapt,even if this meant modifying their perceptions of their own
capabilities: This happened not only in the regular day schools, but also in the
Sunday and Adult and Evening schools thatprovided instruction for the slaves. An
examination of both the formal and the hidden curricula of schools would reveal
that they reflected the political and social priorities of the plantocracy.
Schools at the time 1 therg{QreJ were activ~JyegJt:i_atternQting to passon
the knowledge
rsc;tice~ wbic.h,.wai:e,la-tgelv .... ~QOSt.~ wiffi the
i
e. orma schoo1ing in the post-emancipation perioosTi'fiply
co nue e e orts started earlier to help ensure the reproduction of the major
structural features which supported the exploitative practices and relationships that
pervaded slave society. The objective was to use education to help bring about
social stability without any real reforms in the system of highly unequal distribution
of rewards in these societies. This was particularly important because the elites did
not envisage am; important modification in the autocratic relationships which
existed between whites and blacks during the days of slavery.even after
emancipation.
There is usually a degree of congruence between what is forma-lly taught in
schools and what is more informally passed on through the hidden curriculum. An
examination of this aspect of the work of the school would also help to reveal what
kinds of norms and values schools attempted to transmit through the
rules,practices · and type of organisational structures which they developed. For
example,one important lesson that was taught indirectly through the hidden
curriculum was that pupils had to accept the dominant/submissive
relationship,which was reflected in the organisational structure of the school
system,in preparation for their eventual role of subservience·in the larger society, in
which non-whites were expected to carry out orders without question.
The monitorial system, with its emphasis on rote learninR~ithoutpupils'
questioning what was 6e111g taught, ~as a reflection c,f tile ationshf ps and
b~nescnools~preparecnmiofack popu a n in the est ndies.
•_-.\..c>·-• .-;/•.·rs""'"'-"'···· ;,,.-.,."··-,-~.,.,,""---.,-.. ----.-,0-·c.-.•. -

The instructional techniques used played their. part in reinforcing the belief that a
'gidly hierarchical order of society was necessary for social stability. The learning
and.· L!~U .. oaofJa .. _ft .... ~ .•. J!!L .. J·:~.IDPO ..... r .... t
·
~ ..... n .... ~.U .. e·a:tur ....... ·...
e..··· ·
o.·. ·f..
t···.h. ··.··e ...•. m·o.-.fl ....... ·.1·:·t·Q
rls!·L··· .. ·.~.·~.·.·.·· ~ .. t···e· m ..• a o
reinforced student Jln the
i2eQ!2sical con,trol fthe Inasses ~s t~er~f 9r~ fOnsiq~refl. Y~!~dmii>r:tanf: and
scliool~§ca~e.~~)~~J2(ifi~tn1m~~f itfl1~Jt?iP~ to .. 7 tr~.9gth'.~11the ... he~monic
doffiinaflon C>~! ola~J~l':!!8~~2"'6yJ!1~""E~ .~h!t~.:Jn o~er words, sch~ls
were"""enga:ge

outcome of the educational process sometimes goes beyond what can be prE:ctlctea
bythe social reproduction model. It is suggested here that education,or even Just
literacy,in these early West Indian.and Guianese societies, not only helped
develop nonns, values and aspirations which were congruent with, and delimited
by the realities of the existing social order,but also created expectations,raised
levels of social aspirations,and contributed to a certain amount of dissatisfaction
with the status quo, at least among some of .those who had been educated,
Schools, directly and indirectly,were mooifying and, in a few cases, even helping to
resist some of the planters' demands for an entirely submissive type of black
individual whom they considered suitable for the society and the labour force •.In
this way ,practices in the dassrooms and in schools in general began to have
certain,though admittedly limited, counter-hegemonic influences, some of which
worked in the interests of the dominated, rather than the dominant, groups. The
"cracks" which developed in these societies found expression in one way or
another in what went on in these early schools. It was probably not accidental that
the leaders ofthe nineteenth-century slave revolts were among those who
benefited most from the education offered by the variousmissionary groups.
Another source of discrepancy often arises from the fact that individuals
sometimes make an independent and different interpretation and use of the
knowledge and skills which they acquire in the process of their education, than that
which is intended, directly or indirectly, by the dominant group. This happened
among the slaves who, often unknown to the missionaries, developed their own
version of the Christian message and its political implications - a version which was
less accommodating to the slave system than the missionaries or the ruling elites
expected. As Turner noted, "the slaves' political consciousness, though fed and
watered by the {teachings of tlie) mission churches, came to fruition outside tlilem,
in the religious (and other) groups which they developed under the tuition of
leaders recruited among themselves. It was in these groups that.their political ideas
took their most radical form. " 54
This lack of a "tight fit" between what takes place in the educational process and
the expectation of the dominant groups, therefore, allowed for some of this
deviance to develop, even though it is obvious that no major structural change was
brought about as a result of the education provided to the black population. But
neither were the changes which ultimately occurred those which simply contained
the 'dissonances', resulting simply in a reduction of sources of strain or instability in
the system.
It is obvious that one cannot simply ignore the importance of structural
constraints which existed in these autocratic states and prevented such changes
from occurring or developing. However, it is through some of these "cracks" that
education· might have helped some of those who benefited from it to be better
prepared to capitalize on their situations or be better equipped to influence, in their
favour, some of the changes which were occurring in these societies.
This alternative view is one which, while recognising the limitations of education
and even of literacy as instruments for the radical transformation of society.__refuses
25
j

to ignore totally the potential for change which individuals who have received some
degree of education can develop, or the ability which they can acquire, to capitalize
on the tensions, disruptions, or discontinuities which occur or which they might
helpto generate in society. The reproduction theory of education, therefore, seems
to carry with·.u too simplistic a notion of the outcomes of schooling;because it
excludes or ignores the importance of the human agents who might acquire the
capacity to,or become instruments of, change as a result ofan increasing
understanding of their situation,.brought about ~y their education or literacy. Such
developments do help to awaken in some individuals a fuller recognition of ,and
belief in,their own_potentialities,and as a result,if can have a countervailing
influence to that which the dominant group might intend to exert.
It is true the kind of education that was then being offered in schools in the West
Indies and Guiana was not.the type geared toward producing .. creative" or "deviant"
individuals. Butwith an increasing number of individuals acquiring reading_§lwls,it is
likely that among some of them this might have laid the foundation of a questioning
or challengin~ attitude to the. existing social order~~One of th~ o~tcorngs w~at
some slaves, in their d~i)Y, r?~fld otg~ty!Jha~l;.~JJJ~,.£~i:~\in·~~!~!C;!D~ main
~i!}i~nlne
society, ma~~~~ ~

3. W. Green, British Slave Emancipation: The Sugar Colonies and the Great Experiment 1830-1865
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1976), p.7.
4. Response to An Enquiry by the Anti-Slavery Society. See British Parliamentary Papers, 1845, Vol. XXXI,
p.412.
5. R. Farley, "The Shadow and the Substance," Caribbean Quarterly, Vol.4,No.2.(1955),p.143.
6. Ibid.
7. Dalton,p.314.
8. Ibid.
9. Responses by the Governor of British G.liana to an Enquiry by the Anti-Slavery Society. Reported in British
Parliamentary Papers,1845,Vol.XXXl,p.412.
10. G. Lewis, Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean (London: Merlin Press,1963),p.29.
11. S. Gordon, A Cen of West Indian Education: A Source Book (London: Longmans~3).
12. A. Carmichael, Domestic annen and Social Conditions o ii'Wfiil'e,~;._;;ed and Negro
Populations in the West Indies (London, 1833), Vol.1, p.244.
13. C. Nicole, 1be West Indies. Their People and History (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1965),p.167.
14. V. Daly, A Short History of the Guyanese People (Georgetown, Guyana: The Daily Chronicle, 1966),
p.167.
15. B. Edwards, The History, Civil and Commercial, of the Briti;h West Indies (London: T. Miller
1819),Vol.2,p.72.
16. The Colonist, 18 February, 1824.
17. Quoted. in A\Bums' History of the West Indies (London: George AUen& Unwin, 1954), p.622.
\18. Daly, p.254. )
19. H. Coleridge, Si~ Months in the West Indies in 1825 (London: 1825),p.321.
20., Gordon, p.10·:
21. C. and R. Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond .the Llne (New York: Oxford University Press,1972),p.302.
22. Daly, p.254.
23. J. Latbner, • An Historical and Comparative Study of the Foundations of Education in the British,Spanish
and French West Indies (Up to the End of Slavery on the British Islands)." Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis,
University of London, 1952,p.18.
24. W. Harte, i.ectures on the Gospel of St. Matthew (London, 1824),Vol.1.
25. J. Buchner, The Moravians in Jamaica (London, 1854) p. 70f., quoted in l.atimer,p. 64.
26. In Minutes of the Proceedings of the Colony of Berbice for the Year Ending 30 June,1827 ,10
January, 1827 ,p.25.
27. E. Goveia, "Past History and Present Planning in the.West Indies," New World Quarterly,
Vol.ll,No.1(1966).
28. A. Adamson, Sugar Without Slaves: The Political Economy of British Guiana, 1838-1904 (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972), pp.34-5.
29. Ibid.
30. Burns,p.635.
31. Dahon, Vol.l,p.360.
32. Ibid., pp.360-61.
33. Instructions to Missionaries in the West India Islands. West India Pamphlets, 1705, Sect.XXXl, p.11.
34. R. Watson, A Defence of Wesleyan Missions in the West Indies (London·, 1817), p.9.
27

35. Latimer.
36. See, for examp!e,B. Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees (Edinburgh: 1772),1,p.216.
37. Miro Trust, The First Book jor Use in Schools, quoted in Gordon, pp.37-8.
38. Shipman's (VJesleyan) Catechism. Section on Heaven and Hell, quoted in Reckord,p.174.
39. Quoted in P. Rooke, "The Christianizatlon and Education of Slaves and Apprentices in the British West
Indies," Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis,University of Alberta,1977,p.156.
40. H. Waddell, Twenty-Nine Years in the West Indies and Central Africa, 1829-1858 (London:
Thomas Nelson & Sons,1858),p.35.
41. Report of the Society for the Conversion of Slaves, 1824, p.32.
42. J. Larsen, Virgin Islands Story (Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1950),pp.125-8.
43. S. Hodgson, Truth from the West Indies (London:WUliam BaU,1838),p.121.
44. Ibid.
45. Report of the Society for the Conversion of Slaves,1824,p.32.
46 .. Report of the SPG,1836,quoted in Latimer,p.215.
47. J. Thorne and J. Kimball, Emancipatfon in the West Indies. A Six Months' Tour in Antigua,
Barbados and Jamaica in the Year 1837 (New York.1838),p.118ff.
48 .. Manual of the System of Primary Education (1831),quoted in Rooke,p.139.
49. T. Hobbes, The Leviathan (1651). Republished in 1943,edited byW. Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
50. S. Bowles and H. Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America (New York: Basic Books, 1976).
51. L Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy (New York: Monthly Review Press,1971).
52. H, Giroux, Theory and Resistance in Education ~London: Heinemann Educational
Books, 1983),pp.3-4.
53. G. Brizan, Grenada, Island ofConRict: From Amerindians to People's Revolution, 1498-1979
(London: Zed Books Ud., 1979), p.152.
54. M. Turner, Slaves and Missionaries. The Disintegration of Jamaican Slave Society, 1787:-1834
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press,1982),p.93.
55. lbid.,p.95.
28

EAST INDIAN POLITICAL REPRESENTATIONIN BRITISH GUIANA
DURING THE LATTER PART OF INDENTURE, 1890 - 1917
by
Tyran Ramnarine
Guyana 1 is the only country in the Western Hemisphere where the descendants of
migrants from India 2 are in the majority. In fact, today they are roughly just over
one-half of the total population.
Indians first arrived in the Colony in 1838 and except for two minor
interruptions, 1838-1845 and 1848-1851, they continued to come every year as
indentured immigrants until 1917. They were only one of several immigrant
groups brought after emancipation to supplement the ex-slaves as field labourers
on the sugar estates. West Jndians (mostly Barbadians), Europeans, liberated
Africans, Madeiran Portuguese, and Chinese also came to the colony. Indians,
however, eventually became the largest immigrant group as their period of
immigration was the longest and the best organised. By the end of indenture they
had almost completely supplanted African and other field labour on the sugar
estates.
In the course of Indian immigration important demographic change took place
in British Guiana. Firstly, the 1911 census revealed that East Indians formed the
largest single ethnic group. Out of a population of 296,041 there were 126,517
Indians and 115,486 Africans. When indenture finally ended about 68 percent
remained, although they were guaranteed repatriation rights. Secondly, by 1917
the majority of Indians lived independently of the sugar estates, although they
·originally had been brought there as labourer. In the villages and scattered
settlements Irn;lians adopted a variety of occupations: as tradesmen, general
labourers and porters, cart-proprietors, shop-keepers, milk-_sellers, rice cultivators,
and most of all, as peasant proprietors. In paying tribute to the pioneering spirit of
the colony's Indians the Immigration Agent General in 1907 noted that:
Originally introduced to satisfy the requirements of the planting body, these immigrants
and their descendants have gradually spread themselves over the country, reclaiming
places formerly lying waste and opening up new tracts of land on the creeks and rivers
Re-circulated on the University of Guyana History Society Facebook 29 Page by the UGHS Alumni ( History Graduates of the University of Guyana)
Courtesy of the Westmaas collection
J

fromthe Ggtentyne to the North West District. With their thrifty industrious habits and
unfaltefirig perseverance in the face of Joss of drought and flood,they form the very ideal of
settlers for a tropical country like this.3
Inevitably as East Indians began to put down permanent roots, it was only a matter
of time before the question arose of their participation in colonial politics. This
paper traces the political positionof East Indians from the constitutional reform of
1891 up to the formation of the British Guiana Eastlndians' Association in 1917.
It also examines the views of various officials on the political role of Indians.
The first intimation on the political representation of East Indians came ·after the
startling revelations of the 1870 Royal Commission. This Commission enquired
into the general conditions of indentured Indians·on the-colony's 124 sugar estates.
It came about largely because of a twenty-six page letter written by William Des
Voeux, a former stipendiary magistrate of British Guiana. His 134 paragraphs
virtually indicted the indentureship system as it operated in the colony. His
charges were too serious to ignore and the Secretary of State immediately set up
this Commission. . The Commissioners in an exhaustive report generally confirmed
Des Voeux'salleiJations .. Sir George Young, the Chairman, described the Indians
in the colony as a very stationary,dependent, and almost helpless race." 4 Among
their most important recommendations was a widening of the functions of the
Immigration Agent General, whose charge was the general welfare of immigrants.
Theyproposed that he be given a seat in the Court of Policy, the colony's
executive and legislative body.· They felt that he had superior claims to the Court of
Policy than any public officer except the Government Secretary and the Attorney
General. His presence in the Legislature, they argued, could help to avert
legislation inimical to the interest of Indians. 5
Governor John Scott, who felt adequate safeguards already existed, voiced
reservations on the Commission's proposal, but the Secretary of State accepted it.
Lord Kimberley was probably influenced in his decision by the fact that in 1871
the immigrant population was sizable. Out of a total population of 193,000 they
numbered 55,200, i.e. just below one third. Moreover, the Immigration Agent
General at that time was James.Crosby who served the longest in this office, from
1858 to 1880. His invaluable contribution to the life and welfare of the immigrants
made. him truly deserving of the title "Protector of Immigrants." The immigrants.so
ap_preciated his services that in due course and after his death they referred to his
office and even his successors by his name.
The constitutional reform of 1891 retained the position of the Immigration
Agent General as the official political representative of East Indians. The exclusive
Co1lege of Kiezers, from where came nominations for the Legislature, was
abolished. In its place came a widening ofthe qualifications for membership to the
Legislature and of the franchise for voters. >The Court of Policy comprised eight
elected members and eight official members with the governor possessing an
original and casting vote. It kept its legislative powers, but its executive powers
were vested in a newly created Executive Council. The Immigration Agent General
30
Re-circulated on the University of Guyana History Society Facebook Page by the UGHS Alumni ( History Graduates of the University of Guyana)
Courtesy of the Westmaas collection

now had membership of these two bodies. Financial matters remained within the
jurisdiction of the Combined Court which comprised six elected Financial
Representatives and the sixteen members of the Court of Policy. The tenure of
office for the Court of Policy and the Combined Court was set at five years with
comparatively high qualifications for membership. For the Court of Policy they
included eighty acres of landjwith forty at least under cultivation, or an income
from real property of five thousand dollars a year, while for the Combined Court
the same qualifications were required with the addition of a lower income franchise
derived from any source. For voters the franchise was set at the ownership of
three acres under cultivation, or the tenancy of six acres, or an income of three
hundred dollars a year. "
Aserious problemthatarose during this period was the anomalous position of
Eastlndians inthe body politic. As can be seen in Table 1, although in 1911 East
Indian males formed more than half, 51.8 percent,
TABLE 1
Classification of the Electorate According to Ethnic Group, 1911
Ethnic % of each race % of each race % of adult
Group in the adult male in the total males of each
population electorate race registered
as voters
East Indians 51.8 6.4 0.6
Africans 42.3 62.7 6.8
Portuguese 2.9 11.4 17.7
British
1.7 17.0 46.1
Chinese
0.9 2.4 12.3
Source: C.O. 111/606, Clementi to Bonar Law, Conf., 23 June 1916.
of the whole adult male population of voting age, only 0.6 per cent among them
were registered as voters and formed only 6.4 per cent of the whole electorate.
The 1891 constitutional reform had transformed the monopoly of a planter
electorate into the predominance of an African electorate.
Several reasons could be adduced to explain the apparent low political
consciousness of the East Indians. First, the essential·concern of the large majority
at this time was to create a solid economic base. For men who had only recently
escaped the thraldom of estate life with little or no capital, the primary concern was
31
Re-circulated on the University of Guyana History Society Facebook Page by the UGHS Alumni ( History Graduates of the University of Guyana)
Courtesy of the Westmaas collection

survival. Economic problems predominated in their discussions with the different
delegations. British Guiana was unique in that expensive and elaborate drainage
and irrigation schemes first had to be undertaken before agriculture could be a
worthwhile venture. Fortunately, they found salvation in the rice industry which
was well adapted to the swampy coastlands. The widening of the franchise in
1891 up to 1917 also encompassed the boom years of rice. The Immigration
Agent General rightly ascribed their political disinclination at this time partly to
"their attachment to the soil", as they were "contented .... to plod on in their rice
fields or provision farm. " 6
Secondly, their ignorance of English, a prerequisite to any form of political
participation as it was the language of public discussion, deterred East Indians with
the other qualifications from seeking registration. By far the larger proportion of
indentured immigrants were entirely uneducated and could not therefore be
included among those entitled to the franchise. Those who could read or write
their own Indian language only were also disqualified. The ordinance did not
specify that English should be the only language in the literacy test, but no
provision existed in the ordinance for the printing of the necessary papers in any
other language than in English. The introduction in 1896 of the secret ballot which
was printed in English further excluded potential East Indian voters. Parents, who
harboured ideas of returning to India, did not send their children to school because
they were impressed "with the belief that education in English will be of no
advantage to them on their return to their country. " 1 Some of those who decided
to settle permanently in the colony were cautious about their children's education,
since it also exposed them to Christianity and possible conversion.
Thirdly, the Immigration Department continued to exercise its wardship over
East Indians even when their five-year indenture had ended. Ever since the time of
Crosby, they had looked forward to the Department for intervention in their
grievances. A move by Governor Frederic Hodgson (1904-11) to remove free or
time-expired East Indians from the tutelage of the Immigration Agent General
met with failure because government agencies did not treat them as ordinary
subjects of the colony. Hodgson himself intervened to rectify a few East Indian
grievances. Perhaps because of the taint of indenture, free East Indians, unlike
other groups, were disallowed from receiving medical treatment at the Georgetown
Public Hospital. They were made to attend the district dispensaries where only
outdoor treatment was available. Governor Hodgson was puzzled "as to why these
unindentured East Indians should not be treated as regards both outdoor and
indoor medical relief in the same way as other members of the community." 8 He
directed that all free East Indians should have access to the hospital on t.heir
producing an identity certificate,i.e. the Certificate of Exemption from Labour.
Robert Duff, Immigration Agent General (1905-12),was the staunchest defender
of East Indians after Crosby. In a memorial to the Secretary of State in 1910 he
severely criticised the administration of Governor Hodgson with respect to East
Indian affairs. 9 Duff pointed out that East Indians who settled up the rivers and
32
Re-circulated on the University of Guyana History Society Facebook Page by the UGHS Alumni ( History Graduates of the University of Guyana)
Courtesy of the Westmaas collection

creeks had spent large sums of money in empolde_ring their land without
government aid. The Portuguese and African settlers ot the Pomeroon River, on
the other hand, had the sum of $800 placed on the estimates for the purpose
having their river cleared. The government refused to do the same for East
Indians. He further noted that East Indians experienced discrimination in
government employment. Rohee, an East Indian interpreter, although he had no
legal right to a pension, was led to believe he would get one. The Combined Court
rejected his claim, butatthe same sitting sanctioned the pension of teachers, mostly
Africans, who did not previously enjoy this privilege. 10 Duff complained also that in
the Registrar's Office, with which East Indians had many dealings, most of the
appointments had been filled by Africans and mulattoes. Governor Hodgson
dismissed Duff's charge that the legislature was "actuated by any adverse feelings
towards the East Indian." He conceded, however, that "the fact that there are
several representatives of the negroes in the legislature necessarily means that
questions affecting that class are constantly brought forward for discussion. " 11
One traditional Indian social institution, the panchayat or village councif,.had the
capacity for channeling political activity, but it did not survive in the colony. In
India the panchayat, composed of at least five leading members of the community,
was the only social institution that pervaded the villages and exercised a
comprehensive authority over the community. The efficacy of the panchayat
depended on its acceptance by the individuals involved as well as on the ability of
the community to enforce the panchayaf s rulings, such as social ostracism. It
depended essentially on a socially homogeneous society. In British Guiana, on the
other hand, division existed not only between the East Indians and other
communities at large but alsowithin the East Indian community itself. Differences
existed among the different castes, between Moslems and Hindus, and Northern
Indians and Madrasis. It is doubtful also whether the sugar planters would have
permitted the recreation of this institution in view of their efforts to stamp out all
forms of leadership which they suspected as being responsible for the frequent
labour disbJrbances on the estates. The failure of the panchayat to survive meant
that Indian political activity would not be expressed through a customary Indian
institution but through western modes.
A suggestion by a prominent East Indian would have drawn heavy opposition
from the other groups. Parbhu Sawh, a wealthy storekeeper in Georgetown,
applied for pen;nission to engage the District Immigration Agents in securing the
names of East Indians in the official register as voters. 12 He claimed that it would be
a very long time before East Indians could secure a share in the government
because, under the prevailing circumstances,therewere no natural increases in the
population and every year children born in the colony departed for India.
Undoubtedly, the Immigration Agents, by their influence, their strategic position in
all the districts where Indians resided, and their regular visits to these areas, would
have had an impact on Eastlndian electoral registration. Duff endorsed Sawh's
suggestion, but Governor Hodgson rejected it. Hodgson rightly considered it
improper for the Immigration Department to intervene in such a matter. i:, Had
33
Re-circulated on the University of Guyana History Society Facebook Page by the UGHS Alumni ( History Graduates of the University of Guyana)
Courtesy of the Westmaas collection

Parbhu Sawh's suggestion been accepted, there is little doubt that other elements
of society would have vigorously protested.
Other suggestions for securing political representation by East Indians involved a
modification of the colony's constitution. Immigration Agent General Duff, in the
eager pursuit of extending his patronage over the East Indians, appeared to have
been equally keen to obtain Indian political representation as to abolish the
predominance of the non-official section in the Combined Court. The colony's
peculiar constitution gave the African, Coloured, and Portuguese members of the
Combined Court control of the purse and thus rendered their influence in local
politics paramount. Duff condemned the location of political power in "a body alien
in race, religion, habits and interests" to the East Indians and) moreover, "not
superior to them in numbers, weaith,industry and thrift." 14 Before the 1910 Royal
Commission which examined the system of emigration from India to the colonies,
Duff advocated a change in the constitution that would reduce the elected majority
by increasing the official members in the Combined Court. He claimed that British
Guiana, with Natal, was the only coiony importing Indians where the government
did not have a majority. 15 The elected members of the Court ofPolicy vehemently
objected to Duff's statements before the Commission and passed a resolution
protesting "against many of the statements made by the Immigration Agent
General, and especially those having reference to the constitution of this Colony." 16
The official members, however, abstained from voting and the resolution had to be
taken as an expression of opinion by the elected section.
Sir Walter Egerton, Governor of British Guiana (1912-16), advocated the
withdrawal of the franchise from Indians and its replacement with two nominated
seats in the legislature. Egerton was an inveterate critic of the constitution. In
1914 he put forward a proposal to construct a railway from Georgetown to the
Brazilian border with the important condition that the colony exchanged its
constitution for one like that of Trinidad, where the Crown controlled all financial
matters. A referendum was taken, but before any firm decision could be made the
First World War broke out. African politicians protested over his overt and c~vert
moves to change the cons~itution and engaged in a campaign for his recall.
Eger.ton ~as, at hfar~,a~ ultra-c~nsen.,~t.\ve wh_o de~,med the campaigping at
election times as ag1tat1on. He tound 1t undesirable that East Indians should
be ~ncour~ged to beco~e politic~ agitators as are too many of the negroes. " 17 To
achieve this end and to solve the t:.ast Indian representation problem, he suggested
they exchange their voting powers for two nominations in the Court of Policy and
the Combined Court respectively. He recommended also that two official
members be added to these bodies so as to retain the balance between the elected
and i:i~minated members. Feari!1g that hi5,,suggestion "would be viewed with great
susp1c1on by the Negro and other races, he devised the ruse whereby it would
appear as originating from the India Office as result of the visit of the two
commissioners of the Indian government, James Mc Neil and Chimman Lal who
were then in the colony . 18
'
34
Re-circulated on the University of Guyana History Society Facebook Page by the UGHS Alumni ( History Graduates of the University of Guyana)
Courtesy of the Westmaas collection

Egerton's proposals for special representation for East Indians were promptly·
and vigorously condemned. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lewis
Harcourt, pointed out that "if you have a system of representative government, you
cannot introduce a measure disenfranchising a particular race without causing
trouble. " 19 Moreover, he argued, there would be a tremendous agitation in India
over it because of the prevailing sensitive feeling towards Indian immigrants
overseas. Lord Crewe, Secretary of State for Jndia, endorsed Harcourt's views "as
to the objections to any arrangement that would differentiate the constitutional
position of East Indians in British Guiana from that of other sections of British
Guiana" and considered it "essential that Indian immigrants who have completed
their term of indenture should be in all respects free citizens: " 20 4'
At the end of the last century, however, a small East Indian middle class began
emerging. 1t comprised a few merchants but mostly lawyers who.had returned to
the colony after their training in Britain. With very few exceptions they were first
or second-generation Jndo-Guyanese who lived in the urban areas and went to
Christian schools. Being in the towns, which were the centres of colonial political
activity and were socialised into a predominantly western culture, they related easily
to the political process: Their orientation, goals, and aspirations differed from the
great majority of rural illiterate Indians who still needed the guidance of the
Immigration Department. As principal political spokesmen for Indians, they raised
no objections against the.constitution or in anyway linked it with their low political
representation. No radical, in the context of colonial politics, appeared from this
class during this period. Early attempts to bring them under one body to articulate
their views had limited success. In 1-892 several prominent Indians assembled in
Georgetown to form the "East dian Institute," aimed at developing "better social
relationship amon the educated Indians. 2 er orwar ing an address of
co gra u 10n to ueen · 1c ona on er . iamond jubilee, t e ns 1 u e came
def_unct because of lack of public suppQ!t. A move to establish a Hindu-Guyanian
Christian and Mutual Improvement Society underfhepatronage of Christian
ministers also failed.
The activities of two professional Indians might have quickened the fate of
politicisation of their brethren, but the colonial government closely monitored their
movements. They came to the colony as free Indians. One of the them, Bhai
Permanand, a leading and very active member o.f the Arya Samaj, a progressive
Hindu sect in the Punjab and who had travelled widely in Europe and the United
States, arrived in British Guiana in 1910. ·H~ stayaj with. iID . diru1.mru:ci1ant,
~~~~~~l!1,Po~h!mself klio.~J!I~f~i~:~as de~?!J!~~h
. . 'Q " ellQ ..,·-·-ro
sga ··enng subsctfpliorfs Were
started to· establish a
du College in Georg~town for Hindu boys of British Guiana, Suriname,
I \
Trinidad, and Jamaica. 22 The govemmentof India regarded him "a dangerous man
. on who. se d.oings. and m .. ovements abroad. it is desi.rable to keep watch" and
· requested information "as to his movements in British Guiana. " 23
· In the case of the other potential leader of the Indian community, the
government of the colony over-reacted. Dr. Ram Narayan Sharma was one of
35
Re-circulated on the University of Guyana History Society Facebook Page by the UGHS Alumni ( History Graduates of the University of Guyana)
Courtesy of the Westmaas collection

those who occupied the platform during Permanand' s lecture at the Town Hail.
Governor Hodgson immediately asked the India Office whether he had been
connected with seditious activities in lndia. 24 In spite of the reply to the contrary
and the fact that there was nothing to support Hodgson's suspicion that ...
Sharma and ... Permanand were known to·each other before they visited British
25
Guiana," the . gove~~ill.zmaiot~!n~ 1:,1,cQD.stantpo~c~ .surv~i}lance on Sh,,. Y•••····ar·to'sfo
(\ ~< . • ••,. e .... ga lf~~nfn~m~i~I . . . eJihadar
~ / M"affiranrwas 'addressedlc>"IJi.]tN:·snarmaiftGeor ··etown: 34.Affer
1
iwast SararRam Narain Sharma at ew mster am. e Bande
Ifs.:aetection
\ 1 cdfmrs·or·ooflr-papers~wer;~senrto·1trtm_mr···ratio~·ne,·artm_enTaddressed .to
\-·mmont:asrrnmaff namif'JTifaweie'~ose-'uent:r~aesffo ·e,r"
~~1Irsc~reatnar'"'fio'·on,roy"rflat "nariz'e··worKeiffn1fie·1~m~1iirat1on
Department. 35 Not all the newspapers impounded were of a militant nature. The
India Office found that the publication of the Canada India League did "not appear
to be of a seditious character." 36 36
Re-circulated on the University of Guyana History Society Facebook Page by the UGHS Alumni ( History Graduates of the University of Guyana)
Courtesy of the Westmaas collection

East Indians, nevertheless, were making slow progress. In 1908 Philli Daniel
Guyadeen became the first Indian to seek a seat for the e islatur
con e m 1 se ui o to e ombin rt. He
was, however, de ea e ya coloured barrister, J.S. Mc Arthur. Of the 111
37
registered voters,82 voted:26 for Guyadeen and 56 for McArthur.
Subsequently,East Indians would be contesting seats forthe legislature at every
election.
N

documents from the Immigration Department. Prominent East Indians who
travelled frequently to Trinidad and Suriname found this requirement belittling, as
other groups were free of it.
In spite of the opposition from Immigration Agent General Duff, the petition was
accepted by a sub-committee of the Court of Policy. Duff objected strongly,
arguing that some East Indians felt it would "interfere with their racial customs and
tend to the loosening of their family ties and consequent degeneration of the
race." 44 This was a typical reaction from the excessively paternalistic Duff. He
jealously guarded against any diminution of his authority and saw the petition as a
threat. However, Governor Hodgson, although reducing the petition to a .,
"sentimental grievance," believed "the aspirations and wishes of the ... East Indians
should be satisfied as far as possible and as soon as possible. " 45
Concessions which came in the Immigration Exemption Bill, Ordinance number
5 of 1911, were a virtual dead letter. Time-expired East Indians who wished to
secure exemption from all provisions of the Immigration Ordinance had to make a
simple declaration. After two years of its being in effect not one of the signatories
of the petition availed himself of its provisions. In 1920 there were only 14
declarants in all. 46 The Bill failed to win numerous adherents because it did not
abolish the primary reason for the petition - the degrading requirement of an East
Indian needing a document to establish his identity. The Attorney General argued
that the law could not be changed because:
so long as we have indentured immigrants the need will remain of seeing that they do not
leave the colony till they have fulfilled their contract, and it will be impossible without the
production of some document, for steam-ship agents or any other person to distinguish
between an East lndian who is not yet free to leave the colony, and one to whom the
Immigration laws do not apply. 47
Also the agitation for it was conducted solely by the small number of middle-class
East Indians, with the bulk of the community standing aloof. This large majority
shunned the Bill because it gave "them little they have not already got, and ... take
from them something they have." 48
Educated East Indians, nevertheless, shunned the office of the Immigration
Department and used the forums available to the other groups when airing their
grievances. They frequently wrote letters to the newspapers. The first letter
appeared to have been written in 1882 after an Indian had read in The Colonist
newspaper that "we coolies are called liars." His response appeared in the Daily
Chronicle where he begged "leave to be allowed to contradict that statement" as
"there are good and bad in all classes." 49 East Indians felt discriminated against in
the appointment to middle and top positions in Government Departments and
Boards, even when such bodies handled matters mainly connected with East
Indians. One Indian subscriber to the Daily Chronicle, after notin~ the absence or
very small number of Indians in Government employment, asked Now Sir, is the
action of the Government fair towards the East Indian inhabitants of the Colony
38
Re-circulated on the University of Guyana History Society Facebook Page by the UGHS Alumni ( History Graduates of the University of Guyana)
Courtesy of the Westmaas collection

taking into consideration their contributions to the revenue
Another wrote:
Colony?"so
The East Indians who form nearly one half of the population of this Colony, are treated
very slightly by the Government, especially when it is remembered that some time ago
representations were made to the Government that East Indians were denied employment
in the Government Service, and the Government of the day said that they were in the same
footing as any other people. 51
The most famous Indian spokesman and letter writer of the period was Bechu.
He was a Bengali of Koormi caste who came to British Guiana as an indentured
immigrant at the beginning of 1895.si He first wanted to go to Trinidad where tbe
indenture was three years as opposed to five in Guiana. But he ran into problems.
After staying a while at theT rinidad depot in Calcutta, no ship was leaving soon for
that Colony. The recruiter prevented him from leaving the depot unless be paid
the expenses for his keep. Not being in a position to do so, Bechu accepted the
recruiter's alternative arrangement that he come to Guiana. He was unique in
several respects. He was among the very few Indians who were literate in English
upon their arrivaLinthe colony. He was taughtand brought up by a Presbyterian
missionarylady as an orphan in Calcutta. Although he defended the interests of
Indians. in general, he was unlike the middle-class Indians of the Colony in that his
principal concern was the welfare of indentured Indians. He frequently wrote
letters on behalf oflndians to the Immigration Department on issues ranging from
overseers who kept Indian women to difficulties Indians encountered in obtaining
their repatriation rights. When the 1897 Royal Commission came to examine the
position of the colony's sugar industry, Bechu prepared a memorandum which was
a serious indictment on certain aspects of the indentureship system. 53 He also gave
evidence and became the first Indian in British Guiana to address a Royal
Commission. His comments before the Commission and his publicity of the death
ofan indentured immigrant, Bhagri, exacerbated relations between Bechu and the
plantocracy. Bechu wrote in the press that Bhagri of Cove and John estate was
admitted to the estate hospital by the Government Medical Officer. On the
following day, however, the sick nurse, acting on instructions from the manager,
discharged Bhagri and sent him back to work. Bhagri died soon after. The
manager charged Bechu with libel. 54 Bechu was acquitted, although several
members of the jury were estate employees and the foreman himself was an
overseer. Not satisfied with indentureship in general and the circumstances of
Bhagri's death in particular, Bechu appealed to the Principal Secretary of State for
India to conduct an independent inquiry. 55 Nothing, however, came of his request.
Slowly Indians were becoming assertive and wished to be involved in issues that
animated the other groups in the body politic. Aware of the grand Coronation
Durbar scheduled for Delhi in December 1911, a group of East Indians sought to
have a similar celebration in the colony. They petitioned Governor Charles Cox in
November of that year that the Durbar be held in Georgetown, that December 12
be a general holiday or at least a holiday for East Indians in the Colony, and that
the governor "lend patronage and pecuniary help towards the management of the
occasion. " 56 The governor, however, disallowed the petition on the grounds that a
39
Re-circulated on the University of Guyana History Society Facebook Page by the UGHS Alumni ( History Graduates of the University of Guyana)
Courtesy of the Westmaas collection

form of celebration had already occurred, that u might be against "the wishes and
interests of the general community to declare another public holiday at this
extremely busy season of the year," and that the Combined Court might not vote
more money for this purpose. 57
Atthe outbreak of the first World War East Indians, like the other groups,
hastened to demonstrate their loyalty. More East Indian recruits applied to join the
British West India Regiment than were required. Many had to be rejected because
of their ignorance ofEnglish. 58 The Governor, Sir Wilfred Collet, found an unusual
case of East Indian determination during his visit to plantation Wales on the West
Bank of Demerara in 1917. Some indentured East Indians had offered themselves
as recruits in one of the colony's contingents, but three of them were rejected for
their lack of English. These subsequently began studying English in earnest for the
following three months and re-applied "to be sent to the Front 'to finish the war. '" 59
Even the shackled Dr. Sharma, who came under police surveillance because of his
subscription to militant publications, wrote to the Governor offering to "go and
fight for my country and my King. " 60 In another case an East Indian devised a
means of countering the submarine menace and requested that.tis plan be placed
before the Admiralty. The Governor, however, felt that it was not necessary to
trouble the Admiralty with this man's scheme as somewhat similar means have
been adopted from the early stages of the war. " 61 Several wealthy East Indian rice
producers contributed to the war effort by offering large amounts of rice to make
up the colony's pledge of 500,000 pounds. 62 P.D. and J.G, Guyadeen of Leguan
offered 2·,000 pounds "for use by the East Indian troops now in Europe, fighting
for the British Raj".6.3 Among others, Boodhoo, of Plantation Windsor Forest, gave
fifteen bags. 64
The rumour of a possible cession of British Guiana to the United States saw
another manifestation of East Indian loyalty. In spite of Bechu's criticisms of
indenture, he vouched his loyalty to British Guiana when a ruined planter suggested
in 1898 that the West Indies be incorporated in the United States. Bechu stated
that although the lot of East Indians was far. from desirable, they were content to
remain under the Union Jack "rather than fall a r.rey to the Golden Eagle, to see
Stars and possibly stand a chance of being beaten with many stripes. "' 65
Immediately following the end of the first World War there were more seriou~
discussions of a possible cession. Lord Rothermere proposed to cede British
Guiana and some other territories of the British West Indies to the U.S. in
liquidation of the war debt. The elected members of the legislature saw the
proposal "as obnoxious in the extreme" and a resolution of protest followed after a
public meeting at the Town Hall. 66 The British Guiana East Indian Association, 67 on
the other hand, sent a separate resolution to the Colonial Office affirming:
its unswerving loyalty to the British throne and recording its solemn protest against any
such.suggestion as contrary to the feeling of British Indians and one that is calculated to
render nugatory the desires and aspirations of a people who have just entered a new phase
of its existence and whose destiny is inextricably bound up with the great future of the
British nation. 68 40
Re-circulated on the University of Guyana History Society Facebook Page by the UGHS Alumni ( History Graduates of the University of Guyana)
Courtesy of the Westmaas collection

During the famous Recall Movement, however, East Indians became more
involved in the politics of the colony. The African, Coloured, and Portuguese
elected members · of the legislature sent a memorial to the Colonial Office seeking
the recall of Governor Egerton who was then in England on leave. They
condemned his administration as an absolute failure and were particularly angry at
his criticisms of the consutution. 69
Only one East Indian, Parbhu Sawh, supported what became known as the
Recall Movement. Indians, claiming to represent the Indian community of the
colony, met at the Georgetown Town Hall and passed a "Resolution of
Disassociation." They requested the Secretary of State to hear "the protest of a
loyal, patriotic and obedient section of the population, affecting as it does the
interestof nearly half the population of the colony." The resolution read further
that
this is not a fit and proper time for an agitation to be launched against the King's
representative, and more especiaUy in view of the fact that His Excellency is absent from
the colony and unable to defend himself from such attacks. As loyal East Indians we feel
that when the Empire, of whiehwe have the honour to belong, is in the throes of the
greatest war the world has.ever known, petty discussion and personal spite should be
subservient to that spirit of unity and patriotism which has evercharacterised the British
colonies when the Mother Country has been threatened with danger. 70
The timely retirement of Governor Egerton soon after brought a quick solution
this issue.
An important feature of the Recall Movement controversy was that ]ndians
entered the political arena as a distinct group. Their Resolution of Disassociation
illustrates that they had taken stock of their position in the colony and found reason
for confidence. It stated that the East lndian population was "larger than any other
race inthe colonyd and that on that ground alone we respectfully submit we have .a
right to be heard. It further stated that East Indians were "not represented in the
Legislature of this.Colony, and.that the elective members·associated with the recall
movement areunrepresentative of ourrace." 11 East Indian involvement in the
controversy set the tone for the general elections two months later.
The 1916 elections for the Court of Policy and the Combined Court witnessed
for the first time a comparatively large number of
East Indians seeking
office. . of them, Thomas John Veerasawmv, Ashrafally, and
brothers, Edward and Joseph Luckhoo, came to • seats for
legislature. Thomas Flood lost the seat of the Court Policy for to
J.S. Mc Arthur, a Negro barrister. had an adventurous to iife. In 1865,
when only seven years old, both of his parents died during the voyage from India to
British Guiana .. On arrival he was placed in the orphan asylum in Georgetown. He
later absconded and found a job as ship's boy on a steamer trading between the
colony and England. In 1878 he opened business as a butcher in Georgetown nd
was very successfuL He purchased Blankenburg estate on the WestCoast of
Demerara, owned a racing stable, was among the richest East Indians in the
colony at that time. He cha.ired the meeting of East Indians to protest against the
Recall Movement. Veerasawmy was born in the colony. His father was
41
Re-circulated on the University of Guyana History Society Facebook Page by the UGHS Alumni ( History Graduates of the University of Guyana)
Courtesy of the Westmaas collection

interpreter and depot-keeper in the Immigration Department. He attended the
Roman Catholic Grammar School in Georgetown and Queen's College, the
colony's {oremost secondary school. He studied law in London and was called fo
the bar in July 1913. Among the East Indians who diassociated themselves from
the recall movement, he was prominent, being the chief speaker at the gathering
thatdrew up the resolution. He contested the seat of financial Representative for
Demerara, but failed to win partly because of a last-minute hitch. He was
promised support by the Demerara planters who withdrew it when a planter's son,
H. C. Humphreys, a solicitor, decided at the eleventh hour to enter the contest.
The third East Indian candidate f qr the election was Ashrafally who contested the
seat of Financial Representative of Georgetown. He came to the colony under
indenture, but later rose to become a shop-keeper in Water Street, the colony's
commercial centre. Apparently his candidature was not treated seriously by the
electorate, as he obtained only 11 of the l,196 votes polled. Edward Luckhoo
attended the Anglican school in New Amsterdam and Queen's College. Upon
leaving shcool he was articled to a lawyer and later became a solicitor. He
practised and lived in New Amsterdam and became the mayor of the town in
1911. His defeat in 1916 by A.A. Thome, an African schoolm9ster, for the New
Amsterdam Financial Representative seat marked his second failure to win this
seat. 72
Joseph Luckhoo was the only East Indian to win a seat. He attended the same
school as his brother and studied law in London. In 1912 he was called to the bar.
He defeated a European planter, J.R Laing, whose estate, Marionville in
Wakenaam, was situated within the south-west Essequibo constituency. Of the five
Indians who contested the elections Luckhoo alone was a member of the Peoples'
Association. This was a quasi-political party, dominated by African, Portuguese,
and Coloured middle-class elements, and functioned mostly around election times.
Luckhoo's success came primarily from his affiliation to this body which appealed
specifically to the African electorate. Besides the African votes, he.also obtained
the Indian votes that were crucial in this doubtful seat.
Luckhoo's election received mixed reactions. Cecil Clementi, Colonial Secretary
and Acting Governor at various times between 1916 and 1922, conducted a
relentless campaign to introduce Crown Colony Government in British Guiana. He
wished to control East Indian entry and·participation in the body politic. Before
the 1916 elections when there was no East Indian representative in the legislature,
he recommended that Indians should receive representation both by election and
nomrnation. He hoped that through nomination they would be adequately
represented and would not "indulge in the noisy political agitation which is
characteristic of the ... voter of African descent ... at election times. " 73 Precedence
existed, he argued, in the British colonies of Ceylon, Hong Kong, and Fiji where
both methods of election and nomination were·concurrently used for apportioning
elected members to the legislature. After.Luckhoo's success Clementi advanced
more severe criticisms. He condemned' elections on the whole and was "very
strong ofopinion that neither the negro ... nor the East Indian population in this
42
Re-circulated on the University of Guyana History Society Facebook Page by the UGHS Alumni ( History Graduates of the University of Guyana)
Courtesy of the Westmaas collection

colony as a whole is really fit for the franchise." He further believed that "the next
General Elections ... will involve a trial of strength between the black electorate ...
and the East Indians." 74 Clementi's obsession with constitutional change blinded
him to anything positive about Luckhoo's election, that it augured well for the
future that an East Indian should receive political support from African voters.
Luckhoo, on the other hand, saw his election in a brighter light. While he was in
England as.a member of the British Guiana deputation to renew Indian immigration
to the colony, he admitted that he "did not succeed owing to the votes of East
Indians alone," as he "received votes from black peot?le and from among the other
people in the place." This he saw as an example of the public spirit that exists in
the colony~ " 75 . . ,,
Governor Wilfred Collet (1919-22) also had a sanguine view of Luckhoo's
election. He argued that Luckhoo's election with African support proved "that the
East Indians have under the present system considerable influence." Moreover,
"the fact that an East Indian is elected by a Negro vote does not seem ... to be
€onducive to hatred between the two races but the reverse. " 76 With regard to
Clementi's suggestion of East Indian nomination, he warned that if the unofficial
members were to be appointed exclusively from the East Indian community, then
the African electorate would have ground for seeking the withdrawal of the
franchise from the Indians. He saw this as "a great mistake and would .. only tend
to perpetuate racial antagonism." 77
rhe climax to the increased participation of Indians in the public life of the
colony came with the formation of the British Guiana East Indian Association. In
1916 J~~EhJiMhQm.~Ili."': .. ~tE;[}JrJ::t~lL~~Liant afld prominent activist in Indian
'affairs, convened a meeting 1n~ew,Ams~erd.arr1. t()C()nsiderthe advisability of
f9rming an association fottne moral, socialancl intelledGarcThvelopment of
Indians. " 7 s . Ruhoman was .ent~sted. ~vi th.th~ tas~ .. of guHi~JngJhe aL and
objectives offfle~@ti6ii'''f!e clesit~ft ... ~~l~dia~i'tal

professional Indians continued in a more vigorous manner where those of New
Amsterdam left off. ,Madhoo Lall Bhose, an ardent Bengali patriot and nationalist,
initiated the move by surnmonin~ a meeting at his home in 1919. Thence came a
larger gathering at St. Andrew s Hall where Joseph Luckhoo presided. In his
address he stressed the need for cooperation among the Indians in the Colony and
cited the rote and activities of the Indian National Congress of India. Luckhoo was
elected president and Dr. W.H. Wharton and Thomas Flood honorary presidents.
Ther~fter th

5. Parliamentary Papers (hereafter cited as P.P.). P.P. 1871, (C. 393), p. 54.
6. C.O. 114/121, Report of the Immigration AgentGeneral, 1907-8.
7. C.O. 1_14/135, Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1910-11.
8. C.O. 111/563, Hodgson to Crewe, no. 307, 10 October 1908.
9. C.O. 11/572, Hodgson to Crewe, conf., 4 August, 1910, end.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. C.O. 111/577, Hodgson to the Secretary of State, conf. 13 May 1911, end.
13. Ibid.
14. C.O. 111/572, Hodgson to the Secretary of State, conf., 13 May 1911. ..
15. P.P. 1910, (Cd. 5193), pp. 520-23.
16. C.O. 111/572, Hodgson to Crewe, conf., 31 August 1910, end.
17. C.O. 111/593, qJerton to Harcourt, conf., 9 Mardi 1914.
18. Mc Neil and Lal visited British Guiana and other colonies to enquire into, and report on, the condition of
Indian hnmigrants.
19. C.O. 111/593,Egerton toHarcourt, conf., 9 March 1914.
20. C.0.111/598, India Office, 11 June 1914.
21. Peter Ruhoman, Centenary History of the East Indians in Br.itish Guiana (Georgetown: The Daily
Chronicle, 1946), p. 227.
22. C.O. 111/577, Hodgson to Harcourt, Secret, 26 May 1911.
23. C.0.111/588, India Office, 20 March 1911.
24.C.0.111/577, Hodgson to Harcourt, Secret, 26 May 1911.
25. C.O. 111/581, India Office, 1 August1911.
26. C.0. 111/594, f.gerton to Harcourt, Secret, 9 May 1914.
27. C.0.111/598, India Office, 29 December 1914.
28. C.0. 111/606, Clementi to Bonar Law, conf., 20 July 1916.
29. Ibid.
30. C.O. 111/579, Miscellaneous, 23 March 1910.
31.C.0.111/575, Home0ffice, 13April 1910.
32. C.O. 111/575, Home Office, 26 February 1910.
33. C.0.111/594, qJerton to Harcourt, Secret, 9 May 1914.
34. lbld.
35. C.O. 111/594, qJerton to Harcourt, Secret, 30 June 1914.
36. C.O. 111/614, India Office, 24 June 1917.
37. C.0.111/560, Hodgson to Elgin, no 50, 2 March 1908.
38. JAE. Young, The Approaches to Local Self Govemmentin British Guiana (London: Longmans,
1958), p.160.
39. Ibid.
40. The Argosy, 17 April 1909.
41. C.O. 114/151, Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1914-15.
42. C.O. 111/572, Hodgson to Crewe, no. 181,28May 1910.
43. Ibid.
44. C.O. 111/572, Hodgson to Crewe, conf., 16 Sept. 1910.
45
Re-circulated on the University of Guyana History Society Facebook Page by the UGHS Alumni ( History Graduates of the University of Guyana)
Courtesy of the Westmaas collection
J

45. Ibid.
46. C,0. 114/177, Report of the Immigration Agent General, 1920.
47. C.0.111/572, Hodgson to Crewe, conf., 16 Sept. 1910, encl.
48. C.O. 111/572, Hodgson to Crewe, no. 181, 28May 1910, encl.
49. The Daily Chronide, 9 May 1882.
50. The Daily Chronicle, 29 May 1910.
51. The Daily Chronicle, 2_June 1910.
52. Summarised from P.P. 1897, L(C. 8657), sect. 98.
53. P.P. 1897, L(C. 8657), sect. 158.
54. The Daily Chronicle. 13 Sept.1898.
55. C.O. 111/516, lndla Office, 7 June 1899.
56.C.0.111/580, Cox to Harcourt. no. 385, 25 Nov.1911.
57.lbid.
58. C.O. 111/600, Egerton to fhe Secretary of State, telegram 12 July 1915.
59; C.O. 111/617, Collet to W.H. Long, conf., 31 July 1917.
60. India Office, J & P 29229: 1914 "Confidential: British Guiana• quoted in H. Tinker A New System of
Slavery Cl..ondon: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 332.
61.C.O. 111/612,Collet to W.H. l.ong, conf., 3lJuly 1917.
62. C.O. 111/597, f.gerton to Secretmy of State, telegram, 16 Nov. 1914.
63. C.O. 111/599, f.gerton to Harcourt, no. 13, 8 Jan. 1915. encl.
64. C.O. 111/599, f.gerton to Harcourt, no. 61, 6 Feb. 1915.
65. The Daily Chronicle, 24 Sept. 1898.
66. C.O. 111/625, Clementi to the Secretary of Slate, telegram, 23 Ck;t. 1919.
67.See pp. 26-8.
68. C.O. 111/625, Collet to Milner, no. 504, 15 November 1919, encl.
69. The Daily Argosy, 26 August 1916.
70. C.O. 111/607, Clementi to Bonar Law, Secret, 28 August 1916.
71. lbid.
72. C.O. 111/608, Clementi to Bonar Law, conf., 24 October 1916.
73. C.O. 111/608, Clementi to Bonar Law, coo£., 31 October 1916.
14.lbid.
75. C.O. 111/625, India Office, 18 Sept. 1919.
76. C.O. 111/628, Collet to Milner, conf., 10 January 1920.
77. Ibid.
78. Peter Ruhoman, p. 227.
79. Joseph Ruhoman, "The Creole East Indian," Tlmehri, vol. VI (Aug. 1921), p. 105.
46
Re-circulated on the University of Guyana History Society Facebook Page by the UGHS Alumni ( History Graduates of the University of Guyana)
Courtesy of the Westmaas collection

THE COMING OF CROWN COLONY GOVERNMENT
TO BRITISH GUIANA IN 1928
by
James Rose
The nineteenth-century constitutional arrangement in British Guiana was a unique
system of administration. The Court of Policy,introduced in the 1690's, 1 was made
up of the Commandeur, his secretary and two or three managers of the
plantations belonging to the Dutch West India Company. This body met
periodically to discuss the affairs of the Company and on occasions addressed its
attention to matters of judicial significance. In the beginning, this was a very
informal arrangement but some twenty years later, on,28 September 1718,it was
institutionalised as the Raad Van Politie en Justitie - The Council of Policy and
Justice. 2 At the same time, the clerk of +he Company was invited to become a
member, while the secretary of the Company was identified as the functionary next
in authority to the Commandeur. 3
In 1739, after much agitation, private planters grudgingly were permitted to sit
with the Company's managers in the Council. 4 In 1746, six officers of the burgher
militia were constituted into a College of Kiezers (Electors) with the express
purpose of nominating the representatives from the free planter community to the
Court of Policy and Justice. 5 Over a period, the Council of Policy was separated
from the Council of Justice (1750), was enlarged and gathered to itself diverse
other functions. 6 The evidence suggests that almost from the beginning there were
divisions within the Council over issues, a few of which were critical to the ultimate
structure and function of the organisation. 7 One of the really contentious issues was
the jurisdiction of the Council over matters pertaining to the finance of the colony.
There was a Company (King's) Chest derived from customs duty and a head tax on
slaves. This revenue was used to defray all colonial expenses. There was, as well,
the Colony_ Chest, over which the colonists exercised some mea:sure of control by
virtue of the fact that all contributory taxes necessitated their consent. 8 The
problem here was the tendency on the part of the Commandeur to charge
expenses percei~ed as belonging under the jurisdiction of the Company Chest to
this fund.
The other thorny issue concerned the role and function of the Kiezers. Did they
have rights in so far as Company issues were concerned,or were they restricted to
colony affairs only? Since they were derived from the burgher militia,their
jurisdiction over things colonial was understood,but the burghers preferred to be
seen as having a jurisdiction extending across Company affairs as well,and this
47

produced early conflicts which had to be speedily resolved.9
In 1784,a crisis arose when the States-General attempted to reduce the
representation of the free planter community and,more importantly,the right of
nomination,perceived as the elective principle,from the burgher community,the
College of Kiezers. 10 Protest and agitation produced an investigation in 1786
resulting in the Concept Plan of Redress of 1787 . 11
The Plan was something of a mixed blessing, for while it offered the free planter
community equal representation with the Company officials, it seemed to be
denying the right to discuss the finances of the colony. It should be noted that equal
representation was in itself coming much later than it had been earned, for the free
planters were by far the dominant economic group in the society. This fact was
recognised in the enlargement of the membership of a separate College for
Demerara. The free planter community, however, was disturbed by the implied
right of the Governor, in agreement with the Commandeurof Essequibo and
Demerara and sitting with the Fiscals, to control the revenue. This reversal created
much distress and, as a ·consequence, on 12 January 1795 new instructions
suggested that the Government and College of Kiezers should watch over the
colonial fund. This joint meeting took place on 22 June 1795, when the Court of
Policy and the College of Kiezers met to discuss matters of a financial nature and
decided that this combined council would henceforth supervise the raising of funds
12
and regulate itsexpenditure. In this way, the College of Kiezers was for this
peculiar purpose transposed into a College of Financial Representatives.
The true implications of the combination of a single interest were soon
realised,and the concession was withdrawn on 11 June 1796. This brought to an
end the functioning of what had come to be known.as the Financial Department.1 3
These developments coincided with the capture of the colony by the British,
foUowed by the French who retained possession pending the return to peace. It
was convincingly argued by the plantocracy that the new arrangement, in which the
Governor would put an esti~q1~ g(~rnual expenditure to the Court of Policy ,and
allow the Combined Court to~tfie·ways and means of funding the estimate, was the
practice at the time of capitulation. The _Articles of Capitulation made .sacred and
inviolable those institutions, practices and customs which were in existence at this
time. The planter community argued that its control over the revenue was a
recognised practice atthe time of the capitulation and therefore was to be
continued by the British in keeping with the Articles ofCapitulation. 14
In 1803, the British took over the administration of the Guiana colonies for the
third time. 15 The Articles of Capitulation undertook to uphold the existing
institutions and practices,presumably confirming the Combined Court ii) its
participation in the consideration of financial matters. The British were confirmed
in their control of the colonies in 1814 arid the colonies were unffied in 1831.
With the abolition of slavery,the old system of raising revenue by a tax on slaves
could no longerwork,so a new system had to be devised. The Colonial Office
directed the Government to induce the Combined Court to grant the King's Chest
48

a fixed sum of £17,500 ,in return for which it conceded to the Court that the Civil
List, " ... though continuing to be prepared as at present by the Court of Policy,shall
be discussed in detail, freely, without reserve by the Combined Court ... " 16 In this
way the oligarchy gained British acceptance of its control of the revenues of the
colony.
Emancipation threatenedthe existence of the sugar economy. Labour problems
created the need for immigration, and immigration generated a need for funding.
This forced the planter-oligarchy increasingly to strengthen its stranglehold on the
administrative machinery, to the exclusion of all other interests, and more often
than not, at the expense of the Colonial Office. 11 This was vital to the interests'of
the planters, since they needed to control finance to be able to assist themselves
tnrough state funding. As interests other than sugar emerged, they demanded
access to the political process,but this could not be granted at such a critical
juncture. The franchise was restricted. It was based on ownership of property and
on the extent to which that property was cultivated. Agitation persisted against this
form of discrimination but, essentially, what was sought was not so much a change
in structure and function as in eligibility. Limited gains were achieved in 1849,
1852 and again in 1855 18 during periods of particularly intense agitation.
The second half of the nineteenth century.and particularly the final quarter,·.saw
the sugar economy in deep and almost chronic recession. The peasantry was also
in decline. The independent Creole community was systematically dislodged from
its huckstering activities. The labour force was being contracted and the wage rate
considerably reduced. The independent, embryonic Portuguese commercial sector
was also ailing in the wake of the recession in the dominant sugar economy. 19 All
sectors clamoured for relief and they aU sought amelioration through political
action. By the 1880's, the need for constitutional reform of a profound nature was
admitted by the Colonial Office,its local chief servant, Governor Henry T. Irving,
and the planter oligarchy. 20
In the attempts to· deal. with this situation, however, the Colonial· Office was
restrained by countervailing issues, especially the colour question. Liberalisation of
the franchise would lead to increasing access of Blacks to the legislature, and since
theyenjoyed a numerical preponderance in the population, it was not difficult to
foresee their taking complete control of this body eventually. Bat the Blacks were
considered unsuited for the exercise of power, particularly in so far as this power
could be used against White economic interests. This was of critical importance
because, as the Whites perceived it, Blacks' , .. "knowledge of economics, finance
and commerce has oft times not a very deep foundation ... " 21 It was also no secret
that the disaffected Black peasantry and Creole groups were still atwar with the
White oligarchy. Their repeated calls for state-funded drainage and irrigation and a
relaxation of the prohibitive and punitive tax system, and the consistent rebuffs
which ~ey suffered from the White power structure, were compelling reminders of
this contest. 22 The anti-Portuguese riot of 1889 was essentially displaced anger by
the urban Creole sector. 23 49

Once again, the survival of the sugar economy depended on the control of the
political process. The 1891 reforms abolished the College of Kiezersand
intl"ociU

have declared themselves available for military service," which seems to have been
unpopular among some sections of the community. 33
The machinery did not function in a manner encouraging to the newly
enfranchised. There were complaints about a shortage ofregistration forms, 34 and
in addition, Blacks and Coloureds were deliberately obstructed in their efforts to
become registered. 35 It seems that every opportunity was taken to deem them
illiterates or, in other ways, ineligible. 36 Furthermore, the time available was much
too short and many. of the newly qualified seemed unaware of the procedure as
well as the import. 37 Then too, miners and those in the timber industry located in
the interior were totally excluded. 38 . Finally, the iniquitous practice of the open ballot
discouraged many from. participating for fear of victimisation in one form or
another. 39 · · "
On the one hand, it was not difficult to explain the moderation of the refor~.
The Colonial Office was not prepared to be liberal at the expense of the planter
class, already burdened with serious economic problems. 40 It was reluctant to
encounter the criticisms anticipated in the British Parliament from the strong. lobby
which supported coloniaLeconomic activity. 41 Also, the grave importance which it
attached to the procurement of an enlarged Civil List discouraged any attemptat
radicalism.
42 '
On the other hand, Governor Sir Henry Irving was resolute about meaningful
changes. He was strongly against a constitution in which "... one interest only is
represented and in which that interest can,when it may deem proper to do so,
bring about a deadlock in public affairs". 43 Irving was enterprising. He persuaded
the planters thatchanges were necessary. However, he was abrasive and in the
circumstances the Colonial Office deliberately withheld changes until he was
.replaced. 44 Governor Viscount Gormanston actually encouraged the planter
oligarchy to oppose any attempt to change the tonstitution. 45 The Colonial Office,
the Governor, and the planter body were able to gef away with this volte face
becauseinreality therewas anabsenceof a really radical pressure group bent on
achieving meaningful changes .. The middle dass was composed of two conservative fr(
elements: firstly, the domestic capitalist who wanted to be granted privileges similar'! ·.
to those enjoyed by foreign capital,and secondly, ·a Coloured and Black
intelligentsia/professional group who Wanted recognition, but who at the same .
ti~e was suspicious of similar ambitions of the Black working class. Neither
element "craved profound structural changes. It was easy therefore for the Colonial
Office to satisfy such demands by offering limited concessions; There was, as
always, thecomrnitmentgivenin1803 to honour the Articles of Capitulation. All
the same, it is significant to note that the Colonial Office never perceived itself as
duly hampered. Thus the Secretary of State told Governor Gormanston:
In ...• your request for instructions as to how far any reform of the constitution of the
colony can be effected without Imperial Legislation, I have to acquaint you that as the
colony was added to the British dominion by conquest confirmed by the concession
51

contained in the Treari1 of 1814, the power of making laws was from the first, exercisable
by the King in Council.;;
7
In sfiort, It was not that the British government could not, but rather that it chose
not to, legislate for Guiana.
Yet, wnat was notmanifest was latent. In 1896, secret balloting was introduced.
The Colonial Office for some time was bothered by the abuses of open.balloting
and in 1891 had reluctantly conceded this dause. The timely withdrawal of this
device one year before the generalelections of 1897 helped other interests to
exploit the latent flaws in the 1891 constitution. 48
Furthermore, it does seem that the reverses of the 1892 elections inspired the
Coloured and>Black elements t6 improve their performance at subsequent
elections. Their politics became more radical, more flamboyant and better
organised. The.report of the Royal Commission of 1897 gave added impetus to
those opposed-to the sugar interest, when it virtuallv certified the death of the sugar
industry and demanded recognition of other forms of economic activity. 49
.J'l.1oreover, the issue of race, never far below the surface, emerged as a critical
factor in aU subsequent election campaigns. 50 finally,there definitely was a new
consciousness,manifested in intense working-class militancy and protests: " 1 While
working-dass organisations, still. few in number, were not directly associated with
any particular political organisation, and although no really mass:--based political
party was in existence, it appears that a direct correlation existed between
working-class restiveness and heightened conciousness among the masses. This
was recognised by the middle-class politicians who chose to exploit the Black
platform. This encouraged· those Blacks and Coloureds recently admitted to the
franchise to stand more solidly with the Black and Coloured caucus. The result was
the increasing gains of these politicians and the corresponding marginalisation of
White representation in the legislature.
This ouster of the white element is critical to an understanding of what was to
take place in the 1920s. In the immediate post-reform elections this consequence
was not· obvious, but it became increasingly evident, particularly when further
liberalisation took place in 1909 . 52 Such a development was important because the
bulk of the newly enfranchised came from to the lower classes, particularly Black
and Coloured; and some second-generation East Indians. This class of voter had Its
own concerns, grievances and ambitions, and it was apparent that these did not
coincide with those of·the White oligarchy. 53
This divergence produced a shift in electoral Issues which tended to .radicalise the
political progress. 54 The oligarchy complained thatthe process had been wlgarised,
55
a factor which may partially account for Us withdrawal. Us inability to carry the
new issues convincingly to the recently enfranchised seems to have been another
motivating factor. Further, the fact that the distorted socio-economic formation
produced recurrent racial issues kept the Whites on the defensive, making some of
them extremely unpopular, particularly at election time. This prompted some of
them to withdraw from politics even when an electoral·contest was unnecessary. 56
The fact that their concerns and ambitions were still given priority consideration in
the Executive Council would have considerably helped to ease their withdrawal
52

from public contest. 57 In addition, the introduction of secret balloting reduced the
possibility of victimisation and ensured a greater measure of confidentiality. 58 The
planters' control of the electorate through coercion and mystification wa$. thus
undermined, thereby helping to reduce their efficacy at the polls. As early as 1897,
EdwardDavson, an Englishman, planter and bigot, proposed the abolition of the
1891 constitution on the ground that too many blacks had been enfranchised. He
lamented the fact that Black representatives with no stake in the economic
weH-being of the colony had begunto take over the legislature. 59 In a lecture to the
Royal Colonial Institute, Davson declared:"I do not believe that in any colony of the
Empire the White element should be subject to the coloured whether it be be black,
brown or yellow ... "60In 1889, Rev.J.G. Pearson was even more explicit. He
lamented "the futility of speaking of legislating for, and treating, the Blacks as 1,1pon
all fours with ourselves. " 61 He had earlier noted:
We govern him by the same laws as we govern ourselves and that in the abstract is
right,but probably in practice laws apparently less equitable would prove tenfold more
beneficient ... we owe it to the Negro to think for him,to help him by placing over him
trustworthy men ar.med with almost feudal authoritg to enforce such social duties as
devolve upon him and so save him from himself. .. We le~islate as men for men;and so far
as men are concerned all.is well.but the Negro is a child. 6
This attitude was significant,since it aggravated already existing tensions between
the Blacks and Whites as the economy continued to founder and Black faces
increasingly appeared in the legislature.
The appearance of Black representatives in the Combined· Court was particularly
frightening to the planter class and the commercial interests. This development
would have been a spectacle of more than passing concern to these economic
interest groups at any time· in· colonial history,· but was even more· a concern si.Ace
the collapse· of the local economy in the 1880s. Control of the Combined Court
once again became increasingly important as the crisis prolonged and deepened.
Working-class protests began in a disorganised fashion in the first decade of the
twentieth century, but became more organised and broad-based in the second
decade. 63 The war brought temporary relief to the employer class, but none to the
disaffected w. orking class. Control of the political process was necessary to
influence the concessions dispensed to workers in an effort to diffuse their
militancy. Yet, because of the political gains of the Coloureds and the Blacks, it was
difficultto·exercise this control. In 1922,the Chief Secretary, and· on occasions
Officef Administering the Colony, rnade this telling point:
So far the effect of the (1891) reform has mainly been to transfer to the Black and
Coloured element much of the power formerly possessed by the planters while leaving the
government of the Colony still in a permanent minority .. .in the Combined Court ... For
when sugar was King,the Combined Court did at least continuously pursue a policy which
would benefit the sugar industry. But since the reforms of 1891 it is questionable whether
any definite policy whatever has been consistently pursued by the Combined Court. 64
There were of course two sides tothis perceived inconsistency. In the first place, it
was no secret that the incumbents were not revolutionaries bent on the destruction
of sugar. 65 This was rnanifestin the joint appeal made to the Commission led by
E.F.L Wood for the amelioration of conditions adversely affecting the sugar
53

industry. 66 That the Combined Court was not ipso facto anti-plantation or
a.nti-Whitewas always an accepted fad, sometimes worrying to Black lower-class
leadership. But whereas in the past sugar, as King in the Combined Court, could
use its command of this forum to exclude itself from its obligations to colonial
welfare, it could no longer do so as a consequence of the marginalisation of its
influence in the Combined Court. Equallycrucial was the fact that the incumbents
were not reluctant to appropriate sugar its fair share of taxation. 67
Since the beginning of constitutional government, and particularly since 1798,
the planter's control of the Combined. Court had always been a critical factor in his
survival of one crisis after the other. On three occasions, in 1835, 1840 and
1847 ... 8, planter-controlled Combined Courts had refused to vote the supplies, and
government had been forced to grant concessions; 68 In 1887, Governor Irving was
moved to complain about this stranglehold, noting that:
... a constitution in which one interest only is represented and .in which that interest can,
when it may deem proper to do so bring about a deadlock in public affairs ... is politically
indefensible, and.necessarily breaks down the moment the elective members come into
collision with the Government acting on behalf of the unrepresented classes. 69
When the planter oligarchywas displaced irithe Combined Court, this monopoly
wastransf erred to the new. incumbents, The mere fact the new controllers were
Blacks and Coloureds frightened the plantocracy, the commercial class and the
Colonial Office. All were still convinced that sugar should be treated as special and
became perturbed on those occasions when the Combined Court failed to do so.
This is not to suggest thatthe Combined Court was unaware of the importance of
sugar to the economic welfare of the colony. Nor was the,Cornbined Court, as a
group,uniformly opposedto protection for sugar. The crux was that it was not
prepared to off er uncritical support and protectionto sugar exclusive of all other
economic interests. In a real sense,whil~ sugar remained important, it was no
longer perceived as the only important economic activity in the colony.
Henceforth, it would have to share its• importance. with. other sectors of the colonial
economy.
This Was but one consequence of the post-1891 shift in power in the Court.
There WfZre two other effects of similar significance. One was the lukewarm
support given to government's development programme in the Court. The other
concerned the general implications of the Court, with "its new composition and its
· control· of taxation, for attracting overseas fonding and investments, both of which
were accepted as criticalto economic recovery. 70 While the withdrawal of uncritical
support for the sugar economy was considered grave, what was interpreted as the
Court's lack of sympathy for the problems faced by government was an even more :a ..
serious cause of concern.The colony hovered on the brink of economic collapse "
and an "unpatriotic" and "irresponsible" group of politicians was seen to be bent on
facilitating economic disaster.
The situation, however; was not quite as simple as official critics often
contended .. The government made up the annual budget and presented it to the
Combined Court. This body was charged with raising the revenue to fund the
estimates. The Court could delete items or reduce the cost of items in the
54

estimates, but it could not add items thereto. In its deliberations, the· Court decided
who, and>what, were to be taxed for the current year. Herein lay the fjrst crisis.
When the planter oligarchy was in charge, the burden of taxation fell heavily on the
unrepresented classes and, toa lesser extent, the commercial sector. When other
interests took control of the Court, they sought to correct this disequilibrium by
redistributing the taxes and by bringing some measure of relief to other sectors and
to the poor, by attempting to curb government spending. 71 These initiatives
gradually produced deficits and these deficits induced the Court to levy taxes on
the do111inantsectors of the economy, namely sugar and bauxite. 12
In the post;...1916 period, considerable controversy raged over the increasing
magnitude ofgovernment's spending, particularly since this coincided with a severe
economic crisis, under1:!mploYJrlent, unemployment, wage cuts and high taxation. 73
The Court charged the Government with reckless spending, while the Goverfiment
accused the Court of indifference, tardiness and sabotage. It is important to note,
however, that towards the 1920s, in direct response to chronic economic
recession, the Government had initiated serious measures to expand and diversify
the colonial economy. 74 These efforts necessitated an ever-expanding budget.
Simultaneously, the recession forced the Government to seek to have more and
more members of the establishment on the permanent Civil List.7 5 Both trends
tended to inflate the annual estimates .and this rarsed the ire of the Court. When
some names were struckoff the List or their salaries questioned or reduced, both
the Government and.the Colonial Office accused the Court of scaring away public
servants, 76 thereby impeding economic development and aiding a prolongation and
a deepening of the economic crisis.
Furtheqnore,
it was believed that the reluctance of the Court to support
uncritically everything put before it,• its taxing of the· dominant economic sector and
Jtsgeneralattitude of hostility to the Government jeopardised the colony's chances
ofhenefiting from the best overseas fundingavailable. 77 The best loans,particularly
those contracted through the Crown Agents and guaranteed by the British
Government, were to, be had at much lower interest rates than those obtained
78
through other agencies. The exclusion from Crown Agents' assistance
automatically deprived the Government of much needed capital for development
projects. Similarly, the inability of the Govemmentto be assured of internal funding
through the Court rendered the colony's ability to repay or service any debt
contracted internally or externally exceedingly unpredictable. 79 This weakness
placed the colonyin an unfavourable light to donors and lenders in general. At the
same time, taxes such as those levied on sugar, an ailing industry, and bauxite, a
new economic venture, tended to frighten away prospective investors to the
detriment of the colony. 80
In th~se circumstances, the Colonial Office chose to blame the Court for the
colony's indebtedness. Essentially, what ought to have been argued was that, by
not granting enough financial coverage to the colonial budget, the Court may have
contributed to a deficit in the budget. Furthermore, by this same reluctance, the
Court may have reduced the avenues for external assistance and thereby inhibited
economic recovery. In either case,the Court might have justifiably responded that
by not supporting the Government's liberal fiscal policy, it was attempting to put a
55

ake on Government's spending at a time when prudence was necessary, bearing
in mind the problems in the economy 81 The accusations were presented in a form
suggesting that the Court was in some way responsible for the excessive spending.
This was wholly unfounded, since it was the Government which made up the
estimates and, while the Court could delete, it could not add to the estimates. The
crisis stemmed from the reluctance of the Courfto
support government's
programmes. 82
The Colonial Office chose to see and interpret this conflict in terms of a group of
elected representatives possessed of power but at the same time devoid of a proper
· sense of responsibility. The Government; on. the other hand ,was deprived of power
in the Court. It was also subject to strict accountability to the British Government
and the general public for its inability to bring economic relief to the colony. 83 This
"wholly untenable" situation, it was argued, had.to be speedily corrected. Yet this
was not a novel situation.
Perhaps the most important innovation of the 1891 reform was the Executive
Council. While in a formal sense such a council did not exist prior to 1891, an .
informal arrangement permitted the Court of Policy the exercise of some of the
duties of an Executive CounciJ.1!4 This relationship did not of course apply in
matters of "overriding imperial concern," for on such occasions the Governor
could, and nearly always did,act onhis own. 85 Further, since the Court of Policy
had not been appointed an Executive Council, the Governor. was never duty-bound
to consult with it or to be· guided by such advice as was given when consultation did
take place. Finally, while the records. tended to suggest that such consultations took
place with the Court of Policy, the practice was to consult only with the official
section, and not so much with the elected representatives. 86 Some particularly
influential and amenable mernbers of the planting comrnunity,who happened to be
among those elected to the Court ofPolicy, also may have had access to the
consultative process. This nexus between important economic interests and
extra-legal consultation was critical, since at all times, economic interests, and
therefore access to the consultative process, coincided with whiteness, and may in
fact explain the functioning of this body. It appears thatthis pseudo-executive
arrangement, notwithstanding occasional minor controversies, continued
satisfactorily until the advent of the Coloured and, in some respects, commercial
interests. It was at this juncture that the Executive Council became a "fall-back"
position of safety from pressure politics, intended to strengthen the hand of the
Government, to preserve planter prestige, and to protect his vested interests.
After 1916, the Executive Council became the locus ofcontroversy, not so much
because it relieved the Court of Policy of the .administrative functions which this
latter body had been accustomed to performing and which it had come to see as its
right, but rather because subsequent governors chose to violate the spirit in which
the Executive Councjlwas expected tofunction.8;/ From the beginning, there were
complaints that the Executive Council had increased the strength of the governor at
the expense of the legislature. It was also noted that it disrupted the calm and good
will whichhad characterised the consultative process. Now that the Governor was
authorised to nominate members of the Court of Policy to the Council, he had
56

created a serious division among the ranks by choosing only from among the
nominated representatives. Further, since the proceedings oftheCouncil were
secret, the rest of the Court of Policy was in effect excluded from participation in
the· Executive Council.
In the beginning, however, successive governors did in fact appoint elected
representatives to the Executive Council, but controversy arose over the tendency
to appoint eitherplanters or their white sympathisers. In fact, the governors placed
considerable store on the advice which they could, and did, receive from those
colonial notables. Consultation with such worthieswas preferred over that with any
other sector ofthe society. This was illustrated in the treatment meted out to the
elected representatives. They were considered unofficials and as such were eligible
for appointments to the Ex~tutive Council. But since the constitution did not
stipulate elected representatives, this was not necessarily a right, even thougf;ias
elected representatives in the Court of Policy, they had every expectation of such
nomination and indeed some of them were so appointed. Subsequently, as the
White sector became smaller in the Court of Policy, and its places were taken by
I31acks,Coloureds, Portugueseand, after 1912, East Indians,·itwas more difficult
fqr.gover,nors to recruit White nominees to the Council. As a consequence, in
}916, Governor \A/ilfred Collet discontinued the practice of nominating from within
the Court of Policy.ss .
Collet stated that he found the elected representatives cantankerous and
hostile.ii 9 Subsequent governors found supportfor his policy in the Colonial Office,
where the thinking was that the inclusion of the elected representatives was
essentialonlyas a preparation forresponsible government. 90 Since British Guiana
was not considered as being set on this course, it was not considered necessary to
nominate the elected representatives to the Council. This varying of the old
· practice created unnecessary but fertile ground for animosity between the elected
representatives and the Government, producing in a very real sense an almost
unified opposition within the Court of Policy. 91 This opposition was transferred
to,and was bitterly fought out in , the Combined Court. This contest resulted in
interminable financial disputes,always with racial overtones,that would help to bring
about the final withdrawal of the constitution.
There could be no doubt that governors such as CoJlet in no way actually
violated the constitution when they chose to exclude the elected elements from·the
Council. Their action received the open support of the Col_onial Office. The
problem was that the period was one of severe economic recession when unity
among aUthe sectors was important. The conditions for this unity were created
when elected representatives served in the Executive Council and came to see
themselves aspart of the Government. On the other hand,the conditions were
subverted when the elected representatives were excluded. No doubt,this explains
why the Governor frequently found it difficult to win the support of any member of
the elected representatives in time of dire need. 92 After 1916, no representative felt
responsible,or obligated enough by virtue of his inclusion in the Executive Council,
or camaraderie, to support the Government's position. Any such sympathy was
alienated; all opportunities for establishing a coalition were passed over, and
militant opposition was the result.
57

In the midst of all of this, the Commission led by E.F.L Wood visited the colony.
Its report pronounced optimistically on the future prospects of the colony,
expressed satisfaction with the workings of the constitution and seemed ob1ivious
· of the problems and seething anger of the dispossessed. The brief post-war boom
ended in the mid 1920s, and the colony was immediately afflicted with a new
recession in the economy. Unemployment and under-employment increased. 93
Prices went up and wages were cut twice, once in 1921 and again in 1922. 94
Rents, which were normally high, rose and tenants, particularly those drawn from
the working dass, who could not normally pay their rents, now found such
obligations impossible. 95 The · people took to the . streets demanding
employment, living wages and•. rent restrictions. This restiveness was not confined
·to the urban areas;estate workers took strike action and threatened to join with the
urban dispossessed to force concessions from the employer class. The Colonial
authgrities panicked, the police opened fire and twelve workers were killed in
1924. 96 .
Micldl$":cb1ss politicians,. Portuguese, Coloured, Black·. and East Indian, made
capita}.ofthe crisis. They appeared prominently .among the dispossessed, agitating
andarticulating but doing little else, since in a real sense they were themselves
unaware of the wider crisis 1ninternational capitalism, and. perhaps even more so
because theywere themselves afraid of a militant working class."' '
On the political front,the situation was complex,. The process of middle-class
displacement of the planting interest in the legislature was accelerated as a
L consequence of the on-going struggle, party organisation and increasing
enhancement of the recently enfranchised. A bitter contest produced a stalemate in
the mayoral elections of 1922, resulting in an acrimonious libel suit. One daily
newspaper was forced to dose its doors as a result of the court judgement. 98 The
Popular Party emerged as a significant political force, appearing to be more than a
mere election campaign organisation. It capitalised on the. various issues abroad
and joined in the general agitation of the British Guiana Labour Union. The
election campaign of·l926 was.bitterly contested. Econoffiic·developmentand
politicaLreforms,not unexpectedly, were the major issues. The Popular Party won
the elections, . but the· results were· immediatelychallenged 99 and· as a consequence
five of eight candidates were unseated by the Court. Against this background, the
financial situation reached a criticallevel and was exploited by the plantocracy to
reverse·the electoral results by·bringing .about the.eventual overthrow of the
constitution:
The Court controlled the fiscal system, devising ways and means of raising the
taxes to fund the annual estimates. Increasingly, however, conflis:;t emerged over
whattheCourt perceivedas extravagance on the part·of the.Executive·and what
the Executive convinced itself was sabotage on the part of the Court. The root of
the conflict lay in the depressed economy: .In the post-war years, prices fell for
sugar, and Guiana lost the Caribbean rice market to suppliers from the Indian
sub-continent.1° 0 Efforts to improve the situation proved futile. From 1920,. with
the singular exception of 1923, budgets of the colony showed substantial deficits.
58

-------------------------------
In 1926, the year ofelection,the deficit was £119,364and in 1927 it was
£97,163. In 1927, the total assets and liabilities stood at £1,728,194 and
£1,910,904 respectively. The accumulated deficit at this time stood at
£182,710. 101 -
In any British colony this would have been considered-a serious situation. What
was cause of even graver concern in Guiana, however, was the fact that the
colony's funded debt stood at £3,000,000,and its short-term debtto the Crown
Agents was in thevicinity of £1,300,000,producing a disturbing foreign debt of
£4,300,000. 102 Critics were quick to point out that a debt of this magnitude worked
out to about £14per person in the overa11 population: nearly the highest in the
British Empire, 103 Another .frightening aspect ofthis debt was the .fact that 80 per
cent· of the colony's revenue was derivedfrom customs duties. 104 This was a factor
of critical concern since the annual Tax Ordinance was jealously controlled by the
Court.
The Colonial Office was moved to appoint a Royal Commission in 1927 to
examine and.make recommendations on the Guiana constitution. The conduct o.f
the Commission was sufficientto raise eyebrows, eve11 without its reactionary
conclusions. Jt pronounced that "the Government in British Guiana have never
been able to govern." Itargued that the Combined'Courtwas "in·the position of a
minor who can overrule his owntrustee. " 105 The report was contentious,but it was
obvious to all that changesJn the constitution were necessary. The controversy
sprang from the nature of the changes. As early as 1914, the colony in a
"referendum" gave an undertaking to SUpp.ort Changes in the constitution in
exchange for economic development World War 1 (1914- 1918) intervened, 106
but the post-war :recession created an even greater need for development. The
1927 Commission_ reasoned that:
The situation was possible as long as the Junction of the administration was confined to
attempting to prevent misgovernment. It is not possible when the government are
expected to take a direct and active part in_ the development of the country and the
improvement of the condition of the people. 107
This the elected representatives could not accept. Development was impeded by
the colony's parlous financial situation. Budgets wer.e not balanced because
Government did not have effective control· over taxation and, as a consequence,
Guiana could not raise loans Oh the better markets of Britain. This the elected
representativesrejected. In 1914, Sir Walter Egerton observed that a loan from the
British_ moriey market without imperial control was unthinkable. 108 Secretary of
State Harcourt supported him:
"You have rightly assumed thatWithout full Imperial Control over the finances of the
colony there could be no question ofadvances being made from the Imperial Treasury.n• 109
In a very real sense,this was political blackmail. The Colonial Office was demanding
full control in return for economic assistance.In 1914, the local representatives
were willing to surrender their jealous)y guarded rights and privileges in exchang~
59

for economic development, butin 1927 they were not prepared to do so, and they
wouldnotbe coerced. However, they were prepared to fight for other changes.no
They demanded an ~xtension of their powers; they wanted the executive to be
selected from those elected by the people. The old guard had been swept aside and
should not be reconstituted more powerful than ever in the Executive Council.
They condemned the Colonial Office for attemptingto thwart the will of the people
as expressed in the 1926 elections. 111 "Give power to the people" was the basic
demand of the elected representatives.
Against this background, two developments conspired to decide not just the
nature of the constitutional change but the timing of such changes as well. In 1927
the Court rejected en blocthe Government's proposal to raise revenue by means
of." an emergency surtax of ten percent on every duty and on every surtax except
that payable onmachinery ... as well as on every tax, duty, licence and other
charges." 112 lnstead, it imposed a one-year tax on sugar and bauxite. This step was
immediately criticised by the planting interest, the Government and the Colonial
Office. 113
. This situation was aggravated by two scandals which rocked the capital. The
more serious of these affected the City Improvement Scheme when the consulting
rountry.,.dairningth.ey would riotsubject
t . engineet'§J:Y:~

Legislative Council, the Governor was equipped with a casting vote and special
powers of reservation through which he could overturn an adverse vote in the
Legislative Council. The Executive was retained; it now consisted of eleven
members to be drawn exclusively from the Legislative Council, including the
Colonial Secretary, the Attorney General, four nominated officials, three
nominated unofficials and two elected members nominated by the Governor. Five
of these members comprised a quorum. The Commissioners were particularly
concerned with protecting the main economic interests and recommended that
they be given specialconsideration when selecting nominated officials. The
franchise was extended to women on the same basis as enjoyed by men. These
recommendations were accepted by the Colonial Office, .enacted by the British
Parliament on 28 March 1928, and introduced into British Guiana in July 1928.
Thus the elected representatives were transported from a position of power and
influence to one of impotence.
Recognising this reversal, Governor Sir Cecil Rodwell pointed outthat the old
constitution was never intendedto be a short cut to self ~govemment,even though it
had been erroneously perceived in· this light by the elected representatives ..
Essentially it had always been a cul-de:...sac. A Crown Colony Government
therefore was an attempt by the British to reverse the colony out of the
cu/-de-sacandput iton the road to real constitutionaladvance. 119 Cecil Clementi
supported the Governor. Crown Colony Government ,he claimed, had rescued
British Guiana from the quagmire in which it had floundered for more than a
century. 120 The local· population was not convinced and protested. vehemently. Lord
Snell, leader of the 1926 Royal Commission, also dissented . He considered the
reverses "an enormously serious thing" and observed that Guiana had fared much
more harshly under itsown hand than it would have under his. 121 In truth, the
explanation was to be found in boththe mandate and composition of the
Constitution Commission .. The Colonial Office very pointedly instructed the
Commission to change the existing constitutional arrangement The Commission
had been given a choice of altering the powers of the Court of Policy and
Combined Court to strengthen the Government or of replacing them completely
with a Crown Colony constitution. 122 From hereon, the conservative nature,
economic interest, ethnicity and· class affiliation of the. Commission clearly indicated
the direction in which the reforms·would be fashioned. Of the seven members, four
were officials and three unofficials and only one, Mr.E.G.Woolfordwas not
White. 123 Two of them were ex-officio members of the Court of Policy and two
were planters. The European orientation ofthe Executive Council was represented
by the overwhelming majority in the Commission. Itis also significant to note that
the only non-European expressed strong reservations about the findings of the
Commission in a minority declaration. .
1n the Combined Court, the terms of reference of the Commission were deemed
destructive of the rights of the people of Guiana. TJ-iey were condemned as
prejudging the essential issue. as to whether change. was indeed necessary at all. In
terms of the nature of the changes to be brought about,. if they were necessary, the
terms of reference deprived the Commissioners of the need to exercise any
61.
. l

initiative. They were afforded no opportunity to do but as the Secretary of State
had instruct~d them. The Commissioners were criticised as being too
pro-European and pro-Executive to permit a balanced judgement. 124 The majority
of them were drawn from that very sector which ·had been demanding a derailment
of the old type oLarrangement Similarly, the Commission was composed of that
group which had been expressing alarm at the. non-European access to political
power. Finally, it was made up of those very persons who had felt threatened by
the Combined Court over the past decade. Cecil Clementi,a militant advocate of
these sentiments, reasoned:
.. .that unless the ronstitution is revised, the position of the inhabitants of the British race in
this colony Will become intolerable and that inadequate protection will be afforded to the
interests of the planters and the large mercantile firms which are the mainstay of the
revenue ... 125
T.he process of emasculating the elected representatives, which had begun with
appointment of the Executive Council, was now completed. First, in 1891, the
Court of Policy was shorn of its power, then with the abolition of the Combined
Covrt, the elected representatives were effectively divorced from their'former
financial pr.ivileges. Within the Legislative Council, the (o~rteen ele~ted
repre$entat1ves found themselves outnumbered by .the nommated section.
Furthermore, the situation was such that even if by. persuasion, or the compelling
nature of the issue, the elected representatives succeeded in having their way
against the government, the Governor was equipped with reserve powers to
reverse such a gain. In all ways possible, the position of the elected represent 9 tives
had been severely circumscribed by the new constitution. , "
·. While the constitution stipulated that two elected representatives sit on the
Executive Council, the "oath of secrecy" prevented effective communication with
other representatives. This reduced. those nominated to the Council to the role of
"dummies", a very unhappy situation againstwhich they protested vehemently but
with little avail.1 26 There were also two major criticisms against the Executive
Council. In the first place, the elected members were under-represented on the
Executive Council; and secondly, the secrecy oath reduced the effectiveness of the
limited exposureprovided the elected·representatives in the Council.
Of considerable significance was the fact that the Colonial Office had always
promised economic development in exchange for effective control over the
government. Crown Colony Government epitomised this control and was
supposed to have swept aside all obstacles to economic development. But two
decades after the change, no discemible benefits had accrued to the colony. Elected
representative E.G.Woolford had warned against this possibility, when he
confessed that he would have been willing to cooperate in the hapding over of
power to the Governor had he been assured that any "material benefit would
be gained thereby ... No such prospect, however is being held out to the
colony." 121
The recognition that the constitution was "a delusion and a failure" no doubt
. helped to fuel the widespread working-class revolt that occurred in the
1930s.I2!1
62

Not only hadeconomicassistance not·materialised from the British as had
been promised, but the .deepened crisis in the· 1930s gave the lie to the much
vaunted"British Imperial trusteeship" and "government in the interest of the
unrepresented." The working class was never convinced that the British, or the
Colonial, government was on its side. It was convinced that the old conspiracy
to shift the burden of the crisis from the economic sector to its back was
continuing unabated. In the circumstances,. no one was really surprised that the
1939 Royal Commission concluded that any attempt at socio-economic
change must be premised "upongreater participation of the people in the
business of government." Furthermore, the Commission suggested that in
order to be meaningful, such changes should be as liberal as possible. 129
Thus had the people enjoyed power and influence, and thus had these been"'
taken away from them. But their level of political consciousness had been
stirred and forces, both local and international, would help that consciousness
to grow and increasingly to reject the withdrawal of power and demand that
those powers be returned to them.
NOTES
L Sir Cecil Clementi, A Constitutional History of British Guiana (London: Macmillan, 1937), p. 24.
2. P.M.Netscher, History of the Colonies Essequibo, Demerara and Berbice. From the Dutch
Establishment to the Present Day (S. Gravenhage: Martinus Nijltoff, 1888) trans. by W.E.Roth
(Georgetown:1929), p. 42.
3. Ibid.
4. James Rodway, History of British Guiana, Vol. 1 (Georgetown, 1891), p. 102.
5. Clenlenti,pp.28-29.
6. Radway, Vol. 1, pp. 76-77.
7. D. Davfs, "The Records of British Guianaft, Timehri, Vol. 11(1888), p. 239. See also British
Guiana/Venezuela Arbitration 1899, No. lV of Appendix to British Guiana Case, pp. 185-6.
8. Ibid.
9. 1832 Local Guide of British Guiana, p. 11.
to. James Rodway, History of British Guiana, Vol. 11 (Georgetown, 1891) pp. 24-40.
11. Demetara and Essequibo Vade Mecum 1825, pp. 54-57.
12. Clementi, p. 409.
13. Mohammed Shahabuddeen, Constitutional Development in Guyana 1621 - 1978 (Georgetown:
G.lyana Printers Ltd., 1978), p. 43.
14. Minutes of the Council of Policy, National An::hiVes of Guyana (N.A.G,).
15. The British captured the Guiana colonies in 1781,1796 and finally in 1803. The Colonies \Vere ceded to
the British in 1814.
16. Oementi, pp. 106-109.
63

17. The local oligarchy refused to vote the in 1835, 1840 and again in 1848. In each instance, it
extracted legislative concessions from the British.
18. See N.A.G., Minutes of the Court of Policy (M.C.P.), 19 May 1852, 16August 1855, 18 September
1855, 25 August 1857.
19. For an elaborate discussion of these issues, see Walter Rodney, A History of the Guyanese Working
People, 1881- 1905 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Francis M. Drakes,"The 1905
Protest in Guyana: Causes, Course and Consequences," Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Guyana,
1981.
20. HA. Wil, Constitutional Oiange in :the British West Indies 1880 - 1903 ( Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1970 ), pp: 9&-122.
21. Edward R. Davson, "British G.Jiana and Its Devefopment,"A Paper read before the Colonial Institute, 24
April 1908, p. 16.
22. Tota .Mangar, "The Administration of Sir Henry Turner Jrving as Governor of British Guiana 1882 - 1887:
AStudy in Astuteness and Resoluteness," UnpUblished M.A. Thesis, University of Guyana, 1987.
23 .. Brian L Moore, "The Social Impact of Portuguese Immigration into British Guiana after Emancipation,•
Boletin de £studios Latinamericanos y del Caribe, Vol. XIX, (1975)
24. N.A.G., Governor Gormanston to Secretary of State Knutsford, No. 209, 20 June 1890. See also the
reply, Secretary of State Knutsford to Governor Gormanston, No 261, 14 October 1890.
25. NAG., Letter Patent, 5 March 1891, in Official Gazette, 2 January 1892.
26. NAG., Governor Gonnanston to Secretary of StateKnutsford, No. 4, 3 January 1890.
27. Harokl Lutchman, Planter Power in the Politics of Former British Guiana ff urkeyen: University of
Guyana, 1968).
28. See Davson, pp.14-16.
29, Will, p. 148. See also V.T. Daly, A Short History of the Guyanese People (London: Macmillan, 1975),
p.269.
30. Oementi, pp. 313-14.
31. Ibid.
32. Will, p.147.
33. Ibid.
34. The New Daily Otronicle, 19 June 1927.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., 28 June 1927.
39. T.W.Bracey as reported in The Demerara Daily Chronicle, 9May 1882. See also speeches by
Woolford, PhiDips and.Cunningham in.The Daily Chronicle, 30 January 1886, 27 August 1889,
40. Lutchman, Planter Patronage, p. 7.
41. Ibid.
42, NAG., Secretary of State Knutsford to Governor Gormanstoo, Confidential, 30 April 1890.
43. NAG., Governor H.T. Irving to Secretary of State Holand, No. 407, 22 October 1887.
44. Will, pp.111-17.
45. NAG., Governor Gonnanston to Secretary of State Knutsford, No. 176, 20 May 1888.
46. Oementi, pp. 305- 7.
64

47. NAG., Secretary of State Knutsford to Governor Gormanston, No. 300, 18 November 1889.
48. NAG., Gonnanston to Knutsford, No. 4, 3 January 1890.
49. Great Britain, Report of the West Indian Royal Commission 1897, (London: HMSO, 1897).
50. The Echo, 20 January 1892, 16, 22 January 1897.
51. Drakes, op. cit.; Ashton Chase, A History of Trade Unionism in Guyana 1990 1961
(Georgetown: New Guyana Co., 1964).
52. Clementi, p. 318. The franchise was reduced from $480 to $300 a year.
53. NAG., Attorney General Joseph Nunan to ffjerton, Confidential, 25 July 1925.
54. 1ne Daily Argosy, 11 January 1928.
55. Letter to the Editor, Ibid., 24 August 1916.
56. Note the case of Cecil Farrar (1921). Even though he was returned unopposed, Farrar resigned. See
Lutchman, The 1891 Constitutional Change and representation in the former British Guiana
(Georgetown: CLC Political Science Series, 1970).
57. Lutchman, Some Aspects of the Crown Colony System of Government (Turkeyen: University of
Guyana, 1968), pp. 20- 24.
58. SeeNote39.
59. Cited in Shahabuddeen, Constitutional Development, p. 416.
60. Davson, p. 16.
61. J.G. Pearson, "The Negro in the West Indies.~ Timehri, Vol.VIII (1889), p. 224.
62. J.G .. Pearson, "The Negro's Grievance," West Indian Quarterly (1885- 6), pp. 141- 2.
63. Drakes,
64. Sir Cecil Clementi, "Colonisation in Bntish Guiana 1922," United Empire, XIll, pp. 449 50.
65. Lutchman, Planter Power, p. 6.
66. Ibid.
67. Great Britain, Memorandum of the Elected Members of the Combined Court 1928 (London:
HMSO, 1928), pp.47 - 50.
68. David Chanderbali, "Sir Henry Light: A Study of Protection and Paternalism,~ Unpublished M.A. Thesis,
University of Guyana, 1977.
69. N.A.G., Governor Henry T. Irving to Holland, Secretary of State for the Colonies, No. 407, 22 October
1887.
70. Great Britain, Memorandum of the fleeted Members, p. 47.
71. Ibid., p. 48.
72. Ibid., p. 49.
73. NAG., Vote of Censure by Mr P.A:Fernandes, Minutes of Combined Court, (M.C.C.), Thursday, 29
December 1927.
74. Great Britain, British Guiana Commission 1927, pp.52- 53.
75. N.A.G., M.C.C., 29 December 1927.
76. Great Britain, British Guiana Commission 1927, pp. 52 - 53.
77. NAG., M.C.P., 14 December 1927. See also Great Britain. Memorandum of the Elected Members,
pp.70-72.
78. J.W. Harper-Smith,"The Colonial Stock Acts and the 1891 British Guiana Constitution,w Social and
Economic Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 3 (September, 1965), pp. 252 - 63.
79. J Van Sertima,"The Colony's Financial Position," Timehri, Vol. DI, No. 1 (1912). See also NAG., Letter
65

from Crown Agents for the Colonies to the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 January 1928.
80. The New Daily Ouonicle, 6 March 1925, 10 February 1927; NAG., M.C.P., 9 February 1927.
81. NAG., Memorandum from PA Fernandes, M.C.P., 29December 1927.
82. Great Britain, Memorandum of the Elected Members, pp. 84 - 86.
83. Great Britain, British Guiana Commissionl927 (London: HMSO, 1927}, pp. 51- 55.
84. N.A.G., Governor Gormanston to Secretary of State for the Colonies Knutsford, 3 January 1890. See
also G:wemor Irving to Derby, 14 October 1883.
85. NAG., Governor Wodehouse to Secretary of State for the Colonies Herbert, No. 35, 23 March 1855.
86. N.A.G., G:wemor H.T. Irving to Derby, Confirl"ntial, 14 October 1883.
e ~ Great Britain, Memorandum from the Elected Members, pp. 38 - 42.
,!; '1· 89. N.A.G., Governor Egerton to Secretary of State.for the Colonies Harcourt, 13 December 1912, 23 June
1913.
90. E.F.L. Wood, Report of his visHto the West Indies and British Guiana, December 1921 -
February 1922 (London: HMSO, 1922), pp. 9 - 10.
91. Great Britain, Memorandum of the Elected Members, pp. 39 40.
92. Ibid., pp. 39 - 40.
93. R.F. Webber Centenary History and Handbook of British Guiana (Georgetown: Argosy Company
Ltd., 1931), pp. 43 - 48. See also The New Daily Chronicle, 6, 8 February 1927.
94. Oiase, p. 62.
95. Ibid., p. 64.
96. Francis X. Mark, Organised Labour in British Guiana (Puerto Rico, n.d.).
97. Francis M. Drakes, "The Middle Class in the Political Economy of British Guiana 1870 - 1928, ~ Paper
presented at Post Graduate Seminar, Caribbean Societies, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of
London, 3 March 1987.
98. Webber, p. 355.
99. The Popular Party won 14 seats.
100. Great Britain Memorandum of the Elected Members, p. 51; Webber, pp. 343 -4.
101 Clementi, p. 392.
102. /bid.
103. /bid.
104. Ibid.
105. Great Britain, British Guiana Commission, p.52.
106. British G.uana, Combined Court Sessional Papers, No. 779 of 1914, pp. 9 11.
107. Great Britain, British Guiana Commission, p. 51.
108. N.A.G., Governor Sir Walter Egerton, to Mc.L. Harcourt, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 January,
1914.
109. NAG., Mc. L Harcourt to Governor Sir Walter Egerton, 21 April 1914.
110. Great Britain, Memorandum of the Elected Members, pp. 76 - 7.
Ill.Ibid .• pp. 38- 62. See also "First Shots Frred in the Constitutional Struggle," The Daily Chronicle, 1
July 1927.
112. lbid., pp. 47 - 48.
113. Great Britain, Report of the British Guiana Commission, pp. 60 61. See also Roy Wilson and H.
Snell, the Future of British Guiana," West Indian Committee Circular, Vol. XUI, 14 July 1927.
66

114. Great Britain, Memorandum from the Elected Members, pp. 60 - 61. See also N.A.G., Letter from
Messrs. Howard Humphreys and Sons to the the Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1 March 1928.
115. Great Britain, Memorandum from the Elected Members, pp. 72 - 78.
116. N.A.G., M.C.C., 13 July 1927.
117. Great Britain, Report of the British Guia~ Commission, pp. 52 - 53.
118. See recommendations contained in Great Britain, Report of the BritisnConstitution Commission
(London: HMSO, 1927).
119. Governor Sir Cecil Rodwell, "The Problems of British Guiana.ft United Empire, Vol. XVII, 3rd Series
(1927), p. 680, quoted in Shahabuddeen p. 448.
120. aementi, p. 402.
12L Quoted in Shahabuddeen, p. 455.
122. N.A.G., Mr. LS. Ameiy, Secretaiy of State for the Colonies, to Governor Sir C. Rodwell, No. 144, 25
May 1927 and criticised by A.RF. Webber, P.A. Fernandes, R.Y. Evan Wong in the Combined Court. See
M.C.C., 13 July 1927.
123. There is a distinct possibility that.Mr. Hector Joseph, Immigration Agent General, a member of the
Commission, was both a Jamaican and a .Coloured gentleman as well.
124. N.A.G., M.C.C., 14 July 1927.
125. NAG., Mr. Cecil Clementi, O.A.G., to Bonar Law, Secretaiy of State for the Colonies, 31 June 1916.
126. N.A.G., Governor Denham to Lord Passfield, Confidential, 28 July 1930. See also Douglas Jones,
Attorney General to Lord Passfield, No. 71, 30 Januaiy 1930.
127. Great Britain, Report of the British Guiana Constitution Commission, p. 13.
128. NAG., Governor Lethem to Lord Stanley, 8 October 1943. (Confidential).
129. Great Britain, West India Royal Commission Report, (London: HMSO, 1938), p. 373.
"
67

..... And so They've Captured Demerara ... "' 1
A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA - GUIANA RElA TlONS DURING THE SECOND WORID
WAR.
by
Roberta Walker-Kilkenny.
United States interest in British Guiana can be traced at least to the immediate
pre-World War l perio~ when U.S. capital became actively involved in the
exploration for, and exploitation of, Guianese bauxite deposits. 2 Interest continued
to grow during the 1920's when U.S. and Guianese businessmen, with the support
of the State Department, agitated for an exception to the British prohibition on
foreign investment in strategic resourcesto allow for U.S. involvement in the
anticipated development of a Guianese. petroleum industry. 3 With the outbreak of
Worki War II, British Guiana took on even more significance in the United States
schema, far greater than any previously held:
The establishment of a United States base in British Guiana under a friendly arrangement
has done away with any necessity for the use of force to fulfill the need of occupation of
this colony in the scheme of defence of the Panama Canal. Situations under which we
would have to fight to maintain our position there are conceivable, but the possibility is
extremely remote. The force we will maintain there will be adequate to take care of any
opposition from within. An enemy intent on establishing bases in South America would
probably direct his efforts to more useful and less protected localities.
4
impo nee o t e rn ,
industry and in attempts to d,my
In addition, with customary sources cut the war in Asia, the U.S. turned to
Guiana, and Latin America·generally, to obtain natural rubber. 7
The 1941 U.S. War Department Country Survey quoted above makes little or
no mention of long".'"term U.S. intentions with respect to British Guiana, stating
simply that "the colony has three resources [bauxite, timber and sugar) of potential
value to the parent country or other power which can control develop them." 8
"The friendly arran2ement" between the governments of Britain and the United
States was a major .actor in making any possible intentions realizable, by providing
68

abase from whichto deal with boththe international threat and "opposition
within." In practical terms, this meant receiving Colonial Government support in
developing local pro~American sentiment, local intelligence gathering, and U.S.
military involvement· in securing· the bauxite area at Mackenzie. 9
This paper explores United States-Guiana relations during the Second World
War, with particular emphasis on such issues as impacted on labour. Its purpose is
twofold: first to explore some of the antecedents of the U.S.-Guiana relations of
the 1960' s; and, secondly, to demonstrate the usefulness of the records contained
in the U.S. National Archives in broadening our knowledge and understanding of
colonial Guianese history.
During the early stages of hostilities in Europe, i.e. in 1938 - 1939, the United
States maintained its position of apparent political neutrality and isolation. It was
only after Great Britain and France declared war against.Germany that the U.S.
Congress lifted. its embargo on arms sales to the Allied. Powers, so long as such
sales were made on acash-and-carry basis. 10 There were those, however, who,
favouring a more lenient policy, rekindled an idea advanced during and after the
previous World War, namely, the cancellation of war debts in exchange for
territory .11
The "Make Europe Pay War Debts Committee", chaired by Senator Ernest
Lundeen of Minnesota and formed by several Democratic and Republican
members of Congress, the Governor of Nevada and the Mayor of Buffalo among
others, advocated the acquisition of theBritish and French Caribbean in partial
payment of war debts. 12 This policy would not only supply Britain with required war
materials, despite her faUing dollar reserves, 13 but could resultin material benefits
for the U.S. aswell.According to W.E. Stewart of the Stewart Oil Company, Tyler,
Texas,who called upon the U.S. to cancel the British debt in exchange for British
possessions in the Western Hemisphere, Guiana was "exceedingly rich in
aluminium and manganese. " 14
The exigencies of. the war forced U.S. concerns to broaden to include
hemispheric defence. The capitulation of France in June .1940. left Britain alone to
defend the Atlantic. That same year, U.S. investments in Central America alone
totalled US$ 149 million. 15 U.S. interests extended from Cuba to Chile as locales
for investment, as markets, and as suppliers of raw materials. Washington officials
feared that German and Japanese settlers in Latin America might overthrow
existing governments,
that Japan might attempt to seize British and Dutch
colonies, and that German naval warfare might disrupt Atlantic shipping. 16 Britain,
for het part, lacked the, destroyers necessary to protect the Atlantic adequately. 11
On 13 August 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt informed Prime Minister
Winston Churchill that the.U.S. would be willing to supply Britain with fifty navy
destroyers in exchange for the right to use eight Atlantic colonies, including British
Guiana, as naval and air bases. The base lease agreement, which developed from
this proposal, was signed by representatives of the United States, Great Britain and
Canada on 27 March 1941. 18
Under a ninety-nine year lease signed on 27 May 1941, two U.S. military bases,
thefirst in South America, were established in British Guiana - an army air base at
69

1-l~e>Parkon the Demerara River and· a naval air station at Makouria on the
Essequibo River. The anny base (Atkinson fleld) originally occupied 5,540 acres.
This was supplemented b¥ an additional 12,080 acres in 1945. 19 According to
Vice-Consul Albert Rabida s estimates, 6,800 persons, including 5,007 Guianese,
were involved in the construction of these bases over a tvJenty..;;month period. The
payroll he estimated at US$10,860,000, of which one half wentto the 1,793 U.S.
citizens who served as engineers and administrators. When the bases opened·,
Guianese continued to be employed as maintenance workers. During the
fifteen-month periodwhich ended on 30 June 1944, US$875,760 were assumed
to have been paid out to this local staff: An additional US$l,455,615 were paid to
U.S. servicemen,induding 13 officers and 358 enlisted men. Vice-Consul Rabida
felt that in addition to the monies paid to local staff ,which would have remained in
British Guiana, "it [ could ] be estimated conservatively that 15 percent of the
monies paid to servicemen and 10 percent of the monies paid to officers has been
expended by them locally." Though Rabida had difficulty validating his figures and
cautioned that they be regarded as "'unofficar' "unauthoritatlve," he felt that
"there was no doubt whatsoever that the existence of these has contributed
greatly to the amount of currency now in circulation,and that bases have
exercised a highly sUmulating effect 9n the local economy." 20 According to the
Department of Labour, Guianese employment at Atkinson Field stood at 2,350 in
December 1945. That year, wage rates were revised to a minimum of $0.17 per
hour, and a forty-hour work weekwas·established. These rates were comparable i6[l
to wages paid at that time in the bauxite industry, where fewer than half as many
Guianese were employed. 21
Bauxite and natural rubber were the strategic materials which the U.S. hoped to
obtain from Guiana. Prior to 1940,U.S. domestic production of bauxite (200,000 -
300,000 tons per year) amounted to only one third of aluminium industry
requirements. As for rubber, inDecember 1941 U.S. reseroes stood at only thirty
22
per centof the target set by the Office of Production Management. During the
war, the U.S. government intervened in these and other strategic industries to
boost production of aeroplanes, tanks and armaments. Under legislation passed in
June 1940, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation established four subsidiaries -
the Metals Reserve Company, the Rubber Reserve Company, the Defense Plants
Corp0ration and the Defense Supplies Corporation - to purchase strategic
materials, to builq and equip war plants, and to equip privately-owned plants. 23
In the aluminium industry, for example, the Government invested over US$1
billion in the construction of new.hvdropower stations, smelters, and alumina and
fabricating plants by.1945. Reynolds Aluminium, which first took an active interest
in British Guiana. during the war, was lent nearly US$15 million to develop an
int~rated industry. 24 In Canada as well, aluminium production was increased with
governmental assistance. The allied governments lent Aluminum Ltd. $173 million
during the· war to finance expansion. 25
The majority of pre-war U.S. bauxite needs were met by imports from the
Guianas/.6 The Demerara Bauxite Company (DEMBA) facility at Mackenzie was
directly affected by developments in the North American aluminium industry. In
70

1928, DEMBA was among the foreign and other properties transferred to
Aluminum Ltd. of Canada by the Aluminum Company of America (a U.S.
company). However, this move,designed to circumvent the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, did not end the link between DF.lyfBA and U.S. capital. Nearly eighty~four per
cent of Aluminum Ltd, stock was reported to be in the hands of ALCOA owners in
1937. 27
As the North American demand for bauxite grew between 1939 and 1943,
bauxite exports from British Guiana to the U.S. and Canada increased dramatically
from 30,566 tons to 389,790 tons in the case of the U.S. and 429,413 tons to
1,488,858 tons for Canada. 28 Two additional mines were opened, a railway bridge
was erected across.the DemeraraRiver, a new crushing and washing plant with
three rotary kilns was built atMackenzie,and a railroad linking Mackenzie and ltuni
was constructed. 29 Employment increased during the early years of the war,
reaching approximately 3,600 persons in 1942. 30 Hours were gruelling, with only
on·e· day off each fortnigM. 31 ·I·n 1943J. a s.ixty-hour, six-day work we. ek was
introduced.The minimum wage was~ 0.14 per hour, with a$ 0.30 per day
bonus. 32 According to the Commissioner of Labour, Colin Fraser:
... about half the employees of the Demerara Bauxite Company lived in overcrowded
conditions in Chrlstianburg and Wismar; the remainder are hous.ed in quarters rented from
the Company ... employers al Mackenzie continued lo pay considerable attention to the
health and welfare of their working peopfe ... 33
71

.... ·
.
.. an anticipated and a logical result of the successful prosecution of the war effort. During
past months,it is understood that more than adequate reserves both of bauxite and of
aluminium have been available in the United States and Canada. Present production in
British Guiana,therefore, is not expected to increase in any appreciable degree in the near
future.
This situation presents the local government with the problems of unemployment, a
decrease in national income, and reduced colonial revenue hitherto collectible as excise,
income, and excess profits taxes. The Consulate has been unable to learn of the existence
of any specific solutions which the local government may intend to apply to these
problems. 42
In 1944, despite the strict security measures in effect, the workers at Mackenzie
went on strike for ~mproved wages and other conditions, Hubert C[jtchlow, BGLU
General Secretary, was iw.Ated to·Mackenzie to confer with DEMBA officials for the
first time. Only Com an re resentatives and security officers were present.
Ac r m o n Chase Critch ow s date, the secµrity personnel i · cted
..• Crilch ow with "fe r a to it o situa ion. e ,mme iate y e for
Ge n ivin i t ctions th t e s n e peter out.
Union mem · om 3217 in 1 . DEMBA continued
11
dis issing em l e s tar · 1ve of
senior· . ' rs for
seygral yeai:s to come.
The other raw material to which the U.S. paid special attention in Guiana was
natural rub15er, needed for the procluction of tyres and other rubber manufactures. 44
Hevea rubber trees, planted at the turnof the century,had been abandoned
between 1910 and 1920, owing to falling prices and attackby leaf blight. An
estimated 70,000 trees were still thought to exist in 1942. 45 The Rubber Reserve
Company (RRC) was organized inJune 1940 to acquire and distribute natural,
synthetic and scrap rubber to defence industries. 46 The Governor of British Guiana,
Gordon Lethem, signed an agreement with the RRC on 10 August 1942,
according :to which the RRC and its local agency would purchase and export all
rubber produced in Guiana. Under this agreement, the Government was to use its
best efforts to promote the maximum procluction of rubber" and the RRC"to assist
in the development of[ ...) rubber resources." A basic price of US$ 0.48 per pound
was fixed. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) saw the rubber
programme as directed towards immediate production, not long-range or
plantation development. 47
The Rubber Development Corporation {RDC) took over the responsibility of
developing and acquiring natural rubber from foreign, i.e. non-U.S., sources in
February 1943. 48 Itmaintained a Field Technician and a Resident Manager
responsible for Guiana. The Field Technician made.regular inspections of thirty
rubber "plantations." These ranged in size from the 17,000 tree e~tate at Pin.
Tuschen, to the eighteen trees owned by a Charity farmer. Many of the trees had
been planted on sugar plantations and the majority continued to be found on land
owned or leased by the limited liability companies. 49 The yield of rubber from a
number of countries, including British Guiana, involved in the RDC program was
small. This, however, was anticipated. U.S. officials were aware that sparse
populations and difficult terrain would pose problems in a number of locations.
72

Despite this, "'it was felt that cumulative results ... might be a
importance in the latter stages ofthe war." Shipments of rubber from
increased from one long ton in 1941 to 132 long tons in 1944. The
attributed this to the full support received from.the Colonial Government, the
of the RDC field technicians, and a favourable price, but doubted that the
could be maintained. 50 The RDC resident Manager, in his May 1945 report,
explained that the primary problem which faced the rubber programme was the
"turnover of labor and foremen." This he initially attributed to general inefficiency"
and an "'indisposition to do more than earn barely enough to eat and have a
spree. " 51 His further remarks, however, put the labour problem in a different
perspective:
Under war conditions, the rke cultivation, timber, balata extraction and domestic food
growing have all become much more profitable than formerly, thus offering labor wider
and more profitable fiekls. {illegible! relatively low cost and is happy in his work, producing
often as much as a pound per tree per month. But on the large properties where the
laborer is hired, the per tree production is low, averaging about 6 lbs. per year ...
Getting owners to pay enough to get the rubber produced and· on a system of pay that
will reaUy induce production is only a smaU though important part of the work.
Our position prevents us dictating or in any way appearing to interfere with labor and
pay conditions, so extreme tact is required in such matters. 52 •
With Allied victory assured, and an expectation that riatural rubber would once
again be available from Asia, the various U.S. agencies concerned sharply reduced
their expenditures on the Latin Americanrubberprogram. On June 13,1946 the
RDC contracted with R.D. BalataCo., Ltd. of Guiana to undertakeall the local
functions previously performed by the RDC This contract was to run until 30 June
1947, the expiration date of the RRC/RDC agreement with the Government of
British Guiana. 53
The reaction in Guiana to the U.S. presence was multifaceted. On an official
level, the newly appointed Governor, Gordon Lethem, welcomed the U.S.
presence from the time of his arrival, both practically and ceremonially. At
Lethem' s request, he was met at the pier by the Commandant of Atkinson Field
LieutenanF·Colonel George Campbell, and thre~ other U.S. officers. At th~
opening session. of· the Legislative Council in 1943, Campbell accompanied
Lethemduring the inspection of the honour guard and the opening ceremony. 54
C. V. Wight, mayor of Georgetown and a member of the Legislative Council, also
was viewed. by the Council as "openly sympathetic to American interests. "ss
Wi ht the father of C.V. w· ht, was the ma'ori stockholder of the Daily
C ronic e. Th ron tor rom ear 5, re enc
supporte or criticized . . epen mg on t e issue, was t e onl editor i
n 1an se o e o o ress materials
w m . . .· . ffice of Information and airs o ly
by the Office of War Information), 56
1 he Argosy was another daily owned by Percy Wight. In the opinion of Rabida
during the war years the Argosy:
'
frequently contained editorial expression which was anti-American in nature ... lne basis for
the [... J anti-American views of the Argosy consisted of the color problem. Racial
73

discrimination Inadvertently exhibited on occassion in the past by the military authorities
has been strenously condemned in the columns of this vehicle. 57
One incident reported.in the Argosy involved a visit to the United Service
Organisation Club by two Guianese, Dr. Jon-alon Tjon-a-Man and Mr. Julian
Nurse. Several Englishwomen in the Club protested the presence of Mr. Nurse, an
Afro-Guianese. When the Director,.Miss Dorothy Edwards, suggested that the
Doctor visit the ·USO alone in future,· he immediately departed accompanied by Mr.
Nurse and two other associates. For Consul Carlton Hurst, the importance of the
incident was that it was carried in the press. He wrote the Secretary of State
commenting that "althoughthe incident which occurred at the USO on April 18 is
extremely regrettable, it should be regarded neither as unusual nor discriminatory."
Hurst's remarks were indicative of U.S. insensitivity to the race question at that
time. It is of interest to note that Brindley Cyrus, a Barbadian-American lawyer
based inChicago, wrote to President Roosevelt in 1940 advocating U.S.
acquisition of the Guianas and their settlement by _Afro-Americans. The settlers
would escape the "peonage, starvation wages, race prejudice, exploitation,
discrimination and other forms of injustice" which they suffered in the U.S., and
settle in a territory where .. no obstacles will be thrown in [their] pathway excert the
limitations of {their] own capacity." 58 The Guiana Graphic also was critical o U.S.
racism. 59
~ The opinion of popular leaders on theU.S. was divided. On 26 August 1944,
" J klc inari · , · f the British Guiana East Indian Association 'th
~ the .S. Naval server, Lieu enan _ rge a , an Vice- ons ge
, f _.·. . ney o iscuss U.S. acquisition o . . . ccor ing o · ney s report, Singh
Gv-i.i#'aavocated acqu1S1tion because he believed that U.S. interests, unlike the British,
would be willing.to make significant investments in the development of the entire
country.

the pages their respective
Indian Opinion. 64
AA. Thome, Presidenfof the British
....,,.,T,,..,
before the inaugural
Section), on 4 March 1944,
terminating base ::.rt·rot:;,m,::>nT
Consul Hurst. on the Support
revealing. He remarked that:
Trades Union Council, .,,,,.,.._ ... ,-1nr1
Congress ........... .,,,...
British Government to consider
the war. 65 The comments of U.S.
leaders for this resolution were quite
labour leadersw.oold.particula. rly find 'lhe presence of Am. ericans odious si.nce If the
American military worked in cooperation with the British authorities, all strikes, riots,
uprisings, and othedabor weapons 1NOUk1 be eliminated. 66
Fitz Baptiste, in a study of the inter-war period, referred to the Second World
War as a ec1s1ve • se m process o . mencan n in e ri . 67
T is was ce true m e ca uiana. e almost ree rein given
, o 1c1aiS an capitru ritis, umana the early 1940's was a function
wartime conditions. Faced with possibility conquesJ by Germany,
Britain was forced to make concessions on the question of imperial exclusivity in
order to obtain the war materials and support from the U.S. required its
survival.
The U.S; was already an mportant trading partner of Guiana in 1938. Although
supplying only eleven per cent of the value of all exports, the U.S. supplied
twenty-'eight per cent of the machinery Guiana imported. In .1946, one year after
the end of the war, the U.S. supplied eighteen per cent of imports overall, and
forty-seven per cent of machinery imports.~ This heavy reliance on the U.S. as a
supplier of capital goods was a reflection of the high level of industrialization in the
U.S., given a boost during 1939 to 1945 by the war and resultant
intervention, and the dependent nature of the Guianese economy.
Wartime fluctuations in bauxite production and the resumption of rubber tapping
·were direct responses to the external, U.S. demand for raw materials. There was
no significant processing carried out within Guiana and no transformation of social
relations. For the duration of the war, the impact of U.S. actions seemed to be
limited to the proVision of relatively high-paying eny>loyment opportunities, and a
heightened incidence of racism, prostitution, and minor offences" ·of all kinds. 69
The long-tenn implications may have been more profound.
The Second World War legitimized the U.S. presence in Guiana as a security
and an intelligence force. Both the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were active, together with other military
intelligence agencies. 70 The Consu r · er · rmation asweU. More \ 1
information on the intricacies o uianese · itica I e an erram !
state
75

Guiana emerged from the Second World War into a world schema dominated by
the U.S. and shaped by Cold War paranoia. In the U.S. schema, Guiana continued
to have strategic importance. Most Immediately, bauxite production was once
again increased to allow for stockpiling. 12 !n bauxite, and later in manganese, ·u.s.
capital reproduced the same dependency relations seen during the war - foreign
ownership,· capital-intensive but with little local processing or other. spinoffs. The
hope which some Guianese had for U.S.- assisted development of the interior
never materialized. Beyond this, the U.S. was concerned with what it perceived as
the growing threat of organized labour and communism,7 3 and what these might
mean for the U.S. investments in aOindependent Guiana and for the future of the
hemisphere. It was this preoccupation with the direction and character of the
GuTanese independence movement which led to the involvement of the U.S.
CentraUntelHgence Agency (successor to the OSS),the American Institute for Free
Labor Development (AlFLD) and the American Federation of Labour Congress of
Industrial Organisations (AFL ... CIO) in the demonstrations and riots of 1962 -
1964,7 4 an intervention from which Guyana has yet to recover.
NOTES
1. Enclosure, Albert A.Rabida to Colonial Secretary, 14 Nov. 1944, CSO 140/115/57. The enclosure
consisted ofa 'Guianized' version of"Rum and Coca Cola," See Appendix for an explanation of archival
sources.
2. See RG 59, 8448.63.
3. See RG 59, 8448.6363.
4. Department of Defense, .De.partment of the Anny (War),"A Survey of British Guiana," 3 March 1941, p. 1,
RG226, OSS1782.
. ft. • A Survey of British Guiana," p, 1. ··
\$. Alfred Eckes, Jr., The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals, (Austin: University of Texas
Press; 1979), pp. 98 - 99.
7. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Office of the Secretary,. Administrative Histories ... Rubber Program,
Exhibit IX, "Statistical Review ofRubber Procurement Program in Tropical America and Liberia," p. 1, RG
234.
8. "A Suivey of British Guiana," p. 1.
9. AlbertRabicla to Secretary of State, 27August 1945, RG407, OPD 336.6; RG 407, OPD 470.1 Bauxite;
Eckes, pp. 98 - 99, 107 - 108. Kwakwani die! not begin operations until 1945.
;lO. Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globa!ism,.4th ed., (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1985). pp. 1 - 3.
vlL Fitz Baptiste, The United States and West Indian Unrest, 1918 1939, (Mona: !SER, UWJ, 1978),
pp. 15 - 16; Roger Townsend to Director, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 15 May 1930, RG
151,430.4. . .
12,Edward Chester, The United States and Six Atlantic Outposts, (Port Washington: National University
Publications, 1980), pp. 6 - 7.
13. Ambrose, p.8.
14. WE. Stewart to Cordell HuD, 6 Dec., 1940, RG 59, 8446.01415.
15. Jenny Pearce, Under the Eagle (Boston: South End Press, 1982), p. 26.
116. f.ckes, p. 93. · .
7. Ambrose, pp. 6 - 7. . .. .. . . · . .
8. Edward Chester, The United States and Six Atlantic Outposts, (Port Washington: National Universit~
'\JPublications, 1980) pp. 6 - 9, 12; S~ FA Baptiste, "The British G~ant ofAir and Naval facilities ... ,
Caribbean Studies, XVI, 2, (1976), for a discussion oTabase agreement negotiated in 1939.
19. "ASurvey of British Guiana," p. l; Robert Bates to Secretary of State, IO Oct., 1944, RG 59,
844B.51/10-1044; Memo, C.P.L to Bond, 28 April 1944, RG 407, OPD 601 CDC; Jack McCord to the
Commandlnq Officer, 21 Dec. 1944, RG 407, OPD 601 CDC; Albert Rabida to Secretary of State, 7 Sept.
76

1945, RG 407, OPD 601 CDC. The naval air base was decommissioned in 1944.
20. Albert Rabida to Secretary of State, 10 Oct 1944, RG 59, 844b.51/10-1044; G.C. MarshaU to Lt. Gen.
G.N. Macready, 3 May 1943, RG 407, OPD 336.2 Puerto Rico.
21. Labour ... 1945, pp. 3 - 4. .
22. Metals Reserve Compa!1y, General Records, wReport on Activities of Metals Reserve Company from 28
June 1940 to 1 Nov., 1944, p. 7, RG 234; Eckes, p. 101.
23. Eckes, p. 94; Charles laid (compiler), Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Reconstruction
Anance Corporation, 1932 -1964, (Washington: Nationa1Archivesl973), 0). 1- 2.
24: Walter Rice to Secretary of State, 20 June, 1946, RG 59, 844B.6359!7-946; Ronald Graham, The
Aluminwn Industry and the Third World, iLondon: Zed Press, 1982), pp. 35, 36.
25. Norman Girvan, Corporate Imperialism: Conflict and Expropriation, (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1976), pp. 162-3. Aluminum Ltd. was called Alcan from the 1960's onwards, Girvan, p. 184, fn 10.
26. "Report on Activities of Metals Reserves Company ...,"_p.
7, RG 234.
27. Girvan, p. 162; Cheddi Jagan, The West on Trial, (Berlin: Seven Seas Books, 1971), p. 74.
28. British Guiana, Annual Report of the Comptroller of Customs for the Year 1939, Table 14r
Customs .•. 1945, Table 14.
29. AP. Garratt, "Activities of the Demerara Bauxite Company, Umited,"Timehri, Nov. 1951.
30. Enclosure, Albert Rabida to Secretary of State, October 9, 1944, HG 59, 844B.504/10-944, p. 2. The
enclosure consisted of the British Guiana, Report of the Department of Labour for the Year 1943, p. 1;
Labour ... 1945, p. 3.
31. Labour ... 1943,.p. 2.
32. Oiase, p. 126; Labour. .. 1943, p. 2.
33. LaboUT ... 1943, p. 2.
34. Oiase, p.127. . . . <
35. Stuart (AUenJ to Edward Wailes, 26 July 1941, RG 59, 844B.6359/2.
36. Henry Barber to Adjutant General, 2 April 1942, RG 407, OPD 470.1 Bauxite.
37. Frederick Matthews to Commandin!l: General, 24 July, 1942 HG 407, OPD 470.1 Bauxite; Albert Rabida
to Secretary of State, 17 Feb. 1945, RG ::>9, 844B.20 Defense/2-1745.
38. Chase, p. 127.
39. "Report on Activities of Metals Reserve Company ...," p. 8; Eckes, pp. 107, 115.
40. Customs ... 1944, Table 14.
41. Chase, p. 126; Labour ... 1945{ p. 3.
42. Albert Rabida to the Secretary o State, 25 Nov. 1944, RG 59, 844B.6359/l l-2544.
43. Chase, pp. 127 - 8.
44. "Statistical ReviewofRubber ...,· p. 1, HG 234.
45. TeleQram, Hurst to Secretary of State, 4 July 1942, RG 59, 8448.6176/2; Records of the Reconstruction
Anance Corporation, Office of the Secretary, Administrative Histories ... Rubber Program, Exhibit X, "Rubber
Potentialities in the Western Hemisphere," part B, p. 1, RG 234.
46. Z.aid, p. 58.
47. Rubber Development Corp., Entry 282, "Executed Copy of Agreement Between Colony of British Guiana
and the Rubber Reserve Company," 10 August 1942, RG 234; "Rubber Potentialities ...," p. 29, RG 234.
48. laid, p. 64.
49. Reconstruction Finance Corp., Rubber Development Corp., Country Correspondence File 1945,
"Monthly Report - British Guiana, May - 1945", RG 234; Reconstruction Finance Corp., British Guiana,
•Reports on the Rubber Plantations in British Guiana," 12 July 1945, RG 234, E 276, Box 5; Edgar Beckett,
"The Minor Industries,» Timehri, July, 1912; Telegram, Hurst to Secretary of State, 4 July 1942, RG 59,
844B.6172/2.
50. "Statistical Review ...," pp. 4 - 5, RG 234; "Rubber Potentialities ...," pp. 25, 32, RG 234.
51. "Monthly Report ...," p. 4, RG 234. .
52. "Monthly Report ...," pp. 4 - 5, RG 234.
53. Reconstruction Finance Corp., Office of Rubber Reserve, Exhibit XII, "Report on the Rubber Program.
Supplement No. 1," 1945, pp. 18 -19, RG 234; "Agreement Between Rubber Development Corporation and
R.D. Balata Company, Ltmited." RG 59 844B.6116/6-1346; Albert Rabida to Secretary of State, 7 May
1945, RG 59, 844B.6176/5-745.
54. Robert Bates to Secretary of State, 15 Nov. 1941, RG 59, 8448.001/23; Carlton Hurst to Secretary of
State, 29 May 1943 RG 59 844B.032/5; Airgram, Bay to Secretary of State, 23 Sept. 1946, RG 59,
844B.001/9-2346.
55. George Skora to Secretary of State, 29 Dec. 1947, RG 59, 844B.00/12-2947; Airgram, Skora to
Secretary of State, 23 Dec. 1948, RG 59, 8448.101/12-2348.
56. Enclosure, Albert Rabida to Secretai:y of State, 19 June 1946, 8448.91/6-1946. The enclosure
consisted of an office memorandum entitled "the Press of British C':JUiana. •
77

57. "The Press ...," p. 3. .
58. Who's Who Among Black Americans, 1975 - 1976, Vol 1, (Northbrook, Ill.: Who's Who Among
Black Americans, Inc. Publishing Company, 1976), p. 143; E.ndosure, Brindley Cyrus to Franklin Roosevelt,
29 Aug., 1940, RG 59, 8448.52/20. The enclosure consisted of "A Proposal That the United States Acquire
British, Dutch and French Guiana ..."
59. !he Press ...,• p. 4, RG 59, 8448.91/6-1946.
60. George Widney to Secretary of State, 18 Aug. 1944, RG 59, 8448.00/8-2844.
61. · See: Roberta K~kenny, the Radicalization of the Women's Movement in British Guiana, 1946 - 1953,"
Caribbean Studies, forthcoming.
62. Airgram, Hull to American Consul.Georgetown, 18 Sep. 1944, RG 59, 8448.00/8-2844.
63. Albert Habida to Secretary of State, 25 May 1945, RG 407, OPD 601 CDC.
64. "'The Press ...: p. 5, RG 59, 8448.91/6-1946.
65. Carlton Hurst to Secretary of State, 7 March 1944, RG 407, OPD 601 CDC.
66. Carlton Hurst to Secretary of State, 27 April 1944, RG 407, OPD 601 CBD.
67. Baptiste,The United States, p. 3. ,
68. Customs ... 1939, pp. 10, U; Customs ... 1946, pp. 6, ii, xii - xiii.
69. Albert Rabida to Secretary of State, 7 Nov. 1945, RG 59, 844B.l151/ll-145; Paul Blanshard,
.·,De·. · mocracy and Empire in the. Cari.bbea. · n .•. · (New York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 132; WA Orrett .• History of
.. V !he British Guiana Police Force, (Georgetown: DailyOlronide, 1951), p. 54.
70. RG 226, OSS 1782, Naval Attache to the Secretary of State, 3 June 1942, RG 59, 8448.1561.
71. United States, Defense Department, U.S. Use of Atkinson Field, (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1972)
72. Dean Acheson to American Consul, Georgetown, 9 July 1946, RG 59, 8448.6359/7-946; Stephen
Krasner, Defending the National Interest, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, l

APPENDIX
Archival References
National ·Archives of Guyana
Rle number
CSO 140/115/57
United States Archives
Record Group Number
RG59
RG151
RG226
RG234
RG407
Hie Name
War. U.S. Naval and Air Bases.
Relationship between American
Forces and Local Population
Record Group Name
General. Records of the Department of State.
Records of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
Commerce.
Records of the Office of Strategic Services
Records of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation.
Recotds of the Adjutant General's Office.
79

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS
A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS BY WALTER RODNEY
Compiled by Laurette Telford
AFRICA: HISTORY.AND CONTEMPORARY AFFAIRS
With Kwesi Botchwey, the African development experience of the sixties: some
brief working notes," Paper presented at the International Conference on
Development Strategies ih Africa in the 1970' s, Arusha, Tanzania, 1973.
The African Revolution: Urgent Tasks (Sojourner Truth Organisation, Chicago,
12, 1981), pp.5-13. Address delivered at a symposium on C.L.R. James at the
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, March 31, 1972.
"African Slavery and other Forms of Social Oppression on the Upper Guinea
Coast in the Context of the African Slave Trade," Journal of African History,
7,3 {1966), pp.431-443. Also published in S.M. Scheiner and T. Edelstein (eds.),
Black Americans: Interpretative Readings (New York: Dryders Editions, 1971);
Martin A, Klien and G. Wesley Johnson (eds.), Perspectives on the African Past
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972), pp.152-66. Excerpted in Evelyn Jones Rich
and Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa and Change. (New York: Random House
School Division,1972), pp.185-7.
" African Trade through Bourgeois Eyes," A Review of Richard Gray and David
Birmingham (eds.), Pre-colonial African Trade, London, Oxford University
Press, 1970, Trans African Journal of History (Nairobi) 2,1 {1972), pp.123-6.
"The Arusha Declaration : Problems of Implementation," MBIONI (Kivukoni
College, Dar-es-Salaam, August, 1967).
"Aspects of the Inter-relationship between the Atlantic Slave Trade and domestic
Slavery on the Upper Guinea Coast," Paper presented at the African History
Seminar of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London,
October 1965,7pp.
"Brief Tribute to Amilcar Cabral," Ufahamu {African Activist Association, UCLA),
3,3 {1973), p.13.
80

"Class Contradictions inTanzania,"The Pan-Africanist (Programme of African
Studies, Northwestern University), 6 (1975), pp.15-29, (based on a lecture given at
North Western University on April 21, 1975). Also in Haroub Othman (ed.), The
State in Tanzania (London:Heinemann, 1979).
"The Colonial Economy," in Adu Boahen (ed.), Africa under Colonial
Domination, 1880-1935, UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol.7 (London:
Heinemann, 1985), pp.332-381.
"Declarations. Problems of implementation," MBIONI (Kivukoni College,
Dar-es-Salaam), Vol. 4 (1967), pp.29-40. (Special edition on the Arusha "
Declaration Teach-In held at University College 5th- 6th August, 1967).
"Education and Tanzanian Socialism," in Idrian Resnick (ed.), Tanzania:
Revolution by Education(Nairobi: Longmans, 1968), pp. 71-84.
"Education in Africa and Contemporary Tanzania," in Education and Black
Struggle: Notes from the Colonised World, (ed.) InstiMe of Black World (IBW),
Monograph No. 2, Harvard Educational Review (1974), pp.82-99. Based on a
lecture delivered on April 27, 1972 at W.E.B Du Bois Department of
Afro-American Studies, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. ,
"The Era of the Mane Invasions: 1545-1606," Paper presented at the African
History Graduate Seminar of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University
of London, February 1966, 2lpp.
"European activity and African reaction in Angola," in T.O Ranger (ed.), Aspects
of Central African History (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1968),
pp.49-70.
"Gewaldt and Widerstrand in Der Geschichte Africas," Freibeuter 5 (Berlin:
Freibeuter Verlage/Klaus Wagenbach, 1980), pp.4 7-53. Translated by Guyana -
Komitee, Hamburg. Auszuge aus der Voslesung Walter Rodney's" African
Development 1878-1978" vom Sommer semester 1978 and der Universitat
Harnburg.
"Gold and slaves on the Gold Coast." Transactions of the Historical Society of
Ghana, 10 {1969), pp.13-28.
"The Guinea Coast," In Richard Gray (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa,
Vol. 4, c.1600-c. 1790. (Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp.223-324.
"The Historical Roots of African Underdevelopment," in Proceedings
of the
81

Social Sciences Conference of East African Universities, 27-31 December
1970 (Dar-es-Salaam: University of Dar-es-Salaam, 1971), 36pp.
A History of the Upper Guinea Coast 1545-1800
1970),283 pp.
{Oxford: Clarendon Press,
How Europe Underdeveloped Africa {London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Pub., 1972),
316pp.
"Hundert Jahre Afrika: Ent wicklung and Klassendynamie eines Kontinents,"
Herausgegeben, ubero etzt and eingeleitet von Harald Sellin. - {Berlin : Verlag
Klaus Wagenbach, 1981). Lectures in Sommer semester 1978, Universitat
Hamburg.
"The Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade on West Africa," ln Roland Oliver (ed.)
The Middle Age of African History (London : Oxford University Press, 1967),
pp.34-,40.
"The ImperialistPartition of Africa," Monthly Review, Special Edition,"Lenin
Today," 21,1 {April, 1970), pp.103--114.
"Introduction" and !(Glossary" to Richard Jobson (H. 1620-1623), The Golden
Trade; or a Discovery of the River Gambia, and the Golden Trade of the
Aethiopians (London: Dawson of Pall Mall, 1968) pp. v-xi, xiii-xv.
"Jihad and social revolution in Futa Djalon in the eighteenth century," Journal of
the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol. 4, 2 {1968}, pp.269-284.
~Liberation struggles," Afras Review. (University of Sussex, School of African and
Asian Studies, June 1977), pp.15-19.
"Migrant Labour and the Colonial Economy," in W. Rodney, K. Tambila and L.
Sago, Migrant Labour in Tanzania. during the Colonial Period. Case Studies
of Recruitment and Conditions of Labour in the Sisal Industry (Hamburg:
lnstitut fur Afrika-Kunde, 1983), pp.4'"""28.
"Migrant Labour Reserves in the Tanganyikan Colonial Economy," Paper for
discussion af a meeting of African Urban Culture members, School of Oriental and
African Studies, University of London, 28 June 197?.
"A New Periodical: review of the African Review 1(1)," Taamuli: A Political
Science forum (University of Dar-es-Salaam) 2,1 {1971), pp.39-44.
82

"A Note on the Mau Mau in Tanganyika territory ... Paper presented at the Annual
Conference of the Historical Association of Kenya, 24-'26 August, 1973,
Highdridge Teachers' College, Nairobi, 7 pp.
"Pan-Africanism and Neo-colonialism," Black Liberator 2,3 (June
1974/Jan.1975), pp. 254-66.
"Parties, Jdeologies andpoliUcal development: A conversation with Walter
Rodney," Black World-View,. 1,2 (April/May 1976), pp. 8- 9, 15
"Policing the countryside in colonial Tanganyika," in Proceedings of the Annual
Social Science Conference of East African Universities, 1973, Paper no. 51 ¢
(Dar-es-Salaam: University of Dar.;;es-Salaam, 1974), 18 pp.
"The political economy of colonialTanganyika, 1890-1939," Paper presented to
the Annual History Teachers' Conference, Morogora, Tanzania, June 15-21,
1974. Published in M.H.Y. Kaniki, Tanzania under colonial rule (London;
Longmans, 1980), pp.128-163.
"Politics of the African Ruling Class, in Black World-View, 1,7 {1976),
pp,12-17, (excerpted froma lecture aUhe Institute of the Black World's Summer
Research Symposium, July 1974.)
"Portuguese Attempts at Monopoly onthe Upper Guinea Coast, 1580-1650,"
Journal of African History, 6,3 (1965), pp. 307-322.
"Problems of Third World Development: A discussion of Imperialism and
development," Ufahamu 3,2 (1972), pp.27-47. Transcript of a discussion held at
the African Studies Center,UCLA, on May 30, 1972.
"A reconsideration of the Mane Invasions of Sierra Leone," Journ 9 1 of African
History, 8,2 (1967), pp. 219-246.
"Recruitment of Askari in Colonial Tanganyika,)920-1961,"
the East African Social Science Conference, 1973, 12 pp.
Paper presented at
"The Rise of the Mulatto Trader on the Upper Guinea Coast; 1600-1800," Paper
presented at the African History Graduate Seminar, School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London, March 1964, 7 pp.
«Rodney Analyses African Leader Amilcar Cabral," International
(UClA) 1,2 (June1973), pp. 1-6.
Spectrum
83

Toe Roots a.,d Consequences of African Underdevelopment," (Type.cl transcript of
an address to the Symposium of the Political Economy of the Black World, Centre
of Afro;;.American Studies, UCLA, May 1979).
"Schoiarship on African Development: an Overview," - The Centre for
Afro-American and African Studies, Colloquium on Africa, March 13, 1972, 7 pp.
"Siavery and Underdevelopment," Roots and Branches: Current Directions
in Slave Studies. MichaeLCraton {ed.), Issue of Historical Reflecti

World·War II and the Tanzanian.economy. Cornell University African Studies
and Research Center, Monograph Series, No, 3 (Ithaca, New York, 1976).
"The year 1895 in Southern Mozambique: African Reactions to the Imposition of
European Colonial Rule," Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 5,4
(1971), pp.509-535.
GUYANA AND THE CARIBBEAN
"Africa in Europe and the Americas," In Richard Gray (ed.), The Cambridge
History of Africa, Vol. 4, c. 1600 - c. 1790 (Cambridge: Cambridge~
University Press, 1975), pp. 578~22.
(With Earl Augustus), "The Negro Slave," Caribbean Quarterly, Vol. JO (2), (June,
1964) pp.40-47.
"Barbadian Immigration into British Guiana, 1863-1924," Paper presented at the
Ninth Annual Conference of Caribbean Historians, University of the West Indies,
Cave Hill, Barbados , 1977, 31 pp.
~The Birth of the Guyanese Working Class and the First Sugar Strikes
1840/41 and 1847" (Georgetown: Working People's Alliance, 1989), 24 pp.
"The Black Scholar Interviews Walter Rodney," Black Scholar, 6,3 (1974),
pp.38-47.
"B.G., Some New Dimensions," Pelican (U.W.L, Mona, Jamaica) 10,1 (1963).
"The Colonial Economy: Observations on British Guiana and Tanganyika," Paper
presented at a seminar at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of
London, June 1977, 7 pp.
"Contemporary Political Trends in the English-speaking Caribbean," Black
Scholar, 7,1 (1975), pp. 15-21.
"Dr Rodney: Some thoughts," Caribbean Perspectives 1,3 (1980), pp. 19-24.
"The Economics of Racism," In Guyana Council of Churches Consultation, "Race
Relations in Guyana," Synopsis of his presentation, 10 April 1980, pp. 1-2.
From Nigger-yard to Village (Georgetown: Working People's Alliance, 1988).
85

Groundings With My Brothers, with an introduction by Richard Small and a new
introduction by Omawale (London : Bogle L'Ouverture, 1969), 68pp., reprinted in
1983,
"Guyana; the making of the labour force," Race and Class, 22,4 (1981),
pp.331-352.
Guyana Sugar Plantations in the Late Nineteenth Century: A
Contemporary Description from the 'Argosy,' edited and introduced by Walter
Rodney. (Georgetown: Release Publ., 1979), 97 pp.
A History ofthe Guyanese Working People, 1881-1905.
Hopkins University Press, 1981,) 282 pp.
(Baltimore: Johns
"Immigrants and Racial Attitudes in Guyanese History," Paper presented at a
seminar at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, May
1977.
"Internal and External Constraints on the Development of the Guyanese Working
class," Georgetown Review, 1,1 (1978); pp.4-22.
"Keine Massenpartei in Traditionellen Sinn: Zur rolle des Working People's Alliance
in Guyana."3. Welt Magazine, 11/12 (Nov-Dec., 1978), pp.69-71. (Translation
of "The Working People's Alliance of Guyana: towards the Revival of Working
Class Politics in a Neo-colony").
Kofi.Baadu: out of Africa. (Georgetown: Guyana National Lithographic, 1980),
32pp.
"Masses in.action," New World Quarterly (Georgetown), Guyana Independence
Issue, 2,3 (May 1966), pp.30~37.
"Oye, his last speech on the Mall," (Georgetown: Working People's Alliance,
1987).
People's Power, no Dictator (Georgetown: WPA. 1979), reprinted with an
introduction by Trevor A Campbell in Latin American Perspectives, 8,1 (1981),
pp.64-78.
"Plantation Society in Guyana," Review (Fernand Braudel Centre, SUNY,
Bringhampton}, 4,4 (1981), pp. 643 - 666.
"The Politicisation of Race in Guyana: A Conversation with Walter Rodney," Black
World-View, 1,4 (1976?), pp. 8 - 10.
86

"Guyana's Socialism: An ·Inteiview with Walter Rodney," Colin Prescod,. Race
Class, 18,2 (1976), pp. 109 -128.
"Rodney tells why PNC panicked in this. "Year of the Tum," Caribbean Contact,
7 ,5 (Sept. 1979).
"The Role of the Historians in a Developing West Indies." Social Scientist, 1
(1963-1964), pp.13, 14, 16.
"Some political aspects of Independence," Flambeau (Kingstown Study Group, St.
Vincent) 8 (1967).
"Some thoughts on the political economy of the Caribbean," Talk delivered at the
Caribbean Unity Conference, Howard University, Washington D.C., U.S.A, April
21, 1972. Published as a New Beginning Pamphlet (Washington, D.C. : New
Beginning Movement, 1972), pp. 3"-14.
"Southern Africa and liberation support in Afro-Amertca and the West Indies,"
Paper presented at the United Nations African Institute for Economic Development
and Planning (Dakar) Conference on the "Socio-economic Trends and Policies in
Southem Africa," held at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, Nov. 29 - December 7,
1975, 16pp.
The Struggle Continues (Georgetown: Working People's Alliance, 1982).
The Struggle Goes On (Georgetown: Working People's Alliance, August 1979)',
18pp., reprinted by WPA Support Group (U.K.), London, June 1980. Excerpted
as Voices of Revolution," Guardian (New York, 2 July 1980)
"Subject Races and Cass Contradictions in Guyanese History," Paper'presented at
a seminar at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, May
1977.
"Towards the Sixth Pan-Africanist Congress: Aspects of the International Class
Struggle in Africa, the Caribbean and America," Maji Maji, 16 (1974), pp. tl-22,
also in Pan- Africanism: Struggle against neo-colonialism and Imperialism,
edited by Horace Campbell. (Toronto: Afro-Carib Publications, 1975), pp. 18-41;
and as occasional Paper of the Institute of the Black World (IBW), Atlanta, Georgia,
IBWPress, 1975.
"Transition," 1,1 (1978), pp. 1-8 (Reprinted in Maji Maji 43 (1980).
87

"Dr. Walter Rodney writes an 'Open letter' to the CCC," Caribbean Contact
{Bridgetown,·Barbados), 5(7), November 1977, p. 9.
"We Are Moving Forward,'' last public speech delivered by Walter Rodney on 6
June 1980 in Bourda Mall, Georgetown, Guyana.
"Will the World Listen Now? Dr. Rodney: A recent interview," Guyana Forum
(Mississauga, Ontario, Canada), 1,3 (June, 1980), pp.2-3. Partially reprinted as
"Rodney's Views on This Month's Arson Trial and Why He Ignored His Own
Safety," Caribbean Contact, 8(4), August, 1980, p.8.
88

GOLDSIDNE HALLESTATE, BERBICE, 1845:
CORRESPONDENCE BE1WEEN AN ABSENTEE PROPRIETOR AND
HIS A ITORNEY
With an introduction by Mary Noel Menezes.
INTRODUCTION
Interesting aspects of history are continuously being revealed through insights
gained from both personal as well as official correspondence. The following
selection of letters (1845), drawn from a collection dating from 1839 - 1848
located in the Hague Archives, Holland, reveals the history of Goldstone Hall,
Berbice. The day-to-day problems regarding the labour supply, maintainance, the
difficult soil, climatic conditions, the state of the sugar market, the lack of unanimity
among planters, the apathy of the Agricultural Society, to say nothing of
unsatisfactory managers, are seen through the eyes of the estate's absentee
proprietor, Lord Reay ofGoldings, and his attorney, James Grimond of New
Forest.
Goldstone Hall Estate on the rightbank of the Canje Creek, Berbice, comprised
of lots 10, 11 and 12, according to Downer's Chart. 1 It was purchased by Lord
Reay in 1830 at that critical time during the depreciation of estates. 2 Abolition of
slavery.was soon to be a /ait accomp/i, and the owners and planters were on the
verge of panic in their segirc:hJora substituteJabour fori:~ that wC>µld gglJoth cheap
~tiDUoUS-ThishungerJorJat>ourwo.ttlg.J:io11p9 the.hi5,!g!Yof(3C>lsl.st9pe Hall,
as reflectedJn r11uch of the correspondence. The estatewould suffer a considerable
reductionofjJ!:i .34~tslaves. png balf 9[th2rp!~i:lviJ)S=c:!!~rJst~!!$051·• ~8g},§::!)~t the
saJ.llitiimacapital.expenses IDQ!J!:11~, wfiile \Alcl9e§ irl:cr~g".Jn· 1 ~3Q lli~.pijt:,

Stipendiary Magistrate from managerial buUetins. 5 ·Managers tended to be callous
with the truth, overstating the amount of the crop while understating the amount of
the wages. 6 In his letter of 5 March 1839 Barkly informed Lord Reay that the
leniency of his manager, Mungo McPherson, towards the labourers was entirely
"mistaken". 7 Whether for his callousness with the truth, his carelessness with the
crop or his leniency towards the labourers, Reay acted on Barkly' s advice and
dismissed McPherson from both the attorneyship and the managership. After
Mr.Gunn, Mr. McPherson's successor, died of apoplexy, Mr. James Grimmond,
strongly recommended by the agents, Alex and Thomas Winter, as "a practical
planter ofability and reputation" was appointed Attorney. 8 He owned New Forest
in the vicinity of Gotdstone Hall and it was felt that thus he would be able
personally to supervise the manager through frequent visits to the estate. He
seemed to be thoroughly aufait.with the situation there, having been associated
with Goldstone Hall since·1820. 9
Attorneys· of estates - representatives in law of the owners - were very powerful
personages. By the constitution of the Colony an attorney held the owner's proxy
and could vote in all the elections of the College of Kiezers and of the Financial
Representatives in proportion to the number of qualified proprietors he
represented. 10 Governor Henry Light, who administered British Guiana from 1838
to 1848, always objected to this system of absentee votes which could enable one
attorney representing ten to twelve estates to have sixty votes! 11 On the other hand,
his successor, Henry Barkly, considered the abolition of absentee votes "... a suicidal
Policy." 12
Attorneys were also empowered to dismiss unsatisfactory managers. Grimond
uses this prerogative and one reads of the dismissal of Mr. Walker and the
appointment of Mr. Fraser who is envisaged as a more "respectable and
industrious" planter. 13 Reay, relying on his attorney's judgement, pens his approval.
The correspondence notes Lord Reay' s continuing concern over the poor yield
ofthe canes on his estate,his supportive shipping of guano to fertilise the poor,
clayey soil and his fears. regarding the pending sugar crisis. On the whole, the soil is
an atrociously difficult one and the prevailing drought aggravates crop production.
To grow a profitable crop of canes also called for considerable labour - that "great
desideratum - a commodity that was obviously scarce at Goldstone Hall.
No. of Apprenticed Negroes at Goldstone Hall
1 Jan. 1835 1 Jan. 1836 1 Jan. 1837 30 Nov. 1837
295 287 275 265
Itseemed,from Grimond's observations,thatGoldstone Ha!lreceived a very limited
quota of labourers when the immigrant ships arrived in the colony. This state of
affairs he blamed on the Immigration Agent General and Governor Light. All in all,
90

1845 was seen as "a most trying year" with the Negroes demanding" enormous
wages" . 14 Th~pgdx:Q.Usbtp.lc1y~d haV?C ~thJ2LQfI!§,!h~ c::2nce~9~f the
a~~JlL~,.JlLQJ?J:t~l@JQrJh!L$JJ.(;(;~$§.~ifd'w]11-.l:5.~}Jl9 .()I hI~ ~.~!ci.t.~. ~trikes a
conspicu9us 11ote)11theseJet,t~. Attorney Grimond does not hesitaiefcrl:e1nt as it
is:"Tnecanes everywnere are y1ekhng badly at present, but, I know of none so bad
as Goldstone Hall." 15 1846 ushers in no change for the better and Grimond again
informs Reay that "the presefitprospects of G.H. are by no means cheering."
Although Reay' s patience is "severely tried" and his disappointment is manifest, he
faces 1846 in a more hopeful mood than that of his attorney. In that hope lay llis
only comfort! But this hope would be short--lived. B~!or~ t,he !:r11 the
passage. of the Sugar Duties Bm threVJ the plant~rs .ofthg fgo~an and the
a ~ee
Bar y_,.theo M. P. for
Leonirnisfifr, speaNng JD tf}e. Flotise 9J1ttv~.Blll.c~QQ~l11ded that though
"Emancfpafion fiad succeeded morally, If had failed economica1ly ..,,ui·...
~L1§_1,?
p·roj:,rlelo~~·:!!!!~::p:a,·~1~:a~rt~:~~Iif~}r..:E.ei1ry
• •~

DOCUMENTS
I.Lord Reay expresses concern over poor production and promises supply
oLguano.
Reay to Grimond
Goldings, 29th March 1845
Dear Sir,
I have not had this pleasure since mylast letter of the 14th January and 1 have to
acknowledge your letters of 1st January and the 14th February - I have not been
quite well of late, and have had but little spirit forwriting, and even now I do not
feel up to it. You may be assured however thatl will not neglecfany of your
recommendations - Your report of the promising. good effects of the Guano
affords me great p1easure,and if you can make purchase of it in the colony at the
rate you mention, I beg you will notlose the opportunity. I believe that if sent out
from here itwould cost more,and I am further given to understand that the African
Guano is likely soon to be exhausted. I shall send out the Ten Tons which you ask
for, either Peruvian or African as it may be - I shall not neglect the still, and I shall
consider about the Hurdles for penning Cattle - I am both anxious and ambitious
that Goldstone Hall should give a large return, according to what I was led to
expect on purchasing it -I am surprised that for general protection the Planters do
not combine to put a stop to the ruinous Task Gang system, indeed I cannot
conceive how they can pursue it. I was of course disappointed that the calculated
crop· of last year should. have· fallen short, but I am confident at the same time that
every exertion for my interest was used hy you. Your remarks with regard to Mr.
Walker distress and annoy me extremely - 1 have always understood from my first
connection with the West Indies fifty ye3rs ago that the well-doing of an Estate
depended greatly on the Manager, and as soon as you can, indeed, until you
succeed in doing so, 1 shall be ill at ease in regard to the Property.
With full confidence,} remain my dear Sir,
Very faithfully Yours.
P.S. I have heard of the arrival in Berbice of several ships from Africa with
Emigrants, now have they they been placed? The "Blanche" has not yet arrived. I
have from Mr. Moore's connections that he is pleased with his appointment, and I
shall be glad if you will be good enough to look after him now and then. How
92

comes Everton to give so large a return? Is there any penning of cattle in the
Colony? How do the Tenants in Goldstone Hall get on? I have no doubt you have
the best information as to the Sugar Market, and therefore l say nothing about it -
at present I hear it is very low, but we are in hopes that the reduction in duty wiU
give us a lift - In fact, if appears to me that we have only hope to live upon.
2.Attorney Gtitnond stresses. need for greater economy ""' wages at
Goldstone Hall rather high -,notes his appointment of new manager and
assures Reay ofa better crop soon.
Grimond to Reay New Forest, May 151845
My Lord,
r have received Your Lordship's favr of the 29th March and I regretto learn that
Your Lordship has been indisposed, but I hope ere this, you are perfectly
recovered-
Since my last report respecting the effects of the Guano the Weather has been
very fine for the Young Canes, but it appears to me thafthe effects ~J the Guano
are not now so perceptible as at first. I therefore think that a sound dressing would
be more beneficent and for this purpose I have wrote {sic) to Demerara for 10 Tons
more, but I am not sure I shall get it as I hear it is how very scarce.
I am rather inclined to think that Your Lordship has been deceived in regard to
the capabilities of G. Hall - ari average crop of 1 Hhd per acre for a series of years
is considered a fair return in Berbice. I admit that in favourable season there rnay
be a few estates that exceed that average but take it for 5 or 10 years and I am very
sure that there has been no estate in this county that has exceeded 1 Hhd per acre
- with the exception of Euston who is a new Estate and the land is very superior. I
have known G.Hall for the last 25 years and that or long before it was sold, and I
am very certain that it did not make an average crop of 1 Hhd per acre - but with
plenty of labour, I am of the opinion thata larger return than that can be obtained
from it. There is no cattle pen'd in Berbice for the purpose of making manure. It is
Your Lordship's question, that suggested to me the idea of movable pens, as being
the only way they could be made useful! (sic) for making Manure - With regard to
the high rate of wages given here, I have only to say that I have done all I could to
keep them down and what I have gained by it - absolutely nothing but against - of
ill will, I have therefore determined to let things take their course . If absent
proprietors will continue to be so blind to their own interests in appointing men as
their representatives here who know nothing of a Sugar Estate, they must abide the
consequences but the evil is that others suffer as well as themselves, as an instance
of this, an Estate· called Philadelphia nearly opposite to· this Estate has been for the
last three years using the plough to some extent and has been held up as an
example to the whole Colony. The proprietor has spent a large sum of money, in
93

consequence of large crops being promised the crop has never been made and the
Estateis literally abandoned. G. Hall as well as this p]ace has suffered already from
the system pursued on Philadelphia, the proprietor finding that they got nothing,
but heavy Bills and wages .,. requested me sometime ago, to take charge of it but
when I saw the state of the cultivation I declined it. I did not neglect the opportunity
of putting a good manager upon it. I have neither time nor inclination to serve an
abandoned Estate. The pay list of this Estate for last year was nearly as much as
Eusfon,the one.didnotmakelOO Hhds another made over800Hhds sugar, so
that Your Lordship may easily imagine the inducement the people had to go to
work on·Philadelphia. We cannot expect to get for our sugar more than 15 per
Hhd, it will therefore require the strictest economy to make a Sugar Estate pay at
that price. lhave seen the necessity of a Change of Management of G. Hall but 1
could not find though I thought I could·trust? - but Mr. Walker has been so careless
lately that I have been forced to discharge him. I have given the management to a
Mr. Fraserwho has been a long time in the Colony as a planter, he is a highly
respectable man .and verylndustrious. He is also a person that has some stake in
the Colony, being himself part proprietor on a sugar estate on the Coast. I thought
it was better to give the situation to a person I have known for many years than to
a stranger I did not know. Mr. Fraser tookoverthe management today. The only
thing I am afraid ofis thathe will not keep his health, as G. Hall is very unhealthy
and he has been accustomed to live on the coast.
We shall commence making sugar on G. Hall early next month and if the Canes
yield as well as l expect they will make about 100 Hhds Sugar before they stop. I
am fully aware that Your Lordship's patience has been severely tried in not getting
sugadrom G. Hall this year but 1 hope we will make up for it before the latter end
of theYear. There has been only one Vessel that has arrived in Berbice this Year
with immigrants fromAfrica and·she was chartered by private individuals. She is
daily expected from her second trip, and if successfull (sic) she will return when I
shall take a share for G. Hall. The reason I did not do so before, was that Your
Lordship being so sanguine of getting Coolies but now I see·tittle chance of Berbice
getting any at all events unless we get a vessel to come direct to this port we shall
not get one,aU the emigrants arrived in Demerara, Berbice has not got one
emigrant from · ; a vessel arrived in Demerara a few days ago from India with
Coolies and more are expected but not one for this county -
The Tenants on G. Hall are not getting on so well as I could wish, I cannot get
them to drain their fields ..;; some of those Canes however look well, will be cut next
month, and when they seHtheir sugar and get a little money, they might get on
return.
The reason Euston makes such la.rge returns is that the land is good and easy
worked, two weedings are quite sufficient there, at G. Hall it takes from 6 to 8
Weedings .. they also have plenty of labour, and the people on the Estate are
particularly well disposed - especially the headman.
94

Mr. Moore lam sorry to say has been very sick, he expressed a wish to go
home. I had arranged every thing for his passage but when he got a little better he
changed his mind but during the few days he was in town with Mr. Winter his berth
at Euston was filled up. I advised him to take a situation as a clerk until he got
strong and seasoned to the Country, but he does not seem to like this proposition.
1 can easily get him a situation as a planter, but not one where he will be taken care
of, as on Euston. I have just now heard that he has got fever again. I am surprised
that Mr. Allport should have allowed such a delicate person as Mr. M. to come out
here, as he must have known the hardships and privation of a planter's life. The
plan of G. Hall will be forwarded in a few days.
I remain
My Lord
Your Lordships
Most Obt.Svt.
James Grimond
3.Reay is satisfied with appoinbnent
shipment to Goldstone Hall
of new Manager and promises guano
Reay to Grimond London, 30th June 1845
My Dear Sir,
Since my last to you of 13 May, 1 have rec'd yours of the 15th of the same
month, and I write to you to express my best thanks for the careful and business
like account you have therein given me of the present position of Goldstone Hall.
l have also to express my satisfaction that you have succeeded in appointing a
new manager on Goldstone Hall - Mr. Fraser who you report so favourably of -
and that under your guidance and supervision I am more confident than ever that
the Estate is in· a fair way of being made productive as circumstances will or can
admit ofl
have reason to believe you will have a supply both qf Coolies and Africans.
The ten tons guano I promised are now shipped in the Medora about to leave
the River, and I hope they will arrive in goqd time.
I fear Mr. Moore is too delicate a frame to stand the rigours of climate, etc and if
it proves to be so, he of course should come home - I feel thankful to you for the
kindness you have shown hirn, and
I remain
ever faithfully yours,
Reay
I think W. Indians are in better spirits ..
95

4.Grimond deplores poor soil and consequent bad yield of canes at
Goldstone Hall; complains of the inactivity of the Agricultural Society and
sees the need for improved machinery
Grimond to Reay New Forest, July 15, 1845
My Lord,
I have to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordships favr of the 13' May and an
extract of a letter on the subject of applying Guano. It appearsveryevident to me
that the quantity useclontheJigbtdrysoil ofJamaica will not sufficeJorthestiff
clay soirofGoldsfone Hall - at all events UouridthattheJirstapplicationwas not
enough,. but thata second Qressing?was abs9lutely necessary. l do not see, judging
fromthe appearance of the Canes, that they have got too much, but on the
contrary they look much better than those that only got one dressing. TheC

planter, but unless he is more robust than-Mr. Moore, I think it would be follv for
him to come out here, as the hardships and·privations of a planters life are great I
presume Mr.Moore has given his opinion of the country fully to his relatives at
home. I would therefore advise this young Gentleman to be guided accordingly. If,
however, he should be determined to try his future as a planter it will afford me
great pleasure to give him all the aid I can - Mr. Moore seems to like his new berth
in Town.
I regret exceedingly to say that the Canes lately cut on G. Hall have yielded
miserably bad worse than any thing I could have anticipated. The Canes every
where are yielding badly at presenfbut, I know of none so bad as G. Hall. I feel the
disappointment the more, as particular attention was paid to the fields. I have
determined in letting them stand for a few weeks in hopes, that they may improve
their yielding. The plan is ready and will go by the Blanche.
l remain
My Lord
Your Lordship
Most Obt.Svt.
James Grimond
5. Labour -The Great Desideratum for Estate
Reay to Grimond
Goldings, 31 Aug., 1845
MyDearSir,
I have to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 15th July, and I confess that
after all the pains you have taken in addition to the Guano, etc. - I am extremely
disappointed to hear that the canes at the time you were writing proved so
ungrateful.
I still however must go on repeating that I cling to hope - An adequate supply of
labour is I am satisfied indispensable to realize my wishes, and I have heard from
several·friends who know the Colony and Goldstone Hall, that that is the great
desideratum and which you have frequently expressed to me - J therefore feel
convinced that you will make every exertion to obtain it. I can't help thinking that if
your Agricultural Society were animated by proper feeling and energy great good
would be done in all ways, and you must stir them up.
I leave you to do whatyou think best about the still - one from London of 400
Gallons could cost more than double what you state, and if therefore you deem it
advisable to have a still now, by all means get it at the half price - the Young man
whom I have already mentioned to you, will go out in about a month - I have not
seen him but I have a very good report of him, and I am told that he is of a stout
hearty constitution - he is a Relation of a particular Friend of mine.
I enclose you a letter which 1 received a few days back from a Brother West
Indian, who is a Friend and Neighbour of mine - he is one of the fortunate ones
97

who have ample means and althd I can vie with him in that respect, yet I should
like to know the particulars concerning the machinery which you state to be used
with such advantage by some of your neighbours - ·Mr. Chauncy has not yet used
any new machinery -
I have only to repeat that I am always glad to receive any recommendations from
you, and to the utmost of my power and means I shall be happy to attend them.
P.S.: I am afraid that there will be some delay in forwarding The Madeira Wine
which I mentioned in my note of the 29th July in consequence of there being no
seldom or direct communication· from Madeira to Berbice.
6. Grimond looks forward to a batch of immigrants from Sierra Leone as
scarcity of labour continues to be felt
Grimond to Reay New Forest, September 1845
My Lord,
I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordships' fav' r 9th 30th June and 29'
Ulto and I beg leave to return my best thanks for your Lordships very handsome
present of a Cask of Madeira wine and at the same time I must regret that I have
not had it in my power to do anything to deserve such a mark of your Lordship's
confidence
I am glad to learn that we are at last likely to get· Coolies but unless the vessels
come direct to this port - we must not expect to a single immigrant from
Demerara and lam glad to hear from Messrs Davidsons that· persons interested in
this county have taken steps to get vessels to come here direct from India. I had
already ma.de applicationfor 50 for Goldstone Hall but I intend to increase my
application to 100, as 1 find there are houses sufficient for that number. The Louisa
Baillie frorn Sierra Leon may be expected in a couple of weeks, and if she has been
successfull [sic]Goldstone Hall share will be at the 25, they are very much wanted,
as labor continues very scarce, and I am certain that without assistance the present
labourers will not take off the crop this year.
The dry season has set in fully a monthsooner than usual this year and I fear it
will more orless affect the crop.I find that the Canes that got Guano does not seem
to stand the dry weatl)er better than those that got more. I am anxious to know if
the Guano will improve this yielding, the first field on which it was applied will be
cut next week. I shall then be able to inform your Lordship of the result, the canes
look well and I hope the return will be large. The Medusa has just arrived and I am
in hopes of being able to give her a pretty good shipt. from G. Hall- When the
cask of wine arrives I shall have it carefully stored to wait Your Lordships orders - I
find on enquiry, that the agricultural society is absolutely doing nothing. Most of its
98

Members live at such distances from town that it is very difficult to get them to
meet. 1 fear therefore that little good can be expected from it.
I remain
My.Lord
Your Lordships
Most Obt. Sevt
dames Grimond
7. Difficult soil of Goldstone Hall. Suggests Charcoal and guano treatment
G.rimond to Reay New Forest, Oct., 15 1845
My Lord,
I have received Your Lordships favor of the l" ulto enclosing a letter from Mr.
Channing on the subject of Manure. I am fully aware that some of the manure he
maintains as proving so beneficient in Grenada would not answer on the stiff soil of
G.Hall.
I however think that charcoaLmixed with Guano in equal proportions would
prove a good Manure for G. Hall. It is my intention when the rains set into mix the
Guano with the ashes. from the Megass. This contains a - portion of potash and
lime and I am in hopes that this will answer better than using the Guano alone but
without labour to work the soil, Hie part of the soil of G. Hall in wet weather is
like and as few houses seen upon it makes it as hard as a mortar fine - Your
Lordship will easily perceive from this that G. Hall requires to be well worked a11d
thatany manure will have very little effect upon such a soil until it is thoroughly
turned up.
I have done several fields already and I think the difference is very perceptible
and lintend to go on withthe other fields as I can get labour. l cannot however
concealfrom Your Lordship that it wHl be very expensive when done it will last
for years and we shall get thorougly rid of the grass - which at present it is
impossible to do -
I think Mr. Channing plan of a small cultivatjon area kept in good order is highly
proper but here we have been led to expect a large influx of immigrants from year
to year and therefore have been- very loth to curtail the cultivation in order that
we might make their services at once. lrnust not say that we have been grievously
disappointed in these Expectations. The Louisa Baillie is now past due, I hope she
wjll be successfull [sic] for the last two months there has been very few of the G.
Hall peopleat workon account of sickness. I am sorry to say that the mortality
amongst them has been Very greaL They are now nearly all at work I have shipped
by the Medusa 50 Hhds of sugar from G. Hall and as the quality is very good, I
hope it will fetch a good price. - I expect to make a similar ship about the end of
this month.
99

I regret to say that the Canes are yielding badly and I fear that the Crop will fall
short of what I expected. This rnay be attributed to their being neglected in the
early part of the year - ltrustthis will never happen again. The first field that got
Guano has been cut - it yielded a tittle over one Hhd. per acre. This is no great
yielding, but when it is taken into consideration that this field has never before
rnade 1/2 a Hhd an acre - lthink it must be allowed thatthe Guano has one good
besides the sugar from it this year, the quality is very fine - whereas last Year the
quality was very bad indeed.
I have had the still repaired and I think it may now last for 2 or 3 years .. Rum and
Molasses still continue very low in price here - Mr. Moore's health is now fully
restored and he is anxious to try the planting again. I have advised him to continue
where he is until the beginning ofthe Year when the crop would be off, and of
course the duty not so hard, but lfind from a note just received from him that he is
determined to try a planters life again. I shall therefore comply with his wishes and
get him a situation as soon as possible. l hope the young Gentleman who is coming
out is more robust than Mr. M. I am sorry lcannot send Your Lordship peppers by
the Medusa as these cannot be got in the creek - -
The machinery I alluded to is not yetin operation {sic} when it is I shall be able to
explain it folly to Your Lordship. There was [sic] two Gentlemen sent out to
superintend it I have seen some sugar made by them in·the usual long way and the
quality is very fine indeed. TheVacuum pan has been in use in this colony for many
Years but the great objection to it, is the enormous expense.
I remain
My Lord
Most Obt. Sevt.
James Grimond
8. Reay approves Grimond' s policies and looks forward to brighter days
Reay to Grimond
Goldings, 1 December 1845
My dear Sir,
Since my last of.the 30th October I have received yours of the 15th of the same
month, and altho' I have little to say or remark on its contents I do not wishto
delay Writing to you.
I am pleased that you are directing your attention so particularly to Manures, as I
am satisfied that it is or.lly through the proper p.pplication of them accompanied by
adequate labour that G. Hall can do well and it is highly gratifying to me that you
areproceeding in working and turning up the Fields in the manner you describe as
far as your means will allow.
I observe that the expected 300 Hhds are not likely to be forthcoming but I have
100

emarked hitherto that the caneshave usuallyyieldedbetter in the latter part
crop. What you say of the application and effect ofthe Guano is satisfactory. as
shows that it has not been thrown away and I hope the increase of the L
Hogshead per acre may become general.
My.friend Mr.Chauncyhasse11t me another letter upon the subject of manure,
which I enclose - I have not been able to go to town lately to make inquiries upon
the point, but l shall attend to as soon as I can. 1t would be very agreeable to
learn that the sugar: scum would produce a salutary effect upon the Brickand
Mortar soil of Goldstone Hall. I hear that it is the hop growers in the country who
monopolize nearly the whole supply of itas the hop soils are of a very stiff nature. 1
am very glad that you have repaired the still to hold out for another year or two - I
hope Mr. Moore may·succeed in his views, and.I again request that you will keep
an eye on him. The other young Man. who was to have gone out has ch~d his
mind. The Theodora has not yet arrived. I hear the Sugar Market is steady with fair
prices, of which I trust I shall reap the benefit -
9. Grimond reports severe drought and very poor sugar production and
blames management for bad yields
Grimond to Reay ~ew Forest, December 1, 1845
My Lord,
I have received Your Lordships esteemed fav'r of the 30th and feel obliged to
Your Lordships kind enquiries after my health. I am happy to say that my health is
perfectly restored some time ago - my attack was of short duration, although much
severe·than I usually get, the fever I.care little about, being pretty well accustomed
to it, but in this instance it was accompanied by a very bad cough which annoyed
me very much for several weeks. l return Your Lordship my best thanks for the
Quinine. so kindly sent me, and which has arrived safe in Demefara and will be
forwarded here in a few days -
I am glad to hear that we are likely to get an accession of labourers, which will be
very acceptable - providing we can get them.here, but at present they will be very
little use to us, as the whole country is completely burned up and fresh water is
selling at Sets - to five pound· sterling per gallon, this has not been the case before
for many years - even on this estate where there is always an abundant supply of
fresh water -'-the young canes are entirely burned up and at G. Hall they are if any
thingworse, but I do notthinktheyhave suffered more than some canes I see on
the adjoining Estate. My last letter would have prepared Your Lordship to expect a
very short crop from G. Hall this year. In all my experience of Sugar Estates 1 was
never so deceived as I have been with the canes on G. Hall this year. I saw myself
all the fields properly supplied, and they all spring very well. I therefore flattered
101

myself that there was a fair stand of canes established .. I did not think that it was
necessary for me to superintend the weeding and moulding of them, but it appears
there was nothing done, except a tittle on the outside, as when the fields were cut,
there was nothing in the midst but grass, but the outside looked uncommonly well,
and would have deceived any planter - I regret exceedingly that I did not make a
change in the management sooner, as lnow find that Mr. Walker was much more
negligent that I had anticipated - I never saw such an extent of canes cut to make
so little sugar, and I am very certain had any planter gone round the Estate four
months ago, he would have estimated the crop, at the very least 300 Hhds, instead
of that it will not make so much as .it did last year. In my next I will be able to say,
what crop will be -
I. am well aware of the feelings of an absent proprietor, and the reason I did not
write more frequently was thatl was afraid of tending ? upon Your Lordship more
especially as I write the House almost every packet. Living as I do at some distance
from Town, it is therefore late before I get my letter, and I was some time obliged
to answer then by candle light. My correspondence is necessarily hurried and I fear
frequently imperfect. The apparatus I alluded to for improving is not yet completed,
for the want of Engineers.
I was sorry to learn from the House that the plan of G. Hall did not please Your
Lordship. l believe I stated at the time, that it was not such as l could have wished
but if Your Lordship will say how you wish it done, a copy can be very easily made.
I remain
My Lord
Your Lordship
Most Obt. Sevt.
James Grimond
10. Bad state of crops due to drought ; farms are neglected
Grimond to Reay
New Forest, January, 1846
My Lord,
Since I had the pleasure on the 1st Ulto - I have not received any of Your
Lordship fav , I regret to say. that the present season has been as yet much more
adverse than any we have for many years with the exception a few light showers
about two weeks ago which did little good to the stiff soil of G. Hall. We have had
no rain to do any good to the cultivation for six months and at present the Weather
is as dry it was in October - and all the appearance of a continuance of it, there is
therefore little chance of doing anything to the fields at G. Hall in the way of
supplying, until we get rain, with any prospect of success and now that the season
is so far advanced I fear we need not expect much rain before April or May in
which case the Crops of every Estate in the Colony will be seriously injured I
102

cannot conceal from Your Lordship, that the present prospects of G. Hall is [sid by
no means cheering, at the same time I must state that ifwe get rains soon it wm
make a tolerable crop, as the fields are all dean and in a good state to receive it.
Hall is so much dependent upon the season that it is impossible to make anythi, ,g
like a correct Estimate of its crop. I was so woefully [sic) deceived by the
appearance of the Cultivation. Then last year that 1 will not ....... to give anothe,-
Estimate, as I would only be deceiving Your Lordship which I have no \Vish to do. l
was certainiy under the impression last year that the crop would have been fully a
half more than it turned out to be. I am well aware that it must be very distressing
to send Your Lordship such ... but lconsiderit my duty to give a plain candid
statement of the property and Your Lordship must be aware also, that it is very
disheartening for those in charge, to see every effort they make to improve the
property, almost in every instance fail, which has been the case on G. Hall for the
last three years. This Estate is suffering from the same cause, though not perhaps
to the same extent but I know that every thing has been done to remedy the soil,
but an absent proprietor cannot know this - and he frequently attributes the effects
of the weather to negligence on the part of those in charge - more especially when
he hears that some parts of the colony has suffered from too much rain which has
been the case of the district and even in the lower part of the Canje the season
has been more favourable - I am still of the opinion that with favourable seasons G.
Hall can be made as ...
property. but ·,1ot with such seasons as we have had for
some years back - at the same time I must confess that ithas had far from justice
9one to it. It appears to me that the fields that got Guano last year looks [sic) better
than those that got none. I have not yet applied the last 10 tons received from
England but will do so the moment the ground is sufficiently moistered and I shall
endeavour to geta further supply from Demerara.The crop of G. Hall last year, I
am sorry to say has only turned out 175 Hhds sugar. This miserable crop has cost
more to make it than the crop of the previous year - this has arisen principally
from the bad stand of canes upon the fields, the people would not cut them unless
they got higher wages.· The average of the cane cutting upon this estate is under $4
for a Hhd. sugar while on G.Hall, it is about $10 per Hhd - this is more than
double what they would have cost had the canes been good. The Farms are by no
means getting on well at G. Hall nor anywhere else. When the system of leasing
has been tried, it was generally thought thatthey would take very good care of their
farms - but the contrary has been the case ..... and every farm l have seen is sadly
neglected.
The cattle are looking well, but they are not worth the expense of a stock
keeper. Cattle at present is a perfect . here on account of their being got so
cheap from the Spanish Main. A vessel arrived in Demerara a few days ago with
263 Coolies, all in good health - and no deaths on the passage. The reports are
that a vessel was to sail a few days after for Berbice - I understood that the
Governor is to give the Estates on the coast all the Coolies that may arrive, as
103

eing better adapted for them that the rivers and creeks, but I believe that the latter
are better suited for them than the former.
I have therefore given the Immigration Agent distinctly to understand that if G.
Hall does not get a share I will consider myself perfectly justified in taking them
wherever I can get them as G. Hall has been too often overlooked by Governor.
I have seen the apprentices at work. I formerly alluded to and was disappointed
to find it so complicated and expensive. I was led to believe by the makers Messrs
Geadesden & Evans that it was quite simple and cost only £160 but I find it cost
when rented £2,000 the sugar is much improved, but I prefer the vacuum pan, and
it only cost a trifle now. Mr. Moore has gone to Pin. Skeldon as overseer, it is
considered a very healthy situation butl fear he has not got strength to undergo
thefatigues of an overseer life.
I am sorry to learn fromtheHouse that Your Lordship has been indisposed, but
I hope Your Lordship is long ere this in the enjoyment of good health.
I remain
My Lord
Your Lordships
Most Obt Sevt.
James Grimond
11. Despite the misfortunes of 1845, Reay hopes for improved production
in1846
Reay to Grimond Goldings - 14 Feb., 1846
My dear Sir,
I have received your letter of the 1st January and yours representation of matters
at Goldstone Hall has, as you may easily imagine, added considerably to the
concern which it has occasioned me for some years past. Annoying and distressing
however as this state of things must be to me,. yet I should be still more concerned
ifl could think that you supposed that I attributed any of these misfortunes to the
want of all due care on your part .... I repeat that you are doing all you can for my
interest, and your full and candid statements are what I like - I don't give up hope!
as it would make me more unhappy to cut this source of comfort from under me. I
have a consolation to have your report that the "Fields" are clean and in a gpod
state and it is therefore fair to expect that the canes will so improve as to prevent
the enormous expense incutting which you describe. I cannot allow myself to think
that the Immigration Agent would artfully act with injustice towards Goldstone Hall
in the distribution of Emigrarits, as I arn given to understand that the whole matter
has been putunder his.control purposely to avoid undue interference of private
Parties, but if it can be provedthathe is acting with partiality, I should not hesitate
104

to represent the case at the Colonial Office. - l am glad to hear that young Moore
is placed, and I hope his health will not prevent his doing well as a Planter - I wrote
you a few lines on the 1st February.
I remain, my dear Sir
Very faithfully Yours.
12. Reduction of Wages and Expenses at Goldstone Haff
Davidson to Reay Lime Shrub Square, 5 May 1847
My dear Lord Reay,
We received a day or two ago from Captain of the Mary, the Goldstone Hall
Contingent Account, which I have had epitomised and now enclose - The wages In
1845 amounted to £2700 and last year Mr. Grimond redt1,ced them to £2300 -
the whole expenses were £4600 against £4900 in 1845 - so far so good, if the
crops had not fallen off so terribly.
This year with 300 Cross Canes he ought to.make near upon 300 Hhds. ·Sugar
- and as Rum is likely still to sell well, we ought to see a different result in 1848
after your long trials and hopes. The Com Market has again advanced and the
price of wheatis risen _ _ there is a talk of the Government prohibiting
Distilling from corn which might be a help to us in sugar. At present, however, we
cannot move and there is no relaxation of the difficulties which press upon.the
Mercantile classes.
Believe me,
My dear Lord Reay,
Very truly Yours,
H. Davidson
105

BOOK REVIEW
Basdeo Mangru, Benevolent Neutrality: Indian Government PoHcy and
LabourMigration to British Guiana 1854-1884 (London: Hansib Publishing
Limited, 1987), pp. 287.
Dr. Mangru's book is a most timely publication, marking the 150th anniversary
of the arrival of East Indian labourers in British Guiana. It is essentially a revision of
the doctoral thesis of a scholar who much earlier had the notable achievement of
being the first studentto he awarded a Master's Degree by the University of
Guyan.a and subsequently taught with distinction at that institution before taking up
residence abroad.
A number of readily available and important historical works, both published and
unpublished, dealwith East Indian immigration into the former colony of British
Guiana, Contemporary works include John Scoble's A Brief Exposure of the
Deplorable Conditions of the Hill Coolies in British Guiana and Mauritius
(London, 1840); J. Beaumont's New Slavery: An Account of the Indian and
Chinese Immigrants in British Guiana (London, 1871); Edward Jenkins' The
Coolie: His Rights and Wrongs (London, 1871), and H.V.P. Bronkhurst's The
Colony of British Guiana and its Labouring Population. (London, 1883) and
Among the Hindus and Creoles of British Guiana (London, 1888). Recent
decades have witnessed a steady increase in publications, including Peter
Ruhoman's Centenary History of the Indians in British Guiana 1838-1938
(London, 1947) and Dwarka Nath's History of Indians in British Guiana
(London, 1950), both of which are largely general accounts.
More analytical works are Mary Cumpston's Indians Overseas in British
Territories 1834-1845 (London, 1953) and Hugh Tinker's A New System of
Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas 1820 - 1930 (London,
} 974). Among the several unpublished works are Basdeo Mangru's M.A. Thesis,
Imperial Trusteeship in British Guiana with special reference to the East Indian
Indentured Immigrants, 1838-1882. Myth or Reality?" (University of Guyana,
1976), and seminar papers by scholars on various aspects of the question, such as
evolution and structure of the indentureship system, immigration policies of specific
governors, and resistance by indentured labourers.
106

In spite of the impressive amount of literature available on the subject, Mangru's
work is in several ways a welcome departure from most earlier publications. Firstly,
it focuses in depth on the socio-economic conditions and recruiting system on the
Indian sub-continent. It also makes a scrutiny of the various policies of the Indian
Govemmentin its efforts to minimize abuses. Fu1:thermore, it investigates the
physical conditions and other attendant problems of the arduous voyage
experienced by immigrants and examines the system of indentureship and its
consequences in British Guiana. The author himself rather modestly asserts:
This book attempts to examine the effectiveness of policies designed to protect the
interests of indentured labourers from India. It analyses the pressures to formulate policies
and put them into effect and the ways in which in practice policies·were obstructed. It
seeks to show that where the interest of government and colonial employers tended to
coincide, policies to protect labour proved largely effective. Where there were divergent
aims the interest of the plantocracy tended to predominate with the result that conditions
under indenture, basicaily a system of personal and industrial control, underwent very little
improvement. {p. 7).
In the pursuance of his task, Mangru adopts modern historical scholarship in
terms of a methodical approach and the utilization of his sources.To a great extent
there is a smooth flow of subject matter throughout the study and this is partly due
to the· fact that the author ably combines both the thematic and chronological
methods of presentation. Of greater significance is the fact that he carefully utilizes
a variety of sources. For example, extensive usage is made of the Public Record
Office and the India Office Library in England and the National Archives in Guyana,
with the focus being on manuscript and printed materials. These were
supplemented. by an impressive list of relevant books, periodical articles and
unpublished dissertations.
Specifically, the period under scrutiny spans thirty years, commencing in 1854
"when five year indentureship came into effect' and terminating in 1884, the year
the su~ar industry received a crippling blow with the collapse of world sugar
prices. (p. 7).
Chapter 1 is more or less an overview of the immediate post-emancipation era.
It deals with labour problems, planter response and the various immigration
schemes which emerged. lnthis regard it presents·very little new information but,
admittedly, sets the scene for whatis presented in the ensuing chapters.
Chapter 11 holds'more interest as far-as the study is concerned. Indian labour
migration was initiated to fillthe void created following the mass withdrawal of
compulsory plantation labour (p. 53). Mangru observes that numbers despatched
were influenced by a combination of factors, including the annual needs of recipient
colonies, the persuasiveness of colonial recruiters and the socio-economic
pressures in India. While "social conservatism and caste prejudices" were major
obstacles to colonial emigration, the author emphasises that it was largely the
'push' rather than the 'pull'factors which were dominant. Famine, disease, poverty,
.107

unemployment and a high cost of living in the recruiting districts clearly forced
many to seek a way out by turning to migration and higher expectations.
With the 'caste system' and 'caste prejudices' rooted in the Indian sub-continent
for centuries; it is widely felt by many, and. perhaps justifiably so, that migrants
were drawn exclusively from the lowest rung of the society. The author, however,
refutes such a notion .. According to him, "emigrants comi;?rised a variety of caste
groups at different levels of the Indian caste hierarchy. (p. 74). While such a
conclusion is based on entries in emigration certificates, Mangru questions the
complete accuracy of this source. He notes that it is quite possible that some
people provided misleading information to emigration officials. For exampte, some
could have assumed higher caste status with the expectation of receiving
preferential treatment or more lucrative jobs inthe colony, while others could have
deliberately assumed low caste in order to be recruited. The latter in particular must
have been a distinct possibility especially after the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny, and more
so the increasing labour unrest on the plantations in the 1860s and 1870s. In any
event, one has to recognise the extreme difficulty facing recruiting officials in
verifying caste daims and hence the heavy reliance on whatever information was
provided by prospective emigrants.
Chapters 111 and 1 V are extremely valuable, since they provide a wealth of
information and analysis on· the key issues of recruitment and the actual voyage to
the colony. The role of the Government of India in relation to labour recruitment is
seen as admirable, since it tried as far as possible to ensure that whatever laws were
implemented had direct bearing on safeguarding the emigrants. Even with these
'built-in' measures, in practice the system produced numerous abuses such as
bribes, intimidation, kidnapping, illegal confinement and deception on the part of
dishonest recruiters motivated by economic greed.
Mangru highl~hts the difficulty of recruiting adequate numbers offemales and
describes it as a· perennial problem" (p. 96). Certainly such a situation is not unique
to indentured Indians as, for example, Chinese immigration also suffered from a
paucity of women. Nevertheless, as the author rightly points out, disparity of the
sexes was to have a serious social impact on the plantations in the form of "high
incidents {sic,) of wife murders." {p. 97).
Distinctive features of the voyage including depots, medical inspectors'
examinations, the roles of Emigration agents and ships'.surgeons were all detailed.
ln this regard the author argues, with appropriate forcefulness, that these played a
significant role in determining the levels of mortality as far as the long, arduous
voyage is concerned. He goes further, linking a number of innovations with the
reduction of the mortality rate as the years progressed.
Mangru's final chapters (VandV1) to a great extent deal adequately with the
evolution of the indenture system, labour control and labour response, and the
early attempts at establishing village settlements. He is convinced that as the system
108

evolved and developed, planters "progressively tightened" their grip over the
labourers through the implementation of stringent laws. Such a state of affairs is
not in the leastsurprising, since it was the plantocracy that wielded considerable
political power through its dominance of both the Court of Policy and the
Combined Court in the post-emancipation decades.
Jn reality, the immigrants found themselves in a system as bad as slavery. The
author laments this situation when he declared: "The demands sanctioned by the
law virtually relegated the·immigrantfo the position of a slave." (p. 183). This view
is certainly shared by both Beaumont and Tinker, who describe indentureship as a
new form of slavery.
The author unwittingly underplays the role of active and passive forms of
resistance by indentured labourers when he asserts that these had little effect on the
system itself. Walter Rodney in his study, A History of the Guyanese Working
People, 1881-1905 goes beyond that by linking the high incidence of cases
which surfaced under the labour laws and "restlessness, absenteeism and
non-compliance" by indentured workers. Further, Rodney states that the Leonora
and Devonshire Castle riots helped to condition "planter and official attitudes"
towards Indian indentured labour. While it would seem that labourers are not given
the due recognition by Mangru for their efforts in getting the system modified, the
author gives much credit to William De Voeux for his "celebrated letter" of
complaints.
Unfortunately the terminal point of the study comes at a time when tangible
efforts were being made to establish village settlements in the colony. As a
consequence, this important landmark involving the immigrants is largely confined
by Mangru to the abortive Nooten Zuil settlement and the initial stage of the
Huist'Dieren experiment. The cessation of reindenture and the considerable
increase in repatriation costs along with the need for continuous labour supplies
were factors which forced colonial authorities to encourage village settlement. It
was Governor Irving in the early 1880's who modified the scheme by creating
opportunities for immigrants to purchase land in localities best suited to their
individual needs. Although the Huist'Dieren modification was itself plagued with
problems, it paved the way for future settlements to emerge along the coastal belt.
While these immigrant settlers continued to provide plantation labour, they also
became associated with the rapidly emerging rice industry at the turn of the
century.
The combination of a thematic and chronological structure of the work allows it
to treat all the major aspects of East Indian immigration. However, it has also
resulted in a certain degree of repetition of information. This is particularly
noticeable in Chapters 11 and 111, even though the general purpose is admittedly
different.
109

The study has been enhanced by the inclusion of a number of useful
supplementary materials, including tables, maps, diagrams and relevant
appendices .. Of importance also is a glossary which, in the main, contains
important Indianwords and their meanings. All of these help to make the work
easy to follow.
BenevolentNeutralitr· is by any standard an excellentbook, one which is
obviously the end result o a thorough scrutiny of documents. Its value lies in its
information, exposition and analysis on an important aspect of the
post-emancipation era, namely, East Indian immigration. In this regard it is a
significant contribution to the historiography of Guyana. Students and teachers of
Guyanese History in particular are certain to find this study very interesting and
useful.
Tota Mangar
A
' . '
llO

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
M.K. BACCHUS is Professor of Education at the University of Alberta in Canada.
TOTA MANGAR is a Lecturer in the Department of History at the University of
Guyana.
MARY NOEL MENEZES is a former Professor of History at the University of
Guyana.
TYRAN RAMNARINE is a former Lecturer in the Department of History at the
University of Guyana.
JAMES ROSE is a Lecturer in the Department of History at the University of
Guyana.
LAURETIE TELFORD is an Assistant Librarian at the University of Guyana.
ROBERTA WALKER-KILKENNY is a former Lecturer in the Division of
Caribbean Studies at the University of Guyana. She is currently a Ph.D. student in
economics and historical studies at the New School for Social Research in New
York City.
111