BEYOND THE "BOMBER"

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LRSS and Nuclear Deterrence We have focused so far on the conventional contributions that the stealth bomber provides due to its long range, heavy payload, and high survivability. At the same time, these attributes make the LRSS a highly effective instrument for political purposes: namely, for maintaining nuclear deterrence and for conducting either conventional or nuclear crisis management. During the Cold War, the United States developed the so-called triad of bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs to deter the Soviet Union. Every American bomber in service today—the B-1, B-2, and B-52—was designed for this purpose. Like the other legs of the triad, the bomber force is aging and needs replacement. Although the Cold War nuclear arms race is over, there is a clear need to modernize the triad, and especially the bomber force with the LRSS, to ensure that America’s deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective in the new security environment. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report stated that the United States should retain the triad in order to maintain strategic stability while hedging against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities. 95 Each leg of the triad complements the others and complicates the problems of the enemy. The report noted the advantages of bombers: “Nuclear-capable bombers are important to extended deterrence of potential attacks on US allies and partners. Unlike ICBMs and SLBMs, heavy bombers can be visibly forward deployed, thereby signaling US resolve and commitment in crisis.” 96 The report observed that heavy bombers are strategically stabilizing, because they “do not pose a first-strike threat to either side” and “on a day-to-day basis, few or no bombers are loaded with nuclear weapons” and maintained on alert. 97 Russia and China are modernizing their nuclear arsenals. Russia has developed and deployed new ICBMs and SLBMs since the end of the Cold War and intends to replace all of its Soviet-era ICBMs and SLBMs within the next decade. 98 Russian President Vladimir Putin has announced that a new strategic bomber will enter service in the 2020s. 99 Russia has also deployed the SS-26, a new, highly accurate, nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missile system. From forward positions on Russian soil, this missile can reach deep into NATO territory. 100 In recent years, Russia has employed its nuclear-capable forces to send political signals. Russian bombers have been particularly active in this respect, participating in large-scale exercises, simulated attacks on foreign targets, incursions into foreign air defense identification zones, and overflights 95 2010 NPR is online at: http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf. 96 Ibid., p. 24. 97 Ibid., p. 21. 98 National Air and Space Intelligence Center, “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat” (Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 2013), p. 18 and p. 22. 99 “Russia to develop new strategic bomber by 2017,” Sputnik News, Dec. 23, 2009. 100 “Russia Confirms Tactical Missile Deployment on NATO Borders,” Sputnik News, Dec. 16, 2013. www.mitchellaerospacepower.org 39
of foreign warships. 101 China is modernizing and increasing the size of its ICBM force. The new DF-41 ICBM is a mobile, solid-fueled missile that can carry up to 10 warheads. China is deploying the new Jinclass ballistic missile submarine with the JL-2 SLBM to create a credible sea-based deterrent. The upgraded Chinese bomber fleet can carry long-range, nuclear-capable cruise missiles. 102 After the end of the Cold War, Pakistan and North Korea tested nuclear weapons. Other countries such as Iran aspire to possess nuclear capability, and non-state actors remain the subject of serious proliferation concern. The calculus of deterrence and defense in the “second nuclear age” is thus likely to be very different from during the Cold War, when the United States faced a single, relatively predictable, technologically sophisticated adversary. 103 Today, America must deter not only two modern nuclear powers, but also a number of “lesser” nuclear states. These states may not be able to ensure the security and reliability of their arsenals, may have weak command and control systems, and may have questionable or unknown doctrines for nuclear use. Worse yet, a terrorist group may acquire a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials from a patron state, either through deliberate transfer, theft, or purchase. Rogue states or non-state actors may not hesitate to employ nuclear weapons, and in such cases, American nuclear strikes to retaliate or eliminate the threat may be necessary. The United States thus faces a spectrum of scenarios and potential opponents, including peer competitors with large, capable arsenals, lesser states with smaller arsenals, rogue states or aspirants with nascent nuclear capabilities, and non-state actors. In all these scenarios, American nuclear forces must deter and preserve nuclear stability. They must also be useful for crisis management and, if necessary, employment. The case for preserving the traditional triad is strongest in scenarios involving Russia or China. Stealthy LRSS aircraft are a highly stabilizing system, because they provide neither side any incentive to strike first during a crisis. Their ability to generate rapidly and disperse on warning makes them unattractive targets for an enemy surprise attack. Their slow speed relative to ballistic missiles means they do not threaten the opponent with a disarming American nuclear attack. Due to their high survivability, they present a potent threat of retaliation in the event America is attacked. Unlike ballistic missiles, LRSS aircraft can be recalled after launch. They are better suited than ICBMs or SLBMs for sending signals of national resolve, as was repeatedly demonstrated during Cold War crises. They can deploy forward or fly airborne alerts if necessary to coerce the adversary into de-escalating during a crisis. The production of a new stealthy LRSS to recapitalize our aging bomber force hedges against further expansion and modernization of the Russian or Chinese nuclear arsenals, and against the possibility of a technological breakthrough that threatens the other legs of the triad. For scenarios involving lesser nuclear powers or non-state actors, deterrence must rest on a credible threat of actual use. The threat of employment of ballistic missiles against such powers is much less credible than 101 “Russian Bombers Continue Probing US Defenses,” Forbes, Sept. 16, 2014. 102 NASIC, “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” pp. 18-19 and pp. 22-23. 103 Keith Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1996). Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age (New York: St. Martin’s, 2013). 40 Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies
Page 1 and 2: BEYOND THE "BOMBER": The New Long-R
Page 3 and 4: About the Mitchell Institute for Ae
Page 5 and 6: Contents Executive Summary_________
Page 7 and 8: 18 months), resulting in an exponen
Page 9 and 10: 4 Mitchell Institute for Aerospace
Page 11 and 12: • High Survivability (involving s
Page 13 and 14: The Anti-Access, Area-Denial Challe
Page 15 and 16: enemy coasts. 18 Advanced mine warf
Page 17 and 18: During the Cold War, in the best ca
Page 19 and 20: • In the Middle East, we will cou
Page 21 and 22: Buttressing the new strategic guida
Page 23 and 24: Airpower has always projected power
Page 25 and 26: But the most serious strategic issu
Page 27 and 28: and fighter aircraft would face sev
Page 29 and 30: In summary, the advantages of long
Page 31 and 32: weeks of Operation Allied Force in
Page 33 and 34: All signs indicate that the Air For
Page 35 and 36: weapon’s seeker acquires the targ
Page 37 and 38: As a practical matter, advanced SAM
Page 39 and 40: Figure 15: The Value of Stealth The
Page 41 and 42: Versatility to Adapt When a single
Page 43: Too much reliance on short-range, f
Page 47 and 48: Conclusion The new long-range senso
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