07.01.2016 Views

Common Reporting Standard: Survivor's Guide to OECD Automatic Exchange of Information of Offshore Financial Accounts

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

NON-CRS<br />

Individuals<br />

and entities<br />

NON-CRS<br />

Individuals<br />

and entities<br />

Eesh Aggarwal


COMMON REPORTING STANDARD<br />

Survivor’s <strong>Guide</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>OECD</strong> Au<strong>to</strong>matic <strong>Exchange</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>Information</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Offshore</strong> Bank <strong>Accounts</strong>


COMMON REPORTING STANDARD<br />

Survivor’s <strong>Guide</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>OECD</strong> Au<strong>to</strong>matic <strong>Exchange</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>Information</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Offshore</strong> Bank <strong>Accounts</strong><br />

Eesh Aggarwal, FCA TEP<br />

SOCTA PUBLICATIONS


<br />

7<br />

Introduction<br />

The <strong>Common</strong> <strong>Reporting</strong> <strong>Standard</strong> (CRS) is the latest weapon in the<br />

Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development (<strong>OECD</strong>) arsenal<br />

<strong>to</strong> attempt <strong>to</strong> tackle global tax evasion. Nearly 100 countries have agreed <strong>to</strong><br />

implement the CRS. The aim is for each country <strong>to</strong> receive information on<br />

<strong>of</strong>fshore accounts held overseas by its taxpayers. Member countries will force<br />

domestic financial institutions <strong>to</strong> report <strong>to</strong> them data on accounts which are<br />

owned by tax residents <strong>of</strong> other CRS member countries. Relevant data will<br />

then be shared with other CRS member countries.<br />

Such legislation is fraught with problems and is flawed in its primary purpose<br />

– <strong>to</strong> tackle tax evasion.<br />

This book will explain the CRS, the legal problems associated with it and how<br />

it misses its primary objective <strong>of</strong> eradicating tax evasion.<br />

The book is written in an easy <strong>to</strong> read style and assumes no prior knowledge <strong>of</strong><br />

business, finance or taxation. At the same time, diverse <strong>to</strong>pics are dealt with in<br />

sufficient depth <strong>to</strong> enable readers <strong>to</strong> achieve a high level <strong>of</strong> understanding. It is<br />

written from a practical perspective by a practitioner in this field. It is hoped<br />

this practical approach will complement any academic publications.


8<br />

The book is divided in<strong>to</strong> four parts:<br />

• Part I looks at the wide variety <strong>of</strong> players and vested interests in the <strong>of</strong>fshore<br />

financial and tax world and the fac<strong>to</strong>rs that led <strong>to</strong> the creation <strong>of</strong> the CRS.<br />

• Part II explains the CRS in detail from the viewpoint <strong>of</strong> different parties<br />

– reporting institutions, individual account holders, and various types <strong>of</strong><br />

entity account holders (companies, partnerships, trusts and foundations).<br />

Strategies <strong>to</strong> comply with the CRS and retain privacy are discussed for the<br />

benefit <strong>of</strong> account holders.<br />

• Part III explores the future impact <strong>of</strong> the CRS and how the behaviour <strong>of</strong><br />

tax departments, financial institutions and account holders will change. It<br />

identifies two countries that will benefit immensely.<br />

• Part IV provides detailed technical guidance with respect <strong>to</strong> due diligence<br />

procedures required by the CRS. It is suitable for compliance departments<br />

<strong>of</strong> financial institutions.<br />

Part I – Stakeholders and their vested interests<br />

Part I examines the origins and rise <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fshore finance sec<strong>to</strong>r and <strong>of</strong>fshore<br />

tax evasion. It explains the cause <strong>of</strong> huge government deficits in the Western<br />

world and how governments danced <strong>to</strong> the tune <strong>of</strong> big business. Politicians<br />

paid lip service <strong>to</strong> the fight against <strong>of</strong>fshore tax evasion until the 2008 financial<br />

crash. An angry US public forced political action and the <strong>Financial</strong> <strong>Accounts</strong><br />

and Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) was born. The ideology on which FATCA<br />

is based is discussed. The flaws <strong>of</strong> FATCA are discussed including issues <strong>of</strong><br />

privacy, sovereignty <strong>of</strong> nations and why it is an economic disaster. The CRS<br />

aped FATCA and its similar flaws are analyzed. The biggest tax avoiders were<br />

exempted from CRS, including certain illegal transactions! Part I finishes<br />

with the implications <strong>of</strong> the loss <strong>of</strong> privacy for the weak and the wide ranging<br />

scope for data abuse including political oppression, kidnapping and blackmail.<br />

Part II – Nuts and bolts <strong>of</strong> the CRS<br />

The operation <strong>of</strong> the CRS is discussed in this part.<br />

<strong>Financial</strong> institutions that must report <strong>to</strong> governments are identified. These<br />

include banks, funds, cus<strong>to</strong>dial entities and certain insurance companies.<br />

Surprisingly, trusts and foundations and their managers may also be caught<br />

in the net. Group holding companies may also be trapped. The various parties<br />

involved in the investment fund business and the provision <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fshore<br />

corporate and trust services are also analyzed in case they may be classified as


<br />

9<br />

financial institutions.<br />

The different types <strong>of</strong> accounts and which persons are reportable are discussed.<br />

Account holders are classified in<strong>to</strong> different types. Each type is explained in<br />

detail and how the CRS impacts on such an account holder. Options for each<br />

type <strong>of</strong> account holder <strong>to</strong> mitigate the impact <strong>of</strong> the CRS are detailed.<br />

Part III – The impending doom<br />

This section gazes in<strong>to</strong> the future and attempts <strong>to</strong> identify how the behaviour<br />

<strong>of</strong> account holders and financial institutions will change. It examines the<br />

his<strong>to</strong>ry <strong>of</strong> fighting <strong>of</strong>fshore tax evasion by various governments and changes<br />

in future behaviour. One country is identified as a possible major beneficiary,<br />

as a result <strong>of</strong> FATCA and the CRS, which may become the world’s largest tax<br />

haven. Another country is identified as a key haven for privacy. Finally, in the<br />

absence <strong>of</strong> facts, some interesting theories are promulgated for the benefit <strong>of</strong><br />

curious readers.<br />

Part IV – Due diligence guide for compliance pr<strong>of</strong>essionals<br />

There is a dearth <strong>of</strong> detailed guidance with respect <strong>to</strong> due diligence procedures<br />

that must be implemented by financial institutions. The CRS and related<br />

commentary provide guidance but key concepts are scattered randomly within<br />

the <strong>of</strong>ficial published material. This part attempts <strong>to</strong> set out procedures in a<br />

logical manner so that compliance departments do not waste valuable time<br />

seeking out pieces <strong>of</strong> the jigsaw and instead concentrate on developing and<br />

implementing policies and procedures. The main aspects have been addressed.<br />

It is not possible <strong>to</strong> provide guidance on every scenario. However it is hoped<br />

there is sufficient guidance <strong>to</strong> enable compliance <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>to</strong> logically work out<br />

requirements for scenarios not mentioned in this publication.


<br />

11<br />

How <strong>to</strong> read this book<br />

The CRS is a complex beast and difficult <strong>to</strong> explain in simple terms. An attempt<br />

has been made <strong>to</strong> do this and hopefully it will be successful.<br />

The book has been written from the viewpoint <strong>of</strong> the different types <strong>of</strong><br />

individuals and institutions that are affected by the CRS. It has deliberately not<br />

been written as a standard analysis <strong>of</strong> the law which frequently requires much<br />

cross referencing <strong>to</strong> other parts <strong>of</strong> the book <strong>to</strong> avoid repetition. Unlike most<br />

legal books, there is repetition in this book. It was felt this was a necessary<br />

trade <strong>of</strong>f <strong>to</strong> make each chapter self-contained as far as is possible so that the<br />

reader is not inconvenienced by constant references <strong>to</strong> other parts <strong>of</strong> the book.<br />

To make the book engaging, examples have been provided naming certain<br />

countries. The examples could have been given using anonymous countries<br />

e.g. country A, country B. It was decided this approach would distract readers<br />

and real examples would be preferred by them. The aim is not <strong>to</strong> <strong>of</strong>fend any<br />

country but <strong>to</strong> illustrate underlying concepts. We trust all readers will read<br />

these in this spirit in which they were written.<br />

Please note the word ‘bank’ is used for the convenience <strong>of</strong> the reader as the vast<br />

majority <strong>of</strong> reporting will be carried out by banks. The correct terminology<br />

should be financial institution. This category includes cus<strong>to</strong>dial institutions,<br />

investment funds, pr<strong>of</strong>essional corporate trustees, some trusts and insurance<br />

companies with investment products and certain holding companies. The<br />

word bank should be read in this context.<br />

The term ‘he’ is used throughout the book for convenience only and does not<br />

reflect any gender bias.<br />

The author has expressed opinions throughout the book. These are based<br />

on decades <strong>of</strong> practical experience in international tax and inferences from<br />

the CRS. The CRS is new and has yet <strong>to</strong> be implemented. It will evolve over<br />

time. Naturally the author’s opinions will change accordingly. Taxation is a<br />

spectrum with two extremes – governments who are tax recipients and wish<br />

<strong>to</strong> maximize tax revenue, and taxpayers who wish <strong>to</strong> minimize tax due. The<br />

subject matter is such that a variety <strong>of</strong> opinions will exist. In the author’s view,<br />

such opinions are perfectly valid as the same facts are viewed from different<br />

viewpoints. It is hoped the book will stir a debate <strong>of</strong> the CRS and hopefully a<br />

myriad <strong>of</strong> opinions will emerge.<br />

This book is based on legislation as at 30 November 2015.


<br />

13<br />

Preface<br />

Early in 2015, I was requested by a European international tax lawyer <strong>to</strong><br />

comment on the <strong>Common</strong> <strong>Reporting</strong> <strong>Standard</strong> (CRS) issued by the<br />

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (<strong>OECD</strong>) the<br />

previous year. The task seemed easy enough – a bit <strong>of</strong> research and reading<br />

<strong>of</strong> the CRS would suffice. To my surprise, the standard proved difficult <strong>to</strong><br />

read and at that time no <strong>OECD</strong> commentary existed and little information<br />

was available on the internet. A private international tax conference held in<br />

Singapore proved <strong>to</strong> be eye-opening as the implications <strong>of</strong> the standard became<br />

clear. Privacy <strong>of</strong> individuals and the sovereignty <strong>of</strong> nations would be lost for no<br />

real gain in tax revenue from fighting tax evasion.<br />

This prompted me <strong>to</strong> study the standard word by word. It became clear the CRS<br />

implied a knowledge <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Financial</strong> Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)<br />

was necessary as the CRS was derived from it. This led <strong>to</strong> a separate painful<br />

exercise that occupied many weeks. The axiom, ‘no pain no gain’, proved as<br />

true as ever.<br />

In the meantime, similar commentary requests came from other clients.<br />

Clients wanted a simple understanding <strong>of</strong> the CRS, its implications for them<br />

and options for any proactive action they could take. A simple report <strong>of</strong> a few<br />

pages would suffice.<br />

A draft report was prepared and it became clear such a report would not


14<br />

clarify matters for clients as there were <strong>to</strong>o many new concepts in the CRS.<br />

Talk <strong>of</strong> participating jurisdiction financial institutions, reportable accounts,<br />

specified insurance company, equity interest, reportable person, controlling<br />

person, active and passive NFE’s would mean nothing <strong>to</strong> them. The CRS is<br />

25 pages long, <strong>of</strong> which 14 pages are devoted <strong>to</strong> definitions! Smothered in<br />

jargon, it almost appeared as if the standard was specifically written <strong>to</strong> confuse<br />

readers. Only governments and financial institutions would be keen <strong>to</strong> read the<br />

standard, more out <strong>of</strong> necessity than for any other reason. Any person whose<br />

accounts would be reportable under the CRS would struggle.<br />

This led <strong>to</strong> the difficult decision that a detailed analysis would be required in<br />

order <strong>to</strong> explain the CRS from a practical view point. A formal legal work was<br />

considered but this would be <strong>of</strong> limited interest only. An attempt was made <strong>to</strong><br />

write a simple book with no technical jargon. This proved <strong>to</strong> be a failure as it<br />

became clear some technical terms would be necessary. Thus a compromise<br />

was reached. The book would be written in clear plain English as far as<br />

possible, including technical explanations and jargon where necessary. To keep<br />

the reading flow going, detailed conditions and parameters which are easily<br />

unders<strong>to</strong>od have been referenced <strong>to</strong> the CRS directly. Any complex conditions<br />

or parameters have been explained in the book.<br />

Finally, following requests from banking compliance <strong>of</strong>ficers, the book was<br />

expanded <strong>to</strong> include a technical due diligence section.<br />

I qualified as a chartered accountant in 1990 in Windsor, England and joined<br />

a medium-sized practice in the City <strong>of</strong> London. At that time, non-resident<br />

UK companies were popular. The UK government banned these and these<br />

companies promptly closed down and relocated <strong>to</strong> Ireland. I was tasked with<br />

researching Irish tax and company law <strong>to</strong> understand how <strong>to</strong> use non-resident<br />

Irish companies for international tax purposes. This was my first step in<strong>to</strong> the<br />

world <strong>of</strong> international tax, a journey that still continues <strong>to</strong> the present day. In<br />

those days, the research was carried out without the benefit <strong>of</strong> the internet or<br />

emails. As a newly qualified accountant I was surprised, if not shocked, at the<br />

difference in domestic tax laws that applied <strong>to</strong> local taxpayers and overseas<br />

inves<strong>to</strong>rs. This gave rise <strong>to</strong> my curiosity in this field that has never diminished.<br />

Over the years, I have been exposed <strong>to</strong> many jurisdictions around the world<br />

and a wide variety <strong>of</strong> clients globally. I have guest-lectured on accounting<br />

and international tax <strong>to</strong>pics over the years, including at the London School <strong>of</strong><br />

Economics.<br />

Eesh Aggarwal<br />

December 2015


<br />

15<br />

About the author<br />

Eesh Aggarwal qualified as a chartered accountant in 1990 and is a Fellow <strong>of</strong><br />

the Institute <strong>of</strong> Chartered Accountants in England & Wales. Since qualifying<br />

Eesh has specialised in international tax. He is member <strong>of</strong> the International<br />

Tax Planning Association.<br />

Eesh has guest-lectured in many institutions around the world, including the<br />

London School <strong>of</strong> Economics. He has authored various articles on international<br />

tax published in journals and magazines over the years.<br />

Eesh advises high net worth clients and provides inhouse training and<br />

compliance guidance <strong>to</strong> regulated financial institutions, including banks,<br />

funds and trust and corporate providers.<br />

He has lived in the UAE since 2004, <strong>to</strong>gether with his wife and two sons. He<br />

enjoys playing squash and chess. He is a keen movie buff and is interested in<br />

military, economic and political his<strong>to</strong>ry.<br />

Eesh may be contacted at: eesh@soctapublications.com


<br />

19<br />

Contents<br />

Introduction 7<br />

How <strong>to</strong> read this book 11<br />

Preface 13<br />

About the author 15<br />

Acknowledgments 17<br />

List <strong>of</strong> figures 29<br />

Abbreviations 30<br />

Part I: Stakeholders and their vested interests 33<br />

1 The perceived problem – rampant <strong>of</strong>fshore tax evasion 35<br />

1.1 <strong>Offshore</strong> beginnings 36<br />

1.2 Sun, sand and la dolce vita 37<br />

1.3 <strong>Offshore</strong> banking boom 38<br />

1.4 <strong>Offshore</strong> tax efficient solutions 39<br />

1.5 The dark side <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fshore 40<br />

1.6 Laughing all the way <strong>to</strong> the bank 41<br />

1.7 Only men are born equal 42<br />

1.8 A politician’s best friend 43<br />

1.9 Government response 44<br />

1.10 Tip <strong>of</strong> the iceberg 49<br />

2 Money merry-go-round 53<br />

2.1 Mediaeval taxation 53<br />

2.2 Government deficit fix 54<br />

2.3 Western experiment - freedom <strong>of</strong> movement <strong>of</strong> capital 54<br />

2.4 House <strong>of</strong> cards 55<br />

2.5 BRICS bulldozer 55<br />

2.6 Western ‘harmful tax competition’ 55<br />

2.7 The tail wags the dog 57<br />

2.8 Failure <strong>of</strong> Western experimentation 57<br />

2.9 No more economic freedom 58<br />

3 Are financial institutions guilty? 61<br />

3.1 Unwitting accomplices <strong>to</strong> tax evasion 61<br />

3.2 Biased tax risk assessment 63<br />

3.3 Crime is in the eye <strong>of</strong> the beholder 64<br />

3.4 Tear up the rule book 65<br />

3.5 Creative compliance 65<br />

3.6 Swiss shenanigans 66<br />

3.7 Failure <strong>of</strong> anti-money laundering 71<br />

3.8 Fines versus prosecutions 71<br />

3.9 Jail the messenger 72<br />

3.10 Reluctant reformers 73<br />

3.11 Will the CRS reports trigger a wave <strong>of</strong> bank prosecutions? 73


20<br />

4 The butterfly effect 77<br />

4.1 The tempest 77<br />

4.2 Socialism bails out capitalism 78<br />

4.3 Robin Hood reversed 79<br />

4.4 Averting the public gaze 79<br />

4.5 Swiss catalyst 79<br />

4.6 A red rag <strong>to</strong> a bull 80<br />

4.7 Biggest tax haven criticises others 81<br />

4.8 US <strong>of</strong>fshore smokescreen 81<br />

5 The irrational logic behind the cure 85<br />

5.1 When political ideology trumps pragmatism 85<br />

5.2 The ideological pendulum 86<br />

5.3 Bootleggers and baptists 89<br />

5.4 The pot calling the kettle black – government evasion 91<br />

6 FATCA - the precursor <strong>to</strong> the CRS 95<br />

6.1 Every cloud has a silver lining – FATCA 95<br />

6.2 Cost - have your cake and eat it 96<br />

6.3 Global stick – privacy costs 30% US withholding tax 97<br />

6.4 Invasion <strong>of</strong> global privacy – IGAs 98<br />

6.5 Imaginary carrot – US <strong>to</strong> share information 98<br />

6.6 Privacy – not all Americans are equal 99<br />

6.7 One rule for the rich 99<br />

6.8 A mere trillion dollars…. <strong>to</strong> dupe the public 100<br />

6.9 Flawed laws 100<br />

6.10 Not just for tax evasion 102<br />

6.11 What does the future hold? 102<br />

6.12 Brave new world 103<br />

7 The <strong>Common</strong> <strong>Reporting</strong> <strong>Standard</strong> 107<br />

7.1 EU attacks privacy and competition 107<br />

7.2 Jumping on the FATCA bandwagon 108<br />

7.3 The motley crew 109<br />

7.4 EU or global masquerade 110<br />

7.5 No global stick 111<br />

7.6 Have your cake and eat it 111<br />

7.7 Invasion <strong>of</strong> global privacy 112<br />

7.8 United we stand, divided we fall 113<br />

7.9 Real carrot 113<br />

7.10 Privacy - not all citizens are equal 113<br />

7.11 One law for the rich 114<br />

7.12 The one country that escapes the CRS 114<br />

7.13 Flawed laws 114<br />

7.14 Brave new world – part 2 116<br />

8 Death <strong>of</strong> sovereignty 119<br />

8.1 Stage one 120


<br />

21<br />

8.2 Stage two 121<br />

8.3 New world order? 124<br />

9 1% fool’s gold 127<br />

9.1 What is the target? 128<br />

9.2 Fool’s gold 128<br />

9.3 Ignore principles at your peril 129<br />

9.4 How did the US government get it so wrong? 129<br />

9.5 The 1% target 130<br />

9.6 The one-way US government mirror 130<br />

9.7 Lemmings abound 131<br />

9.8 The one-way <strong>OECD</strong> governments’ mirror 132<br />

9.9 <strong>Information</strong> for information’s sake 132<br />

9.10 Pig’s breakfast 133<br />

9.11 See no evil 133<br />

9.12 Easier <strong>to</strong> write a cheque <strong>to</strong> the IRS 133<br />

10 Get out <strong>of</strong> jail free 137<br />

10.1 Aiming at the wrong target 137<br />

10.2 Ignorance is bliss 138<br />

10.3 Why is big business exempt? 139<br />

10.4 Why are trading entities exempt? 145<br />

10.5 The insurance kiss <strong>of</strong> life 146<br />

10.6 It’s a rich man’s world 149<br />

11 Privacy by patronage 153<br />

11.1 Fundamental human right breach 153<br />

11.2 Disproportionate data collection 154<br />

11.3 <strong>OECD</strong> 155<br />

11.4 Tracking <strong>to</strong>tal individual wealth 155<br />

11.5 Fundamental non-human right honoured 155<br />

11.6 No accountability 156<br />

11.7 The one unexpected exception 156<br />

12 Quis cus<strong>to</strong>diet ipsos cus<strong>to</strong>des? 159<br />

12.1 Legal (mis)use <strong>of</strong> data by the taxman (1) 159<br />

12.2 Legal (mis)use <strong>of</strong> data by the taxman (2) 160<br />

12.3 Legal (mis)use <strong>of</strong> data by government 161<br />

12.4 CRS data – who gets it? 162<br />

12.5 Who guards the data? 162<br />

12.6 Quis cus<strong>to</strong>diet ipsos cus<strong>to</strong>dies? (Who guards the guards?) 163<br />

12.7 Accidents will happen? 163<br />

12.8 Illegal mis(use) <strong>of</strong> data 164<br />

12.9 Hunting the hunter 165<br />

12.10 Great expectations 166<br />

12.11 Unintended consequence 166<br />

12.12 Accountability <strong>to</strong> taxpayers 166


22<br />

Part II: Nuts and bolts <strong>of</strong> the CRS 171<br />

13 <strong>Common</strong> <strong>Reporting</strong> <strong>Standard</strong> overview 173<br />

13.1 <strong>Common</strong> <strong>Reporting</strong> <strong>Standard</strong> (CRS) framework 174<br />

13.2 <strong>Reporting</strong> process 175<br />

14 <strong>Reporting</strong> financial institutions 179<br />

14.1 Types <strong>of</strong> financial institution 181<br />

14.2 Use <strong>of</strong> service providers 187<br />

15 Are trusts or trustees financial institutions? 191<br />

15.1 <strong>Financial</strong> assets 192<br />

15.2 Trust structures 193<br />

15.3 Trustees 193<br />

15.4 Trusts 196<br />

15.5 Trust subsidiaries 198<br />

15.6 CRS reporting responsibility – in case both trust<br />

and trustee are financial institutions 201<br />

16 Are foundations or council members financial institutions? 207<br />

16.1 <strong>Financial</strong> assets 208<br />

16.2 Foundation structures 208<br />

16.3 Council members 209<br />

16.4 Foundations 212<br />

16.5 Foundation subsidiaries 214<br />

16.6 CRS reporting responsibility – in case both foundation<br />

and council member are financial institutions 217<br />

16.7 Which assets are reportable? 218<br />

17 Are TCSP’s reporting financial institutions? 223<br />

17.1 Trust and corporate services providers 223<br />

17.2 Is the TCSP an entity? 223<br />

17.3 CRS residency 224<br />

17.4 Which TCSP activities make it a reporting financial institution? 224<br />

17.5 Cus<strong>to</strong>dial services 224<br />

17.6 Management and investment services 227<br />

17.7 Which assets are reportable? 229<br />

18 Investment fund industry 233<br />

18.1 Money and financial assets 233<br />

18.2 <strong>Reporting</strong> financial institution 234<br />

18.3 Investment entity based in a CRS country 235<br />

18.4 Investment fund investing primarily in non-financial assets 237<br />

18.5 Parties <strong>to</strong> an investment fund 237<br />

18.6 CRS reporting responsibility – multiple financial institutions 240


<br />

23<br />

19 <strong>Financial</strong> accounts 245<br />

19.1 Potentially reportable financial accounts 245<br />

19.2 Deposi<strong>to</strong>ry accounts 246<br />

19.3 Cus<strong>to</strong>dial accounts 247<br />

19.4 Equity and debt interest in financial institutions 248<br />

19.5 Cash value insurance contracts 249<br />

19.6 Annuity contracts 250<br />

19.7 Excluded accounts 251<br />

19.8 Reportable financial accounts 252<br />

19.9 Reportable balance rules 252<br />

20 Who is reportable? 257<br />

20.1 Exempt persons 257<br />

20.2 Non-CRS tax residents 258<br />

20.3 CRS tax resident individuals 258<br />

20.4 CRS tax resident entities 258<br />

20.5 CRS tax resident controlling persons 259<br />

20.6 Active and passive entities 260<br />

20.7 Non-CRS resident trusts 261<br />

21 Individual accounts 265<br />

21.1 Background 265<br />

21.2 Parties <strong>to</strong> an individual bank account 266<br />

21.3 Tax residency 266<br />

21.4 The future – ‘Big Brother’ au<strong>to</strong>matic reporting 267<br />

21.5 <strong>Information</strong> required <strong>to</strong> be held by banks 267<br />

21.6 Au<strong>to</strong>matic global reporting mechanism 268<br />

21.7 What will be reported <strong>to</strong> your local tax authority? 269<br />

21.8 Key dates 271<br />

21.9 Account closure 271<br />

21.10 Internet access and ‘hold mail’ services 271<br />

21.11 ‘Care-<strong>of</strong> ’ services 272<br />

21.12 Power <strong>of</strong> at<strong>to</strong>rney 272<br />

21.13 Individual accounts – 10 survival options 273<br />

21.14 Individuals content <strong>to</strong> waive privacy 274<br />

21.15 Individuals who wish <strong>to</strong> retain privacy 276<br />

22 Estate <strong>of</strong> deceased persons 287<br />

23 Company accounts 289<br />

23.1 Background 289<br />

23.2 Parties <strong>to</strong> a company 290<br />

23.3 CRS classification <strong>of</strong> companies 290<br />

23.4 Effective management <strong>of</strong> companies 291<br />

23.5 Tax residency 291<br />

23.6 Nominees 292<br />

23.7 The dark side - undetectable bank accounts 292<br />

23.8 The future – ‘Big Brother’ au<strong>to</strong>matic reporting 293


24<br />

23.9 <strong>Information</strong> required <strong>to</strong> be held by banks 293<br />

23.10 What will be reported and <strong>to</strong> which tax authorities? 295<br />

23.11 Key dates 300<br />

23.12 Company accounts – 14 survival options 301<br />

23.13 Owners and companies content <strong>to</strong> waive privacy 302<br />

23.14 Owners and companies who wish <strong>to</strong> retain privacy 304<br />

24 Partnership accounts 319<br />

24.1 Background 319<br />

24.2 Parties <strong>to</strong> a partnership 320<br />

24.3 CRS classification <strong>of</strong> partnerships 321<br />

24.4 Effective management <strong>of</strong> a partnership 322<br />

24.5 Tax residency 322<br />

24.6 Nominees 323<br />

24.7 Undetectable bank accounts 323<br />

24.8 The future – ‘Big Brother’ au<strong>to</strong>matic reporting 323<br />

24.9 <strong>Information</strong> required <strong>to</strong> be held by banks 324<br />

24.10 What will be reported <strong>to</strong> which tax authorities? 325<br />

24.11 Key dates 331<br />

24.12 Partnership accounts – 14 survival options 332<br />

24.13 Partnerships and partners content <strong>to</strong> waive privacy 333<br />

24.14 Partnerships and partners who wish <strong>to</strong> retain privacy 335<br />

25 Trust accounts 349<br />

25.1 Legal systems 349<br />

25.2 Background 350<br />

25.3 Qui est in cus<strong>to</strong>dia cus<strong>to</strong>dibus? (Who guards the guards?) 351<br />

25.4 Parties <strong>to</strong> a trust 352<br />

25.5 CRS classification <strong>of</strong> trusts 352<br />

25.6 Effective management <strong>of</strong> trusts 353<br />

25.7 Tax residency 354<br />

25.8 Nominees 354<br />

25.9 The dark side - undetectable bank accounts 355<br />

25.10 The future – ‘Big Brother’ au<strong>to</strong>matic reporting 356<br />

25.11 <strong>Information</strong> required <strong>to</strong> be held by banks 356<br />

25.12 What will be reported <strong>to</strong> which tax authorities? 358<br />

25.13 Key dates 364<br />

25.14 Trust accounts – 13 survival options 365<br />

25.15 Trusts and connected individuals content <strong>to</strong> waive privacy 367<br />

25.16 Trusts and connected individuals who wish <strong>to</strong> retain privacy 368<br />

26 Foundation accounts 381<br />

26.1 Legal systems 381<br />

26.2 Background 382<br />

26.3 Qui est in cus<strong>to</strong>dia cus<strong>to</strong>dibus? (Who guards the guards?) 383<br />

26.4 Parties <strong>to</strong> a foundation 384<br />

26.5 CRS classification <strong>of</strong> foundations 384<br />

26.6 Effective management <strong>of</strong> foundations 386


<br />

25<br />

26.7 Tax residency 386<br />

26.8 Nominees 386<br />

26.9 The dark side - undetectable bank accounts 387<br />

26.10 The future – ‘Big Brother’ au<strong>to</strong>matic reporting 388<br />

26.11 <strong>Information</strong> required <strong>to</strong> be held by banks 388<br />

26.12 What will be reported <strong>to</strong> which tax authorities? 390<br />

26.13 Key dates 396<br />

26.14 Foundation accounts – 13 survival options 396<br />

26.15 Foundations and connected individuals<br />

content <strong>to</strong> waive privacy 399<br />

26.16 Foundations and connected individuals who wish <strong>to</strong><br />

retain privacy 401<br />

27 Implementation unknowns 415<br />

27.1 Bilateral agreements 415<br />

27.2 Tax residency 416<br />

27.3 Different definitions 417<br />

27.4 Undocumented accounts 418<br />

27.5 Multiple financial institutions 418<br />

27.6 Moni<strong>to</strong>ring dicretionary beneficiaries 418<br />

27.7 Be fined at your own peril 419<br />

Part III: The impending doom 423<br />

28 The hare and the <strong>to</strong>r<strong>to</strong>ise 425<br />

28.1 CRS reports – the new panacea 425<br />

28.2 A trillion dollar fishing net <strong>to</strong> catch minnows… 426<br />

28.3 …whilst ignoring the big fish 426<br />

28.4 The wasted catch (mostly) 427<br />

28.5 How will governments react? 427<br />

28.6 The track record <strong>of</strong> government enforcement 428<br />

28.7 A new hope – kick the habit 433<br />

28.8 Confused governments and taxpayers 433<br />

28.9 Cost <strong>of</strong> the exercise – money and privacy 434<br />

29 The future 437<br />

29.1 Will tax evasion be eliminated or dramatically decreased? 439<br />

29.2 Follow the money 439<br />

29.3 Follow the taxpayer – change <strong>of</strong> residency (or not) 441<br />

29.4 Future transactions 442<br />

29.5 Illegal invasion <strong>of</strong> privacy? 444<br />

29.6 Cracks in the data dam 445<br />

29.7 Cost <strong>of</strong> a white elephant 446<br />

29.8 Impact on individuals and organisations 446<br />

29.9 And finally… <strong>OECD</strong> developments 449


26<br />

30 USA - privacy winner for non-residents 453<br />

30.1 Welcome <strong>to</strong> the land <strong>of</strong> the free 454<br />

31 The United Arab Emirates – CRS privacy winner for residents 457<br />

31.1 A desert jewel 457<br />

31.2 Residency 458<br />

31.3 No tax… 459<br />

31.4 …but access <strong>to</strong> tax treaties! 459<br />

31.5 Existing financial accounts 459<br />

31.6 Privacy 459<br />

31.7 Unique position 460<br />

32 Conspiracy theories 463<br />

32.1 Smokescreen 463<br />

32.2 Follow the wealth <strong>of</strong> citizens 464<br />

32.3 Invasion <strong>of</strong> privacy 464<br />

32.4 New cat and mouse games 464<br />

32.5 The long arms <strong>of</strong> governments 465<br />

32.6 Kill the competetion 466<br />

32.7 Conclusion 466<br />

33 Conclusion 469<br />

33.1 Past 469<br />

33.2 Present 470<br />

33.3 Future 471<br />

Part IV: Due diligence guide for compliance<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>essionals 477<br />

34 Due diligence: individual accounts – preexisting 479<br />

34.1 Step 1: Identify any individual accounts<br />

outside the scope <strong>of</strong> reporting 480<br />

34.2 Step 2: Divide the remaining Preexisting Individual <strong>Accounts</strong> 481<br />

34.3 Lower Value Account procedures 481<br />

34.4 High Value Account procedures 498<br />

34.5 Deadlines 506<br />

35 Due diligence individual accounts - new 509<br />

35.1 Account opening 509<br />

35.2 Tax Residency 510<br />

35.3 Self-certification 511<br />

35.4 Result 511<br />

35.5 On-going Moni<strong>to</strong>ring 512<br />

35.6 Deadlines 513


<br />

27<br />

36 Due diligence: entity accounts – preexisting 515<br />

36.1 Preexisting Entity Account 515<br />

36.2 Exempt accounts – value up <strong>to</strong> US$ 250,000 517<br />

36.3 Identify Preexisting Entity <strong>Accounts</strong> subject <strong>to</strong> review 517<br />

36.4 Step 3 – Review procedures 517<br />

36.5 Test 1 – Review procedures <strong>to</strong> check if the Entity<br />

(Account Holder) itself is a Reportable Person 519<br />

36.6 On-going Moni<strong>to</strong>ring - test 1 525<br />

36.7 Test 2 - determine if the Entity is a Passive NFE with<br />

Controlling Persons who are Reportable Persons 526<br />

36.8 Deadlines 530<br />

37 Due diligence: entity accounts – new 533<br />

37.1 Entity <strong>Accounts</strong> – New 534<br />

37.2 Test 1 – Review procedures <strong>to</strong> check if the Entity<br />

(Account Holder) itself is a Reportable Person 536<br />

37.3 On-going Moni<strong>to</strong>ring – test 1 541<br />

37.4 Determine if the Entity is a Passive NFE with<br />

Controlling Persons who are Reportable Persons 543<br />

37.5 Deadlines 547<br />

38 Self-certification and relationship managers 549<br />

38.1 Purpose 549<br />

38.2 Content 549<br />

38.3 Signature 553<br />

38.4 Self-certifications furnished on account-by-account basis 553<br />

38.5 Format 553<br />

38.6 S<strong>to</strong>rage <strong>of</strong> self-certification 554<br />

38.7 Examples: 554<br />

38.8 Use <strong>of</strong> third party providers 555<br />

38.9 Validity <strong>of</strong> self-certifications 557<br />

38.10 Reasonableness <strong>of</strong> self-certifications 557<br />

38.11 Curing self-certification errors 560<br />

38.12 Change <strong>of</strong> circumstances 561<br />

38.13 Relationship manager inquiry for actual knowledge 562<br />

39 Documentary evidence 567<br />

39.1 Documentary evidence 567<br />

39.2 <strong>Standard</strong>s <strong>of</strong> knowledge 569<br />

39.3 Documentation collected by other persons 571<br />

39.4 Reliance on documentary evidence 573<br />

39.5 Requirements for validity <strong>of</strong> Documentary Evidence 575<br />

39.6 S<strong>to</strong>rage <strong>of</strong> documentation 579<br />

39.7 Currency translation rules 579<br />

40 Active and passive NFEs 581<br />

40.1 Active NFE 581<br />

40.2 Passive NFE 585


28<br />

Appendices 589<br />

1 <strong>Common</strong> <strong>Reporting</strong> <strong>Standard</strong>: Introduction and overview 591<br />

2 Multilateral Model Competent Authority Agreement 601<br />

3 Model Bilateral Competent Authority Agreement (reciprocal) 611<br />

4 Nonreciprocal Model Competent Authority Agreement 619<br />

5 <strong>Common</strong> <strong>Reporting</strong> <strong>Standard</strong> 629<br />

6 <strong>OECD</strong> - Early adopter countries 660<br />

7 <strong>OECD</strong> - Late adopter countries 662<br />

8 Tax administration: UK au<strong>to</strong>matic exchange <strong>of</strong> information 664<br />

9 <strong>Offshore</strong> voluntary disclosure programmes (<strong>OECD</strong> 2015) 666<br />

10 <strong>OECD</strong> member countries 667<br />

Index 669


<br />

29<br />

List <strong>of</strong> figures<br />

Figure 1: Government response 44<br />

Figure 2: <strong>Financial</strong> institutions 75<br />

Figure 3: FATCA cost US$ 2 trillion 96<br />

Figure 4: Misuse <strong>of</strong> data 167<br />

Figure 5: <strong>Reporting</strong> process 175<br />

Figure 6: <strong>Financial</strong> institutions 188<br />

Figure 7: Non-reporting financial institutions (exempt) 189<br />

Figure 8: Trustee classification as a financial institution 203<br />

Figure 9: Trust classification as a financial institution 204<br />

Figure 10: Trust subsidiary classification as a financial institution 205<br />

Figure 11: Council member classification as a financial institution 219<br />

Figure 12: Foundation classification as a financial institution 220<br />

Figure 13:<br />

Foundation subsidiary classification as a<br />

financial institution 221<br />

Figure 14: Trust and corporate service provider 230<br />

Figure 15: Investment entities 242<br />

Figure 16: <strong>Financial</strong> accounts - which are reportable 253<br />

Figure 17: Excluded accounts 254<br />

Figure 18: Individual accounts 283<br />

Figure 19: Company reporting 314<br />

Figure 20: Company accounts 315<br />

Figure 21: Partnership reporting 344<br />

Figure 22: Partnership accounts 345<br />

Figure 23: Trust reporting 377<br />

Figure 24: Trust accounts 378<br />

Figure 25: Foundation reporting 410<br />

Figure 26: Foundation accounts 411<br />

Figure 27: Hawala 443


30<br />

Abbreviations<br />

AEOI<br />

AICPA<br />

AIM<br />

AML<br />

BEPS<br />

BRICS<br />

CAAs<br />

CEO<br />

CIA<br />

CPI<br />

CRS<br />

DoJ<br />

DTA<br />

EBT<br />

EEC<br />

EU<br />

FATCA<br />

FATF<br />

FBAR<br />

FFI<br />

Fis<br />

GDP<br />

HMRC<br />

HSBC<br />

ICIJ<br />

IGA<br />

IRS<br />

KYC<br />

M&S<br />

MCAA<br />

NFE<br />

NNM<br />

<strong>OECD</strong><br />

PTCs<br />

PwC<br />

SEC<br />

SWIFT<br />

TCSPs<br />

TIEA<br />

TIN<br />

UAE<br />

UBS<br />

UK<br />

UNCTAD<br />

Au<strong>to</strong>matic <strong>Exchange</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Information</strong><br />

American Institute <strong>of</strong> Certified Public Accountants<br />

Alternative Investment Market<br />

Anti-Money Laundering<br />

Base Erosion and Pr<strong>of</strong>it Shifting<br />

Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa<br />

Competent Authority Agreements<br />

Chief Executive Officer<br />

Central Intelligence Agency<br />

Corruption Perceptions Index<br />

<strong>Common</strong> <strong>Reporting</strong> <strong>Standard</strong><br />

Department <strong>of</strong> Justice<br />

Double Tax Agreement<br />

Employee Benefit Trust<br />

European Economic Community<br />

European Union<br />

Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act<br />

<strong>Financial</strong> Action Task Force<br />

Report <strong>of</strong> Foreign Bank and <strong>Financial</strong> <strong>Accounts</strong><br />

Foreign <strong>Financial</strong> Institution<br />

<strong>Financial</strong> Institutions<br />

Gross Domestic Product<br />

HM Revenue & Cus<strong>to</strong>ms<br />

Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation<br />

International Consortium <strong>of</strong> Investigative Journalists<br />

Intergovernmental Agreement<br />

Internal Revenue Service<br />

Know Your Cus<strong>to</strong>mer<br />

Marks & Spencer<br />

Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement<br />

Non-<strong>Financial</strong> Entity<br />

Net New Money<br />

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development<br />

Private trust companies<br />

PricewaterhouseCoopers<br />

Securities and <strong>Exchange</strong> Commission<br />

Society for Worldwide Interbank <strong>Financial</strong> Telecommunication<br />

Trust and corporate services providers<br />

Tax <strong>Information</strong> <strong>Exchange</strong> Agreement<br />

Tax Identification Number<br />

United Arab Emirates<br />

Union Bank <strong>of</strong> Switzerland<br />

United Kingdom<br />

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development


<br />

31<br />

US/USA<br />

VAT<br />

United States <strong>of</strong> America<br />

Value Added Tax

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!