End-to-End Mitigation

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In-the-Cloud Services BGP-based “inter-AS” DDoS Protection • Traffic to the victim is steered-up into the DDoS protection service by advertising a /24 prefix owned by the victim • Similar as BGP hijacking • Good traffic is filtered and transmitted through a tunnel to the victim DDoS Mitigation Service Scrubbing device Attack traffic to 1.2.3.4 The Internet Traffic to 1.2.3.4 mysite.com 1.2.3.4 3
In-the-Cloud Services BGP-based “inter-AS” DDoS Protection Limits • Most specific prefix advertised in the internet: /24 attracts all traffic for the prefix, not only the victim • Similar as BGP hijacking • future adoption of BGP Origin Validation could make this approach challenging DDoS Mitigation Service The Internet Scrubbing device mysite.com 1.2.3.4 4
Page 2 and 3: DDoS Attacks: End-to-End Mitigation
Page 4 and 5: Agenda • Introduction, DDoS Attac
Page 6 and 7: Introduction • Do we still need t
Page 8 and 9: Largest DDOS Attack in History 8
Page 10 and 11: ATLAS Initiative: Attack Sizes "Las
Page 12 and 13: DDoS Mitigation Mitigation implies
Page 14 and 15: Different Business, Different Targe
Page 16 and 17: Different Business, Different Targe
Page 18 and 19: Deployment Models In-the-Cloud / On
Page 20 and 21: In-the-Cloud Services DNS-based DDo
Page 36 and 37: In-the-Cloud Services BGP-based “
Page 46 and 47: In-the-Cloud Services DDoS Mitigati
Page 48 and 49: On-Premises: Centralized vs Distrib
Page 50 and 51: On-Premises: Centralized vs Distrib
Page 52 and 53: Attack Detection: In-line Inspectio
Page 54 and 55: Protecting your Infrastructure Infr
Page 56 and 57: Introducing BGP FlowSpec 56
Page 58 and 59: BGP FlowSpec Matching Criteria and
Page 60 and 61: Amplification Attacks • Specific
Page 62 and 63: Mitigating Amplification Attacks Se
Page 64 and 65: Mitigating L3 / L4 Stateless Volume
Page 66 and 67: Mitigating L3 / L4 Stateless Volume
Page 68 and 69: Mitigating SYN floods, HTTP, SSL an
Page 70 and 71: Mitigating SYN floods, HTTP, SSL an
Page 72 and 73: Mitigating SYN floods, HTTP and SSL
Page 74 and 75: Particular Case of Residential Subs
Page 76 and 77: Slow Pace Attacks DC and Enterprise
Page 78 and 79: Partnership • Cisco established p
Page 80 and 81: Arbor SP solution Portfolio Arbor N
Page 82 and 83: Arbor SP solution: Cisco vDDoS Prot
Page 84 and 85: Arbor SP solution Deployment and Us
Page 86 and 87: Demo 86
Page 88 and 89:
Cisco Partnerships Radware DefenseP
Page 90 and 91:
Understand 9300 Radware DDoS Soluti
Page 92 and 93:
Security Services Architecture on F
Page 94 and 95:
Demo 94
Page 96 and 97:
Behavioral DOS - Network baselining
Page 98 and 99:
BDOS Detection and Mitigation of a
Page 100 and 101:
BDOS Detection and Mitigation of a
Page 102 and 103:
Configuration Define Global Options
Page 104 and 105:
Configuration Define Global Options
Page 106 and 107:
BDOS Profile Three main tabs - •
Page 108 and 109:
Page 110 and 111:
Page 112 and 113:
Page 114 and 115:
DNS Mitigation Attack Escalation Bo
Page 116 and 117:
Page 118 and 119:
Page 120 and 121:
SYN Flood Protection is adaptive Us
Page 122 and 123:
Conclusion 122
Page 124 and 125:
End-to-End Mitigation Summary • A
Page 126 and 127:
End-to-End Mitigation Summary • S
Page 128 and 129:
End-to-End Mitigation • Cisco off
Page 130 and 131:
Complete Your Online Session Evalua
Page 133 and 134:
VSM Internal Architecture SFP+ SFP+
Page 135 and 136:
Enterprise Perimeter Protection Use
Page 137 and 138:
Service Provider: Service Center DC
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End-to-End Mitigation

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