CONSERVATIVE

Indeed, this enracinement can become a radical
closing off to the koinos (the common). The idiotès can
“idolize particularity to the point of loathing difference
[or otherness]. This is the specific perversion of
Nazism”. Because of Nazism, “Europe currently
rejects with horror any idea that opposes individualism
and limitless emancipation … and describes ‘identities’
as fundamental human requirements”.
The idiotès is highly resistant to time and
space: He is both “against progress” and “against
globalization and Europe”. Resentment stems
from this resistance. According to the “all powerful
ideology of emancipation, it is in the nature of man
to deploy himself on these two levels”. But he who
cannot, “cannot be happy”, she says. Delsol does not
entirely dismiss this language; but she still argues that
the populist is an idiotès—in the Greek sense (not an
‘idiot’ in modern parlance).
Nevertheless, Delsol gives more credit to the
idiotès. Indeed, she says, “one cannot say, like in ancient
Greece, that the popular element leans toward its own
private interest, while the elite gives priority to the
common interest. Everything is more complicated and
is even often inverted”. In my view, we may go further
than Delsol on this point: The individualism that has
been promoted by liberalism decisively contributed to
the destruction of the sense of responsibility among
the elites. With such an ethos, it is no surprise that the
elites have lost sight of the common good.
From the polis to truth
Delsol’s insights are remarkable. First, she says
that in the “popular milieu, people believe that the
citizen is not a universal individual living in some
abstract country but rather a man incarnated in space
and time”. These serve as “bedrocks”, she says, “on
which man can lift himself up towards the common
good”. At a time of “limitless emancipation”, the
people can provide the elites with common sense.
Thus, the former should engage with the latter, instead
of insulting them. This debate should carry on in
mutual respect since “none of the two tendencies—the
love of our roots and the appeal of emancipation—is
meant to win people over”. In Delsol’s mind, both
terms are equally essential and “the West was created
with emancipation as a new dogma”. She concludes
that “[a] well-ordered political regime should “educate
people to work towards emancipation and educate
the elites to work towards enracinement—giving to
both what they lack”. Such a regime could do this, for
instance, “by convincing people of the barbarism of
the death penalty”.
All this requires that people seek the truth in the
manner of the Greeks—that is, without ideology. In
this way, it becomes a personal and philosophical quest,
rather than a collective and political one. All political
communities are by their nature particular. Because
the absolute is always hard (if not impossible) to reach,
intellectuals should make an effort not to give in to
an excess of emancipation. One should realize that
particularisms can point towards universal truth—and
that citizens should devote themselves to the good of
their own political community. In this, Delsol, who
explores all these ideas with verve and nuance, is an
excellent guide.
Edouard Chanot is the Director of the Institut Clisthène in
Paris and a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science.
A. SAVIN / CCA-SA 3.0
A view of the Acropolis of Athens from Philopappos Hill. “[A]t various times throughout its uninterrupted 6,000 yearlong
cultural history [it] served as dwelling place, fortress, sanctuary, and symbol” (J. Hurwit, 2004).
The European Conservative 29