Lessons Learned from South Sudan Protection of Civilian Sites 2013–2016
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<strong>Lessons</strong> <strong>Learned</strong> <strong>from</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Sudan</strong> <strong>Protection</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Civilian</strong> <strong>Sites</strong> - Beginning <strong>of</strong> the Crisis - 27<br />
50). Therefore, the discussion should focus on what can be<br />
done with fewer resources, including fewer bases, fewer<br />
troops with better training and greater coordination and better<br />
prioritization by the leadership (Interview 95).<br />
Guidelines for Roles and Responsibilities<br />
Following months <strong>of</strong> extensive coordination between<br />
humanitarians and UNMISS, guidelines for defining the<br />
various roles <strong>of</strong> responsibility in the PoC sites were approved<br />
on 19 September 2014. While the guidelines resolved much<br />
<strong>of</strong> the debate, some key issues were still left unclear. For<br />
example, some members <strong>of</strong> the Mission Support Unit in the<br />
PoC sites in state capitals claimed they were not informed<br />
<strong>of</strong> the guidelines by the mission and instead received the<br />
information <strong>from</strong> humanitarian agencies on the ground<br />
(Interview 21). There were also uncertainties within the mission<br />
whether the leadership had signed <strong>of</strong>f on the guidelines and if<br />
they should be followed or not (Interview 17).<br />
Despite clearly defined responsibilities, some humanitarian<br />
actors continue to rely on UNMISS when they require<br />
heavy equipment or do not have the capacity to fulfil<br />
their responsibilities, such as dead body management in<br />
the PoC sites. Former DSRSG/RC/HC Lanzer, as well as<br />
other UNMISS staff, acknowledged that the stakeholders<br />
responsible for the perimeters <strong>of</strong> the PoC sites were still<br />
not clearly defined. According to the agreed guidelines,<br />
the construction <strong>of</strong> physical security infrastructure falls to<br />
Mission Support, however it is “subject to availability <strong>of</strong><br />
heavy engineering equipment and resources.” 24 This was<br />
repeated by a member <strong>of</strong> Mission Support who stated that<br />
“if these [money and resources] are not available, what can<br />
we do?” (Interview 21). Even though the responsibilities<br />
have become clearer, the issue <strong>of</strong> limited funding still exists<br />
and some parties do not follow the guidelines (Interview<br />
11). Importantly, even before the creation <strong>of</strong> the PoC sites,<br />
the common refrain was that UNMISS did not have enough<br />
resources, in terms <strong>of</strong> cash or forces, to properly carry<br />
out its protection <strong>of</strong> civilians mandate outside the bases.<br />
An UNMISS soldier walks the berm <strong>of</strong> the Bentiu PoC site as part <strong>of</strong> his regular patrol. © IOM 2016 Photo: Muse Mohammed