revistaieee7

Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 7 / 2016
Thirdly, if we take a look at Resolution 1441 (2002), it is worth noting two important
aspects: on the one hand, it states that the Security Council decides ‘to afford Iraq
[…] a final opportunity’ and it does not explicitly include the use of force. Furthermore,
neither does Resolution 1441 (2002) delegate, under any circumstance, powers
to make any form of decision concerning the Iraqi crisis to states, or coalitions, as it
states that this matter remains the exclusive competence of the Security Council.
The international military intervention in Iraq in 2003 was thus not underpinned
by a sound international legal basis, since the Security Council is the only body that
may authorise the use of force and it does not have powers to delegate decisionmaking
competences to a state regarding when military intervention should take place.
As the reader will be aware, this military action occurred in the form of the invasion
Iraq and was criticised by the international community, carving deep division within
the heart of the Security Council, above all later on when international inspections
revealed there to be no conclusive proof of the existence of weapons of mass destruction.
47
The motivations for the invasion were more political than ones justified on the
grounds of international security, since the military attack in 2003 due to the ‘suspected’
possession of weapons of mass destruction proved to be disproportionate compared
with the simple verbal international condemnations that the ‘real’ use of chemical
weapons by Iraq in the eighties as part of its war against Iran had merited –as a clear
and blatant violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and customary international law-; at
that point neither the Security Council nor the United States adopted firm measures,
despite the fact that an event of such gravity had required this at the time . 48
The credibility of the United Nations Security Council was seriously damaged, and
the differences of opinions between its members weakened its actions. Moreover, the
lack of conclusive evidence about whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction
cast doubt on the intervention of the Security Council.
Iraq eventually signed an Additional Protocol to its 1972 Safeguards Agreement
in 2008, through which the verification capabilities of the IAEA vis-à-vis Iraq were
47 See NOVOSSELOFF, Alexandra. Le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies et la maîtrise de la
force armée, Paris: Bruylant, 2003, p. 333. For the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the role played by the
United Nations see REMIRO BROTÓNS, Antonio. ‘¿Naciones Unidas o Naciones «a la orden»?’ in
ROLDÁN PANADERO, Concha, MATE RUPÉREZ, Manuel Reyes, and AUSÍN DÍEZ, Txetxu
(coords.), Guerra y paz: en nombre de la política, Calamar: Madrid, 2004, pp. 83-104; ANDRÉZ
SÁENZ DE SANTA MARÍA, Paz. ‘El Consejo de Seguridad en la guerra contra Irak: ¿ONG privilegiada,
convalidador complaciente u órgano primordial?’, Revista Española de Derecho Internacional,
vol. 55, no. 1, 2003, pp.205-222; CASTILLO DAUDÍ, Mireya. ‘La ocupación militar de Irak ante el
Derecho Internacional’, Revista Española de Derecho Internacional, vol. 55, no. 1, 2003, pp.223-245.
48 QUEVEDO RUIZ, José Ramón. ‘Naciones Unidas y la lucha contra la proliferación de las armas de
destrucción masiva. Logros y expectativas’, in MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (ed.), Naciones Unidas como principal
elemento del multilateralismo del siglo XXI, CESEDEN Monographs no. 109, Madrid: Ministry of Defence,
2009, pp.132-139.
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