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National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015

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<strong>National</strong> <strong>Security</strong> <strong>Strategy</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Defence</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Security</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>2015</strong><br />

11<br />

19. We welcome the stronger emphasis on a whole-of-government approach to<br />

national security in the NSS & SDSR <strong>2015</strong>. It is an important step in creating <strong>and</strong><br />

delivering cross-government responses to the threats facing the UK. A more substantial<br />

discussion of the three <strong>National</strong> <strong>Security</strong> Objectives, the links between them, whether<br />

<strong>and</strong> how they can be traded off against each other, <strong>and</strong> how they are intended to tackle<br />

threats to UK national security would have provided a sound foundation for the rest of<br />

the NSS & SDSR <strong>2015</strong> <strong>and</strong> for future policy-making.<br />

Merging the <strong>National</strong> <strong>Security</strong> <strong>Strategy</strong> with the <strong>Strategic</strong> <strong>Defence</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Security</strong> <strong>Review</strong><br />

20. The NSS <strong>and</strong> SDSR were merged into a single document for the first time in <strong>2015</strong>.<br />

Oliver Letwin told us that the merging of the two documents was an “advance” on previous<br />

practice, because it linked the strategy with the Government’s decisions on investments<br />

<strong>and</strong> capabilities. 35<br />

21. Merging the NSS with the SDSR obscured the guiding principles behind the various<br />

sub-strategies that are informed by the NSS. Those sub-strategies cover policy areas as<br />

varied as counter-terrorism <strong>and</strong> counter-extremism, cyber security, serious <strong>and</strong> organised<br />

crime, aid <strong>and</strong> bio-security. A fuller discussion of the three <strong>National</strong> <strong>Security</strong> Objectives<br />

would have helped to clarify these guiding principles (see paragraphs 17–18). The merger<br />

also obscured the 89 commitments set out in the SDSR. Those key commitments are<br />

scattered throughout four chapters of the document with nothing to distinguish them<br />

beyond the use of bold font, which is used across the document in other contexts.<br />

22. It is unclear whether merging the NSS with the SDSR was driven by presentational<br />

requirements or whether it was the product of a joined-up process where strategy was<br />

combined with decisions on investments <strong>and</strong> capabilities. Sir Mark Lyall Grant told us<br />

that he had suggested merging the two documents in September <strong>2015</strong>, when he took up<br />

the position of <strong>National</strong> <strong>Security</strong> Adviser weeks before the publication of the NSS & SDSR<br />

<strong>2015</strong>. 36 However, Oliver Letwin stated that the NSS <strong>and</strong> SDSR were “tied together” <strong>and</strong><br />

developed in t<strong>and</strong>em with the Spending <strong>Review</strong> over the course of six months in mid-<br />

<strong>2015</strong>. 37<br />

23. The primary goal of the NSS <strong>and</strong> SDSR process is to set out (a) what the UK wants<br />

to achieve; (b) how it intends to achieve it; <strong>and</strong> (c) what capabilities are required. The<br />

NSS & SDSR <strong>2015</strong> does not achieve that presentational goal. The Cabinet Office must<br />

review the presentation of the NSS & SDSR <strong>2015</strong>. SDSR commitments must be numbered<br />

<strong>and</strong> include a timeframe for completion to enhance transparency <strong>and</strong> accountability.<br />

35 Q72<br />

36 Oral evidence taken on 1 February 2016, HC (<strong>2015</strong>–16) 644, Q28<br />

37 Q73

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