National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015

34 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015
A flawed approach?
101. Analysts have questioned whether a risk-based approach to security is appropriate.
Dr Blagden listed the following constraints to the methodology underpinning the NSRA
2015:
• The use of a matrix to assess the likelihood and potential impact of a particular risk
relies on assigning qualitative values to variables for which there is inevitably little
high-quality quantitative data; 168
• The categorisation of risks into broad types and tiers fails to recognise potential links
between threat types—for example, between ‘Cyber’ and ‘International Military
Conflict’ in tier one, or between ‘International Military Conflict’ and ‘CBRN Attack’
in tiers one and two respectively. 169
102. We questioned the utility of the three tiers as a guide to policy prioritisation and
resource allocation. In some cases, the magnitude of funding allocated to capabilities did
not correspond with the categorisation of the threat type. A CBRN attack (an attack with
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons), for instance, is categorised as a tier
two risk in the NSRA 2015 and may be perceived by some as being of lesser importance
as a result. Yet at £31 billion in escalating capital costs and in-service running costs of
6% of the annual defence budget, 170 the UK’s programme to replace the Trident nuclear
deterrent, which is a key part of Government efforts to mitigate the risk of a nuclear
attack, is one of the Government’s largest investment programmes. The NSS & SDSR 2015
described the Successor programme as similar in scale to Crossrail or High Speed 2. 171
That example demonstrated the lack of correlation between the categorisation of risk and
resource priorities, as did Oliver Letwin’s oral evidence when it became apparent that he
did not appreciate the scale of the budget. 172
103. Oliver Letwin told us that there is a “much finer-grained [classified] analysis” that
guides government decision-making on the allocation of finite resources in proportion
to the threats posed. 173 He pointed out that the prioritisation of risks and the relationship
with funding can broadly be discerned from the NSS & SDSR 2015:
168 David Blagden (NSS0004) para 9
169 David Blagden (NSS0004) para 9
170 Oliver Letwin’s letter to the Joint Committee clarified that: “The estimated acquisition cost of four new submarines,
spread over 35 years, is £31 billion. The MOD is also setting a contingency of £10 billion. On average, that amounts
to 0.2 per cent per year of government spending. … [The] in-service costs of the UK’s nuclear deterrent … will be
similar to those of today—around 6% of the annual defence budget (0.13% of total government spending).” Letter
from Oliver Letwin MP to the Chair of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, submitted 24 June
2016, following an oral evidence session on 23 May 2016, Annex, A2.
171 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and
Prosperous United Kingdom, Cm 9161, November 2015, para 4.73
172 Q63 ff
173 Q63