$hell on Earth

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Since kernel-mode read and write was achieved, the system process and the current process’s EPROCESS structures can be obtained by traversing the PspCidTable. CVE-2016-0176 Patch Microsoft patched this bug by adding a size check before the memmove: Figure 10: Kernel code diff Figure 11: Added size check 62 | <strong>$hell</strong> on Earth: From Browser to System Compromise
Conclusion Although all of the aforementioned exploit chains exhibited remote code execution and privilege escalation in different ways, a majority of the cases exhibited similar methodology to attain read and write exploit primitives in order to create program behavioral changes. Application sandboxing is a step in the right direction, but the kernel attack surface remains expansive and exposed. Each of the winning entries was able to avoid the sandboxing mitigations by leveraging vulnerabilities in the underlying OSs. Adding new mitigations to isolate access to the kernel APIs from sandboxed processes adds more hurdles in the quest to pop shell with the greatest privilege possible. 63 | <strong>$hell</strong> on Earth: From Browser to System Compromise
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$hell on Earth: Fr
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The winning submissions to Pwn2Own
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Here are some of the welcome improv
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Pwn2Own 2015 Zeguang Zhao (Team509)
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The vulnerability is triggered with
Page 11 and 12: Here is a snippet of the original c
Page 13 and 14: } if ( !(unsigned __int8)_mthid_isG
Page 15 and 16: Here is the location within JavaScr
Page 17 and 18: Exploitation of CVE-2016-1857 The e
Page 19 and 20: The following code triggers the vul
Page 21 and 22: CVE-2016-1796 - Apple OS X libATSSe
Page 23 and 24: Google Chrome Vulnerability to Kern
Page 25 and 26: ZDI-CAN-3612 Patch This is the root
Page 27 and 28: Here is a snippet of code showing t
Page 29 and 30: CVE-2016-1017 Patch To patch this v
Page 31 and 32: Adobe Flash Vulnerability to Kernel
Page 33 and 34: Finally, the pointer to the string
Page 35 and 36: This shows how PostIAMShellHookMess
Page 37 and 38: The patch itself looks straightforw
Page 39 and 40: As they do with all vulnerabilities
Page 41 and 42: Exploitation of CVE-2016-1018 Explo
Page 43 and 44: } } } a1[a3 + 345] = v6; a1[a3 + 34
Page 45 and 46: This is how GreGetUFI looked before
Page 47 and 48: Microsoft Edge Vulnerability to Ker
Page 49 and 50: The graph below represents the targ
Page 51 and 52: GetIntegerString returns the value
Page 53 and 54: Figure 6: AddAgent code diff Figure
Page 55 and 56: Consider the following JavaScript c
Page 57 and 58: The second heap spray was composed
Page 59 and 60: D3DKMT_GDIMODEL_SYSMEM_PRESENTHISTO
Page 61: Nevertheless, execution continues a
Page 65: TREND MICRO TM Trend Micro Incorpor
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$hell on Earth

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