Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor

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Attack Robustness • How much effort is required to exploit a SEP vulnerability? ▫ E.g. stack/heap corruption • Determined by several factors ▫ Address space layout ▫ Allocator (heap) hardening ▫ Exploit mitigations ▫ And more
Address Space Layout - Image • SEP applications are loaded at <strong>the</strong>ir preferred base address ▫ No image base randomization ▫ Typically based at 0x1000 or 0x8000 (depending on presence of pagezero segment) • Segments without a valid memory protection mask (!= 0) are ignored ▫ E.g. __PAGEZERO is never “mapped”
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Demystifying the Secure Enclave Pro
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Introduction • iPhone 5S was a te
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Secure (?) Enclave Processor • Ve
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Glossary • AP: Application Proces
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Dedicated Hardware Peripherals •
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Physical Memory • Dedicated BootR
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SEP Initialization - Page Tables
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SEP Initialization - Second Stage
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SEP Boot Flow SEP AP Configure TZ0
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Memory Encryption Setup • Use “
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• Mode actually used is AES-256-X
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SEP Boot Flow: Stage 3 SEP AP Ackno
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Sending SEPOS • SEPOS is sent (op
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Boot-loading: Img4 • SEP uses the
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Img4 - Manifest • The manifest (A
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IMG4 - Manifest Properties (2/2) He
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Reversing SEP’s Img4 Parser: Stag
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Img4 Parsing Flow SEP AP Decode Pay
Page 41 and 42: Demystifying the Secure Enclave Pro
Page 43 and 44: Secure Mailbox • Actual mailbox i
Page 45 and 46: Interrupt-based Message Passing •
Page 47 and 48: Mailbox Message Format • A single
Page 49 and 50: SEP Endpoint • Each endpoint is r
Page 51 and 52: SEP Endpoints (2/2) Index Name Driv
Page 53 and 54: Control Endpoint Opcodes Opcode Nam
Page 55 and 56: Endpoint Registration (AP) Start Cr
Page 59 and 60: L4-embedded • Modified version of
Page 61 and 62: SEPOS Architecture SEP Applications
Page 63 and 64: System Calls (1/2) Num Name Descrip
Page 65 and 66: Privileged System Calls • Some sy
Page 67 and 68: SEPOS (INIT) • Initial process on
Page 69 and 70: Application List • Includes infor
Page 71 and 72: Bootstrap Server • Implements the
Page 73 and 74: Privileged Methods • An applicati
Page 75 and 76: proc_has_privilege( ) int proc_has_
Page 77 and 78: Entitlement Assignment int proc_cre
Page 79 and 80: SEP Drivers • Hosts all SEP drive
Page 81 and 82: Driver Interaction Retrieves SEPD t
Page 83 and 84: SEP Services • Hosts various SEP
Page 85 and 86: Service Interaction Retrieves sepS
Page 89 and 90: Attack Surface: AKF Endpoints • E
Page 91: Attack Surface: Endpoint Handler SE
Page 95 and 96: Stack Corruptions • The main thre
Page 97 and 98: Stack Corruptions • SEP applicati
Page 99 and 100: Heap Corruptions: malloc() Free Lis
Page 101 and 102: No-Execute Protection • SEPOS imp
Page 103 and 104: Attack Surface: BootROM • Effecti
Page 105 and 106: Attack Surface: Hardware • Memory
Page 107 and 108: End Game: JTAG • Glitch the fuse
Page 109 and 110: Conclusion • SEP(OS) was designed
Page 111 and 112: Thanks! • Questions?
Page 113 and 114: SEPOS: System Methods Class Id Meth
Page 115 and 116: SEPOS: Object Methods (2/2) Class I
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Demystifying the Secure Enclave Processor

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