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C< No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/28: NLC-10-14-5-13-6 

4 t 

MEMORANDUM 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

August 25, 1978 

I 

v 

MEMORANDUM FOR: 

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

Daily Activities 

(Erb) 

NORTH/SOUTH 

Evening Report 

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE 

INSTRUCTIONS APPLY 

North-South Initiatives. Garten chaired a session last 

night at which s/p staff and some private consultants reviewed 

possible North-South policies and actions that might be 

taken in a climate that is hostile to major initiatives. 

No conclusions yet, and further meetings and drafting will 

take place over the next few weeks. (C) 

Senate Consideration of foreign assistance bill. At different 

times today and last week I discussed the aid bill with 

Beckel, Bergsten, Albright, and Owen.* Two possible approaches 

Beckel favors acceptance of Senate approval of the House aid 

levels and elimination of the Cuba and Viet-Nam amendments as 

well as the inevitable middle ground, emerge. Owen favors 

a strong effort to restore half of the cuts made in the 

House, plus elimination of the two amendments. Bergsten's 

consultations with Senate Appropriations Subcommittee members 

indicate that Inouye will strike the Cuba and Viet-Nam 

amendments but the situation regarding aid levels is unclear. 

Inouye apparently favors cuts in the IDB, but he will restore 

Asian Development Bank levels, and Schweiker may support an 

increase in IDA. No one in the Senate showed any enthusiasm 

for a large restoration of the House cuts* (LOU) - - 

The situation has been complicated by the possibility of IMF 

and World Bank action to give cost-of-living salary increases 

to their staffs and by pending IMF action on an arrangement 

(that the Executive Branch accepted) with the new IMF Managing 

Director to raise his salary to roughly $140-150,000 before 

taxes. McNamara would follow suit, a development that has 

incensed Congressman Long who feels that he was misled. He 

wasn't, but he can do some damage on the .Senate side. 

Bergsten has seen the British Executive Director, Dale, and 

others in an attempt to postpone IMF/World Bank action on 

these delicate issues. Sam Cross will follow this up next 

week. (C) 

CONriDENTlALA,Dg~ 

NSA, DOE, DOS reviews 

completed.____________ 

Not referred to DOC. Waiver 

applies._________________ 

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/28 : NLC-10-14-5-13-6

No Objection to Declassification in.Part.2010/06/28 : NLC-10-14^5-13-6........................ .......... 

POMPIDENTI&L/GDS 

MTN. Alan Wolff and I reviewed various MTN issues today. 

He agreed that we are doing better with the LDCs in the 

negotiations on tariffs than in the talks on codes. Getting 

the major LDCs in the trade codes will be difficult, but 

critical to success of the negotiations and Congressional 

approval of the MTN package. Wolff has also made what I 

feel are unpalatable proposals regarding LDC;graduation:. 

from the Generalized System of Preferences. He proposes a 

TPRG discussion of the Preferences issue and I suggested 

that he add LDC code negotiations to the agenda. (C) 

Colombo Plan. Possible high-level participation in the 

December Colombo Plan meetings here in Washington and the 

central place to be given at the meetings to basic human 

needs policies add significance to that forthcoming event. 

Because of the moderation of..the NAM's statement...in. Belgrade 

on bhn we may be able to advance toward greater LDC understanding 

of a broad BHN approach. I will provide BHN material and 

guidance regarding last year's PRC decision to those who are 

preparing for the meeting.- fC) - -........... 1--- 

Hunger Commission. Lynn Daft, Peters, and DuSault (0MB), 

and I discussed NSC/DPS cooperation in back- stopping the 

Linowitz Commission on World Hunger. Daft and I agreed on 

an approach to the statement , announcing the .Commission'.and 

on the means of managing the transition from Peter Bourne to 

Henry Owen as White House "point man.” (U) 

f 

jCONFIDBNTIAfi/GDS 

f 


No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/28: NLC-10-14-5-13-6 

4 « 

rgQP—6BCRET/C0DEW0RD 

Significant Intelligence (Erb) 

The G-77 and the MTN. At a meeting in Geneva earlier this 

month a G-7? subcommittee began to lay plans for criticism 

of the MTN, not within the framework of the negotiations, 

but at the May '79 UNCTAD V meeting in Manila. Comment: 

Such an approach would detract from LDC participation in the 

closing stages of the MTN and contribute to the likelihood 

of a confrontation at UNCTAD V. (SECRET/XGDS-2/Noforn) 

Steel. 

f 

25X1 

Comment: The United States continues to 

push for ldc participation in the steel group. In a conversation 

with Barraclough, OECD Secretary General Van Lannep has 

suggested that OECD members be required to object to the 

participation of particular countries if they wished to 

limit the steel group's membership. OECD Secretariat staff 

and some USG officials doubt that- this "negative consensus" 

method will work. (TOP SECRET/Codeword-XGDS-2) 

I * 

1 

CLASSIFIED BY ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION 

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER. 11658 . 

i-XEilPTIOH CA.ftCURY■ r rr2 V" ' ■' 

AUl’OMAiICALLX ^JLASSXITED 03 IMP TO PET-' 

TOP SECRET/CODEWORD XODC 2 

< v. 


No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/28*: NLC-10-14-5-13-6 

A. « 

Daily Activities (Pastor) August 25, 1978 

Yesterday, I attended the organizing meeting for PRM-41 on Mexico. 

The level of attendees was quite high, and all clearly understood 

the importance of our relationship with Mexico and the 

need for developing a coherent strategy. Also met with Benson 

Ford and his colleagues and gave them a briefing of our policy ____ 

to Latin America with special emphasis on: Mexico, where Ford .. 

is very interested in investing. 

Last night, I attended a seminar involving Gen. Lanusse, former 

President (1969-73) of Argentina. Lanusse urged the largely 

American audience to understand the "Argentina reality," and 

to loosen up the human rights policy or risk a nationalist 

reaction. Qne Professor of Argentina history used a marvelous 

quote from Lanusse himself that you cannot beat terrorism with 

government-sanctioned violence.- Lanusse'admitted Argentina had 

"gone wrong somehow;" he did not have*any kind words for Videla. 

Vaky thinks that Videla is currently debating whether to receive 

him, and he believes we shouldn't push at this time. I urged him 

to try to put together an overall strategy paper on U.S. policy. 

On Nicaragua, I relayed the message from Reg and Bill Odom to 

Vaky that we should go in quietly to the Panamanians and State 

our concern with the Sandinistas-within the-overall context of 

our global anti-terrorist policy. Perez and Torrijos have 

both publicly tried to justify their involvement by stretching 

the principle of non-intervention beyond its legitmate limits. 

After hearing some, other diatrubing reports aboutthe-Sandinistas. 

and speaking to David, I have set up a CIA briefing on this 

subject on Monday and an inter-agency meeting on U.S. policy on 

Tuesday. Jonathan Steele of the Manchester Guardian and 

Richard Valeriani of CBS called for background briefing on the 

Nicaraguan situation. I saw Valeriani on CBS/s-raorning show, 

and he got the story right. 

Vaky recommends at least a one week delay on a.Presidential 

response to Mrs. Chamoro's letter, .and IKconcur. 

Puerto Rico is causing concern. Cleaned off with Henry on a 

press release which Andy Young may issue on Monday restating 

our full support for self-determination. The problem 

is that the Committee looks about evenly splitour": Puerto 

Ricans may hold the balance in their hands, but they're 

playing hard ball. They told USUN that if we continue to 

aim for deferral, we will hear the word "colonial" all day 

long. They may be prepared to compromise on ’a consensus 

statement — not necessarily inscribed — which urges the 

Committee to continually review the issue. I will follow 

this closely over the weekend. 

rONFTPHNTIAL 


work on the Humphrey Scholarship Program. We are selecting 

universities with an eye for excellence .and for certain ..Congressional 

districts. I will send a memo on that, next week. Also met 

with Barry Sklar who is writing the Latin America, .part of . a study 

being prepared for the Senate* Foreign Relatione ;epinmittee on 

the effectiveness of U.S. human rights policy. Also worked on 

Cuba and on the Presidential message to the UN Conference on 

Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries. 

* 

« 


No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/28 : NLC-10-14-5-13-6 

Significant Intelligence; (Pastor) 

Ecuador: 

Embassy Quito's 

assessment indicate that plotting to eliminate* Roldos -as a 

potential candidate continues. The Embassy indicates that 

their soundings have confirmed the existence of a plot to 

establish sufficient fraud in the first round voting tortry 

to convince Poveda to cancel the,follow-up elections. At 

the same time, however, they have encountered enough doubt 

and dissent to possibly undermine tfhe scheme. The decisive 

moment may be reached during the week of September 4 when 

the Guayas province results are scheduled for review. (S XGDS-2) 

Mexico: Scretary Schlesinger briefed Ambassador Margain on 

progress of US natural gas legislation and our desire to 

resume negoitations with the Mexicans. Schlesinger emphasized 

that we understand the importance of the price to Mexico and 

that there are various ways to meet Mexican political interests 

without disrupting our own. Margain was impressed and 

promised to raise the issue with Lopez Portillo during his 

consultations in Mexico. (C) 

Haiti: The Haitian Foreign Ministry informed our Embassy that 

they will not seek the return of Lucien Rigaud and had been 

looking for a way to get rid of the problem posed by his 

presence in the Mexican Embassy. (C) 

OAS; A special OAS session called to deal with human rights 

commission issues was diverted to a discussion of commodity 

problems and concern over US protectionism. Sugar and 

copper were the concerns with-Peru, Chile-/- and-Jamaica ■ ■ ■■ 

speaking out forecefully. Jamaica^characterized consultations 

with the US in all forums, including the OAS, as an "exercise 

in futility." (U) 

Ecuador: Press reports indicate that Natural Resources 

Minister Semblantes announced that GOE favors an oil price 

hike of no more than 5%. The Embassy comments that while 

Ecuador usually follows Venezuela's lead, it will diverge 

in its own interest and usually follows suit-;-when ari- OPEC 

consensus develops. (LOU) 

Mexico and Nicaragua: Our charge^briefed Foreign Minister 

Roel on the Nicaraguan situation. Roel indicated that the 

only long term solution was the removal of Somoza'and held 

forth on the need for the US to stop supporting Somoza. 

Roel expressed interest in receiving further information 

on the Nicaraguan situation. (S XGDS 1) 

COHHW. 

t 


DATE. JUly 3, 1980 

7attno?j. PPC/PDPR/CP, J.onathan 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 

memorandum 

■ubjecti. Weekly Report 

to. AA/PPC, Mr. Charles Paolillo (Acting) 

To undeAAtand Argentina.'* economic. hUtoAy, the 

approach oh a pAychiatnic social. ujonken might be 1 

moAe uaej[uZ than that oh an economist... . 

f 

Con&ideAabZe. px.ogA.eA6. has been made, in 6ta.biLi.zing v 

both the. economy and iociety in the 6 ho At nun, 

although at a ca6t in tenmA oh yet another Ahanp 

dnop in h.eat unban uxcge& and 6ome Zoaa oh poiitical 

hAeedom. 

Report: 

News and views 

15 

Case 2662 - Alberto - Samuel FALICOFF 

The Commission heard public testimony from the wife of Dr. Fallcoff, 

denouncing the detention, Imprisonment and torture of Hr. Fallcoff by the 

Security Forces. ^ The arrest took place In his residence, In the presence of 

his wife, who was'also detained and later released. Mrs. Fallcoff signed the 

testimony. 

Doctor Fallcoff, a physician,- was practicing In the C6rdoba Children's 

Hospital and was a member of the Medical Association of that city. 

The Commission considers pertinent the complete transcription of Mrs. 

Fallcoff's testimony: 

On Thursday, November 25, 1976, at 18 hours, the bell rang . 

In the apartment where I lived with my husband, Dr. Alberto 

Samuel Fallcoff and my son, Alfredo Fallcoff, who was then two 

years of age. I saw through the peephole four men In civilian 

clothes standing against the wall. When they realized I was 

there, they knocked the door, and told me to open it or they 

would shoot. Since the baby was sitting watching television In 

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan OPTIONAL. FORM NO. 10 

(REV. 7-70) 

GSA FPMR (41 CFR) I0t-l I .* 

soio-na

line with the door, I opened it. They quickly entered and 

grabbed me by the arms. I was frightened and screamed. They 

said "Keep quiet, for the baby's sake-' and asked me where my 

husband was. I replied that he worked at the Clinic. Then 

they began to search the house, locking me and my son in his 

room. They searched the living room and dining room, 

dismanteled the stove and the Venetian blinds, and removed the 

pictures from the walls. I saw this being done because the 

baby asked to go to the bathroom and they let me take him. 

After half an hour, they ordered me to prepare the baby's 

supper. They were courteous to me and told me they knew that I 

had done nothing. They said they had come looking for my 

husband. After a while, they brought the janitor in and locked 

him in the apartment also. They said they had' done this to 

keep him from warning my husband. They did the same thing with 

a neighbor, who came in because he thought that thieves had 

broken in. The janitor, who was a very old man, was very 

frightened, tfy husband arrived at about 2 o'clock and unlocked 

the door with his keys. When they heard the elevator, they 

again sent me to my son's room. They Immediately locked 

themselves up with' my husband in our room and I began to hear 

the sounds of a struggle, pushing and blows. Later, an officer 

of the Army Intelligence Service arrived along with another 

officer. 

They were all well dressed, in suits and ties and carrying 

a walkle talkie. They came in and out quietly and, on one 

occasion, brought sweets and toys for the baby, who behaved 

very well with them because they let him touch their 

revolvers. The^ told me to prepare clothing for the baby, 

since they had decided to take me with them. I asked them to 

let him say goodbye to his father and they did so. I then saw 

my husband with his hands tied with a cable. I explained to 

the child that they were going to take him to his grandmother's 

house and I begged them to do so. I gave them the address of 

my mother in El Chaco and her telephone number. Then they took 

us away. They took the money we had in our pockets and any 

jewelry they found. They said that if I was taking any 

medicine to bring it with me, and I did so. I went down in the 

elevator with my husband and three of them. They put 

sunglasses on me with paper pasted on the inside of the 

lenses. My husband's hands were tied. It was 2130 hours. 

They took us in separate cars. I was taken in a bright yellow 

car. I sat in the back of the car with one of them. The ones 

in the front seat had not entered the apartment. They asked, 

quietly, why my hands were not tied. The one in the back 

answered: "That's no problem". While we were driving down the 

first streets, I tried to see the road; from Fatriclos, we

-3- 

turned on Martin Garcia and then on Almlrante Brown* Then they 

realized 1 was watching the road, so they pressed my head down 

on the legs of the one alongside me, and pointed a revolver at 

me. After travelling at high speed for about 20 minutes, we 

arrived at our destination* The car stopped and they made me 

get out and walk about 30 meters* Others came and asked why 

they did not bring the car In. - They answered the lights 

weren't working and that the hlghbeams-were on and they were 

hot going to enter with the hlghbeams on. We entered a 

building with a very large door (a garage door, or perhaps, 

much bigger). From the little I was able to see, there was a 

very large room with no one in It. They took me down a spiral 

staircase to a basement. There they told me to close my eyes 

and they put a very tight blindfold, with elastic In the back, 

on me, which Immediately gave me an Intense headache. They 

handcuffed me and shackled my feet together by a chain with 

padlocks on both shackles. Thy were very tight and had sharp 

edges. Then they took me to a kind of cell. The place was 

full of these cells. In other words, they were small rooms 

made of pressed board or cardboard, with chairs and a small 

desk in them. They left me there for a while, and I could hear 

that they were Interrogating my husband in the cell on one 

side, but I could not hear what they were saying. 

The interrogation and the detention: I was soon taken to 

another room much further away, and they told me to remember 

that my number was 103. After half an hour, someone entered 

and asked me whether I was going, to say anything or whether I 

preferred to have them take me in. I said that I knew 

absolutely nothing. They began by asking me my name, I.D. 

number, the name of my parents, brothers, and my husband, his 

parents and brothers, and the date and place of my birth. They 

left and after a while they returned and asked me to tell them 

what my husband was doing In C6rdoba. I answered that, because 

of his work as a physician, he had been in contact with 

patients whose parents were prisoners, and a short while ago, 

they had begun to ask him to help them with money, samples of 

milk, etc. and I knew that he had only done that because he 

always brought home cans of milk, used clothing, books and 

other food for the prison. Then we decided to move to Buenos 

Aires. At that point In the interrogation, other persons 

entered. They attached no importance to me, and all of them 

left. I began to feel totally exhausted and I slept sitting 

up. When they returned, they asked me again for my I.D. 

number. I actually couldn't remember because .1 felt so 

.exhausted and I told them so. Then they left. After a while,

-4- 

I began to hear, coming through one of the walls of pressed 

.board, the sound of a lot of running water, and then the cries 

of my husband Insulting them and repeatedly calling them 

"murderers". This is repeated approximately every hour, or 

perhaps less* Obviously the torture room is next door. On the 

following day — I . guess—they took me out and led me to a 

corridor on the same floor. My legs are so swollen that the 

shackles begin to cut into my skin..' A nurse came who loosens 

the shackles and put cotton around my legs'. A guard asked him 

"Why are you doing that?" and the nurse replied "So... we don't 

have to treat her afterwards". He asked me why, I, a doctor, 

had gotten into this, and he said he didn't understand how, 

with all the money we could earn, we had ended up here. He 

added that if I needed anything to ask to speak with Pedro, the 

nurse, since there were other Pedros there. There were chairs 

against the wall on each side, in the passageway, very close to 

each other. They told me to close my eyes. Then they took the 

mask off and ordered me to open,my eyes. I could not see 

anything because they were taking photographs and the 

flashbulbs blinded me. One of the ones who. had been to my 

house approached me and put a hood of thick white cloth over my 

head. He explained that with that hood they would not bother 

me. That was because they were taking people to the torture 

room according to the order of their chairs.'. I could see that, 

because the door was nearby and every time they took someone 

out, the noise of running water and the desperate screams of 

pain could be heard, despite the fact that a record player was 

constantly playing very loud music. There were certain songs 

that they played more frequently, an^ despite the fact that the 

tapes were worn, I could hear the lyrics which went roughly: 

"and now what are they? where are they? what are their Ideals? 

etc." I wondered why my legs were so swollen. I said that I 

had a weak heart and therefore bad circulation. They put 

another chair In front of me to put my legs up on. One asked 

me if I recognized his voice, and I said he was one of the ones 

who had been at my house. I asked for my child and he said 

"Relax", we have notified your family and they are coming to 

get him." Afterwards I noticed that they brought my husband to 

the chair alongside me, because I recognized his pants and 

shoes. During the entire time I was there, I heard the same 

sound; the loud record player, screams of pain, running water. 

The guards wore rubber boots. I suppose I spent an entire day 

and night there because the music was Interrupted twice when 

they brought food to the guards and their superiors. They 

drank a lot of wine asking the guards to bring more. I could 

smell the wine. The Chief came and asked how things were 

going. They answered that three persons had died, two men and

-5- 

one woman. The Chief told them to be more careful because that 

was too many for one day. That day they ;took my husband away a 

number of times, and I recognized his screams. Twice I heard 

his difficulty breathing and it sounded as though he had 

swallowed his tongue. The music stopped and an urgent call for 

the doctor came over the loudspeaker. I heard people running, 

and I heard the doctor say, if they wanted him alive, that was 

enough for now, and not to go further. Then they took me to 

one of the rooms. This time they took off the hood, and I saw 

that several of the ones who had' been to my apartment were 

there along with one 1 did not know. They now spoke harshly to 

me and again asked, me for Information. A torturer entered 

wearing jeans, a red jacket and rubber boots. He was blond, 

with a red face, and he told them "I will give to her". To me 

he said: "All right, I'm in a hurry, tell me whether you know 

anything, or I will give you the 6 pointed cattle prod." The 

others wanted to hurry me. I cried and said I was telling the 

truth; I knew nothing; I was not a militant; and since I did 

not like such things I consciously knew nothing about them. 

They asked me what mbney we were living on, and 1 told him 

ours. They took me again to the corridor. After several 

hours, they made many of the people line up, each with his 

hands on the shoulders of the person in front of him. There 

were probably about ten of us, and they made us walk, climb 

stairs, and then take an elevator. He probably went up about 

five floors, and there they made us squat down and told us to 

stretch out on a mattress. Alongside of me there was a man who 

did not comply well, and they kicked and punched him for about 

an hour. I immediately fell into a deep sleep. I was 

completely exhausted, and I no longer cared what happened to 

me. I was so exhausted that, while they were taking me there 

they pawed me and I wasn't even startled. When I awoke they 

served sandwiches. They made me sit up, but I could eat only a 

few mouthfuls. I continued to sleep, I believe, the entire 

day, I cannot be sure. I woke up in the morning and they were 

distributing a little food to each person in turn. I felt 

rested, and tried to find out what was going on. I heard those 

with me calling the guard to go to the bathroom. I did the 

same thing. Soon one of them made me stand up, and I hit my 

head on a beam. I realized that the roof was very low. In the 

bathroom, the guard took off my hood. He asked me how old I 

was, whether I was married, and whether I had any children. He 

was a kid about 17 years old. He was very kind to me and told 

me to read what was written on my hood. The words "possible 

release" were written on the cloth in throad. I asked .what it 

meant, and he told me they were going to release me. I asked 

him why I was there, and he said it was a mistake. His only

-6- 

job was to'see that the prisoners did not speak, did not take 

off their hoods, and those who did so, he could beat at will 

until he knocked them out. He and - the others were taught 

karate and self defense. They were made to read books like 

Paplllon and to hate the. prisoners, about whom the only thing 

they knew was that they "are enemies of the country, who want 

to destroy It, by destroying the army”. They were kids 15 to 

20 years old. Sometimes they were called kids, but usually 

they were called by their first names.' At night they were 

given bottles of wine, and then ttyey became very violent. This 

guard told me that some of them were taken oh raids, and 

sometimes they were given special commendation or merit 

awards. They were very proud of that. For example, he told me 

that the previous day he has been assigned to go to a house 

that someone had denounced. It answered the description, and 

when the owners tried to escape, they had to shoot them: a 

young woman with a child two or three years old. Later they 

learned that the people were not. involved. He had felt bad 

about that, but the persons Who denounced Innocent people were 

to blame. He took me to my place again, and there I continued 

to spy. I could see that It was a large "L" shaped room. It 

was of make-shift construction on the terrace of the building, 

since the outer walls were only one meter high. A peaked roof 

came down to there. Its highest part was in the middle of the 

room, which is where the guards go. In the angle of the. "L" 

there is a large table where they eat and a medicine chest and 

a small file. We, were on both sides In sort of pressed board 

cubicles about 1 meter high. The cubicles where I was were 

make-shift so I was able to move them carefully. The rectangle 

was made up of four separate "L" shaped parts. I think that 

this detail is very important because of what I am going to 

tell further on. That day I realised that they brought someone 

to the cubicle oh my left, and I heard him barely complain, as 

though he were very 111. I thought It was my husband. So I 

moved over, displaced one of the walls and changed position (we 

were lying on the floor on a mattress ahd a blanket. That is 

all we had). I managed to see my husband, shirtless, with 

marks everywhere from the cattle prod. I realized that he had 

no more than two centimeters In a row of unmarked skin. He 

breathes heavily and asks for "water, water", but his voice is 

very weak and It is hard for him to move his tongue so the 

words do not come out. A guard came, and told him not to 

bother them, that they could not give him water because if they 

did he would die. They sat us down and gave us a sandwich and 

a small bottle of water and a cup of broth. I hid the small 

bottle and, when they caqe back to take It away, they did not 

realize it was missing. Then, carefully watching out for the

-7- 

guards, I put my hands through Into my husband's cubicle and 

was able to touch him* I felt that he had a fever* He tried 

to touch my hands* Then I passed the water to him and he drank 

it all. The same thing happened the next day* A few days 

later,, they let him eat and gave him water* Little by little 

he began to recover. Once when the guards were not watching, 

we spoke a little* He told me he had gone out in a car with 

them, telling him that he was going to take them to a 

rendezvous near the Italian Hospital. When they were not 

paying attention, he jumped out of the car and a bus ran over 

his body. He succeeded in yelling his name so that people 

could notify his family. They immediately put him back into 

the car and when they brought him back they tortured him more 

than ever. He tried to encourage me and told me that he was 

very proud of me. Every day of the month I spent there was the 

same, stretched out on the mattress and constantly shackled. 

Sometimes they took the handcuffs off for a few days, and they 

took the hood off permanently. The electric light was always 

on and the music was always playing loudly. Once a day, after 

much begging, they took me to- the bathroom. On three 

occasions, I was able to take a bath and change into clothing 

they gave me. While I did so, the guards would open the door 

whenever they wished. I had to undress, bathe and dress again 

in three minutes. For the bath they took off our handcuffs, 

chain and shackles. Meals were always the same: in the 

morning, a cup of stew, at noon a meat sandwich and sometimes a 

cup of broth, and at night the same. On some days, one or two 

meals were omitted. I don't know exactly how many people were 

there, but I estimate that there were about 50. The pregnant 

women—and there were many of them—were given special meals; 

in the morning coffee with milk, at noon and at night, meat 

with mashed potatoes, and in the evening coffee with milk. 

Sometimes they were given vitamins. Every day the guards 

punished two or three persons. They did so for any reason; 

because they removed their hoods while they were sleeping, 

because they were not lying right; It because the guards 

suspected them of spying; or for any other reason. - The 

punishments consisted of kicks and punches for hours until they 

were left unconclous. The panic is constant. Only once was 

the situation reversed: the lights went out and the guards 

were frightened and rushed out. Then they realized how 

ridiculously they were behaving and they returned, with their 

weapons in their hands, saying: "Everybody quiet, don't move"; 

but even their voices were trembling. Another time, the lights 

went out—It must have been about December 20th—and we' could 

hear troops marching past. In the first days they called roll, 

asking for the name and number of each person. My husband was 

on one side of me, with the number 104. I was number 103; at

-8- 

my other side was number 102, a lawyer !whom they had taken from 

his office in the Palermo area the same day. they took us. I 

could see him as well as I could see my husband: he was 

olive-skinned, had black wavy hair and a beard and was of 

average build. He wore a mask. Later I overhead that he was a 

veterinarian, and that his sister, a teacher who had been 

brought in a month before, had—according to what I've heard— 

recently married a widower with children. They were going to 

hold her until her brothers appeared and she did not know where 

they werd. They took her from the room a few days before I 

left, and I suppose they released her. They called one of the 

prisoners "peg-leg." He was very near me, and 'by his voice 

seemed to be an older person and very weak. One night the 

guards got drunk and began to bet that they could make him 

stand on his peg-leg. They brought him into the middle of the 

room and ordered him to do it. He begged them, said it was 

impossible, that he was going to fall. Then they began to kick 

him, punch him, and they stood him up. Of course, he fell. 

They stood him up ajgaln, he fell again, and so on, throughout 

the night. It was a most macabre spectacle. The guards went 

crazy, they beat him without interruption and the poor man was 

begging them to stop. There was the sound of blows to the 

lungs, the abdomen, the noise of broken bones. They stopped 

when he fell unconscious. Afterwards he was delirious for two 

or three days until they called the doctor. The doctor said he 

had many broken bones and ordered him to be taken away. I 

didn't hear him again. In early December, a transfer occured. 

Apparently they were taking away those who had been there the 

longest; however, they included among them the lawyer who was 

next to me; in all, some 40 persons. They adjusted the 

handcuffs, the shackles and the hoods. They assembled them 

together, were taking them out when the noise of an airplane 

was heard that seemed to be landing nearby. (I shall explain 

that the sound of airplanes was very frequent. I also heard a 

train, and a helicopter, two or three times every day). After 

a time, the sound of an airplane was heard again, then nothing 

more. A guard asked another where they were being taken, and 

he answered: "Fishfood". They were very few people left in the 

room, and they changed our places. Fortunately, my husband and 

I continued to be next to each other with the same consecutive 

numbers. But I shall explain that there were three or four 

with the number 100, others with 400, 700, 900, etc. On the 

following day, they began to bring in a large number of new 

people and this continued for succeslve days, until they had to 

put us on the floor, in the guard's passageway. Many of them 

were taken out at night and were ordered to get dressed.

-9- 

Apparently they were released* Also, when It rained very hard, 

(I heard the rain In spite of the noise because the roof was 

over our heads) they took, out people to release them. They 

were careful to have the people well dressed and, In the case 

of women, to tie them up as much as possible* I could not see 

my husband now, nor speak to him because my new cubicle was 

completely made of wood. However, he made friends with an 

occasional guard-—that Is, one who,did not work there but came 

to fill In because many of them were on vacation. The boy was 

really very good, and taking a risk himself, he took us to the 

bathroom and let us speak to each other without hoods. Of 

course he was present, so that we could only speak about 

ourselves. My husband'had a very small hematoma but the doctor 

said that the dislocation was not going to be set because a 

general anesthesia would be needed to relax the muscles and 

that could not be done' there. To do that he would have to- be 

transferred, and transfer was impossible. He explained that 

the nurse came by evjpry two or three days, but never touched 

anyone; however, they usually gave some medicine, mostly 

laxatives, antlspamodlcs and eyedrops, because we all had 

conjunctivitis because of the hood and the mask. The guards 

had the eyedrops; sometimes when somebody said that he needed 

them, the guard himself Inserted the drops. I began to feel 

bad. I had nightmares about my son every night because despite 

their having told me that my parents had him, I did not believe 

them. All of this was due to the fact that they had taken off 

the white hood and given me a gray one like all the others. 

Also, because of the time that had elapsed. I realized that 

there was very little possibility that they would release me, 

because the ones* they released only stayed a very short time. 

I mentioned this to my husband, and he always tried to 

encourage me. I spent the day thinking about how to get out, I 

began by trying to get to know the place, telling the guard who 

took me to the bathroom that with the little water they give us 

we were dying of thirst (which was true) and I offered to carry 

the bottles as often as necessary and to do any kind of work, 

cleaning, etc. I said that from lying down so much I was 

beginning to feel weak, and I was afraid that I would not be 

able to walk when they took me to my house the following week 

(that was pure fabrication). The guard began to take me to 

wash the dishes, to the bathroom, and let me go without 

handcuffs, to carry water bottles, to clean up the bathrooms. 

Some of the trays and dishes had the seal of the Argentine 

Army. So the days passed. There were no windows In the 

bathroom, but there was a door locked with a key, which was the 

guard's closet. 1 found It opened one day, and I saw the 

guard's civilian clothing and that the closet had a window

-10- 

cove red with a blanket. I lifted the blanket and saw thick 

grass and a heavy metal screen outside of it. I could see many 

tall trees, and at the end, high woven wire, a pick-up truck 

and a kind of garage. It would be possible to escape by 

breaking the window and cutting the metal screen. We were not 

very high up, surely the fourth or fifth floor. Blankets would 

be needed to climb down. But was the woven wire electrified? 

And what lay beyond? I could not see. Furthermore, we had to 

take our chains off. They they took us to bathe, they unlocked 

the padlock with a master key that the chief of the guards had; 

he gave it to them only on those occasions. I realized that my 

husband was very weak because of everything that had happened, 

and that he also had a dislocated shoulder. However, it would 

be a question of giving it more thought. One day, while I was 

washing the plates, they took me to wash diapers and rubber 

pants. This Impressed me very much because I realized that 

there were children on the other, side from where we were. At 

that time I heard the voice of children about 4 years of ages, 

asking the guards why their fathers had those things on their 

heads.. I asked the guard how it was possible for children to 

be there. He said that they were the only ones and that they 

had been brought with their parents because there was no place 

to leave them. However, they were going to be taken away the 

next day. Another day I was taken to the linen room to arrange 

the clothing they were taking to the laundry, by sex and size. 

Again I saw children's .clothing in those places, I heard the 

voices of women who were working in the kitchen and sewing torn 

clothing. When the guards finished their shifts, they said 

that they were going to the swimming pool. One day they took 

me down to one of the boxes. They took off my hood and left me 

alone for a moment. I looked at the walls of the box and was 

impressed by the number of bloodstains. Some of them were very 

high. I don't know how they' did it but since the stains are 

very large and there are small splattered stains around 

them-monstruous. He came back and told me to talk to him about 

something. I told him that I did not know anything and that 

the only thing I was thinking about at that time was my husband 

and my child; that I had nightmares about my son and that if 

they did not release me, I would take off my hood and that I 

knew very well that that meant that the guards would kill me; 

that they should release me, that I did not know why they were 

keeping me there. He told me that it was very likely that I 

would leave. They told a guard to take me upstairs again. On 

one occasion when the guard was not watching, I told my husband 

that I would probably leave and that he should be on the 

lookout for times When the guards were not watching so that we 

could talk. But there were watching us, especially from that

-11- 

night until the time of my departure* -The following night, the 

Chief guard came, told me to sit up; he handcuffed my hands 

behind me* They picked up my mattress and searched my 

cubicle* They felt my breasts and between my legs; they shoved 

me around and moved me to another cubicle* During the previous 

interrogation, I had been told, that, while they knew that I 

had not taken part in the activities that led to my arrest, 

considerable time had passed since my arrival at the place of 

detention, and under such circumstances, I could not leave. I 

■ told them that they could not commit another injustice added to 

the injustice of my arbitrary detention, and after an exchange 

of opinions among themselves, they proceeded, to interrogate me 

exhaustively on all the circumstances that- I might have 

observed during my detention* Thus, I was Interrogated on what 

my opinion was about the treatment the prisoners were 

receiving, whether I felt that they were tortured there, 

whether I had-any idea of where I-was, and under what security 

authority the procedure there were conducted* To all of these 

questions I answered; that I was totally ignorant of the details 

they were asking of me, and that I felt the treatment was 

adequate* They asked me what I knew of my husband and I 

answered that I knew that he was alive, that I had recognized 

his voice when he ■ spoke with the guards, and I denied that I 

had seen him. I was led again to my usual place where the 

guards handcuffed my hands behind me, and they watched very 

closely to see whether I tried to communicate with my husband* 

That evening, they sent me to bathe and to change my clothes. 

The one who told me that I was go^ng to be released appeared 

and told me that I was going to Reslstencia, to my mother's 

house. He was so drunk that he threatened me and they 

handcuffed my hands behind me and sent me to a cubicle* On one 

side was a girl having an asthma attack and she was also 

handcuffed with her hands behind her* She was frantic because 

with the hood she was choking even more. She had an oxygen 

mask beside her, but with her hands tied she could not put in 

on and she asked the guards to do it* They didn't listen to 

her. After a while, they got me up and took off my handcuffs 

and shackles. The drunk guard came and took me downstairs. 

Soon I realized from the fresh air that I was outside. A car 

approached and they put me in it. It was raining. They put me 

in the front seat. The car went round and round many times. I 

suppose it was going around in the park of the same building 

because I- noticed that the road was muddy and the car was 

skidding from side to side. Also, it seemed to me that it was 

turning in the same places. This went on for a while. Then we 

went on to an asphalt road and drove for several hours until 

they took off the mask that they had put on me to replace the 

hood before we left. We were on General Paz Street. I was

-12- 

__ 

alone with, the drunken guard. He- told me that I was completely 

free but not to communicate with my In**laws, never to go to 

C6rdoba, and not to come out In Buenos Aires for several - 

months. He repeated that all of my movements were going to be 

carefully watched and to remember that they still had my 

husband. I told him that I was going to leave the country, and 

he told me not to, to let a long time pass; otherwise I would 

have problems. It was 5 o'clock In the morning of December 24, 

1977. He gave me a document, a’Federal Police I.D., with one 

of the photos they'd taken of me, but with a number other than 

my real one, and a forged■signature.. He told me.to burn It as 

soon as I reached El Chaco and to get a duplicate of my real 

I.D. He gave me three million pesos, told me to go to the 

Austral window, and said that I had passage reserved In the 

name of Mrs. Ramos; that If there was no room they were going 

to take me in the pilot's cabin and that I should buy my son a 

cart for Christmas, He left me at the airport entrance* My 

plane left at 9.20 pm. I realized that there were two men, an 

18 year-old youth and a man around 40, who watched me until the 

airplane took off. In El Chaco there were almost always 

several pairs in cars along the street of my mother's house and 

I never noticed anyone following me. Although I hardly went 

out of doors for months. 

After my release I lived at my house In El Chaco. When I 

went to the police headquarters to arrange for my passport, I 

was told after lengthy proceedings and psychological harassment 

that they had received' a denunciation of my disappearance. 

When they asked who had made it, I replied that It was my 

mother. Then they made me sign

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INFO AMEMBASSY LIMA 3683 

CONFIDENTIAL 

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 7 BUENOS AIRES 7776 

E.O. 12065: N/A 

TAGS: AH, SHUM 

SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT FOR ARGENTINA 

REFs STATE 224684 

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT ANNUAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 

FOR ARGENTINA: 11 

............. .—• 

BEGIN TEXT: 

OVER THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE TEARS ARGENTINA HAS PASSED THROUGH 

SEVERAL CYCLES OF ALTERNATING CIVILIAN AND MILITARY RULE j 

SINCE 1955, THERE HAVE BEEN SIX MILITARY AND SIX CIVILIAN 

PRESIDENTS. BEGINNING IN 1969, VIOLENCE MOUNTED PROGRESSIVELY 

FROM THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT AS GROUPS WITH WIDELY DIFFERENT 

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND CONCEPTIONS STRUGGLED FOR POWER. 

AS A RESULT, BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAVE 

MAINTAINED A "STATE OF SIEGE" FOR SOME NINE OF THE PAST TEN 

YEARS. AT THE HEIGHT OF THIS VIOLENCE IN 1975-1976, TERRORISM 

HAD TAKEN ON BROAD DIMENSIONS: BOMBINGS, ROBBERIES, 

KIDNAPPINGS AND ASSASSINATIONS FOR POLITICAL REASONS WERE 

COMMON OCCURRENCES. ORGANIZED TERRORIST GROUPS ON BOTH 

SIDES OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM NUMBERED SOME 5,000-6,000 

PERSONS, WITH SYMPATHIZERS ESTIMATED AT AN ADDITIONAL 

15,000. 

BY 1976 THE SITUATION IN ARGENTINA HAD DETERIORATED 

SHARPLY. COURTS AND POLITICAL LEADERS WERE BEING INTIMI 

DATED* INFLATION APPROACHED 800 PERCENT AND MANY ESSENTIAL 

PUBLIC SERVICES HAD BEEN DISRUPTED. AT THIS POINT, THE 

ARMED FORCES AGAIN TOOK CONTROL OF THE STATE, WITH THE 

AVOWED GOALS OF PROMOTING ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND ENDING 

TERRORISM AND CORRUPTION. THEY PROMISED THAT DEMOCRACY 

WOULD ULTIMATELY 3E RESTORED. THE ARMED FORCES MAINTAINED 

THE STATE OF SIEGE IMPOSED IN 1974 BY PRESIDENT MARIA 

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ESTELA PERON, CLOSED CONGRESS, DEPOSED THE PRESIDENT, AND 

REPLACED ALL MEMBERS OP THE SUPREME COURT. ELECTED STATE 

AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIALS WERE REPLACED BY MILITARY 

OFFICERS, AND POLITICAL PARTY ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING THE 

EIGHT OF ASSEMBLY, WERE PROHIBITED. MOST TRADE UNIONS WERE 

"INTERVENED," AND ALL STRIKES WERE BANNED. ' 

THE SECURITY FORCES EMBARKED ON A WIDESPREAD COUNTER- 

CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE AIMED AT TERRORISTS AS WELL AS 

ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIETY THEY CONSIDERED SUBVERSIVE? 

MANY KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, AS WELL AS MANY 

PERSONS WITH NO SUBVERSIVE RECORD, DISAPPEARED. CONDITIONS 

OF DETENTION WERE OFTEN CRUEL. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT 

ASSETTS THAT TORTURE WAS NEVER AUTHORIZED, THERE ARE MANY 

REPORTS THAT IT WAS EMPLOYED DURING PRELIMINARY DETENTION. 

MANY OTHERS WERE DETAINED BY THE EXECUTIVE WITHOUT ANY 

SPECIFIC CHARGE UNDER THE "STATE OF SIEGE . POWERS OF THE 

CONSTITUTION. 

BY 1978 SPOKESMEN FOR THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED TEAT TEE 

WAR ON TERRORISM HAD BEEN WON. AS DESCRIBED IN LAST YEAR'S . 

REPORT, 1979 SAW IMPORTANT POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN 

THE REDUCTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. IN 1980 THE 

TRENDS ESTABLISHED THE YEAR BEFORE CONTINUED AS THE HUMAN 

RIGHTS SITUATION IMPROVED, BUT SERIOUS PROBLEMS REMAIN: 

— ELEVEN CASES OF DISAPPEARANCES WERE REGISTERED IN 

ARGENTINA? HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS ASSERT THAT THE TOTAL MAY 

BE CLOSER TO 22. IN CONTRAST, DISAPPEARANCES NUMBERED 

MANY THOUSANDS IN 1976 AND 1977, OVER 600 I'N 1978, AND 44 

IN 1979. THE BULK OF THE DISAPPEARED LAST YEAR SEEMINGLY 

INVOLVED INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED TO ARGENTINE TERRORIST 

ORGANIZATIONS AND WHO MAY HAVE ENTERED THE COUNTRY CLAN 

DESTINELY. 

— THE NUMBER OF DETAINEES HAS BEEN REDUCED. EIGHT 

THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PEOPLE HAVE BEEN DETAINED UNDER THE 

SPECIAL EXECUTIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT SINCE 1974. 

ABOUT 1,800 PRISONERS ACCUSED OF OTHER THAN COMMON CRIMES 

BT 

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REMAINED IN DETENTION AT THE END OF 1980. ABOUT 750 

WERE BEING HELD EITHER WITHOUT TRIAL, SOME FOR MANY 

YEARS, OR AFTER SERVING THEIR SENTENCES. ABOUT 600 

HAD BEEN TRIED AND CONVICTED IN MILITARY OR CIVILIAN 

COURTS. ANOTHER 400 WERE IN TRIAL STATUS. 

— UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SUPREME COURT, HE 

JUDICIAL SYSTEM HAS INCHESIN6LY ASSERTED ITSELF. THE 

SUPREME COURT HAS, IN EFFECT, ORDERED LOWER COURTS TO 

INVESTIGATE DISAPPEARANCES. HOWEVER, THE COURTS HAVE NOT 

YET BEEN ABLE TO CLARIFY THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ANY OF THE 

MANY DISAPPEARANCES BROUGHT TO THEIR ATTENTION. 

— TERRORISTS REPEATEDLY SOUGHT TO'REINFILTRATE THE 

COUNTRY BUT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL IN THE FACE OF ACTION 3Y 

THE SECURITY FORCES. THERE WERE NO NEW MAJOR TERRORIST 

INCIDENTS IN THE COUNTRY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE MONTONEROS IN 1980. 

— PRISON CONDITIONS IMPROVED. COMPLAINTS IN THE PAST 

FOCUSED MOST HEAVILY ON OVERCROWDING, LACK OF MEDICAL 

TREATMENT, INADEQUATE FOOD, AND RESTRICTIONS ON VISITS. 

TODAY, SUCH CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY RELIEVED 

AND SUCH CONCERN AS IS EXPRESSED FOCUSES ESPECIALLY ON 

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS, PARTICULARLY ARBITRARY USE OF 

AUTHORITY BY GUARDS. 

— THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE EXERCISE OF POLITICAL 

LIBERTIES EXPANDED THOUGH FREEDOM REMAINS CIRCUMSCRIBED 

BY THE PROHIBITION ON POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND DE FACTO 

LIMITS ON THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. WITHIN UNCERTAIN 

LIMITS POLITICIANS AND THE PRESS INCREASINGLY VOICED 

CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AND PLANS. OCCASIONALLY 

POLITICIANS WERE DETAINED ON THE GROUNDS THAT 

THEY HAD OVERSTEPPED THE LIMITS OF THE LAW. 

— THE MILITARY DESIGNATED THE PRESIDENT FOR THE PERIOD 

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1981-84 WHILE REITERATING- ITS COMMITMENT TO RETURN THE 

COUNTRY EVENTUALLY TO CIVILIAN RULE. NO DATE HAS BEEN 

FIXED FOR THAT DEVOLUTION. THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINED A 

FORMAL DIALOGUE WITH POLITICAL LEADERS AS PART OF THE PROCESS 

THAT IS INTENDED TO LEAD TO THE RETURN OF DEMOCRACY. 

AT THE INVITATION OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, THE INTER- 

AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION VISITED ARGENTINA IN 

SEPTEMBER 1979, TO INVESTIGATE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. IN 

ITS FINAL REPORT THE COMMISSION RECORDED A' PAST PATTERN 

OF VIDE SCALE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND MADE AN EXTENSIVE 

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES FOR 

CORRECTING THE SITUATION. 

ARGENTINE HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS REMAIN ACTIVE AND WELL 

ORGANIZED. THOUGH OCCASIONAL HARASSMENT CONTINUED, IT 

VAS AT A LOWER LEVEL THAN IN THE PAST. 

1. RESPECT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, INCLUDING 

FREEDOM FROM: 

A. TORTURE 

THERE HAVE BEEN FEW REPORTS FROM PEOPLE DETAINED 

FOR NATIONAL SECURITY REASONS DURING 1990. EXISTING 

REPORTS SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT PHYSICAL MISTREATMENT 

CONTINUES TO BE USED AS PART OF THE INTERROGATION OF 

SUCH DETAINEES. IN THE PAST TESTIMONY FROM FORMER 

DETAINEES INDICATES THAT MISTREATMENT TOOK THE FORM OF 

ELECTRIC SHOCK, IMMERSION OF'HEAD IN WATER, MOCK 

EXECUTIONS, SEVERE BEATINGS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE. MOST 

OBSERVERS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT SUCH TREATMENT CONTINUES 

TO BE METED OUT TO NEWLY DISAPPEARED INDIVIDUALS. THE 

ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS TORTURE AND THE GOVERNMENT 

HAS PUBLICLY STATED THAT IT HAS NEVER AUTHORIZED ITS USE. 

B. CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OF PUNISHMENT. 

IN APRIL, 1979, THE GOVERNMENT DECREED UNIFORM PRISON 

REGULATIONS WHICH HAVE LED TO A GENERAL IMPROVEMENT IN 

PRISON CONDITIONS. WHILE CONDITIONS REPORTEDLY IMPROVED 

SIGNIFICANTLY FOR A TIME AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE, 

THEY AGAIN DETERIORATED IN SOME RESPECTS THEREAFTER. IN 

MAY, 1980, A NEW DECREE WAS ISSUED AIMED AT UNIFORMLY IMPROV 

ING CONDITIONS, PARTICULARLY ARBITRARY USE OF AUTHORITY, 

AVAILABILITY OF MEDICAL TREATMENT, ACCESS TO READING MATERIAL, 

WORK AND EXERCISE. INITIAL REPORTS SUGGEST THERE HAS BEEN AN 

IMPROVEMENT IN THESE AREAS SINCE MAY. HOWEVER, HUMAN 

RIGHTS GROUPS REMAIN CONCERNED, PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE 

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PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS AFFECTING PRISONERS. THE 

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS MAINTAINS A 

REGULAR PROGRAM OF PRISON VISITS. 

C. DISAPPEARANCES 

THE ARGENTINE PERMANENT ASSEMBLY ON HUMAN RIGHTS HAS 

RECORDED ELEVEN REPORTS OF DISAPPEARANCES IN CIRCUMSTANCES 

WHICH SUGGEST THAT THE VICTIM WAS PROBABLY TAKEN BY THE 

SECURITY FORCES. THERE ARE REPORTS BY HUMAN RIGHTS 

ORGANIZATIONS ASSERTING THAT SUBSTANTIALLY MORE PEOPLE 

DISAPPEARED — PERHAPS TOTALING AS MANY AS 22. MOST 

QUALIFIED OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT ALMOST ALL OF THE PEOPLE 

WHO DISAPPEARED HAD ACTIVE LINKS TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. 

SOME OF THE DISAPPEARED SEEM TO HAVE BEEN CAPTURED WHILE 

SEEKING TO ENTER THE COUNTRY, WHILE OTHERS-HAD ENTERED OR 

WERE LIVING IN THE COUNTRY CLANDESTINELY. AT THE SAME TIME, 

THERE WERE A FEW INSTANCES OF FORMER TERRORISTS WHO AFTER 

CAPTURE WERE PLACED BEFORE THE COURTS, WHEN IN THE PAST 

SUCH PEOPLE MIGHT HAVE SIMPLY DISAPPEARED. AS A RULE, 

HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT CAPTURED TERRORISTS ARE NOT 

BEING BROUGHT TO A A PROPER TRIAL BEFORE EITHER MILITARY OR 

CIVILIAN COURTS. 

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF A WIDELY PUBLICIZED ALLEGED ABDUCTION 

AND DISAPPEARANCE OF THREE ARGENTINES IN LIMA, REMAIN OBSCURE. 

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS 

CHARGE THAT ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES PARTICIPATED IN 

THE ALLEGED ABDUCTION IN PERU. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT 

HAS STATED THAT THE THREE WERE MEMBERS OF THE MONTONEROS 

BUT HAS DENIED ANY ROLE IN THEIR DISAPPEARANCE, POINTING 

TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE BODY OF ONE OF THE ALLEGED VICTIMS 

IN A MADRID APARTMENT IN CIRCUMSTANCES SUGGESTING THAT SHE 

WAS LIVING THERE AFTER HER REPORTED DISAPPEARANCE. 

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TO DATE THE AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT SOUGHT TO PROVIDE AN 

ACCOUNTING OF THE FATE OF THE PEOPLE WHO ALLEGEDLY DIS 

APPEARED IN THE PAST. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN HAVE SUGGESTED 

THAT THE BULK OF THE DISAPPEARED ARE DEAD. BASING THEIR 

CONCLUSION ON THE STATEMENTS OF FORMER DETAINEEES WHO REPORT 

THAT MOST OF THEIR FELLOWS ARE EXECUTED AS-WELL AS THE 

DEARTH OF ANY SUBSTANTIAL INFORMATION TO THE CONTRARY, MOST 

OBSERVERS HAVE ACCEPTED THAT THE GREAT BULK OF THE DIS 

APPEARED ARE INDEED DEAD. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH 

THIS WITH CERTAINTY, HOWEVER, IN THE ABSENCE OF DEFINITIVE EVIDENCE. 

D. ARBITRARY ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT. 

THE ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION, IN ARTICLE 23, ESTABLISHES 

THE POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO DETAIN AND HOLD 

PRISONERS UNDER A "STATE OF SIEGE" (WHICH HAS BEEN IN 

EFFECT SINCE 1974). THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ARE 

REFERRED TO AS THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE POWER ( PEN 

FOR THE SPANISH WORDS PODER EJECUTIVO NACIONAL). THE 

EXECUTIVE HAS INTERPRETED THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH PLACES 

NO EXPLICIT TIME LIMIT ON THE DURATION OF THE PEN 

DETENTION, AS MEANING IT CAN HOLD PRISONERS UNDER THE 

PEN POWERS INDEFINITELY. THE SUPREME COURT, OVERRULING A 

NUMBER OF LOWER COURT DECISIONS, HAS UPHELD THIS VIEW, 

ACCEPTING BRAOD AND UNSUBSTANTIATED CHARGES OF ASSOCIATION 

WITH SUBVERSION AS SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR DETENTION. SOME 

PEN PRISONERS HAVE BEEN IN JAIL WITHOUT CHARGE FOR SEVERAL 

YEARS — INCLUDING A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER DETAINED BEFORE 1976. 

IN 1980 THE GOVERNMENT REDUCED THE NUMBER OF PEN PRISONERS 

TO ABOUT 1,200, FREEING SOME, BRINGING SOME TO TRIAL, EX 

PELLING OTHERS, AND PLACING OTHERS ON SUPERVISED LIBERTY. 

APPROXIMATELY 750 PEN PRISONERS ARE BEING HELD WITHOUT 

TRIAL, SENTENCING OR AFTER SERVING SENTENCE. THE REMAINDER 

ARE EITHER IN TRIAL STATUS, OR SERVING SENTENCES AFTER 

MILITARY OR CIVILIAN TRIALS. IN ADDITION TO THE PEN 

PRISONERS, APPROXIMATELY 600 INDIVIDUALS ARE IN JAIL ON 

OTHER THAN COMMON CRIMINAL CHARGES. THUS THE TOTAL PRISON 

POPULATION OF OTHER THAN COMMON CRIMINALS IS APPROXIMATELY- 

1,800 COMPARED TO THE APPROXIMATELY 8,400 THAT WERE 

ARRESTED ON SUCH CHARGES SINCE 1974. 

A 1979 GOVERNMENT LAW SHORTENING THE PERIOD FOR COURT 

FiNDING OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH HAS ALLEVIATED SOME PERSONAL 

HARDSHIPS IN LEGAL AND FINANCIAL MATTERS FOR THE SURVIVORS 

OF THE DISAPPEARED. THE LAW DREW SHARP CRITICISM FROM 

ARGENTINE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, RELATIVES AND THE 

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, BECAUSE OF FEARS THE GOVERNMENT 

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WOULD MISUSE IT TO ARBITRARILY CLOSE THE CASES OF DIS 

APPEARANCES. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS THAT THE LAW WAS 

IN FACT ABUSED BY THE AUTHORITIES. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOW 

RESTRICTED THE TERMS OF THE LAW IN A WAY WHICH EXPLICITLY 

SHOULD EXCLUDE ITS POSSIBLE MISUSE. 

E. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL" 

THE TRIAL OF THOSE ACCUSED OF SUBVERSION OR TERRORISM 

MAY BE HELD IN CIVILIAN OR MILITARY COURT. CIVILIAN 

COURTS FOLLOW THE CUSTOMARY LEGAL PROVISIONS REGARDING 

OPEN AND FAIR TRIALS. ARGENTINA LAW, HOWEVER, REQUIRES 

WRITTEN RATHER THAN ORAL TESTIMONY, SO TEAT OPEN" HAS A 

DIFFERENT MEANING AND DIFFERENT CONSEQUENCES FROM THOSF 

IN OTHER LEGAL SYSTEMS. THE LAW PROVIDES THAT THE CIVILIAN 

COURTS ARE INDEPENDENT. MILITARY TRIBUNALS, BEFORE WHICH 

CIVILIANS MAY BE TRIED, CONDUCT THEIR PROCEEDINGS IN 

SECRET. THE DEFENDANTS HAVE ACCESS ONLY TO A MILITARY 

DEFENSE COUNSEL WHO IS USUALLY NOT A LAWYER. DEFENDANTS 

LEGALLY MAY BE KEPT UNAWARE OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM, 

IN BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PROCEEDINGS. 

ALTHOUGH USED FOR NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS, THE SYSTEM OF 

MILITARY TRIBUNALS USUALLY DOES NOT NOW DEAL 

WITH NEWLY CAPTURED TERRORISTS AND THEIR ACTIVE SUPPORTERS. 

LAWYERS HAVE GENERALLY BEEN RELUCTANT TO ASSUME THE 

CASES OF PEOPLE CHARGED WITH TERRORISM OR SUBVERSION FEAR 

ING HARASSMENT OR REPRISALS. THE NEW YORK CITY BAR 

ASSOCIATION FOLLOWING ITS VISIT TO ARGENTINA IN APRIL 

1979 CONCLUDED THAT IN 1975-1978 SOME LAWYERS DISAPPEARED 

OR WERE DETAINED IF THEY DEFENDED CLIENTS OR CAUSES UN 

POPULAR WITH THE GOVERNMENT. OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, NO 

LAWYERS DISAPPEARED OR WERE DETAINED FOR SUCH REASONS, 

AND IT APPEARS THAT THE PROFESSION IS OPERATING MORE 

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SECURELY THAN IN THE PAST. 

THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE COURTS IS ESTABLISHED IN THE 

CONSTITUTION. IN 1976 HOWEVER, THE JUNTA REPLACED ALL 

MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND REMOVED A NUMBER OF 

JUDGES IN LOWER COURTS, THOUGH MOST WERE RETAINED. SOME- 

OBSERVERS HAVE ASSERTED THAT THESE CHANGES.COUPLED WITH 

THE PRESSURES INVOLVED IN TRIALS OF SUBVERSIVES -AND 

TERRORISTS MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE COURTS TO MAINTAIN 

THEIR INDEPENDENCE. INDEED, THE COURTS HAVE OFTEN UP 

HELD EXECUTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF LAWS OF THE CONSTITUTION? 

AND THEY HAVE NOT SUCCESSFULLY CLARIFIED THE 

FATE OF ANY OF THE DISAPPEARANCES BROUGHT TO THEIR ATTEN 

TION. HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN INSTANCES WHEN THE COURTS 

SUCCESSFULLY CHALLENGED GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND INTER 

PRETATIONS OF ITS POWERS. THE MOST CELEBRATED OF THESE 

CASES TOOK PLACE IN 1979 AND INVOLVED THE SUPREME COURT 

ORDERING THE JUNTA TO RELEASE NEWSPAPER PUBLISHER JACOBO 

TIMERMAN. IN 1980 THE SUPREME COURT ORDERED THE COURTS TO 

FULLY INVESTIGATE DISAPPEARANCES WHEN THERE IS EVIDENCE 

SUGGESTING GOVERNMENT FORCES MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED. 

F. INVASION OF THE HOME. 

THE SANCTITY OF THE HOME HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN PRO 

TECTED BY ARGENTINE LAW, CUSTOM AND PRACTICE. THE SECURITY 

FORCES, HOWEVER, HAVE OFTEN VIOLATED SUCH SANCTITY DURING 

THEIR ANTI-TERRORIST AND ANTI-SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS. 

THOUGH THE NUMBER APPEARS TO HAVE DROPPED OFF SHARPLY 

DURING 1980, AVAILABLE INFORMATION SUGGESTS THAT VIOLATION 

OF THE HOME'S SANCTITY WAS EMPLOYED ON SOME OCCASIONS. 

2. GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARD THE FULFILLMENT OF SUCH 

VITAL NEEDS AS FOOD, SHELTER, HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION: 

ARGENTINA IS ONE OF THE MOST DEVELOPED OF THE NATIONS 

IN LATIN AMERICA. ITS STANDARD OF LIVING IS HIGH. IN 

1978 PER CAPITA INCOME IN CURRENT DOLLARS WAS $2,331 AND 

ARGENTINE GOVERNMENTS HAVE—WITHIN THE ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS 

OF RECENT YEARS—SOUGHT TO CONFRONT SOCIAL NEEDS. INFANT 

MORTALITY IN 1970-79 WAS 5^ PER 1,000 BIRTHS. IN 

1977 93PCT OF THE ADULT POPULATION WAS LITERATE. OFFICIAL 

UNEMPLOYMENT IN ARGENTINA WAS ONLY 2.0PCT IN 1980 BUT SOME 

OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A HIGHER LEVEL OF HIDDEN 

UNEMPLOYMENT. THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME HAS BECOME 

LESS EQUAL IN RECENT YEARS, IN PART AS A RESULT OF GOVERN 

MENT POLICIES DESIGNED TO REDUCE INFLATION AND REVITALIZE 

THE COUNTRY'S PRODUCTIVE SECTOR. TOWARD THAT END, THE 

GOVERNMENT HAS MADE AN EFFORT TO OPEN THE ECONOMY TO 

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EXTERNAL COMPETITION BY LOWERING TARIFF PROTECTION, RE 

DUCING SUBSIDIES, AND LIMITING STATE INVOLVEMENT IN THE 

ECONOMY. INFLATION, HOWEVER, IS STILL HIGH, RUNNING AT 

ABOUT 75 PCT FOR THE YEAR. 

PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND TRANSACTION IS A RIGHT OF THE 

CITIZENS. THE TAX SYSTEM IS PROGRESSIVE AND TAX COLLEC 

TIONS ARE INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE, THOUGH COMPLIANCE RE 

MAINS A PROBLEM. 

EDUCATION HAS BEEN FREE AND IS WIDELY AVAILABLE, THOUGH 

THE GOVERNMENT IS NOW MOVING TO REQUIRE TUITION FOR 

UNIVERSITY-LEVEL EDUCATION. HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS ACCOUNT 

FOR A MAJOR SHARE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET. GOVERNMENT, 

PRIVATE AND TRADE UNION MEDICAL CARE PROGRAMS MAKE TREAT 

MENT AVAILABLE AND AFFORDABLE TO MOST OF THE POPULATION. 

THERE IS A SERIOUS HOUSING DEFICIT IN ARGENTINA, MOST OF 

IT ATTRIBUTABLE TO NOW DEFUNCT LEGISLATION THAT SUSTAINED 

RENT CONTROL GUIDELINES. 

3. RESPECT FOR CIVIL AND POLITICAL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING: 

A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH, RELIGION AND ASSEMBLY 

IN 1980 THE MARGIN FOR EXERCISE OF FREEDOM OF 

SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY, PROVIDED FOR BY THE ARGENTINE CON 

STITUTION, EXPANDED SIGNIFICANTLY. IN EARLIER YEARS 

THE CLIMATE OF VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION MADE MANY 

ARGENTINES FEARFUL OF ASSERTING THESE FREEDOMS. THE 

RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY FOR POLITICAL GROUPS HAS BEEN SUSPENDED 

SINCE MARCH 1976, AND MARXIST PARTIES TO THE LEFT OF THE COMMUNISTS 

BANNED. 

THE PRESS IS NOT SUBJECT TO PRIOR OFFICIAL CENSORSHIP FOR 

POLITICAL — AS OPPOSED TO MORAL — CONTENT. GOVERNMENT 

IMPOSED GUIDELINES AND SELF-CENSORSHIP DO PLAY AN IMPORTANT 

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ROLE. NEWSPAPERS, HOWEVER, ACTIVELY CRITICIZE' THE GOVERNMENT 

AND REPORT THE REMARKS OF OPPOSITION POLITICIANS. COVERAGE 

OF SUCH SENSITIVE ISSUES AS HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DISAPPEARANCES 

INCREASED OVER THE COURSE OF 193*. MOST FOREIGN PULICATIONS ENTER 

ARGENTINA WITHOUT CENSORSHIP ALTHOUGH OCCASIONALLY SOME ISSUES 

ARE CENSORED FOR POLITICAL OR MORAL REASONS. 

THE GOVERNMENT HAS TOLERATED A LOW LEVEL OF ORGANIZED POLITICAL 

ACTIVITIES BY ESTABLISHED POLITICAL PARTIES. 

PARTY LEADERS MEET AND PUBLICLY CRITICIZE THE CONTINUATION 

OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND 

ACTIONS INCLUDING 50TH THE FCONOMIC SITUATION AND SUCH 

SENSITIVE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES AS ACCOUNTING FOR THE DIS 

APPEARED. ON OCCASION INFORMAL MEETINGS OF PARTY LEADERS 

ARE PROHIBITED OR SOMETIMES DISRUPTED BY THE POLICE AND 

THE PARTICIPANTS DETAINED, USUALLY FOP BRIEF PERIODS.' 

POLITICAL LEADERS STILL RISK ARREST IF THEY OVERSTEP THE 

UNCERTAIN AND UNDEFINED BOUNDS OF PERMITTED POLITICAL ACTIVITY 

AND STATEMENTS. 

THE ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT THE PRESIDENT 

BE A MEMBER OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, AND THF MAJORITY OF 

ARGENTINES PROFESS THIS FAITH. OTHER RELIGIONS ARE 

REQUIRED TO REGISTER WITH THE'GOVERNMENT? ALL BUT THE 

JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES ARE PERMITTED TO FUNCTION, AND 

THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL MINORITY RELIGIOUS GROUPS, INCLUD 

ING A 300,000-4=50,000 MEMBER JEWISH COMMUNITY. 

THE GOVERNMENT PUBLICLY CONDEMNS RELIGIOUS PREJUDICE. 

ARGENTINE JEWS HAVE WELL DEVELOPED COMMUNITY ORGANIZA 

TIONS, EXERCISE THEIR RELIGION WITHOUT RESTRAINTS AND 

PARTICIPATE FULLY IN ARGNNTINE ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL 

LIFE. THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS CORRECT RELATIONS WITH 

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF OFFICIAL 

ANTI-SEMITIC POLICY. DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE "DIRTY 

WAR" THERE WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS OF ANTI-SEMITIC BEHAVIOR 

IN THE SECURITY FORCES. VIRULENT ANTI-SEMITIC LITERATURE 

REMAINS ON SALE IN THE COUNTRY. IN 1980, SEVERAL JEWISH 

SCHOOLS WERE BOMBED IN JULY AND AUGUST AND MORE RECEIVED ■ 

ANONYMOUS THREATS. THOUGH THE CULPRITS WERE NEVER FOUND, 

IN THE FACE OF THESE ATTACKES THE GOVERNMENT SOUGHT TO REASSURE 

ARGENTINE JEWS. 

THE GOVERNMENT HAS RESFUSED TO PERMIT THE LEGAL REGISTRATION 

OF THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES WHO NUMBER APPROXIMATELY 

30,000 IN ARGENTINA. THEIR PROPERTIES AND MEETING 

PLACES HAVE BEEN CLOSED, AND WITNESS CHILDREN HAVE BEEN 

EXPELLED FROM PROVINCIAL SCHOOL SYSTEMS FOR REFUSING TO 

SALUTE THE FLAG AND SING THE NATIONAL ANTHEM. THE 

SUPREME COURT HAS NOW RULED IN TWO CASES THAT PRIMARY SCHOOL 

CHILDREN'SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO SCHOOL. 

SEVERAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, UNITING ACTIVISTS 

AND RELATIVES OF THE DISAPPEARED, HAVE PLAYED A SIGNIGICANT' 

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ROLE IN ARGENTINA OVER THE PAST SEVERE TEARS. SOME 

LEADERS OF THESE GROUPS WERE SEVERELT HARASSED AND 

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THREATENED IN THE PAST AND SEVERAL ACTIVISTS DISAPPEARED. 

IN 1980 IT APPEARED THAT THE ORGANIZATIONS WERE OPERATING 

IN A CLIMATE OF ENHANCED SECURITY THROUGH THERE CONTINUED 

TO BE OCCASIONAL HARASSMENT. 

B. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, FOREIGN 

TRAVEL AND EMIGRATION. 

THE ARGENTINES ARE FREE TO TRAVEL WITHOUT RESTRICTION 

WITHIN THE COUNTRY AND TO LEAVE WITHOUT RESTRICTION. THEY 

ARE FREE TO EMIGRATE. THE ARGENTINE CONSTITUTION PERMITS 

PERSONS HELD UNDER EXECUTIVE DETENTION (PEN) TO CHOOSE 

SELF-EXILE. EXERCISE OF THE "RIGHT OF OPTION" WAS 

DENIED BY THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT UNTIL 1978 AND IS STILL 

RESTRICTED THROUGH THE USE OF AN EXTENSIVE SCREENING 

PROCESS FOR ALL APPLICANTS. MANY APPLICATIONS WERE DENIED 

DURING 1980, EVEN THOUGH TEF APPLICANTS HELD DOCUMENTS 

AUTHORIZING THEM TO ENTER OTHER COUNTRIES. 

ARGENTINA HAS ACCEPTED ABOUT 300 INDOCHINESE REFUGEES. 

THE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM HAS GONE REASONABLY WELL FOR 

MOST OF THESE. SOME, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN VERY DISCONTENT, 

PARTICULARLY ABOUT JOB CONDITIONS AND HAVE SOUGHT TO 

LEAVE THE COUNTRY. ARGENTINA HAS ALSO ACCEPTED 11 CUBAN 

REFUGEES. TWO PEOPLE WHO REPORTEDLY DISAPPEARED IN 1980 

WERE PARAGUAYAN COMMUNISTS LIVING AS REFUGEES IN ARGENTINA. 

MARRIED WOMEN LIVING IN ARGENTINA MUST RAVE THE PERMIS 

SION OF THEIR HUSBANDS TO TRAVEL ABROAD WITH THE CHILDREN 

IF THE HUSBAND IS NOT ACCOMPANYING THEM. 

C. FREEDOM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS. 

MOST ELEMENTS OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS REMAINED 

LEGALLY SUSPENDED IN 1980. TEE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION 

IS TO RETURN THE NATION TO FULL DEMOCRACY BUT IT HAS NOT 

ESTABLISHED A TIMETABLE FOR REALIZING TEAT GOAL. AS 

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PART OF THE PROCESS OE REDEMOCRATIZATION OTHE GOVERNMENT 

IN LATE 1979 PROMULGATED A "POLITICAL PLAN” CONTAINING 

VERY BROAD GUIDELINES FOR THE EVENTUAL RETURN OF TEG 

COUNTRY TO CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. IN 1980, UNDER THE 

LEADERSHIP OF THE MINISTER OF TH£ INTERIOR, THE GOVERN 

MENT BEGAN A "DIALOGUE" WITH MANT OF THE NATION'S POLI 

TICAL LEADERS. THE STATED PURPOSE OF THE DIALOGUE WAS 

TO DEVELP IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION FOR THE POLITICAL 

PLAN. AS OF SEPTEMBER 1980 THIS IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 

HAD NOT EMERGED AND THE DIALOGUE WITH POLITICAL LEADERS 

CONTINUES. IN THE MEANTIME, THE JUNTA DESIGNATED AN 

OTHER MILITARY PRESIDENT TO SERVE UNTIL MARCH 1934. 

PROFESSIONAL POLITICIANS DURING THE YEAR PUBLICLY CON 

DEMNED THE EXCLUSION OF TEE PUBLIC FROM PRESIDENTIAL 

SELECTION PROCESS• 

ARGENTINE WOMEN ENJOY EQUAL JURIDICAL STATUS WITH MEN. 

WOMEN'S RIGHTS ARE NOT A CONTENTIOUS ISSUE IN ARGENTINA, 

AS JOBS AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES, ALONG WITH 

SUPPORT SYSTEMS THAT FACILITATE THE SIMULTANEIOUS HANDLING 

OF JOB AND FAMILY, ARE READILY AVAILABLE. SEX DISCRIMINATION 

IS PROHIBITED IN EDUCATION, POLITICS AND EMPLOYMENT. 

TRADITION AND SOCIAL CUSTOMS STILL DICTATE THAT A WOMEN'S 

PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY IS TO HUSBAND AND HOME AND LIMITS 

WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WORE FORCE. 

THE GOVERNMENT HAS INTERVIEWED MAJOR TRADE UNIONS, REPLAC 

ING HIGH LEVEL UNION OFFICIALS WITH MILITARY PERSONNEL, 

AND STRIKES HAVE BEEN PROHIBITED. IN 1976,.AND AGAIN IN 

MID-1979, THE GOVERNMENT DETAINED A NUMBER'OF IMPORTANT 

LABOR LEADERS (ALMOST ALL HAVE SINCE BEEN RELEASED). 

STRIKES FOR WAGE INCREASES HAVE NEVERTHELESS OCCURRED AND 

NEARLY ALL HAVE BEEN SETTLED WITHOUT VIOLENCE. IN LATE 

1979, AFTER MORE THAN THREE YEARS OF STUDY, THE GOVERN 

MENT ISSUED A NEW TRADE UNION LAW WHICH SETS THE GUIDE 

LINES FOR TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION AND LAYS THE GROUNDWORK 

FOR LIFTING THE SUSPENSION OF UNION ACTIVITIES WHICH HAS 

BEEN IN EFFECT SINCE TEE ARMED FORCES TOOK POWER IN 

1976. IT IS NOT CLEAR WEEN THE GOVERNMENT WILL LIFT 

THE SUSPENSION OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND TO BARGAIN 

COLLECTIVELY. FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S POINT OF VIEW, THE 

NEW LAW IS DESIGNED TO INTRODUCE MORE GRASS ROOTS DEMO 

CRACY AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION FOR THE WORKERS THAN 

EXISTED IN THE PASTJ LABOR LEADERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, 

SEE IT AS AN EMASCULATION OF UNION POWER, AS IT PROSCRIBES 

ALL POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND GREATLY RESTRICTS CONTROL OVER ' 

SOCIAL FUNDS. THE PROCEDURAL STEPS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION 

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OF THE NEW LAW WILL NOT BE CLARIFIED UNTIL THE MINISTRY 

OF LABOR ISSUES DETAILED REGULATIONS, WHICH MAY TAKE UP 

TO ANOTHER 120 DAYS TO BE DRAFTED. THE ICFTU CONDEMNED 

THE LAW AS A VIOLATION OF UNION RIGHTS. 

ALTHOUGH ENJOYING NO OFFICIALS STANDING OR RECOGNITION BY 

THE GOVERNMENT, SEVERAL LABOR GROUPINGS ARE ACTIVE IN MAYING 

THEIR VIEWS KNOWN. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY OPPOSE THE 

GOVERNMENT'S TRADE UNION LAW ON GROUNDS THAT IT RESTRICTS 

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AS DEFINED 

IN CONVENTIONS 87 AND 98 OF THE INTERNATIONAL BABOR ORGANIZA 

TION AS RATIFIED BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. THEY ALSO 

OPPOSE THENEW LAW'S PROHIBITION AGAINST POLITICAL ACTION 

BY TRADE UNIONS. 

4. GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE AND RECORD REGARDING INTERNATIONAL 

AND NONGOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS 

OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 

IN LATE 1978, THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT INVITED THE 

INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (IAHRC) TO VISIT 

ARGENTINA. THAT VISIT TOOK PLACE FROM SEPTEMBER 6 TO 20, 

1979. THE COMMISSION MET WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA AND OTHER 

HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS, POLITICAL 

AND LABOR OFFICIALS, TOOK TESTIMONY FROM FAMILY MEMBERS 

OF DISAPPEARED PERSONS AND FROM FORMER PRISONERS AND 

VISITED SEVERAL PRISONS AND DETENTION CENTERS. THE IAHRC 

RECORDED A PAST PATTERN OF WIDE SCALE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, 

INCLUDING VIOLATIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT RE THE RIGHT TO 

LIFE, TO PERSONAL SECURITY, TO PERSONAL LIBERTY, TO DUE 

PROCESS, TO FREEDOM OF OPINION, EXPRESSION AND ASSOCIATION, 

THE IAHRC ALSO OBSERVED, HOWEVER, THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION 

OF THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES, FREEDOM OF RELIGION PREVAILS ’ 

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IN ARGENTINA.' IT REPORTED THAT THERE IS NO OFFICIALS POLICT 

OF ANTI-SEMITISM, THOUGH IN SOME INSTANCES JEWS HAVE BEEN 

THE SUBJECT OF DISCRIMINATION. THE IAHRC FORMULATED A 

SERIES OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT FOR 

CORRECTING THE ABUSES IT HAD OBSERVED. THESE RECOMMENDATIONS 

INCLUDED AN OFFICIAL ACCOUNTING FOR THE DISAPPEARED? 

EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF HABEAS CORPUS 'PROCEDURES? 

RELEASE OR TRIAL OF THOSE BEING HELD UNDER PEN? IMPROVE 

MENT IN PRISON CONDITIONS? ESTABLISHMENT OF DUE PROCESS? 

ALLOWING THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES TO EXERCISE FREELY 

THEIR RELIGION AND TO INVESTIGATE AND PUNISH DISCRIMINATION 

AGAINST JEWS? AND TO ASSURE SECURITY AND FREEDOM FOR 

HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS. 

ARGENTINA HAS NOT SIGNED THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 

RIGHTS. 

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS MAINTAINS 

AN ACTIVE PROGRAM IN ARGENTINA, WITH REGULAR PRISON 

VISITS. 

END TEXT. 

RUSER 

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

#34- 

Washington, D.C. 20520 

BUREAU OF HUMAN RIGHTS 

AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS 

January JO 19 80 

MEMORANDUM 

TO: 

FROM: 

Dr. Lincoln Bloomfield 

Patricia Deria 

■ j 

I 

I* 

I 

I 

SUBJECT: 

Human Rights Country Report 

Attached is the completed Human Rights report on: 

AOtr&UT/AJfl 

The report is mainly based on extensive reporting from 

our mission abroad, research and analysis in the Department 

of State and review of current non-governmental organizations' 

statements, such as Amnesty International. The report is 

prepared according to a standard format and guidelines. 

The report has been approved in the Department of State 

by the appropriate geographic bureau, the Bureau of 

Intelligence and Research, the Policy Planning Staff, the 

Office of the Legal Advisor, the Office of Congressional 

Relations, and the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian 

Affairs and thr TTfffiiiin ur n'll rijjTrlj niiTr-n^-rir 

If 

appropriate, it has also been cleared by AID. 

The report is not to be shown to, or discussed with 

representatives of any foreign government. This not only 

applies to this report, but to reports on other countries. 

As you know, all such reports are by statute required 

to be submitted by the Secretary of State to the Congress by 

January 31, 1980. The Department is providing this 

completed report to you for your information. Should you 

notice any factual errors, please, let me know directly 

within three days. 

This report has been cleared by the Secretary of State 

personally.

■This wor+ has betr* e^Vtrfe* 

bo, T»»« See. of 

ARGENTINA 

ibrseiî ■ jftR 

Over the*past twenty-five years Argentina has passed 

through several cycles of alternating civilian and 

military rule; since 1755/ there have been six military 

and six civilian presidents. Beginning in 1969, violence 

mounted progressively from the -left and the right 

as groups with widely different political objectives 

and conceptions struggled far power. As a result, 

both civilian and military governments have maintained 

-a "state of siege" for some nine of the past ten years. - 

At the height of this violence in 1975-1976, terrorism 

had taken on' broad dimensions: bombings, 'robberies, 

kidnappings and ‘assassinations for political reasons 

were common occurrences. Organized terrorist groups 

on both- sides, of the political spectrum numbered some 

5,000-6,000 persons, with sympathizers estimated at 

an additional 15,000. 

By 1976 the situation in_Argentina had deteriorated sharply. 

Courts and political leaders were being’intimidated;- 

inflation approached 800 per cent; and many, essential 

public services had been disrupted. At- this point, 

the Armed Forces again took control df the state, 

with the avowed goals of promoting economic recovery 

and ending terrorism and corruption. They promised 

that democracy would ultimately be restored. The ' 

Armed Forces maintained the state-qf siege imposed 

in 1974 by President Maria Estela Peron, closed Congress, 

deposed the President, and replaced all members of 

the Supreme Court. Elected state and local governmental 

officials were replaced by military officers, and 

political party activities, including the right of 

assembly, were prohibited. Most trade unions were 

intervened.and all strikes were banned. 

The security forces embarked on a widespread countercampaign 

of violence aimed>at terrorists as well as 

elements of the society they considered subversive; 

many known or suspected terrorists, as well as many 

persons with no subversive record, disappeared. Many 

others were detained by the Executive without any 

specific charge under the "state of siege" powers 

of the Constitution. 

The most carefully recorded and documented list of 

unexplained disappearances, compiled by the Permanent 

Assembly for Human Rights- in Buenos Aires, contains 

about 6,5G0 cases for the period 1976 to 1979. Some . 

estimates, however, run considerably higher. The 

Mission of the New York.City Bar Association, which 

visited Argentina in 1979, considers a figure of 10,000 

as more accurate, while Amnesty International asserts 

that 15-20,000 persons have disappeared. There is 

substantial evidence that most af these persons were 

abducted by the security forces and interrogated under 

torture; as most have not reappeared, many observers 

believe that they were summarily executed. There 

have been reports, difficult to verify, that some 

missing persons have been seen alive in detention 

centers. 

9 

As regards use of the Argentine Executive's "stateof-siege” 

detention powers; some 8,200 persons have 

been arrested under these provisions since 1974, both 

by the present Government and its predecessor. While 

many of those so detained have been released, others 

a ^ • 1 4 • t £ ^ u •• j m i C n v *j s ^ C T « k Vi q •» J ay

of the Executive, the Argentine constitution places 

no specific time limit on detention under the "state 

of siege". Several courts (first-instance and appellate) 

held -.that such prolonged detention is in essence an 

imposition of punishment without due process, and 

hence unconstitutional. The Supreme Court! however, 

has overruled these lower court-decisions and upheld 

the Executive's position. 

Conditions of detention were often cruel, and serious 

problems of mistreatment, overcrowding, and insufficient 

medical care often existed. . Although the Government 

asserts that torture was never, authorized, there is 

extensive evidence that torture was routinely used 

during interrogation by the security forces. _____ 

Beginning in early 1978, Government spokesmen declared 

the war on terrorism to have been won. Conceding 

that excesses had been committed, the national authorities, 

through a variety of directives and personnel transfers, 

have sought to tighten control over the operations 

of the security forces. At the invitation of the 

Argentine Government, the Inter-American Human Rights 

Commission visited Argentina in September 1979 to 

investigate human rights abuses. The Commission interviewed 

many government, human rights, religious, political 

and labor officials, and had access to several prisons and 

detention centers. A mission of the New York City 

Bar Association was also permitted to visit Argentina 

in 1979. 

Since late 1978, the incidence of disappearances has 

declined significantly. They numbered' many thousands 

in both 1976 and 1977, and over 500 in 1978; since 

then such occurrences have been sharply reduced. 

In 1979 there were 44 known disappearances, most of 

which occurred in the first half of the year. There 

are indications that the Government has committed 

itself to end this practice. 

The number of prisoners held without charge under 

the Executive's "state-of-siege" has been reduced 

substantially; about 1,300 remained in late 1979. 

The Government has released large numbers of these 

detainees. An estimated 1,000 others have been tried 

and convicted and are still serving prison terms. 

About 500 more are currently on trial. A review board 

is working actively on cases of the remaining prisoners. 

A presidential decree in April regularizing prison 

rules led to significant improvements in many prison 

facilities. 

Terrorist activities in Argentina have largely ceased. 

There are reports that small numbers of terrorists 

are being trained in third countries and are returning 

to Argentina. In three separate instances, terrorists 

attempted to murder high officials in late 1979. 

The GOA has declared that the incidents of the past 

year are isolated events which do not signal a major 

resurgence of terrorism. 

Political party activity continues to be prohibited 

and labor unions remain narrowly circumscribed; Government 

1 * -i ■' i. r\£ avnrpeq' nr , Cqt*B t-

The law has been criticized by Argentine and international 

labor organizations as a Government.attempt to curtail 

organized labor's political and economic power. 

In late 1979, the Government promulgated a "political 

plan" containing broad guidelines for an eventual 

return to civilian rule and a promise to develop specific 

proposals in 1980, following a dialogue between military 

leaders and diverse civilian.groups. 

Argentine human rights groups are active and well 

organized, although their leadership has been subject 

to severe harassment and arrest. 

1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including 

Freedom from: 

a. Torture 

There is extensive evidence, primarily the statements 

of former detainees, that torture has been routinely 

used by the security forces. It has been most frequent 

during the first days of interrogation and, according 

to numerous reports, has taken such forms as the use 

of electric shock, immersion of the head in water, 

mock executions,'and other types of severe physical 

and psychological abuse. There are also credible 

allegations that such practices continued in 1979, 

with new detainees. The national Government has publicly 

stated that it has never authorized the use of torture. 

b. Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 

or Punishment 

There is an extensive body of evidence indicating 

that summary execution was a common practice during 

the years when large numbers of people were being 

detained by the security forces. 

Before early 1979, conditions of imprisonment were 

poor, and medical services rudimentary. In April 

1979, the government decreed uniform prison regulations 

which have led to a general improvement in prison 

conditions. There are some reports of continued abuse, 

but in general over-crowding has been reduced, medical 

care is better, and visits by family and legal counsel 

assured, as is the receipt of educational and.writing 

material. The International Committee of the Red 

Cross maintains a regular program of prison visits. 

c. Arbitrary Arrest and Imprisonment 

The Argentine Constitution, in Article 23, establishes 

the power of the Executive Branch to detain and hold 

prisoners under a "state of siege" (which has been 

in effect since 1974). The constitutional provisions 

are referred to as the National Executive Power ("PEN" 

for the Spanish words Poder Ejecutivo Nacional). 

The Executive-has interpreted the Constitution, which 

places no explicit time limit on the duration of the 

PEN'detention, as meaning it can hold prisoners under 

the PEN powers indefinitely. The Supreme Court*, 

overruling a number of lower court decisions, has 

upheld this view, accepting broad and unsubstantiated 

charges of association with subversion as sufficient 

grounds for detention. Some PEN prisoners have been 

in jail without charge for several years — including

a significant number detained before 197S. 

Since January 1, 1979, 44 persons, who have not since 

been located, have disappeared under- circumstances 

suggesting that they were taken by security forces; 

most of these disappearances occurred in the first 

half 'of the year. There have also been charges that 

persons are being held clandestinely by the security 

forces. While there is no evidence that large numbers 

of persons are thus being held, hopes have been nourished 

by the experience of some prisoners who "disappeared", 

were presumed to be dead, and later — in some cases 

months or years later — reappeared as officially 

acknowledged prisoners held under the "FEN". Reports 

of the existence of clandestine camps have diminished 

in the last several months! 

In September 1979 the Government approved a law shortening 

the period required for a court finding of presumptive 

death; it gives the Government as well as relatives 

the right to initiate proceedings. The law has alleviated 

some personal hardships in legal and financial matters; 

however, it has drawn sharp criticism from Argentine 

human rights organizations, relatives, and the European 

Parliament because they feared the Government would 

use the law-to arbitrarily close the cases of the 

disappeared. 

In 1979 the Government reduced the number of prisoners 

being held under the "PEN” from 3,400 to about 1,300, 

freeing some, bringing some to trial, expelling others 

and alloving still others to leave the country. Perhaps 

another 1,000 are serving sentences after trial and 

conviction on charges of terrorism, or "subversive” 

'political activity or associations. About 500 more 

are still in trial status. 

d. Denial of Fair Public Trial 

The trial of those accused 6f subversion or terrorism 

may be held in civilian or military court. Civilian 

courts follow the customary legal provisions regarding 

open and fair trials. Argentine law, however, requires 

written rather' than oral testimony, so that "open" 

has a different meaning and different consequences 

from those in other legal systems. The lav provides 

that the civilian courts are independent, but the 

pressures accompanying trials involving subversion 

and terrorism make it difficult for the courts to 

maintain independence. Military tribunals, before 

which civilians may be tried, conduct their proceedings 

in secret. The defendants have access only to a military 

defense counsel who is usually not a lawyer. Defendants 

legally may be kept unaware of the evidence against 

them, in both military and civilian proceedings. 

An adequate defense in cases of terrorism or subversion 

is also difficult to ensure because many attorneys 

are reluctant to assume cases of this nature for fear 

of harassment and reprisals. The New York City Bar 

Association, in its report on the visit of its mission 

of lawyers to Argentina, concludes that some lawyers 

disappeared or were detained as the result of defending 

clients and causes unpopular with the Government, 

resulting in the intimidation of other lawyers. 

While the courts are constitutionally independent, 

in 1976 the Junta replaced all members of the Supreme

Court; it also removed a number of judges in lower 

courts, though most judges were retained. The courts 

have often upheld Executive interpretations of laws 

and the Constitution. However, there have been instances, 

when the courts challenged Government actions and 

interpretations of its powers. The most celebrated 

of these cases revolved around detained newpaper publisher 

Jacobo Timerman — who was ordered released by the 

Supreme Court in an opinion the Junta upheld despite 

the reported objection of some members of the military. * 

The Bar Association's report also highlights other 

problems associated with the lack of due process, 

but does state that "the ingredients for progress 

are present" in Argentina. In its report the Association 

cited the decline in abductions, the Government's 

commitment to expand procedural safeguards, and certain 

Supreme Court efforts to exert pressure in the direction 

of due process. The report recommends the removal 

of all detainees from executive detention, new trials 

for those convicted in military courts, an accounting 

for the disappeared, the termination of restrictions 

on the exercise of the right -of option (see Section 

3b) and the reestablishment of the rule of lav and 

constitutional guarantees. * 

e. Invasion of the Home 

The sanctity of the home has traditionally been protected 

by Argentine law, custom and practice. The security 

forces, however, have often violated such sanctity 

during their anti-terrorist and anti-subversive operations. 

Though the number of intrusions dropped off during 

1979, information available suggests that violations 

of the home's sanctity in the form of raids and unauthorized 

searches remains a practice of these forces. 

2. Government Policies Toward the Fulfillment of 

Such Vital Needs as Food, Shelter, Health Care and 

Education: 

Argentina is one of the most advanced of the newly 

industrialized nations. Indices of Argentina's 

standard of living are high. In 1978 per capita income 

in current dollars was $2,331 and Argentine governments 

have — within the economic constraints of recent 

years — sought to confront social needs. 

Unemployment in Argentina was only 1.8 percent in 

1978; the distribution of income has become less equal 

in recent years, in part as a result of government 

policies designed to reduce inflation and revitalize 

the country's productive sector. Toward that end, 

the Government has made an effort to open the economy 

to external competition by lowering tariff protection, 

reducing subsidies, and limiting state involvement 

in the economy. Inflation, however, is still high, 

running at about 160 percent for the year. 

* 

^The tax system is progressive and tax collections 

•'are increasingly effective, though compliance remains 

a problem. 

Education has been free and is widely available, although 

the Government is now moving to requ-ire tuition for 

university-level education. Illiteracy is virtually

private* and trade union medical care programs 

make treatment available and affordable to most of 

the population. 

There is a serious housing deficit in Argentina* much 

of it-attributable to now defunct legislation that 

sustained rent control guidelines. Corruption in 

the public sector has declined significantly under 

the current government. 

3. Respect for Civil and Political Liberties, Including: 

a. Freedom of Speech, Religion, and Assembly 

The Argentine Constitution provides for these freedoms, 

but under both civilian and- military governments they 

have been circumscribed since the imposition of the 

”state of siege" in November 1974. The climate of 

violence and repression in Argentina in recent years 

has made many Argentines fearful of exercising freedom 

of speech. 

Since 1976 the Government has intervened or confiscated 

a number of newspapers, notably La Opinion, edited 

by Jacobo Timerman. Journalists have been among the 

Argentines who "disappeared". Although the press 

is not subject to prior official censorship, Governmentimposed 

guidelines result in self-censorship. Newspapers 

have, however, actively criticized the Government 

on economic policy and have discussed political issues 

including, especially in recent months, human rights. 

Most foreign publications enter Argentina without 

censorship although occasionally some issues are censored 

for political and sexual content. 

The Argentine Constitution requires that the President 

be a member of the Catholic Church, and the majority 

of Argentines profess this faith. Other religions 

are required to register with the Government; all 

but one are permitted to function, and there are substantial 

minority religious groups, including a 450,000 member 

Jewish community. There are credible reports of- anti- 

Semitic attitudes and behaviour in the security forces, 

but the Government publicy condemns religious prejudice 

and maintains officially correct relations with the 

organized Jewish community. The Government has refused 

to permit the legal registration of the Jehovah's 

Witnesses who number approximately 30,000 in Argentina. 

Their properties and meeting places have been closed, 

and Witness children have been expelled from provincial 

school systems for refusing to salute the flag and 

sing the national anthem. Although the Supreme Court 

has now ruled in one case that primary school children . 

should be allowed to return to school, the Witnesses 

still report instances at the local level where children 

are expelled from school for failure to respect national 

symbols. 

Several human rights organizations, uniting activists 

and relatives of the disappeared, have played a significant 

role in Argentina over the past several years. Some 

leaders of these groups were harassed and threatened 

during 1979, and a police raid on the headquarters 

of three of the organizations in August raised questions 

about the future. The police action was ordered by 

a federal judge. The files of the organizations seized 

during the raids had not been returned to them by

December, when this report was prepared. The "Mothers 

of the Plaza de Mayo" — relatives of disappeared 

persons — who used to assemble in front of the Ministry 

of the Interior in the Plaza de Mayo, were forcibly 

prevented from using the Plaza late in 1978 and early 

1979 ;and were not permitted to return in 1979. Some 

of the "Mothers" themselves disappeared, including 

at least one during 1979. 

b. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign 

Travel and Emigration 

Argentines are free to travel without restriction 

within the country and to leave without restriction. 

They are free to emigrate. The Argentine Constitution 

permits persons held under executive detention (PEN) 

to choose self-exile. Exercise of this "right of 

option" was denied by the current government until 

1978 and is still restricted through the use of an 

extensive screening process for all applicants. Many 

applications were denied during 1979, even though 

the applicants held documents authorizing them to ' 

enter other countries. 

c. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process 

After the March 1976 coup d’etat, the Government restricted 

or suspended most elements of the democratic political 

process. It has expressed its intention of moving 

the country back toward normal constitutional, democratic 

processes but has not established a timetable for 

reaching this goal. In December 1979, the Government 

promulgated a "political plan" containing broad guidelines 

and a commitment for an eventual return to civilian 

government. The plan promises implementing legislation 

in the second half of 1980 following a dialogue between 

military leaders and diverse civilian groups. 

The right of assembly for pblitical groups has been 

suspended since March of 1976, but the Government 

has tolerated a law level of organized political activity 

by established political parties. Party leaders meet, 

spokesmen criticize a variety of government policies 

and actions, and proclamations are Issued in .the names 

of specific parties. Some informal meetings of party 

leaders have, however, been disrupted by the police, 

and the leaders detained for brief periods. 

c. 

Argentine women enjoy equal juridical status with 

men. Women's rights are not a contentious issue in 

Argentina, as jobs and educational opportunities, 

along with support systems that facilitate the simultaneous 

handling of job and family, are readily available. 

Sex discrimination is prohibited in education, politics 

and employment. Tradition and social customs still 

dictate that a woman's primary responsibility is to 

husband and home and limits women's participation 

in the work force. 

The government has intervened major trade unions, 

replacing high level union officials with military 

personnel, and strikes have been prohibited. In 1976, 

and again in mid-1979, the Government detained & number 

of important labor leaders (almost all have since 

been released). Strikes for wage increases have nevertheless 

occurred and nearly all have been settled without 

violence. On November 15, after more than three years 

of study, the Government issued a new Trade Union

lav which sets the guidelines for Trade Onion organization 

and lays the groundwork for lifting the suspension 

of union activities which has been in effect since 

the Armed Forces took power in 1976. It is not clear 

when the Government will lift the suspension of the 

right to strike and to bargain collectively. From 

the Government's point of view, the new law is designed 

to introduce mare grass roots democracy and freedom 

of association for the workers than existed in the 

past; labor leaders, on the other hand, see it as 

an emasculation of union power, as it proscribes all 

political activity and greatly restricts control over 

social funds. The procedural steps for the implemention 

of the new law will not be clarified until the Ministry 

of Labor issues detailed regulations, which may take 

up to another 120 days to be drafted. The XCFTU has 

condemned the law as a violation' of union rights. 

In September 1979, two major groups of union leaders 

merged to form the United Leadership of Argentine 

Workers (CUTA), a provisional committee which purparts 

to speak in the name of the organized Argentine trade 

union movement in the absence of an officially functioning 

national central body. Although enjoying no official 

standing or recognition by the Government, CUTA is 

active in making its views known. For example, CUTA 

opposes the recent trade union lav on grounds that 

it restricts freedom of association and the right 

to organize as defined in conventions 87 and 98 of 

the International Labor Organization as ratified by 

the'Argentine Government. It also opposes the new 

lav's prohibition against political action by trade 

unions. 

4. Government Attitude and Record Regarding International 

and Won-governmental Investigation of Alleged Violations 

of Human R-ights: 

In late 1978, the Argentine Government invited the 

Inter-American Human Right's Commission to visit Argentina. 

That visit took place from September 6 to 20, 1979. 

The Commission met with President Videla and other 

high-level government, human rights, religious, political, 

and labor officials, took testimony from family members 

of disappeared persons and from former' prisoners, 

and visited several prisons and detention centers. 

The Commission vill submit its formal report to the 

OAS in 1980. Argentina has not signed the American 

Convention on Human Rights. 

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 

maintains an active program in Argentina, with government 

approval, on behalf of imprisoned persons. The ICRC 

also monitors prison -conditions. The Government has 

usually received and facilitated the efforts of various 

groups and individuals seeking to investigate allegations 

of human rights abuse. ___ ____

\ 

7906540 


n c kis’o 

2Z/6 

April 10, 1979 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 

THE WHITE HOUSE 

Subject: Letter to the President from Mrs. Rische 

M. Timerman 

Mrs. Rische M. Timerman, the wife of a prominent 

Argentine publisher who has been the victim of human 

rights abuse by the GOA, has written to President 

Carter to express her deep appreciation for the President's 

efforts on behalf of her husband. The letter, 

which was delivered to our Embassy in Israel where 

she resides, also expresses appreciation for Ambassador 

Castro's work on this case and Mrs- Timerman's hope 

that these efforts will lead to her husband's release. 

The GOA has recently reconsidered Timerman's case 

and the Junta has discussed whether he might now be 

released. While this review was underway the Argentine 

Foreign Ministry asked our Embassy in Buenos Aires what 

our quid pro quo might be for Timerman's release. The 

Embassy offered no specific suggestions and reiterated 

our position that Timerman should be released on the 

merits of his case. In his most recent discussion of 

the Timerman case with Army Commander Viola, Ambassador 

Castro again urged that Timerman be released. General 

Viola told him that this is not likely to take place in 

the immediate future. 

We recommend that the President sign the attached 

reply to Mrs. Timerman. 

Peter Tarnoff 

Executive Secretary 

Attachments: 

1. Suggested reply 

2. Letter from Mrs. Rische M. Timerman to President 

Carter 

1 1 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O.13526 

C'f'-irruij 

~U'^ 

GDS -4/6/85 

f:a_I£______Date

""F I —B—it—*4 T'"I 8 T*** + ***E cnPY 

jP IMMiO 

lie kJF-.C #2832 3071651 

u1 031643Z i■ V 77 

Fm S L: C .> T A T . WaS-DC 

Id AM-MliASSY BU’-NOS AlRrS IMHFUIaTE 8694 

C il N P I ) - N T I A L 

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE state 262832 

t.u. 11652: GDS 

TAGS: P'o AR 

SUBJECT: LETTER TO PRESIDENT VI DEL A FROM PRESIDENT CARTF.R 

1. PLtASc PASS FOLLOWING TEXT TO PRESIDENT VIPELA ASAP. 

BEGIN 9U0TE: OE'R MR. PRESIDENT:' LET ME SAY AGAIN HOW 

PLEASED I WAS Tr. MEET WITH YOU DURING YUUR VISIT TO WASH 

INGTON FOR THt SIGNING OF THE NEW PANAMA CANAL TREATIES. 

OUR CO'nV-RSATIMn GAVE MF A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF YOUR 

CDnCERhS AND THOSE OF THE argentine PEOPLE* WITH WHOM WE 

*ISH TO HAVE THf- BEST OF RELATIONS. 

2. I WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY YOUR COMMENT THAT WE 

BOTH HAD THE SAHE ITEMS ON OUR AGENDA — HUMA'N RIGHTS AND 

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION — AND THAI YOU SAW OPPORTUNITY FOR 

PROGRESS On BuTh. I SHARE THE SAME HOPES. 

3. W: BrirH rfFrOGNIZE THAT ARGENTINA IS FREOUtNTLY 

CHARGED WITH S=;IOUS VIOLATIONS nF HUMAN RIGHTS. YOU WERE 

CERTAINLY CORRECT IM STATING THAT TERRORISTS HAVE SOUGHT 

TO ISOLATE ARGENTINA IN THEIR PROPAGANDA. HOWEVER* I AM 

CuriF I Or NT THaT SUCH PROPAGANDA WILL LOSE ITS FORCE IN THF 

court of international opinion as your government 

DEMijNST-JaT'.-S PR iGRESS I\ HUMAN RIGHTS. AND I CAN ASSURE 

YijU TH/ i THF united STATFS WILL ALWAYS BE READY TO 

ACKNOWLtOG: SUCH IMPROVEMENTS• 

4. I wAS ALSO PL:-ASED tij WtAR THAT YOU WOULD NOT ORJECT 

♦ ♦♦♦♦♦♦♦♦ + *♦*♦ * Ji»*fFrs r c ctwsf nt ** + *♦♦♦**■“**♦* 

BAP TH I HD VP P^TOR Tl)C• * 

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/17 :10 Z OTG:03164BZ NOV 77 

N I I TT>******E COPY

***+**%r n r.--F—i—4 

V: copy 

-NHFr 

L- VISITS 3Y HU AN RIGHTS S P-C 11L I STS FROM RFSPF.CTEf. 

1 NT:: RNAT I U*'.AL IK GAN I Z AT I r*NS . SUCH VISITS WILL PE AN 

IMPORTANT Yeans uF EDUCATING INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION 

UN IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA. 

P. In THIS REGARD, LET ME KENT 1 ON THE VERY IMPORTANT 

RULE PLAYEu 3Y .-UN-GOVERNMFNTaL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGAN I Z AT IHNS, 

AMO MY H H PTHAT TH~Y WILL CONTINUE TO CONTk I BUT t Tn THF 

ADVANCEMENT OF nUMAN RIGHTS AND MY FIRM RELIEF THAT THEY 

SHOULD Ri-TMN lutlR CONSULT AT IV- STATUS AT THE UNITED 

NAT IONS. 

5. I WELCOME YOUR EXPRESS IUN nF HOPE THAT THL DETAINEE 

PROBLEM MIGHT 8'- RtSiJLVÔ BY CHRISTMAS THIS YEAR. A5 I 

IGLD YJU, THERE IS GREAT INTEREST AND CONCERN IN THF 

UNITED STATES OVER THE RATE OF PEOPLE DETAINED IN ARGENTINA 

UNDER THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE PUWFR. THE CLARIFICATION OF 

THEIR STATUS WQi.'LD BE WELL RECEIVED, I BELIEVE* THROUGHOUT 

THE INTERNET ION :.L COMMUNITY. LIKE YOUR GOVERNMENT 1S RECENT 

ANNOUNCEMENT UF THE RESTORATION OF THE RIGHT OF OPTION AND 

* PAROL- F-jR JcTAlNrfcS, SUCh A CLARIFICAITOU WUULD RE 

another import* 'T step r«> demonstrating Argentina's 

C..-MM IT *T TL’ T-b PRQTbCTIf'N OF HUMAN RIGHTS. 

7. I /MS MOST GRATIFIED AND PLEASED TO LEARN THAT YOUR 

GOVERNMENT I n T t ■: D S T-.i R.-.TIFY THE TREATY UF TLaTELOLCO. I 

R fc A L IZ ■- THAT TH- TIMING OF YOIJR GOVERNMENT'S RATIFICATION 

IS DEPENDENT UP.lN POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS* RUT I HOPE THAT 

YJU WILL FIND It PJSSI3L TO RATIFY THE TREATY IN THF NEAR 

PUTIJRE. A'sGcNT | NA ' S FULL ADHERENCE TO THF TREATY WDULD 

HAVE GR-AT IMPG.

■h-f t n 

■*t- T Hi—j L****+**E COPY 

tSTA6LlSh-J IK - ASHlNGTf vi PROVIDED '1? THIS OPPORTUNITY TO 

'iRITL YOU. I V RY "MJCH nrip1- THAT WF CONTINUE TO EXCHANGE 

VIEWS 'iITH FRANKNESS AND CANDOR Sn A S TO STKPMGTHFN 

:

11/11/77 

TO: 

FROM: 

Ms. Loretta Braxston 

Julie Jacobson, State Secretariat 

Attached is cable to post concerning 

October 11 letter on Deutsch family 

we discussed yesterday. Please take 

off our suspense. 

Thanks.

LtotllElMfrr-l-fMM-.u.'T 

OepartniPn; of Sunn 

OU! UO s:;K 

PAGE 31 

ORIGIN 6H=_-_U 

STATE 2o'.'S32 

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'3iv; .3 canos-r so as to eisengt/;!; 

Rcuricis *eiw::m ip two cheat pcgnles . 

10. 1H TRiS VEi-.'-O, I PART ISULAKLY nFIT-ECIATi YOUR 

LETTERS or SEPll".:■'? L-7 AND OCIC'LK 11, iS77, A.NU 'TFy 

I .NF'CRIIAT ! ON G-.'-a TO.. ■' El NTE1! 1.1: GCCSUB lElT'-R 

CONCERIIIHG Tii? CE'.'LSCif rf.NILY. AS I f.K SURE VOJ AW AW.?-'.. 

THERE IS C" ■'.■ ■E.-'.-'-.E :’NB GC-:.-'NLiil.v (L'lGFESSII-iAi A',.i 

PUOLIC COHCE'G .-. liili HATTER I" !l: f'/j'.lRY. 

11. iH n:s per:.;-: : it-: you in novem/ir, -s'eirei.'?'. 

VANCE WELL PAli T.:i (■r-’l'niUlinY 10 C6-;f I HUE. G'/i DlAiC'.E'f. 

12. I WAN! 10' [■.-■Ml YOU AND WW. VIDEiA f" The' V?"■ 

kino t'HVitaiicn 

tCup con's veobii.g, t;;S nmi.: 

11:AT WC i/E-S-r U„'-f.-i Ti- “TIENO. PEEP'.i fl'JS' 0U5 

COli'jRAlULAT IONS Tiii VUlil'S 1C TOTS Oil ANO. KljS 

I.KIOC. SII.'CEI.ELY, Ji!.,1Y CARTER i .if CUOU- VANCr 

S. IN THIS KEGARB, LET HE HEH1I3N THE VEPY IHP'IPIAHI 

'SCI: FEPTEI. El I.C!i-COVE?Nli:NTf-l HL'HAil RIG,ITS IIRSWHT.A71E'llG 

'■■.0 r.t HOPE THAT 1-i'i WILL CO'ITk-HE 'C CGNTNiLU'E 1(1

NSC 6879 


WASHINGTON, O.C. 20506 

October 19, 1977 


Peter Tamoff 

Executive Secretary- 

Department of State 

SUBJECT: 

Letter from President Videla of 

Argentina, dated October 11, 1977 

Attached is a copy of a letter to the President from 

President Videla, which has just been received. 

Please provide a translation and comments as Boon 

as possible. We plan to incorporate the President's 

response into the draft the Department haB already 

provided. 

Christine Dodson 

Staff Secretary

rr/'/t/s/ta. 

BUENOS AIRES, n de octubre de 1977. 

Excelentisimo Senor Presidents de los 

Estados Unidos de America 

D. James E. CARTER 

WASHINGTON D.C, 

Estimado Senor Presidents: 

De acuerdo con lo que amigablemente convinifiramos 

durante nuestra reunion en Washington, en el sen 

tido de mantener canales de comunicaci6n directos e 

informales, me place enviarle estas llneas motivadas 

en uno de los temas que abordSramos en nuestro encuentro. 

Me refiero al caso de la familia Deutsch. 

Como conclusifin de las investigaciones efectuadas 

por los organismos competentes, se ha podido es 

tablecer que: 

- El Sr. Daniel Deutsch y .su esposa, que abandonaron 

ilegalmente nuestro pals, son activos miembros del Par 

tido Comunista Revolucionario. 

Su funci6n, dentro de la citada organizacifin ilegal 

era la de efectuar tareas de Informaci6n e Inteligencia, 

vinculadas a la actividad de los grupos terroristas 

que acttian en el pais. 

- Su hermana Liliana pertenece a la misma organizaci6n 

subversiva, desempenindose como activista en el Smbito 

estudiantil. 

- El Sr. Alejandro Deutsch, padre de los anteriores, 

encubrifi las actividades ilegales de sus hijos. 

- Por tales razones, tanto Alejandro como Liliana Deutsch 

se encuentran detenidos a los efectos de ser sometidos, 

prdximamente, a los Tribunales Militares competentes.

-2- 

/// 

- En cuanto a la senora de Alejandro Deutsch y sus hijas 

Elsa y Susana Silvia, han sido puestas en libertad 

al constatarse que no tenian conocimiento ni 

vinculaci6n alguna con las actividades ilegales del 

resto de la familia. 

Quiero, al presentar a V.E. mi mSs afectuoso sa 

ludo, asegurarle el profundo y cordial interns con que 

acompano su actuaci6n y, una vez m£s, reafirmar la frater 

na amistad de los argentinos por el pueblo de los Estados 

Unidos de America. 

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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM 

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TO: 

FROM: 

The Secretar y 

The Deputy £ ecretary V 

ARA - Viron P. Vaky fL- , J 

HA - Patrici a M. Deri an 

Current Hume n Rights Situatic 

(D) The folic wing is a summary of the human rights 

situation in Argent ina. A more detailed review of 

current conditions is set forth in the attachment. 

(C) Disappear ances: . Seventeen since February 

1? three have turn ed up arrested by the GOA, one was 

released, and 13 re main unresolved. The last reported 

disappearance occur red May 13. In 1978, 55 persons 

disappeared per mo r th in 1977, 180; in 1976, 300. 

(C) Accountirg for the Disappeared: The GOA is 

preparing new legi sjlation to shorten to six months the 

time period for dec laring presumptive death. Army 

Commander and Junta Member Viola has spoken publicly 

for the first time of the disappeared as "those who 

will be absent forejver" and told the Embassy he thinks, thii 

with rare exceptior 

The GOA has so far 

accounting. 

(C) _____ PEN Prisoners The GOA announced on June 

29 it now holds 1, •3 23 persons under PEN (executive 

detention). It is not clear how many former PEN detainees 

have been freed anc how many have continued in prison 

after civil or mill tary trials, but the Embassy and 

the ICRC estimate tjhe total number of political prisoners 

at just under 3r00C in all of these categories. GOA 

officials plan to educe the PEN category to 800-1,000 

by late 1979; the Hatter will continue to be held for 

an unstated period, 

that it held about 

s, most of the disappeared are dead, 

refused to provide individual 

In early 1978, the GOA acknowledged 

3,500 PEN prisoners. 

secret—* 

GDS - 7/31/85 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13S26 ^ 

Authority 

MtRfl *&■ rwti 

•*

SEPR^T 

- 2" - 

(S) Clandesti ne Prisoners; The question of whether 

clandestine prisone rs exist in significant numbers remains 

unresolved. If the re are, they could number up to a 

few hundred as an o utside limit; our Embassy considers 

it unlikely that th e number would be that highj- We 

have no firm eviden ce. Fragmentary data, however, suggest 

the existence of at least some unacknowledged prisoners 

and of some small s cattered clandestine detention centers 

about to be closed. 

(C) Right of Option: Moving at a slow pace, with 

only 18 GOA approva Is so far for PEN prisoners seeking 

to come to the U.S. The GOA has approved approximately 

170 applications si nee September 1977 for all countries. 

(C) Prison Cc 

wide uniform prison 

PEN detainees in si 

were reports of twe 

in prisons and, in 

robberies among a c 

ICRC has told us th 

have improved over 

GOA for poor prison 

nditions: The GOA issued nationregulations 

in late April and consolidated 

x facilities. In February, there 

beatings (one fatal) and a disappearance 

May, of. a number of beatings and 

roup of prisoners in transit. The 

at it believes prison conditions 

last year, when it criticized the 

conditions. 

(C) The Judic iary: The NYC Bar Association mission 

noted that the Exec utive continues to be uncooperative 

in responding to he beas corpus petitions. The Judiciary 

has made some atten. pts to force greater cooperation, 

but its effective bower remains limited. 

(C) Argentine Attitudes Toward the Human Rights 

Issue: Videla and Viola appear to be trying to carry 

out commitments to us to end disappearances and reduce 

PEN detentions. H rdliners such as General Suarez Mason 

and General Menende z have recently stepped up calls 

for a new GOA offer sive to root out "intellectual subversion." 

A political test o strength between these two points 

of view is shaping up for year’s end. 

(U) The NYC 3ar Association mission noted that 

progress is possib e but would come much faster if the 

Argentine legal pre fession would take a more active 

interest in return to rule of law. 

SECRET-

(U) The Church and some elements of the press 

have become more outspokenly critical in dealing with 

human rights. 

Attachment: 

Detailed Review of Current Conditions. 

Drafted: 

{-L ;/ 

HA/HR:PF1bod:ARA/ECA:CHBrayshaw:mas 

8/1/79 X21966 

Clearances: 

INR/RAR:JBuchanan 

! *-( 

lc) This reco qd since February compares to previous 

years when disappeaij ances averaged about 55 per month 

.. t m n

Current Human Rights Situation in Argentina 

(D) Following is a description of key human rights 

developments since the Task Force completed its assessment 

in early February: 

Disappearances 

(C) We have received reports of- seventeen 

disappearances for the period since February 1. We 

immediately communicated these reports to high GOA 

authorities and asked for information on their 

whereabouts. The GOA has provided us with information 

that three of the persons were arrested and charged 

in the courts. One person was briefly detained and 

then released. The GOA has been unable to provide 

information on the thirteen other cases. In three cases, 

however, the disappeared persons have contacted relatives 

by letter or telephone call to advise that they were 

well and would eventually reappear. The last disappearance 

took place May 13. A list-of unresolved disappearances, 

including those three, is attached. 

(C) The victims of these abductions/disappearances 

have no confirmed connection with terrorist groups. 

Some, such as members of the Socialist Workers’ Party, 

and the Argentine Communist Party-associated Relatives 

of Disappeared and Detained Persons are related to the 

nonviolent political left. 

(C) This record since February compares to previous 

years when disappearances averaged about 55 per month 

in 1978, 180 per month in 1977, and 300 per month in 

1976. In mid-May 1979 the Argentine Permanent Assembly 

for Human Rights published a list of 5,465 disappearances 

since 1975; in the month following publication, the 

Assembly received reports of an additional 105 previously 

unreported cases. An earlier Assembly report contained 

80 1978 disappearances unknown to the Embassy and one 

from 1979. 

Accounting for the Disappeared 

(S) The GOA has not yet taken any public step 

to account for the disappeared. The Government has 

addressed the broad issue internally and is seeking 

solutions to specific aspects of the problem, such as

shortening the period for legal presumption of death. 

There are also indications that it is seeking to establish 

what documentary evidence exists throughout the 

security apparatus. 

(C) Foreign Minister Pastor briefed EC-9 ambassadors 

in Buenos Aires recently on the terms of new 

legislation and said that relatives will be able to 

petition the Government for assistance and information 

three months after the occurrence of a disappearance. 

The Government will have three months to establish 

the whereabouts of the missing person and, if no information 

is developed, relatives will be able to claim 

survivors1 benefits and regularize their legal status. 

Although he did not supply details, Pastor said relatives 

will be able to claim indemnization. 

(C) General Viola reiterated to Ambassador Castro 

on June 25 that the -GOA does not have information 

on the fate of the disappeared and in view of the 

extended periods of disappearance he doubted any of 

these people were alive. He said a few of the-disappeared 

may reappear, but these would be rare exceptions. 

In a public speech delivered on Army Day (May 29) 

Viola referred obliquely to the fate of the disappeared, 

calling them "those who will be absent forever." 

Argentine human rights groups have interpreted this 

tacit statement as an admission ■’ that many of the disappeared 

were killed by Argentine police and military 

forces. 

(C) The Embassy concluded in a recent trends 

report (May 31) that "we are reasonably certain that 

the apparatus for disappearing people still exists 

although, even considering a small upsurge of disappearances 

in the past several weeks, it appears less 

used than in the past." 

PEN Prisoners 

(C) The GOA has continued to release detainees 

from PEN. The Embassy estimated in mid-June that 

the political prisoner population in this category 

is now at about 2,200. The GOA announced June 29 

that there are now 1,723 PEN prisoners. At the end 

of 1978, this figure stood at about 2,900 and at the 

beginning of 1978 at about 3,500. It is not clear

how many of those removed from PEN are at liberty 

and how many remain in custody under some form of 

charges in judicial processes, or after having been 

convicted by either military or civilian tribunals. 

The Embassy and ICRC estimate the total current prison 

population of persons confined because of the GOA's 

counter-subversion campaign at just under 3,000> including 

those held under PEN and persons who have been tried 

and convicted in civil or military courts. We have 

been told by a source on President Videla's staff 

that the GOA will continue to review the status of 

PEN detainees and plans -to have the number down to 

800 to 1,000 by the end of this year; these prisoners 

would continue to be held indefinitely under PEN since 

the "Campora amnesty1' of 1973 makes it impossible 

to prosecute them. Other high-level Argentine officials 

have said that a certain number of persons will continue 

under PEN since the GOA considers them committed subversives 

although it lacks evidence that will stand up in court. 

(C} Foreign Minister Pastor said the GOA has 

augmented its legal staff .reviewing PEN detention 

from four to 30. 

Clandestine Prisoners 

(S) The Embassy has received fragmentary but 

credible data which suggest the GOA may continue to 

hold a number of prisoners that it has not publicly 

acknowledged. In a recent case a woman, who had disappeared 

in late 1978, was released by the authorities. It 

appears that most of the persons being held clandestinely 

are either the "disappeared" in process through the 

security apparatus or former terrorists who are cooperating 

with the authorities. As the number of new disappearances 

has dropped, there is little reason to think 

that there are still substantial numbers "in process." 

The Embassy believes that if clandestine prisoners 

exist, their number could not be more than a few hundred 

as an outside limit, and it considers it unlikely 

that the figure be that high. There are fragmentary 

data supporting, in the Embassy's view, that some 

small, scattered clandestine detention centers still 

exist, each holding no more than perhaps 25 persons. 

It is believed that such centers would be closed before 

the arrival of the IACHR in November.

Right of Option 

(LOU) Argentine Government action on the right 

of option program continues at a slow pace. The GOA 

has given permission for 18 detainees to travel to 

the U.S. under the right of option program; 13 entered 

the U.S. under our parole program. The Embassy'has 

issued 95 certificates of eligibility. General Viola 

assured Ambassador Castro again that, approval of right 

of option cases would proceed more quickly. GOA officials 

announced that about 170 persons have been released 

under right of option for travel to all countries. 

Prison Conditions 

(LOU) The GOA has published uniform regulations 

for the treatment of detainees in a move designed 

to end variations in treatment at different facilities. 

The ICRC urged this step and has called the rules 

a significant improvement for the treatment of detainees. 

We have reports, however, that the regulations have 

not yet been fully implemented in all facilities. 

The GOA has consolidated PEN detainees in six facilities. 

(LOU) According to reports reaching ICRC officials 

from other prisoners, in February one person disappeared 

from prison, another was tortured, and a third died 

as a result of beatings by guards. In early Hay, 

the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights .reported that 

some of the 200 prisoners moved from Resistencia prison 

to the La Plata prison were beaten and robbed during 

the transfer. 

The Judiciary 

(U) As the NYC Bar mission noted in its report, 

the executive power continues to decline to provide 

information in response to habeas corpus petitions 

filed by the relatives of disappeared persons. Regarding 

PEN detainees, the Executive response is that "links 

with subversives" constitute sufficient grounds for 

continued detention, invoking its alleged power to 

hold individuals without charge under the Constitutional 

state of siege authority. The NYC Bar mission report 

was sharply critical of the lack of professional objection 

to the denial of due process and deterioration in 

the executive power of the judiciary in recent years.

SECRET 

(U) The courts have recently tried a number 

of persons on pre-1976 subversive charges and sentenced 

them to prison terms. Three police officers were 

recently prosecuted for abuse of prisoners. 

Argentine Attitudes Toward the Human Rights Issue 

(C) President Videla and Army Commander Viola 

are maintaining their leadership position within the 

GOA on human rights policy and appear to have begun 

carrying out commitments made to us repeatedly in 

the past to bring disappearances to an end and reduce 

PEN detention. Hardliners in the Argentine military 

still favor repressive policies directed at a broad 

range of political dissidents. Army Chief of Staff 

General Suarez Mason, for example, recently proposed 

to the Cabinet a broad offensive against political 

subversives which clearly would include groups 

unrelated to the terrorist movements of the past. 

General Menendez, Third Corps Commander, has called 

for continued strong efforts to battle "ideological 

subversion." 

(U) The prestigious daily La Prensa has joined 

The Buenos Aires Herald in championing human rights. 

However, no paper has agreed to publish the Permanent 

Assembly's latest list of disappearances. The Catholic 

Church addressed an appeal to President Videla on 

May 4 on behalf of disappeared persons, PEN detainees, 

jailed labor leaders, and lower income groups adversely 

affected by present GOA economic policy. 

(U) The New York Bar Association's report on 

human rights conditions in Argentina noted that 

ingredients are present for future progress in human 

rights observance, but that the support of the Argentine 

legal profession is essential for a quick return to 

civilized legal practices. The New York Bar Association 

exhorted its Argentine colleagues to take a more active 

role in this area.

c 

HUMAN RIGHTS: 

AHGr.HTINV. 

Political terrorism of the left and tl:i- right has 

wracked Argentina since the late sis'lil- jih! was 

partially responsible for the economic and political 

breaS-.dotn precipitating the March 3 97G coup. The 

Junta's efforts to eliminate leftist terrorism led to 

a massive counter-terrorist campaign, unciertol.cn lay 

the security forces. 

Although the Government has publicly stated that 

terrerism has largely been defeated, the anti-terrorist 

campaign of the last few years has continued and has 

resulted in severe violations of human rights. - 

Recently, however, instructions have been-issued by thc- 

Minister of Interior to the police, and reportedly to 

the military, to curb excesses in counter-tcrrorist 

operations. 

At present, the Government of Argentina acV.now- 

1 edges approxin.ately 3,400 state of siege prisoners 

detained under executive power (PEN). The state of 

siece powers, invoked in 1974, have been used to hold a 

wide variety of persons for long periods without 

formal charges.The USG reports an additional SQO pris'::.er_ 

in military camps... 

Arrests continue but have decreased considerably 

from the level of the past twoycars. From January to 

August 1978, 347 were added to PEN and 446 released. 

Security personnel and prison officials use torture 

routinely during the interrogation process. 

In addition, thousands (estimates range between 

3,(i£.0 and 20,000) have been abducted by security forces. 

These cases, known as the disappeared, include a broad 

range of people, such as labor leaders, workers, clergymen, 

human rights advocates, scientists, doctors and 

political party leaders. A movement is growing, led by 

human rights organizations and the Mothers of the 

Qisappcared, with.the support of some elements of the 

Church, to trace the missing people. The Government, 

however, has not accounted for the vast majority of 

the disappeared, many of whom are presumed to be dead* 

At present, disappearances and summary executions arc 

reported to continue on a reduced scale of 16-45 permonth. 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13528

The GOA in late.- 1977 reinstituted a limi toil "right of 

option” for political pri iionti::, 1 it-1 ■] iimif-r tSi'i/ut i vtdetention, 

to request exile. However, from January to August, 

only 5fi. were allowed to leave under this program. 

The GOA for the first time in rebruary 1978 published 

lists of those detained under the state of siege. 

Once again permission has been granted for the JCP.C to 

visit non-military prisons. 

Responsive action has been taken or. a few cases in 

which the U. S. has expressed special interest. .Newspaper 

editor and Jewish leader Jacobo Timermnn was transferred from 

PEN detention to house arrest, Alfredo Bravo, Co-chairman ot 

the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, was paroled, 

Guillermo Vogler was released to the U. 5. under the right 

of option, and four of the five Deutsch family members were 

released. Also placed on parole was Perez Esquivel, leader 

of Paz y Justicia and Nobel Peace Prize nominee. 

Official harassment of selected religious groups 

continues. The Jehovah's witnesses have borne much of the 

arunt. Reports of anti-semitic incidents targeted at members 

of the Jewish community and Jewish prisoners have decreased. 

Severe restrictions remain on civil and political 

freedoms, among these trade union rights, fair judicial processes, 

and the activities of political parties. Press freedom 

continues to be curtailed although some restrictions were 

recently lifted. There appears to be little concerted or 

effective effort to date to check fund..mental abuses or 

revitalize the legal and institutional barriers that would 

prevent human rights violations in the future. 

Ke had hoped that the Argentine Government would have 

been able to accept a visit by the OAS Inter-American 

Commission on Human Rights (IA1IRC). However, the conditioned 

invitation issued by the GOA was not acceptable to the 

Commission. Negotiations are continuing. 

ACTION TAKEN ON HUMAN RIGHTS 

— On October 27, 1977, the U. S. voted no on a gas pipeline 

loan in the 1DB. -We followed this up with "no" votes on a 

cellulose plant on December 1 and a petrochemical complex on 

December B. On November 3 we did, however, support an IDE 

loan for potable water on the grounds that it meets basic 

human needs. 

CON* 

NTIAL

COM' CTT1AL 3 

-- Early in 197B, we abstained on an industrial credit and 

a grain storage loan, both in the World Rank. Wo abstained 

rather than vote no to signal to the Argentine Government 

that we had noted limited improvements in r.o.i>c .'ir-.-.iE, and to 

"encourage further positive developments. We followed this 

by an extension of a $60 million agricultural credit loan in 

April and abstained on three IFC loans. 

-- L:.i mbenk is currently holding bad ui. uv'.r 7600 million 

in transactions for Argentina because of human rights 

considerateons. 

— Argentina rejected FMS credits for TY ' 7B. The 

Administration declined to sign the FY '77 IMS agreement and 

is not requesting r.MS credits for Argentina for FY '79." All 

arms transfers (FMS sales and commercial sales of items on 

the munitions list) are being reviewed on a case-Ly-easc 

basis; only very few selected new items with no apparent 

relationship to humanriRhts have been approved. 

— On various occasions, ve have discussed our human rights 

concerns with the GOA at the highest levels, including trips 

by two Assistant Secretaries, an Under Secretary and the 

Secretary of State. When Under Secretary Newsom visited 

Argentina in late May, he made clear to the Argentines that 

we want better relations with that country, but that there 

would have to be improvements iii the human rights.area. He 

specifically asked for movement on: an invitationto the IAHRC 

establishment of a mechanism to inform the families of disappeared 

persons of their whereabouts; and trial, release or 

exile for the 3,400 PEN prisoners held without charge. 

-- The Department has submitted over 1,000 names of 

individuals who are either detained orhave disappeared to the 

Argentine Government and have requested that they furnish 

informationon these individuals.

MEMORANDUM ON TORTURE AND DISAPPEARANCES IN 

ARGENTINA 

The Government of Argentina acknowledges approximately 

3,^00 state of siege prisoners detained under executive 

power (PEN). Arrests and disappearances currently continue 

although not on the massive scale of the past 

two years. 

In May 1978, the US Embassy reported that "physical 

torture continues to be used regularly during the 

interrogation of suspected terrorists and so-called 

'criminal subversives' v>ho do not fully cooperate." It 

reports that if there has been a net reduction in reports 

of torture, this is not because torture has been foresworn 

but "derives from fewer operations" because the 

number of terrorists and subversives has diminished. 

Torture used to intimidate and extract information 

is described by the Embassy to include "electric shock, 

the submarine (prolonged submersion under water), sodium 

pentothal, severe beatings, including 'El Telefono' in 

which a simultaneous blow is delivered to both ears with 

cupped hands.” A 1978 Amnesty International report 

in addition describes "cigarette burns...sexual abuse,rape 

...removing teeth, fingernails, and eyes...burning with 

boiling water, oil and acid: and even castration." 

The Embassy reports firsthand accounts of physical 

torture at La Perla Interrogation Center, outside 

Cordoba, in September 1977. It further reports reliable 

information about a case in late December 1977, and in 

the past few weeks credible information about another 

case. Most incidents reported to the Embassy took place 

in 1976 and 1977. 

One well-known case of physical abuse was Jacobo 

Timcrman. Another well-publicized case by Amnesty International 

was that of Elizabeth Kasemann, a 29 year old 

West German citizen who died three months after her 

arrest by security forces in May 1977. Amnesty and our 

Embassy have numerous documented examples. 

The International Committee of the Red Cross reports 

"guard brutality" in the jails, knd "beatings and assaults" 

during "transfers from jail to jail." The Embassy reports 

that "clandestine seizure, hostile interrogation, and 

summary adjudication remain basic operating procedures 

for Argentine security forces." These procedures are

expected to continue at least until after the World 

Cup Soccer matches in June. 

• 

Our Embassy further notes that, while penalties 

exist for police maltreatment of common criminals, they 

do not for political detainees. Furthermore, no such 

charges have been made publicly against members of the 

Armed Forces which carry out much of the countersubversive 

operations, although internal disciplinary 

proceedings have reportedly taken place for some 

"unauthorized excesses." Interior Minister Ilardindcguy 

in May called for an end to police use of terrorist tactics, 

and it was reported that the military received similar 

orders. However, no progress has been reported in deed. 


Reports of torture do not of course deal with the 

thousands (estimates range in the tens of thousands) of 

Argentine citizens who were abducted by security forces 

and summarily executed. These cases, known as the disappeared,. 

include not only suspected terrorists but 

also encompass a broader range of people— including 

labor leaders, workers, clergymen, human rights advocates, 

scientists, doctors, and political party leaders. A 

recent dramatic occurrence was the abduction in December 

of five "mothers of the disappeared" and two French nuns, 

whose bodies were reportedly discovered washed ashore. 

There is a growing movement led by human rights 

organizations and the Church to trace the missing people. 

In La Prensa of May 7, an open letter to President Videla 

was printed as a full page ad listing the names of 2,592 

disappeared and urging an accounting. It was sponsored 

by three Argentine human rights organizations - and paid 

for by contributions from large numbers of Argentine 

citizens. Editorials in Argentine newspapers this month 

further called attention to the "political timebomb" 

of the tragic disappearances. The Buenos Aires Herald 

declared “Every effort must be made to trace missing 

people. It is the only way to .convince the world, and 

to prove to ourselves, that we do care about human 

rights. If anxious relatives are ignored or treated with 

callousness, they will become symbols as victims pf a 

totally brutalized society." Innumerable.- letters are 

received by the US Government from the relatives and friends 

of the disappeared calling for an accounting.

SEO&1 

3 

ifly, hu 

Internationally, human rights organizations are 

also supporting this campaign. Amnesty International,for 

example, on May 18 launched a major drive against political 

imprisonments, torture, disappearances and executions in 

Argentina. 

Both the internal and external pressure building seek 

to generate an impact on the GOA to render a public accounting. 

SECJ»ET

MflftUFN FIAL 


INCOMING 

TELEGRAM 

PAGE II TEL AV 22920 II OF 12 28I404Z 4321 

ACTION NEA-U 

INFO KT-11 ARB-11 ADS-II HA-BS PN-CG .HSC-Di SP-I2 

SS-1S CIAE-I3 0C0E-3I I MR-13 NSAE-OI PA-11 /067 W 

...................................161431 2I1423Z /23 

I 2S1S1SZ OCT 79 

FN AMEMBASSY 'EL AVIV 

TO SEC3TATE WASHDC 4307 

INFO USICA WASHDC 

AMEMBASSY IUENOS AIRES 

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 11 OF 12 TEL AVIV 22921 

STATE FOR NEA/ARA VARY; HA FOR OERIAN 

USICA FOR AR 

E.O. 12B6S: RSS 11/25/99 IDIETERICH, W.J.) OR-O 

TAGS: PEPR, P'NR, PINT, IS, AR 

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH ARGENTINE FKIIF JACHBfl TI HERMAN 

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT! / 

2. IN CONVERSATION WITH PRESS ATTACHE 9IETER1CH, WHO 

KNEW HIM IN ARGENTINA DURING A 1972-74 TOUR THERE, 

TIMERMAN DISCUSSEO INTER ALIA HIS INTERROGATION BY 

POLICE AUTHORITIES IN ARGENTINA, ANTI-SEMITISM SN THE 

ARGENTINA MILITARY RIGHT, HIS PERSONAL DILEMMA AS TO 

WHETHER TO WRITE ABOUT "IS EXPERIENCES, AN3 THE 

FUTURE OF ARGENTINE POLITICS. TIMERMAN WILL BE IN THE 

UNITED STATES TO RECEIVE AN AWARO FROM THE AMERICAN 

JEWISH COMMITTEE ON SATURDAY, CCT. 27. AFTER THAT HE 

PLANS TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK WHERE HE EXPECTS TS SEE 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OERIAN. THEN HE WILL CO T3 WASH- 

INGTON FOR VARIOUS MEETINGS ON THE HILL. AT THE*TfrPARTHENT. 

AND ATJKE WHITE HOUSE. " 

TEL AV 22921 11 OF 12 2I1414Z 

NOT TO RENT I OH COA IN ANY ARTICLES. 

6. TIMERMAN ALSO MENTIONED 'HAT HE BELIEVES THE RIGHT- 

WING AND VERY ANTI-SEMITIC NEWSPAPER CAB IL 30 IS FINANCES 

■Y 01 ANA OE NASSOT, PUBLISHER OF NUEVA PROVIIICIA IN 

1AHIA BLANCA. INI: HRS. NASSOT WAS WELL-KNOWN TO THE 

EMBASSY, AND IF MEMORY SERVES, RECEIVED A MARIA .ICONS 

CABOT OR IAPA AWARD IN 1973 SR 1974.) 

7. AS TO THE FUTURE OF ARGENTINE POLITICS, TIMERMAN 

SAYS HE SEES A SITUATION IN WHICH MOOERATE AND RIGHT WING 

ELEMENTS' IN THE MILITARY WILL COMPETE FOR PERCNIST 

' SUPPORT, WHICH MAY CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH ISABEL PERCH 

WILL BE IN A POSITION TO DECIDE WHO RUNS ARGENTINA. 

B. IN CONVERSATION WITH TIMERMAN ONE IS LEFT WITH A 

CHILL IMS IMPRESSION THAT HE IS SIMPLY REPORTING 

WHAT HE HAS EXPERIENCED AND BELIEVES. HE CHARACTERIZES 

THE ARGENTINE HILITARY RIGHT AS CLASSICALLY TOTALITARIAN 

ANO ANTI-SEMITIC. 

9. TI HERMAN IS NOW EMPLOYED BY THE IMPORTANT TEL AVIV 

DAILY MAARIV ANO SEEMS COMFORTABLE WITH THAT FACT, 

ALTHOUGH HE SAIO HE NIGHT BE INTERESTED IN SPENDING SOME 

TIME AT All ACADEMIC INSTITUTION IN THE US. HE SPECIFICALLY 

MENTIONED COLUMBIA. THUS FAR HE HAS WRITTEN ONLY ON 

LATIN AMERICAN MATTERS, BUT IT IS TO BE EXPECTED THAT HE 

WILL 8RANCH INTO 8R0A0ER DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL 

POLITICAL HATTERS. HE SAIO THAT THE THEME OF A SPEECH 

HE WILL GIVE IN THE UNITED STATES WILL BE HUMAN RIGHTS 

AS THE IDEOLOGY OF THE EIGHTIES, AND ADDED THAT THE US 

3. TIHERHAN SAID THAT THE MAIN FOCUS OF SUESTIONING 

DURING HIS IMPRISONMENT WAS HIS SOLE AS THE ARGENTINE 

'LEADER' OF AN ALLEGED WORLD ZIONIST CONSPIRACY, AND 

THAT THERE WAS VERY .ITTLE EMPHASIS ON ANY LEFTIST OR 

TERRORIST CONNECTIONS. HE WAS ONCE TORTURES IN LA 

PLATA IN A ROOM WITH AN ORGANIZATION CHART WHICH SHOWED 

ZBIGNIEW SRZEZINSKI AS THE LEADER OF THE CONSPIRACY. ON 

ANOTHER OCCASION HE WAS TCLD THAT HE WAS BEING BEATEN 

BECAUSE HE HAS SARES TO USE THE TERM LEFTIST-FASCISTS 

IN A CONVERSATION Wl'H ASSISTANT SECRETARY CERIUM, THE 

OBJECTION APPARENTLY BEING THAT HE HAO SLANDERED FASCISM. 

HE WAS ALSO QUESTIONED CONCERNING SUPPOSED CONTACTS 

BETWEEN MENACiEM BEGIN AND THE MC.HTO.VERO 3UERILLAS 

CURING A BEG.N VISIT TS ARGENTINA IN 1979. TIHERHAN 

BELIEVES THESE GUEST IONS STEMMED 'ROM THE FACT THAT 

BEGIN*S BOCK 'WAR III THE HOLY LANS* HAS BEEN FOUHO AMONG 

MATERIALS USES BY THE M0N10IIER0S. TIMERMAN WAS BROUGHT 

FROM PRISON TO All iNTEPVtE'J WITH GEN. HARGUINOESUY IN 

THE CASA RCSAOA PRIOR TO A SERI 411 VISIT. THE GENERAL 

INFORMED HIM THAT THE ARGENTINA GOVERNMENT WAS AWARE 

THAT PATT OERIAN WAS INTERESTED IN HIS CASE BECAUSE SHE 

WAS HIS COUSIN. 

authority 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13S2B , . . - 

NARA_JL>1_ n«t» -------- 

4. TIMERMAN (LSD REBORTS THAT HE BELIEVES LAHUSSE'S EX' 

PRESS SECRETARY EDGAROO SAJOM DIES OF A HEART ATTACK 

DURING TORTURE 8Y ELECTRIC SHOCX. SINCE HE WAS A 

RELATIVELY YOUNG MAH, THE MIlITARI DID NOT SUSPECT THAT 

HE HAO A HEART CONDITION. 

5. TIMERMAN IS HOW PFIUSTAilT TO lieilT WIT FYPCR- 

LETICE5 111 ARGENTiUA SEC-USE HE FE4.RS REPRISALS BY THE 

MILI*AaiL>'J4:'.ST »H. i.'.SS ST\L :ll .AGENT i.iA. >5 AN 

EXAMPLE OF THIS HE "EIITICNES ‘'■AT ROBERT COX. EC, TOR OF 

THE BUENOS AIRES HERALD, HAO SENT A MESSAGE r0 HIM 

THROUGH THE ISRAELI EMBASSY III BUENOS AIRES ASKING HIM 

Lo>V

PAGE 31 

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AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 

CONF IDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 32 TEL AVIV 22920 

WILL BE REAPING THE BENEFITS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 

FOR YEARS TO COME. TIMERMAN STRESSES THAT IN HIS PUBLIC 

APPEARANCES HE WILL BE DISCUSSING HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL 

AND WILL AVOID SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON POLITICAL AND HUMAN 

RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN ARGENTINA. HE IS ANXIOUS TO EXPRESS 

HIS GRATITUDE TO SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THE DEPARTMENT AND 

Wl S

t 

^-SECRET-" 

ARGENTINA 

1980/1981 PLAN OF ACTION AND OTHER ISSUES 

I. INTRODUCTION 

On May 29 the Interagency Group for Latin America 

developed a strategy, subsequently approved by the 

President, to achieve better balance in our relations 

with Argentina. Before the strategy could be fully 

implemented, Argentina became heavily involved in 

supporting the new Bolivian regime. Imminent GOA 

recognition of the Bolivian regime and continuing 

reports of Argentine involvement led to the postponement 

of Assistant Secretary Bowdler's visit. The visit 

was to have been the major vehicle for implementing 

most of the initiatives to improve U.S.-Argentine 

relations in 1980. 

Argentina continues to be heavily involved in 

supporting financially and militarily the Bolivian 

regime. There is some indication that because of 

the strong USG reaction and the effect on our bilateral 

relations, Argentine leaders are willing to counsel 

moderation to the Bolivians, but there is no clear 

indication as yet the GOA is in fact exerting needed 

pressure to end the more repressive and corrupt practices 

of the Garcia Meza regime. Over the longer term, 

we would hope that Argentina would encourage a return 

to civilian rule and avoid a polarization in Bolivian 

society. 

Argentina is unlikely to cooperate further in 

the West's partial grains embargo on the Soviet Union. 

Although we had been told earlier that cooperation 

was possible and depended on the size of the 1980/1981 

harvests, our Embassy was informed last week that 

Argentina would sell as much grain to the USSR as 

is available. 

The U.S. continues to have a significant stake 

in maintaining and furthering improved bilateral relations. 

We continue to seek Argentine support on East-West 

and Hemispheric issues, in international fora and 

on non-proliferation. We also seek to influence Argentine 

internal developments on human rights and on an eventual 

return to democracy, as well as to limit the potential 

increase of Soviet influence there. Other strategic 

interests include its size, geographic location, natural 

resources, and relatively advanced economic, scientific,

-SECRET 

-2- 

and cultural development. Argentina has the most 

advanced nuclear program in Latin America and potentially 

one of the world's richest oil-bearing areas in its 

vast continental shelf. Argentina*s.port facilities 

and coastline could play an important role in the 

protection of critical sea lanes. 

The U.S. also has major commercial interests 

in Argentina. U.S. exports to Argentina more than 

doubled in 1979 over 1978 (from $704 million to $1.5 

billion). In the first nine months of 1980 exports 

increased 59.3% over the same period in 1979 to $1.8 

billion. Of particular interest to U.S. industry 

are the potentially large exports related to the huge 

hydroelectric projects being undertaken by the GOA 

with Paraguay. Potential sales in one project alone 

could total up to $350 million. The U.S. Government 

has been actively supporting the bids of U.S. firms 

in these projects. 

The U.S. faces a potentially serious confrontation 

with Argentina at the’ OASGA beginning November 19 

on the issue of the IAHRC's human rights report. 

Failure to reach agreement could affect our other 

national interests. In addition, we need to consider 

the U.S. approach to President viola during his planned 

visit to Washington, particularly with regard to the 

GOA's interest in resuming arms purchases and the 

Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment barring such sales. 

II. STATUS OF 1980 ACTION PLAN 

A. Continuing or Early-Action Initiatives; 

— Meeting of the U.S./Argentine Mixed Economic 

Commission. The meeting has been scheduled for April 

1981 (the earliest mutually convenient time frame). 

The agenda will include discussion of bilateral trade 

issues and seek to expand commercial relations. 

— Bilateral Income Tax Treaty. Conclusion of 

the Treaty is in the final stages. 

— Consular Convention. Both parties are reviewing 

a proposed text. 

— Human Rights. We have continued the dialogue, 

most recently through high level bilateral discussions 

at the UNGA. We are continuing discussions at the 

OASGA. 

-SECRET

_SEGRET-- 

-3- 

— Nuclear Relations. We are continuing negotiations 

aimed at resolving the remaining safeguards issues 

to permit the delivery of highly and moderately enriched 

uranium for Argentina's nuclear research program as 

well as components for its power program. We hope 

negotiations will be completed this year. We continue 

to urge the Argentines to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 

most recently during bilateral talks at the UNGA. 

B. Initiatives where the Timing is Undecided; 

— Visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter- 

American Affairs to Buenos Aires. Assistant Secretary .1 

Bowdler's visit to Argentina was postponed following 

Argentina's support of the Bolivia coup and recognition 

of the new Bolivian regime. 

— The first round of periodic security consultations 

focusing on security of the South Atlantic. These 

talks will highlight the critical' strategic implications 

of the South Atlantic and create interest in cooperation 

for its defense. 

— Periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric 

issues. We would exchange views on global issues 

and explore ways to promote mutually beneficial policies. 

The agenda would include an-exchange of views on human 

rights policies and Argentina's evolution toward democracy, 

East-West and Hemispheric cooperation, and international 

issues such as law of the sea and .the transfer of 

arms and technology. 

— Signing the Agricultural Cooperati Agreement. ^ 

We have withheld signing the agreement until GOA participation 

in the partial grains embargo on the Soviet Union 

is resolved. "—1 

— An invitation to an Argentine guest instructor 

to the U.S. Army School of the Americas. H reports 

that consultations with the Congress are completed 

and have been favorable. HA disagrees as to the scope 

of the consultations. 

— A high-level military visit. We told the 

President we will keep under review the desirability 

of an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader, 

such as the Argentine Army CINC or Chief of Staff. 

SBeRET---

-SECRET- 

-4- 

A final decision, including timing, would take into 

account continued improvements in the observance of 

human rights and developments in U.S.-Argentine relations. 

C. Issues To Be Discussed; 

1. In view of the GOA's continuing involvement 

in Bolivia and its policy of non-cooperation on grains 

restriction, which initiatives should be rescheduled 

and which should be deferred for later decision? ' 

III. ARGENTINA AT THE OASGA 

A. Background; 

One of the most controversial issues at the OASGA 

will be how to handle the IAHRC's human rights report 

on Argentina. If Argentina perceives it is unjustly 

or harshly treated by the OAS in general or the U.S. 

in particular, it may ..make good on its threat to walk 

out of the OAS. GOA officials have also implied that 

the U.S. position at the OAS will be taken into account 

in considering the award of contracts for hydroelectric 

projects such as Yacyreta. 

Following USG representations, Argentina allowed 

the visit of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission 

(IAHRC) in September 1979. The Commission's special 

report was severely critical of Argentina, calling 

on the GOA to inter alia account for the disappeared 

and bring to trial and punish those responsible, lift 

the state of siege, release or grant the right of 

option to depart Argentina to those persons held under 

Executive detention, investigate and punish those 

responsible for torture, and restore due process guarantees. 

Consideration of the IAHRC's report on Argentina 

may be the most divisive issue in this year's OASGA. 

Many human rights groups and representatives from 

the Argentine exile community plan to visit Washington 

during the meeting and will push for Assembly condemnation. 

Argentine Nobel laureate Perez Esquivel also plans 

to be in Washington during the meeting. While these 

activities will heighten publicity over Argentina's 

case in the U.S., they will serve even more to focus 

public attention on the Commission's activities in 

Argentina. The Argentine Government believes harsh 

awt.on by the OAS will establish precedent for similar 

treatment in other lnterimL^w—1 fora, and it is seeking 

• SECRET-—

-SEGUE?— 

-5- 

an omnibus resolution which would not name specific 

countries. Mexico, Venezuela and Peru are strong 

supporters of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission 

(IAHRC) and, in varying degrees, favor an activist 

stance by the OAS in the human rights' field. 

U.S.-Argentine bilateral discussions could be 

crucial to achieving a satisfactory outcome. We are 

working informally with Argentina and other interested 

countries to develop an OAS resolution which, while 

not calling for condemnation o£ Argentina, will recognize 

the work of the Commission, take note of the human 

rights situation at the time of the report, note the 

improvements since, and call on the GOA to take into 

account the report's recommendations for improved 

human rights observance. 

B. Issues To Be Discussed: 

1. Should the U.S. back off on its position 

calling for a country-specific resolution and accept 

an an omnibus resolution which would make some specific 

mention of Argentina, if that is the consensus of 

the other OAS members? 

2. Should we accept an omnibus resolution not 

mentioning Argentina? 

V. U.S. MILITARY SALES TO ARGENTINA 

A. Background: 

i 

At the May 14 Policy Review Committee meeting 

on Argentina, it was decided that it would be premature 

to consider rescission or modification of legislative 

restrictions on military supply to Argentina this 

year. In 1981, legislative modifications to permit 

training and perhaps other actions concerning military 

supply might be considered if the human rights situation 

in Argentina continued favorably. The current human 

rights situation is described in the attached summary. 

IMET Training Programs, the sale of training 

under FMS and military supplies to the GOA (FMS and 

Munitions List items) are prohibited by the Humphrey- 

Kennedy Amendment. In addition, under current policy, 

the U.S. Executive limits sales of non-Munitions List 

items to the Argentine military and the police through 

the Commerce export control licensing system. In 

SECRET

^SECRET 

order to permit the sale of these items, either: 

— the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment would have 

to be rescinded or modified; 

— a Presidential determination that a proposed 

sale was in the U.S. national interest would have 

to be evoked (At present, the President has no such 

leeway for Humphrey-Kennedy; however, legislation 

is pending in this year's FAA which would give the 

President this authority); or 

— the Congress would need to pass specific legislation 

permitting a particular sale. 

DOD has identified strategic and economic interests 

which support the sale of military aircraft in the 

near term: 

— There is a strategic need for the sale of 

ocean surveillance P-3., aircraft to the GOA to counter 

the Soviet buildup in the South Atlantic. 

— Argentina plans to embark next year on a $3 

billion modernization program for its Air Force. 

The GOA has told us that it prefers U.S. equipment 

and that it is committed to making a decision by June 

1981. If the U.S. is unable to respond by that date, 

Argentina will turn toward European suppliers. 

i 

The U.S. proscription of military sales toward 

Argentina, while not affecting the availability of 

military equipment to the GOA (European suppliers 

have been more that willing to fill the gap), have 

considerable political significance as a tangible 

expression of disapproval of Argentine human rights 

violations. Modification of our posture must take 

into account the implications for our stance toward 

other countries with human rights violations, as well 

as the message this would send to human rights groups 

in Argentina and internationally who have joined us 

in criticizing human rights violations in Argentina. 

U.S. arms sales policies toward Argentina must 

also take into account the strategic balance in the 

Southern Cone. Chile already sees our improving relationship 

with Argentina as threatening in the context of the 

Beagle Channel■dispute. Major U.S. arms sales to 

Argentina while we maintain our present cool and distant 

relationship with Chile would further tip the balance 

-6- 

GECRET-

^BECHET 

-7- 

of power in favor of Argentina; this plus the political 

signal renewed arms sales would convey to both parties 

could encourage Argentina to seek a military solution 

to the Beagle Channel dispute, if the current mediation 

fails. 

B. Issues To Be Discussed; 

1. Has there been sufficient-improvement in 

the human rights situation to change our position 

on military sales? 

2. What specific human rights improvements would 

be required for us to change our position? 

3. Are there strategic or economic consideration 

which would cause us to seek approval of specific 

sales? 

4. What are the ramifications of a resumption 

of sales to Argentina on the military balance in the 

Southern Cone? On our stance toward other countries 

with human rights violations? 

IV. PRESIDENT-DESIGNATE VIOLA'S VISIT TO THE U.S. 


Argentine President-designate'Roberto Viola tentatively 

plans to travel to New York December 5 to address 

the Council on Foreign Relations and U.S.-Argentine 

Chamber of Commerce. According to the Argentine Embassy 

here, he may also visit Washington December 6-7. 

Viola is a moderate within the Argentine military 

hierarchy, friendly to the United States, and sympathetic 

to U.S. views. His visit would provide an opportunity 

to influence future Argentine policies on Bolivia, 

grains, human rights, and Tlatelolco. On the other 

hand, coming to Washington in the middle of a Presidential 

transition is awkward. The Carter administration 

will not be in a position to discuss policy beyond 

January 20. Whether the President-elect or his advisors 

would want to see him to review U.S.-Argentine relations 

is problematical. 


1. Whether Viola should be encouraged to come 

to Washington. 

SECRET

tSEeBET ’ 

-8- 

2. In the event of an affirmative answer, who 

should see him? 

Attachment: 

Status of Human Rights in Argentina. 

Drafted:ARA/SC:GJWhitman:mas 

11/10/80 

V_SE€RET

STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA 

The human rights situation in Argentina has improved 

over previous years, but remains serious. Most seriously, 

fundamental, internationally recognized rights of 

the integrity of the person have been violated through 

the application by the security forces of the tactic 

of disappearance. The number of confirmed disappearances 

registered in Argentina this year.total 11, but there 

are unconfirmed reports of 22 or more. This total 

is in contrast to the many thousands who disappeared 

in 1976 and 1977, more than 600 in 1978 and 44 in 

1979. There continue to be reliable indications that 

individuals detained as suspected terrorists or subversives 

are subject to torture. There has been no accounting 

for past disappearances. 

The number of detainees on other than common criminal 

charges has been reduced, although the numbers remaining 

are still significant. Since 1974, 8200 people accused 

of terrorism or subversion have been detained under 

the special executive powers of the President. By 

September 1980, prisoners accused of other than common 

crimes totaled 1,700 to 1,800. Of these about 750 

were being held without trial, some for many years 

or after having served their sentences. About 600 

had been tried and convicted in military or civilian 

courts and another 400 were in trial status. The 

right of option program, which allows qualified prisoners 

to choose self-exile in lieu of detention, has been 

greatly restricted by Argentine Government regulations. 

As a result, of the 277 prisoners who have qualified 

for the U.S. Hemispheric Parole Program, only 82 persons 

have been able to travel to the United States. 

Prison conditions have improved, although there 

is still concern over psychological conditions which 

may have been a factor in a number of suicides. Earlier 

complaints regarding overcrowding, lack of medical 

treatment, improper food, and restrictions on visits 

have been largely resolved. 

The opportunities for the exercise of political 

freedoms remain circumscribed by the prohibition on 

political activities and de facto limits on the freedom 

of expression. Within uncertain limits, politicians 

and the press increasingly voiced criticism of the 

Government's actions and plans. Occasionally politicians 

were detained on the grounds that they had overstepped 

the limits of the law. The military designated the

-SBeKfff 

President for the period 1981-1984, while reiterating 

its ultimate commitment to return the country to civilian 

rule. However, no date has been fixed for that devolution. 

-10- 

SECRET-

Cleared:AHA/SC:REService 

ARA:JABushnell . 

ARA/RPP: GJones ■.. 

ARA:WGBowdler 

-11- /

NSU-l/II 

'HE WHITE HOUSE 

WASH I NGTON 

March 21, 1979 

MEMORANDUM FOR 

THE SECRETARY OF STATE 

. i 

SUBJECT: 

U.S. Policy to 

I understand that you are considering changing our approach 

to Argentina to reflect the lack of improvement there in 

human rights. I have read the INR report on the human rights 

situation in Argentina, and I agree that it is a sobering 

document. The human rights situation in Argentina may just 

be the worst in the hemisphere, but in deciding what approach 

the United States Government should take to Argentina, I 

believe we should address two questions: 

(1) What is the most effective approach to Argentina 

to encourage them to respect human rights? (S) 

(2) What approach will permit us to sustain in’ the U.S. 

our overall human rights policy? When we take actions toward 

Argentina, which are interpreted as punitive, we not only 

enrage the right-wing ideologues, we also arouse the business 

sector and the media in the U.S. This doesn't mean that we 

shouldn't necessarily take such steps if we feel that they 

are required, but it does suggest that we should move carefully 

and explain our position to a wide-ranging audience — in the 

U.S. and elsewhere — before taking any steps, least we 

jeopardize our overall human rights policy. (S) 

Argentina is a big, proud and subtle country. We have an 

impact on Argentine government decisions, but it's never 

as direct or as much as we want. This is the case in our 

human rights policy. (S) 

The Argentine government wants a warmer relationship with us 

at least in part because the U.S. under Carter has the prestige 

and the morality which could contribute to the idea that the 

Argentine military government is legitimate. Such legitimacy 

would undermine the civilians and the democrats in Argentina 

and therefore strengthen and contribute to the institutionalization 

of the military government. The Argentine government 

has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer to the 

U.S.: (1) through lobbying and propaganda in the U.S., they 

have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights 

SECRST-~ 

Review on March 20, 1985

-2- 

policy, and (2) they have taken "small steps" in the human 

rights area at home. While the "disappearances" continue, 

still the Argentine Government has released some prisoners, 

they have released the names of about 3,5000 people who 

remain in prison, they have taken steps on high priority 

individual cases (e.g., Deutches, Timerman, etc.), and they 

have invited the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. (S) 

The last —the invitation— may well be the most important. 

It not only broke the monolithic Southern Cone opposition to 

the Commission, but it also will provide us a more legitimate 

basis on which we and other countries should make decisions 

on human rights to Argentina. (S) 

I think our policy toward Argentina should remain cool and 

correct until such time as the human rights situation 

dramatically improves and the government has begun to move 

toward democratization. I believe.that we should continue 

to use every opportunity both directly and through third 

countries to encourage them to improve their human rights 

situation. They will continue to try to lure high-level 

visitors but we should resist that until progress is evident. (S) 

I think to take steps now, which could be interpreted as 

punitive, would be to invite criticism from moderate and 

conservative sectors in the U.S. at a time when we need their 

support on other issues. Moreover, I don't think it would 

be effective vis-a-vis Argentina. (S.) 

Even if you would prefer to adopt a tougher approach, I would 

recommend that you delay implementing this approach until 

after the Commission has completed its report. I realize 

that this may mean six months to one year, but I think the 

wait is justified. (S) 

In summary, I hope that you will reconsider your position on 

Argentina. I think we should continue to maintain a strong, 

cool, and correct posture to the military regime until progress 

in human rights is evident. Now is not the time for us to 

move to negative votes in the IFI's or to cut back Export- 

Import Bank credits. At the least, we should wait until the 

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issues its report 

and then adjust our policy appropriately. (S) 

Onr oc Wm. 6* JU 

ZBIGN] 

EZINSKI 

^SECRET

1£5 *******G 0 M F I B ft ” I~~A £*******£ COPY 


STU408 

DE RUESBA #7745/1 2701320 

0 R 260900Z SEP 80 

FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRFS 


INFO USMISS ION GENEVA 1344 

AMEM3ASSY LIMA 3678 

AMEMBASST ROME 891 

USMISSION USUN NEW TORT 1151 

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 7745 

EXDIS 

ROME FOR VATICAN OFFICE 

DEPT PLS PASS USCINCSO FOR INTAFF 

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/19/86 (RUSER, CLAUS W.J OR-M 

TAGS: SHUM PINT AR 

SUBJECT: THE TACTIC OF DISAPPEARANCE 

REF: BUENOS AIRES 7578 

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 

2. SUMMARY: DISAPPEARANCE IS STILL THE STANDARD TACTIC 

FOR THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES IN DEALING WITH CAPTURED 

TERRORISTS. THE MILITARY'S COMMITMENT TO THIS METHOD IS 

PROFOUNDLY ROOTED IN ELEMENTS THAT RANGE FROM EFFECTIVE 

NESS THROUGH EXPEDIENCY TO CULTURAL BIAS. WE DOUBT WHETHER 

INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AND OPPROBRIUM WILL, IN THEMSELVES, CAUSE 

THE GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE THE TACTIC AND GRANT CAPTURED TERROR 

ISTS DUE PROCESS. GETTING THE AUTHORITIES TO ABANDON THIS 

TACTIC WILL BE AN UPHILL BATTLE. WE MUST TRY. 

TEE VATICAN MAY BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE ADVOCATE IN THIS 

EFFORT WHICH SHOULD TRY TO CONVINCE THE LEADERSHIP THAT 

TRERE ARE OTHER WAYS TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM—ESPECIALLY 

THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COURTS. END SUMMARY. 

RECLASSIFIED 

3. THOUGH DRASTICALLY REDUCED IN NUMBERS FROM PREVIOUS 

LEVELS, DISAPPEARANCE CONTINUES TO BE THE STANDARD TACTIC 

FOR THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES IN DEALING WITH PEOPLF 

THEY BELIEVE TO BE MEMBERS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. 

DISAPPEARANCE IS A EUPHEMISM FOR TEE UNACKNOWLEDGED DETSNg###*###*##**** 

*VJHSP. COMMENT ************** 

PSN:039393 PAGE 01 

*******£ CT-N F-I D E N T I A- L****sit#*E COPY

»*****»^LjO- N 7 I—D-S K' T r~A l**#****E COPY 

TION OF AN INDIVIDUAL BY SECURITY FORCES. EASED ON EVERY 

THING WE KNOW, WE 3SLIEVE THAT DETAINEES ARE USUALLY 

TORTURED AS PART OF INTERROGATION AND EVENTUALLY EXECUTED 

WITHOUT ANY SEMBLANCE 0? DUE PROCESS. AS WE UNDERSTAND 

IT, THE CURRENT GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURITY FORCES ARE TO 

USE THIS PROCEDURE ONLY AGAINST ACTIVE MEMBERS OF TERROR 

IST ORGANIZATIONS. THE RESULT HAS BEEN' THAT VIRTUALLY 

ALL OF THOSE WHO DISAPPEARED THIS YEAR hAVE PROBABLY 

BEEN MONTONEROS. 

4. THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES WON TEE "DIRTY VAR" 

AGAINST THE TERRORISTS TWO YEARS AGO. SINCE THAT TIME THE 

MONTONEROS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CARRY OUT ONLY ISOLATED, IF 

OCCASIONALLY SPECTACULAR, ACTS FOR WHICH THE TERRORIST 

ACTCRS HAVE OFTEN EVENTUALLY PAID WITH THEIR LIVES. 

THUS, EVEN IF ONE WERE TO CONCEDE THE CASE BEFORE, NECESSITY HARDLY 

CAN BE INVOKED BY THE MILITARY TO JUSTIFY THE USE OF DISAPPEAR 

ANCE AS A COUNTER-INSURGENCY TECHNIQUE. ON THE OTHER 

HAND, THE CONTINUED USE OF DISAPPEARANCE HAS A VERY HIGH 

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COST FOR THE -GOVERNMENT. IT IS 

ON THE DEFENSIVE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. RELATIONS 

WITH THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO BE STRAINED 3Y THE 

ISSUE. TEE PROBABLE INVOLVEMENT OF ARGENTINE SECURITY 

FORCES IN THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THREE ARGENTINE MONTONEROS 

IN PERU FORCED PRESIDENT VIDELA TO CANCEL A TRIP TO LIMA 

THAT HE WISHED TO MAKE TO SYMBOLICALLY 

EXPRESS HIS GOVERNMENT'S DEMOCRATIC INTENTION. 

AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL IN THIS GOVERNMENT,‘OUR CONTACTS, 

EVEN AMONG THE MILITARY, RECOGNIZE THESE COSTS AND EXPRESS 

TEE HOPE THAT EVENTUALLY DISAPPEARANCES WILL CEASE. 

5. BUT THEY DON'T THIS UNWILLINGNESS DOES NOT REFLECT 

SIMPLE EL00DY-MINDEDNES5 BY UNTHINKING MILITARY MEN. IF 

IT DID THE PROBLEM MIGHT BE MORE SOLUABLE. RATHER THE 

ARGENTINES HAVE RECORSS TO DISAPPEARANCE BECAUSE: 

—IT WORKED. MORAL AND LONG TERM POLITICAL COSTS APPEAR 

LESS IMPORTANT THAN SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS TO THE GOA. 

ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES DEFEATED ONE OF THE LARGEST 

TERRORIST ASSAULTS ON A MOBFRN SOCIETY USING THIS 

TACTIC. THE EXPERIENCE OF WEST GFRMANY AND THE UNITED 

STATES IN USING THE LAW TO MVET A TERRORIST THREAT MAKES 

LITTLE IMPRESSION HERE SINCE THE MILITARY ACCURATELY 

EVALUATE TEE THREAT THAT THEY BESTFD AS BEING MUCH LARGER 

THAN THE ONE THE UNITED STATES AND THE ERG FACED. RATHER, 

ARGENTINES INVOICE ITALY'S CONTINUING TORMENT AS WHAT 

THEY MIGHT HAVE FACED IF THEY HAD STUCK TO THE LAW. 

—IT CONTINUES TO BE EFFECTIVE. DISAPPEARED PRISONERS YI~I.D 

UP INFORMATION UNDER TORTURE. DISAPPEARED PREISONERS CAN 

BE TURNED AGAINST THEIR FORMER COMRADES. DISAPPEARED 

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PRISIONEP.S ARE BELIEVED TO BE A FRIGHTENING EXAMPLE THAT 

INHIBITS THE MONTONEROS' ABILITY TO RECRUIT NEW PERSONNEL. 

3T 

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DE RUSS3A #7745/2 27K1330 

C R 260900Z SEP 30 

FM AMEMEASSY BUENOS AIRES 

TO SECSTATF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6893 

INFO USMISSIOH GENEVA 1345 

AMEMEASSY LIMA 3679 

AMEMEASSY ROME 892 

USMISS ION US UN NEW YOF.T 1152 

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 771:5 

EXDIS 


DEPT PLS PASS USCINCSO FOP. INTAFF 

—THE MILITARY ARE UNlflLLINC- TO USE CIVILIAN COURTS TO 

PUNISH ACTIVE TERRORISTS. THEY ARGUE ThAT THE COURTS 

WOULD SIMPLY LET THE TERRORISTS GO. IN VIEW OF THE 

STIFF SENTENCES HANDED OUT RECENTLY TO TERP.ORISTS 

CAPTURED IN EARLIER YEARS, THIS ARGUMENT IS NO! CONVINCING. 

WE EFLIEVE THAT THE PROBLEM IS FOUNDED FIRST IN THE 

INABILITY OF TEE MILITARY TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE FOR USE 

IN THE COURTS AC-AINST MEN AND WOMEN FANATICALLY DEDICATED 

TO THEIR CAUSE—OTHER THAN THAT EXTRACTED FROM THE 

DETAINEES UNDER TORTURE. SECONDLY, THE SECURITY SERVICES 

ARE UNWILLING TO SURRENDER THEIR COMPLETE CONTROL OVER 

THE DETAINEES. 

—THE MILITARY DOES NOT HAYS FULL CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE. 

THEORETICALLY A SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE WOULD 

HANDLE THE TERRORISTS, METING OUT CAPITAL SENTENCES 17 

THAT WERE TO ITS TASTES. HOWEVER, FOR SUCE A SYSTEM 

TO WORK, THERE WOULD HAVE TO EE OFFICERS OF RECORD '"HO 

IN THE FUTURE COULD 3? HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR 

ACTIONS. AS ONE MAN, HIMSELF A MEMBER OF ONE OF THE MAJOR 

SECURITY FORCES, TOLD US, THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO 

ARGENTINE OFFICER WHO WANTS TO HAVE HIS NAME ON RECORD 

AS ORDERING THE EXECUTION OF A TERRORIST. UNDER THE 

CURRENT SYSTEM, THE MILITARY ARE RESPONSIBLE AS AN 

INSTITUTION BUT TEE INDIVIDUAL IS FREE FROM ACCOUNTABILITY. 

—AT BEST, THE RULF OF LAW IS A WEAK AND FRA"ILF CONCEPT IN 

ARGENTINA. THE MILITARY POES NOT OPERATE IN A VACUUM AND ITS 

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DISREGARD FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF DUF PROCESS REFLECT 

WIDESPREAD ATTITUDES IN THIS SOCIETY. ARGENTINES WHO 

GENUINELY RELIEVE IN THE RULE OF LAW, SOME IN THE GOVERN 

MENT AND OTHERS OPPOSING IT, REMAIN A MINORITY. 

—FORCING THE SECURITY FORCES TO A3NADON THE TACTIC WOULD 

INVOLVE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE POLITICAL LEVEL OF 

THE GOVERNMENT AND VERY POWERFUL ELEMENTS IN THE -SECURITY 

FORCES. THE POTENTIAL COSTS OF SUCH A CONFRONTATION MAKE 

IT A VERY UNATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO A GOVERNMENT WHICH 

MUST COUNT ON A MILITARY INSTITUTION THAT IS MORE OR 

LESS UNIFIED. 

—INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AND OPINION ARE GIVEN LESS 

WEIGHT BY THE MILITARY THAN THE NEED TO CLEAN UP THE 

REMANANTS OF TEE ANTI-TERRORIST WAR. THEY WILL NOT 

EASILY CHANGE THEIR TACTICS TO MOLLIFY CRITICISM. 

6. TEE USE OF DISAPPEARANCE IS NOW RESTRICTED, WE RELIEVE, 

TO ACTIVE TERRORISTS. THUS, THE EXTENT TO WHICH DISAPPEAR 

ANCES OCCUR DEPSNIS SOLELY ON THE NUMBER OF MONTONEROS WHO 

ARE ACTIVE AND GET CAUGHT. AS TEF NUMBER OF ACTIVE 

MONTONEROS HAS DECLINED, SO HAVE THE NUMBER OF DISAPPEARANCES. 

THIS TREND WILL CONTINUE IF TEE NUMBER OF ACTIVE MONTONEROS 

CONTINUES TO TROP, BUT DISAPPEARANCE AS AN ACCEPTABLE TACTIC 

WILL NOT END SOON. 

7. AS THE VAR BETWEEN THE TERRORISTS AND THE SECURITY FORCES 

GOES ON? HUMANITARIAN VALUES AND US RELATIONS WITH THIS 

COUNTRY ARE CAUST IN A CROSSFIRE. WE OBVIOUSLY CAN DO 

LITTLE TO AFFECT THE TERRORISTS' CHOICE OF WHETHER OR NCI 

TO CONTINUE THEIR STRUGGLE. OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE 

GOVERNMENT'S DECISION ON TACTICS IT WILL USE IN THIS FAR 

IS NOT MUCH GREATER. IT WILL REMAIN DIFFICULT FOR US TO ARGUS 

AGAINST ARGENTINE "SUCCESS" IN ITS UNDELCARED WAR AGAINST 

TERRORISM AND PARA-MILITARY GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. BUT WE 

BELIEVE THAT DESPITE THE OBSTACLES WE MUST MAYF THE EFFORT. 

WE SHOULD: 

—MAKE IT CLEAR TO GOA OPINION MAKERS THAT WHILE WE HAVE 

NO SYMPATHY FOR THE TERRORISTS WE CANNOT CONDONE EXTRA- 

LEGAL ACTIONS GAINST THEM. SO LONG AS THE GOVERNMENT 

CONTINUES TO FMPLOY SUCH TACTICS THERE WILL BE AN 

IMPORTANT IMPEDIMENT TOMORMAL RELATIONS. 

—ENCOURAGE THE GOVERNMENT TO PONDER SERIOUSLY HOW THIS 

POLICY IMPEDES ITS EFFORTS TO MAKE ARGENTINA A RESPECTED 

MEMBER OF THE WESTERN FAMILY OF NATIONS. 

—STIMULATE THE GOVERNMENT TO THINK ABOUT ALTERNATIVES TO 

THE TACTIC OF DISAPPEARANCE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ESTABLISH 

MENT OF AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE MAY BE 

THF BEST ANSWER. IF THE MILITARY COULD BE SHAKEN OUT OE 

THFIR BELIEF THAT DEATH IS TEE ONLY REASONABLE PUNISHMENT 

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FOR TERRORISTS, TRW ARMED FORCES MIGHT SEE ADVANTAGES 

IN USING THE MILITARY COURTS. TEE BRAZILIANS RFLIED ON 

THEM DURING THEIR SUCCESSFUL BOUT WITH TERRORISTS. THIS 

EXAMPLE MIGHT HELP CONVINCE THE ARGENTINES THAT THEY 

SHOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THIS ALTERNATIVE. 

—ENCOURAGE THE VATICAN AND POSSIBLY THE ARGENTINE CHURCH 

TO INTERVENE WITH THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES. THE 

PAPAL NUNCIO HERE UNDERSTANDS THE ISSUES AND IS ALREADY 

INVOLVED IN TRYING TO GET THE GOA TO EXAMINE THE MORALITY 

AND WISDOM OF THE TACTIC OF DISAPPEARANCE (SEPTEL). THE 

CHURCH AND THE POPE HAVE FAR MORE INFLUENCE HERE THAN 

THE USG AND CAN BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE ADVOCATES OF A 

FULL RETURN TO THE RULE OF LAW. WE WILL OF COURSE 

CONTINUE TO FOSTER RETHINKING OF THE POLICY OF DISAPPEAR 

ANCES WITHIN TEE MILITARY AND THE GOVERNMENT. 

RUSER 

BT 

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/ 

DRAFT 

-SECRET {Entire Text) 


THE PRESIDENT 

From: 

Warren D. Christopher 

Subject: 

Steps to Improve U.S.-Argentine 

Relations 

-.Pursuant to 

ycrur instructions, the Inter-Agency 

Group for the Arne rican Republics has prepared a plan 

9 

of action for 198 0, which I am submitting for your 

approval. 

* 

£ 

I. OBJECTIVES 

- 

Our principc 1 objective will be improve our relationships 

so as to fc ster Argentina's identification with 

the West; to seel 

assistance on appropriate East-West 

issues (e.g. grai ns); to foster increased sensitivity 

among Argentine ] 

eaders to global nonproliferation 

concerns; to encc urage further specific 

DECLASSIFIED 

Authority 

E.0.1352B . 0 

^ -I 

NARA

-2- 

improvement in current human rights practices (e.g. 

due process for a+1 persons suspected of subversion 

thus to contain Soviet political 

and economic influence. We also wish to encourage 

continued Argentine cooperation with the Papal Mediation 

of Argentina's dispute with Chile over territorial 

limits in the Beat 

le Channelj a dispute that very nearly 

led to war betweeik the two countries in late 1978. 

Finally, we wish :o encourage Argentina to play a 

constructive role with respect to developments in 

Central America and in other Hemispheric issues. 

II. ACTIONS 

FOR 1980 

1. The Consul tat:. ve Process 

We will cont 

economic consults 

visit to Buenos A 

nue the process of political and 

:ions begun with General Goodpaster's 

res in January. We contemplate: 

—A visit by 

the Assistant Secretary for Inter- 

American Affairs 

iio Buenos Aires, possibly about August 1.

-3- 

—A meeting of the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic 

Commission in October, the U.S. delegation to be 

chaired by the Unêr Secretary of State for Economic 

Affairs. 

—Periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric 

issues, with the 

during the visit 

irst round of such talks to be held 

American Affairs. 

2. Nuclear Relat 

of the Assistant Secretary for Interons 

We want to .kiiep open the door for such cooperation 

as Argentina may 

a way to maintain 

In particular, we 

to provide highly 

flesire for its nuclear program, as 

influence for the longer-term, 

should try to meet our commitment 

and moderately enriched fuel for 

Argentina's resea :ch program. We should: 

—Try to res Dive promptly, in accordance with 

D.S. law, the remDining safeguards issues to permit

-4- 

delivery of the research fuel and the licensing of 

U.S. components; 

—once this is done, undertake a review of the 

advisability of modifying U.S. policy to facilitate 

greater participation by U.S. industry in Argentina's 

nuclear program. (The principal case currently at 

issue is an export license permitting the sale of 

a high-pressure vessel for the Atucha II power reactor.) 

3. Human Rights 

We would continue the dialogue on human rights 

with Argentine leaders, through'Ambassador Castro 

and dtrring the visit by the Assistant Secretary for 

Inter-American Affairs. In these consultations we 

will attempt to obtain assurances that: 

■ 

—the GOA will accept an OASGA resolution which 

encompasses a call for further improvements by Argentina 

and which maintains the integrity of the OAS Commission 

on Human rights;

-5- 

— there be no new disappearances, (i.e., extralegal 

abductions of persons suspected of association 

with terrorism or subversion, including persons believed 

to be active terrorists); 

—all persons suspected of terrorism or subversive 

activities be processed through normal judicial channels, 

thus ensuring due process to such detainees; and 

—there be substantial progress in advance of 

the OASGA, in reducing the number of political prisoners 

held without charges through release, trial, or exile 

(during his recent .visit, Ambassador Smith-was assured 

that half of these prisoners—1,300 at the time—would 

be released or sentenced by the end of the year). 

The Inter-Agency Group noted that an accounting 

of the fate of disappeared persons was being addressed 

in UN fora, and concluded that this should not be 

a central requirement for improving our bilateral 

relationship.

-6- 

4. Military Relations 

We will begin to rebuild relations through increased 

contact and consultations, while stressing that further 

progress on human rights will'be essential to the 

more fundamental improvement in relations (including 

a modification of the Humphrey/Kennedy amendment, 

as reported in the conclusions of the PRC meeting). 

We plan to: 

—begin periodic security consultations with 

Argentina; the fir-s’t round, to be held this year in 

Buenos Aires, would focus on Soviet activities in 

the South Atlantic; 

— invite an Argentine Armed Forces team to make 

a return visit to Washington later in the year to 

discuss global defense issues; 

— invite Argentina to send a guest instructor 

to the U.S. Army School of the Americas. (The Executive 

Branch will consult with members of Congress on this 

initiative.)

-7- 

Other issues are: 

—High-Level Military Visit. 

We will keep under review the desirability to 

proceed with an invitation to a senior Argentine military 

leader (such as the Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine 

Army or the Army Chief-of-Staff) to visit Washington 

this year. A final decision on this (including the 

question of timing) should take into account the implications 

of such a move on the selection of the next 

Argentine president now under way within the Argentine 

Armed Forces, as well as developments in human rights 

and D. S.-Argentine’ relations. 

—Sale of P-3 Aircraft. 

In DOD's view, there is a strategic need for 

the sale of ocean surveillance aircraft .to the GOA. 

We see no possibility, however, to seek special legislation 

to permit the sale of these aircraft to Argentina 

this year.

5. Other Cooperative Steps 

In addition, we would: 

—Sign the pending P.S.-Argentine Agricultural 

Cooperation Agreement during the visit of the Assistant 

Secretary for InterAmerican Affairs; 

— Seek to conclude the negotiations for the bilateral 

income tax treaty; 

— Seek to negotiate a consular convention. 

6. Consultations with Other Allies 

The Inter-Agency Group also considered whether 

and in what form the Administration should consult 

our NATO allies and Japan about issues of common concern 

such as human rights and recent Soviet initiatives 

toward Argentina and other countries in the Hemisphere. 

•We believe recent Soviet activities are a subject 

for the NATO experts group on Latin

8 

America and should be addressed in that forum. Human 

rights are discussed by the WEO group in the appropriate 

UN fora, such as the UN Human Rights Commission. 

A majority of the Inter-Agency Group recommended against 

any new bilateral approaches to our Allies on these 

issues. 

7. Implications for U.S. Policy Toward Brazil and 

Chile 

_ The Group also-considered the implications for 

> 

neighboring countries, especially as regards security 

consultations. 

As a general point, the Group noted that many 

of these steps will merely restore a better balance 

in U.S. relations with the two countries since the 

U.S. already has a comprehensive consultative process 

with Brazil (including*, most recently, security consultations). 

There was agreement that Brazil would not 

respond favorably to a proposal for trilateral security 

talks at this time.

9 

Not addressed by the Group, but a problem of 

some consequence, nonetheless, is the Chilean perception 

that we have "tilted" toward Argentina. Chile sees 

our warming relationship with Argentina as being directly 

threatening in the context of the Beagle Channel dispute. 

We have attempted to persuade the Chileans that what 

we are doing with Argentina has nothing to do with 

Chile or with our position on the Beagle Channel, 

which is to encourage acceptance of the outcome of 

Papal mediation and avoid war. However, the Chileans 

seem to fear that the Argentines, enjoying improved 

relations with the U.S., and seeing Chile increasingly 

isolated, will be encouraged toward adventurism. 

This'problem of art imbalance in our relationships 

in the Southern Cone, and of the dangers that this 

could pose to peace in the region, will need to be 

looked to in the not-too-distant future. 

ABA/SCsCWRuser:Is 

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 3828 

MODIS 

E.O. 12055: XDS-1 1/28/10 (CASTRO, RAUL r ■ . ) OR-M 

TARS: PFPR, AR 

SUBJECT: (C3 DRA^T MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION: GENERAL GOODPASTER'S 

VISIT TO />ROENTlnTT'S!!!^5U!, 'P'OtiynTAt ‘I'OFll'b ; JlWUAKr*g3-------------------- 

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.) 

2. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION 

*. SUBJECT: GENERAL GOODPASER'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA: 

GENERAL POLITICAL TOPICS 

4. PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS: BRIGADIER (RET) CARGOS PASTOR, 

FOREIGN MI MISTER 

DR. JOS51 ALFREDO MARTINEZ DE FOZ, MINISTER OF ECONOMY 

COMODORO CARLOS CAVANDOLI, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER 

MR. VICTOR R’EADGE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (NOTETAKER) 

GENERAL ANDREv; J. GOODPASTER, PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY 

RAUL H. CASTRO, U .S. AMBASSADOR IN ARGENTINA 

CLAUS «V. RUSER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE (ARA/ECA) 

WILLIAM H. HALLMAN, Cf.S. EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES (NOTETAKER) 

c. PLACS AND TIME: JANUARY 23 AND 24, 1953J TiE MINISTRY 

Qtp FOREIGN AFFAIRS, RUENOS AIRES 

c. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMA.U. GENERAL GOODPASTER 

mut ON TV70 CONSECUTIVE DAYS AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 

AFFAIRS. TOREIGN MINISTER LED GENERAL POLITICAL 

DISCUSSIONS FOR ARGENTINA, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS 

COMCFRNS, POLITICAL-MILITARI AFFAIRS AND MATTERS 

HAVING TO DO vITH NUCLEAR COOPERATION. IT T*AS HIS 

GENERAL CONTENTION THAT AM ACCRETION OF MISUNDERSTAND 

INGS TROUBLES U.S.-ARGENTINE RELATIONS, AND TEAT U.S. 

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MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF ARGENTINA HAVE LED US TO MISCAL 

CULATIONS IN POLICY. MOST TROUBLING, HE ASSERTED, HAS 

BEEN OUR MISUNDERSTANDING OF ARGENTINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS 

SITUATION. IN HIS SECOND PRESENTATION, ON JANUARY 24, 

BRTGAUIER PASTOR SUGGESTED SPECIFIC REMEDIES FOR 

^FS^RING FULL CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION. 

7. A SÂRATE MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION COVERS 

ECONOMY MINISTER MARTINEZ OE ROZ'S RESPONSE TO OUR 

WORTS TO ENLIST ARGENTINA'S HELP IN KEEPING GRAINS 

SHIPMENTS TO THE SOVIET UNION AT EARLIER EXISTING 

LEVELS. END MEM CON INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. 

P. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23: FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR'S 

T’IRST PRESENTATION. 

PASTOR RESPONDED TO GENERAL GOODPASTEK'S EXPLANATION 

0* PROBLEMS RISING FBQM THIS SOVIET INVASION OF 

AFGHANISTAN, AND THE GENERAL'S PROPOSED AGENDA FOR 

DISCUSSING ARGENTINA'S ROL5 IN THESE, WITH THE WISH 

AT SOMF POINT TC COVER TEE FULLEST RANGE OF POLITICAL 

PROBLEMS EXISTING UEWEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED 

STATES. 

°. LATER PASTOR LED INTO HIS SUBJECT WITH A RHETORICAL 

QUESTION: IF GRAINS SHIPMENT COOPERATION IS SO IMPORTANT 

JUST NOW IN 00R BILATERAL RELATIONS — EVEN AS W.E ADMIT 

THAT THIS PROBLEM IS TRANSITORY AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL — 

PQW MUCH MORE IMPORTANT IS IT TO HAVE DELATIONS ON SUCH 

BASIS TÂW IN s’A?. MORE SERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES, WAR FOR 

EXAMPLE, ’’’HE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA WOULD STAND 

TOG^TPER? 

IB. wp CANNOT ARRIVE AT THIS HOWEVER WITH "ON-THE-SPOT" 

DISCUSSIONS. WE NEED TIME, AND IT IS REQUIRED THAT WE 

ADDRESS A SERIES OF POLITICAL-MILITARI AND OTHER QUESTIONS. 

UNFORTUNATELY. PASTOk CONTINUED, MEDIOCRE OR BAD RELATIONS 

ARE THE ”NORM BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE II.S. THE UNITED 

SPATES HAS SELDOM UNDERSTOOD ARGENTIMF REALITIES, AND 

BAD INFORMATION AND MISJUDGMS.MJ HAVE LED TO ERRORS OF 

U.S. POLICY, AND "INADMISSIBLE U.S.G. ACTIONS. 

1. A GREAT U.S. ERROR FAS FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THAT 

ARGENTINA FOUGHT A ''7AP AGAINST TERRORISM-COMMUNISM THAT 

TASTED BETWEEN T>*0 AND THREE Y REARS. AND ARGENTINA WON 

vAR — UNLIKE, FOR EXAMPLE, NICARAGUA. THE U.S. 

SHOULD BE PRO'JU OF ARGENTINA FOR HAVING DONE THIS — 

RATHEH TÂN ASSUMING THAT "VIOLENT REPRESSION" WAS 

TFT! HALLMARK OF THIS GOVERNMENT. YET IS IS THIS 

SYMBOLISM, PASTOR «'FNT ON, THAT H4S BEEN TAXHN SO 

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SERIOUSLY BY HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES — 

RATHER AS TROUGH "ATOMIC BOMB DROPPER" SHOULD 

CHARACTERIZE THE UNITED STATES BEFORE ARGENTINES, 

WEN THE U.S. HAD FOUND IT NECESSARY TO USE THAT 

INSTRUMENT ONLY IN ONE BRIEF SET CF CIRCUMSTANCES. 

12. FURTHERMORE, THIS U.S. CHARACTERIZATION OF 

ARGENTINA LED TO MANY UNFAIR POLICY DECISIONS: TO THE 

R'UMP^REY—KENNEDY AMENDMENT, TOWARD CONDEMNATION OF 

.ARGENTINA AT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND 

OT^FR INTERNATIONAL FORUMS — EVEN, PASTOR ASSERTED, 

TO U.S. OPPOSITION TO ARGENTINE NUCLEAR. DEVELOPMENT. 

13. COITL3 "RE U.S. NOT HAVE RECALLED THAT IN 1932 

ARGENTINA .-'AS FIRS" TO SEND SHIPS TO REL*3 THE FREE 

,,fORLD IN THE CARIBBEAN? ("WE DIDN'T EVEN GET \ 

TFANK-YOU NOT'7.") ARGENTINA BACA ED Til U.S. IN 

PAKISTAN'S DISPUTE WITH INDIA j THIS COUNTRY HELPED 

DEFEAT AN UNFRIENDLY MOTION ON PUERTO RICO AT THE 

NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT CONFF iENCEJ WE WERE THE FIRST 

LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY TO TAKE IN EAST ASIAN REFUGEES J 

WE VOTED VITfl THE U.S. IN TOKYO ROUND TRADE MEETINGS; 

'■•TF ALIGNED WITH THE iJ.S. AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN A 

RESOLUTION ON AEHGANISTAN. 

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NOD IS 

14. U.S. LACS OF APPRECIATION IS NOT UNDERSTANDABLE 

TO THE ARGENTINE "MAN ON THE STREET," 'REN RE LEARNS 

*PR EXAMPLE TRAT YOU WANTED TO USE US TO TAKE IN TEE 

SÂB OF IRAN. GOVERNMENTS CHANGE, BUT ARGENTINES 

RVMEMRFP all these PROBLEMS. 

15. FOR IS REASON, PASTOR CONTINUED, GOA MUST ASK 

NOW FOR PROFOUND CHANGES IN U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD US, 

PASTOR SAID. AND NOT ONL? MUST ATTITUDES TOWASD ARGENTINA 

HE CHANGED, BUT ATTITUDES TOWARD MOST OF LATIN AMERICA. 

THESE CHANGES OP ATTITUDES IN POLICY HOPEFULLY WILL BE 

reflected at *re white house, in thf. congress, at inter- 

MATIONAL MEETINGS. PASTOR ASKED THAT THE U.S. STOP_PRESSING 

ARGENTINA SO SAPP IN NUCLEAR AFFAIRS ( IN RESPONSE TO"WHICH WS__ 

in)*fW-Ct3rSSI3S^.^SCOMt«NW9LG_MAT- 1HE-PRESIDENT POSTPONE A TRIP TO 

^ THE gQVIF.T UNTON HE PLANS TO MAKE LATE?. THIS YEAR'"'). 

10. (AT THIS POINT PASTOR TOUCHED ON SEVERAL OTHER 

SPECIFIC POSSIBLE ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES, WHICH 

Hp DEVELOPED MORE FULLY THE FOLLOWING DAY. THEY ARE 

RECORDED IN THAT CONVERSATION.) 

17 PASTOR TÊ.M ADDED: AND YOU MUST NOT CATEGORIZE US 

AS JUST ANOTHER ANTI-DEMOCRATIC MILITARY GOVERNMENT. 

TWIS GOVERNMENT IS WORKING HARD TO ARRIVE AT REAL 

DEMOCRACY — AND NO* OF TfU LAUGHING STOCK KIND OF 

*PF IAS* PTRQNIST PERIOD, EVEN THOUGH TRAT "DEMOCRACY” 

BOASTED A CONGRESS AND OTHER TRAPPINGS. IT WAS THAT 

GOVERNMEN* WHOSE FIRST ACTS WERE CO-SIGNED BY CUBAN 

PRESIDENT DORTICOS AND CHILEAN PRESIDENT ALLEMDEJ 

TTS LATER DAYS WERE CHARACTERIZED BY DISORDER AND 

KIDNAPPINGS. NOW !//E nAVE NO HUNGER, RACE PROBLEMS OR 

PPRTOUS CRIM?. "rfE WANT TO 9E CONSIDERED AS A SERIOUS 

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amugijc n N V T 1} d i‘ T p -y. COP if 

COUNTRY" PASTOR SAID. 

IP. A NEW PATH WILL LEAD TC A PULL ALLIANCE; TuS 

FKIS'i’ING COURSE WILL LEAD n A "NEW NEUTRALITY" WITH 

WWICK NEITHER THE TT.S. NOR THE ARGENTINES "/ILL FEEL 

COMFORTABLE, PASTOR CONTINUED. THE CONSEQUENCES 

■?ILL BE "UNCERTAIN." THEN wg ADDED: ifOUR REVISIONS 

OF THOUGHT MUST BE TOWARD LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 

OTHER THAN MEXICO AND VENEZUELA — ALL O'*' LATIN AMERICA 

N*EDS U.S. ATTENTION, HOWEVER MUCH STB MAY APPRECIATE 

YOTTR ATTENTION TO THE MID-EAST, SOUTH ASIA AND OTHER 

TROUBLE SPOTS. 

19. IN RESPONSE, GENERAL GOODPASTER ASSURED PASTOR 

r"JAT ARGENTINA HAD EARNED ITS PLACE AMONG RESPECTED 

NATIONS, AND THAT WE S HOW THIS APPRECIATION IN WORKING 

WI^H ARGENTINA IN THE OAS, AS WE DID EARLIER IN THE 

ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS. w5 UNDERSTAND ARGENTINA'S 

TRADITIONAL CONCERN FOR HUMAN DIGNITY — IT IS PART 

C7 OUR SHARED HERITAGE — AND CURRENT EFFORTS TO 

RTSTORE THIS SITUATION. 

23. FURTHER, GOODPASTER CONTIN-JED, PRESIDENT CARTER 

"AS SAID HE SHARES HOPES FOR BETTER RELATIONS. THERE 

IS AN UNDERSTANDING OF PAST JVIT.ED STATES ERRORS. 

IN NUCLEAR Affairs FOR EXAMPLE: KNOWING OF ARGENTINA'S 

LACK OF INTENTION TO DEVELOP A WEAPON WE WANT ARGENTINE 

PROGRESS — BUT WITH APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS.

*******(>_£_ N fid njus-^t-nj******^ copi 

•T TRU HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT. " I TAL-.CED WITH 

SECR^TAR7" VANCE ABOUT SOME OT THIS THE DAT 37"'ORE 

LEAVING WASHINGTON. H'H IS CONCERNED FOR BASIC 

LEVELS 0? HUMAN TREATMENT, BOT KNOWS TOO OF YOUR 

ÂgT DIFFICULTIES AND ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS TO RESTORE 

L^GAL PROCESSFS." (COMMENT: GENFR&L GOODPASTER 

ADDRESSED OTHER SPECIFIC POINTS. THESE TOO ARE 

INCLUDED IN GREATER DETAIL IN THE SUBSEQUENT CONVERSA 

TION.) 

23. GENERAL GOODPASTEfl REFLECTED ON THE NEED FOR 

'T’IMELY CONSULTATION, AMU RECALLED WHAT THE LACT OF IT 

CAN DO TO AN ALLIANCE. HE SPOKE OF BETTER COORDINATION 

AND USING the EMBASSY AS A CONSULTATIVE DEVICE. HE 

CONCLUDED: "WE UNDERSTAND THAT TEE RIGHT OF CITIZENS 

TO RE PROTECTED FROM VIOLENCE IS AN IMPORTANT RIGHT, 

AND WR FEEL ARGENTINA HAS COME FAR TOWARD ACCOMPLISHING 

THIS. TRR ttniteD STATES UNDERSTANDS THIS — BUT YOU 

MUST UNDERSTAND SOME OF THE INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE 

MADE THE O.S. STRONG. AMONG THEM IS A FREE PRESS, 

VITAL *0 OUR SOCIETY EVEN .-'RILE WE ADMIT THE PRESS TENDS 

TO 'ACCENTUATE THE NEGATIVE.'* 

24. (COMMENT: THIS CONCLUDED SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS 

ON JANUARY 2^. SEPTEL "7ILL CONTINUE WITH PASTOR'S 

PRESENTATION AND GENERAL GOODPASTER'S RESPONSES ON 

JANUARY 24.) 

CASTRO 

T^T 

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TELEGRAM 

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FH AHEHBASSY TEL AVIV 

TO SECSTATE WASHOC 4307 

INFO USICA WASHOC 

ANEH9ASSY BUENOS AIRES 


STATE FOR NEA/ARA VARY; NA FOR DERI AN 

USICA FOR AR 

E.O. 12065: RDS 10/25/99 (DIETERICH, W.J.) OR-O 

TAGS: PEPR, PI NR, PINT, IS, AR 

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH ARGENTINE EXILEJA£QBQ,.TJ11ER>UIN 

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT) 

2. IN CONVERSATION WITH PRESS ATTACHE DIETERICH, WHO 

KNEW HIH IN ARGENTINA DURING A 1972-74 TOUR THERE, 

TI HERMAN DISCUSSED INTER ALIA HIS INTERROGATION BY 

POLICE AUTHORITIES IN ARGENTINA, ANTI-SEMITISM ON THE 


WHETHER TO WRITE ABOUT HIS EXPERIENCES, AND THE 

FUTURE OF ARGENTINE POLITICS. TINERNAN WILL BE IN THE 

UNITED STATES TO RECEIVE AN AWARD FROM THE AMERICAN 

JEWISH CCNNITTEE ON SATURDAY, OCT. 27. AFTER THAT HE 

PLANS TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK WHERE HE EXPECTS TO SEE 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIAN. THîy^WILL JSD.TO WASH 

INGTON FOR VARIOUS MEET jN.G.j_ ON THE HIlT/V ThTTWMTMENT, 

AND AT THE WhTtE-HOUSE~— " 

V" * 

TEL AV 22920 01 OF 02 200494Z 

NOT TO MENTION COX IN ANY ARTICLES. 

6. TI MERMAN ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE BELIEVES THE RIGHT- 

WING AND VERY ANTI-SEMITIC NEWSPAPER CABIL30 IS FINANCED 

BY DIANA DE MASSOT, PUBLISHER OF NUEVA PRCVINCIA IN 

BAHIA BLANCA. INB: MRS. HASSOT WAS WELL-KNOWN TO THE 

EMBASSY, AND IF MEHORY SERVES, RECEIVED A MARIA MOORS 

CABOT OR IAPA AWARO II. 1973 OR 1974.1 

7. AS TO THE FUTURE OF ARGENTINE POLITICS, TI HERMAN 

SAYS HE SEES A SITUATION IN WHICH MODERATE AND RIGHT WING 

ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY WILL COMPETE FOR PERONIST 

SUPPORT, WHICH MAY-CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH ISABEL PERON 

WILL BE IN A POSITION TO DECIDE WHO RUNS ARGENTINA. 

B. IN CONVERSATION WITH TIMERMAN ONE IS LEFT WITH A 

CHILLING IMPRESSION THAT HE IS SIMPLY REPORTING 

WHAT HE HAS EXPERIENCED AND BELIEVES. HE CHARACTERIZES 

THE ARGENTINE MILITARY RIGHT AS CLASSICALLY TOTALITARIAN 

AND ANTI-SEMITIC. 

9. TIMERMAN IS NOW EMPLOYED BY THE IMPORTANT TEL AVIV 

DAILY MAARIV AND SEEMS COMFORTABLE VITH THAT FACT, 

ALTHOUGH HE SAID HE MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN SPENDING SOME 

TIME AT AN ACADEMIC INSTITUTION IN ThE US. HE SPECIFICALLY 

MENTIONED COLUHBIA. THUS FAR HE HAS WRITTEN ONLY ON 

LATIN AMERICAN NATTERS, BUT IT IS TO BE EXPECTED THAT HE 

WILL BRANCH INTO BROADER DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL 

POLITICAL MATTERS. HE SAID THAT THE THEME OF A SPEECH 



3. TIHERMAN SAID THAT THE MAIN FOCUS OF QUESTIONING 

DURING HIS IMPRISONMENT WAS HIS ROLE AS THE ARGENTINE 

’LEADER* OF AN ALLEGED WORLD ZIONIST CONSPIRACY, AND 

THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE EMPHASIS ON ANY LEFTIST OR 

TERRORIST CONNECTIONS. HE WAS ONCE TORTURED IN LA 

PLATA IN A ROOM WlTh AN ORGANIZATION CHART WHICH SHOWED 

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZIIISKI AS THE LEADER OF THE CONSPIRACY. ON 

ANOTHER OCCASION HE WAS TOLD THAT HE WAS BEING BEATEN 

BECAUSE HE HAD DARED TO USE THE TERM LEFTIST-FASCISTS 

IN A CONVERSATION WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIAN, THE 

OBJECTION APPARENTLY BEING THAT HE HAD SLANDERED FASCISM. 


BETWEEN MENACHEM BEGIN AND THE HOHTONEKO GUERILLAS 

DJRING A BEGIN VISIT TO ARGENTINA IN I97G. TIMERMAN 

BELIEVED THESE QUESTIONS STEHHED FROM THE FACT THAT 

BEGIN'S BOOK ’WAR IN THE HOLY LAND" HAD BEEN FOUND AMONG 

MATERIALS USED BY 1HE MONIONIKOS. TIMERMAN WAS BROUGHT 

FROM PRISON TO AN INTERVIEW WITH GEIi. HARGUINDEGUY IN 

THE CASA ROSADA PRIOR TO A DERIAH VISIT. THE GENERAL 

INFORMED HIH THAT THE ARGENTINA GOVERNMENT WAS AWARE 

THAT PATT DERIAN WAS INTERESTED IN HIS CASE BECAUSE SHE 


4. TIMERMAN ALSO REPORTS THAT HE BELIEVES LANUSSE'S EX 

PRESS SECRETARY EDGARDO SAJCN DIED OF A HEART ATTACK 

DURING TORTURE BY ELECTRIC SHOCK. SINCE HE WAS A 

RELATIVELY YOUNG MAN, ThE MILITARY DID NOT SUSPECT THAT 

HE HAD A HEART CONDITION. 

5. T IME.BMM ^S.NqW,RU.HST^HJ JJ) .VfclEOBflîSJ.JJPER- 

IENCES III ARGENTINA BECAUSE HE FEARS REPRISALS BY THE 

MiL IfXRUJlJ*IHST FRTeIICs'STILL III TrGENT'ihT "AS ’aN 

EXAMPLE 0F~ IlTls’ HE PiEilTI'OMED "THAT“ROBERT COX, EDITOR OF 

ThE BUENOS AIRES HERALD, HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO HIM 

THROUGH THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IH BUENOS AIRES ASKING HIM 

CONFIDENTIAL 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O. 13526 

Authority M LC. -Le "4-1-,2-1 

NARA—Data 

u

CONFIDENTIAL 

Department of Stati. 

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HIS G R AT t T U DE_ TO SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THE DEPARTMENT AND 

T H E wh'i jTjiui&C -lIw I S 

__ _ 

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM 

CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL 


WASHINGTON 6275 

ACTION November 2, 1979 

S53N59 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

THE PRESIDENT 


Jacobo Timerman (U) 

Jacobo Timerman, the Argentine newspaper editor and publisher, 

who was recently released from house arrest and expelled from 

Argentina, has asked to see you. He has been in New York 

since October 29 to receive the Hubert Humphrey Freedom Award 

from B'nai B'rith. In light of your personal intervention 

with President Videla on behalf of Mr. Timerman, the Department 

of State believes you should meet with him. (C) 

Timerman last week told our Press Attache in Tel Aviv that he 

is now reluctant to write about his experiences in Argentina 

because he fears reprisals by the military against friends 

still in Argentina. For a similar reason, I believe a meeting 

could be counterproductive to our efforts to encourage human 

rights improvements in Argentina. Timerman's release was the 

culmination of such a vicious struggle between moderates and 

hardliners in the Argentine military that it provoked a coup 

(which was unsuccessful) by the hardliners. I believe that 

the moderates would consider your meeting with him as an unfriendly 

(rather than an appreciative) gesture, and they would 

be less likely to be accommodating to future cases. (C) 

RECOMMENDATION: 

That in liew of a meeting, you sign the attached letter to 

Timerman conveying your congratulations. 

Approve 

Disapprove 

The letter has been cleared by the speechwriters 

CONFIDENTIAL 

Review 10/30/85 

COtFIDEHTtAL 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority . A*

MEMORANDUM 5601 

-CQNFIDENTIA Er~ 

INFORMATION 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


WASHINGTON 

THE PRESIDENT 

August 31, 1977 

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 1$ 

An Update of Human Rights 

Developments in Argentina 

(L 

I. Hopeful Developments 

Prisoner releases. While the announcement of the release of 

342 political prisoners is a positive sign, it should be noted that 

we can only confirm that there have been four releases, and 

that we do not yet know what proportion of those released 

have actually been £reed without charges and what proportion have 

been charged formally and must face trial. In the six weeks 

since, the Argentine government has reported 199 detentions and 

77 releases. 

rT -5 

§ 1 

O J 

J±i ID j 

E w ;j 

P 

□ 

353 % □ 

D 

t-V 

. \j 

& 

'll 

I *. 

.iCQNEIDENTJLAU 2 

In mid-July, Argentina's Ambassador to Venezuela was 

kidnapped -in Buenos Aires. He has not been found yet. 

It appears that the kidnapping reflected hard-line military 

resentment against President Videla, who made a very 

successful state visit to Venezuela in May. 

The publisher of the only major Argentine newspaper, 

which has demonstrated consistent courage on behalf of 

human rightB, is being held by the government on economic 

charges at a secret place of detention; he waa tortured. 

At least five labor leaders have been warned recently to 

leave Argentina. Earlier this month a prominent Jewish 

leader fled to the United States after being threatened. 

III. Conclusion 

Most serious violations of human rights in Argentina are now 

taking place in the Buenos Aires military region. The commander 

of the region. General Suarez Mason, is a notorious hardliner, 

and is viewed as one of Videla'a principal rivals for power. 

Given the delicate political situation in Argentina, as well as the 

very uncertain nature of recent human rights developments, Embas 

Buenos Aires recommends that we should await developments befo 

further public comment. State will continue to keep you fully 

informed as events unfold. 

o 

-GeWl* mElsi ITAJLi/GDS 

-men

September 6, 1977 


THE HONORABLE TERENCE A. TODMAN 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR 

INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS 

CongrvifSMn Heavy Wanmaxt «I CaUierai* baa brought to our attention 

the bet that a relative ei eee of hie aeaetltutat^ Alejenro Seateh, 

wee allegedly HUtaapped by the Argentine secret police along with his 

eatlre family (hie wife, Helene, and three daughter#). According fee 

Cwgttttnan Waaoaaa, AJtejeare Deuteh ie art political it any way* 

but ie Jewish. He i« aa air conditioner manafeeturert hit wife is 

a pediatrician. Mr. Dent eh is reportedly a diabetic which leads his 

family to have great concern about his health. 

Congressman Waaman wanted the subject raised with the Argentinian 

delegation during their visit here. Z understand that Pat Darien has 

also been informed of tisds case. We believe it would be useful if 

you could pursue it at aa appropriate level with the Argentinian delegation. 

and we would appreciate receiving a report of their response 

so that Congressman Waxman could be appropriately Informed* 

David Aaron 

Deputy Assistant to the President 

for National Security Affairs 

act Pet Darien 

Coordinator for Human Right* sad 

Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the 

Deputy Secretary of State 

^CONFHMBWTT/^f 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.1352B 

Authority 

NARA__^l£— Dst° —^HSSua.—

MEMORANDUM 


” ffONF T DENT X T i—mr~ HP R 


FROM: 


DAVID AARON 

ROBERT PASTOR 

August 9, 1978 

l/* 

SUBJECT: Argentina: Your Questions 

You asked for three items on Argentina: (1) current status 

of the human rights situation in Argentina; (2) whether U.S. 

policy is in a bind with respect to Argentina and also the 

Southern Cone, and if so, how we got into it, and whether the 

NSC was involved; and (3) an alert item for the President. 

The item for the President is at Tab A. The other questions 

are answered below. 

I. Argentina's Human RightB Situation 

Argentina is still one of the worlsLlS-fflOat—serious human 

rights problem countries. Just tnis monthTAfflTSTTr^TKiTfernational 

launched a major campaign world-wide aimed at 

focusing public opinion on Argentina's dismal record, which 

includes, since March 1976, 15,000 disappearances, 8-10,000 

political prisoners, the majority of whom have not yet been 

charged; over 25 secret prison camps; and numerous documented 

stories of arrest and torture. (One report from our Embassy 

is at Tab B.) On human rights-related matters, world opinion 

always seems to lag behind the reality; Amnesty intends to 

correct that. 

While Argentina still has the worst record in the hemisphere, 

there has been some improvement in recent months. We understand 

that the Minister of Interior has instructed the police, 

and reportedly the military, to curb excesses; arrests under 

executive power have decreased and lists of those detained 

have been published; and a limited right of option for political 

prisoners to request exile has been reinstituted. On a number 

of cases in which we have expressed special interest — Jacobo 

Timerman, Alfredo Bravo, 4 of 5 members of the Deutsch family — 

the Argentine Government has released them. 

II. U.S. Policy 

In recognition of this progress, we have switched from voting 

"no" on non-basic human needs loans in the IFI's to abstaining. 

declassified 

CONFTDENT3EAIt-=u,GDS 

E.0.1352B . 

ionty7 ^ Dste l\ -------

„ CONFIDENTIAL - GL»d -2- 

We have also approved the licensing of 16 safety-related 

munitions items from FMS, and are currently considering another 

group of requests. 

We have informed the Argentine government that if they reach 

agreement on terms for a visit by the Inter-American Commission 

on Human Rights, and there is no deterioration in the human 

rights situation, we will go ahead with military training to 

them and will recommend that the Export-Import Bank permit two 

major credit sales. 

The most pressing deadline is October 1, 1978, when the Kennedy- 

Humphrey amendment prohibiting new arms transfers, and the Roybal 

amendment, eliminating grant military training to Argentina, come 

into effect. Both the Argentines and we are eager to take steps 

which would permit the enormous back-log of credit to be committed 

before then. (There are over 75 pending FMS cases for 

$50 million and $150 million on the munitions control lists.) 

There are also funds for military training, which are being 

held up, and which the President noted (on June 29) that he had 

a "slight" inclination to find an excuse for approving. 

Our current objectives are to urge the GOA: (1) to permit the 

IAHRC to visit in accordance with the IAHRC's regulations; 

(2) to begin releasing large numbers of prisoners (without rearresting 

them); (3) to stop the disappearances and explain 

those which have occurred; and (4) to seek a return to the rule 

of law. 

everything is stuck now pending Argentina's reaching agreement 

(with the Inter-American Commission or moving on one of the 

other objectives above. This basic decision, made in accordance 

with various legislative requirements, was made by State without 

consulting NSC. ------- - 

III. Future U.S. Policy: Who Blinks at the Brink? 

Have we gone too far? Have we pushed our policy beyond its 

effectiveness? Are we pushing the Argentines over the edge and 

jeopardizing our future relationship? Does the terror justify 

the repression? 

The last question is definitely the easiest. First of all. 

President Videla told our Ambassador in April 1978 that the 

war against subversion in Argentina had ended and that he was 

working to restore the rule of law. Terrorism has not left 

Argentina, but it is now the exception, not the rule. And 

Videla, himself, admits that the war is over; we are just 

encouraging that he secure his own promise. But regardless, 

a central tenet of our human rights policy is that governmentsanctioned 

repression never solves terrorism. As Vance said in 

his' OAS speech last year, "The surest way to defeat terrorism 

is to promote justice. . . Justice that is summary undermines 

the future it seeks to promote. It produces only more’ 

violence..." 

--CQNFIDENT-IAi—- GDS

„ GONgÊBEWTlSir - GDS -3- 

I, myself, believe that we may have overloaded the circuits 

and pushed too far, but like our policy to the Soviet Union, 

there is a logic to it which is difficult to argue. Indeed, 

it is even more difficult to change direction than with the 

Soviets because there are laws on the books which mandate 

that with respect to Argentina we tie oiir X-M credits, oppose 

bans in the IFI's, and condition our arms sales. Anything 

less, or a step backwards from the place we currently find 

ourself, would be judged as a Presidential retreat just as 

surely as a different decision on Dresser. 

|V Personally, I am most disturbed abo

eeWFTDENTiMr - GDS -4- 

us is out-of-date and wrong. For a short time, in early 1977, 

'the Southern Cone countries — led by Brazil but including 

Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay — tried to establish 

a bloc to confront our human rights policy. Because these 

governments distrusted each other more than they despised 

President Carter, the movement did not get off the ground, and 

indeed they were all over the lot at the O.A.S. General Assembly. 

Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are big- countries with extremely 

narrow, ultra-conservative authoritarian governments. The 

narrowness of their view is reflected in, among other things, 

the pettiness of their international disputes with one another. 

Chile and Argentina have almost gone to war over the Beagle 

Channel, and Brazil and Argentina have strained their relations 

almost to the breaking point on the issue of water rights. 

Our relations with Brazil are now better than they have been 

at any time since January 1977, and they are as good as can 

be expected given our non-proliferation policy, and the deliberate 

chill which Silveira injects into the relationship. We have 

tried through the working groups and the visits by the President 

and Vance to develop a cooperative relationship, but that will 

have to await Brazil's new government next year. 

What Kissinger failed to see, after completing his talks with 

the military leaders in Argentina and Brazil, is that Jimmy 

Carter has inspired a younger generation of Latin Americans; 

no other American President in this century has done that. 

Even Jack Kennedy, who was loved in Latin America, was suspected 

in the universities because of his strong anti-Communism and the 

Bay of Pigs intervention. Carter is' clearly viewed as a man of 

great moral stature in Latin America, and that inspires the 

young and the democratic and embarrasses, and unfortunately, 

sometimes infuriates some of the conservatives and the military. 

Carter's stature has translated into real influence unlike anything 

the U.S. has had since we turned in our gunboats, and at 

the same time, it has given the U.S. a future in Latin America, 

which we had almost lost. 

The best indication that the U.S. is winning in the Southern 

Cone, even though governmental antagonism is evident, is that 

the Argentines are still hungry for a return to normalcy in our 

relations. They use every opportunity and every channel — 

including Kissinger — to try to get Carter's approval. Thirty, 

twenty, even ten years ago, the idea that the Argentines would 

ask the U.S. to bestow upon them the mantle of legitimacy would 

have been unthinkable, even laughable. Today, it's real. 

The Argentines are a proud people, but they are also embarrassed 

by the human rights situation. They are also more sophisticated 

CONFIDENTIAL - GDS

CONF IDENTIfttr - GDS -5- 

than in the days of Peron when they looked for foreign scapegoats. 

There are limits to their sophistication, no doubt, 

and r will take care that we don't cross them, but I think 

it would be a mistake and an injustice if we turned our policy 

around at this time.

ATTACHMENTS 

1 - HUMAN RIGHT'S 

2 - KENNEDY-HUMPHREY AMENDMENT 

3 - HUMAN RIGHTS & U.S. RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES 

4 - UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM VISIT 

5 - NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION - ARGENTINA 

6 - CONSULTATIONS 

7 - ARGENTINA - GENERAL BACKGROUND 

8 - BIOGRAPHIC DATA 

President-Lt. Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla 

Foreign Minister - Vice Adm. Oscar A. Montes 

CONHDENTIM.

commit' 

HUMAN RIGHTS 

'The 1978 human rights record of the military junta 

led by President Jorge R. Videla is demonstrably better, 

than it was in mid-1976 or even mid-1977. • Serious 

violations still occur, however, raising questions about 

the significance, scope and effectiveness of measures 

that Argentine officials insist be recognized as 

"fundamental improvements," 

There is no evidence available to us that would 

indicate that strict observance of legal procedures in the 

treatment of political-security cases is in sight. 

On the positive side: 

— An apparent, although unverifiable, decline 

in the rate of disappearances has occurred since 

mid-1977. Both Embassy Buenos Aires and Argentine 

human rights, activists believe that the rate has 

declined. If true, this is the most important 

development listed here, 

— Over 300 prisoners were released in a Christmas 

amnesty. Subsequently, the government undertook 

serial publication (nine lists to date) of the 

names of the some 3,600 executive (state-of-seige) 

prisoners acknowledged as detained, 

i 

-- The "right of option" program has been implemented, 

enabling executive detainees to petition for exile 

in lieu of continued imprisonment. Less than 50 

prisoners have so far departed under this 

procedure, however, 

— Responsive action has been taken on cases in 

which the U.S. has expressed special interest, 

e,g,, Jacobo Timerman, Guillermo Vogler, and 

the Deutchs, 

— Attempts reportedly have been made by some 

security authorities to regularize detention 

procedures, return counterterrorist troops to 

normal military activities, and demilitarize 

the police, 

'CQWrefflAb—- 

GDS

-2- 

On the negative side of the ledger: 

— Disappearances continue, with one of the several 

security entities probably responsible in nearly 

every instance. Victims have included not only 

suspected terrorists but also labor leaders and 

workers, human rights advocates, scientists and 

doctors, members of radical political parties, 

and others whose specific vulnerability remains 

unknown• 

— Despite President Videla's professed desires, 

renegade security elements continue to operate 

with apparent impunity because they act with the 

toleration if not under orders of Borne military 

officials. At least in cases involving suspected 

terrorists, clandestine arrest, torture, and 

summary execution are standard practices. 

— There are five reasonably documented cases 

(which occurred in February and March) in which 

political prisoners were released and almost 

immediately assassinated, presumably by security 

officials. There have been reports of other 

caseB like these. 

— A particularly shocking incident, which 

occurred last December, was the abduction 

by unidentified security personnel of 13 

members of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, 

a group that pressures the government for 

information on disappearance cases. According 

to reports, the bodies df seven of the group, 

including two French nuns, later washed ashore. 

— Official harrassment of selected religious groups 

continues. The Jehovah's Witnesses have born 

much of the brunt. 

Problem of the "disappeared." Estimates vary widely, 

but at least several thousand people have disappeared since 

the March 1976 military coup. Security personnel have 

been responsible in most cases, and it is during illegal 

detentions and subsequent interrogations that the most 

egregious violations tend to occur. In mid-1977 there was 

some fear that the gradual reduction in the number of 

terrorist combatants would be fallowed by a sweeping and 

systematic effort 'to eliminate so-called "intellectual authors

-3- 

of terrorism" and others who, for whatever reason, ran 

afoul of military hardliners. To our knowledge, no 

such sweeping attack was initiated, although, 

as indicated above, individuals not terrorists and 

representing a variety of sectors and interests have been 

abducted. Many are reported or presumed to be dead.

OTOENTIAL 

Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment 

On October 1, 1978 the 

to the Foreign Assistance Act 

prohibit the sale of items on 

to Argentina* 

Kennedy-Humphrey amendment 

will enter into effect and 

the Munitions Control List 

The amendment was passed by Congress in August 

1977 because of the serious human rights problems in 

Argentina, but was drafted to allow approval of license 

requests before October 1, 1978 if the situation in 

Argentina merited* 

Based on this amendment, and-more general legislation, 

the Department has held back most license requests for 

Argentina -- over 200 are now pending. This has created 

a most adverse reaction among the Argentine military and 

triggered their turn to European arms suppliers. 

^-eeNFioemAt—- 

GDS

KENNEDY—HUMPHREY ADMENDMENT 

ft 

Drafted: ARA/ECA : JNBuz^nis : jma 

9/1/197B x 29166 

Clearance:ARA/ECA:CWRu

HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. RESTRICTIVE ACTIONS 

The United States has taken the following 

restrictive aptions in response to human rights 

violations in’Argentina. 

* The International Financial Institutions 

— IBRD - We have abstained on three loans 

valued at $265 million since June 1977. 

— IDB - We have voted .no on three loans worth 

$123 million since October 1977. 

-- IFC - We have abstained on $33 million of loans 

since March 1978. 

The Export-Import Bank 

By law, the Export-Import Bank must take human rights 

into consideration when considering new transactions. 

Because of this legislation, there are 11 loan requests 

for Argentina valued at $683 million held back by the 

Bank. One of these bases, a request by Allis-Chalmers 

for $270 million for electrical generating equipment for 

a hydroelectric project, caused considerable negative 

reaction in Argentina. The Bank announced that it could not 

give Allis-Chalmers a letter of interest, which would have 

strengthened the company's hand in the international 

bidding for the contract because of the human rights 

situation in Argentina. The Argentines called in our 

Ambassador and presented a Note of Protest over what they 

considered this intervention in their domestic affairs. 

The Boeing Corporation, which has requested 

Export-Import Bank financing for the sale of $196 million 

in airplanes to Argentina, has had to turn to private 

banks in the face of the Export-Import position. The 

company may lose $100 million of the potential $196 million 

order• 

Military Sales 

— There are over 200 Munitions Control List cases 

valued at $145 million pending. Mainly spare parts, some 

cases have been held back eight months or more. 

-- 101 requests worth some $25 million for Foreign 

Military Sales letters of authorization are pending action 

by the U.S. They will not be acted upon unless there is 

positive movement in the human rights area in Argentina. 

GDS

HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. RESTRICSTIVE PRACTICES 

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Under Secretary Newsom Visit 

Under Secretary Newsom's late May visit to Argentina 

was made with the hope of eliciting same positive movement 

in the human rights area. Newsom made clear to the Argentines 

that our basic concern was for the rights of the 

person and promised that the U.S. would respond if the 

Argentines moved in any one of the three following areas : 

— Reach mutual agreement with the Interamerican 

Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) of the OAS for a 

visit by the Commission to Argentina 

— Try, release, or allow exile for the 3500 prisoners 

held without charge. 

— Establish a mechanism to inform the families of the 

disappeared of the fate of these people. 

Specifically, Mr. Newsom promised that the U.S. would 

1} recommend approval of the Aliis-Chalmers and Boeing requests 

for Export-Import Bank financing and, 2) approve sale 

of military training if the Argentihes would agree to a 

mutually acceptable IAHRC visit (President Videla had 

expressed to Mr. Newsom his government's intention to invite 

the IAHRC). 

The Argentines were elusive on the actions they would 

take, but the conversations were generally positive in 

tone • 

p** 

rw'i*. 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O.I352B

UNDER- SECRETARY NEWSOM VISIT 

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation -- Argentina 

Argentina has the most advanced and comprehensive 

nuclear energy program in Latin America. It seeks to 

become self-sufficient in nuclear energy, find to become 

the first exporter of nuclear technology in the hemisphere. 

It has based its power program on reactors fueled by natural 

(unenriched) uranium in order to avoid dependence upon 

suppliers of enriched fuel. Natural uranium reactors 

require heavy water to operate, and while Argentina can 

produce small quantities of this material, it cannot 

produce heavy water in the amounts required to support 

its ambition of complete independence. Acquiring heavy 

water production technology is therefore of critical 

importance to Argentina, and adequate technology is available 

only from the U.S. and Canada. However, -technology 

of a lower order might be available elsewhere. 

Beyond self-sufficiency in its nuclear energy 

program option, the ultimate intentions of the Argentine 

leadership in the nuclear field are not clear. Argentina's 

decision to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco represents 

a limited but welcome step to accept greater restrictions 

on its freedom of action. At the same time, Argentina is 

continuing with its plan to construct a sizeable reprocessing 

plant, and maintains that it is not prepared to 

forego this program unless parallel action is taken by 

Brazil. This plant would give Argentina an ample source 

of safeguard-free plutonium to support a weapons program 

as early as 19B1. There is no evidence of a decision by 

the government to carry out such a program, but the capability 

is there. 

Our most important lever in Argentina is the possibility 

of eventual transfer of heavy water production 

technology. We have made clear that the supply of heavy 

water production technology to Argentina is conditioned 

upon the acceptance of full-scope safeguards and the cancellation 

or deferral of the Argentina reprocessing 

project. The Argentines have repeatedly attempted to 

distort the U.S. position to obtain this technology 

without foregoing reprocessing. They maintain that since 

they have now ratified Tlatelolco and have indicated 

their readiness to accept full scope safeguards, the U.S. 

is obligated to supply this technology. But, we understand 

that in fact they have not deposited their instrument 

GDS 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526

2 

**■*'' '.^rW •’•J^ V Vi wUM - 

of ratification in Mexico City. We are uncertain whether 

this is in retaliation for U.S. human rights initiatives 

or simply bureaucratic laggardness. 

Both Governments have thus far managed to keep our 

nuclear dialogue apart from the human rights issue, but 

this is becoming increasingly difficult. In an effort 

to keep nuclear cooperation from becoming linked to the 

deterioration in other aspects- of'our relationship with 

Argentina, we are sending a delegation to Buenos Aires in 

October to discuss some next steps in expanding our cooperation 

in this area. 

c 

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3 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation - Argentina 

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CONSULTATIONS 

We have attempted to convey to 

our interest in maintaining continued 

cooperation in areas other thap those 

to human rights. 

the Argentines 

contact and 

directly related 

Joint US-Argentine Economic consultations are 

scheduled for September 18-22 in Washington. The 

talks will touch most areas of economic concern, 

including discussion of the MTN, countervailing duties, 

investment and tourism. 

We are also scheduling an October visit to 

Argentina by a nuclear group which- will discuss possible 

ways of expanding cooperation in this field. We hope 

that sandwiching the tWo meetings -- nuclear and economic — 

around the October 1 military sales cutoff dates will make 

it clear to the Argentines that we are desirous of improved 

relations and that the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment is not 

a unilateral declaration of hostility by the U.S. 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

WARA- 

.. 

-eem*-- 

GOS

ARGENTINA 

GENERAL BACKGROUND 

Argentina is Latin America's most European state. 

Its highly literate population of 26 million is Latin 

America's best trained. The first Latin American 

state to build a nuclear reactor (1958-}, it is the 

first "Third World" state to export a reactor to another 

country - to Peru in 1978. In agriculture, its 

potential remains vast. It is already the fourth 

largest wheat exporter in the world as well as the 

fourth largest cattle producer. 

At the time of the military takeover in March 1976, 

the civilian government of Maria Isabel Peron had disintegrated. 

Fanatical groups of leftist and rightist terror 

ists fought pitched battles, the country was nearly 

bankrupt and inflation exceeded an annual rate of 600%. 

Order has been imposed but at a heavy price in terms 

of human rights. 

The three man Junta which came into power in 1976 

has managed to maintain stability for 2 1/2 years, and 

prospects are for a continuation of relative internal 

peace for the foreseeable future. 

President Videla, recently elected in his retired-or 

civilian-status constituting the "fourth man" in the 

junta, projects a cautious image, suggesting a preference 

for acting by consensus within the army rather than risk 

dissension within the senior ranks. Civilian politicians 

and Church leaders perceive Videla as a moderate whose 

objective is to restore democratic rule. 

The ambitious Navy Commander, Admiral Massera, wants 

to circumscribe the Presidency's as yet unclearly defined 

powers. Massera himself will retire soon and has his 

lines out to civilian politicians and labor leaders in 

a cl-ear bid for the Presidency at some future date. 

Massera, who distinguished himself as a tough counterterrorist, 

is now championing human rights. 

The political parties, whose activities were suspended 

when the Junta came to power, discreted themselves by 

their ineffectiveness before the 1976 coup and have

-2- 

shown little effective resistance to the military government. 

They have few attractive candidates or issues 

to offer the voters. The PeroniBtas, a coalition of 

populist and minor labor elements won over 50% of the 

vote in the last election in 1973, but ard divided over 

who should inherit Juan Feron's mantle. The middle class 

Radlcales are making some effort to revive their party 

and stimulate public support, but seem.to be making 

little effective headway. 

In the next few years, there appears little possibility 

of a return to civilian rule, provided the Junta 

is able to bring about improvements in the economic lot 

of major sectors of the population. Although the Junta 

has been successful in rationalizing the economy and 

restoring business confidence from the chaotic pre-revolution 

conditions, serious problems remain. 

The government has built up foreign exchange holdings 

of over $5 billion, increased exports to over $5 billion 

annually and is attempting to balance the budget and 

has held unemployment to 4%. However, the government 

has not been able to control inflation, which is still 

running at over 100% per year. Expectation of runaway 

inflation is the main obstacle to private enterpriseoriented 

Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz's plans for 

economic recovery. * Given credit for the economic progress 

made by the Junta, the Minister could lose his military 

backing if the situation does not improve soon. Most 

serious is the decrease in the salaried employee's living 

standards. Real wages have declined by as much as 30% 

in some sectors in the last two years and popular discontent 

is increasing. 

The United States has $1.4 billion in investments 

in Argentina and $3 billion in loans from U.S. commercial 

banks. U.S. companies and banks have continued to show 

interest in Argentina, but are awaiting assurances that 

the country is politically and economically stable before 

making new long term investments. 

The U.S. has traditionally enjoyed trade surpluses 

with Argentina. 1977 exports to Argentina were $383 

million. The Argentine trade deficit with the U.S. for 

the First Quarter of 1978 was $42 million.

-3- 

Organized terrorist: movements have been largely 

brought under control* The once powerful Hontonero 

revolutionaries and the Trotskyite People's Revolutionary 

Army (ERP) have been decimated* Assassinations 

and bombings attributable to the left, however, do still 

occur occasionally. The American business community, 

which numbered approximately 1,200 in 1973, plunged to 

50 business representatives in 1975 but has now increased 

to somewhere over 100. 

The human rights situation remains bleak. While 

the government did acknowledge in February that it is 

holding some 3,400 prisoners without charges, there 

has been a reluctance to free or charge those detainees. 

Meanwhile, disappearances and torture continue. We have 

made it clear to the Argentines that we do want better 

relations, but that there will have to be improvement 

in the human rightB area before this is possible.

^CONFIDENTIAL, 

United States - Argentine Relations 

The human rights situation in Argentina bedevils 

our relations. This memorandum reviews our interests 

in Argentina, discusses the question of terrorism and 

human rights violations, and reports on steps we have 

taken to promote human rights. This latter category 

includes the use of our voice and vote in the international 

financial instituticns, a subject which the 

Argentine Minister of Economy .surely will raise with 

you. 

United States Interests 

- Human Rights: Wanton violations of human rights 

are taking place in the name of counterterrorism. We 

seek an end to such abuses and restoration of legal 

processes. 

- Non-proliferation: Argentina has the most 

advanced nuclear weapons prospects in Latin America 

and is moving rapidly to acquire an indigenous, and presumably 

unsafeguarded, reprocessing capacity. (The 

Department is currently considering possible strategies 

to inhibit this trend.) 

- Petroleum:. The U.S. Geological Service has estimated 

that Argentina's vast continental shelf may contain 

more than double existing proved reserves in the 

Western Hemisphere. 

- Food: Argentina has immense capacity for the 

production of grains and meat. 

- Economic: U.S. private investment stands at $1.4 

billion; our banks are owed $3 billion; and we have a 

$250 million trade surplus. (Prospects for greater trade 

and investment are enormous in the petroleum, minerals 

and agricultural fields.) 

- Scientific: Argentina is important to our 

Antarctic research program and an eventual claim to polar 

resources. 

- International Influence: Argentina is an almost 

wholly literate, generally self-sufficient industrial 

and cultural leader in Hispanic America. 

.CONFIDENTIAL

êeNFTDESTRAL 

- 2 - 

•Political Violence and Human Rights 

The Argentine military inherited an almost impossible 

situation when they took over the government of 

Isabel Peron in March 1976. Terror and. inflation were 

rampant. Even the Peronist Parliament and unions stood 

aside to permit the military to do their job. Now, 

well over a year later, the military have largely 

accomplished their initial security goals but are not 

moving to restore legal forms and political peace. On 

the contrary, they are polarizing society. The government 

refuses to acknowledge the names of thousands of 

political prisoners; torture, disappearances, prolonged 

periods of incommunication, summary executions, intimidation 

of lawyers, journalists and foreign refugees are 

undeniable. While not directly attributable to the 

government, anti-Semitism is also a problem. However 

battered, the terrorists, who are a mixture of anarchists 

and Marxists,1, continue to murder military personnel, 

policemen and businessmen but at a reduced rate. 

Notwithstanding, President Videla's aircraft was almost 

blown up upon takeoff earlier this year, and Foreign 

Minister Guzzetti very narrowly survived an assassination 

attempt, last month. 

Promoting Human Rights 

The United States raised the question of human rights 

with the Argentine military even before their welladvertised 

coup in March 1976. Since then we have 

pressured Argentina progressively, unfortunately with 

little to show in return. (Historically, Argentina has 

been the Latin American state least susceptible to our 

influence.) 

- In February 1977 the Secretary announced that 1978 

military sales credits were being halved as a result of 

the human rights picture. Argentina reacted by turning 

down the balance. Before then, we had advised the Argentines 

that $36 million in 1977 credits could not be 

signed as a result of the human rights situation. 

- Commercial arms purchases with direct applicability 

to internal security are now denied routinely. Other 

munitions licenses are also being held up although we 

have not yet decided how extensively to restrict commerical 

arms purchases. 

- A $700,000 grant military training program has 

survived Congressional efforts to eliminate it although 

this program's demise seems likely in 1979. 

CONFIDENTIAL

-€QNFIDENTI£Ir 

- 3 - 

- In the international financial institutions, 

since September, Argentina has tried to keep loans out 

of the Inter-American Development Bank which might 

trigger a negative vote under the Harkin Amendment. 

In March we raised our human rights concerns orally in 

the World Bank before voting for a $105 million highway 

project. 

Most recently we have been faced with the problem 

of how to vote on $265 million in five loans soon to 

come up for Argentina in the Inter-American Development 

Bank and the World Bank. This issue was raised by 

Secretary Blumenthal with Minister Martinez de Hoz on 

May 31. The Secretary said the Administration is as 

a matter of its own policy and conviction committed to 

the advancement of human rights. He suggested that it 

might be advisable for Argentina to postpone applications 

for loans until it could show a definite improvement in 

human rights. Martinez stated that this might be possible 

in the case of two Inter-American Bank loans, but he 

was anxious to move ahead on a $100 million World Bank 

project. The Secretary noted that the World Bank loan 

was particularly difficult for us (because it may be 

hard to argue that it benefits the needy). 

Suggested Talking Points 

Martinez de Hoz may well Jnake a plea for greater 

understanding of Argentina's difficult problems and 

raise the question of our votes in the international 

financial institutions. You might wish to: 

-- Compliment the Minister for his achievements to 

date m restoring Argentine economic stability (notably 

through the raising of foreign capital and promotion of 

Argentine agriculture). 

-- Inquire about the health of the former Foreign 

Minister who is now recovering from an assassination 

attempt. 

-- Ask why it has not been possible for the government 

to begin to restore legal processes after it has 

acknowledged publicly that it has all but finished the 

guerrillas. 

— Note the Administration's overall commitment 

to human rights and the great difficulty we are encountering 

with respect to Argentine projects in the 

international financial institutions. 

-U3QNFIDENTTAL

.CONFIDENT I Air 

- 4 - 

-- Refer to Secretary Blumenthal's suggestion 

that it would be help fill if Argentina deferred loan 

projects in the financial institutions that do not 

clearly benefit the neediest sectors of society. 

^CONFIDENTIAL-

JACOBINI CHARLES 

77 BUENOS AIRES 4638 

dMNFIDENTIAL--- 

J&GNFIDENT1AL 

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BUENOS 04638 01 OE 02 222034Z 

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TO SECSTATE VASHDC 1040 


E.O. 11652: CDS 

TACS: PORG, SHUM, AR, US, EFIN 

SUBJECT: COA NOTES HUMAN RICHTS IMPROVEMENTS 

REF: (A) STATE 138380, (B) BUENOS AIRES 4444, (C) BUENOS AIRES 4483 

SUMMARY: AS ANTICIPATED IN DEMARCHES BY MARTINEZ DE HOZ IN 

BUENOS AIRES (REFTEL B) AND AMBASSADOR AJA ESPIL IN 

WASHINGTON (REFTEL A), ARGENTINE OFFICIALS ANNOUNCED A 

NUMBER OF ACTIONS JUNE 14 THAT BEAR ON THE COUNTRY'S HUMAN 

RIGHTS IMAGE OVERSEAS. THESE ANNOUNCEMENTS INCLUDE THE RELEASE 

OF 342 PERSONS FROM EXECUTIVE CUSTODY, PROCESSING OF ALMOST 

1,000 SUBVERSIVE CASES IN FEDERAL AND MINITARLY COURTS, 

POSSIBLE REINSTATEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF 

OPTION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, AND BANNING OF TWO ISSUES 

OF A FAR RIGHT, RACIST MAGAZINE. VHILE THE ANNOUNCEMENTS IN 

THEMSELVES SHOW LITTLE BY WAY OF CERTIFIABLE SUBSTANTIVE 

CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, THE 

GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO COMPILE EXAMPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 

IMPROVEMENTS DEMONSTRATES ITS -RISING SENSITIVITY TO THE 

SERIOUSNESS OF THE U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POSITION AND OUR 

ADVERSE VOTES IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. 

END SUMMARY 

CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL 

PAGE 02 

BUENOS 04638 01 OF 02 222034Z 

1. AS NOTED IN REFTEL B, GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA'S (GOA'S) 

PRESENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS‘DEMONSTRATES BASICALLY 

FRIENDLY GESTURES AND INCREASED CONCERN ON THE PART OF GOA 

OFFICIALS TO MAINTAIN POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP IN 

RESPONSE TO U.S. REPRESENTATIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION. TEE 

LIST OF ACTIONS TAKEN, HOWEVER, SHOWS LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE. 

AS ANTICIPATED, THE'GOA ACTIONS AND COMMUNIQUES WERE RELEASED 

JUNE 14 AND PUBLISHED’IN JUNE 15 PRESS. 

2. AS A 15-DAY COMPENDIUM THE LISTING OF 342 PERSONS CITED AS 

NO LONGER BEING HELD AT THE DISPOSITION OF THE EXECUTIVE IS 

CONSIDERABLY LARGER THAN THE TYPICAL WEEKLY LISTS PUT OUT BY 

THE INTERIOR "MINISTRY. FURTHER, THERE IS NO WAY ' IMMEDIATELY 

TO VERIFY THAT PERSONS LISTED HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN RELEASED. 

(MARTINEZ DE HOZ DID, HOWEVER, TELL CHARGE THAT THE PERSONS 

LISTED WERE DEFINITELY BEING PHYSICALLY RELEASED FROM 

DETENTION AND NOT JUST PASSED TO OTHER AUTHORITIES’.) 

CONFIDENTIAL / ; PAGE 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13S2B 

Authority


77 BUENOS AIRES. 4638 

GONJIDENTIAIr- 

3. AS TOR SPECIEIC CASES, THREE OF THE NAMES-VERB Elf 

DAVID DIVINSKY AND HIS WIFE ANA MARIA MILER, BOOK PU1 

LISTED AS RELEASED TROM EXECUTIVE CUSTODY FOR SUBVERS 

CRIMES; AND JUAN CAR!OS ROUSSELOT, LISTED as releasei 

CUSTODY TOR ECONOMIC CRIMES. AS OF JUNE 16, NEITHER f 

DIVINSKY HAS YET BEEN RELEASED ACCORDING TO FAMILY FI 

ARE TRYING TO VERITY THESE CASES AS POSSIBLE INDICATC 

USUAL TATE'OF LISTED PERSONS. SINCE THE LISTS BEGAN1 1 

PUBLISHED VEEKLI IN JANUARY, WE HAVE VERIFIED-AND REI 

SEVERAL ACTUAL RELEASES, ALTHOUGH MANY EMBASSY SOURCJ 

INCLUDING VISITORS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF CHURCH AND 

RIGHTS GROUPS, CLAIM THAT THE MAJORITY OF PERSONS LIS 

IN DETENTION. (THIS COULD RESULT PARTIALLY FROM DEFIi 

INTERIOR MINISTRY ORDERS, AND PARTLY FROM BUREAUCRAT] 

INCOMPETENCE OF FEDERAL AND MILITARY PRISON AUTHORIT] 

CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL 

PAGE 03 

BUENOS 04638 01 OF 02 222034Z 

PERMANENT ASSEMBLY DIRECTOR JOSE WESTERKAMP (WHO HOS1 

PATRICIA DERIAN'S MEETING WITH ASSEMBLY IN MARCH) TOI 

ON JUNE 14 ABOUT THE PARTICULAR CASE OF A BOY JAILED 

WESTERKAMP'S SON IN SIERRA CHICA PRISON WHOSE NAME SI 

TWICE ON THE RELEASE LISTS AND ONCE ON THE LIST OF PF 

NEWLY DETAINED BY THE EXECUTIVE. THE BOY HIMSELF WAS 

INFORMED OF THE PUBLICATION OF ANY OF THE LISTS AND B 

AS A DETAINEE UNDER.STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS HAS IN 

REMAINED UNCHANGED FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR. 

CONFIDENTIAL



JWHFIDENTIAL- 

CONFIDENTIAL 

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BUEN.OS AIRES 4638 

4. THE INTERIOR MINISTRY STATEMENT THAT 667 SUBVERSIVE CASES 

HAVE BEEN REMANDED TO THE FEDERAL COURTS (WITH 327 SENTENCES 

PASSED) AND 305 CASES SENT TO SPECIAL MILITARY COURTS MARTIAL. 

(WITH 158 SENTENCES HANDED DOWN) APPEARED IN PRESS 

WITHOUT NAMES OR COMMENTARY. AS VERY FEW OF THESE TALKS AND 

SUBSEQUENT SENTENCING HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE-PRESS OR 

INDEPENDENTLY. CONFIRMED BY. EMBOFFS , WE CANNOT COMMENT ON THE 

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT. 

5. PRESIDENT VIDELA'S REPORTED INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORITIES 

TO ANALYZE THE REINSTATEMENT OF ..THE SUSPENDED CONSTITUTIONAL 

OPTION FOR PERSONS BEING HELD UNDER STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS 

TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY RECALLS HIS EARLIER APPOINTMENT OF A 

COMMISSION CHAIRED BY INTERIOR MINISTER HARGUINDEGUY TO REVIEW 

THE SUSPENSION LAST APRIL. AS A RESULT OF THE COMMISSION'S 

DELIBERATIONS AT THAT TIME, LEGISLATION WAS PASSED TO EXTEND 

THE SUSPENSION FOB ANOTHER 150 DAYS BEGINNING MAY 1, 1977. IT 

IS NOT YET KNOWN WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS MEAN THE 

OPTION WILL BE CONSIDERED MORE FAVORABLY IN THE NEAR FUTURE OR 

WILL ACTUALLY BE REINSTATED BEFORE THE PRESENT 150 DAYS SUSPENSION 

IS UP IN SEPTEMBER. 

6. GOA SUSPENSION OF THE DISTRIBUTION, SALE, -AND CIRCULATION OF 

THE MAY-JUNE CABILDO ISSUE NO. 8 WAS OF INTEREST. THE MAGAZINE 

CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL 

PAGE 02 BUENOS 04638 02 OF 02 222035Z 

WAS ACCUSED OF "PROPAGATING IDEOLOGICAL-RACIAL CONFLICT IN 

OPPOSITION TO THE NATION'S OBJECTIVES." THE DECREE FURTHER 

PROHIBITED THE PRINTING AND CIRCULATION OF THE’JULY ISSUE AND 

"ANY OTHER THAT ATTEMPTS TO REPLACE IT." THE BAN DOES NOT, 

HOWEVER, AFFECT THE MAGAZINE'S ADMINISTRATIVE OR PUBLISHING 

CAPACITY BEYOND THE TWO ISSUES, AND THIS SHORT'TERM SUSPENSION 

DOES LITTLE TO UNDO THE STRIDENT ANTI-SEMITIC RHETORIC OF THE 

APRIL CABILDO, ISSUE NO. 7. IT WAS THIS WHICH PROMPTED PROTESTS 

BY JEWISH GROUPS IN ARGENTINA AND OCCASIONED LOCAL AND 

INTERNATIONAL PRESS COMMENTARY (SEE BA 3370 AND 3631). 

7. COMMENT: THIS FLURRY OF STATEMENTS TO THE PUBLIC ON HUMAN RIGHTS 

WAS UNDERTAKEN WITH THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF INFLUENCING THE U.S. 

VOTE ON TWO LARGE BANK LOANS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THIS 

COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT-INTERVENED LA OPINION ON JUNE 16 

FLATLY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S RECENT ACTIONS WERE 

—CONFIDENTIAL / PAGE 3



CONFIDENTIAL- 

"SIGNIFICANT MEASURES TO COUNTERACT ACCUSATIONS FROM 

IMPROVE THE COUNTRY'S IMMAGE OVERESEAS". {NO OTHER PA 

COMMENTED EDITORIALLY ON THE GOVERNMENT'S ANNOUNCEMEN 

OF INTEREST, IS WHETHER THIS INITIATIVE WAS NOTHING ? 

WARMED OVER STATISTICS AND SMOKESCREEN GESTURES OR WB 

NEW ELEMENT HAS BEEN ADDED TO ARGENTINE EFFORTS' IN T£ 

OUR CONCLUSION AFTER STUDYING THIS LATEST "EVILENCE"- 

OUR INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REPORTED IN REF B—IS THAT TB 

INITIATIVE IS HOLLOW FROM THE SUBSTANTIVE SIDE, BUT I 

AND ENCOURAGING IN WHAT IT DEMONSTRATES ABOUT RISING 

BUREACRATIC SENSITIVITY CONCERNING THE SERIOUSNESS 01 

RIGHTS POSITION. 

CHAPLIN 

CONFIDENTIAL

* 

S/S 7720657 

35 


WASHINGTON 

August 25, 1977 

..CONFIDENTIAL" 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 

Warren Christopher, Acting ^"2! 

The President's Interest in Argentine 

Human Rights Improvements 

Our Embassy in Buenos Aires has now responded to 

the instructions sent to it concerning the President's 

interest in human rights improvements in Argentina. The 

exchange of messages on this subject is attached. The 

Embassy concludes that recent steps have some substance, 

but recommends caution with respect to associating the 

President with any specific favorable developments. 

Nevertheless, our Charge in Buenos Aires did call the 

attention of the Minister of Economy, the key civilian 

in the Argentine government, to the President's statement 

at Yazoo City. According to the White House 

transcript of July 21, the President said, "We have 

seen recently in Argentina 342 political prisoners, who 

had been there for a long time, released." 

I. 

We can point to the following hopeful human rights 

developments: 

— Prisoner releases. While the announcement of 

the release of 342 political prisoners is a positive 

sign, it should be noted that we can only confirm 

categorically that there have been four releases, and 


have actually been freed without charges and what proportion 

have been charged formally and must face trial. 

In the six weeks since, the Argentine government has 

reported 199 detentions and 77 releases. 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13528 

CONFIDENTIAL 

GDS 

Authority 

napa r.V n«tn IXaMu 

T^\S

■£ONP-IDENTISir 

-2- 

— Right of option. It seems likely' that the 

Argentine government will restore a limited form of the 

"right of option," whereby state of siege prisoners 

may seek voluntary exile. This will be an important 

measure if it actually leads to prisoner releases. 

— Political tolerance and the courts. There are 

signs that President Videla may be gaining support 

from other generals for a greater ventilation of 

political ideas with civilian leaders. This has prompted 

Argentina's oldest party, the-Radicals, to criticize the 

government's human rights record. The Radicals were 

accused of engaging in politics by the government, but 

rather than summarily punish the politicians, the government 

took the case to the courts. The lower courts 

ruled against the government, and the matter is under 

appeal. An Argentine government ban against the Jehovah's 

Witnesses is now in the Supreme Court, and there is hope 

that the court will declare the ban unconstitutional. 

II. 

On the other hand, the human rights situation 

remains very unsatisfactory in Argentina, particularly in the 

Buenos Aires region. 

— Eight lawyers or their wives were kidnapped at 

a sea resort near Buenos Aires in mid-July; one subsequently 

was found .murdered brutally. It appears the 

others were later released. It seems likely that the 

security forces were responsible. ■ (It is noteworthy that 

Argentina's most important newspaper, La Nacion, which 

has not distinguished itself on behalf of human rights, 

called unequivocally on July 18 for the Argentine government 

to protect lawyers from barbarism.) 

— In mid-July, Argentina's Ambassador to Venezuela 

was kidnapped in Buenos Aires. He has not been found 

yet. It appears that the kidnapping reflected hard-line 

military resentment against President Videla, who made 

a very successful state visit to Venezuela in Hay. 

— The publisher of the only major Argentine newspaper, 

which has demonstrated consistent courage on 

behalf of human rights, is being held by the government 

on economic charges at a secret place of detention; he 

was tortured. 

•CONFIDENTIAL

CQNP-IDENTI Mr~ 

-3- 

T” At least five labor leaders havp been warned 

recently to leave Argentina. Earlier this month a 

prominent Jewish leader fled to the United States after 

being threatened. 

Nearly all serious violations of human rights in 

Argentina are now taking place in the Buenos Aires 

military region. The commander of the region, General 

Suarez Mason, is a notorious hard-liner, and is viewed 

as one of Videla's principal rivals for power; Suarez 

is seconded by a retired general who acts as governor. 

These men are being held responsible by many for the 

latest round of violence. 

Given the delicate political situation in Argentina 

as well as the possibly hopeful but very uncertain human 

rights situation, I believe that we. should await develop 

ments before further public comment. We will remain 

alert for favorable developments, as the President has 

directed, and for appropriate opportunities to express 

his gratification. 

Attachments; 

1. State 162292, dated July 12, 1977. 

2. Buenos Aires 5303, dated Ju;ly 18, 1977. 

3. Buenos Aires 5522, dated July 27, 1977. 

CONFIDENTIAL

J* 

jaMrf+irttrnit, 


PAGE II BUENOS 06656 01 OF 13 212226Z 5763 BUENOS BSSSS II OF B3 31222bZ 

ACTION ARA-14 

INFO OCT-BI ISO-OB HA-SS TRSF-BB CIAE-OB DODE-BO PH-D6 

N-Bl I HR-1B L-03 NSAE-8B NSC-05 PA-81 SP-B2 

ss-is- ICA-11 AID-BS /B7B V 

.................................... B21372 22BS27Z /64 

R 212114Z JUL 7B 

FN AMEHBASSY BUENOS AIRES 

TO SECSTA7E WASNDC 6628 

INFO AMEMIASSY ASUNCION 

AHEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 

AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 

USCINCSO OUARRY NTS 


l 

E.O. 11662: GDS 

TAGS: SHUH, AR 

SUBJECT: 

HUMAN RIGHTS ROUNDUP 


PART I - NEV EVENTS AND INDICATORS 

(THE FOLLOWING IS NOT A COMPLETE REPORT OF ALL NEV 

EVENTS SINCE OUR LAST REPORT OF JUNE 16, 197B. A FOLLOV-UP 

SEPTEL WILL IE SUBMITTED NEXT WEEK.) 

DECISION REPORTED IHHINENT ON PERSONS HELD UNDER 

INSTITUTIONAL ACT. 

SENIOR MILITARY CONTACTS CONTINUE TO REPORT THAT A 

GOVERNMENTAL DECISION SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED 

BEFORE AUGUST 1 REGARDING THE 36 PLUS PERSONS PRESENTLY 

BEIHG HELD UNDER THE ACTA INSTITUCIONAL. THE JUNTA 

EVIDENTLY IS UNDOUBTEDLY UNEASY ABOUT 

THE ACTA WHICH INTER ALIA DETAINS INDEFINITELY A NUMBER 

OF SENIOR PERONIST LEADERS WITHOUT SPECIFIC CHARGES OR 

TRIAL. ACCORDING TO MILITARY SOURCES, THE JUNTA HAS " 

DECIDED IN PRINCIPLE THAT BEFORE AUGUST 1 ALL PERSONS 

BEING HELD UNDER THE ACTA SHOULO RECEIVE SPECIFIC 

SENTENCES AS ACTS OF ’REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE' OR BE TURNED 

OVER TO THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM FOR CRIMINAL PROSECTUION OR 

SET FREE. ONE NAVY CONTACT IN EARLY JULY ADMITTED THAT 

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN EACH CASE WAS PROVING TO 

BE VERY DIFFICULT, BUT HE WAS OPTIMIST THE DETERMINATIONS 

WOULD BE MADE AND APPROVED BY THE JUNTA. 

iiiCui...;.G 

TELEGRAM 

HAVE REPORTED TO THE EMBASSY THAT IN MID-JUNE A FEMALE 

PSYCHOLOGIST WAS ABDUCTED BY SECURITY FORCES AND HELD FOR 

16 HOURS. DURIHG HER DETENTION, THE PSYCHOLOGIST, A 

POLIO VICTIM CONFINED TD A WHEEL CHAIR, WAS REPORTEDLY 

INTERROGATED WITH ELECTRIC PICANA REGARDING THE WHEREABOUTS 

AND ACTIVITIES OF ONE OF HER PATIENTS. 

LOCAL LAVYER WHO ACCEPTS HUHAH RIGHTS CASES REPORTED 

TO EMBASSY ON JULY IS THAT THE MOTHER OF ONE OF HIS CLIENTS, 

DANIEL ALBERTO EGEA, WHO HAS BEEN UNDER EXECUTIVE DETENTION . 

SINCE EARLY 1S76, WAS ABDUCTED FDR FIVE DAYS IN EARLY JULY 

BY MEH CLAIMING TO BE FROM THE SECURITY FORCES. ^ MAS. EGEA 

WAS BEATEN AND THREATENED DURING HER INTERROGATION WHICH 

FOCUSED ON HER SON'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AHD FORMER 

FRIENDS. DURING THE LAST .TWO DAYS OF MER CAPTIVITY 

SHE SAID SHE WAS TREATED KI HOLY AND RELEASED WITH APOLOGIES, 

BUT WITH AH ACCOMPANYING THREAT TO REMAIN OUIET. (WE ARE 

CHECKING FURTHER AS TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REPORTED 

INTERROGATION OF ALLEGED 'POLITICAL ACTIVITIES'.) 

NEW DRUG REPORTED INTRODUCED 

A HUHAN RIGHTS SOURCE CONTACT IN THE MEOICAL 

PROFESSION WHOSE REPORTING HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST 

INFORMED THE EMBASSY IN LATE JUNE THAT TERRORISTS AND 

SUBVERSIVES SELECTED FOR ELIMINATION WERE HOW BEING 

ADMINISTERED INJECTIONS OF "KETAIAR", WHICH SOURCE 

DESCRIBED AS A POWERFUL ANESTHETIC, INSTEAD OF CURACE. 

ACCORDING TD SOURCE, KETAIAR IS ADMINISTERED IN AN INTRA 

MUSCULAR INJECTION TD THE PRISONER AS A PREVENTIVE HEALTH 

MEASURE, THE SUBJECT RAPIDLY LOSES CONSCIOUSNESS AND 

VITAL FUNCTIONS CEASE.' SOURCE ALLEGES THAT SUBJECTS ARE 

THEN DISPOSED OF IN RIVERS OR THE OCEAN. 

MISTREATMENT OF PRISONERS REPORTED 

A NUMBER OF THE EMBASSY'S HUHAN RIGHTS CONTACTS HAVE 

REPORTED THAT RECENTLY CATHOLIC PAROLED PEACE ACTIVIST 

AOOLFO MARIA PEREZ EOOUIVEL WAS SEVERELY BEATEN BY PRISON 

GUARDS IN LA PLATA PRISON SEVERAL WEEKS PRIOR TO HIS 

RELEASE. A NUHBER OF HIS RIBS WERE BROKEN. SAW SOURCES 

REPORT THAT ANOTHER PERMANENT ASSEMBLY LEADER (SEPARATE 

HEHCOH) WAS SEVERELY TORTURED DURING HIS INITIAL INTER 

ROGATION. (WARNING: XGDS-4. LEAKAGE OF THESE REPORTS 

IN WASHINGTON HAY PUT THESE HEN IN GRAVE DANGER.) 

EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED REPORTS I ITTHE LAST SEVERAL 

HOHTHS THAT SOME PEN PRISONERS TRIOR TO THEIR RELEASE 

FROM LA PLATA PRISON NAVE BEEN BRUTALLY BEATEN BY 

PRISON GUARDS. RED CROSS AUTHORITIES (PROTECT) HAVE 

EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN TO EMBASSY'REGARDING THE 

PHYSICAL ABUSE OF PRISONERS IN LA PLATA PRISON. 

UtCiASSIRED 

E.O. 13526 

Authority 

NARA._S;.?L-_- Dato__r3A2S^3c___ 

^9.^ 

i i 

MATERIAL 

i 

WITNESSES REPORTED TORTUED 

’ 

PERMANENT ASSEMBLY AND NUNCIATURA SOURCES (PROTECT) 1 • U ' 4^

-CMfHJtifrrffT 

Department of Stal 

! N w U MIH G 

TELEGRAM 

PAGE B1 BUENOS B5656 12 OF 13 212254Z 5767 

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, INFO OCT-II ISO-11 HA-15 T1SE-11 CIAE-11 OOOE-B1 PH-15 

iTTi INI-11 L-I3 NSAE-BB NSC-15'. PA-11 SP-12 

SS-15 ICA-11 AID-15 /B7I V 

................................... 121341 22B12IZ /64 

R 212114Z JUl 71 

FH AHEH1ASSY BUENOS AIRES 


INFO AHEHBASSY ASUNCION 

ANEIUASSY MONTEVIDEO 

AHEHBASSY SANTIAGO 



II - JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES PROBLEMS CONTINUE 

JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES' LEADER INFORMED EHBASSY OH 

JUNE 21,THAT GOVERNMENT ACTION HAS RESULTED IN THE VIRTUAL 

EXPULSION OF EVERY JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES CHILD FROH THE 

ARGENTINE SCHOOL SYSTEM. THE WITNESSES ABEL I EVE THAT MORE 

THAN A THOUSAND CHILDREN HAVE RECENTLY BEEN EXPELLED. 

ACCORDING TO THE WITNESSES' SPOKESMAN, HAHY SCHOOL SYSTEMS 

USED THE WITNESSES REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELABORATE 

JUNE 28 FLAG DAY EXERCISES AS THE PRETEXT FOR THE EXPULSIONS. 

TO THE WITNESSES PARTICIPATION IN FLAG DAY 

CEREMONIES IS A FORM OF RELIGIOUS WORSHIP AND IS FORBIDDEN. 

THE ARGENTINE WITNESSES HAVE SUBMITTED A OETAILEO 

ARTICLE ON THE REPRESSION OF THE LOCAL CHURCH FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES MAGAZINE, 

AWAKE. THE ARTICLE IS EXPECTED TO BE PRINTED IN ALL THE 

WORLD'S MAJOR LANGUAGES. ACCORDING TO THE WITNESSES' 

SPOKESMAN, THE ARGENTINE LEADERSHIP PLANS TO DISTRIBUTE 

COMES OF THE ARTICLE TO ALL SENIOR EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL 

OFFICIALS IN ARGENTINA, AS WELL AS TO EACH ARGENTINE. 

AMBASSADOR ABROAD. 

BUENOS B565S B2 OF 13 212Z54Z 

INTERVIEWED ALMOST EVERY PEN PRISONER IN ARGENTINA. 

HE NOTED THAT ABOUT SB PERCEHT HAD BEEN TORTURED. SOME 

KAO MERELY BEEN BEATEN UP BUT THE LARGE MAJORITY HAD 

1EEN SUBJECTED TO ELECTRIC SHOCK OR THE SUBMAR I HE. THE 

ICRC REP WAS HOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THE RED CROSS WOULD BE 

ABLE TO INFLUENCE ANY CHANGE IN THE WIDESPREAD PRACTICE 

OF TORTURE IN ARGENTINA. THE REP STATED THAT NO GOVERNMENT 

IN THE WORLD ADMITS THAT TORTURE TAXES PLACE AND A GOVERNMENT 

CANNOT CORRECT A PROBLEM WHICH IT DOES NOT RECOGNIZE. 

THE DELEGATE RECOGNIZED THAT PHYSICAL MISTREATMENT OF 

PEN .PRISONERS IS INFREOUENT AFTER THEY HAVE PASSEO 

THROUGH THE INTERROGATION PHASE, I.E., AFTER THEY HAVE 

PASSED OFFICIALLY TO THE PEH. HOWEVER, VARIOUS FORMS 

OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE PERSIST IN THE PRISONS. 

ESTIMATED PRISON POPULATION AS OF JULY 1, 1171: 

PRISON PEN* DAM* 

LA PLATA PRISON B5I 2B TO 5B (MULTISOURCED) 

DEVOTO PRISON 751 

SIERRA CHICA 53B UNCONFIRMED REPORT OF OVER 101 

CORONDA 451 

RESISTENCIA 351 21 (ICRC) 

RAWSOJI 25B S (ICRC) 

CORDOBA 151 51 PLUS/MINUS (ICRC) 

CASEROS MUNICIPAL 41 - 

MENDOZA 22 

I ICRC ESTIMATES (PROTECT) 

• UNRECOGNIZED PRISONERS HELD AT THE 

DISPOSITION OF HILITARY AUTHORITIES. 

(ACCORDING TO SECURITY FORCES THERE HAY BE UP TO 5B1 

AROUND THE COUNTRY AT ANY GIVEN POINT IN TIME.) 

VILLA DEVOTO FIRE UPDATE 

THE WITNESSES' SPOKESMAN COMMENTED THAT THE MINISTRY 

OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND WORXSHIP HAS STILL HOT ISSUED THE 

FORMS FOR THE REGISTRATION OF RELIGIONS IN ARGEHTINA UNDER 

LAW 21,745. HE ADDED THAT THERE WAS HO POSSIBILITY OF 

THE WITNESSES REGISTRATION BEING APPROVED, GIVEN THE 

CURRENT DECREE BANKING THE WITNESSES FROM PUBLICLY PRACTICING 

THEIR FAITH. HE NOTED THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT 

IS NOW REFERRING TO THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES AS AN 

‘.ORGANIZATION WITH RELIGIOUS COLORATIONS* (TIHTE RELIGIOSJU. 

ON JUNE S, THE LOCAL PRESS REPORTED THAT THE PROVINCE 

OF SANTIAGO DEL ESTERO HAD ISSUED A DECREE PROHIBITING 

ANY TYPE OF ACTIVITY BY THE WITNESSES. THE DECREE ORDERS 

THE SEIZURE OF ALL WITNESSES MATERIALS AND THE CLOSING OF 

ALL WITNESSES' FACILITIES WHERE ‘PUBLIC OR PRIVATE* 

MEETINGS ARE HELD. 

RED CROS5 ACTIVITIES: 

TORTURE REPORT 

SIX RED CROSS SWISS NATIONAL DELEGATES AND TWO SWISS 

OOCTORS ARE CONTINUING TO VISIT ARGENTINE NON-CRIMINAL 

PRISONERS THROUGHOUT ARGENTINA. THE RED CROSS PLANS TO 

VISIT ALL THE MAJOR PENAL FACILITIES IN ARGENTINA THREE 

TIMES DURING 1S71 AND THE SMALLER INSTITUTIONS TWICE. 

ICRC SOURCE (PROTECT) STATED THAT AT PRESENT SIERRA CHICA 

WHICH HOLOS 53B PEN PRISONERS AND TINY LA RIOJA PRISON 

APPEAR TO BE THE COUNTRY'S WORST. IN GENERAL, THROUGHOUT 

ARGEHTINA PEN PRISONERS ARE UNDERFED, HAVE LITTLE OR NO 

MEDICAL ATTENTION AND NO HEAT IN THE WINTER. 

ICRC SOURCE (PROTECT) INFORMED EMBASSY RECENTLY 

THAT FOUR PRISONERS HELD UNDER PEH WERE INVOLVED IN THE 

MARCH 14, 1S7I VILLA DEVOTO RIOT ANOFIRE. 

ACCORDING TO SOURCE, ALL FOUR WERE BEING HELO ON DRUG 

CHARGES BUT SIMULTANEOUSLY UNDER PEN AS WELL, AS THEY HAD 

FALSE ARGENTINE PASSPORTS WHEN ARRESTED, WHICH PUT THEM UNDER 

SUSPICION OF BEING POSSIBLE SUBVERSIVES AS WELL. THREE 

OF THE DRUG TRAFFICKERS DIED IN THE FIRE. THE BADLY BURNT 

SURVIVOR TOLD THE ICRC THAT HE AND THE OTHER PEH PRISONERS 

HAD NO CONNECTION WITH SUBVERSION BUT WERE DRUG ADDICTS 

AND TRAFFICKERS WHO HAO OBTAINED FALSE PASSPORTS TO USE 

IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES. 

WITH .REFERENCE TO A HAY 4, 1371 LETTER TO THE 

SECRETARY IN WHICH COHA DlkECTOR LAURENCE R. 8IRNS ARGUES 

AGAINST EXPORT LICENSES FOR THE SALE OF THREE TROOP 

CARRYING BOEING' CH-47 HELICOPTERS ALLEGING THAT 

‘HELICOPTERS SIMILAR TO THE ONES BEING SUPPLIED’ WERE USED 

IN PUTTING DOWN THE VILLA DEVOTO PRISON RIOT AND CRUSHING 

LABOR STRIKES, VE NOTE THE FOLLOWING BASED OH DISCREET 

INQUIRIES OF SECURITY SOURCES: 

THE RED CROSS DELEGATE STATED THAT ICRC REPS HAD 

-mmrntft-

MAILGRAM service center 

MIDDLETOWN, VA, 22645 

V SfcRVlCE 

’ 1-085003U20I025 07/20/78 ICS WA05272 

00029 MLTN VA 07/20/78 

W5HA 

72fc-* F^Jirlv «" -V 

K„Jz. Q.'iUJ'sfiJ 

'■ 

ROBERT PASTOR 

LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS 


OLD EXEC OFFICE BLDG 

WASHINGTON DC 20506 

V 

\ I - 

N 

1. THE FRONT PAGES OF ARGENTINE NEW8PAPERS REFLECT THE DECISION 

OF EXIMBANK TO DENY A S270 MILLION FINANCING OF U,S, EXPORTS BY 

ALLIS-CHALMERS FOR THE YACIRETA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT IN LINE WITH 

THE U.8, HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY. 

2. THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN ARGENTINA, REPRESENTING 

OVER ONE THOUSAND BUSINESS ENTITIES,1 AT ITS ANNUAL MEETING TODAY 

VOTED UNANIMOUSLY TO CONDEMN THIS ACTION, ASIDE FROM THIS CASE 

COUNTLESS OTHER U,S, CORPORATIONS HAVE OR WILL BE PREJUDICED BY THIS 

POLICY IN FAVOR OF OTHER CORPORATIONS OF OTHER NATIONALITIES, 

OUR ESTIMATES IN THIS REGARD RUN INTO THE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, IT 

MEANS THE LOSS OF COUNTLESS JOBS IN THE UNITES STATES AND THE 

IRREVOCABLE DISAPPEARANCE OF UNITED STATES PRESENCE IN THE' ARGENTINE 

MARKET AND A FURTHER WORSENING OF THE OVERALL UNITED STATES BALANCE 

OF TRADE POSITION, LASTLY IT CAN ONLY RESULT IN UNNECESSARY BAD 

WILL IN A NATION WHERE BILLIONS OF U.S, DOLLARS ARE ALREADY 

INVESTED, 

3. WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THIS ACTION BE REVERSED BEFORE FURTHER 

IRREPARABLE DAMAGE IS DONE, 

THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN ARGENTINA .

0 i i F i u l iiT I / \\ '1'1 *111; 1,1 

Department of Stale -TELEGRAM 

1 

P-uE ci eÊ'.os e;;3‘ j; c; ;; 2:2:13; 32:1 euenos z-S1-' ;i c: 22 2:2113; 

ACT C N An A -14 

HA*B5 nCT-31 'FSE'Dl .-1005 EE~CS /J37 A 

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - CC753L 2722C7: 773 

P 272212Z OOi 7S 

FM AMEMEAGSY ElE 

C 0 N F I 0 E N T 1 A l SECTION 1 OF 2 EÊNOS A i R E S 4337 

E.0. 11652: GD3 

TAGS- Q71P 

SUBJECT: HENRY KISSINGER VIS’T TO ARGENTINA 

SUMMARY: FROM ARRIVAL 7C DEPARTURE HENRY KiSSIN'GER AND HIS 

FAMILY WERE WELL RECEIVED BY ARGENTINE POPULACE. THE GOA 

LAID OUT RED CARPET, PULLING OUT STOPS. DR. KISSINGER SPOKE 

TO DIVERSIFIED GROUPS - - FROM BANKERS TO GAUCH03. IN MOST 

INSTANCES, HE COMPLIMENTED GOA FOR DEFEATING TERORISTS BUT 

HE WARNED THAT TACTICS USED AGAINST THEM THEN ARE NOT 

JSTIF1A6LE NOW. GENERALLY, DR. KISSINGER PUBLICLY AFFIRMED 

HIS SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY WiTH A 

FEW EXCEPTIONS. 

COMBATTING TERRORISM BUT H: ALSO STRESSED THAT TACTICS USED 

IN DEFEATING TERRORISTS hAD NO PLACE I N_ ARGE I JlNA TODAY, 

7, THROUGHOUT LUNCH VIDE.A SEEMED RELAYED AND FRIENDLY. 

HE TENSED UP ONLY -WEN ARGENTINA'S PRCSPECTS IN THE WGFLD 

CUP WERE DISCUSSED. HE DISPLAYED NO ANNOYANCE AT U3G. 

1. DR. KISSINGER, HIS WIFE AND SON ARRIVED IN BA EARLY 

WEDNESDAY MORNING (JUNE 21). HE WAS MET AT THE AIRPORT B ( 

A FONQFF REP WHO DOGGED HIM THROUGHOUT HIS VISIT. KISSINGER 

WAS THE GUEST OF PRESIDENT VIDELA, SUPPOSEDLY INVITED TO VIEW 

WORLD CUP. THE FORMER SECRETARY MADE IT CLEAR DURING HIS 

FIVE-DAY STAY HE WAS IN ARGENTINA AS PRIVATE CITIZEN AND NOT 

A SPOKESMAN FOR U3G. 

2. KISSINGER'S FIRST ACTIVITY HAS TC LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT 

VIDELA, CCL. MALLEA GIL (INTERPRETER! AND AMBASSADOR CASTRO 

AT LOS OLIVOS, OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL RESIDENCE. VIDELA 

PREARRANGED IT SO KISSINGER AND THE INTERPRETER WOULD MEET 

WITH HIM PRIVATELY HALF HOUR EcFORE AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL. 

IMMEDIATELY ON AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL.AT_ 1300 LUNCH WAS SERVED. 

3 KISSINGER INFORMED AMBASSADOR THKT DURING PRIVATE 

SESSION WITH PRESIDENT HUMAN ÎGÎS WERE D.SCU3SED. ALLEGEDLY 

VIDELA WANTED SUGGESTiON3 FROM D?. KISSINGER AS TO HOW TO 

IMPROVE RELATIONS WiTH U3G. THE AMBUSS.DOR W3 NOT INFORMED 

WHETHER KISSINGER OFFERED ANY SOLUTIONS. 

4. AT LUNCH, VIDELA ASKED KISSINGER FOP HIS VIEWS ON LATIN 

AMERICA FORMEd_:ECRE7^/ RESPONDED THAT NOA NOPE Ti-O E7E = 

w-s TIME TO BE CONCERNED -£C.T DEFENSE C-PAB-.'T'ES C- WECE'iV 

HEM'-SPHEPE HE added LN C-'-STiCN -MONG t-E LA COUNTRIES 

IS REQUIRED IF ALi Aftt2 • C-fi CC'JNTPiES -PE TO SURVIVE HE 

STRESSED THAT CURING HIS TENURE AG CECRETARr OF STATE, LATIN 

AMERICA WAS NOT HIS TOP PRIORITY HE SAID THIS WAS TRUE 

BEFORE HE WAS SECRETARY AND IT IS TRUE NOW KISSINGER POINTED 

OUT THAT THIS WAS NOT ME -N~ TC BE a REFLECTION ON ANY 

Authority 

NARA 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

S>A-

■GttttftUtli f I f [ 

inu'-,::.,-' 

Department of State • TELEGRAM 

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“A' ICE K.SSINGER'3 .A.CA’D3' STATEfEN" A3 .-3T ■ F I CAT I C.N 

FOR HARDENING THE-R HJMA.N RIGHTS STANCE 

CAS'RC 

9. Cli HIS RETURN FRCR THE FJFM, -H1 S31 fiGER SPOKE TO Er,EA33f 

personnel. he “iAiE a pep ’alts tc a-er.c.n fc'E’Gn service 

PERSON'.'. A3 -E. . AS .CCA.S. -£ NASRA’SC SOME - S 

EXPERIET.CES Wfll.E «N uSG SERV.CE. nIS hIMORO'JS APPROAC- 

WAS WELL RECEIVES BT A.L. 

IB. C'i FRIDA' E/EI.I.G A RECEPTICIi '.AS GVEI. AT ErEASSi 

RESIDENCE HC'IOPIIIS KISSINGER AND FAMILY. APPROXIMATELY TWO 

K'JNDPEC PE = 3CNS ATTENCED. GCA TCP OFF ' C: ALS WERE JELL 

REPRESENTED. 

LI. AFTER THE RECEPTION, XiSS>USER ATTENCED A O'HUER GI JEM 

E' “IN'S’ER D: ECC.G-1 MAR"iI.EZ CE “CZ. 'rIS GRCLP WAS 

COMPOSED OF EA'RERS, ECCIIC"..:': AIIS ! NC.G*= ; AL .STS. THE KAMI 

DISCUSS'OII CONCERNED MEANS TO ATTRACT FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL AND 

CTHFR N;ES'*-EN’ *: A = SENT NA. 'HE LCNS "ERM LALH OF PCL.TICA. 

s'AB-.i'f an: c. seemed "c ee the concern :f 

THE GRCJP. little ElSE DEVE.CPEC f=0(1 Tat CiN.NER. 

12. c, .jne 2; hiss.ncer papt.c pa’e: an off "-E >e::r: 

PRESS CONFERENC: Af.C WAS MACE AN ROI.CRAR- "EMSEr CF ARGENT.NE 

COUNCIL 01. ,:ITEA,IATICN:AL RELATIONS. THIC GROUP 'S COMPRISED 

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3EA.3 -RE 'C "REVA .. 

13. CR. h 1 S3 NGER A.:c APPEARED .'I A 0,EC"CN ANC ANC.-F 

PER'CC j-TH CNE OF ARGENT.NAS»OPLLAR .NE'.: COMMENT ERG. 

:.R.'.G --E ■■'•'G E. ■■ -:-:4i.AAA V"” TTT .RA' C ; 

CF T-E GREATEG' ..C.«'LSC CF - 

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7904941 

DEPARTMENT OF 5TATE 

April 7, 1979 



Subject: 

Status Report on Progress in Human 

Rights in Latin America 

In accordance with your request of March 

14, there are attached human rights progress 

reviews on Latin AmericanAand Caribbean countries. 

P< 


Attachments 

As stated 

(GDS 4/4/S5) 

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL 

ARGENTINA 

Human Rights Conditions in January, 1977 

Ten months after having carried out a military 

coup that removed President Isabel Peron from power, 

the Argentine Armed Forces were at' the height of an 

anti-subversive campaign to put an end to urban and 

rural guerrilla movements. The campaign was conducted 

under a state of seige and the security forces of 

the police and the military ruthlessly pursued all 

suspected subversives, detained them clandestinely 

and abused them severely. Prisoners were subjected 

routinely to torture during interrogation 

abuse during detention. In January 1977, 

280 persons per month were being detained 

and otherwise) by the security forces and 

the anti-subversive campaign an estimated 

and general 

approximately 

(both legally 

throughout 

15,000 persons 

disappeared. Most were probably summarily executed. 

The Government eventually acknowledged the detention 

of over 3,000 persons. Many of these persons had 

no connection to subversive movements. 

2. Major Human Rights Events Since January 1977 

1.. February , 1978 

The Government published the first in a series 

of lists that purported to list all PEN detainees. 

2. February-March 1978 

There were reliable reports concerning the 

surfacing of mutilated bodies on beaches. 

None were subsequently identified, to our 

knowledge. Similar credible reports circulated 

in December. 

3. April 17, 1978 

Jacobo Timerman was transferred to house 

arrest where he still remains despite a July 

20 Supreme Court finding that there were 

no grounds for his detention. 

-CONFIDENTIAL - 

GDS - 4/4/1985

CQNFWENTTAL 

-2- 

4. May 7, 1978 

A 3-page ad appeared in La Prensa j^pn-s^ st i ng 

of a .4-e-fe-fc&r to yidela and the names of 2,59 2 

disappeared persons— .JC.Jt .was....funded by the 

PAHR, tfe£...League_on Human Rights, and the 

Ecumenical Movement. Tt symbol i ■?.&£ *-j^p I'r^rpacp 

inactivity, bv those grouP5-an.d-^hfi_lacjL£asing 

willingness of the—press to address the issue 

either In thisform or through reporting 

and editorials. 

5. October 17, 1978 

The Government announced that the IAHRC had 

been invited to Argentina. An earlier conditioned 

request made in June was rejected by the 

IAHRC. 

6. December 1978 

The Plaza de Mayo was closed to the Mothers 

as their regular meeting and demonstration 

site. 

7. December 1978 

Politically-inspired abduction and murder 

of Argentine career diplomat Elena Holmberg 

causes widespread shock and concern among 

influential circles who had previously ignored 

problem of disappearances. 

8. December 25, 1978 

A Christmas amneRt-y-h^np^j,ted_ 193 persons 

of whom we know 186 were actually released. 

9. Early 1979 

Preliminary evidence suggests a decrease 

in vinJLajtions. of category one . rights with 

few reports of disappearances or torture 

having been received. 

10. March 1979 

The local ICRC representative stated that 

COnfidf-NTt y.

e-eWFTPgNflAL 

-3- 

prison conditions had clearly improved and 

he expected further improvements both because 

of the IAHRC visit and because government 

officials now seemed to want the improvements. 

There was probably some quantitative improvement 

in 1978 with respect to 1977, but the qualitative 

aspect remained little changed with disappearances 

continuing at a high rate and torture and prisoner 

mistreatment common. 

CONFIDENTIAL

mmm 

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 

Washington, D.C. 20230 


The Vice President 

The Secretary of State 

The Secretary of Defense 

The Secretary of Agriculture 

The Secretary of Energy 

The Director, Arns Control and 

Disarmament Agency 

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

The Director of Central Intelligence 

MAY 13 1980 

FROM: 

Philip M. Klutznick 

SUBJECT: PRC Meeting on Argentina: Bilateral Trade Factors that Merit 

Consideration 

The PRC is scheduled to meet to review U.S.-Argentine relations in light of 

recent Soviet initiatives in Argentina. Such a review would not be complete 

without consideration of the significant developments in U.S.-Argentine trade. 

Thus, I am attaching a memorandum summarizing this bilateral trading relation. 

The following points bear highlighting: 

1. Argentina now has a very free market with substantial potential for U.S. 

exports. At the recent trade fair in Miami and in several other contexts 

the Argentine officials have made clear their interest in improving trade with 

the U.S. 

2. Bilateral trade with the U.S. is strong and improving. Continued improvement 

would have both political and economic benefits for the United States. 

(We are, of course, not unaware of the conditions relating to human rights 

and other factors which have slowed such improvement in recent years, and 

which must still be considered.) 

a. Continued improvement in bilateral trade would help offset the Soviet 

Union's vigorous effort to expand its trade with Argentina and then 

exploit its trade position politically. 

b. It would help demonstrate to the Argentines the tangible value of 

improving their relations with the U.S. 

c. The strengthened economic interchange would have substantial benefits 

for the U.S. For example, the Yacyreta hydroelectric project, if 

awarded to the U.S. bidders, would create 18 million hours of work for 

U.S. workers. 

3. In the proposed October meeting of the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Commission it 

would be in the U.S. interest to respond affirmatively, to the extent possible, 

to Argentine concerns on bilateral trade issues. 

AUa6te&SIFIED 

E.O.13526 

WfBFNTf# 

CLASSIFIED BY Munip_lo_SourcHS 

DECLASSIFY ON 5/13/2000.

e 

ATTACHMENT 

)T‘ 

BACKGROUND INFORMATION 

(U) U.S. Trade with Argentina. Argentina is the fourth"!angest market for U.S. 

exports in Latin America, after Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil, and ranks 

twentieth in the world. Following Argentine trade liberalization measures 

of the late 1970s, particularly reduction in customs duties, U.S. exports 

to Argentina registered impressive gains. A striking 124 percent increase 

in U.S. exports was achieved in 1979 over 1978, with total sales of nearly 

$1.9 billion resulting in a U.S. trade surplus with Argentina of $1.3 

billion. The resumption of Eximbank lending to Argentina in the autumn of 

1978 has also stimulated U.S. exports. 

(U) Argentina is an important supplier in the international market as well as a 

significant U.S. import market. The country's exports exceeded $6.5 billion 

in 1979; imports climbed to over $5 billion, nearly $2 billion of which was 

supplied by U.S. exporters. West European suppliers and Japan represent the 

major foreign competition for U.S. suppliers to the Argentine import market. 

(U) The major items imported into Argentina from the U.S. include aircraft, 

organic chemicals, construction and other heavy duty earthmoving equipment, 

1 automotive parts, and telecommunications equipment. The best prospects for 

U.S. manufacturers in the future include, in addition to the items previously 

noted, machine tools, electric power generation, transmission and distribution 

equipment^ and chemical and petrochemical machinery. The prospects for 

increasingly larger volumes of U.S. exports to Argentina appear quite promising. 

(U) Argentine imports may be up by 20-25 percent in 1980. In all likelihood the 

Argentine market for industrial and raw material imports will be even larger 

in 1980 than the boom market of 1979. As noted previously, U.S. exports t" 

Argentina more than doubled in 1979, despite aggressive European and Japanese 

competition. 

(U) Although the U.S. is Argentina's largest single trading partner, the Soviet 

Union represents an extremely important market for Argentine suppliers. 

Argentine exports to the USSR increased nearly 83 percent in 1978 over 1977. 

Currently, the Soviet Union receives more than 6 percent of total Argentine 

exports, a considerable amount of which is grain. Argentina's balance of 

trade with the USSR in 1978 ran a surplus in excess of $370 million. 

(U) Bilateral Trade Issues of Concern to Argentina. For the past two months the 

Department of Commerce has reviewed with the Argentines the current bilateral 

trade issues of concern to them. Recently decisions favorable to Argentina 

have been made by the USG on several of these issues. Argentina was redesignated 

a beneficiary country for the United States Generalized System of 

Preferences (GSP) on several products, including sugar and corned beef, and 

a number of new items of interest to Argentina were added to the GSP list. 

(Several import-sensitive items which Argentina wished to have included were 

not added during the recently completed GSP review.) In addition, President 

Carter announced on March 24 that he had decided not to grant import relier 

to the U.S. leather wearing apparel industry, despite a finding by the ITT 

that the U.S. industry wi: being injured by increased imports. Twenty 

million dollars in Argentine exports would have been affected if import 

relief had been granted.

UNCI WIED 

2 

(U) Among the other issues raised by Argentina are the U.S. insurance industry's 

claim that Argentine maritime cargo insurance requirements are discriminatory, 

and the Food and Drug Administration's study erf nitrite^ in foods that 

could affect Argentine exports of corned beef to the UVS. These two issues 

are currently being reviewed in the U.S. Government. 

(U) The Argentines also raised the issue of countervailing duty actions the U.S. 

has taken against Argentine products. Argentina has not signed the MTN Subsidies 

Code, although it has indicated its intent to do so. Argentine accession 

to the Code would improve the prospects for removal of these duties. 

(U) The Argentines questioned sanitation requirements administered by the Department 

of Agriculture which are applied to unwashed wool and cooked ground meat 

imported from Argentina. These requirements are designed to protect against 

hoof and mouth disease. 

(U) The Argentines asked for an increase in the cheese quota and for the addition 

of a quota for Mozzarella cheese. Argentina has been informed that it will 

not receive a quota for Mozzarella cheese. The procedure for redistributing 

other unfilled cheese quotas is well established and any future redistribu- 

. tions will be handled as in the past. Argentina would be given a similar 

~ opportunity to fill such a shortfall. 

(U) The Argentines also asked that the U.S. not reimpose import restrictions on 

specialtyJsteel and not increase sales of quebracho extract from the strategic 

reserves. Neither of these actions is expected to be taken by the U.S. 

(U) U.S. Investment in Argentina. Argentina's foreign investment laws are among 

the most liberal in Latin America and do.not exclude foreign investment from 

any sector. U.S. foreign direct investment in Argentina as of yearend 1978 

totalled $1.7 billion, up from $1.5 billion in 1977 and $1.0 billion in 1970. 

(U) As a host country for U.S. foreign investment, Argentina ranks 19th in the 

world and 5th in Latin America (excluding tax havens in the Caribbean), after 

Brazil, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela. The hydrocarbon, automotive and 

financial sectors are the primary attractions, although investments are also 

being made in the machinery and equipment, drugs and cosmetics, chemicals, 

and food, beverages and tobacco sectors. The mining sector is also emerging 

as a potential focus of major new MNC activity. International investor confidence 

is definitely on the upturn as a result of the apparent stability 

and economic achievements of the military government, attractive investment 

guidelines, and a government drive to inform businessmen of opportunities. 

(U) OPIC. From 1959-1970 OPIC had an inconvertibility agreement with Argentina, 

but from 1970-1976 experienced a great many claims of inconvertibility and. 

therefore, stopped issuing guarantees. Any plans to arrive at a new agreement 

(covering inconvertibility or expropriation) after the new government 

assumed power in 1976 were shelved as a result of the human rights proble-”. 

In addition, OPIC's new fecus on lower income developing countries would 

further reduce any OPIC rctivity in Argentina even if the human rights issue 

were to be resolved. 

UNCLASSIFIED

3 

The Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project 

A joint Argentina/Paraguay undertaking, Yacyreta is the largest jnfrastructure 

project and the most potentially lucrative U.S. e>^5ofj; opportunity in 

Latin America. Currently at stake are contracts for turbines and generators 

and civil works services having an export value of $830 million. Bid submissions 

are due th's June, and contract awards are expected in October or 

November (turbines and generators) and next January (civil works). 

Competition is intense -- primarily from a Japanese consortium, Argentine 

and Spanish firms, and a consortium of West German, Italian and Russian 

entities. The U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay advises that the latter consortium 

is favored. When asked by an Argentine envoy, President Stroessner reportedly 

raised no political objections to the possibility of the turbine generator 

contract going to a group which includes the Russians. 

The Soviets have previously supplied hydroelectric equipment to Argentina. 

The Soviet enterprise Energomachexport was awarded the contract for twelve 

140 MW hydraulic turbines at Salto Grande in 1974 for the price of $40 million. 

The U.S. company was the. next lowest bidder for $58 million. 

There have also been press reports and reports from other sources that the 

Soviets received oral commitments from Argentina to purchase Soviet hydroelectric 

generating equipment during the recent visit of the Soviet mission 

to Argentina .y This commitment appears to be a general commitment for future 

purchases of‘Soviet equipment and does not relate specifically to the Yacyreta 

project. 

Morrison-Knudsen has requested OPIC insurance coverage for construction equipment 

and bonding for the Yacyreta project. A meeting of the Interagency Groun 

on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance (Christopher Committee) is scheduled 

to consider this request on May 15. 

Human Rights Issue and the IFIs 

The Harkin Amendment requires the U.S. representative to the IBRD and IDB not 

to support (i.e., either to abstain or oppose) loans by these IFI's to gross 

violators of human rights, except loans that directly meet Basic Human Needs. 

The policy is administratively implemented so that the beneficiaries of the 

loan must be the poor or disadvantaged. Since 1977, the U.S. representative 

has abstained on 19 IBRD and IDB loan proposals to Argentina and voted in 

favor of two. (Note: Eximbank financing is permissible under current policy, 

although with reservations from State's Humanitarian Affairs Bureau.) Eleven 

loan proposals are now in the IBRD and IDB pipeline for Argentina. 

How our trade interests in Argentina are affected by human rights policy is 

difficult to characterize wi'h any precision. Exporters claim it has poir--,nH 

the commercial atmosphere for U.S. products, and that the exporters are tK?:vselves 

made uncertain by the apparent U.S. policy struggles and inevitable 

delays. No doubt some busin-ss has been consciously diverted to U.S. competitors 

by the Argentine authorities and private sectors. 

Multiple, Sourcesi


WASHINGTON, O.C. 20506 

CONFIDENT! ATT 

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION 

DATE: Monday, March 7, 1977 

PLACE: 

PARTICIPANTS: 

Organization of American States 

Washington, D. C. 

Secretary General Alejandro Orfila 

L. Ronald Scheman, Sub-Secretary for 

Management 

John Ford, Special Assistant to the 

Secretary General 

Robert A. Pastor, NSC Staff 

U.S. Policy on Human Rights 

Secretary General Orfila told me that he had recently returned from a 

trip to the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, 

and he explained to them that they were dealing with a new kind of 

Administration in Washington. He told them that the Carter Administration 

would unquestionably demonstrate a concern for human rights that was 

not evident in the previous Republican Administrations. And Orfila 

warned them that they had better be prepared for this change. All 

three governments were rather slow to adjust, but they have come to 

understand its importance. 

Uruguay, however, does not quite understand why the U.S. currently 

attacks it for human rights violations while several years ago it encouraged 

the Uruguayans to suppress all forms of subversion. They are particularly 

confused because the human rights situation in their country has 

definitely improved in the last year. 

In Argentina, there is a fascinating debate between the moderates and 

the hard-liners, and the question which Orfila feels we should address 

is: how can we strengthen the hands of the moderates? not, how do 

we drive the Argentine Government to the wall? He believes that we 

should be careful not to put the government on the defensive least we 

strengthen the hard-liners . The result would be even worse violations 

of human rights . 

. GON FI DENTI Air 

declassified 

E.0.13526 

i A rA \ i

Orfila said that he was concerned that the United States policy on human 

rights may get so heavy-handed that it would strengthen the hard-liners 

and lead to an alliance among the military governments. He said he feared 

that Latin America would be divided in half with the Southern Cone countries 

on one side, and Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and Costa Rica on the other. 

He himself had encouraged Argentine officials to make special efforts to 

establish good relations with Venezuela and Mexico, and apparently the 

Government of Argentina accepted his recommendation and will be sending 

Hector Campora as its Ambassador to Mexico. 

I asked whether the division between a repressive Latin America and a 

democratic Latin America would necessarily be a bad thing. It seems to 

me that it might introduce a constructive tension whereby the military 

governments would be encouraged to join the ranks of several of the more 

democratic governments . It would also provide an opportunity to deal 

with real issues rather than to maintain an artificial facade of Latin 

American unity. We both agreed that "Latin America" was a myth, and 

that the discussion of substantive issues in which the U.S . and Latin 

America were always on opposite sides of every issue was not constructive. 

Orfila said that the U.S. would increase its credibility if we were more 

evenhanded. For example, when the Congress held hearings on human 

rights violations in Argentina, he encouraged Congressman Fraser to 

hear from people from both sides, but instead the hearings were very 

one-sided. 

Belize 

On his most recent trip to Central America, Orfila met with officials in 

the Guatemalan Government as well as in the Mexican Government about 

the issue of the future status of Belize. Mexico urged him to get involved 

in the issue. Guatemala said that it would be willing to accept only twothirds 

of the southern province of 3elize, which amounted to about onefifth 

of all of Belize. This represents a considerable compromise on 

Guatemala's part, since the country has been demanding total annexation 

of Belize. Orfila will be going to Great Britain on April 4, to negotiate 

with Ted Rowlands, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on this issue. 

He will try to convince Rowlands to convince Prime Minister Price of Belize 

to accept the Guatemalan offer. He thinks that if the United States mentioned 

to Great Britain its interest in Orfila’s effort that Great Britain would be 

moved to persuade Prime Minister Price. (Comment: This is a particularly 

important issue only because if it is not solved in the next year, it could 

conceivably lead to war between Guatemala and Belize. It would most 

definitely lead to a very significant split between the Caribbean countries 

which support Belize, and the Latin American countries which support 

Guatemala.) 

roxnDBrHrttr -2- 

-GONFfBEfmAfc-

-3- 

E1 Salvador 

The Secretary General was very pleased with his success in getting the 

President of El Salvador to sign the mediation agreement with Honduras. 

The border has been closed since 1969, and the economies of both countries 

have suffered greatly as a result. He is hopeful that the appointment of 

a Moderator will lead to a more lasting peace between the two countries, 

lasting 

OAS 

Orfila was very frank in his assessment of the almost hopelessness of the 

present OAS . He said he had tried to bring the staff level down to a mangeable 

one, but that he couldn't fire anyone. When he tried, everybody 

ganged up on him, and the U.S . remained silent. The Permanent Council 

of Ambassadors to the OAS was also, in his opinion, a hopeless body. In 

fact, he called it "a joke.11 

"I need your help to change this place," Orfila said. Orfila would like 

to see the OAS concentrate on peacekeeping, human rights, and political 

issues. He thinks it would be desirable for the OAS to get out of the 

economic and social field. He blamed the United States for the massive 

structure that had been built up since the early years of the Alliance. 

In 1961, there were only 300 staff people in the OAS; there are presently 

1,500. He would like to cut the staff down to only the Secretariat, and 

deal only with those issues which it could do well. He would like to do 

away with the Permanent Council, and only have Latin American Ambassadors 

to the U.S. attend occasional meetings. (Scheman later called me and 

said that the Assistant Secretary of State would be the appropriate U.S. 

delegate to these occasional sessions, rather than a Special Ambassador 

to the OAS . ) 

Orfila expressed his frustration at trying to do these kinds of reforms 

without any support. If only the United States gave him support, he said, 

he could assure us a majority of the delegates and fundamental reforms 

in staffing, in the organization of the OAS, and in the issues that it 

addresses could then be taken. A good example he used was the designation 

of Grenada as the site of the June General Assembly meeting. The Grenadan 

Ambassador to the OAS forced the issue at the last OAS meeting in Santiago, 

and no one raised any objections. The Peruvians seconded the motion, 

and that was it. Grenada was the site.

G0Nffl5E.\TIAL -4- 

(Commcnt: Orfila's remarks were very encouraging, particularly on the 

structural reforms necessary to make the OAS into a body worth paying 

attention to. The real source of the OAS's problems right now is the state 

of international politics in the hemisphere. At Latin America's insistence, 

the L’.S. has retreated from its predominant position in the OAS , but the 

Latin Americans themselves have been reluctant to take any initiative in 

this regional forum . Any international leadership on the part of the Latin 

Americans has been in global fora like CIEC, as well as at UNCTAD in the 

United Nations. The result is that the OAS is rudderless, and the quality 

of representation there is one indication of the low importance which 

countries attach to it. 

The image of the OAS as a bureaucratic morass is no help. So Orfila's 

attempt to prune the OAS, cut its staff and its tasks, would be a very 

healthy sign, and we should definitely encourage such a move and support 

his efforts. 

Orfila's efforts in the El-Salvador-Honduras and in the Belize disputes 

represents one path that the OAS could constructively travel. Indeed, 

no one else can really play that kind of role in the hemisphere at this 

time except the OAS Secretary General, and we are fortunate that Orfila 

is both energetic and intelligent. We should encourage his efforts in 

the peacekeeping field, and encourage the OAS's efforts in human rights. 

We should also encourage the OAS to leave the economic and social 

fields to other institutions which can do those tasks much better.) 

■CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM 


WASHINGTON 

^Gow-i-'iLitvriAr May 1, 1979 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


CONGRESSIONAL (Albright) 

Evening Report (U) 

Rhodesia. Have spent quite a lot of time talking to Hill 

staffers about the Rhodesia sanctions situation. There 

seems little question at this time that we would lose a vote 

to retain sanctions. The best intelligence we can get now 

is that Helms is going to offer an amendment to lift on the 

first legislative day after the British elections, i.e., 

May 7. At this point, if we are going to avoid a total loss 

we need to do some heavy lobbying at least to get time for 

the SFRC to hold hearings. This is the strategy that worked 

on the House side. Funk and I will be sending you a separate 

memo assessing the situation. (C) 

Panama. I don't know what Rick is doing up there but Church 

is becoming more difficult. Today he voted against aid to 

Panama, stating that toll revenues would be high enough to 

take care of any development problems. The language in the 

bill is not a prohibition — the funds were cut, however. (C) 

In addition, funds were cut for El Salvador and Paraguay. 

The overall aid levels are $10 million below last year — 

and we can expect more on the floor. (C) 

Chile and Argentine Restrictions. Spent a ridiculous amount 

of time working out language to respond to Zorinsky's proposal 

to add a Presidential waiver to language prohibiting aid to 

Argentina and Chile. State human rights was concerned lest 

we give the wrong signals about our human rights policy. At 

the end of the day, with David's help, I think we have it 

resolved. We recommend removing all country specific 

restrictions. (U) 

CQNFIDENTIMT 

Review on May 1, 1985. 

' •/« 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O.I352B 

Authority \ 

NARA_£r_____0=aiJtirLV\^

cnN^pgyyEAijv"'.rayT»*~: 

ARGENTINA 

A. Human Rights Information 

I. Political Situation 

Argentina is a federal republic headed by President 

Jorge Rafael Videla, who came to power on March 24, 1376, 

after a coup overthrew the administration of President 

Isabel de Peron. 

The March 1976 coup was precipitated by serious political 

and economic instability which fed upon each other. In March, 

the Consumer Price Index was increasing at a 5665 annual rate 

(on an accelerating curve). There was deepening recession, 

and an external payments crisis threatened default on foreign 

debts. Violence was rampant. In the three years of the 

Faronist administration (1973-76), over 2,000 Argentines died 

as a result of left and right-wing terrorism. Since March, 

political violence has claimed at least 1,000 lives. 

The current cycle of violence in Argentina began in the 

late sixties with the formation of the People's Revolutionary 

Army (ERP) and the Montoneros, both terrorist organizations 

dedicated to violent, revolution and working closely with 

guerrilla groups in Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia. When guerrilla 

organizations were defeated or ousted in these three countries, 

many of their members fled to Argentina, beginning in the early 

lS70’s with the defeat of the Tupamaros in Uruguay. Significant 

rightist counter-terror commenced under the Peron regime and 

with the sponsorship of his confidant Lopez Rega. 

2. Legal Situation 

The Argentine Constitution of 1853 is in effect. In 

practice, however, the decrees and Jaws promulgated by the 

military government take precedence in case of conflict. This 

principle has been consistently upheld by the Argentine 

Supreme Court. 

The Argentine Constitution is closely patterned after 

the United States Constitution and provides most of the same 

legal guarantees. The major exception is a "State of Siege" 

precision contained in Articles 23, 67 and 86 of the Constitution. 

Thsoo articles provide for the suspension of habeas corpus 

temporarily, the detention of suspects indefinitely and the 

moving of accused cersans from olace to olace- within the country 

COW F It>BM TIA11 

CLASSIFIED 

■ ■ _ 

it. 

■■■ 

• J \J _____ 

lit

ca&m:;;;TiA^ 2. 

without their consent. 

!i State of Siege was invoked by the Peronist 

muni: end has beer, in effect since November 6, 1974. 

B. {i'^^rvancc of Internationa lly-Recognized Hunan Righ18 

;

CQ&k£B£nttal 3 

Article 5: While torture, cruel, inhuman and 

degrading treatment or "’mishrrent have not been a 

general practice in At£ ina, such methods are 

rtrar.’tcdly used by the s«__urity forces to extract 

information from sane prisoners, particularly suspected 

or proven terrorists. After initial questioning, 

prisoners of this type apparently receive more or less 

normal treatment. Olga Talanante, an American released 

shortly before the March coup, has stated that she was 

tortured; the same charge was made by American Gwenda 

I'eo Token Lopez, who was held from April to September 

1376. (Father James Weeks, who was imprisoned in 

Argentina, iron A.ugust 3-17, testified about the 

mistreatment of prisoners in Argentina on 

September 2S, before the Subcommittee on International 

Organizations of the Committee on International Relations 

of the House of Representatives. Father Weeks said "most... 

atrocities are carried out by right-wing extremist groups 

made up of police and para-military personnel." Amnesty 

International *s 1976 , Testimonies on Persons. Torture 

and Detention in Argentina, describes several cases of 

reported torture.) 

Article 8: Legal redress for governmental abuse of 

basic rights is normally available in Argentina but may 

well be denied in cases involving charges of subversion. 

Article 9: The security forces have detained numerous 

persons for investigation and questioning under the 

provisions of the State of Siege or other laws, e.g., arms 

controls laws. Some are held indefinitely, others are 

freed altar a short time, and still others are passed on 

to the regular courts or to military courts as prescribed 

by law. An accurate estimate of parsons detained under 

the State of Siege is impossible to calculate. At tho.ti-e 

of the March coup, the Amnesty International Ronort 1^75-76 

estimated that over 4,000 people were under detention 

withe-3*: trial for unlimited periods. The figure is 

currently lower in all probability. In October 1976, 

during a visit to the United States, the Argentine 

Foreign Minister told the press dure were 1,000 

prisoner's as of that date. He reportedly said that 300 

jvsrrons had been released a few days earlier. We have 

no independent information to corroborate any of the 

abeve sieristica. 

Aj.jlj r. l ? 10 

Argent in':, pro i 

judge.-. The ri 

cares tri : ins 

right to a £ :i.r hearing. In 

ir.7.--:ti 

'\-r> are conducted by 

. . j' not honored in

■rnNFTnrNTiftir 6. 

and with most members of the Cabinet, including the 

Minister of the. Economy and the Minister of Interior. 

In addition, Embassy officers and visiting American 

officials discuss human rights regularly in conversations 

with their Argentine counterparts. Officials at the 

Department of Defense, including the Director of the 

Inter-American Region, have discussed the subject with 

resident and visiting Argentine military officers. Our 

military attaches in Buenos Aires also consistently raise 

the problem of human rights' with their Argentine 

counterparts in an effort to make them aware of U.S. 

views. In these discussions, the following topics have 

been raised repeatedly by American officers. 

— Access to and the treatment of American 

; prisoners held on political charges. 

— Deep concern over reports of officiallytolerated 

mass murders, and the indiscriminate 

killings of political refugees and priests. 

The urgent need to control vigilante groups 

and punish terrorism of both the left and the right. 

— The safety of political refugees. 

Anti-Semitism. 

The need to bring to trial or release alleged 

SVifc.'VG’JCSi VGS * 

The need to publish the names of prisoners. 

Thu Ceverr.mant of Argentina has stated that the current 

.'situc.t5.cn is temporary and that normal conditions will be 

restored within a short time. 

At the behest of Congress and American citizens, we 

or.ve also inquired about Argentine and other non-American 

n .'.t:.c.:cs held in detention. While most of our diplomacy 

iC.n been private, the Ambassador did raise the subject of 

nvj-ie-n rights in ar. interview published in July by Argentina's 

leadii'.g business publication, "Mercado". The*Ambassador r.c 

that human rights violations had disturbed U.S. relations w 

■other countries and expressed the hope that this would nor 

happen with Argentina, noting President Videla's promise to 

.respect human rights. 

f t 

gewnDBifflASr -

COMFIDttKTTftL" 7. 

The United States Information Service reprinted in 

pamphlet form and distributed to Key Argentines and to the 

media Secretary Kissinger's speech in Santiago last June. 

USIS also provided all media with copies of then Assistant 

Secretary Rogers' speech on "Human Rights and U.S. Policies 

in Latin America". "La Opinion", one of the most important 

Argentine newspapers, published the complete text of the Rogers' 

article. Our Embassy also sent the text of both the Secretary's 

speech and the Rogers' article to the Foreign Ministry and to 

the Office of the Presidency. In addition, USIS officers 

have given numerous briefings to Argentine journalists in an 

effort to explain the U.S. position on human rights. 

’i 

2. Disassociation of U.S. Security Assistance from 

Violations of Human Rights 

In September, our Embassy in Buenos Aires outlined 

the human rights provisions of the International Security 

Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 to high-level 

Argentine officials, giving a copy of the law to the 

President and Foreign Ministry on September 12. The 

Commander of the U.S. Military Group at the same time 

raised the subject with the Minister of Defense and 

provided*him with a copy of the same legislation. 

Argentine leaders have stated that as a matter of 

policy they do not condone and are seeking to curb 

violations of human rights, but that in the present 

atmosphere of terrorism, they cannot yet control the 

situation. 

D. U.S. Security Assistance Program 

1. Justification for Continuation of Program 

United States security assistance to Argentina for 

Fiscal Year 1977 consists of $48.4 million in foreign 

• military sales credits and less than $700,000 in grant 

military training. These sums were justified to Congress 

and approved soon after the Videla Government came to power. 

The United States does not extend aid to the Argent in-* 

police, except to control and interdict the flow of narcctl: 

U.S. military credits are used almost exclusively 

for major investment items, such as ships ar.d aircraft. The 

have little :r no bearing on the counterterrorist capability 

of the arm.a forces.

CQMP tor. -.VTT.TC 

8. 

Security assistance demonstrates our desire to 

cooperate militarily with a country which has 1,000 

miles of coast-line on the South Atlantic reaching 

to Cape horn. Our assistance orients the Argentine 

military professionally toward the United States, 

exposing them to our technology and methods. In 

return, it offers the United States easier access 

to the Argentine military who have-always influenced 

events in their country and are now the dominant 

sector. It also gives the Argentine military a certain 

vested interest in good relations with the United States 

This hftlps promote and protect our various interests 

and helps ensure that we will get a hearing on matters 

of concern to the U.S. 

Argentina, it should be noted, is already a 

middle power in terms of development. It has a high 

rate of industrialization and is one of the world's 

leading exporters, of foodstuffs. In addition, it has 

substantial uranium deposits, well-trained physicists 

and ambitious plans for nuclear power development. U.S. 

direct investment in Argentina totals §1.4 billion; 

U.S. exports were $623 million in 1575; our imports were 

$215 million; and we have a credit exposure of about 

$2.7 billion, of which almost $600 million is owed to 

the Exlm Bank and the balance to commercial banks. 

2. National Interest Determination 

In order to preserve a professional relationship 

with the Argentine Armed Fi"'ces and demonstrate our 

interest in constructive c\ »rc.ii relations with Argentina, 

thereby promoting the U.S. r :licy objectives outlined 

above, the Department of Ft.v a is of the opinion at 

this time that it is in the r ricnai interast of the 

United States to provide conf. cad security assistance to 

Argentina. The Department is or.itoring the situation 

closely.

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SUBJECT: (O^ HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE ? TH? FLAVOR OF .TIE 

REP: .QUITO 5325^ (NOTAJ-} , ■ V ' . /* • '' 

1, G - ENTIRE' TEXT.' ’ - \ . . . * . 

2. SUM HAST:' AT T 3 MID SB BY miHINQWN POLITICAL AML HUMAN 

RIGHTS- PISTEES FROM TWENTY AMERICAN' .COUNT.RIIS»■ THIS SI-CONT 

LATIN AMERICAN- HUMAN RIGHTS;-CQIfFEREKCS, OPENED IN QUITO 

AUGUST 11. THE- CONFERENCE'S' PRIMARY OBJECTIVE: IS fFK 

ORGANIZATION 0? A LATIN AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOP -SWAM ’ 

SIGHTS J A .SECONDART PURPOSE ' I3-. A .REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF 

THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA. THE'OVERALL ' 

TENOR 0?' THE' CON FUSE MCE IS LIFT 1ST. ALTHOUGH ANTXrO.S. • 

SENTIMENTS WERE • EXPRESSEDf CONDEMNATION OF U.S.- POLICIES, 

VHIII NOT ABSENT, DID NOT DOMINATE THE FIRST SESSIONS. 

END SUMMARY. - 

3. SPONSORED BY THE FILED RICH iMJtfr FOUNDATION FINANCED- 

INSTITUTO LATIN..) AMERICANO M INVESTIGACiOÎS- SOCIA1FS 

{ILDIS) AMI' THE GOB, A LATIN AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS 

CONFERENCE IS BEING HELD IN QUITO AUGUST 11-13. AfKNDK) 

BY PROMINENT- LATIN POLITICIANS AND ■ HUMAU RIGHTS. FIGURES, 

SUCH AS ARGENTINA'S RECTOR CAMPORA, BOLIVIA '.S . JAIME' PAX • . 

ZAMORA , COLOMBIA'S ALFREDO YA.2QTJP2, COSTA SICK' :■. UNJ BL 

0RUBER, CHILE'S FA3IOLA LFTELIIH ,- EL SALVADOR'S GUILLrAM--' 

UNGOf MEXICO'S GUSTAVO CARVAJAL, NICARAGUA'S PA DRY 

ERNESTO CA KDI-NAL AND’ VENEZUELA'S 'CARLOS ANDSSfr. PEREZ, • 

THE‘CONFER SN CP PROPOSES . TO OBGAN'I-ZG A PERMANENT LATIN • ; 

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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION 'JO?, - .HUMAN RIGHTS'." ■ A SECONDARY : . 

PURPOSE IS 'TO SEVtEW THE" HUMAN- EIGHTS SITUATION IN LATH 

AMERICA. THE' BOLIVIA A' SIT* 'A T ION, AMD AEGTivT —-----—■ - 

DOLE TREES IK, ARK LIXFi-Y TO RECEIVE THE -MAJOR ATTENTION 

ALTHOUGH THE CENTRAL AMERICAN SITUATION WILL ALSO BE- 

ADDRESSED. THE CONFERENCE IS DEGIEELY -LEFTIST A ML TRY / 

U.S.UNDOUBTEDLY WILL CONTINU? UNDFF CRITICISM.. . 

4-. THE FIRST.FAT'S SESSION DEMONSTRATED TUX ’LEFTIST 

AND S 0 NEWS AT- A NT I-U. S. FLAVOR 0? THE CONFEHEHCB^J?.RS:-_--_^-.:.. •••... 

OPENING' SPEAKER, DR. ALFREDO VASQUE-Z CARR I SOS A, "FX-FQNMIX 

OF COLOMBIA, SPENT AP.FRG-XtMATEfcY FIFTEEN MINUTES-OF AN . 

HOUR LONG SPEECH CONDEMNING THE-'U.S. FOR THE FALL 0? 

CHILE'S ALLENLE, ARGUING THAT "NIXON-tlSSIN3ER~CIA POLIOS 

OF DESTABILIZATION WAS ACTUALLY SATAMIZATION." UF 4ENT- 

ON TO CASTIGATE -U.5. .SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AS- 

HAVING TEE RESULT OF POLITICIZING LATIN AMERICAN- ARMED - 

FORCES, ERGO,' THE ARMED FORCES WERE. MORE PRONE TO 

TAKE CONTROL 0? THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. 

5. THE SECOND SPEAKER, JOSE FRANCISCO PENA GOMEZ, . . 

SECRETARY GENERAL OF TET DOMINICAN REVOLUTIONARY PARTY- 

AND PRESIDENT OF SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL FOR LATIN 

AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, BEGAN BY QUOTING THE OPENING 

PHRASES OF TIE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND SPENT 

MOST Of HIS HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTE DISCOURSE ON THE 

ROLE OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FIGHT FOR 

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS. AS-- HE CAME TO THE CON 

CLUSION OF IIS REMARKS, HE MADE APOLOGIES TO SIS GOOD ■ 

FRIEND THE REVEREND JOE ELDHIDGE OF TIE WASHINGTON 

OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, WHO HE KNEW TO BE * A TRUE 

FIGHTER FOR HUMAN. RIGHTS" (APPLAUSE),-THEN LAUNCHED . 

INTO A SCREAMING, FIST SHAKING, BOLT'SHAKING, FOOT' 

STOMPING TIRADE AGAINST THE- "IMPERIALIST- UNITED STATES" 

(STANDING OVATION). 

t". BOTH MORNING AND AFTERNOON SPEAKERS- MADE REFERENCE ' 

TO EXISTING PROBLEMS IN ARGENTINA, URUGUAY AND CHILE, .. 

LOT THEY STUDIOUSLY IGNORED MENTIONING, POSITIVE ASPECTS - - 

AND RESULTS OF U.S. HUMAN EIGHTS POLICY. ALTHOUGH 

EL SALVADOR HAS NOT YET BEEN MENTIONED,.. BOLIVIA AND THE 

GARCIA MEZA COUP HAVE COME UNDER SHARP ATTACK. O.V 

SEVERAL OCCASIONS THE ANDEAN PACT STAND AND- NICARAGUA/$ 

-CALL FOR AN MFM VP IE LAUDED, BUT WITH THE RICE?:ION OP 

JAIME PAZ ZAMORA , SIDES ZUAZO'S RUNNING MAT-S- MONF • CHO5F 

ira-o-m the u.s, credit for its role in defense of 

Bolivian democracy, armando vi-i-lanufva, Peruvian 

PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN TIP’ R1CFHT‘ ELECT TONS r ..-t ARNES . 

THE DELEGATES. TO .BEWARE OF PAN AM'EB, I CAN I.$M INTEGRATION. 

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DEPARTMENT PASS ALL AHA POSTS . 

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PRESIDENT ROLDOS ADDRESSED THE EVENING SESSION .-OF 

CONFERENCE, IN A SHORT WELCOME,.HE EXPRESSED HIS HOP 

THE MEETING WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE' AND If THERE PE RE ANT 

CRITIC ISMS O f ECUADOR, 7HI .DELEGATES WOULD NOT HESITATE 

TO DISCUSS THEM. , » 

IA f 

8. AN INDICATION OF TSI ONE-SIDEDNESS OF THE CONFERENCE 

WAS CARRIED IN EL TIEMPO ON AUGUST 12. ARGENTINE, JORGE 

CESASSET , CLAIMED THAT EE WAS .EXPELLED FSOMTHS SEMINAS 

WREN HE OBJECTED TO FORMER PRESIDENT HECTOR CAMPORA'S 

PRESENCE ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE EX-PRESIDENT CREATED 

AND DIRECTED A BAND OF ASSASSINS THAT EXECUTED -THOUSANDS 

OF ARGENTINES. CESARSXY ALLEGED THAT A SECOND REASON FOR 

HIS EPULSION WAS BIS' DESIRE TO REMIND THE ASSEMBLY OF 

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TAXING PLACE IN CUBA. 

CISARSKY CHARGED .THAT THE ASSEMBLY'S OBJECTIVE IS TO 

CONDEMN HUMAM RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OF ONE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 

AND OVERLOOK THOSE OF OTHER IDEOLOGIES. CSSARSKY'S 

NAME DOES NOT APPEAR ON, ANY OF THE PUBLISHED LISTS OF 

INVITEES, THUS, OUR INITIAL ASSUMPTION IS THAT' HE 3IMPLY 

SHOWED UP AT THE CONFEREMCF. , ' 

I-. THE CONFERENCE HAS RECEIVED WIDESPREAD PUBLICITY. 

PARTICULARLY IMPRESSIVE WAS AN EL" COMERCIO EDITORIAL 

WHICH JUSTIFIED THE CREATION OF k NEW .HUMAN EIGHTS 

ORGANIZATION 0 THE BASIS THAT LISTING ONES HAD BEEN 

DISCREDITED BY EXTREMISTS'WHO HAD CO-OPTED THEM. TH1 

.EDITORIAL NOTED TEAT HUMAN RIGHT?. ARE'OBSERVED ONLY IN 

DEMOCRATICALLY GOVERNED COUNTRIES, AMD -W.W. IS ED 

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Gv T.T DEMOCRATIC LEADINGS 07 Tfil COD* "HENC :• A:■ ;'ICT?c'J-.T-. 

ANTIC IF ATI THAT ONLY HUMAN RIGHTS 710 L.r.T' IONS 0: Til' 

RIGHT WILL PE T;: PATIO. CJFAN AND IFSSORTSfVIOLATIONS 

WILL COMPLETELY IGNORhl WHILE ALLEGET U.S. IDL AT'IONS 

“ILL FE GIVEN CONSIDERABLE PROMINENCE. ANTT-U.S. STATT- 

MFNTS DURING THE FIRST DAY'S SESSION WIRE - MUTED THAN 

aE RAD IXPFCTSBJ ROVEVr’.R, MOST OF TEr SPEAKERS »rE?E 

POLITICIANS. IT IS LIKELY THAT TH? VCRE RADICAL PRINCES 

WILL HAVE THEIR TURN TODAY ANT TOMORROW AND WT FFIIVVF 

IT LIKELY THAT SOME WILL TAX K THAT OPPORTUNITY TO 

LAUNCH A FI*1 P ARBS AT THE U.S. 

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1. SUMPARY: THE GOE-IS3TITUTO LATINO AMERICANO H;’. 

IKYPSTIGACIONES SOCIALES (ILDISj' SPONSORED HUMAN RIGHTS 

CONFEREECF ENDED AUGUST 13 AFTER ESTABLISHING A NEW 

UTIN AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. A NUMBER OF 

RESOLUTIONS—CONDEMNATION OF THE COUP IN BOLIVIA, RECOG 

NITION OF tl SALVADOR'S TRENTS DLMOCRATICO RFVOLUCIONARIO 

AS THE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE., AN 

EXPRESSION OF SOI ILARITY FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF PUERTO 

RICO, AND CONDEMNATION OF THE 'DICTATORSHIPS U ARGENTINA, 

CHILE, PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY—OF INTEREST TO THE USG fcERS 

ADOPTED. M.OST OF AUGUST 13 WAS SPENT IN ’WRAPPING UP 

THK DERATES AND AGAIN A FEW TOMATOES WERE FLUNG 

AT TSF USG, RUT POSION DARTS i ERL ABSENT. IN PP.5 LATE 

AFTORNOOK SESSION, ECUADOR TOOK. ITS LUMPS .iS VARIOUS 

HFFRFSEMATIVES OF NATIONAL UNIONS AND ORGANISATIONS 

TOO. THE PODIUM. END SUMMARY. 

.?. 4 LATIN AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 

*HICH '■•-'ILL BE HEADQUARTERED IN QUITO, OFFICIALLY CAMP 

IKTO BEING AUGUST 13 AT THE CONCLUSION OP THE T3REE-DAi 

CQ'.-ILDIG SPONSORED BUUAN RIGHTS CONFER!'NC - . HORACIO 

SFvILLA 30BJA, FORMER GOP CHARGE IN WASHINGTON AND 

"ULS'TtivnTLT INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT 

Cl. DOS, WAS name: EXECUTIVE secretary of the K&v 

■;'■17f\7JC.V . ?.-■ "SID J.NT ROLPOS AND aFRNAS ILLS ZUA70 

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C? BOLIVIA Wt:!?s. NAM.iD FT-OFFICIO PRESIDENTS . FORMER 

PPVsi IjP^T OP VENEZUELA CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ WAS NAMED 

ftC^raL prfsid^. .tajmi paz zamora, Lionel prizzola, 

OF'flAT.DO 30 AY At AM I N , ALFREDO V A SOUSE CARPI SO Z A, JOSE 

FRANCISCO PENA, GUSTAVO CARTAJAL, DANIEL ODUBER, 

MANUEL UNCO AND RUBEN BERRIOS MARTINEZ '.’FRF NAMED TO 

T:i5: EXECUTIVE COUNCIL. ?CTJA DOR SANS OSWALT-O GUAYASAMIN 

ANr BISHOP LEONIDAS PROANO, ARGENTINIANS HECTOR CAMPO?A 

i'-XT EMIL 10 MICtNONS, RPTIV1AN JAIME PAZ ZAMORA, 

■U:’ZILIANS DOM HSI. DXP CAMARA AND I SONET, BPIZZOLA, ■ 

CCLOMI-IANS ALFRETO V A SOU I? CARRISOZA AND APOLINARIO 

DIAZ CALLKJAS, COSTA RICAN DANIEL ODUBER, CHILEAN 

S ABIOLA LET FLIER , EL SALVADOREANS GUILLERMO MANUEL 

UNGO AND ROBERTO LARA VEDADO, JAMAICAN JOHN THOMPSON, 

MtlllCAN GUSTAVO CARVAJAL, NICARAGUAN ERNESTO 

CARDENAL, PANAMANIAN GERARDO GONZALEZ PERUVIAN 

ARMANDO VILLANFUVA, PUERTO RICAN RUBEN BERRIOS, 

DOMINICAN JOSS FLA NCISC-0 PS NT. GOMEZ AND URUGUAY AN 

JUAN FERREIRA 'VaU-F NAMED TO THE COUNCIL 0? DIRECTORS. 

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. TRD RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY THE CONFERENCE WERE: 

— A DECLARATION OF SUPPORT FOR "THE COPE 0“' CONDUCT 

PROPOSED by i'RF.S. jdfnt roldos and a do pet dd by thv 

AND PAN PACT FORk ’ C-K MIUI FT.FRS J 

— AM TNEHGV.TIC CONDEMNATION 0? -ii; GARCIA MEZA 

COUP AND ?£«' CON SEQUEL * SYSTEMATIC AND CTrfJ: T. VIOLATION 

OF HUMAN RIGHTS TA.ilhG PL AC F IN U CL I VIA I 

— RECOGNITION ON THE CLANDESTINE BOLIVIAN NATIONAL 

UNITY GOVERNMENT AS TS7 ONLY CONS IITIJI ON V-'. GOVERNMENT; 

— RECOGNITION CF THE ? I 3, NT I' D EMC C RATI CO P F V 0 L U C10 ■ A R10 

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PUERTO .RICAN -SELF GATE RUBEN BPPRIOS &TTA.C/I..P 

rm US CLAIM I Nil TEAT POTATO' RICO WAS TR? FWOHT LIN'.." 

IN TBS' BATTLE’ AGAINST PS IMPERIALISM. "

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U8CINCSO QUARRY HTS PANAMA . - 

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 2 OF 2 QUITO 5516 

DEPT PASS TO ALL ABA. POSTS 

£.. THE BRAZILIAN DELEGATE, ARCHBISHOP TEOTONI DOS 

SANTOS, PROPOSE!) THAT THE CONFERENCE PASS A RESOLUTION. 

WHICH WOULD URGE THE US TO GRANT GENERAL AMNESTY - TO 

ALL UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS. ARCHBISHOP DOS SANTOS ARGUED 

TEAT BY MAKING COMMON CAUSE WITH THE MILLIONS OF 

UNDOUCMINTED ALIENS RESIDING IN‘'THE UNITED STATES, THE 

ASSOCIATION COULI) BEGIN BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS OF A 

POWERFUL AND EFFECTIVE PRESSURE GROUP. THE RESOLUTION 

WAS NOT ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE, BUT W5 ANTICIPATE, - 

THAT THE IDEA WILL SURFACE AGAIN. . ; . . 

6. IN THE LATE AFTERNOON, PRESIDENT ROIDQS WHO IN HIS 

WELCOMING SPEECH EXPRESSED HIS1"HOPE THAT IF THE 

DELEGATES FOUND GROUNDS FOR CRITICISM IN ECUADOR 

THEY WOULD NOT HESITATE TO DO SO, GOT HIS WISH. SOME 

SIX ECUADOREAN CITIZENS, REPRESENTING VARIOUS NATIONAL 

UNIONS, THE PEASANTS' ORGANIZATION AND PROVINCIAL 

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEES, ROSE TO DENOUNCE HUMAN RIGHTS 

VIOLATIONS IN ECUADOR. THE PRIMARY FOCUS'OF THEIR 

DENUNCIATIONS WAS ECUADOR'S NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, WHICH 

PERMITS THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF CONSTITUIONAL ' 

GUARANTEES. PRESIDENT ROLDOS SPOKE ON THE CONTINUING 

NEED FOR THIS LAW SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, AND THE...CONFERENCE 

DELEGATES, WHO REPEATEDLY LAUDED ROLDOS, DID NOT- PASS 

ANY RESOLUTIONS CONDEMNING THE LAW. ECUADOR WAS ALSO 

CITED FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN AND LABOR RIGHTS DURING 

TEE RECENT TRANSPORT WORKERS STRIKE. OTHER ECUADOREANS 

SPEAKERS CASTIGATED THE SUMMER INSTITUTE FOR LINGUISTICS 

•(5IL), A PROTESTANT MISSIONARY GROUP WHICH WORKS IN 

DSMi040789 PACE 01 TOR:228/15:032 DIG: 1.51230Z 

AUG 

*g- N T—P—D ■£. M 

C0 PT'

.'tjjesfcrt jfr J1*:! L*#***#:?:*; n Q p . 

■ h ' AMAZON REGION. fHF S PfcA-lFR S' CHARGES THAT ] 

rfcsraoiiNS Indian c'JLTnar: and their iv-mants 

DC.* AM; HRC LUNCHED WITH CONFERENCE BLLFGATFS 

ILLRIUGE AND LAURIE WISEBSRG ON AUGUST 13. BOTH 

I rt -s • 

FT WITH EMBASSY'S CONCLUSION THAT THERF SEEMED TO 

:f a conspiracy of silence neither to give credit to 

Ini UNITED STATE 3 MO R TO CRITICIZE CUBA. HL DR IDG 3 

POINTED OUT THAT THE DELEGATES POLITICAL LEANINGS MADE 

SOME CRITICISM OF THE US MANDATORY, PUT THAT THERE 

APPEARED TO BE A GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT TO HOLD IT TO A 

MINIMUM. ACCORDING TO ELDSIDGE MOST OF TEE DELEGATES 

V.SRE EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S HUMAN 

RIGHTS POLICY, BUT THAT THEY WOULD NOT EXPRESS PUBLICLY 

•HAT GRATITUDE. 

r.. COMMENT: IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT IN THE DELEGATES' 

CRITICISMS CF ARGENTINA, MORE WAS NOT SAID ABOUT THE 

ARGENTINE ROLE IK BOLIVIA? IT IS ALSO UNFORTUNATE THAT 

DELEGATES CONFIN FT THEMSELVES TO CRITICISMS OF 

r.lGaTWING DICTATORSHIPS. HOWEVER, ALL IN ALL THE 

CONFERENCE WAS MOT BAD FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE. THE EVENT 

'.’AC QUITE OBVIOUSLY V'FF. WELL FINANCED. ILDIS PICKED UP 

Thr. TAB FOR AIR FARES AND HOTEL BILLS ANr PROVIDED 

TRANSLATORS FOR PARTIO IPANTS AND OBSERVERS WHO DID NOT 

CPEAX SPANISH. Y r.T AT NO TIME WAS PHF FUTURE FINANCING 

OF THE ORGANIZATION DJ SCUSSED. FOREIGN Ml MISTRY OFFICIALS 

i'A'.V: TOLD US THAT HO RACIO SEVILLA WILL MOT EE RETURNING 

TO THE FOREIGN MINISTR ‘f AND THAT. THE MINISTRY WILL NOT 

:F PAYING HIS SALARY ’-': r.ILF HI SERVES AS EXECUTIVE- 

."d'CRETARY OF TUT ASSOC imON. WE DO NOT NOW IF T-.IS 

rS TO PT A FUT.T. TIME J 0T< AND IF IT IS, WHO IS 10 PAY 

1.?: SILL. rONSrQ UENTLT , THE FUTURE VIABILITY OF Z nK 

‘.SSCCIATION IS 0 TEN Tr GUEST ION. 

TONS: AX. EZ 

(; •. r\ T‘ 

0 N V r--) ^ A L 7* p C C p'

MEMORANDUM 

■;2iv 

( 

u 


gqnf i.a 

-rtr 

July 11, 1978 

INF0RMATION 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


.s? j 

ROBERT PASTOR f j/A\} 

Kissinger on Human Rights in 

Argentina and Latin America 

The attached cable summarizes Kissinger's visit to Argentina 

for the World Cup. His praise for the Argentine government 

in its campaign against terrorism was the music the Argentine’ 

government was longing to hear, and it is no accident that his 

statements were played back to us by the Southern Cone countries 

during the O.A.S. General Assembly. His other comments on the 

security problem in Latin America and the Soviet/Cuban threat 

surprise me only in that they are about 15-20 years out of date. 

What concerns me is his apparent desire to speak out against 

the Carter Administration's human rights policy to Latin 

America within two weeks of his return—which is soon. 

Frankly, I think it would be a mistake from a political point 

of view for him to make such a speech since he will only open 

himself to criticism for being anti-human rights since clearly 

Latin America is one of our success stories. On the other 

hand, we don't want to get into a public argument with him 

on this subject when we will need his help on SALT, etc. 

You may want to call him and ask how he enjoyed his trip and 

whether he would mind if a member of your staff—me—debrief 

him on his trip. That would provide me with an opportunity 

to see whether he is really concerned enough about our human 

rights policy to launch a campaign and also to give him some 

information on the effectiveness of our human rights policy 

in Latin America. 

CC ! 

«.< CSS JLCci .-la *z.r.GW3 

CONFIDENTIAL 

declassified 

I- .irtcofl

MEMORANDUM 

GONFIDE?JTIALi 


5601 

ACTION August 29, 1977 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


JESSICA TUCHMA 

Human Rights -- Argentina 

The President's positive remarks at Yazoo City on the Argentine 

human rights situation caused something of an upset at State which 

does not view recent events in Argentina in the same positive light. 

This was apparently the origin of the memorandum to you at Tab A. 

Its message is that the human rights situation in Argentina is still 

. very bad, notwithstanding recent announcements, and that therefore the 

President should not make favorable comments until we know more about 

what's really going to happen. Ampng other things, the memorandum 

points out that while the GOA announced the release of 342 prisoners, we 

can only confirm that 4^ have so far actually been released. 

In case you feel that the President would be interested, a shortened 

version of the State memorandum is at Tab I. 

RECOMMENDA TlON: 

That you forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I. 

Bob Pastor concurs 

C ON PIPEM TIA L/GBS 

DECLASSIFIED

:i 

• b 

MEMORANDUM 5601 

C ON FIDE?? TIA'T: 

THE WHITE HOUSE • 

WASHINGTON 

INFORMATION 


THE PRESIDENT 

i 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


An Update of Human Rights 

Developments in Argentina 

I. Hopeful Developments 

-- Prisoner releases. While the announcement of the release of 

342 political prisoners is a positive sign, it should be noted that 

we can only confirm that there have been four releases, and 


have actually been freed without charges and what proportion have 

been charged formally and must face trial. In the six weeks 

since, the Argentine government has reported 199 detentions and 

77 releases. 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.Q. 13526 

VjOtUAXA l-Mv'b 

€. ^ Data U,\tMu* 

Right of option. It seems likely that the Argentine government will 

restore a limited form of the "right of option", whereby state of 

siege prisoners may seek voluntary exile. This will be an 

important measure if it actually leads to prisoner releases. 

Political tolerance and the courts. There are signs that President 

Yidela may be gaining support from other generals for a greater 

ventilation of political ideas with civilian leaders. This has 

prompted Argentina1 s oldest party, the Radicals, to criticize the 

government's human rights record. The Radicals were accused of 

engaging in politics by the government, but rather than summarily 

punish the politicians, the government took the case to the courts. 

The lower courts ruled against the government, and the matter is 

under appeal. An Argentine government ban against the Jehovah's 

Witnesses is now in the Supreme Court, and there is hope that the 

court will declare the ban unconstitutional. 

IL Negative Developments 

-- Eight lawyers or their wives were kidnapped at a.sea resort near 

Buenos Aires in mid-July; one subsequently was found murdered 

brutally. It appears the oLhcrs were later released. It seems 

likely that the security forces were responsible. 

oxinfidfntiawgps

-GONFif'llJLN T1AL, 2 

»» Inmid-July, Argentina's Ambassador to Venezuela was 

kidnapped in Buenos Aires. He has not been found yet. 

It appears that the kidnapping reflected hard-line military 

resentment against President Videla, who made a very 

successful state visit to Venezuela in May. 

-» The publisher of the only major Argentine newspaper, 

which has demonstrated consistent courage on behalf of 

human rights, is being held by the government on economic 

charges at a secret place of detention; he was tortured. 

. -- At least five labor leaders have been warned recently to 

leave Argentina. Earlier this month a prominent Jewish 

leader fled to the United States after being threatened. 

HI, Conclusion 

Most serious violations of human rights in Argentina are now 

taking place in the Bue.nos Aires military region. The commander 

of the region, General Suarez Mason, is a notorious hardliner, 

and is viewed as one of Videla's principal rivals for power. 

Given the delicate political situation in Argentina, as well as the 

very uncertain nature of recent human rights developments, Embassy 

Buenos Airds, recommends that we should await developments before 

further public comment. State will continue to keep you fully 

informed as events unfold. 

ên-riDEN ti a l/gds

.VKMOUANI.U M 

Tin: wnrn: noi sr. 

\\ AMII.N 1.1 OS 

4140 

✓ 

INFORMATION' 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

THE PRESIDENT 


Your Remark That Argentine Improvements 

in Human Rights Should be Acknowledged 

The State Department has prepared a short report (Tab A) assessing 

the significance of Argentine President Videla's recent steps (on 

June 14) to improve the country's human rights image. Our mission 

in Argentina and the Department suggest that these steps — the release 

of 342 persons, the processing of 1,000 cases, the reexamination of 

the right of exile — should be "viewed cautiously." Nonetheless, the 

Department has sent a cable which instructs our Embassy to acknowledge 

and express our continued interest and encouragement for these and 

other steps which improve the human rights picture in Argentina. The 

State Department also requested further information on whether the 

announced steps have been taken. 

A recent cable summarizing President Videla's trip to Uruguay appears 

to reinforce the conclusion that we should-be more cautious about 

accepting announcements of reforms by the Latin American military governments 

at face value. At his press conference at the conclusion of his 

visit, Videla backed away from recent statements on democracy and 

instead said that his government has no fixed timetable for the installation 

of a democratic form of government. 

SECRET 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13S26

MEMORANDUM 

4140 


■ SECRET July 7, 1977 

ACTION 



FROM: 

ROBERT A. PASTOR 

6^ 

SUBJECT: 

Human Rights in Argentina 

We have just received a short paper (Tab A) from State responding to 

your memorandum of June 27 asking that State acknowledge the improvement 

in the Argentina picture. ARA, which probably drafted the 

memorandum, is not exactly known for its reluctance to compliment 

Latin American governments when given the chance; and therefore, 

their note of caution carries great credibility. I have attached at 

Tab B the cable, which I recommend be sent to the post, and at Tab C, 

a cable on the meeting between Videla and Mendez of Uruguay which 

lends support to State's conclusion. 

I recommend you send the memorandum at Tab I because the President 

raised the point about acknowledging the Argentine case a second 

time during his conversation with President Perez of Venezuela. 

RECOMMENDATION 

1. That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President. 

Approve___________ Disapprove___________ 

2. That you instruct me to clear the cable at Tab B. 

Approve___________ Disapprove___________ 

■V< 

Jessica Tuchman concurs'.!. 

SECRET----- &BS- 

Authority 

NARA__ 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

vAsc. 

fc-v- Data UVaUig---------

No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3 

ARGENTINA: 

ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION 

(C) Parameters and problems. The following assessment 

covers the Argentine government Is 1978 performance and the 

current situation with respect to category-one human rights. 

Inevitaoly, efforts have been hampered somewhat by the US. 

Government.'s limited capacity for monitoring human rights' 

events in Argentina and verifying reports of either positive 

or negative developments. 

i 

(C) Imprecision is most clearly a problem with statistical 

material. Frankly stated, we do not know exactly how many 

people have been tortured or killed, how many are now being 

held prisoner, how many prisons are being used, etc. We 

are forced, in many cases, to reply upon estimates whose 

credibility stems from their relatively wide acceptance amonggroups 

interested in and informed upon Argentina human rights 

developments. 

(C) We do not believe, however, tnac timely, precise 

and verifiable information would fundamentally alter the 

assessment offered below. 1 The record of Argentine human 

rights events is sufficiently complete to produce a convincing 

cumulative picture of the government;s performance. And 

while precise statistics might alter somewhat the quantitative 

dimensions of that picture, its qualitative aspects would ' 

remain unchanged. 

(C) Current situation. With respect to category-one 

rights, conditions can be summarized as follows; 

(C) — Political prisoners: Approximately 2,9Q0 persons 

purportedly guilty of security violations are being detained 

at the disposition of the national executive branch under 

state-o£-siege powers provided for in the Argentine constitution 

(PEN prisoners).* 

(CJ “ The current state of siege was instituted on 

November 6, 1974 by the Isabel Peron government. Under the 

state-of-siege, the national executive is empowered to detain 

prisoners indefinitely, but it can neither judge nor punish 

detainees. The Argentine courts ruled in 1977 and 1978 that 

the executive branch must cite specific causes for detention 

DOS review(s) completed. 

PECRET/NOFORH/NO CONTRACT 

MORI/CDF C0321B601 

l 

DECLASSIFIED IN PART 

E.0.13526 ' _ 

Authority__~ -3 ^ ~ ^ — 

NARA ^ __natn La\\la \\ 

No Objection_To Declassification 2008/1J/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3


-2- 

There are two other groups of prisoners, neither of which 

is publicly acknowledged by the government. One group is 

being held at the disposition of military authorities (DAH 

prisoners) and proDably includes about 500 persons. According 

to Embassy Buenos Aires sources, most of these prisoners are ■ 

either former terrorists now cooperating with security units 

or new detainees undergoing interrogation and not, therefore, 

listed as PEN detainees. The final group involves prisoners 

who have been selected for a rehabilitation program run by 

the security services. We have no reliable figures, but the 

program appears to be relatively small, encompassing at most 

a few hundred persons. 

m 

(C) No sustained official effort is being made to substantially 

reduce the-number of political'prisoners• by (1) 

releasing those against whom there exists no evidence of 

terrorist or criminal involvement nor pending charges; (2) 

trying those charged with specific offenses; or (3) permitting 

political prisoners to exercise their constitutional rights 

to choose exile over imprisonment (rignt-of-option). The 

right-of-option program initiated inlate 1977 has resulted 

in few approvals of prisoner petitions for exile. 

(C) There is little evidence to substantiate persistent 

rumors that thousand's of political prisoners are being 

held in clandestine camps located throughout the country. 

(C) — Torture, and prisoner mistreatment; Physical and 

psychological torture apparently remain standard treatment 

for alleged subversives, or persons believed to have information 

about subversion who refuse to cooperate with security 

in response to habeas corpus petitions covering PEN prisoners. 

However, the Executive does not always respond to court 

order. While we have little information that would permit 

categorizing detainees according to ty£>es of offenses, the 

PEN list probably includes few if.any terrorists suspected 

of having committed violent acts against persons or property. 

Such individuals, when captured by security units, are routinely 

killed after interrogation. The alleged security violations 

of most of those listed as PEN detainees probably include 

sucn things as (a) non-violent -actions undertaken in support 

of subversive (broadly defined to include action or teachings 

contrary to the military's conception of social order) 

groups, e.g., poster and pampnlet distribution and a variety 

*f Ff R frT/HQf OKM/rcO rONTHftC.T- 

No Objection JTo Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3 i_-—-j.-:.-. ~.~:r—r. 

i

No Objection lo Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3 

officials. Torture generally occurs ,during interrogation, 

prior to official listing of a detainee as a FEN prisoner, or 

his or her summary execution. International Committee of the 

ked Cross {ICRC) representatives who have interviewed most of 

the PEN prisoners and many undeclared prisoners reported in 

August that as many as 90 percent of PEN detainees were tortured 

during interrogation.' "w 

(C) Prisoner treatment beyond the interrogation stage ' 

and after PEN listing appears to vary considerably depending 

upon such factors as the prisoner?s alleged offense, the 

proclivities of the regional military commander, and the 

character of individual jailors. Reports of severe mistreatment 

(beatings, -denial of adequate food, medical care, exercise, 

etc.) are most often associated with specific military 

jurisdictions and prisons, or with the transfer or release of 

prisoners. In at least five reasonably documented instances 

in early 1978, for example, prisoners released from a La Plata . 

jail were immediately either murdered or kidnapped, presumably 

by security elements. Official actions appear to have prevented 

recurrences of this particular type of abuse, but in late 1978 

an ICRC official reported to the Embassy - his belief that 

prison conditions and prisoner treatment had deteriorated during 

the year. 

(C) — Disappearances: Reports of disappearances continue 

to accumulate. In the vast majority of cases, responsibility 

almost certainly lies with one of the many security units* In 

the absence of evidence-of clandestine camps bousing thousands 

of allegedly disappeared persons, most must be presumed dead.. 

of other support activities; (b) economic actions perceived . 

by the authorities as directly having supported subversion. 

(the Graiver case) or otherwise endangered-national interests; 

(c) affiliation with groups vaguely defined as "leftis-t"; or 

(d) actions that contributed. to an intellectual-cultural 

environment conducive to the growth of ?subversion" (herein 

lies the clanger to journalists, writers, teachers, performing 

artists, etc.). Thus, the term "security violation? has no 

specific meaning. Its operative definition is largely left 

to the discretion of regional and local authorities with arrest 

powers. ' ■ " 

(C) ** Reports received from released prisoners tenet to 

substantiate the ICRCjs observations on the frequency of torture. 

• QECRET/NOFOiRN/hO. CONTRACT 

------->— ... nq Objection To Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3 -------- -----------'• —


(U) Non-governmental human rights organizations tend 

to use the figure of 15, 000 for disappearances over the' 

past 3-4 years. Argentine groups shar§ that estimate and 

have presented the government with documentation on almost 

5,000 cases. In truth, however, no one knows precisely 

how many people have disappeared or, in many cases, why 

specific individuals were victimized. . * 

(C) Few who have disappeared since about, mid-1977, ' 

and on whom we have any information, could be considered 

terrorists or security threats. With most terrorists either . 

eliminated pr living in exile, the security forces have made 

a significant shift in their targetting practices to draw 

into tne security net a range of non-terrorists associated 

with the vague and expansively defined political left. The 

decision as to which specific individuals will be picked 

up is left to regional and local authorities and, therefore, . 

depends upon the latter's perception of what kinds of activities 

constitute security threats. The victim's culpability may 

only have involved past membership in a group that was 

entirely legal at the time, insofar as there is a discernible 

pattern, there has been a tendency toward the disappearance 

or persons wi-th a common association past or present; e.g., 

graduates of the same high school or university faculty, 

memoers of a political party or youth {group, etc. However, 

tnere are many cases that make no apparent sense and for 

which the explanation may lie more in internal politics than 

in any specific act of the victim. 

(C) Public criticism of government policies has, with 

few known exceptions, generally not been considered by 

authorities as grounds for detaining the critics and abusing 

or killing them. Many politicians, labor leaders, businessmen, 

and other professionals have criticized the government.'s economic 

political and human rignts policies without suffering 

retribution at the hands of the security forces. 

(C) There, has been no significant official effort to 

collect and publish information on persons who allegedly ' 

have disappeared. When queried about-disappearances by non-: 

governmental organizations or foreign governments, the Argentines 

standard response is "no information". The Argentine courts 

6gC*fcBT/NOrOItN/NO CONTKACT- 

t 

No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3

ino UDjection 10 ueciassincation 2UUU/n/U4 : NLU-2b-b-i-y-3 

regularly accept habeas corpus petitions concerning alleged 

disappeared persons, but they have recused to accept' 

jurisdiction in such cases. 

(i:) The Mothers of the Plaza ae Mayo (relatives of 

disappeared persons,} one of the most persistent and cohesive 

groups seeking information on disappeared persons, has 

recently been prohibited from conducting what had oeen a' 

weekly Thursday vigil in front of Government Bouse in downtown 

Buenos Aires. The demonstrations apparently had become 

too large and potentially disruptive in tne judgment of 

government officials who do not intend to satisfy their demands 

for information. The Mothers are now holding their gatherings 

at smaller and less conspicuous sites. 

(C) Given the diffusion of authority that has characterized 

the counterterrorist effort, it is highly unlikely that 

any government agency either has collectea or will be able to 

collect definitive files on alleged: disappearance cases. The 

various security units have an obvious interest in withholding 

or destroying information on cases for which their operatives 

have been responsible. 

(C) "Reappearances" emerged as a new.and possibly underreported 

facet of the human rights scene in 1978. There are 

no reliable figures, but the number of cases is probaoly 

quite small in relation to the reported number of disappearances. 

As of mid-September, the Embassy had received reports of 15 

cases ana by mid-November Argentine human rights groups placec 

tne figure at over 100, with a UNHCR representative suggesting 

it might oe as high as 300. During 1978, the government 

published 4 lists with the names of hundreds of persons who 

hao allegedly reappeared* In most cases, however, the 

individuals appear to have been the subjects of regular "missing 

persons" cases. Their .names did not appear on the lists of 

disappeared persons maintained by the Embassy and Argentine 

human rights organizations. 

(CJ — Fair public, trial. All who have been detained by • 

official security agencies and subsequently disappeared have 

obviously been denied a fair public hearing of the charges 

against them. 

g 

MDCft£T/NOFOnM/HO CONTRACT 


no UDjecnon 10 ueciassmcation 2UUb/n/U4 : NLU-^d-o-i-y-a 

-o- 

(C) Insofar as alleged security violators are charged 

ana tried in civilian or military courts, xxx there are two 

notable problems: the often extended period between detention 

and judicial processing and the reported predominance 

of convictions based on confessional evid'ence extracted 

through torture- Professional legal groups such as the 

ICJ intend to investigate the question of confessional 

evidence. 

(C) — Invasion, of the home. The detention practices of 

operational counterterrorist units regularly involve illegal 

invasion of the home. In addition, there are numerous reports 

of arresting officers ransacking private residences and 

stealing ttie personal property of the detainee. 

(C) Trends. 1978 produced no substantial quantitative 

improvement or deterioration in category-one. terms. The year 

featured a variety ot positive and negative factors, hut the . 

net result was to leave the situation little changed. 2 

Violations of category-one rights at the hands of official 

security personnel were, frequent throughout the year, and 

there was no evidence of a concerted, effective government 

effort to halt the abuses. 

(C) It is difficult to refine the trends analysis to 

reflect possible patterns of the incidence of certain kinds 

of abuses because the available statistical material is not 

always reliable. The question of disappearances provides a 

good example. In June 1978, Embassy Buenos Aires and 

Argentine human rights groups believed that disappearances 

during the first third of 1978 had declined in frequeny 

(about 15 per month) in comparison to 1977- by later in 

(C) *xx The status of PEN prisoners with respect to 

judicial processing is quite complicated because a prisoner 

nela under a PEN decree can simultaneously be processed on 

charges in civilian or military courts and, if convicted, 

serve and complete the imposed sentence. Perhaps half . 

or more of the current PEN detainees are either being 

tried or have been sentenced by judicial authorities. 

Tnis is significant because, among other reasons, PEN 

detainees who are under the concurrent jurisdiction 

of judicial authorities are not eligible to petition, 

for exile under the right-of-option program. 

-SE6HET; 

'NO- CONTRACT- 

.............. No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3 .

no UDjection 10 ueciassmcation 2UUd/n/U4: NLU-28-b-l-y-3 

: -7- 

the year, however, additional information .forced upward.* 

adjustments in the figures, interior Ministry records showed 

a rate ot 40 per month for January to October (as compared to 

150 per month in 1977 and 250 per month in 1978} and a Foreign. 

Ministry source placed the ten-month 1978 figure at aoout. 

80 per month. By November, the Embassy had repdrts of disappearances 

averaging aoout 34 per month for the Jaauary-April 

period. The Embassy has since concluded that a-figure of* 

55 per month would be a reasonable estimate for 1978. . 

* 

(C) On the basis of such evidence, the only conclusion 

that can be drawn is that disappearances occurred with relative 

frequency throughout the year with month-to-month variations 

reflecting tactical consioerations rather than policy 

aecisions. In essence, the situation changed little 

duriny 1978. 3 

(S/NF/NC) Counterterrorism, uncontrolled. The 

conclusion tnat conaitions did not improve in 1978 is 

cased, in part, on evidence that the security forces 

continued to operate without effective central control. 

Numerous reports during the year from a variety of intelligence 

sources stated that: 

— President Videla and his moderate supporters 

were attempting to establish rigid command and 

control over security operations; 

— new orders had been issued with respect to conducting 

police and military operations within • 

the bounds of the law; or 

— police and military operativesj had been dismissed 

or disciplined for abuses. 

(C) Some of the reported efforts were probably undertaken. 

Some improvements may well have occurred, particularly in 

areas under the jurisdiction of officers disposed toward 

reform. Nonetheless, at the close of 1978 it was apparent 

that counterterrorist actions were generally being conducted 

in accord with orders issued by regional and local military 

authorities who viewed themselves as unconstrained by the 

law or the directives of national authorities. In late 

October, an admiral with counterterrorist responsibilities 

in the Buenos Aires area stated to an Embassy officer that 

there was almost no central control over operational 

counterterrorist units. 

-ftEteKgT/NQronN/MO CONTRACT 

l 


No Ubjection I o Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3 

-ga 

gradual increase in military and civilian disenchantment 

with the general economic and political performance of his 

government. Those conditions, plus the degree to which the 

beagle Channel controversy with Chile dominated official 

attention during the last quarter of the year,' created highly 

improbable circumstances for bold human rignts initiatives on 

Videla's part. 

(C) The results of the recent army promotion/reassignment 

cycle appear to offer mixed prospects for human rights reforms. 

Moderates politically in sympathy with Videla and Army Commander 

Viola now may be., in a position to exert more effective control 

over the service. Particularly notable changes involved 

the following officers; 

— Suarez Mason has been shifted from his Corps I 

commander slot to Army Chief of Staff. His 

new post is a prestigious one from which he 

might be able to advance to the Commander in 

Cnief^s slot. Nonetheless; since he no longer 

has a troop command nor, mure importantly, 

direct control over counterterrorist units, his 

promotion is probably a net' short*-term, human 

rights gain.. 4 

— Major General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri has 

replaced Suarez Mason as Corps I commander. 

Galtier! most recently commanded Corps II 

(Rosario) where he established a reputation for 

reasonableness and restraint in human rights 

matters. It has been in his geographic jurisdiction, 

for example, that the most progress has been 

registered with respect to the judicial processing 

of PEN prisoners. If he displays the same 

tendencies as Corps I Commander, he will be a 

needed improvement over Suarez Mason. 

— Major General Santiago Omar Riveros, another 

officer notorious for his permissive attitude 

toward human rights abuses, has been shifted from 

his sensitive buenos Aires command (Military 

Institutes) to the Inter-American Defense Board. 

— Major General Jose Montes will replace Riveros. 

A Videla-Viola loyalist, Mohtes ctauld combine with 

Gaitieri to give the moderates? the potential forcurbing 

the abuses heretofore characteristic of 

-SEL’RtiT/NOFOKN/NO. CONTRACT 

DOS review(s) completed. 


no UDjection 10 ueciassiTication 2UUb/n/U4 : NLU-2b-b-i-y-b 

f 

counterterrorist operations in the Buenos Aires 

area. 

brig. General Juan flautists Sassjain’s appointment 

as Chief of the National Police is an ominous 

move in human rights terms. A counterterrorist 

expert, Sass'iain is reputedly rough and cruel. 

Major General Luciano B. Menenaez, a fanatic*on • 

suuversion who has condoned human rights violations 

by those under his command, • remains the Corps III 

commander (Cordoba). Militarily, Menendez.'s retention 

may _ be attributable to the need for his services 

in the event of hostilities with Chile over 

the Beagle•Channel. In human rights terms, 

however, it means that the situation in Cordoba 

is not liable to improve in the near future- 

In all likelihood, the army command shifts will not 

result in immediate and drastic human rights improvements, 

but the political context appears to be more favorable than . 

it has been since the March. 1976 coup.5 Much will depend 

upon whether the Videla-Viola tandem chooses to exercise 

the necessary- leadership, and perhaps ultimately upon whether 

the Argentine public becomes sufficiently exercised over 

continuing aouses to' demand change. 

(C) IABRC visit. Prom the Argentine government Vs 

perspective, the next critical human rights deadline is May 29 

when the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) will 

begin a week-long on site investigation. 

It is questionable, however, whether'the prospect of 

the IAHKC visit will lead to- fundamental changes in the tactics 

employed by the security forces ana, thereby, open the way to 

long-term human rights advances, in this critical area, the 

army command changes probably offer more hope for reform than 

the IAHRC visit.® 

■tiJBCRDy/NOPQRN/NO- CONTBAfc^ 

i 

* 

___ _ No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/04 : NLC-28-8-1-9-3 

r

No Objection Trrftn-ln nifinntinn in full 2013/02/04 

D^nnrtmpnt. nf State 

.DOS REVIEWED 29-Jun-~2bT0: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL; 

NLC-24-91-4-1-9 

TELEGRAM J+,3r 

page at 

ACTION HCA-ll 

TEL AV 22921 II Of

. No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9 

Department of State TELEGRAM 

PAGE 01 TEL AY 22920 02 OF 02 280404Z 4324 

ACTION NEA-11 

INFO OCT-01 ARA-11 AD5-00 PM-06 NSC-0.5 SP-02 SS-15 

CIAE-00 DOOE-00 I NR-10 NSAE-00 PA-01 HA- 05 /06 7 W 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 06 0 4 4 1 28 0 4 2 4 Z /23 

R 25 1510Z OCT 79 


' TO SECSTATE WASH0C 43 08 

, INFO USlCA WAS HD C ( 

AME MB ASSY BUENOS AIRES 

C 0 N F I -o E N T 1 A L- SECT I ON 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 229 20 






HIS GRATITUDE TO SENIOR OFFICIALS A'T THE DEPARTMENT AND 

THE WHlTF HOILSF- IFJWIS ‘ ---------- 

I 

nmic incuTHH--------- 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2C513/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9

187 

No Objection To Declassification in F'^ll 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9 

*******C ONFIDBNTIA L*******E COPY 

-£7 

OP IMMED 

DE RUESBA #8154 2641610 

0 101603Z OCT 80 

FM AMEMBASST BUENOS AIRES 

LK 


THE-WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 

INFO AMEMBASST ASUNCION 5231 

AMEMBASST BRASILIA 4323 

AMEMBASST CARACAS 4611 

AMEMBASST LA PAZ 4068 

AMEMBASST LIMA 3718 

AMEMBASST MONTEVIDEO 6800 

AMEMBASST SANTIAGO 4966 

‘CONPIDENTI A £~~SECTION 1 OF 2 

'EXDIS / 

,0^-S 

JENOS AIRES 8154 

t 

x. t 

DEPT. PLEASE REPEAT USCINSCO FOR INTAFF 

EO 12065: RDS-4 10/8/96 (RUSER, CLAUS W.) OR-M 

TAG'S: AR 

SUBJECT: DELI VERT OH^PRES IDlTmALs. "MESSAGE 

REF: (A) WHITE H0USEy?397 (NOTALjT (B) BUENOS AIRES 8098 (NOTEL)J 

(C) BUENOS AIRES 7652 


2. CHARGE DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GENERAL VIOLA 

OCTOBER 8 (REF A}. GENERAL VIOLA EXPRESSED HIS PROFOUND 

APPRECIATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S THOUGHTS. HE STATED 

THAT HE WOULD OF COURSE BE REPLYING IN WRITING. IN THE 

MEANTIME HE WOULD WISH TO SAY THAT HE FULLY RECIPROCATED 

THE PRESIDENT'S BELIEF IN THE IMPORTANCE OF STRENGTHENING 

US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS. "MY GOVERNMENT", HE SAID, "WILL 

SEEK TO MAKE US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS AS PRODUCTIVE AS 

POSSIBLE. HE RETURNED TO THIS THEME AT VARIOUS POINTS 

IN THE CONVERSATION STATING, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IT IS HIS 

(BELIEF THAT THE CURRENT ISSUES BETWEEN ARGENTINA, WHICH 

IN AN EARLIER MEETING HE HAD ENUMERATED AS BEING BOLIVIA, 

■ GRAINS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND NUC.LEAR MATTERS, ARE THE PRO 

DUCT OF PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND WILL "ONE WAT OR ANOTHER" 

BE REOLVED. THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCES ON BASIC 

INTERESTS. HE SAID, ALSO, THAT HONESTY AND FRANKNESS . 

*************** +VHSR COMMENT *************** 

VP 

\Y 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O. 13526 

Authority M L r - 

NARA_. fe-frf____Date LtVnVvu 

l PSN1004066 

PAGE 01 T0R:294/16:52Z DTG;101603Z OCT 80 

*******0 ONFIDENTIA L******»E COPT 

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No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9 

****♦*&€ QNFIDENTIA !**»*♦*»E COPT 

'WERE REQUIRED FOR THE RELATIONSHIP TO PROSPER.‘ 

t 

'3. VIOLA, AS USUAL OPEN AND ACCESSIBLE, MADE IT CLEAR 

THAT HE WANTED TO USE THE MEETING TO EXPLORE OTHER MATTERS 

—IN EFFECT HE SAID "ASK ME QUESTIONS." THE CHARGE IN 

QUIRED WHAT GENERAL VIOLA SAW AS TEE AGENDA FOR HIS 

GOVERNMENT. VIOLA RESPONDED BT LISTING WHAT HE CALLED 

THE "PROBLEMS". GIVEN TO SCHEMATIC RESPONSES, HE STATED 

THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY -WAS IN THE POLITICAL 

AREA WHERE THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO PRODUCE 

LEGISLATION THAT WILL ALLOW THE POLITICAL PARTIES 

TO RENEW THEIR LEADERSHIP AND "FUNCTION NORMALLY." IN THE 

ECONOMIC AREA, HE SAID, THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO 

REVITALIZE THE ECONOMT, BOTH INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE 

IN THE SOCIAL AREA, HE SAIB IT WAS NECESSARY TO CORRECT 

THE IMPRESSION THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS ESSENTIALLY 

OPPOSED TO THE BROAD INTERESTS OF MOST ARGENTINES. HE 

SUGGESTED THAT THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY EFFECTIVELY 

IMPLEMENTING THE LABOR REFORM LEGISLATION AND INSTITUT 

ING OTHER, UNDEFINED, MEASURES IN THE SOCIAL FIELD. 

VIOLA STOPPED WITH THESE PRIORITIES. BUT WHEN QUERIED 

ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAS 

.FOUR OBJECTIVES: TO INCREASE THE "PRESENCE" OF'ARGENTINA 

IN THE SOUTHERN CONE (HE HASTENED TO ADD THAT THE COUN 

TRY WAS NOT SEEKING REGIONAL HEGEMONY); TO REBUILD 

ARGENTINA'S TIES TO THE ANDEAN PACT; TO REPAIR.AND EXPAND 

RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE; AND TO RESTORE AND 

STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. 

4. VIOLA THEN TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPELL OUT SOME 

OF HIS THOUGHS ON THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S BASIC GOALS. 

HE SAD THAT THE MILITARY TOOK OVER IN 1976 WITH ONE OB 

JECTIVE: TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A SECURE AND GENUINE 

DEMOCRACY. THE MILITARY WANTED TO FINALLY END THE CYCLE 

IN WHICH INEFFECTIVE AND UNSTABLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS 

ALTERNATE WITH MILITARY REGIMES. GETTING THE MILITARY 

PERMANENTLY OUT OF THIS GAME BY BUILDING A HEALTHY 

DEMOCRACY WAS STILL THE- MILITARY'S OBJECTIVE AND ONE 

THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD FAITHFULLY PURSUE, HE SAID. 

5. THESE THOUGHTS LED'TO A QUESTION ON PERONISM BY THE 

CHARGE. VIOLA SAID THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES DID NOT 

WANT TO LEAVE POWER KNOWING THAT IN FIVE TO TEN YEARS 

THE COUNTRY WOULD AGAIN BE FACED WITH THE OPTIONS IF 

BT . < k 

i *■ 

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188 

■" i 

****»»*c o n n i n i i i»*»***»£ copy 

OP IMMED 

DE RUESBA #8154 2841615 

0 101603Z OCT 80 



,THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 

■INFO AMEMBASST ASUNCION 5232 ! 








EIDIS 


HAS HAD SINCE 1946—PERONISM AND ANTI-PERONISM. STATING 

THAT HE WAS CHOOSING HIS WORDS WITH GREAT CARE BECAUSE 

THE SUBJECT IS A PARTICULARLT SENSITIVE ONE, VIOLA SAID 

THAT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT EVEN TODAT PERONISM IS A 

MAJORITT. PERONIST SENTIMENT RUNS DEEP AND STRONG. IN 

ARGENTINA. BUT PERONISM HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTED AROUND A 

LEADER AND LACKED A WELL DEFINED IDEOLOGICAL BASS; THE 

MOVEMENT NOW NO LONGER HAD SUCH LEADERSHIP. THE PROBLEM 

FOR THE MILITARY WAS HOW TO SHAPE THIS FORCE TO DEMO- 

1CRATIC PURPOSES. HAVING RAISED THE ISSUE, HOWEVER, 

'VIOLA DID NOT OFFER A CLEAR SOLUTION. HE SUGGESTED THAT 

'ON THE ONE HAND IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CREATE "AN 

ALTERNATIVE" WHICH WOULD APPEAL TO SOME SECTORS OF PERON 

ISM. HE ALSO SAID THAT EFFECTIVE LEGISLATION ON PARTY 

ORGANIZATION COULD HELP SHAPE PERONISM TO DEMOCRACY. IN 

DISUCSSING THE POLITICAL FUTURE, VIOLA SEEMED TO DISMISS 

THE POSSIBILITY OF FORMING AN OFFICIAL PARTY FOR EVENTUAL 

ELECTIONS. AT LEAST THAT APPEARS TO BE THE IMPORT OF HIS 

REMARK THAT IT WAS’"TOO LATE" TO FOLLOW THE POLITICAL -v 

PATH TAKEN BY THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY IN STRUCTURING THAT1- 

COUNTRY'S PARTY LIFE. VIOLA SAID THAT "IF WE WERE GO 

ING TO DO WHAT THE BRAZILIANS DID, WE SHOULD HAVE 

STARTED FIVES YEARS AGO. 

6. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, VIOLA ELABORATED ON THE 

UcClassifie: 

E.Q. 13526 

Aiii'nnrity . NA L f 3 V l-cV - vA -\-ql 

NARA__f^g____ Data u \ ^ \ l t. 

PSN:004090 PAGE 01 TORs284/£7:11Z BTG:101603Z OCT 80 

No Objection To Declassification in Full" 20T3/62/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9 

.

No Objection 1 o Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9 

**»*»*»G ONFIDENTIA L*****»»E'COPY 

ECONOMIC ISSUES. HE SAID THAT HE SEES NO CONTRADICTION 

BETWEEN POLICIES TO FIGHT INFLATION AND POLICIES TO 

.PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH. THE TWO GO TOGETHER. HE 

ADDED THAT IN HIS VIEW IT WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO 

•HAVE POLITICAL STABILITY IN A COUNTRY THAT IS UNDERGOING 

LONG TERM RECESSION. HE SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY FAVORED 

THF POLICY OF TRIMMING BACK THE PUBLIC SECTOR'S PARTICI 

PATION IN THE ECONOMY. HE SAID THAT PARTICIPATION IS 

DIVIDED INTO THREE AREAS * INFRASTRUCTURE (TELEPHONES, 

ELECTRICITY, WATER, ETC.); STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES 

(FABRICACIONES MILITARES, THE STEEL INDUSTRY); AND 

INDUSTRIES AND OPERATIONS.WHICH THE STATE TOOK OVER IN 

THE PAST FOR SOCIAL OR POLITICAL REASONS. THIS LAST 

GROUP COULD BE SPUN OFF IMMEDIATELY. THE STRATEGIC 

INDUSTRIES WERE "COMPLICATED" AND THERE WAS LITTLE 

POSSIBILITY THAT THEY COULD BE TURNED OVER TO THE PRIV 

ATE SECTOR. WATER, GAS, TELEPHONES AND THE LIKE COULD 

BE TURNED BACK IF INVESTORS COULD BE FOUND WHO WOULD BUT 

THEM OUT. THE PROBLEM WAS TO FIND INVESTORS, HE SAID. 

7. OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WERE: 

A. VIOLA'S TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES. VIOLA STATED 

THAT NO FINAL DECISION HAD-BEEN MADE FOR HIS TRIP TO THE 

UNITED STATES AND EUROPE. HE SAID THAT IF" HE SHOULD 

TRAVEL IT WOULD BE AT THE END OF NOVEMBER OR 

'EARLY DECEMBER. HE SAID HE. APPRECIATED THE EMBASSY'S 

OFFER TO HELP WITH ANY ARRANGEMENTS. AS HISS OWN FLANS 

DEVELOPED HE WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH ON THIS SUBJECT. 

VIOLA THEN SAID THAT IN ANY CASE HE WOULD TRAVEL TO 

WASHINGTON IN A PRIVATE .CAPACITY AIMING AT BETTER RELA 

TIONS WITH THE US. 

B. THE OASGA: THE CHARGE SAID THAT AMBASSADOR ROS AND 

HE ON MONDAY HAD DISCUSSED THE ISSUE OF THE IAHRC REPORT 

AT THE OASGA * THE CHARGE NOTED THAT IT SEEMED POSSIBLE, 

AS ROS HAD POINTED OUT, DIFFERENCES THAT BETWEEN THE 

US AND ARGENTINA ON THIS ISSUE WOULD ADVERSLY AFFECT 

THE CLIMATE FOR GENERAL VIOLA'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON. 

VIOLA STATED THAT EE *HAD TAKEN UP THIS ISSUE WITH PRESI 

DENT VIDELA FOLLOWING THE CHARGE'S LAST MEETING WITH HIM 

(REF C). HE SAID THAT THIS WAS AN ISSUE FOR VIDELA, AND 

GAVE NO FURTHER INDICATION THAT HE INTENDED TO INVOLVE 

HIMSELF IN THE MATTER ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. 

RUSER 

BT 

( * 

t 

PSN:004090 PAGE 02 OF 02 T0R:284/17:11Z DTG:101603Z OCT 80 

***»*»»C QNFIBENTIA l*****»*E COPY 


no UDjection 10 ueciassmcation 2uuy/uu/u4 : NLU-24-ij4-b-i-y 

V ■ 

> 

MEMORANDUM 

-CONFfBENTIAtT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

State Department rev.ew completed 

Dn file DOC re'ease instructions 

appiy 

March 5, 1979 

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY 


FROM: 


LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor). 

I 

SUBJECT: 


Mexico. With Erb and Owen, I worked oâ a letter on GATT for the 

President to send to Lopez Portillo. Secretary Vance met with 

Mexican Finance Minister Ibarra, who was very positive about the 

President's visit. He also was relatively encouraging about the 

MTN, and after the meeting, Bergsten met with Ibarra for a coupleof 

hours to discuss the codes. Negotiations will continue next 

week. Ibarra also said that Mexico would be prepared to consider 

contributing to IDA if the U.S. provided assurances that we 

didn't intend to phase them out of the MDB's. (C) 

Worked on the NRC decision with Jessica and State. The problem 

was pretty much resolved by Askew, who postponed his trip to 

Mexico. The decision will be conveyed in a routine manner, (c) 

I 

I talked to Frank Weil of Commerce on their closing the Trade 

Center in Mexico City. The reason the decision was disclosed on 

February 14th was because of a Congressional hearing. He said 

that Commerce is closing all its trade centers abroad, and therefore 

is not discriminating against Mexico. He gave a good defense 

of his decision, and I will just leave it at that. Discussed with 

Owen and Poats the prospective decision by X-M on a loan to 

Chrysler for a plant in Mexico. We believe X-M should be encouraged 

to go ahead, provided we are not over-ruling everyone 

else. Also met with Rich Nuccio, a professor from Williams who 

is interested in Mexico, (c) 

Nicaragua. Met again with our Ambassador Solaun, and agreed that 

the best posture at this time to Nicaragua is cool and correct — 

low-key to GON and looking for appropriate occasions to underline 

our continued support for the democratic process, (c) 

Argentina. Re-worked a memo on Argentina after discussing it 

witTT Jessica. (C) 

( 

General Viola, Commander of the Argentine Army, gave assurances 

(again) to our Ambassador that Argentina's human rights record 

will improve, viola deplored the hundreds of disappearances and 

frankly admitted this was their "nightmare." "The deal will not 

reappear," he said. He could not guarantee a complete cessation 

of disappearances but promised they would drop dramatically as 

would tortures, the use of the electric prod, etc. Viola asked 

•CCWFIDDNTIAT, 

Review on 3/5/85 

No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/04 :*NLC-24-54-6-1 -9 

i 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

■- ,-gAc. M ~ T 

'g.T- aaoJik^L-

.nNF’Ti No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/04 ^NLC-24-54-B-1-9 

that the GOA not be judged by the past, but by the present and 

the future. (C) 

Costa Rica. Initial spaDing between the U.S. and Costa Rica over 

positions on the upcoming tuna negotiations occurred last week 

with Costa Rica's Minister of Economy firing the first volley. 

He informally placed on the table a 57 per cent minimum for 

coastal state allocations, but was told that our formal maximum 

was 45 per cent. In spite of what appears to be inflexibility 

on the paifft of both Costa Rica and Mexico, we are still planning 

to hold the scheduled tuna talks in Washington March 7-8. (C) 

* i 

i 

CONFIDENTIAL 


^ V ,No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/17 : NLC-24-35-7-9-0 

744 

Q. y ■ I .p g ft -[I J A ;,***COPY 

rp IMMED 

UTS418 

HE HUESBA #5172/1 1772122 

C 262017Z JUN 7? 

VM AMEMBASSY BUiNOS AIRES 

DOS REVIEWED 12 VIAY 2010 DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE l\ FULL, 

70 SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1252 

C -0-N MU N-T-f A It SECTION 1 0? 2 3-JENofc AIRES 5172 

v-0. 12065 XDS-1 6126109 (CASTRO, RADI H) CR-M 

TAGS .«R, SHUM 

SUBJECT (C) AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES HUMAN RIGHTS WITH GENERAL 7ICI-A 

REE: A BUENOS AIRES 47215 B STATE 163322 

1. (C-FNTIRE TEXT) 

?. SUMMARY: GENERAL DENIAL ENTERED BY GENERAL VIOLA 

ON JACOBO TIMERMAN'S REPORTED IMMINENT RELEASE. HE 

LABELED RECENT NEWSPAPER STORIES AS TOTALLY INACCURATE. 

VIOLA AGAIN PROMISED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WOULD BE 

ÊDUCED SUBSTNATIALLY. HE ALSO PREDICTED GREAT MOVEMENT 

IN RIGHT OE 00PTI0N CASES. VIOLA EXPRESSED GREAT 

CONEIDENCE IAHRC WOULD FIND IMPRESSIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN 

HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD. BUT OFFERED NO HOP 5 FOR "DESAPARECIDOS." 

HE EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN ABOUT NICARAGUA STRESSING 

r.OA'S WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH USG IN ITS OBJECTIVES. 

ÎCLA IELT AN OAS MILITART PEACE FORCE PROBABLY NEEDED 

HUT NCT ACCEPTABLE TO LA COUNTRIES. END SUMMARY 

i • *■ 

7. APPRECIATION ECR MEM SUPPORT: GENERAL ROBERT0 VIOLA, 

Junta president and army commander, requested i meet 

with HIM ON MONDAY, JUNE 25 AT 1715 HOURS AT HIS OFFICE. 

DUE TO MY BEING OUT.OF COUNTRY, I HAD NOT SEEN GENERAL 

VIOLA SINCE ABOUT MIDDLE OF APRIL. EE *E'j. ME WITH THE 

TRADITIONAL "ABRAZO" AND INQUIRED ABOUT f.OW THINGS STOOD 

IN WASHINGTON, DC. HE EXUDED FRIENDLINESS BUT YET 

SHCWEr CONCERN ABOUT RECENT WAVE OF NEGATIVE NEWSPAPER 

ARTICLES ON ARGENTINA APPEARING IN CONUS. 

Q 

1 

uVrvVvu. 

4. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES: VIOLA WAS SPECIFIC IN HIS 

DISDAIN FOR NEW YORK TIMES SERIES WRITTEN BY MR OA'uS 

AND ENSUING EDITORIAL. HE TERMED WASPI-'GTON POST 

FRITORIAL CONTEMPTIBLE AND IRRESPONSIBLE. RE HOPED 

•J 

.-yjis#**^***#*#*#* *WHSR COMMENT 

$ it sic $ # $ 

FOB :PASTOR,BLOOM 

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. *****»«C ONFIDENTll L*****»*E COPY 

Nn Dhinrtinn Tn Dfidassifinatinn in Full 2013/01/17 : NI.C-24-35-7-9-0

.i\o UDjection ! o ueciassitication in hull 2Ui a/un/i f : NLU-24-bb-/-y-u 

*******C 0 N F I B- tr \ ? p- A x,*******]S COPT 

Ul‘FARTMENT WOULDN'T ACCEFT VERACITY OF ARTICLES "IN TOTO", 

RECOGNIZING SOME MERIT TO PORTIONS OF REPORTING. I MADE 

IT CLEAR TC VICLA AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS ARE INDEPENDENT 

AND ATTRIBUTION SHOULD NOT BE TO EMBASSY OP DEPARTMENT. 

FT ACKNOWLEDGED TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF NEWS MEDIA AND 

STATE! NO LINKAGE OR ATTRIBUTION SHOUL! 5E M£DE TO USG. 

VIOLA'S CONCERN WAS TEAT DUE TC IMPORTANCE 0? NEW I OR'A 

TIMES AND WASHINGTON POST, DEPARTMENT MIGHT CAVE IN 

ASSUME AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS POSTURF TOWARDS GOA. 

I ALLAYED VIOLA'S FEARS BY TELLING HIM DEPARTMENT AND 

USG TOOK AN OBJECTIVE AND JUDICIOUS VIFW ON ARGENTINA. 

I REMINDED VIOLA THE STRAIN IN RELATIONS IS DUE TO HUMAN 

RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, BUT USG WELCOMED IMPROVEMENTS. I 

EMPHASIZED "BALL NOW IN THEIR COURT"ND IMPROVED 

RELATIONS WERE CONTIGENT ON MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS. 

HE ACCEPTED THIS AS A FACT. 

5. IAHRC VISIT: VIOLA BFMINLTD ME IA5RC WOULD BE VISIT 

ING ARGENTINA 

g, H*1 STATED THIS 

PATE WAS CBOSEN BY IAFRC AN! NOT BY GOA, WHO HAVE 

BEEN ANTICIPATING ITS VISIT SINCE LATE MAY. VIOLA 

STATE! PRISON CONDITIONS HAVE IMPROVED TREMENDOUSLY 

AND RELEASES WILL OCCUR IN LARGE NUMBERS. RE SAID ALL 

OF GOA IS BEING GEARED FOR IAHRC VISIT RESULTING IN 

VIRTUALLY NO DISAPPEARANCES, NO TORTURE AND NO IRREGULAR 

ARRESTS. I REMINDED HIM OF SIX DISAPPEARED STUDENTS 

£S OF A FEW WEEKS AGO. HE AGREED THIS a’AS -A BLACK 

MARK IN THEIR RECORD, BUT DESPITE ALL INVESTIGATORY 

VEFCRTS NO INFORMATION EXISTED ON THIS BIZARRE OPERATION. 

p. DESAPARECIDOS: VIOLA STATED IN 1S78 THERE WAS AN 

AVERAGE OF ABOUT FIFTY "DESAPARECIDOS". AT THIS POINT 

PE LOCKED AT HE WITH DIABOLICAL GRIN — FROM EAR TO EAR 

— JOINING HIS GREY MUSTACHE WITH HIS SIDEBURSNS, AS IF 

THOUGH HE HAD ONE ON ME AND SAID: "l TA^S YOUR FIGURES 

OF FITTY PER MONTH LAST YEAR. LOOK AT THE RECORD THIS 

YEAR. IT'S ONLY SEVENTEEN DISAPPEARED IN SIX MONTHS." 

I INTERRUPTED EIM STATING OUR FIGURES INDICATED TWENTY- 

TWC DISAPPEARANCES. HF SAID EVEN SO, YOU MUST ADMIT 

THERE IS A MAJOR IMPROVEMENT." I ACKNOWLHGED THE 

IMPROVEMENT BUT TOLD HIM HE WOULD NOT GET MUCH SOLACE 

FPOM USG UNTIL THE FIGURE WAS ZERO. HIS REPLY WAS 

TEAT THEY WERE GETTING THERE AND WAS CONFIDENT BY 

TIME IAHRC .ARRIVE! GOA WOUID REACH THE ZERO STATUS. 

VICLA MADE IT CLEAR TO ME THE DESPARECIDOS" WOULD NOT 

RFTURN. I INQUIRE! ABOUT HIS STATEMENT. HF REPEATED 

IN HIS OPINION THE DISAPPEARED WOULD NOT BE SURFACING. 

AGAIN, I ASKED ON WHAT HE BASED HIS OPINION. VIOLA'S 

REPLY WAS THAT GOA LACKED INFORMATION CN THE DISAPPEARED 

i ‘ 

PS N:304421 

l 

PAGE 592 TOR :177/21:51Z DTG:26£0l?Z JU‘‘ 7 

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Nn OhiRntinn Tn npnlassifinatinn in Full ?ni3/01/17 : Nl C%?4-3H-7-9-0

u 

■No Objection I o Ueclassitication in hull 2U13/U1/1 f : NLU-24-;ib-/-y-i) 

»»*****C 0 N F I B-R-N T t- A l******»E COPY 

AND IN VIEW OP THE EXTENDED PERIODS CF DISAPPEARANCE 

PE DOUBTED ANY OF THESE PEOPLE WERE ALIVE. HE SAID THERE 

MIGHT BZ A FEW CASES SURFACING - THOSE UNACCOUNTED 

TOR IN PRISON DUE TO ERROR — BUT THIS! WERE RARE EXCEPTIONS. 

VIOLA STATED GOA WOULD PROBABLY HAVE SOME STATEMENT ON 

DISAPPEARED WHEN IAHRC ARRIVED. HE SAIL IT WOULD'BE A 

STATEMENT WITHOUT SPECIFICS, BUT HOPEFULLY WOULD BE 

PALATABLE TO SOCIETY. 

7. RIGHT OF OPTION: I TOLD VIOLA THE RIGHT OF OPTION 

PROGRAM HAD BEEN A FIASCO UP TO NOW. HE JAS REMINDED 

GOA — THROUGH ITS APPROPRIATE AGENCIES — E AD NOT GIVEN 

TMBASSY REASONABLE COOPERATION, BUT TO CONTRARY HAD 

RAISED ALL KINDS CE BARRIERS. AMAZINGLY ENOUGH, HE AGREED 

WITH MY STATEMENT, BUT RETORTED RIGHT OE OPTION CASES 

WOULD BE MOVING FAST FROM NOW ON. HE SAID TEESE CASES 

WERF HIGH ON THE AGENDA. 

PT 

t 

FSN:004:421 PAGE 03 OF 03 TOR :1?7/21:31Z DTG:262017Z JUN 79 

#*#+#**& 0- N~F I D 3 H J I A L*»*»***E COFY 

< 

Nn Ohiartinn Tn nadaRsifinatinn in ill 7013/01/17 : Nl C-74-3S-7-9-0

. No Objection I o Ueclassitication in Hull ^013/01/17 : NLC-24-35-7-9-U 

i » 

34c 

i 

0 i) n d * ij •? n !,■*******£ copy 

CP IMMEL 

VTS434 

L'F RUESBA *5172/2 1772115 

C 252017Z JUN 79 

TM AMFMBASSY RUFNCS AIRES 

TO S"CSTAT' WASHEC IMMEDIATE 1252 

C C N E IDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 5172 

2. TI HERMAN CAS*: RECENTLY "CONVICCION", NA'f f ORIENTED 

NEWSPAPER, AND THE 3UENCS AIRES HERALD, ENGLISH-AMERICAN 

NEWSPAPER, FRONT-PAGED 1IMZRMAN'S IMMINENT RELEASE.I 

TOLD VIOLA USG HOPED THESE PREDICTIONS WERE ACCURATE. 

HE DENIED ANY TRUT'T TO THE REPORTS. HE SAID TIMERMAN 

WAS NO CLOSER NOW THAN EE WAS SIX MONTHS AGO TO BEING 

RELEASED. VIOLA AGAIN EXCULPATED HIMSELF ET STATING 

IE IT WERE LEFT UP TO HIM TIMERMAN WOULD HAVE BEEN 

RELEASEE A LONG TIME AGO, IN A JESTING FASHION, I SUGGESTED 

*0 VIOLA THAT AS ARMY COMMANDER AND PRESIDENT OF THE 

JUNTA HE WAS IN A UNIQUE POSITION OF AUTHORITY TO LEAD 

THE WAY. HE SMILED AND REPLIED HIS OCSIACLCS WERE 

W*LL KNOWN TO i*IE. IT WAS THEN I INQUIRED IF IT WOULD BE 

PROPER TO DISCUSS THE TIMER MAN CASS WITH GENERAL SUAREZ 

MASON, CPIYF OF STAFF AND TIMERMAN'S NEMESIS. I 

EXPECTED A MINOR EXPLOSION CN THIS SUGGESTION FOR A5 

LONG AS I HAVE DEALT WITH VIOLA HE HAS NFVER ADMITTED 

SUAREZ MASON TO BE ONI OF HIS PROBLEMS. MUCH TO THE 

CONTRARY, VIOLA LOWERED HIS VOICE AND TOLD ME HE STRONGLY 

RECOMMENDED I DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE UTH SUAREZ MASON. 

I TOLD VIOLA THAT RECENTLY SUAREZ MASON HAD INVITED 

PIMSEIF TO MY RESIDENCE FOR AN "ASADO" - "GAUCHO 

BARBECUE . IT WAS SUGGESTED BY VIOLA THAT DURING THIS 

BARBECUE I DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE. VIOLA INDICATED 

FVEN THOUGH TIMERMAN'S RELEASE IS NOT IMMINENT, THERE 

IS STIII SOME HOPE. 

9. SARAGOVI CASE: I REMINDED VIOLA OF RENEWED AND 

CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST ON TEE FORACIO SARAGOVI 

CASE. BE APPEARED NOT TO EE FAMILIAR WITH -THE .CASE. 

I TOLD HIM THE CASE WAS DIRECTLY IN BIS LAP AS IT WAS A 

MILITARY TRIBUNAL CASE. THE CASE WAS UP ""OR REVIEW EY 

HIM. HE TOOK NOTES AND PROMISED TO LOO'* INTO THE. MATTER. 

12. SOCCER GAME: LAST NIGHT ARGENTINA, WORLD CHAMPIONS, 

PSN5004423 PAGE 01 TCR:17?/21s33Z .■ ETC *2*23173 JI N 7Q 

*******0-0 NF-IDENTI A -fr>***»**]P COPY 

Nn Ohiantinn Tn Dfidassifinatinn in Full 2013/01/17 : Nl C-74-35-7-9-0

- »No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/17 : NLC-24-35-7-9-0 

*******C 0 N F- I D £ M T I A L»******E COP? 

FLAYED AGAINST A TEAM, COMPRISED OP OUTSTANDING PLAYERS 

FRCM ALL OVER THE WORLD. ARGENTINA LOST 2 'TO 1 WITH A 

FUIL STADIUM OE OVER 75,000 PEOPLE. I ATTENDED THE GAME. 

I WAS PREPARED TO SIT WITH THE REST OP THE "COMMON HERD" 

RUT AS I WALKED INTO THE STADIUM AN UNKNOWN GENTLEMAN 

SPOTTED ME AND TOLD ME I WAS TO SIT IN THE "PALCO DF 

T'’ONOR" (VIP BOX 1. I TOLD THIS PERSON MY TICKETS WERE NOT 

TT1E VIP AND I WAS PERFECTLY CONTENT TO SIT AT MY 

DESIGNATED PLACE. THIS GENTELMAN WAS qOITE STERN IN TELLING 

ME I BFLCNGED IN THE PRESIDENT'S BOX. I WAS n’HS ONLY 

AMBASSADOR IN THAT SFECIFIC AREA. THERE VI7.T SEVERAL 

AMBASSADORS IN ATTENDANCE, BUT I WAS TIEONLI ONE PERMITTED 

TO SIT NEAR THE PRESIDENT AND THE JUNTA. I THOUGHT THIS 

vAS AN UNUSUAL TWIST CONSIDERING SOMEWHAT STRAINED 

RELATIONS DUE TO NEGATIVE NEWSPAPER STORIES PROM USA. 

11. COMMENT: THROUGHOUT THE MEETING 71 OLA 'EP TELLING 

"E HIS PURPOSE IN WANTING TC SEE ME WAS TO DISCUSS 

NICARAGUA. WE DID DISCUSS NICARAGUA, BUT I FELT IT WAS 

ONLY AN EXCUSE TO DISCUSS MULTIPLE OTHER MATTERS. HE 

SAID GOA WAS FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH USS ON NICARAGUAN 

POLICY, BUT FEARED SENDING A MILITARY PEACE FORCE WOULD 

NOT BF ACCEPTABLE TO LA COUNTRIES. HIS REASONING 

';jAS MOST OF LA COUNTRIES HAVE INTERNAL PROBLEMS .AND EACH 

COUNTRY FEARED A PRECEDENT WOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN SENDING 

MILITARY UNITS TO SETTLE BASIC DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. 

YIOIA SAID THE NICARAGUAN PROBLEM WAS NOV UEYOND DIALOGUE 

AND NECESSITATED CURTAILING THE INFILTRATION OF MATERIAL 

AND TRCOPS THROUGH PANAMA AND COSTA RICA. VIOLA 

RATIONALIZED THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE WITH A MILITARY 

FFACb FORCE, BUT THE ARGENTINE PUBLIC vOOLD NEVER BUY IT. 

IT APPEARED TO ME HE WAS GRCPING OR 'iO-I'T, FCR ME'TO GIVI 

FIM SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR SENDING A PEACE FORCE TO 

NICARAGUA, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ARGENTINA. 

12. ADMIRAL MASSERA: STRANGELY ENOUGH AS I WAS LEAVING 

VIOLA' OFFICE I RAN INTO ADMIRAL MASSERA, .vRO -TAS 

COMING TO REPORT TO VIOLA ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO MEXICO. 

VA SSERA WAS COMPLETELY SURPRISED TO SEE ME A3 I WAS TO 

SEE HIM. THE ONLY ONE NOT SURPRISED WAS VIOLA AND I FELT 

HAD PLANNEE IT THAT MASSERA AND I WOULD MEET. IT 

APPEARED VIOLA WANTED MASSERA TO KNOW I HAD BS*K WITH HIM. 

IT'S JUST THE CASE OF THE OID ARGENTINE INTRIGUE JUST 

AS SUAREZ MASON WANTED VIOLA TO SNOW Tt-AT I WAS HAVING 

AN "ASACO" WITH HIM. 

CASTRC 

?S N:004423 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR :1?7/21:33Z DTG:262217Z JUN 79 

~»»»****G”0-4>»P I D-E H I A1 !*******£--COPY 

Nn Ohinrtinn Tn DfidaRsifinatinn in Hill 2013/01/17 : Nl C-24-35-7-9-0

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-1-9-1-2-8_ 

MKMORANDL'M ^ 

ft 


____ _ _ t- 

BFCRET-BF.NSITIVE 

Washington December 21, 1978 

X 

\SS_Rvw Completed - Released In Full - Refer to DOS -11/13/12 

1. Beagle Channel Conflict Looms Closer; General Viola 

called in Ambassador Castro this morning to advise 

him that in view of Chile's latest communique, Argentina 

had no other option but to resort to military action. 

The general went on to ask that the U.5. help explain 

to the world why Argentina had no other recourse. 

Castro recommended patience and pointed out that papal 

mediation was still a possible option. Viola, however, 

did not desist from his line that Chile's response 

had terminated any prospects for further diplomatic 

movement. (Buenos Aires 9958, PSN 54104) 

DOS REVIEWEdTTJan-2013: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION] 

2. Meeting with Von Staden on Cruise Missile Definition; 

During a meeting with Deputy Secretary Christopher 

yesterday, Ambassador Von Staden expressed his government's 

serious concern with the possibility that the 

D.S. might consider agreeing that ALCMs on non-heavy 

bombers would fall under the same limits as nuclear 

ALCMs as a solution to the cruise missile definition 

issue. He said the Germans would see serious problems 

with such a solution, since a non-nuclear element would 

be introduced into the SALT negotiations for the first 

time. Von Staden asked whether such a solution would 

create precedents for the Soviets to demand that other 

non-nuclear elements be included in future negotiations 

and whether the U.S. would share German concern that 

the whole non-circumvention question would have to 

be seen in a different light, with non-circumvention 

applying to non-nuclear weapons. He also asked whether 

the new U.S. language in the "Declaration of Intent" 

could lead to a situation in which the Soviets could 

demand nuclear elements not subject to the negotiations 

be taken into account. Christopher assured Von Staden 

that his questions and comments would be transmitted 

to the U.S. delegation before .they left, and also pointed 

out that if an agreement was reached, the President 

would take great pains to make clear that what was 

in the agreement and the protocol would not constitute 

precedents for future negotiations. (State 320329 

TOSEC 150002, NODIS Cherokee, PSN 54076) (S) 

gnrnrT— 

REVIEW ON DECEMBER 21, 2008 

CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES 

uc0tA2SRE. 

ELO. 1352b 

Authority TlftC. NmC--\-VN>~3rr_ 

NARA_JeJL__ Data 


5. No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/16 : NLC-1-8-6-18- 

Mr.MOR-WDLWl W 

W 

JUS REVIEWED Z1 Dec-2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION, 


• "“TjHCWli'l1— 

WASHINGTON 

November 28, 1978 

NSS Rvw Completed - Released In Full - Refer to DOS -11/9/12 

1. Embassy Tel Aviv Comments on the Egyptian-Israeli Talks: 

Ambassador Lewis believes that indications be slowing 

down the pace of negotiations raises the question of 

how the U.S. should proceed following Khalil's visit, 

especially if it turns out that the'Egyptians want 

to reopen the text of the treaty* and continue negotiations 

on the linkage issue. If Egypt accepts the 

treaty, there is some chance of persuading Israel to 

find a formula on linkage; however, if Egypt equivocates, 

the hope of getting the cabinet to accept something 

further on linkage will shrink to about nil. 

Lewis also has "the gravest doubts" that a slowdown 

by Sadat will produce what he wants from the Israelis; 

it will have the opposite affect. Lewis adds that 

Begin agreed to only a ninety day settlement freeze 

and that, with the conclusion of this period In mid- 

December or January, Begin might renew settlement 

activity. The U.S. cannot afford an extended delay 

and Lewis recommends that a new U.S. initiative, obviously 

required to break the impasse, be launched 

no later than mid-December. (Tel Aviv 18266 NODIS, 

PSN 24694, 24695) 

i 

2. Somoza Discusses His Difficulties; A Nicaraguan official 

informed Ambassador Solaun today that Somoza, 

for the first time, openly admitted to his cabinet 

• on Monday that he was under tremendous pressure. Somoza 

allegedly characterized the plebiscite proposal as 

a means to "kick him out of the country" and raised 

as alternatives the calling of a national constitutent 

assembly or simply his resignation. Solaun comments 

that, if true, the apparent change of attitude by Somoza 

could augur well for a resolution to the Nicaraguan 

problem. Somoza is apparently starting to believe 

that the U.S. means business. (Managua 6156, PSN 24866) 

3. Beagle Channel-Ambassador Castro Talks with General 

Viola: General Viola told Ambassador Castro yesterday 

that, although there were still serious problems ahead, 

the Argentine government intended to negotiate in good 

faith and would strive to settle the channel dispute 

' tiXM352^0 Objection To Declassmcation In Full 2UT3/01/16 : NLC-1 -8-6-18-7 

ftîinrifu 

-V? -~T 

l’ iAK/-—tJr Pnto leAnVu______

BECRE1?- -2- 

by peaceful and honorable means, viola emphasized 

that Argentina wants a peaceful solution and not a 

confrontation and indicated that the recent troop movements 

were carefully controlled so as not to place 

them close enough to the border where "temptations" 

could cause an incident. Viola again stressed the 

defensive nature of the troop deployments and made 

the suggestion that, during the negotiating or mediation 

period, there should be a mutual freeze on troop movements 

or even perhaps a withdrawl. (Buenos Aires 9361, 

PSN 24704, 24706) 

l 

'» ■ i 


- 1 


DOS REVIEWED'1 D-Vlar-~2D11: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULLj 

SENSITIVE 

l 

PAGE 36 SITUATION^) H|$SA0E(S) LISTING DATE 01/2S/BO//OZ3 

SITUATION! . AFGHAN 

SUBJECT CATAQORYI SIT IV 

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION! 

MESSAQEI 

PLASH 

Z 1I1B17Z JAN BO ZFP4 

PM 3ICSTATS MASHOC 

TO AMIMBASSY BUENQS AIRES PLASH 6975 

BXDIS 

E,0. 120611 N/A 

008295 

TAGS! 

SUBJECT! 

E5TC# ITRO# AR 

ARGENTINE COOPERATION 4n GRAIN EMBARGO 

1, C - ENTIRE TEXT 

« 

2. CHARGE REQUESTED URGENTLY TO TRANSMIT FOLLOWING 

PERSONAL* MESSAGE PROM AMBASSADOR CASTRO TO GENERAL VIOLA! 

QUOTE! 

TENENTE GENERAL ROBERTO VIOLA 

DOMICZL10 CONOCIDO 

BUENOS AIRES# ARGENTINA 

PSSPUES DE SACUDARLQ EN UNA PORM* MUY ATENTA# SE CE 

SOLICtTA SU 1NTERVENCI0N PERSONAL CON SUS CDMPANBROS 

DEL GOlUftNO ARGBNTINO# MUY ESPECIALMENTE AL SSNQR 

PRESIDENT! VIDELA Y LOS INTBGRANflS DE LA JUNTA# 

REFERENTS 1A LO POSIBLE COCABORACION CON E.E'.U'.U. IN 

EL* CONTRQI DE LA EXPORTACtON DE GRANOS A LA UNION 

SOVIETICA# QUISIBRA ACLARAR QUE BSTA COCABORACIQN NO 

CONTEMPLA LA SUSPENSION D| CQNTRATOS YA PlRMADOS BIND 

MAS B1BN LA IMPORTANCE DE NO BNTRAR IN JWEVOS CONTRAtOS 

QUE TINDRIAN EL PROPOllTO OB COMPBNSAR POR EL* EMBARGO 

DE MI OOBlIRNOi 

t 

WHSR COMMENTS 

A 

1 

1/3 

i 

ri \ 

A 

a 1 r 

jSco J Q 

fs? --' 

l 

§5^ a3* □ 

Q 4! 

\v 

£IS 

eobideal#thorn#brsm 

PSNI02867B DTOl111B17 T0RT0lll9l2 

SENSITIVE 


. ’N No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/10/02 : NLC-16-4-2-15-2 

SENSITIVE 

PACE 1? SITUATION'S) MISSAOE(S) LISTING DATE 01/21/80//021 

SITUATION! 

AFGHAN 

SUBJECT CATAOQRYl SIT IV 

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION! * 

RECUIRDO MUY CLARAMENTE CUE DURANTE SU PARTICIPACtON 

BN LA JUNTA UST6D SJEHFRB Ml MANIFESTO SU APQYO AC 

CONCIFTO PE NQ INTERVENCION Y SU GDIO HACIO AQUELLQS 

PAIIIS QUf tOMABAN PASOS E INCURflONES A0RE5IV0S CONTRA 

OTRDI PAI||$, TAMBIEN RECUIRDO SU ADHESION Y 

RESPltQ A:'AQUiLL‘OS PRINCIPIQS QUE PREVALECEN EN 

DERECHO INTIRNACIONAL. 

TOMANDO IN CUINTA LA RECIINTB LLAORANtE INDEBIOA 

AGRIIlQN PS LA UNION SOVlITICA HACIA AFGANISTAN# Cl 

SUPLICO HUY 8NCAR8CIAMENTI BJIRZA SU INFCUENCtA CON 

LOS MANDATOR IQS DE SU GOBlIRNO PARA QUE PRESTBN S(J 

COLABORACION |N EL SINTIDQ MANIFISTADQ EN LOS PARAFOS 

anterior!*, 

SIIHPRE hi AGRADICIDQ SUS EXFRISIONES DE CARINO; HACIA 

MI PAIS YILA MISHA VIZ RfcCQNOZCQ QUE DURANTE SU llTANCIA 

COMO MIIMMO DC LA JUNTA Y GDHANQANTE EN JEFE DEL 

EJERCITQ


I 

i 

SENSITIVE 

PAGE 75 SltUATIQNlS) HISSAGE(S) LISTING DATS 0i/2iyB0//025 

DOS REVIEWED 10-Vlar-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN 

TUATTWi 

APQHAN 

BJECT CATAOORYT SIT IV 

full; 

MESSAGE f ANNOTATION! 

messaoei 

IMMEDIATE 

Q iUBATZ.JAN 80 

PM AMEMBAtSY MOSCOW 

TO SfCSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6411 

INPO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 5156 

G-O- NPlBBNTIAf SECTION 02 Qft 04 MOSCOW 00607 

EXDIS 

PNGED SO PAR AS PUTURE ASSIGNMENTS WERE CONCERNED'. 

Ei KORNIYENKO RRUQlNBD THAT IP WE WERE IN PACT {NStStING 

THAT THE NYAP PEOPLE COULD NOT BE TRAN$PERRBD TO ?ILL 

VACANCIES.WHICH MIGHT ARISE IN WASHINGTON OR SAN PRANCISCO 

THAT IN IBPBCT WOULD AMOUNT TO PNG ACTIQN--AND WOULD* OP 

COURSE# BE AN EXTRA COMPLICATION FOR BOTH SIDES. KOKNI- 

YBNKQ THEN ADDED THAf BOTH COUNTRIES AT THE MOMENT POUND 

THEMSELVES WITH THEIR AMBASSADORS AT HOME'. IP Wl WERE 

TO DECIDE TO PREI2E EMBASSY StAPPS AT PRESENT LEVELS# 

WOULD THAT MEAN THE AMBASSADORS COULD NT RETURN* CHARGE 

COMMENTED HE THOUGHT IT CLEAR THAT TKAt WAS NOT THE IN 

TENTION OP THE U.S. POSITION# AND KORNIYENKO HASTENED TO 

ADD THAT IN MENTIONING THE AMBASSADORS HE INTENOED NOTHING 

MORE THAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE ABSURDITY OP THE U.S. POSI 

TION, 

10, KORNIYENKO ONCE MORI MADE THE OBSERVATION THAT IT 

WAS NOT PERMISSIBLE TO SPEAK TO EACH OTHER IN LANGUAGE 

SUCH AS THAT USED BY THE U.S, IN UNILATERALLY DETIRHXNING 

HOW THE ISSUES WOULD BE RESOLVED, .AS WA£ STATED IN THE 

SOVIET NOTES# HE ADOEO# THE SOVIETS RESERVED THE RIGHt 

TO RETURN ‘TO tHE QUESTION OP MATERIAL* DAMAGES REgULfXNG 

PROM THE U.S, ACTIONS WHICH WIRE IN VIOLATION OP SPtClPlC 

AGREEMENTS. 

11. CHARBE REPEATED THAT HE WQUL'D SEEK RESPONSES TO 

K0RNIYBNKQ1S QUESTIONS ON LEGAL AND PRACTICAL' MATflRS# 

BUT THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OP THE REASON 

PSNf 0IIVB2 DTOl 111B47 TORT0UZ219 

SENSITIVE 



SENSITIVE 

PAGE 76 SrtUATZON'tS) MMSAOCtSI LISTING DATS 01/2S/BO//OZS 

SITUATION! . AFGHAN 

SUBJECT CATAGORVl SIT IV 

MES5AGE / ANNOTATION! 

FOR THE ACTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN, THEY HAD {JOT BEEN 

TAKEN FRIVOLOUSLY! THEY WERE SERIOUS MEASURES WITH 

SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES# TAKEN FOR THE REASON StATEQ BY tHE 

PRESIDENT. 

IS. KORNIYENKO RESPONDED THAT THE REASONS GIVEN BY THE 

PRESIDENT PROVIOBD NQ BASIS FOR tHE MEASURES TAKEN AND 

THAT THERE WERE IN FACT NQ GROUNDS FOR SUCH ACTIONS UNDER 

ANY INTERNATIONAL LAW OR AGREEMENT, THE SOVIET IlDE# HE 

CONTINUED* COULD SAY A GREAT DEAL AQBUT THE POLITICAL 

aspects op The hatter and could find explanations no Less 

HARSH THAN those USED BY U.S, OFFICIALS# BUT Hi THOUGHT 

tHERS WAS NO NEED TO GO INTO THOSE ASPECTS AT THIS TIME. 

CHARGE AGREED, 

la. FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF NOTE concerning 

BT 

* 

SENSITIVE 



SENSITIVE 

PAGE 85 SXtUATI0N'(S) MeSSAOE(S) LISTING DATE Oi/2»/80//02S 

SITUATION! 

AFGHAN 

SUBJECT GATAGQRVl SIT IV 

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION I 

MESSAGE! 

IMMEDIATE 

t 

D IUS47Z,JAN BO 

pH AMBMBAfSY MOSCOW 

TO SECSTAtl MASHDC IMMEDIATE 8412 

INFO AMCDNSUL LENINGRAD BEST 

•la N F I D I N T 1 H SBCTION OS OF 04 MOSCOW 00807 

EXDIS 

CLOSURE OF KIEV AND NEW YORK ADVANCE PARTIES! 

BEGIN TEXf, 

THE ^SlSfRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR; REFERRING 

TO THE NOffi OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE USA OP 

JANUARY T| 1980* CONSIDERS IT NECBSSARY tO STATS THE 

FOLLOWING, 

THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA CONCERNING THE 

SUSPENSION OF THE OPENING QP THE CONSULATE GENERAL OF 

THE USSR IN NEW YORK AND tHE WITHDRAWAL FROM THERf OF THE 

SOVIET ADVANCE PARTY IS A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE RILE* 

VANT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES* INCLUDING THAT 

REACHED OlfRlNG THE SOVIET-AMBRICAN MEETING AT THE HIGHEST 

LEVEL. IN JULY 1974, THE SAID UNILATERAL' ACTION OF THE 

AMERICAN SIDE TESTIFIES TO THE FACT THAt IT IS ACTIND IN 

COMPLETE DISREGARD OP ITS OBLIGATIONS WHICH ENSUE FROM 

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS WHICH It CONCLUDES, THE lOVllt 

SIDE RESOSuTELY CONDEMNS tHBSC ILLEGAL ACTIONS BY THE 

GOVERNMENT OF THE USA AS DIRECTLY HOSTILE TO THE INTERESTS 

OF THE DIEELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES 

AND INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRACTICE OF 

THE MAINTENANCE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES. IT MUST BE. 

CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WILL DRAW THE APPROPRIATE CON 

CLUSIONS. 

THE SOVIET SIDE PLACES AL'C RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSE 

QUENCES OF THE SAID ACTION ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA, 

t 

PSNI0IB99E DTGUUS47 TQR70U2225 

SENSITIVE 

Nn Dhip.r.tinn Tn Dfidassifinatinn in Full 2012/10/02 : NLC-16-4-2-15-2


SENSITIVE 

PAGE 8* SITUATIONtS) MESSAGES) LISTING DATE 0l/2»/BO//O2i 

SITUATION! 

AFGHAN 

SUBJECT CATAQORY! SIT IV 

MES5A0E / ANNOTATION! 

RE5ERVJN0 TO ITSELF THE RIGHT TO PULL RESTITUTION OF 

MATERIAL OAMAfiE CONNECTED WITH THE ACTIONS OF THE AMBRI* 

CAN SIDE# THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE POSITION THAT 

PRACTICAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE GUARANTEEING QP tHI 

SECURITY AND THE PRESERVAtlQN OP THE PREMISES AND PROPERTY 

QP THE SOVIET CONSULATE GENERAL IN NEW YORK WILL BE AGREED 

UPON IN THE PROPER MANNER, 1 

IN THE LIGHT OP THE SAID UNILATERAL* ACTIONS OP THE USAj 

THE SOVIET SIDE INTENDS TO DETERMINE AT A FUTURE TIME ITS 

GENERAL POSITION TOWARD THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT ON THE 

QPBN|NO Of CONSULATES GENERAL QP THE USER AND THE USA IN 

NEW YORK AND KIEV# RESPECTIVELY. 

MOSCOW# JANUARY 11# 1980, END T|XT, 

14. FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL TRANSLATION OP THE NOT! CONCERN 

ING AEROPgQT FREQUENCIES! 

BEGIN TEXT, 

NO, 2/QSOOA 

THE MINISTRY OP FOREIGN AFFAIRS OP THE USSR REFERS TO THE 

NOTE OP THE DEPARTMENT OP STAtE OP THE U$A OF JANUARY 1i 

1980, AND'CONSIDERS XT NECESSARY TO StATI THE FOLLOWING, 

THE DECISION OP THE GOVERNMENT OP THE USA TO POSTPONE FOR 

AN UNDETERMINED PERIOD THE CONDUCT OP BILATERAL ?!VH 

aviation Talks# which haq been proposed by the amGrican 

SIDS itself; AND unilaterally to reduce the number dp 

REGULAR PLIGHTS TO THE USA QP AEROFLOT AIRCRAFT IS COM 

PLETELY ILLEGAL AND is A FLAGRANT VIOLATION BY T0| UNITED 

STATES OP THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH IT HAS ACCEPTED; INCLUD 

ING THOSE RESULTING PROM fHE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING REACHED 

IN AN EXCHANGE OP AIDE-MEMOIRES tN MARCH 1979, gUCH 

PROVOCATIVE CONDUCT CAN ONLY RE VIEWED AS INCOMPATIBLE 

WITH GENERALLY ACCEPTED NORMS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES; 

THE SOVIET SIDE PLACES ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U|A ACL 

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OP THE SAID MEASURES 

PDR RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES AND RESERVES TO ITSELF 

THE RIGHT TO DEMAND PULL RESTITUTION OP MATERIAL DAMAGE. 

MOSCOW# JANUARY 11# 1980, ENO T|XT, 

15. FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL TRANSLATION OP THE NOTf CONCERN 

ING FISHERY ACLOCATXONST 

BEGIN TEXT. 

NO, l/OSSHA 

THE MINISTRY DP FOREIGN AFFAIRS QP THg USSR, REFERRING TO 

THE NOTE OF THE DEPARTMENT OP STATE OP tHE USA OP JANUARY 7 

1980, CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY tO STATE THE FOLLOWING, 

BT 

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SENSITIVE 

PAGE 87 SITUATION*$) MESSAGE!S) LISTING DATE 0i/2»>f0//023 

SITUATION! 

AFGHAN 

SUBJECT CATAGOftVI SIT IV 


MESSAGE! 

IMMEDIATE 

Q IIIE47Z fJAN BO 

PM AMEM1ASSV MOSCOW 

TO SBCSTAtl WASMOC IMMEDIATE 6413 

INFO AHCQNSUL LENINGRAD 8X98 

CON F—I D B- N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 00607 

BK0I8 . 

. ’ f 

THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA CONCERNING A 

SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF tHE QUOTAS CUSTOMARILY ALLOCATED 

TO THE SOVIET UNION PQR FISH CATCH IN COASTAL' WATERS OF 

THE USA CANNOT BE QUALIFIED At ANYTHING QTHER THAN AN 

ILLEGAL AflttON IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE USSR. THIS STEF IN 

REALITY SIGNIFIES THE INTRODUCTION OF A IAN ON tHl 

FISHERY OF SOVIET SHIPS AND WILL LEAD TO A PREMEDITATED 

WRECKING OF THE MUTUALLY PROFITABLE COOPERATION {N THIS 

FIELD WHICH HAS DEVELOPED..HfWEEN THE CORRESPONDING SOVlEt 

AND AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS* THE SAID ACTIONS BY tHE 

AMERICAN SIDE ARE THUS A OIRICT VIOLATION OP THE AGREE* , 

MENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OP THE USSR AND THE gOVERNMENf 

OF THE USA CONCERNING FISHERIES OFF THE COASTS OF THE 

UNITED STATES OF NOVEMBER 16/ 1976, 

THE SOVIET SIDE PLACES ON THE GQVENRMINT OF THE U*A ALL 

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A UNILATERAL 

STEF ANO RESERVES TO ITSELF THE RIGHT TO DEMAND FULL COM* 

PENSAtlON iP0R DIRECT AND INDIRECT DAMAGE CONNECTED WITH 

IT. 

MOSCOW# JANUARY 11# 1980, 

END TEXT, GARRISON 

BT 

t 

PSNI0IB99S DTGU11S47 TORlOllZZZS 

SENSITIVE 


Ml MORANDUM 

No Objection To Declassification in ;-ull 2012/11/21 

NLC-1 -17-240-6 

‘Or: 

ur ^ 

T 

SECRET SENSITIVE 


wA.sinxtncjN 


THE SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST 

1. Kaunda Concerned by Possibility of a Reagan presidency; 

During private discussions with Ambassador Wisner today. 

President Kaunda expressed deep concern over the possibility 

of a Reagan presidency. He said he was not confident about 

Reagan's views on South Africa or the Middle East — two 

issues which were immensely important to him personally. 

In addition, Kaunda said his recent visit to Eastern Europe 

had brought home the critical state of detente and reinforced 

his belief that the President would be better in 

dealing with the Soviets than Reagan. While admitting that 

American policies do not vary greatly between presidencies, 

Kaunda said he nevertheless wanted to warn us of his deep 

concern should Reagan be e'ccted, and he asked that his 

prayers for the President be communicated. (Lusaka 3928, 

PSN 4260) (C) 

2. Presidential Message to Viola: In response to the President's 

congratulatory message, General Viola expressed his "profound 

appreciation" and said he fully reciprocated the President's 

belief in the importance of strengthening U.S.-Argentina 

relations. Viola said his government would seek to make 

U.S.-Argentine relations as productive as possible. He 

returned to this theme several times, stating that he believed 

the current issues between our two countries were the product 

of present circumstances and will "one way or another" be 

resolved. The Argentine leader went on to describe the 

agenda of his government as one which would seek first to 

produce legislation that will allow the political parties 

to renew their leadership and "function normally;" to revitalize 

the economy "both industry and agriculture;" and to correct 

the impression that the government was essentially opposed 

to the broader interests of most Argentines. Viola added 

that his government had four objectives in the foreign 

policy arena, which were to increase the "presence" of 

Argentina in the southern cone, •ebuild Argentina's ties 

in the Andean Pact, repair and cr-.pand relations with Western 

Europe, and restore and strengthen relations with the U.S. 

(Buenos Aires 8154, PSN 4066, 4090) (C) 

ceciuw - 

SlFIEEi 

E.Ou/iSiio 

REVIEW ON OCTOBER 10, 2000 _ * ,.afl V. VnN\H—.---- 


i r-------- - 

Nn Objection Tn Declassification in Full 2012/11/21 : NLC-1-17-2-40-6 

t

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/21 : NLC-1-17-24Q.-fir * 

■CT^CRRrP- M * * ; ' 

3. tt. f,.-PRC Gra in negotiations: According to Ambassador r,7oocc j!;, 

tli^ substantive v'ork on tlu- grain negotiations appears to 

be near completion. Ke .adds hoover, that the U. S. delegation 

faces considerable '.•.■.certainty with regard to the 

timing of the formal concl 'on of the agreement and its 

announcement. At the dele-^ .ion’s request, VJoodcoc'r: has 

agreed co intervene with th foreign ministry to seek initialing 

of the agreement on Monday, thereby __--~.£ c~in 

both capitals immediately afterwards, flood 

permitting announcements 

;ock 

that the Chinese are deeply disturbed about wire se-v'.oe 

reports from VTashington on the agreement and have svingly 

emphasized that there should be no public announcemj ■■ - 

before the agreement is formally concluded. 

N033IS, PSW 4030 ) (S) 

i 

(Beijing 10015 

i 

Nn Ohiectinn Tn Declassification in Full 2012/11/21 : NLC-1-17-240-6

MEMORANDUM 

No Objection To Declassification in part 2013/01/16 : NLC-1 -13-8-31 -4| 

H H "w i j - I 


■6-EGRET 

WASHINGTON 

January 17, 1980 

1. Afghanistan Expels All American Journalists) Embassy Kabul 

was informed today by the foreign ministry that all American 

journalists have been ordered to depart Afghanistan on the 

first available aircraft. The Afghan official stated that 

this action had been taken because of the "American journalists' 

interference in the internal affairs of Aghanistan and their 

biased reporting." Our embassy estimates that there are 

30 to 50 American journalists and cameramen in Afghanistan, 

and it is now in the process of informing the journalists 

and assisting them to exit the country. (Kabul 175, PSN 

36409) (C) , 

2.' Christopher/Genscher Meeting: Christopher outlined to Foreign 

Minister Genscher yesterday our strategy toward Iran, explaining 

the need to implement economic sanctions and requesting 

FRG assistance. He clarified that we hope sanctions will 

obviate the need for other, more risky measures, and stressed 

the importance of European support. Genscher expressed 

an FRG willingness to help as much as possible bn sanctions, 

indicated coordination with the other Europeans, and promised 

an early decision.. The foreign minister stressed the need 

to consider our decisions and the developments in Iran carefully 

to ensure that European nationals are not taken hostage. 

The foreign minister stated it is important that Iranian 

leaders not see the conflict with the U.S. as more important 

than the Soviet threat; therefore, Western public statements 

should not diminish the Soviet conflict with the Islamic 

world. Genscher proposed that the Western reaction to the 

events in Afghanistan be incorporated into an overall political 

strategy, and outlined some steps the EC is considering 

in this regard, including new arrangements with Yugoslavia 

and consideration of a possible political arrangement with 

the Gulf states and Iraq modeled ion the EC-ASEAN cooperation 

agreement. Genscher further stressed the need to reach 

a comprehensive Middle cAst peace settlement, and described 

Israel's security concerns as small compared to the threat 

now posed by the Soviets to all countries of the region. 

(Bonn 916, PSN 35795, 35800, 35802, 35806, 35810) (S) 

S 

CECRBT 

REVIEW ON JANUARY 16, 1990 


Authority 

NAHA. 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O.13526 

^ 

D8tO... ------ 

i"* .nr*. »»« 

■: ■ -s—i— 

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/01/16 : NLC-1-13-8-31-4

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/01/16 : NLC-1-13-8-31 -4’'’ j 

SE€ftSTL 

-2- 

3- Cooper Meeting with French Economic Officials: On Iran, 

the French identified legal problems in applying the Security 

Council resolution in the face of the Soviet veto, and recommended 

we consider putting the Soviets in a corner tactically 

by pressing them on what "measures" they would be prepared 

to take under Resolution 461. They questioned the tactical 

advisability of countries other than the U.S. imposing further 

measures at this time, but conceded that they probably have 

the legal ability to take some additional actions. Cooper 

proposed three areas where concrete support from our allies 

would be extremely useful in the Soviet/Afghanistan situation: 

no undercutting of U.S. actions; no new official export 

credits; and, strict application of COCOM criteria. The 

French will not undercut U.s. measures; will continue normal 

commercial relations, will not cut off official credits, 

and will take a tough line but act slowly in renegotiating 

the Franco-Soviet credit agreement. On COCOM, the French 

did not know what cases they might be submitting and promised 

to get back to us soon. (Paris 1739, PSN 3576B, 35772, 

35776, 35780) (S) 

4. U.S./Argentine Relations: Ambassador Castro met on Tuesday 

with former Junta member General Viola, who is expected 

to succeed videla as president in 1981, for a genreral review 

of U.S. Argentine relaitons. viola appeared deeply perturbed 

about the adverse turn of events in our bilateral relations, 

and attributed this to the lack of communication between 

the executives and foreign ministers of both countries. 

He feels it is imperative that a dialogue be established 

as soon as possible between the President and President 

Videla and also between Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister 

Pastor. Viola stated that both countries should see each 

other on the basis of conditions as they exist on and look 

into the future rather than base their policy on past acts. 

The general expressed serious concern over the State Department's 

human rights report on Argentina and felt the wording 

of the report could precipitate a wave of emotionalism and 

anti-Americanism if Argentines felt the report was an unfair 

evaluation of their country. Viola agreed to do whatever 

he could to get the government's cooperation on the restriction 

of grain sales to the USSR. (Buenos Aires 472, PSN 35961) 

(C) 

S 

r~ 

-v j> ’j" 2_ V. 

X 3 

No Objection To Declassification in aart 2013/01/16 : NLC-1-13-8-31-4

*■ » No Objection T{rBecte»sifieatioajo_Eull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9 

.- - - =—Thonnrtmpnt. nf State TELEGRAM 

[DOS REVIEWED 29-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] * 

PA(£ n TIL HV 11111 II Of il 2SJ4X4Z MM j Tft« Mill ft OF SI 1IMI4Z 

1 ACTION NEA-11 

INFO OCT-11 AAA-11 ADS-IN HA-OS PR-1* NSC-H1 SP-N1 

IC-ll CIAE-II DOOt-U INI-11 NSAE-IN PA-11 /N7 V 

------------ NKH 1IKUZ /U 

N 1S1S1DZ OCT 71 

FH AHEMHASSY m AVI* 

TO SECSTATE WASKOC Air 

INFO USICA VASNOC 

AflE WAIST IUEN01 AI AES 

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION II OF 11 TEL AVIV 2H1I 

STATE FON NEA/AIA VAST; AA FOX DEII AN 

UIICA FOI AA 

NOT TO HENDON COX IN ANT ARTICLES. 

I. TIHEIHAN ALSO NENTIONEC THAT IE IELIEVES THE RIGHT- 

UIM AW VEIT ANTI-SEHITIC NEWSPAPER CAUL DO IS FINANCED 

IT DIANA DC MASCOT, PUILISNER OF NUEVA PAOVINCIA IN 

UIIA HAMA. Mi Wl. HASIOT WAS WELL-KNOWN TO THE 

EHSASIT, AW IF HEHOAT SERVES, RECEIVED A IUIIA HOMS 

CAIOT OR I AM AWARD IN 1S73 OR 1174.) 

7. U TO THE FUTURE OF AASEITINE POLITICS, TIHERMR 

SATI HE SEES'A SITUATION IN MICH HOOERATE AND SIGHT WIND 

ELIKNTS IN THE HILITART WILL COHPETE FOR PEAORIST 

SUPPORT, MICA MT CREATE A SITUATION IN MICH IIAIEL PERM 

WILL IE IN A POSITION TO DECIDE WO RUNS ARDENT IRA. 

E.O. 12ICS: ADS 11/19/19 OIETERICH, V.J.) DR-0 

TASS: PEPS, Pill, PINT, IS, Al 

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH ARGENTINE " * 

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT) r" 

rmrimii 

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH PRESS ATTACIE OIETERICI, MO 

KNEW HIH IN ARGENTINA OURIHI A 1171-74 TOUR THERE, 

TIHERMAN DISCUSSED INTER ALIA MIS INTERROGATION IV 

POLICE AUTHORITIES IN ARGENTINA, ANTI-SEHITISA ON TNE 

ARGENTINA HILITART RIGHT, HIS PERSONAL OILEHHA AS TO 

, WETHER TO MITE AROUT NIS EXPERIENCES, AND THE 

FUTURE OF ARGENTINE POLITICS. TI HERMAN WILL RE IN TNE 

UNITED STATES TD RECEIVE AM AWAXO FROM THE AMERICAN 

1 JEWISH CCMHITTEE ON SATURDAY, OCT. 17. AFTER THAT HE 

PLANS TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK WERE HE EXPECTS TO SEE 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERI AN. THEN HE WILL CO TO WASH- 

INGTON FOR VARIOUS MEETINGS ON THE HILL, AT TKETWMTMENT, 

AND AT THE MHITE -HOUSE ————— 

S. IN CONVERSATION WITH TIHERMAN ONE IS LEFT WITH A 

CHILLINC IMPRESSION THAT RE IS SIHPLT REPORTINS 

WAT HE HAS EXPERIENCED AID RELIEVES. HE CHARACTER I EES 

THE AROEXTINE HILITART RIGHT AS CLASSICALLY TOTALITARIAN 

AND ANTI-SEHITIC. 

S. TIHERRAN IS NOW EMPLOYED SY TNE IHPORTAIT TEL AVIV 

DAILY HAAS IV AND SEEKS COHFORTASLE WITH THAT FACT, 

ALTHOUGH RE SAID HE NIGHT RE INTEXESTED IN SPEN0IN6 SOME 

TIME AT AN ACADEMIC INSTITUTION IN THE US. HE SPECIFICALLY 

MENTIONED eOLUMIA. THUS FAR HE HAS MITTEN ONLY ON 

LATIN AMERICAN HATTERS, IUT IT IS TO RE EXPECTED THAT HE 

WILL BRANCH (INTO SIOAOER DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL 

POLITICAL HATTERS. HE SAID THAT THE THEME OF A SPEECH 

HE WILL GIVE IN THE UNITED STATES WILL RE HUMAN RIGHTS 

AS THE IDEOLOGY OF THE DUTIES, AND AOQED THAT THE US 

I 

1. TI MERMAN SAID THAT THE MAIN FOCUS OF QUESTIONING 

DURING HIS IMPRISONMENT WAS HIS ROLE AS THE ARGENTINE 

'LEADER* OF AX ALLEGED WORLD ZIONIST CONSPIRACY, AM 

THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE EMPHASIS OR ANY LEFTIST OR 

TERRORIST CONNECT I US. HE WAS ONCE TORTURED IN LA 

PLATA IN A ROOM WITH AN ORGAN HAT I OH CHART MICH SHOWED 

ZSIGNIEW SRZEZINSXI AS THE LEADER OF THE CONSPIRACY. ON 

MOTHER OCCASION HE WAS TOLD THAT HE WAS REINS HEATER 

RECAUSE HE HAO DARED TO USE THE TERR LEFTIST-FASCISTS 

IN A CONVERSATION WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIAN, TNE 

UJECTIOH APPARENTLY HE I NO THAT HE HAO SLMDEHED FASCISM. 


GETWEEX HEHACXEH BEGIN ARD THE HONTCNERO GUERILLAS 

DURING A SECIN VISIT TO ARGENTINA IN 1S7S. TIHENHAN 

BELIEVED THESE CJESTIONS STEMMED FROM THE FACT THAT 

BEDIN'S SOCK ‘WAR IN THE HOL* LAND* NAD SEEN FOUNO AMONG 

MATERIALS USED IY THE H0N10NER0S. TIHERMAN WAS BROUGHT 

FROM PRISON TO AN INTERVIEW WITH GEN. HAROUINOEGUY IN 

THE CASA ROSADA PRIOR TO A DERI AN VISIT. THE GENERAL 

INFORMED HIH THAT THE ARGENTINA GOVERNMENT WAS AWARE 

THAT PATT DERIM WAS INTERESTED IN HIS CASE SECAUSE SHE 


4. TI HERMAN ALSO REPORTS THAT HE RELIEVES LANUSSE'S EX 

PRESS SECRETARY EOGARDO SAJOH OIEO OF A HEART ATTACK 

OURING TORTURE SY ELECTRIC SHOCK. SINCE HE WAS A 

RELATIVELY YCUNG MM, THE MILITARY DID NOT SUSPECT THAT 

HE NAD A HEMT CONDITION. 

9. TI HERMAN IS NOW rn mirr a.ihit mt 

IEMCES IN ARGEHTIHA BECAUSE HE FEARS REPRISALS GY THE 

HiiifmtlMimT PlflEHM ^till iw abgenTIHA. as Ail 

EXAMPLE OF THIS HE MEIITIUED THAT ROBERT COX, EOITOR OF 

THE BUENOS AIRES HERALD, HAO SENT A MESSAGE TO HIM 

THROUGH THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES ASKING HIM 

t 

HECLASSfREn 

. £-0. 

Authority 

nnunnriiTui 


, r '. No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9 


PAGE 01 TEL AV 22920 02 OF 02 28O404Z 4324 

ACTION NEA-11 

INFO OCT-01 ARA-11 ADS-00 PM-96 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 

CIAE-00 DODE-00 I MR-Iff NSAE-00 PAf-0l' HA- 05 /06 7 W 

R 251510Z OCT 79 





. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 06 044 1 280424Z /23 








THFJNlfrrF HOUSE- I F wil ' ‘--------------- 

t 


.*■ ^ No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9 ^ 

18? *******$ 0 HM 1) B-N T-—I 

4_£*******e COPT 

OP IMMED 

DE RUESBA #8154 2841610 

0 101603Z OCT 80 


TO 5SCSTATE VASHDC IMMEDIATE 7695 

THE*WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 

.INTO AMEMBASST ASUNCION 5231 


.AMEMBASST CARACAS 4611 

AMEMBASST LA PAZ 4068 . 




CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 

EXDIS 

DEPT. PLEASE REPEAT USCINSCO FOR IfyfAFF 

EO 12065: RDS-4 10/8/96 (RUSER, CLAUS V.) OR-M 

TAG'S: AH 

_______ _ i 

SUBJECT* DELIVERY OSHPRESIDllffTTMÊSSAGE 

REF: (A) WHITE H0USEV7397 (NOTALlT (B) BUENOS AIRES 8098 (NOTEL)i 

(C) BUENOS AIRES 7652 ‘ 


2. CHARGE DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GENERAL VIOLA 

OCTOBER 8 (REF A). GENERAL VIOLA EXPRESSED HIS PROFOUND 

APPRECIATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S THOUGHTS. HE STATED 

1 THAT HE WOULD OF COURSE BE REPLYING IN WRITING: IN THE 

MEANTIME HE WOULD WISH TO SAT THAT HE FULLTiRECIPROCATED 

'THE PRESIDENT'S BELIEF IN THE IMPORTANCE OF STRENGTHENING 

US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS. "MY.GOVERNMENT", HE SAID, "WILL 

SEEK TO MAKE US-ARGENTINE RELATIONS AS PRODUCTIVE AS 

POSSIBLE. HE RETURNED TO THIS THEME AT VARIOUS POINTS 

IN TEE CONVERSATION STATING, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IT IS HIS 

BELIEF THAT THE CURRENT ISSUES BETWEEN ARGENTINA, WHICH 

IN AN EARLIER MEETING BE HAD ENUMERATED AS BEING BOLIVIA, 

GRAINS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND NUCLEAR MATTERS, ARE THE PRO 

DUCT OF PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES* AND WILL "ONE VAT OR ANOTHER" 

BE REOLVED. THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCES ON BASIC 

INTERESTS. HE SAID, ALSO, T&AT HONESTY AND FRANKNESS 

**************** *tfHSH COMMENT *************** 

VP 

PSN1004066 

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****»**CsJ0uN -F-fDBHTIAr i,***»**»e COPT 

No Objection To Declassification in Fill 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-4-1-9


**»***ftC ON-F-IDENTIA 

COPT 

WERE REQUIRED FOR THE RELATIONSHIP TO PROSPER. 

3. VIOLA, AS USUAL OPEN AND ACCESSIBLE,' MADE IT CLEAR S 

THAT HE WANTED TO USE THE MEETING TO EIPLORE OTHER..MATTERS 

—IN EFFECT HE SAID "ASK.MI QUESTIONS." THE CHARGE IN 

QUIRED WHAT GENERAL VIOLA SAW AS THE AGENDA FOR HIS 

GOVERNMENT. VIOLA RESPONDED BY LISTING WHAT HE CALLED 

THE "PROBLEMS". GIVEN TO‘SCHEMATIC RESPONSES, BE STATED 

THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS IN THE POLITICAL 

AREA WHERE THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO PRODUCE 

LEGISLATION THAT WILL,ALLOW THE POLITICAL PARTIES . 

TO RENEW THEIR LEADERSHIP AND "FUNCTION NORMALLY." IN THE 

ECONOMIC AREA, HE SAID, ,TH£ FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO , 

REVITALIZE THE ECONOMY, -.BOTH INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE; 

(IN THE SOCIAL AREA, HE-‘RAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO CORRECT 

THE IMPRESSION THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS ESSENTIALLY 

•OPPOSED TO THE BROAD INTERESTS OF MOST ARGENTINES.. HE 

SUGGESTED THAT THIS COBLt BE ACCOMPLISHED BY EFFECTIVELY 

IMPLEMENTING THE LABOR REFORM LEGISLATION AND INSTITUT 

ING OTHER, UNDEFINED, MEASURES IN THE SOCIAL FIELD* . 

VIOLA STOPPED WITH THESE PRIORITIES. BUT WHEN QUERIED 

ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAS 

FOUR OBJECTIVES: TO INCREASE THE "PRESENCE" OF ARGENTINA 

IN THE SOUTHERN CONE (HE HASTENED TO ADD THAT THE COUN 

TRY WAS NOT SEEKING REGIONAL HEGEMONY}, TO REBUILD- • 

ARGENTINA'S TIES Tti THE ANDEAN PACTS TO REPAIR.AND EXPAND 

RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPES AND TO RESTORE AND 

STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. 

j 1 . 

4. VIOLA THEN TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPELL OUT SOME 

OF HIS TROUGHS ON THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S BASIC GOALS. 

HE SAD THAT THE MILITARY TOOK OVER IN 1976 WITH ONE OB* 

JECTIVE: TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A SECURE AND GENUINE 

DEMOCRACY. THE MILITARY WANTED TO FINALLY END THE CYCLE 

IN WHICH INEFFECTIVE AND UNSTABLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS 

ALTERNATE WITH MILITARY REGIMES, GETTING THE MILITARY’ 

.PERMANENTLY OUT OF THIS GAME BY BUILDING A HEALTHY : 

DEMOCRACY WAS STILL THE-MILITARY'S OBJECTIVE AND. ONE .. 

.THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD. FAITHFULLY PURSUE*, HE SAID. 

5. THESE THOUGHTS LED'-fD A QUESTION ON PSRONISM BY THE 

CHARGE. VIOLA SAID THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES DID NOT 

WANT TO LEAVE POWER SNOWING THAT IN FIVE TO TEN YEARS 

THE COUNTRY WOULD AGAIN BE FACED WITH THE OPTIONS IF 

bt 

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f. .« •« * ••

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% t 

188 **♦♦♦**■€-0-N F I D B •' WI T I A L**.****^ COPT 

OP IMMED 

PE RUESBA #8154 2841615 

0 101603Z OCT 80 

EM AMEMBASST BUENOS AIRES 

TO SECSTATE VASHPC IMMEDIATE 7696 

THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 

INFO AMEMBASST ASUNCION 5232 




AMEMBASST LIMA 3719 ‘ 



'CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS 4I1IS 8154 

.EXDIS » 


HAS HAD SINCE 1946—PXRONISM AND ANH-PE10NISM. STATING 

THAT HE WAS CHOOSING HIS WORDS WITH GREAT CARE BECAUSE 

THE SUBJECT IS A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE ONE, VIOLA SAID 

THAT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT EVEN TODAT PSRONISM IS A 

MAJORITT. PERONIST SENTIMENT RUNS DEEP AND STRONG IN 

ARGENTINA. BUT PSRONISM HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTED AROUND A 

LEADER AND LACKED A WELL DEFINED IDEOLOGICAL BASS; THE 

MOVEMENT NOW NO LONGER HAD SUCH LEADERSHIP. THE PROBLEM 

FOR THE MILITARY WAS HOW TO SHAPE THIS FORCE TO DEMO 

CRATIC PURPOSES. HAVING RAISED THE ISSUE, HOWEVER, 

'VIOLA DID NOT OFFER A CLEAR SOLUTION. HE SUGGESTED THAT 

ON THE ONE HAND IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CREATE AN 

ALTERNATIVE" WHICH WOULD APPEAL TO SOME SECTORS OF PSRON 

ISM. HE ALSO SAID THAT EFFECTIVE LEGISLATION ON PARTY 

ORGANIZATION COULD HELP SHAPE PSRONISM TO DEMOCRACY. IN 

DISUC5SING THE POLITICAL FUTURE, VIOLA SEEMED TO DISMISS 

THE POSSIBILITY OF FORMING AN OFFICIAL PARTY FOR EVENTUAL 

ELECTIONS. AT LEAST .-THAT APPEARS TO BE THE IMPORT OF HIS- 

REMARK THAT IT WAS-'"TOO LATE" TO FOLLOW THE POLITICAL 

1 PATH TAKEN BY THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY IN. STRUCTURING THAT** 

COUNTRY'S PARTY LIFE. VIOLA SAID THAT "IF ¥5 WERE GO- 

'ING TO DO WHAT THE'BRAZILIANS DID, WE SHOULD HAVE - 

STARTED FIVES YEARS- AGO'. 

6. IN RESPONSE TO A .QUESTION, VIOLA fc£AB0RATED ON THE 

PSN:004090 PAGE 01 TOR:284/17:11Z DTG:101603Z OCT 80 



******* n 0 H * I H 1! N T I ft i,*******Ti-mpT 

ECONOMIC ISSUES. EE SAID THAT HE SEES NO CONTRADICTION 

BETWEEN POLICIES TO FIGHT INFLATION AND POLICIES TO 

PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH. THE TVO CO TOGETHER. HE 

ADDED THAT IN HIS VIEW IT WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO 

HATE POLITICAL STABILITY IN A COUNTRY THAT IS UNDERGOING 

LONG TERM RECESSION. HE SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY FAVORED 

THE POLICY OF TRIMMING BACK THE PUBLIC SECTOR'S PARTICI 

PATION IN THE ECONOMY. HE SAID.-THAT PARTICIPATION IS 

DIVIDED INTO THREE AREAS* INFRASTRUCTURE (TELEPHONES, 

ELECTRICITY, HATER, ETC.)! STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES 

(FABRICACIONES MILITARES, THE STEEL INDUCTRY)S AND 

INDUSTRIES AND OPERATIONS.WHICH THE STATE TOOK OVER IN 

'THE PAST FOR SOCIAL OR PO&TTYCAL REASONS. THIS LAST . 

GROUP COULD BE SPUN OFF IMMEDIATELY. THE STRATEGIC 

‘INDUSTRIES VERS "COMPLICATED" AND THERE VAS LITTLE 

POSSIBILITY THAT THEY COULD .BE TURNED OVER TO THE PRIV 

ATE SECTOR. WATER, GAS, TELEPHONES AND THE LIKE COULD 

BE TURNED BACK IF INVESTORS COULD BE FOUND WHO WOULD BUY 

THEM OUT. THE PROBLEM WAS TO FIND INVESTORS, HE SAID. 

?. OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WERE: 

A. VIOLA'S TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES. VIOLA STATED 

THAT NO FINAL DECISION HAD-BEEN MADE |0R HIS TRIP TO THE 

UNITED STATES AND EUROPE. HE SAID THAT IF HE SHOULD 

TRAVEL IT WOULD BE AT THE END OF NOVEMBER OR 

EARLY DECEMBER. HE SAID HE. APPRECIATED THE EMBASSY'S 

OFFER TO HELP WITH ANT ARRANGEMENTS. AS HIS OWN FLANS 

DEVELOPED HE WOULD BE BACK .-.IN TOUCH ON THI8 SUBJECT. 

VIOLA THEN SAID THAT IN ANY CASE HE WOULD TRAVEL TO 

WASHINGTON IN A PRIVATE -CAPACITY AIMING AT BETTER RELA 

TIONS WITH THE US. 

B. THE OASGA: THE CHARGE SAID THAT AMBASSADOR ROS AND 

HE ON MONDAY HAD DISCUSSED THE ISSUE OF THE IAHRC REPORT 

AT THE OASGA. THE CHARGE NOTED THAT IT SEEMED POSSIBLE, 

iAS R05 HAD POINTED OUT, DIFFERENCES THAT BETWEEN THE 

US AND ARGENTINA ON THIS ISSUE WOULD ADVERSLT AFFECT 

•THE CLIMATE FOR GENERAL VIOLA'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON. 

VIOLA STATED THAT EE-HAD TAKEN UP THIS ISSUE WITH PRESI 

DENT VIDELA FOLLOWING THE CHARGE'S LAST MEETING WITH HIM 

(REF C). HE SAID THAT THIS WAS AN ISSUE FOR VIDELA, AND 

GAVE NO FURTHER INDICATION THAT HE INTENDED TO INVOLVE 

HIMSELF IN THE MATTER ONE WAT OR ANOTHER, 

huser 

:-;j 

BT --I r •..' ■■■ 

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**»»*»*s o n rm min 

copy 


i 

■ 

t

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81 -4-4-7 


Waihlnftton. D.C. 20520 

April 10, 1979 

pos REVIEWED 22-Jun-2P10: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR, ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 


-GBNFENflAt- 

y. 

Subject: Letter to the President from Mrs. Rische 

M. Timerman 

Mrs. Rische M. Timerman, the wife of a prominent 

Argentine publisher who has been the victim of human 

rights abuse by the GOA, has written to President 

Carter to express her deep appreciation for the President's 

efforts on behalf of her husbahd. The letter, 

which was delivered to our Embassy! in Israel where 

she resides, also expresses appreciation for Ambassador 

Castro's work on this case and Mrs. Timerman's hope 

that these efforts will lead to her husband's release. 

The GOA has recently reconsidered Timerman's case 

and the Junta has discussed whether he might now be 

released. While this review was underway the Argentine 

Foreign Ministry asked our Embassy in Buenos Aires what 

our quid pro quo might be for Timerman's release. The 

Embassy offered no specific suggestions and reiterated 

our position that Timerman should be released on the. 

merits of his case. In his most recent discussion of 

the Timerman case with Army Commander Viola, Ambassador 

Castro again urged that Timerman be released. General 

Viola told him that this is not likely to take place in 

the immediate future. 

We recommend that the President sign the attached 

reply to Mrs. Timerman. 

Qjnri*hr 

Peter Tamoff rnoxf 


Attachments: 

1. Suggested reply 

2. Letter from Mrs. Rische M. Timerman to'President 

Carter 

WIHUl 


\ 

innitt,"ri*y ^ E .0 .13528 

^ y~*7 

NARA_£iE____ Date ------

MEMORANDUM 




MEMORANDUM FOR; 

FROM: 


LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor, 


Eos REVIEWED 26-Jan-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 


IM"HAS'81®$ 

WASHINGTON 

- ‘Trrnrr December 3, 1977 

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT 

FROM: 

Cyrus Vance^ 

t 

1. Meeting with Israeli Ambassador Dlnlcz - Ambassador 

Dinltz came to see me this morning to tell me he will be leaving 

Monday evening to join Begin at the close of Begin's visit to London. 

I informed Dtnitz of my Middle East trip, stressing that we see our 

role as supporting Egypt's and Israel's efforts. Dinltz assured me 

that Israeli press criticism of the U. S. in no way reflects the views 

of the Israeli Government. Begin is very interested in continuing 

the intimate dialogue with the U. S. and wants us to be very much 

involved in whatever Israel does, since he knows that Israel will 

need American help and advice in the future. I also informed Dinltz 

about Phil Habib's trip to Moscow. 

Dinltz raised ihe F-16 question. I asked him to look at how 

procurement and payment could be spread out so as not to take up 

all of Israel'8 military funding in a single year. Dinltz is anxious 

to have the F-16 problem resolved before Defense Minister Welzman's 

visit early next year. He also raised the question of the length of 

time required for negotiations on new U4S. military technology and 

indicated that the Israelis will want to talk further with us about 

this. I said that in the light of recent developments we might want 

to take another look at the question of F-5s for Egypt. Dinltz 

reiterated Israel's standard concern about lethal weapons for Egypt 

but said there might be some new thinking now in Jerusalem. I will 

pursue discussion of this issue with the Israelis during my trip. 

1 

5 

On Dinltz' inquiry, I related my efforts with the 

Argentines regarding the Timerman case. Dinltz expressed 

appreciation for this, and for our help in the UN in the vote on the 

Center of Palestinian rights. 

Dinltz spoke with considerable satisfaction about the 

dinner Barbara Walters Is arranging for' him and Ghorbal on Sunday. 

He is obviously looking forward to it. 

DECLASSIFIED 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133^6-2-47-4

■Hi. 

No Objection To Declassification in Fifll 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-6-2-47-4 

-SECRET" 

17= 

2, Congressional Consultations on Trip Announcement - 

As we had discussed, Hodding will announce the Middle Iiast trip 

at noon on Monday. We will inform the leadership and key members 

of the Foreign Relations and International Relations Committees of 

the fact Ehat 1 plan to make the trip before the announcement is made. 

1 plan eo talk personally to as many of these people as I can on Sunday 

evening and Monday morning. I will explain our objectives and ask 

for their public support. 

3, Panama Treaty Passage - On Thursday, I reported 

that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff believed the 

Committee's resolution would link Panama treaty ratification to 

the passage of enabling legislation by both* Houses. 1 think we have 

succeeded for the time being in forestalling such an amendment. 

The Committee will not push for this amendment, although it is 

conceivable that we will face it on the floor. 

Bob Byrd has confirmed that he has asked that the treaties 

be reported by January 23th, with floor action to begin in the first 

week cf February. He expects floor action to take three weeks, 

so final passage could come in late February or early March. 

The State Department has a substantial task force working 

on all aspects of the Treaty ratification process. I find that it is 

functioning well. Doug Bennet, Frank Moore and our legislative 

staffs seem to be meshing smoothly and doing the necessary planning. 

1 conclude that we are reasonably well prepared for what will be an 

extremely difficult and subtle legislative struggle. 

4, Presidential Mail - I am glad to report that the State 

Department backlog of responses to Presidential mall referred to 

us for answering has been eliminated and* we are now in compliance 

with the nine-day limit for processing such correspondence. We 

have ale@ taken steps to solve the long range problem by organizational 

steps within the Department and by contracting with a high speed 

correspondence processing service. 

-SECRET— 


No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/1.2/.12.;NLC-133-6-2-47-4 

TJ*T" 

—=s=~ 

5. Lawsuit Against Transfer of Crown of Sc. Stephen -. 

Senators Curtis and Hay aka wa and Representatives kemp and Do man 

have sued to enjoin the transfer of-the Crown of St. Stephen. They 

claim the U. S. has title, presumably as trustee, to the Crown and 

that it may not be transferred without authorization of Congress. We 

see no merit in this claim. Judge June Green has scheduled a hearing 

at 2:00 Monday on Plaintiffs' application for a temporary restraining 

order. But this may be postponed. We are working to develop a 

strategy that will permit the matter to be adjudicated without Interfering 

with the transfer of the Crown on January 6. 

We are proceeding to discuss arrangements with Hungary, 

including an exchange of letters and public announcement of Cardinal 

Lekai’s particlp atlon and will give you our advice promptly concerning 

the timing of a Joint announcement. 

6. Jim Wright and the Middle East - I met yesterday with 

Jim Wright and six other members of hts delegation which visited 

the Middle Hast. The group was optimistic about (he prospects for 

peace, interested in remaining close to the peace process in which 

they feel they have participated at a critical and historic moment. 

Jim and his colleagues were especially encouraged by popular reactions 

in Israel to Sadat's visit, the Israeli government's interest in Sadat's 

West Bank formula of confederation or federation with Jordan, , and 

in the West Bank mayors' acceptance of demilitarization of a West 

Bank entity. 

7. U. S. /Japan Economic Negotiations - I mentioned a couple 

of days ago that I would provide some additional background on our 

trade relations with Japan. 

We are satisfied with the progress of our trade talks so far. 

Our current approach results from a thorough USG Interagency consensus. 

No agency thinks we have pressed too hard. Our Intent is 

not to escalate the pressure — only to maintain the present level 

consistently. The danger Is that, If we flinch or wobble now, the 

Japanese will be quick to judge this as indecisive and vacillating. 

We are adjusting our position to Japan's political and economic 

realities as we progress. 

■SECRET 



—SEOftET 

—hT” 

The level of pressure achieved successfully galvanized 

Japan's bureaucracy lnco urgent consideration.of our suggestions. 

Fukuda's recent cabinet changes improve ^he potential for responsiveness 

and cocperation. Both Ambassador Mansfield and our Japan 

experts urge that, if we apply sustained, even pressure, we are likely 

to get some trade concessions at little expense to US/Japan relations. 

More than with previous issues, such as Tokal Mura, how firmly and 

consistently we handle this matter will determine how Japan responds 

to future issues with this Administration. If we ease off, we lose 

respect, prospective concessions and undermine future Japanese 

responsiveness. 

Our aim is for a successful visit by Bob Strauss at the 

end of the year, followed fay a unilateral Japanese announcement of 

measures to eliminate its payments surplus and help us blunt 

protectionist pressures. 

8. Uganda - We have taken a number of steps to terminate 

the training of :he Ugandan police helicopter pilots and mechanics. 

We have telephoned and written to each of the schools involved requesting 

that they not go forward with the training. ..The,results were mixed. 

Warren then wrote asking the Federal Aviation Administration 

to advise the two Texas schools involved that the official certifications 

toward which the training la directed will not be Issued. The FAA has 

done so, and we have Informed the Uganda Embassy here of this step. 

The FAA action, which will quickly become public knowledge, will 

put pressure on the schools to end the training. (We considered and 

rejected the possibility of cancelling the trainees'visas, in part 

because the legal appeals might have prolonged their stay, which 

is scheduled to end before January L 

We have also decided to deny visas to officially connected 

Ugandans for any training or education in this country. We would 

only review a decision in the event of exceptional circumstances (UN 

sponsorship, obvslous UN benefit, etc.). 

SECHET— 

f 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12? NLC-133-6-2-47-4


I 

SUE!: 

PLEASE SEND THIS ALONG TO DENIS CLIFT AT CAf1P DAVID 

FOR HIS CLEARANCE. 

a 

c3 

i 

C i 

ALSOi WOULD YOU PLEASE VERIFY WITH *DCLIFT — DOES THE 

REFERENCE TO "VAKY VISITING ALONE” MEAN NO ACCOMPANYING 

PERSONNEL OR JUST A VISIT TO THE COUNTRY OF ARGENTINA? 

THANKS* 

LOUISE 

SECRETARY TO AMBASSADOR VAKY 

5=55 P-M. 

. t 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

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'No Objection To Declassification in 

Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-B-5-8 

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WESTERN WORLD. ARGENTINA WAS WITH THE UNITED STATES » 

AND NOT TROUBLED BY OBJECTIVE CRITICIS/1. HE WAS CON 

CERNED-. HOWEVER-. BY CRITICISM WHICH HAD THE APPEARANCE 

OF INTERVENTION IN ARGENTINE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS- SUCH 

CRITICISM HAD COMPELLED HIM TO POSTPONE AN INVITATION 

TO THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION- HIS CON 

CERN WAS THAT PROBLEMS IN THE RELATIONSHIP AT THE GOV 

ERNMENT PLANE HAD BEEN RAISED TO THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC OR 

POPULAR ISSUES- 

4. THE VICE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT-. TO PUT RELATIONS ON 

A MORE POSITIVE COURSE-. ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY COME TO 

ARGENTINA TO MEET WJTH VIDELA OR A PERSON OF HIS CHOICE 

A REVIEW OF OUR RELATIONS. VIDELA ASKED WHETHER 

tHE VAKY VISIT WOULD BE AFTER THE IAHRC OR BEFORE. THE 

VICE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT IT BE SCHEDULED AS SOON 

AS POSSIBLE- 

5- PRESIDENT VIDELA REVIEWED STEPS TAKEN BY THE ARGEN 

TINE GOVERNMENT SINCE HIS LAST MEETING WITH PRESIDENT 

CARTER {DURING THE PANAMA CANAL SIGNING!, WHICH HE SAID 

SHOWED THAT THERE HAD BEEN EFFORTS BY HI* GOVERNMENT IN 

THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA- VIDELA CONFIRMED THAT HE- WOULD 

RECEIVE THE COMMISSION. HE SAID IT WAS HIS INTENTION 

TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT BEFORE OCTOBER 1, THE EFFECTIVE 

DATE OF THE HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT, BUT DID NOT 

THINK IT COULD BE DONE BEFORE SEPTEMBER IS- CAT AN EARLI 

ER POINT, HE SAID THAT HE COULD PERHAPS ARRANGE A 

VISIT OF THE COMMISSION BY MID-OCTOBER.} ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY VAKY COULD VISIT AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT. 

VIDELA SAID HE PREFERRED THAT VAKY VISIT ALONE AND 

REQUESTED THAT THE USG LET HIM KNOW AHEAD OF TIME THE 

OBJECTIVES OF THE VAKY MISSION. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID 

WE WOULD COMMUNICATE THESEk. 

IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION, THE VICE PRESIDENT 

NOTED THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE EX-IM BANK REACH A DECISION 

ON ALLIS-CHALMERS BY SEPTEMBER IS, THE DATE OF THE BIDS 

FOR THE YACYRETA POWER PROJECT. AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF 

THE COMMISSION’S VISIT BEFORE OCTOBER 1 MIGHT ENABLE 

US TO ACT ON A LETTER BY EX-IM IN.SUPPORT OF THE ALLIS- 

CHALMERS BID BEFORE SEPTEMBER IS. 

. ?• ACTION REflUESTED. VIDELA REITERATED SEVERAL TIMES 

THAT HE INTENDS TO RECEIVE THE COMMISSION- YOU ARE RE- 

. GUESTED TO FOLLOW UP IN LOU KEY FASHION WITH PRESIDENT 

©VIDELA HIMSELF, IF POSSIBLE, OR WITH YOFRE {WHO WAS PRESENT J 

. AT THE MEETING} MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS: O! WE ARE 

I DELIGHTED THAT THE MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT TOOK . 

PLACE', {2} WE WANT TO REITERATE THE U-S- DESIRE TO BRING i1 

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Objection To Declassification in Full 

No 

2012/12/12: NLC-133-57-8-5-8. _ _ 

U.S^RRGENTINE RELATIONS BACK TO THE STATE U£ICH SHOULD 

EXIST BETWEEN TWO FRIENDLY NATIONS*! C3> YOU HAVE BEEN AS 

TO BE IN TOUCH IN ORDER TO FOLLOW UP ON .THE MONDALE-VIDEl. 

CONVERSATIONS; CM} WE ARE NOW TAKING A LOOK AT WHERE WE 

STAND AS A PRELUDE TO THE TRIP TO. ARGENTINA BY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY VAKY WHICH LIAS DISCUSSED IN ROME; AND CS> NOW 

THAT VIDELA IS BACK! DOES HE HAVE A CLEAR VIEW OF THE 

TIMETABLE WHICH MIGHT BE LIKECY FOR BOTH THE ANNOUNCEMENT 

OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION VISIT AND 

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PARTICIPANTS 

No Objection To Declassificalioft-Hrf ull 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-47-1-2-0 

ARGENTINA 

ARGENTINA 

President Jorge Rafael Videla 

(HORhay RAFAIel VeeDEHleh) 

Vice Admiral Oscar Montes, 

Foreign Minister 

(OHScar MOHNtes) 

US 

The President 

The Secretary 

□r. Zbigniew Brzezinski 

Assistant Secretary Todman 

ChargeL Maxwell Chaplin - 

Mr. Robert Pastor 

Checklist — POS~REVIEWED 02-Feb-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 

— Courtesy Point - We want to thank President Videla 

for his warm reception of Assistant Secretary 

Todman on his recent trip to Argentina. 

” t 

— Human Rights - We want to impress on the Argentines 

our concern over their continuing gross violations 

of basic human rights. We understand that they 

inherited a chaotic mess, but terrorism is now 

largely controlled. Human rights violations continue 

however. We think now is the time to move 

ahead. We are heartened to hear of releases of 

prisoners and the reinstatement of the "right of 

option". 

— Non-Proliferation and the Treaty of Tlatelolco - 

We want to impress on the Argentines the danger 

of nuclear arms proliferation; full safeguards 

are a necessity. We also want them to ratify the 

Treaty of Tlatelolco to indicate Argentine dedication 

to peaceful uses of atomic energy. 

— Malvinas/Falkland Islands - We want to stay out of 

this Argentine—UK dispute. We are pleased that 

conversations are going on between the two governments 

to resolve the questions. 

— Helicopter Sale - (If raised by President Videla) - 

We limited theequipment which will be supplied 

on the eight commercial Model 212 Bell helicopters 

because of present problems in the human rights 

field. 

— Trade - Point out that current US health and custom 

regulations will not allow Argentine freBh 

meat to enter the US. 

AUttlC 

NAHA. 

declassified 

EA13620 

— 

INn Ohiection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-47-1-2-01


ARGENTINA 

I. Setting 

President Jorge Rafael Videla came to power in a 

March 1976 coup d'etat. Economic instability and rightwing 

and left-wing violence were rampant. The new 

government took the form of a Junta composed of the 

chiefs of the three armed services with Videla (Army) 

as President. It had two primary goals: elimination of 

terrorism and restoration of the economy. 

The struggle against terrorism from the left is now 

largely won, but the excesses of counterterrorism remain 

a serious problem. Some of the security forces are 

running out of control. We believe that President Videla 

is a moderate who probably would constrain such rightwing 

terrorism if he could, but pressure from hard-line 

military officers restricts his freedom to act. Some 

progress in human rights has been made, however. Prisoners 

have been released and the Argentines have announced 

they will soon reinstate the "righ- of option". 

The once powerful trade unions are under tight wraps 

and many of their leaders have "disappeared". The government 

is considering a plan for incorporating civilians 

into political process, but no action has yet been taken. 

In the security field we are concerned that the 

Argentines $350 million favorable trade balance with the 

Soviet Union, may lead them to seek Russian weapons. Our 

restrictions on arms sales for human rights reasons pushes 

them toward the Russians. 

In the economic field, the Videla government began to 

reverse the populist programs of the Peronist years by 

reestablishing a free market economy. The results have 

been generally very successful; but inflation remains a 

continuing problem and labor has been^squeezed. The U.S. 

had a $250 million favorable trade balance with Argentina 

in 1976. * 

U.S.-Argentina difficulties relate to the excesses of 

pnnnfpr-ferjrirlgiTi and our general concerns regarding nuclear 

proliferation. (The latter issue is now coming to the fore.) 

CONFIDENTIAE 

iNr^hifintinr^Rêclassificatiornn Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-47-1-2-01


W^l1 4.X/U1* X XAij 

—---- 

II. Issues 

I. Human Rights 

The human rights situation in Argentina is the 

principal obstacle to closer relations. There have 

been some improvement^ including the release of some 

prisoners and an announcement that the "right of option" 

will soon be reinstated. However, the Argentine government 

continues to refuse to acknowledge the names of 

thousands of political prisoners. Disappearances, 

summary executions, torture, and instances of anti- 

Semitism also occur. 

As the result of human rights violations, we proposed 

a reduced FMS credits program for FY '78. 

Argentina rejected the proposal but kept the door open 

to FMS sales and training. We have not signed the FY *77 

FMS agreement for human rights reasons. We are now 

refusing all military items for internal security use. 

All other requests for military items are reviewed on a 

case-by-case basis. 

The Argentines will not participate in this years 

joint US-Latin American fleet exercise (UNITAS). Their 

stated reason for nonparticipation is "difficulty in 

obtaining small parts" for their ships. We believe it is 

a protest of our arms sales policy. 

The Kennedy-Humphrey amendment to this year'B security 

assistance bill will virtually eliminate military 

ties to Argentina on October 1, 1978. 

We have abstained, voted against and pressed the 

Argentines to withdraw loan proposals in the international 

financial institutions. There is no AID program in 

Argentina because of its high per capita income. 

Talking Points 

— The United States recognizes that Argentina has 

been victim of a brutal terrorist campaign. 

— The Argentine government has decisively mastered 

the security situation, but it does not appear to 

be moving with sufficient speed and determination 

to abolish lawlessness by security forces and 

others. 

— We are concerned that peopLe are being repressed 

simply because they dissent. ‘Lawful opposition 

should not be confused with subversion. 

iNoObier:tinn To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-47-1-2-01


— We strongly urge an end to the state of siege and 

the public listing of all prisoners Bhowing their 

place of detention and the charges against them. 

Due process Bhould be restored and all future excesses 

punished. 

— Reports of continued torture and disappearances 

are distressing. 

— We want to express our concern over the case of 

Jewish publisher Jacobo Timmerman of the respected 

daily La Opinion. He is bain^ held without charges. 

Should an outbreak of anti-semitism occur it 

would be most harmful to US-Argentine relations. 

— We do recognize the partial steps taken by the 

Argentine government to assure basic human rights. 

The May release of prisoners and the recently 

announced intention to restore the "right of 

option" are positive indications of such Argentine 

movement. (The "right of option" allows Argentine 

citizens to leave country if held under State of 

Siege provisions.) 

— We think it essential for the government to recognize 

its unquestioned strength. It should begin 

to gamble on the side of returning the country to 

the rule of law. 

— Human rights concerns will not permit us to sign 

the FY 1977 FMS credits. 

n 

— We regret the Argentine nonparticipation in the 

UNITAS exercise but appreciate their offer of 

logistic support. We look forward to their rejoining 

UNITAS in the future. 

2. Non-Proliferation and the Treaty of Tlatelolco 

Argentina has the most advanced nuclear capability 

of any Latin American state and the greatest potential for 

an autonomous fuel cycle. The Argentine government has 

stated that it seeks nuclear technology in order to satisy 

its energy needs and for strictly peaceful purposes. We 

are concerned, however, because of Argentina's apparent 

progress toward acquiring an independent, unsafeguarded 

reprocessing capacity. We are considering the transfer of 

sensitive heavy water technology to the Argentines if they 

will forego reprocessing and accept full scope safeguards. 

The Argentines recently signed a limited safeguards agreement 

with Canada covering previously purchased nuclear 

fuel. They are now discussing with the Canadians the possibility 

of accepting full scope safeguards in return for 

further Canadian technical assistance in the nuclear area. 

-CONFIDENTIAL-


- 4 — 


— The United States is concerned over the possible 

spread of nuclear explosive capabilities. We 

feel the world community must take steps to reduce 

this growing danger. 

— At the same time, the United States recognizes 

the need for states to expand and diversify 

their energy resources on a secure basis. 

— We applaud the recent Argentine-Canadian limited 

safeguard agreement. 

— Ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco would 

demonstrate Argentine committment to the peaceful 

uses of nuclear energy. 

— The US is considering Argentine requests for 

technical assistance and nuclear cooperation. 

Specific requests relating to nuclear fuel are 

also under study. 

3. The Malvinas/Falkland Islands 

Argentina has disputed British possession of the 

Malvinas (Falkland Islands) since 1833. The 2,000 

inhabitants of the islands want nothing to do with 

Argentina. The issue is further complicated by possibly 

large oil reserves in the Falkland Island shelf. In July, 

the UK and Argentina began another round in a series of 

conversations about sovereignty of the islands. The US 

has not taken sides in this dispute. (In talking with 

Videla you should use the Argentine name, Malvinas.) 

Talking PointB 

— We are pleased that Argentina and the UK are 

carrying on conversations directed toward resolving 

this question. 

4. Sale of Helicopters (If raised by GOA) 

We have agreed to sell the Argentine military eight 

Bell 212 commercial model helicopters, two of which will be 

used to transport President Videla. However, we did not 

agree to the original configuration requested by the 

Argentines. Machine gun mounts were eliminated on all of 

the eight, and armor plating was permitted only on those two 

aircraft to be used for President Videla's security. 

-G8NFIUENTXAL 

INo Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-B-47-1-2-01


-CONFIDENT TAX 

- 5 - 

We requested assurances from the Argentines that the helicopters 

will not be used for internal security purposes. 


— Concern that the helicopters might have internal 

security uses caused the US to request assurances, 

Retention of the armor plating on two of the helicopters 

will help to guarantee the safety of 

President Videla. 

5. Trade 

Argentina's continuing recovery from past economic 

difficulties should stimulate demand for US goods. The 

already large trade deficit with the US will worsen; 

Argentina will want to rectify the balance by exporting 

fresh meat products to the United States. US sanitary 

regulations do not permit importation of fresh meat from 

countries with endemic foot and mouth disease/ such as 



— We recognize Argentina interest in exportation of 

fresh meat. But we do not foresee the possability 

of removing sanitary restrictions un-til 

adequate safeguards against transmittal of foot 

and mouth disease can be assured. Argentina has 

suggested export from disease-free areas, but 

USDA has ruled that the Tariff Act of 1930 precludes 

exceptions for parts of countries. 

■CONFIDENTIAL. 

iNn Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-47-1-2-01

No Objection To Declassification in 3art 2012/11/21 : NLC-4-43-6-27-5 

l MCIN I ur SS 1 A r k. . 

BRIEFING PAPER 

■CONFIDENT IAL (Entire text) 

BILATERAL PAPER 

ARGENTINA« 

Your Meeting with Foreign Minister Pastor 

I. PARTICIPANTS 

The Secretary 

Ambassador Vaky 

Carlos Washington Pastor 

(Phonetic: pahsTOR) 

II. 

INTRODUCTION 

Argentina was helpful in the OAS vote on the 

Nicaraguan resolution. The GOA wants a high-level 

bilateral exchange with us during the course of the 

Ecuadorean inauguration. We want to encourage Argentina 

to continue its efforts to end human rights abuses. 

The Foreign Minister will note that progress has been 

made. Pastor may suggest that we should take some 

public action to bolster President videla's and General 

Viola's prestige and authority. 

III. 

ISSUES ------- t 

A. Human Rights. There has been some progress 

on human rights in Argentina. Disappearances have 

declined from the 55 per month average in 1978. There 

have been 13 unaccounted-for disappearances since February 1, 

the last occurring May 13. The GOA continues to release 

prisoners held under Executive Power. The ICRC reports 

that prison conditions have improved. There is, however, 

still little information on the fate of disappeared 

persons. Legal efforts to force the Government to show 

cause for holding alleged subversives havq not been 

successful. 

Points to be Made 

— We are pleased with moves to curb disappearances, 

and urge the government to continue to investigate 

recent cases and definitively end the practice. 

— We hope families of the disappeared will 

receive information that they request. 

— We are pleased with the release of prisoners 

held under Executive Power, and hope that all 

CONFIDENTIAL 

GDS - 8/6/85 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13S26 

Authority N ~ 

~if" ■ 

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No Objection To Declassification in 3art 2012/11/21 : NLC-4-43-6-27-5 

-2 - 

prisoners will be given fair trials or be freed. 

— We remain deeply concerned over the 

continued detention of Jacobo Timerman, 

and hope that he will be released without delay. 

-- We hope to see greater numbers of prisoners 

released under the Right of Option Program. 

* 

B. Nicaragua and Central America. The GOA was 

most helpful in supporting the United States and the 

Andean countries in the OAS vote and has already moved 

to recognize the new Government. However, the GOA 

supplied arms to the Somoza regime. It cannot be 

expected to have much influence with Nicaragua. 

Point to be Made 

— We appreciate the GOA's support on the Nicaragua 

Resolution in the OAS and hope that the GOA will 

support the Andean countries in their efforts 

to assist Nicaragua. 

C. Beagle Channel. The Papal mediation of the 

Beagle Channel dispute is still in progress. 

i 


— We are pleased that Argentina and Chile agreed 

to mediation of the Beagle dispute and hope that 

both will continue to work with‘the Vatican. 

t 

D. Nuclear Technology. We are discussing with 

potential suppliers (Canada, the FRG and Switzerland) 

safeguards and other conditions they will require 

for the sale of a heavy water plant. (We would have 

preferred that Argentine deferral of reprocessing 

be a condition, but Canada is unwilling to require 

deferral and the FRG will follow Canada's lead.) We 

are also dicussing with the GOA the additional U.S. 

safeguards requirements, effective in March 1980, 

needed for us to continue nuclear cooperation. We 

do not wish to take the initiative on this. 

■ 

Point to be Made (If raised) 

-- We want to cooperate with Argentina in the 

transfer of nuclear power equipment and technology. 

Our cooperation must be consistent with the nuclear 

export law and policy. 

August 1979 

-GaNirmENTiArr" *

*N; — 4 

MEMORANDUM 



t 

-SEGRET- March 21. 1977 

INFORMATION 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


NORTH-SOUTH 



(Hansen) 

^ 

• Continued preparation for PRM 8. 

(Thornton) 

Met with Gene Kramer, who will represent AP in New Delhi, for general 

background discussion. 

In the afternoon, attended the South Asia Working Group meeting for 

PRM 10 'at the State Department. 

(Pastor) 

1. On Friday night I attended a dinner with the Argentine Ambassador, 

and with two Ministers of his Embassy. We spoke about many issues, but 

the two which we spent the most time on were the current political situation 

in Argentina and U ,S . policy on human rights . They told me that they were 

well aware of President Carter's great concern for human rights, that they 

were presently undergoing a serious political problem in Argentina, and 

they hoped that the United States would understand, and that they wanted 

to continue to have good relations and a dialogue with the United States. 

Privately one Minister told me that he personally hoped that the U ,S . 

commitment to human rights would not waiver. 

SECRET------- 

declassified 

E.Q.13S28 

Authority Ml C -'PH-g-I^S~ 

uana __Pete "A ^"*4---------

No Objection 10 Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-99-5-6-5 

■SECR1ST- -2- 

2. Attended a discussion where there were? two delegates to the Cuban 

mission to the United Nations present. I discreetly overheard one conversation 

where one delegate expressed his concern that jurisdictional problems 

preventing terrorist actions by Cuban exiles. 

3. Lunched with Sergio Motta Mello, a journalist with O Estado da 

Sao Paulo, Brazil's leading newspaper, and discussed the current state 

of U .S .-Brazilian relations . He said that Brazilian politics were in turmoil 

at the present time, and it was not clear to him whether the forces of 

moderation or the forces of repression would win. He said that in the 

short term, U.S . policies on human rights may cause some problems, 

but he thought that in the long term it would be beneficial both to Brazil 

as well as to the United States. Like me, he expressed uncertainty about 

how the nuclear problem would work itself out, but he suggested a cooling 

off period might be in order. 

4. - Met with Eugenio Velasco, one of the two Chilean lawyers who was 

exiled recently because they were defending political prisoners in Chile, 

and discussed the current political situation in Chile. 

» 

5. ■ Worked on Pan American Day speech, letter to Echeverria, background 

memo for credentials ceremony (Chilean Ambassador), and 

various memoranda. 

Significant Inforroation/Intelligence 

(Thornton) 

My batting average slipped to 500 as Mrs. Gandhi went down to crashing 

defeat at the polls. There are other unfortunate implications of this, also, 

but they will require detailed analysis. It is not completely certain yet 

that the Congress could not form a government, but given the trend, it 

seems highly unlikely. The opposition has yet to organize itself and is 

much of an unknown quantity although we know the individual leaders 

very well. 

In Pakistan, the violence over the weekend has abated somewhat, but the 

Embassy now believes Bhutto's days to be numbered. 

a 

SBeSET------- 

t

No Objection To Declassification in :rull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-99-5-6-5 

The situation on the ground in Zaire shows no marked change. Nigeria 

has apparently taken on responsibility to mediate. This is obviously the 

most desirable outcome. Nigerian Foreign Minister Carba was here today 

and has left for the UN. Bill Schaufele tells me that the meeting was 

productive, and a report is on its way over. I am aware of nothing further 

in the military supply front since the SCC Working Group met on Saturday. 

The Turnhalle Conference being held in Southwest Africa has ended. 

It has produced the basis of a constitution which leaves all real power 

in the hands of the South African Government and provides for an interim 

government that may be in place by summer but will be subject to consensus 

procedures and hence very limited in what it can do. 

SWAPO remains unreconciled, and the results of Turnhalle do not look 

like a basis for building a Namibia settlement . 

Mn Hhiortinn Tn naHacîfiratinn jn -nil 9ni3/fl9/n4 ■ Nl P.-94-QQ-fS-fi-S

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-99-3-9-4 

■SECRET 

WASriiNoTCN 

_____________ _____ Ocrsber 18. 8. 1980_____ 

DOS REVIEWED 06-Jul-201D: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL, 

MEMORANDUM FOP. 

TE~ ?PSSIDrn^T 

cmund 5. Muskie . - " 

Subject: 

U.S. Policy Toward Argentina 

On May 29 the Inter-Agency Group for Latin 

America developed a strategy, subsequently approved 

by you, to improve our relations with Argentina 

during 1980. 

However, following the IG meeting two events 

occurred which have caused us to reassess the timing 

of our initiatives: 

— The Bolivian military, with Argentine sympathy 

and support, staged a coup in Bolivia. Assistant 

Secretary Bovdler's visit to Buenos Aires was postponed 

as a result. 

— Argentina thus far has not agreed to continue 

cooperation beyond October on grains export restrictions 

to the Soviet Union. 

I emphasized both of these issues, in addition 

to our human rights concerns, in my recent meeting 

with Argentine Foreign Minister Pastor at the UN 

General Assembly. Under Secretary Cooper in a subsequent 

discussion with the Argentine Minister of Economy 

received the impression that continued cooperation 

on grains is possible but much depends on the size 

of the 1980/81 harvests. We plan to qontinue our 

efforts through further discussions in Buenos Aires, 

Washington, and at international meetings. 

Argentine decision-making is influenced by 

the nearness of our presidential election and by 

their own presidential transition. General Viola 

will replace President Videla March 29, 1981. 

Under these circumstances, we believe that, 

while it is important to proceed with as many of 

the proposed 1980 initiatives as possible, it would 

be inappropriate to proceed this year with some 

of the steps earlier contemplated. However, we 

should maintain private dialogue and avoid public 

confrontation that would make this dialogue difficult. 

The steps we intend to proceed with this year and 

those we plan to defer until next year are as follows: 

Mn Ohinrtinn Tn npHaQciFiratinn in ri;ll 9013/09/04 ■ Nl P—94-QQ-3-Q-4


I. Continuing or Early Action Initiatives: 

f 

— We will pursue our significant commercial 

anc economic interests in preparation for the meeting 

of the D.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic Commission 

to be held in Buenos Aires, prob.ably in March or 

April (the earliest mutually convenient timeframe). 

The meeting will include discussion of bilateral 

trade issues and seek to expand commercial relations. 

We also would use this occasion to continue dialogue 

over the issues that may be current at that time. 

-- We will move forward on negotiations to 

arrive at an agreement on the assurances required 

for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act. We continue 

to urge the Argentines to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco 

as they had earlier promised you. 

— We will seek to conclude the negotiations 

for a bilateral income tax treaty and a consular 

convention. 

II. 

Initiatives Postponed Until Next Year: 

— The first round of periodic security consultations, 

focusing on security of the South Atlantic. 


issues. 

— Signing the Agricultural Cooperation Agreement, 

unless we can obtain a renewal of the Argentine 

decision to limit grains to the Soviet Union. 


to the U.S. Army School of the Americas until consultations 

with the Congress are completed and we are 

satisfied as to the timing of the initiative. 

— A high-level U.S. military visit, although 

we should keep under review the desirability of 

an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader, 


f 

% 

Mn Ohiontinn Tn nprla«;«iifir'at,irm in -nil 9r)13/n9/fM • Nl n-94-QQ-3-Q-4


No Objection To Declassification in rull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-92-1-7-5 

-SECRET 

WASHINGTON 

October 18/ 1330 

From: 

Subject: 

Edmund S. Muskie . ^^ 





during 1980. 





and support, staged a coup in Bolivia. Assistant 

Secretary Bowdler's visit to Buenos Aires was postponed 

as a result. 







General Assembly. Under secretary Cooper in a subsequent 




of the 1980/31 harvests. We plan to continue our 



* 














DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13S26 

Authority M L C .- 3 l4 - 9 a ' \ -~7 -ST 

NAHA- X F Onto n \4 \u . 

Nn Ohiprtinn Tn nprla^îfiratinn in -nil 2013/(12/04 ■ Nl (T-24-P2-1-7-fi

No Objection To Declassification in “uli 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-92-1-7-5 

I. Continuing or Early Action Initiatives: 

— We will pursue our significant coronercial 

anc economic interests in preparation for the meeting 

of the U. S.-Argent!ne Mixed Economic Commission 

to be held in Euenos Aires, prob.ably in March or 






-- We will move forward on negotiations to 







convention. 

II. 

Initiatives Postponed Until Next Years 




issues. 



decision to limit grains to the Soviet Onion. 


to the O.S. Army School of the Americas until consultations 

with the Congress are completed and we are « 


— A high-level O.S. military visit, although 




-SECRET 

Nn Dhiortinn Tn Dprlaîfirptinn in -nil 9(113/02/04 • Nl r.-24-99-1-7-h

□uc 

No Objeclion To Declassification in rull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-3-8 

OP THrtXD REVIEWED 29-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 

STU269 

DE HUESE* #0828/10291505 ADX057038 - MCN SFCDJ PROCESS 

0 2914172 JAN 80 

PM AMEM1ASSY BUENOS AIHES 

&3H 


UOniDINTIAL SUCTION 1 OP 828 

NOBIS 

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 1/28/10: (CASTRO, RAUL fli) OR-M 

TAGS: PEPR, AR 

SUBJECT: (C) DRAFT MEMORANDUM OP CONVERSATION: GENERAL GOOD PASTER'S 

VISIT TO ARGEdTIWTS WiTTOH tOPlUfrt JIWU'A'RI 23 -- - 


2. MEMORANDUM OP CONVERSATION 

3. SUBJECT: GENERAL GOODRfSSR'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA: 

GENERAL POLITICAL TOPICS :. 

4. PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS* BRIGADIER (RET) CARDQkS PASTOR, 

FOREIGN MINISTER 

DR. JOSE ALFREDO MARTINI*-BE HOZ, MINISTER iOF ECONOMY 

COMODORO CARLOS CAVANDOLJ, DEPUTY FOREIGN.MINISTER 

MR. VICTOR BEAUGE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFflfftiS (HOTETAXER) 

GENERAL ANDREW J. GOODBA&ER, PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY 

RAUL H. CASTRO, U.S. AMBASSADOR IN ARGENTINA). 

CLAUS V. RUSSR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE (ARA/S^L') 

WILLIAM H. HALLMAN, U.9.EMBASSY BUENOS AIRIS (NOTESAIER) 

5. PLACE AND TIME: JANUARY.20 AND 24, 1980| THE MINISTRY 

OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BUENOS ACRES 

Co 

6. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. GENERAL GOOBPRSTER 

MET ON TWO CONSECUTIVE DRlS AT THE MINISTRY OP.\I0IEIGN 

AFFAIRS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER LED GENERAL PW3ljtI|AL 

DISCUSSIONS FOR ARGENTINA,. INCLUDING HUMAN RXSMF 

CONCERNS, POLITICAL-MILXVARY AFFAIRS AND MATTER*? 

HAVING TO DO WITH NUCLEAR': COOPERATIONS IT WAS HIE', 

GENERAL CONTENTION THAT AMU ACCRETION OF MISUNDERSTAND 

INGS TROUBLES U.S .-ARGENTINEQUATIONS., AND THAT .B.S. 

i 

■ IV« 

: i 

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ONIIDENTTA L*»>—>*■ COPY. 

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MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF ARGENTINA HAVE LED US TO MISCAL 

CULATIONS IN POLICY. MOST TROUBLING, HE ASSERTED, HAS 

BEEN OUR MISUNDERSTANDING OE ARGENTINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS 


BRIGADIER PASTOR SUGGESTED SPECIFIC REMEDIES FOR 

RESTORING FULL CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION.■ 

7. A SEPARATE MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION COVERS 

ECONOMY MINISTER MARTINEZ DE HOZ'S RESPONSE TO OUR 

EFFORTS TO ENLIST ARGENTINA'S HELP IN KEEPING GRAINS 


LEVELS. END MEMCON INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. 

81. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23: FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR'S 

FIRST PRESENTATION. 

PASTOR RESPONDED TO GENERAL GOODPASTER'S EXPLANATION 

OF PROBLEMS RISING FROM THE SOVIET INVASION CF 


DISCUSSING ARGENTINA'S ROLE IN THESE, WITH THE WISH 

AT SOME POINT TO COVER THE FULLEST RANGE OF POLITICAL 

PROBLEMS EXISTING BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED 

STATES. 

9. LATER PASTOR LED INTO HIS SUBJECT WITH A RHETORICAL 


JUST NOW IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS — EVEN AS WE ADMIT 

THAT THIS PROBLEM IS TRANSITORY AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL -- 

HOW MUCH MORE IMPORTANT IS IT TO HAVE RELATIONS ON SUCH 

BASIS THAT IN FAR MORE SERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES, WAR FOR 

EXAMPLE, THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA WOULD STAND 

TOGETHER? 

10. WE CANNOT ARRIVE AT THIS HOWEVER WITH "ON-THE-SPOT* 

DISCUSSIONS. WE NEED TIME, AND IT IS REQUIRED THAT VS 

ADDRESS A SERIES OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AND OTHER QUESTIONS. 

UNFORTUNATELY. PASTOR CONTINUED, MEDIOCRE OR’BAD RELATIONS 

ARE THE NORM BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE U.S. THE UNITED 

STATES HAS SELDOM UNDERSTOOD ARGENTINE REALITIES, AND 

BAD INFORMATION AND MISJUDGMENT HAVE LED TO ERRORS OF 

U.S. POLICY, AND INADMISSIBLE U.S.G. ACTIONS. 

1. A GREAT U.S. ERROR WAS FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THAT 

ARGENTINA FOUGHT A VAR AGAINST TERRORISM-COMMUNISM THAT 

LASTED BETWEEN TWO AND THREE TREARS. AND ARGENTINA VON 

THE WAR — UNLIKE, FOR EXAMPLE, NICARAGUA. THE U.S* 

SHOULD BE PROUD OF ARGENTINA FOR HAVING DONE THIS — 

RATHER THAN ASSUMING THAT "VIOLENT REPRESSION* VIS 

THE HALLMARK OF THIS GOVERNMENT. YET IS IS iTHIS 

SYMBOLISM, PASTOR VENT ON, THAT HAS BEEN TAKEN SO 

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1 

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SERIOUSLY BY HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES 

RATHER AS THOUGH "ATOMIC BOMB DROPPER" SHOULD 

CHARACTERIZE THE UNITED STATES BEFORE ARGENTINES, 

WHEN THE U.S. HAD POUND IT NECESSARY TO USE THAT 

INSTRUMENT ONLY IN ONE BRIEF SET OP CIRCUMSTANCES. 

12. FURTHERMORE, THIS U.S. CHARACTERIZATION OP 

ARGENTINA LED TO MANY UNPAIR POLICY DECISIONS: TO THE 

HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT, TOWARD CONDEMNATION OF 

ARGENTINA AT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND 

OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORUMS EVEN, PASTOR ASSERTED, 

TO U.S. OPPOSITION TO ARGENTINE NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT. 

13. COULD THE U.S. NOT HAVE RECALLED THAT IN 1962 

ARGENTINA WAS FIRST TO SEND SHIPS TO HELP THE FREE 

W.ORLD IN THE CARIBBEAN? ( WE DIDN'T EVEN GET A . 

THANK-YOU NOTE.") ARGENTINA BACKED TH U.S. IN 

PAKISTAN'S DISPUTE WITH INDIA? THIS COUNTRY HELPED 


NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT CONFERENCE? WE WERE THE FIRST 

LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY TO TAKE IN EAST ASIAN REFUGEES? 

WE VOTED WITH THE U.S. IN TOKYO ROUND TRADE MEETINGS? 

WE ALIGNED WITH THE U.S. AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN A 

RESOLUTION ON AFHGANISTAN. 

BT 

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* 

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C 

■I __ ‘ No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91 -3-3-8 

» 

ofc IMMED 

STU271 

DE RUESBA #0328/2 0291720 ADX057083 - MCN SVCD» PROCESS 

0 291417Z JAN 80 

PM AMEMBASSY B0BN0S AIRES 


NODIS 

B E -N-g -I- A- L -SECTION 2 01 2 BUENOS AIRES 0828 

14. U.S. LACE 07 APPRECIATION IS NOT UNDERSTANDABLE 

TO THE AR&ENTINE "MAN ON THE STREET," WHEN HE LEARNS 

70R EXAMPLE THAT TOU WANTED TO USE US TO TAXE IN THE 

SHAH 07 IRAN. GOVERNMENTS CHANCE, BUT ARGENTINES 

REMEMBER ALL THESE PROBLEMS. 

15. 70R THIS REASON, PASTOR CONTINUED, COA MUST ASX 

NOW 70R PROPOUND CHANCES IN U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD US, 

PASTOR SAID. AND NOT ONLY MUST ATTITUDES TOWARD ‘ARGENTINA 

BE CHANCED, BUT ATTITUDES .TOWARD MOST 07 LAT}N AMERICA. 

THESE CHANCES 07 ATTITUDES IN POLICI H0PE7ULLY WILL BE 

REELECTED AT THE WHITE HOUSE, IN THE CONCRESS( AT INTER 

NATIONAL MEETINGS. PASTOR ASrEP THAT THE 0.S. STqP PWlSSlNfl 

ARCENTINA SO HARD fN NUCLEAR AFFAIRS ("IN RESPONSE TtTWHTCH ¥E 

trm^--fgTwgTT1tB BurnMMUHnTMfi twat tri: 

POSTPONE A TRIP TO 

THTT-ggyiET TTNTON HE PT.ANS TO MAXE LATER THIS TEfiFT; ~ 


SPECI7IC POSSIBLE ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES, WHICH 

HE DEVELOPED MORE BULLY THE 70LL0WINC DAY. THEY ARE 

RECORDED IN THAT CONVERSATION.) 

17 PASTOR THEN ADDED: AND YOU MUST NOT CATESORIZE U$ 


THIS GOVERNMENT IS WORKING HARD TO ARRIVE AT REAL . 

DEMOCRACY — AND NOT OF THE LAUGHING STOCK KIND OF 

THE LAST PERONIST PERIOD, EVEN THOUGH THAT "DEMOCRACY" 


GOVERNMENT WHOSE FIRST ACTS WERE CO-SIGNED BY CUBAN - 

PRESIDENT DORTICOS AND CHILEAN PRESIDENT ALLENSI? 

ITS LATER DAYS WERE CHARACTERIZED BY DISORDER AND 

Kidnappings, now we have no hunger, race problems or 

SERIOUS CRIME. "WE WANT TO BE CONSIDERED AS i( SERIOUS 

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COUNTRY** PASTOR SAID. 

IP. A NEW PATH WILL LEAD TO A PULL ALLIANCE; THE 

EXISTING COURSE WILL LEAD TO A NEW NEUTRALITY WITH 

WHICH NEITHER THE U.S. NOR THE ARGENTINES WILL FEEL 


WILL BE UNCERTAIN.** THEN HE ADDED.* YOUR REVISIONS 

07 THOUGHT MUST BE TOWARD LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 

OTHER THAN MEXICO AND VENEZUELA — ALL 07 LATIN AMERICA 

NEEDS U.S. ATTENTION, HOWEVER MUCH WE MAY APPRECIATE 

TOUR ATTENTION TO THE MID-EAST, SOUTH ASIA AND OTHER 


19. IN RESPONSE, GENERAL GOODPASTER ASSURED RASTOR 

THAT ARGENTINA HAD EARNED ITS PLACE AMONG RESPECTED 

NATIONS, AND THAT WE SHOW THIS APPRECIATION IN WORKING 

WITH ARGENTINA IN THE OAS, AS WE DID EARLIER IN THE 

ALLIANCE 7OR PROGRESS. WE UNDERSTAND ARGENTINA'S 

TRADITIONAL CONCERN POR HUMAN DIGNITY — IT IS PART 

07 OUR SHARED HERITAGE — AND CURRENT REPORTS TO 

RESTORE THIS SITUATION. 

20. TURTHER, GOODPASTER CONTINUED, PRESIDENT CARTER 

FAS SAID HE SHARES HOPES FOR BETTER RELATIONS. THERE 

IS AN UNDERSTANDING 07 PAST UNITED STATES ERRORS. 

IN NUCLEAR AFFAIRS POR EXAMPLE: KNOWING OP ARGENTINA'S 

LACK OP INTENTION TO DEVELOP A WEAPON WE WANT ARGENTINE 

PROGRESS — BUT WITH APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS. WE MADE 

THE POINT 07 PROPER SAFEGUARDS WITH EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS 

NOT TO DELAY ARGENTINE PROGRESS, BUT TO ACHIEVE AN 

OBJECTIVE SHARED BY ALL. SHORTLY ARGENTINA WILL RECEIVE 

A LETTER PROM THE UNITED STATES REGARDING PROVISION OP 

FUEL POR RESEARCH REACTORS. 

21. RECOGNIZED TOO ARE STRIDES MADE IN RESTORING. 

AUTHORITY AND SUPPRESSING TERRORISM, GOODPASTER WENT 

ON. UNFORTUNATE MEASURES WILL SURELY CONTINUE TO BE 

DISCARDED AS THE ARGENTINE SITUATION BECOMES LEES 

EXTRAORDINARY. DISAPPEARANCES WILL BE STOPPED AND 

POLITICAL PRISONERS FREED OR GIVEN RIGHT OP OPTION. 

(COMMENT: PASTOR LET THE TERM “POLITICAL PRISONER* 

GO BY AT THIS MOMENT, BUT PROTESTED ITS USE ON TIE 

FOLLOWING DAY. YOU WERE REFERRING TO TERRORISTS 

AND GUERRILLAS", HE SAID.) 

22. FURTHERMORE, GENERAL GOODPASTER SAID, WE ARE 

MAKING EFFORTS TO BE SCRUPULOUS AND FAIR IN IMPORTANT 

APEAS: THE LEGALLY REQUIRED REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 

HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN ARGENTINA WILL BE REVIEWED 

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No Objection To Declassification in rull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91 -3-3-8 

AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS Of GOVERNMENT. "I TALKED WITH 

SECRETART VANCE ABOUT SOME Of THIS THE DAT BEFORE 

LEAVING WASHINGTON. HE IS CONCERNED TOR BASIC k 

Levels o? human treatment, but knows too of your 

PAST DIFFICULTIES AND ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS TO'RESTORE 

L^GAL PROCESSES." (COMMENT: GENERAL GOODPASTER 



TION. ) 

23. GENERAL GOODPASTER REFLECTED ON THE NEED FOR 

TIMELY CONSULTATION, AND RECALLED WHAT THE LACT OF IT 


AND USING THE EMBASSY AS A CONSULTATIVE DEVICE. HE 

CONCLUDED: "WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS 

TO BE PROTECTED FROM VIOLENCE IS AN IMPORTANT RIGHT, 

AND WE FEEL ARGENTINA HAS COME FAR TOWARD ACCOMPLISHING 

THIS. THE UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDS THIS -- RUT YOU 


MADE THE U.S. STRONG. AMONG THEM IS A FREE PRESS, 

VITAL TO OUR SOCIETY EVEN WHILE WE ADMIT THE PRESS TENDS 

TO 'ACCENTUATE THE NEGATIVE.' 


ON JANUARY 23. SEPTEL WILL CONTINUE WITH PASTOR'S 

PRESENTATION AND GENERAL GOODPASTER'S RESPONSES *ON 

JANUARY 24.) 

t 

CASTRO 

BT 

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* 2vfEWORANDUM * fj ■ r 


March 5, 1979 


FROM: 

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINS£I„ .ZINSXIM 

ROBERT PASTOR 

& ' - *■ 

? 

SUBJECT: 

U.S. Policy to Argentina (S) 

Attached at Tab A is the report on Argentina, which I 

mentioned in a recent evening report item. After reading 

it, both Vance and Christopher were convinced that we 

should adopt a tougher approach to Argentina. From 

October - December 1977, we voted "no" on loanB to Argentina 

in the IFI1s. We changed our position to abstention in 

February 1978 and have kept it since then, hoping that 

would induce some improvement in the human rights situation. 

Such improvement has not occurred, and Vance and Christopher 

now believe that we should vote "no" on loans in the Ifl^s, 

"IOUby ULLD &ouAtrie6 td rollow our exarivbie; and assess 

wn^trier rurtner action in X-M and QPIC shouia oe raxenT""** (S) 

Assessment 

The report was prepared by INK—not HA— and it is a sobering 

document. The human rights situation in Argentina is the 

worst in the hemrspnere, and despite repeated promises 

rn oy tne Argentine government, it has not improved. 

Let me summarize the report: 

There are 2900 acknowledged political prisoners; 

probably another 500 who are believed to be terrorists are 

held by the military; and a smaller group is being "rehabilir 

tated." There is no effort underway to substantially reduce 

this number. (S) 

— "Physical and psychological torture apparently 

remain standard treatment.” The Red Cross estimated that 

90% of the political prisoners are tortured, and some are 

executed. (S) 

Disappearances — probably by security units — 

continued at a rate of about 55 per month during 1978. 

(Argentina's Interior Ministry claimed 40 per month; while 

—eRET- 

IGI1TAL CL ** R- Pastor----- 

DECL 2 HEW OflMaynh g, 1 OJA 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

CT ETivD 6 YZU3 '££_ 

NARA_E£____Date --------


A 

the Foreign Ministry admitted to 80 per month; Embassy 

estimates, 55.) Increasingly, the people who disappear 

have vague associations with the "political left" rather 

than with terrorists. Both international NGO's and 

Argentine human rights groups estimate that there have 

been about 15,000 disappearances in the past 3-4 years. (S) 

— Illegal invasion of the home — including theft 

by security units — remains as commonplace as fair public 

trials are infrequent. (S) 

The justification for official terrorism is tenuous, even 

using the Argentine government's statistics. Argentina’s 

Federal Security Service estimated that there were only 

about 400 active terrorists in Argentina in 1978, and even 

Videla has admitted that the war is over. INK concludes 

that the explanation fnr rnntirmed official terrorism is_ 

army politics. (S) 

Policy 

While I think the assessment is quite accurate, I draw 

different conclusions than State as to what policy we should 

adopt. I understand that Vance and Christopher approach 

the issue as a legal one: Argentina is unquestionably engaged 

in a systematic pattern of human rights violations, and the 

law requires that we vote "no” on non-basic human needs 

loans. (Laws on X-M and OPIC provide more flexibility.) The 

law only requires that we "oppose" such loams, and "opposition" 

has been interpreted to include abstention as well as negative 

votes so I believe we have some flexibility. (S) 

In deciding what approach to take, I believe we should address 

two questions: 

•• 

(1) What is the most effective approach to Argentina to 

encourage them to improve the human rights situation? (S) 

(2) What approach will permit us to sustain in the U.S. 

our overall human rights policy? When we take punitive steps 

toward Argentina, we not only enrage the right-wing ideologues, 

we also arouse the business sector and the media in the U.S. 

This doesn't mean that we shouldn't necessarily take such steps 

if we feel that it's required, but it does suggest that we 

should move carefully and explain ouit position to a wide-range 

audience before taking any steps, least we jeopardize our 

overall human rights policy. (S). 

An Effective Policy 

What is the most effective approach? Argentina is a big, proud 

and subtle country. We have an impact on Argentine government 

.SLECKST

SECRET* • 

No Objection To Declassification in *-ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-12-8 

decisions, but it's never as direct or as much as we want. 

This is the case of our human rights policy. (S) 


for three reasons: (1) our historical., reasonably close 

relationship; (2) the D.S. under Carter has the prestige and 

the morality which could contribute to*the idea that the 

Argentine military government is legitimate; and (3) such 

legitimacy would undermine the civilians and the democrats 

in Argentina and therefore strengthen and contribute to the 

institutionalization of the military government. The Argentine 

government has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer 

to the U.S.; (1) through lobbying and propaganda in the U.S., 

they have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights 

policy, and (2) they have taken "baby steps" in the human rights 

area at home. I think our cool and correct posture has been as 

effective as any policy could be. I think negative steps as 

State envisages would not be any more effective with Argentina, 

and it would cause us serious problems in the U.S. (S) 

In short, I would recommend that we maintain a cool and correct 

posture to Argentina, though we should continue to use every 

opportunity both directly and through third countries to encourage 

them to clean up their act. They will continue to try to lure 

high-level visitors, and we should resist that until progress is 

evident. (S) 

But even if you believe as Vance and Christopher dc, that we 

should take the negative steps outlined above, I would encourage 

delay. (S) 

One could argue that we have been waiting for 18 months; what 

will several more months do? Four new factors argue for waiting 

a bit longer: (1) The Argentine1'government has been paralyzed by 

the Beagle Channel conflict for the past eight months; now that 

it's quiet, they have the opportunity to move. (2) Several of 

Argentina's most hard-line Generalb have been transferred, and 

Videla and Viola are more secure than at any time before. 

(3) Argentina's Ambassador has just told Vaky that he thinks there 

is a good possibility of some progress on the human rights front 

over the next few months. And (4) the Inter-American Human Rights 

Commission is going there in Hay. We should wait and gear any 

new policy shifts to their report. That may mean a delay of six 

months or more. 


Vance has apparently decided to change our policy. I therefore 

recommend you call him and ask him to re-consider. ii He 

remains convinced, you may want to ask him to delay a decision 

pending the IAHRC report. 

Approve______ Disapprove

SSGRET- 


4 

cc: Jessica Mathews Views: 

Bob is right that our primary concern should be what will work with 

Argentina. Our policy of the past year (abstention) certainly hasn't 

worked, and I have little expectation that prolonging it will change 

anything, despite the fact that the Beagle Chanel dispute is over. On 

the other hand, a tougher posture probably won't work either. I suspect 

that in the near term nothingvj&^vork until and unless Videla gets 

much* more secure or there is a strong change in Argentine public opinion. 

However, there is one Important consideration missing here, namely the 

relationship of Argentina to the rest of our Human rights policy. As 

Bob points out, the situation in Argentina is the worst in the hemisphere 

and has even deteriorated in the past year (at least in relation to the 

terrorist threat if not in absolute numbers). While it is Impossible 

to compare events in say Argentina and Indonesia, ve do have to struggle 

to make the policy consistent insofar as we can, and by these standards 

there is a general consensus that we should be taking a firmer atand 

toward the GOA. 

If neither posture is likely to be much more successful vis-a-vis the 

GOA, ve should pick the one that is more consistent with the human rights 

policy — returning to the tougher "no" vote position.


'No Objection To ngrlggQifiratinn in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-90-3-6-6)

MEMORANDUM 

' No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-90-3-6-6 

iw*-1 • ' 

THE WHITE HCf USE 

WASHINGTON 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

MRS. CARTER 


Your Meeting with Argentine Nobel Peace 

Prize Winner (C) 

I understand that you will be meeting with Argentine Peace Prize 

winner Adolfo Perez Esquivel. In 1973, Perez Esquivel, a 

sculptor and Professor of Architecture, established the Ecumenical 

Movement of Peace and Justice, an organization of Catholics, 

Protestants and others opposed to violence by both right-wing and 

left-wing political forces in Argentina. „ In 1974, he became 

Secretary General of the Peace and Justice Service, a Buenos Airesbased 

network of human rights activists throughout Latin America. (C) 

He has been very complimentary of the President's human rights 

policy, and of our former Ambassador to Argentina, Raul Castro, but 

as the attached UPI report indicates, he said that he was "gravely 

concerned" about the human rights movement because of Reagan's 

election. The Argentine government is unhappy that he received the 

Nobel Peace Prize, and the government has suggested indirectly that 

he may have contributed to terrorism. Our Embassy is aware of no 

information that would substantiate the charge. Indeed, he is a 

strong advocate of Gandhian non-violence. (C) 

Perez Esquivel has also criticized military aid to the Junta in 

El Salvador, and there is some question about whether he cares as 

much about condemning left-wing terrorism as he does about government 

repression and right-wing terrorism. The President alluded 

indirectly to the point in his speech to the OAS on Wednesday, 

where he said:' (c) 

"The cause of human rights will be all the stronger if it 

remains at the service of humanity rather than at the 

service of ideological or partisan ends — and if it 

condemns both terrorism and repression." (U) 

I suggest you make the following points: 

— The President and I both wanted to personally congratulate 

you for being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. 

— As you know, the President has placed great emphasis on 

the importance of human rights for the U.S. and the world. Your 

award is symbolic of the importance which the entire world attaches 

to human rights today. (U) 


-mfmmr-' 

Mo OKiontinn To nanloecifinotinn in -nil 

* Ml f*-OA

’ No Objection To Declassification in =-ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-90-3-6-6 

. -z- 

— We believe very deeply that for the human rights movement 

to remain strong it must be credible and to do it has to be perceived 

as separate from ideological or partisan political groups. 

We must support a free and just political process but not a 

political crroup. We must seek balance in our compliments and in 

our criticism; we should condemn the terrorism of the left as 

strongly as the repression of the right. If we fail to maintain 

that balance, we will fall victim to one side or the other. And 

the cause of human rights will suffer. (U) 

— I have heard that you may visit El Salvador. As the President 

said, we have supported the Junta in its effort to implement 

fundamental reforms and to resist efforts by the right to restore 

an old tyranny and of the left to create a new one. We have tried 

to use our aid — both economic and non-lethal military aid — to 

encourage the Junta to curb human rights abuses. Bob Pastor is 

prepared to discuss the situation there at greater length if you 

so desire. (U} 

t 

. -mFffimt- 

Mr» Ohinotinn Tn nanlaccifinatinn in i— i ill 901 9/H9/04 ■ Ml f"‘_9/l_Qn_9_fi-R

No Objection To Declassification in 3art 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-2-6-7^' 

MEMORANDUM 

\

‘•ftEjgRBT 

No Objection To Declassification in ârt 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-2-6-7 

HE WHITE HOUSE 

WAS H ! IMG “ON 



SUBJECT: 





situation in Argentina, and I agree that it' is a sobering 

document. The human rights situation ir* Argentina may just 





to encourage them to respect human rights? . (S) 

(2} What approach will permit us to sustain in the U.S. 


Argentina, which are interpreted aB punitive, we not only 









impact on Argentine government decisions, but it's never 

as direct or as much as we want. This is -the case in our 

human rights policy. (S) ? 











SffGRE?— 


No Objection To Declassification in 3art 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81 -2-6-7 

.SEGRBTt 
















toward democratization. I believe that we should continue 



situation. They will continue to try to' lure high-level 

visitors but we should resist that urttil progress is evident. (5) 


punitive, would be to invite criticism from moderate and 







that this may mean six months to one year, but 1 think the 

wait is justified. (S) 





move to negative votes in the IFI1s or to cut back Export- 



and then adjust our policy appropriately'. (S) 

t 

■SECRET-* 

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Objection To Declassification in 3art 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-2-6-7 

1 

i 

NATIONAL SE.CURITY 

1I 

i** 

i 

NOTE TO: 

10 ENT1AL' flAIT 

Marc 

t 

ZBIGNIEV BRZEZIN 

i i 

I I 

t 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

JESSICA TDCHMAN 

Argentina and Human Rights Policy 

Bob's recommendation is that we delay a change 

in policy until after the-.TATIt,', —i report, 

and Indicates that the dei 

few 

months. In fact it will pi 

h longer. 

It took. 13 monthB after tbi 

Salvador 

to get out the final repor1 

ke at least 

as long to do the controve: 

e report. 

So we are talking about a ; 

until 

June 1980 at least. 

cc: 

Bob Pastor 

1 

< 

i 

■CnNFTUFWTTrtL 




FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZIN&KI 

ROBERT A. PASTO 

President's Request far Information on 

Letter from Videla 

Rick Inderfurth asked me to provide this information very quickly 

for you. I am working on the letters. but I expect that I will not 

be able to send them forward until I return from Panama — which 

will not be until late Thursday night because of very poor flight 

connections. 

A memorandum from you to die President is provided at Tab I. 

t 

CONFIDENTIAL - GDS 

> declassified 

, E.O.13526 

Authority ~~ ^—— 

NARA_£i:------Date —


UUIll IUL.I1I IttU 

MEMORANDl'M 


CONFIDENTIAL - CDS 

WASHINGTON 

INFORMATION 


THE PRESIDENT 

FROM: 

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZIN3KI 

SUBJECT: 

Your Question About the Letter from Videla to You 

The letter from President Videla of Argentina to you was dated October 11. 

1977, but it was received by Bob Pastor at approximately 5: 00 p.m. an 

October 18, 1977. Videla had asked the Embsisay to deliver the letter 

directly to the National Security Council for delivery to you, but we 

informed the State Department immediately of its contents. 

The letter referred to the case of the Deutsch family, which you raised 

in your discussion with President Videla. In the letter, Videla made 

several points: 

— First, that Daniel Deutsch and his family had fled Argentina 

illegally, and that they were active members of the Communist 

Revolutionary Party. (According to our files, Daniel Deutsch 

and his wife left Argentina legally and are currently in the U.S.) 

— That Daniel Deutsch1 s sister, Liliana, is also a member of the 

organization, and is in jail in Argentina. 

That their father, Alejandro Deutsch, Covered up for both of 

his children. 

a 

That for these reasons Alejandro and Liliana Deutsch are being 

held. 

And that the other three members of their family have been released. \ 

Videla closed the letter by reaffirming the friendship between die 

Argentine and American people and Baying that he would like to continue 

to have direct communication with you. We are incorporating a response 

to this letter within the context of a longer letter from you to President 

Videla which we are drafting referring to other important points in 

your conversation with him. 

CQMHBEHTIAL GET CONFIDENTIAL 

i 

t

No Objection To Declassification in --ull 2013/01/16 : NLC-24-73-6-2-6’ /0;‘ 

t 

fapcran S^'AaenA\ 

^ TUX' 

BUENOS AIRES, n de octubre de 1977 

Excelentlaimo Senor Presldente de los 

Estados Unid08 de America 

D. James E. CASTER 

WASHINGTON D.C. 

Estlmado Sezior Presidents: 

De acuerdo con lo que e&aigablemente convinifiramos 

durante nueBtra reunite en Washington, en el sen 

tldo de mantener canales de comunlcaclte dlrectos e 

informales, me place envlarle estas lineas motivadas 

en uno de los temas que abordlramos en nuestro encuentro. 

He reflero al caso de la famllla Deutsch. 

Casio conclusion de las lnvestlgaclones efectuadas 

por los organlsmos competentes, se ha podldo es 

tablecer que: 

- El Sr. Daniel Deutsch y su esposa, que abandonaron 

llegalmente nuestro pals, spa actlvoa mlembroa del Fax 

tldo Camunlsta Revoluclonario. ~ 

Su funclOn, dentro de la cltada organizaclte llegal 

era la de efectuar tareas de Informacldn e Intellgencla, 

vlnculadas a la actlvldad de los grupos terrorlstas 

que actdan en el pals. 

- Su hermana Liliana pertenece a la mlsma organlzacidn 

subversive, desempendndose ccftao activists en el flmbitfr 

estudiantil. 

- El Sr. Alejandro Deutsch, padre de los anterloreB, 

encubrid las actlvldades ilegales de sue hljos. 

- Por tales razones, tanto Alejandro como Liliana Deutsch 

se encuentran detenidos a los efectos de ser sometidos, 

prdxlmamente, a los Tribunales Hilltares competentes. 

//.


\ 

2- 

/// 

- En cuanto a la senora de Alejandro Deutsch y sue hljaa 

Elea y Sueana Silvia, ban sldo puestas an liber" 

tad al conetatarse qua no tenlan conocimlento ni 

vinculaeidn alguna con las actlvidadea llegales del 

reeto de la familia, 

Qulero t al presenter a V.E. mi mfia afectuoso sa 

ludo, asegurarle el profundo y cordial InterSa con que 

aconpafio au actuacldn y, una vez mis, reafirmar la frater 

na ami a tad de los argentinoa por el pueblo de loa Eatadoa 

Unidoa de America. 

\

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 

Weekly Report - March ir, ivn 

NLC-24-69-1-4-4 

* J 

Reporting Items (Pastor) 

Human Rights 

Guatemala and £1 Salvador have followed the path blazed by Brazil, 

Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile in renouncing U.S . foreign military 

assistance because of the way in which aid was tied to human rights. 

Peru's Prime Minister also said that a country's (i.e., the U.S .) policy 

on human rights should not interfere in the internal affairs of another 

country. 

Chile has also tried to spread rumors of an impending conference 

among military regimes to coordinate a response to the U.S., but her 

efforts have been resisted, particularly by Argentina, because (I think) 

the governments are waiting for additional indications of the direction 

of U.S. policy. 

Panama 

Our initial strategy to hold the question of the termination date of a 

treaty in suspension while we explore Panama's position on neutrality 

and post-treaty defense arrangements has apparently failed. The 

President's reference on March 6 to the year 2000 as the date after 

which we will be concerned with the Canal's neutrality was.taken by 

the Panamanians as an indication that the only issue worth focusing 

on is neutrality, and we have been thrown on the defensive. 

Torrijos was ill this past week, but yesterday told an Italian newspaper 

that he wanted the United Nations to control the waterway. Unless he 

accepts a special role for the U.S. within this guarantee-system, we 

are back to the beginning. 

t 

Negotiations promise to be difficult in the months ahead unless we can 

convice Perez and Lopez MichelBen to get Torrijos to accept our requirements 

on neutrality. 

Cuba 

A Presidential Directive was sent out on Cuba on March 15 directing 

the State Department to begin direct and confidential talkB with Cuban 

officials . Such direct talks began on March 10 in New York to Bet a 

time, place, and agenda for talks. 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13S26 . 

Authority 

MARA £Jr nwta l\°\V\to-------- 

t

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 • NLC-24-69-1-4-4 

-SECRET 

Early Warning Signals (Pastor) 

Panama 

The Negotiators are planning to make a trip to Venezuela and Colombia 

next week to discuss the status of the negotiations with the two Presidents. 

Those visits , coupled with erroneous press reports of the testimony of 

Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz before the House Merchant Marine and 

Fisheries Committee, may conceivably evoke a negative reaction in 

Panama. Public opinion there might interpret the visits as an attempt 

to pressure Panama to accept a Treaty permitting us some form of 

perpetual rights on neutrality — not an inaccurate interpretation. 

Cuba 

The Cuban community in Miami is likely to begin heating up with the 

increase in press reports andrumors about U.S .-Cuban discussions. 

Terrorism in any form should be met with an immediate and sharp 

Presidential response. Otherwise, the terrorists will succeed in 

frightening all those Cubans (and there are great numbers), who 

believe there is a need for a new U.S. policy. 

t


Critical Observation and Recommendation (Pastor) 

Public Diplomacy 

To an extent that few people would ever believe, the U.S. has been 

conducting its diplomacy publicly. There is relatively little that 

an astute reader of the best newspapers in the U.S. does not know — 

that I do — about the current state of negotiations on Panama and Cuba, 

for example. And the rest will probably be in the newspapers in a 

matter of days or weeks . 

I personally think that this new development is a good one and clearly 

in line with President Carter's objective of greater openness (though 

not in line with his objective of restricted confidentiality on some 

issues) . But I do not believe that we have thought through the 

implications of public diplomacy or its difficulties . For example, 

on those relatively difficult negotiations like Panama and Cuba 

where you are dealing with two constituencies who are headed in 

diametrically opposite directions, a public statement in one's own 

country may set back negotiations with the other. I am not sure there 

is any easy way to cope with this problem. Certainly, I do not 

believe that an attempt to keep better control of secrets will work, 

but the entire question of how public diplomacy related to private 

negotiations, and whether secrecy is irrelevant is something which 

should be explored at greater depth. 

Human Rights 

The new Administration has succeeded in credibly projecting a concern 

for human rights abroad which is at least as sturdy as that of Congress. 

There is no question that the American people feel better about U.S. 

foreign policy than in any recent period. 

Therefore, the time has come to begin a second phase in our human 

rights policy — this one focused on alleviating the repression abroad. 

We must begin, of course, by realizing that the U.S . cannot determine 

events in less developed countries, but we can influence the debate 

between moderates and hard-liners in different governments. The 

question is: how? And I have.been tasking the bureaucracy on this 

question with no success . 

Part of the reason for the lack of success is the difficulty of the question. 

Another part may be that I am very skeptical? when the bureaucracy says 

we cannot do anything. The first step, I believe in getting good answers 

to the question is in choosing new Ambassadors who share our objectives. 

But in the meantime, we should re-focus our approach to this issue from 

projecting our own interest to weighting the debate in foreign governments.

No Objection To Declassification in i-ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-69-1-4-4 

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 

Key Foreign Reactions (Pastor) 

Venezuela 

Venezuelan President Perez praised the President in his March 11 

annual address to the Congress. Specific references in the three-hour 

presentation included: 

reference to the President's February 2'i letter as a "categorical" 

refutation of the assertions in the New York Times of CIA payments, 

and indicative of the President's "noble moral stature"; 

a description in glowing terms of the "tremendous progress" 

being made in the Panama Canal negotiations and of the President's 

emphasis on the global observance of human rights and effort 

to bring a halt to nuclear proliferation. 

The praise reflects the extent to which Administration initiatives have 

struck a responsive chord with Perez. The Venezuelan leader not only 

refrained from criticizing us, an action always popular in nationalistic 

Venezuela, but showed himself willing to take international flak — Brazil 

reportedly has already postponed a May Foreign Minister visit over his 

nuclear proliferation remark — in order to identify ideologically with 

specific policies of the Administration. 

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

No Objection To Declassification in ?-ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-68-6-6-8 

'CONFIDENTIAL' 


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 


DATE: Monday, March 7, 1977 

PLACE: 

PARTICIPANTS: 

Organization of American States 

Washington, D. C. 

Secretary General Alejandro Orfila 

L. Ronald Scheman, Sub-Secretary for 

Management 

John Ford, Special Assistant to the 

Secretary General 

Robert A. Pastor, ^NSC Staff 

U .S, Policy on Human Rights 

Secretary General Orfila told me that he had recently returned from a 

trip to tli- Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, 

and he explained to them that they were dealing with a new kind of 

Administration in Washington. He told them that the Carter Administration 

would unquestionably demonstrate a concern for human rights that was 

not evident in the previous Republican Administrations. And Orfila 

warned them that they had better be prepared for this change. All 

three governments were rather slaw to adjust, but they have come to 

understand its importance. 

Uruguay, however, does not quite understand why the U.S . currently 

attacks it for human rights violations while several years ago it encouraged 

the Uruguayans to suppress all forms of subversion. They are particularly 

confused because the human rights situation in their country has 

definitely improved in the last year. *■ 

In Argentina, there is a fascinating debate between the moderates and 

the hard-liners, and the question which Orfila feels we should address 

is: how can we strengthen the hands of the moderates? not, how do 

we drive the Argentine Government to the wall? He believes that we 

should be careful not to put.the government on the defensive least we 

strengthen the hard-liners . The result would be even worse violations 

of human rights . 

mNFTDFiNTT AT 

i


CONFIDENTIAL 

-2- 

f 

Orfila said that he was concerned that the United States policy on human 

rights may get so heavy-handed that it would strengthen the hard-liners 

and lead to an alliance among the military governments. He said he feared 

that Latin America would be divided in half with the Southern Cone countries 

on one side, and Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and Costa Rica on the other. 

He himself had encouraged Argentine officials to make special efforts to 

establish good relations with Venezuela and Mexico, and apparently the 

Government of Argentina accepted his recommendation and will be sending 

Hector Campora as its Ambassador to Mexico. 

I asked whether the division between a repressive Latin America and a 

democratic Latin America would necessarily be a bad thing. It seems to 

me that it might introduce a constructive tension whereby the military 

governments would be encouraged to join the ranks of several of the more 

democratic governments. It would also provide an opportunity to deal 

with real issues rather than to maintain an artificial facade of Latin 

American unity. We both agreed that "Latin America" was a myth, and 

that the discussion of substantive issues in which the U.S . and Latin 

America were always on opposite sides of every issue was not constructive. 

Orfila said that the U .S. would increase its credibility if we were more 

evenhanded. For example, when the Congress held hearings on human 

rights violations in Argentina, he encouraged Congressman Fraser to 

hear from people from both sides, but instead the hearings were very 

one-aided. 

Belize 

On his most recent trip to Central America, Orfila met with officials in 

the Guatemalan Government as well as in the Mexican Government about 

the issue of the future status of Belize. Mexico urged him to get involved 

in the issue. Guatemala said that it would be willing to accept only twothirds 

of the southern province of Belize, which amounted to about onefifth 

of all of Belize. This represents a considerable compromise on 

Guatemala's part, since the country has been demanding total annexation 

of Belize. Orfila will be going to Great Britsyln on April 4, to negotiate 

with Ted Rowlands, Secretary of State for External Affairs, an this issue. 

He will try to convince Rowlands to convince Prime Minister Price of Belize 

to accept the Guatemalan offer. He thinks that if the United States mentioned 

to Great Britain its interest in Orfila's effort that Great Britain would be 

moved to persuade Prime Minister Price, (Comment? This is a particularly 

important issue only because if it is not solved in the next year, it could 

conceivably lead to war between Guatemala and Belize. It would most 

definitely lead to a very significant split between the Caribbean countries 

which support Belize, and the Latin American countries which support 

Guatemala.) 

CONFfDENTTXi:

• ■ 


CONFIDENTIAL— -3- 

| --—------- ■ - ' 

I 

El Salvador 

The Secretary General was very pleased with Ids success in getting the 

President of El Salvador to sign the mediation agreement with Honduras. 

The border has been closed since 1969, and the economies of both countries 

have suffered greatly as a result. He is hopeful that the appointment of 

a Moderator will lead to a more lasting peace between the two countries. 

lasting 

OAS 

Orfila was very frank in his assessment of the almost hopelessness of the 

present OAS . He said he had tried to bring the staff level down to a mangeable 

one, but that he couldn't fire anyone. When he tried, everybody 

ganged up on him, and the U.S . remained silent. The Permanent Council 

of Ambassadors to the OAS was also, in his opinion, a hopeless body. In 

fact, he called it "a joke." 

"I need your help to change this place," Orfila sai4> Orfila would like 

to see the OAS concentrate on peacekeeping, lyiman rights, and political 

issues. He thinkB it would be desirable for the OAS to get out of the 

economic and social field. He blamed the United States for the massive 

structure that had been built up since the early years of the Alliance. 

In 1961, there were only 300 staff people in the OAS; there are presently 

1,500. He would like to cut the staff down to only the Secretariat, and 

deal only with those issues which it could do well. He would like to do 

away with the Permanent Council, and only have Latin American Ambassadors 

to the U.S . attend occasional meetings. (Scheman later called me and 

said that the Assistant Secretary of State would be the appropriate U.S. 

delegate to these occasional sessions, rather than a Special Ambassador 

to the OAS .) 

Orfila expressed his frustration at trying to do these kinds of reforms 

without any support. If only the United States gave him support, he said, 

he could assure us a majority of the delegates and fundamental reforms 

in staffing, in the organization of the OAS, and in the issues that it 

addresses could then be taken. A good example he used was the designation 

of Grenada as the site of the June General Assembly meeting. The Grenadan 

Ambassador to the OAS forced the issue at the last “OAS meeting in Santiago, 

and no one raised any objections. The Peruvians seconded the motion, 

and that was it. Grenada was the site. 

CONFIDENT! Air 

i 

i 

l 

*- 

V 

I 

I 

•1

No Objection To Declassification in hull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-68-6-6-8 

fDNEIDBNTIAI -4r 

(Comment: Orfila's remarks were very encouraging, particularly on the 

structural reforms necessary to make the OAS into a body worth paying 

attention to. The real source of the OAS's problems right now is the state 

of international politics in the hemisphere. Ajt Latin America's insistence, 

the U.S . has retreated from its predominant position in the OAS , but the 

Latin Americans themselves have been reluctant to take any initiative in 

this regional forum . Any international leadership on the part of the Latin 

Americans has been in global fora like C1EC, as well as at UNCTAD in the 

United Nations. The result is that the OAS is rudderless, and the quality 

of representation there is one indication of the low importance which 

countries attach to it. 

The image of the OAS as a bureaucratic morass is no help. So Orfila's 

attempt to prune the OAS, cut its staff and its tasks, would be a very 

healthy Bign, and we should definitely encourage such a move and support 

his efforts. 

Orfila's efforts in the El-Salvador-Honduras and in the Belize disputes 

represents one path that the OAS could constructively travel. Indeed, 

no one else can really play that kind of role in the hemisphere at this 

time except the OAS Secretary General, and we are fortunate that Orfila 

is both energetic and intelligent. We should encourage his efforts in 

the peacekeeping field, and encourage the OAS's'efforts in human rights. 

We should also encourage the OAS to leave ttfe economic and social 

fields to other institutions which can do those tasks much better.)



* 

June 23, 1977 

TO: 

THE SITUATION ROOM 

FROM: 

NORTH-SOUTH 

Attached is this Section's submission 

jfor the President's Weekly Report. 

POSREVIEWED Q7-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASETnTOlQ 

I 

* 

» 

~r 

i 

t . 

* 

fcfe-srjisir-iu 

£JASiA_j££_...?^%.„3iahk______ 

No Objection To Declassification in Foil 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-9-3 

1f


—CONFIDED1 AT, 

t 

Alert Items (Pastor) 

Belize. President Laugerud Garcia of Guatemala reportedly has 

hardened his position with respect to how much Belizean territory 

is necessary for any settlement with the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, 

border tensions have intensified. The Guatemalan Government is 

conducting military exercises involving personnel and aircriit in 

the Peten District! and British troops have gone on alert. 

Although this development probably should be interpreted as a 

case of sabre rattling, the possibility exists that the so-called 

"exercises" may be a smoke screen to cover preparations for some 

sort of actual military operation against Belize. UK and Guatemalan 

representatives will be meeting in Washington on July 6 and 7. 

Venezuela. The Perez State Visit is scheduled for June 28-Z9. The 

Venezuelan President is prepared to discuss human rights, nonproliferation, 

energy, the Caribbean, Belize / Cuba, the OAS, North- 

South relations, conserv&tion^nultinational corporations and illicit 

payments . Additionally, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister has 

informed our Embassy in Caracas that Perez or someone in his 

party will wish also to bring up agriculture and food, cooperation 

in cancer research, experimental drugs, and Puerto Rican control 

of its "patrimonial sea." 

wl * 

CONFIDENTIAL 



•CQNEIDKNfTraL 

Recent Developments (Pastor/Trachtenberg) 

OASGA. The issue of human rights dominated the seventh OAS General 

Assembly from the opening speech to the las/ rebuttal. Brazil, Argentina, 

Paraguay, Chile, Guatemala and £1 Salvador opposed the human rights 

position, with Uruguay far out in front as a harsh critic of U.S. politicization 

of the IAHRC. Thanks largely to Mrs. Carter's trip, Ecuador 

and Peru lined up alongside traditional human rights supporters like 

Costa Rica and Venezuela. These countries, joined by the U.S ., formed 

the core of a group which defended a strong resolution commending the 

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for its work and recommending 

that the OAS allocate greater resources to the Commission. 

Ultimately, four human rights resolutions were approved. The key 

victory involved the resolution to ratify the Inter-American Human 

Rights Convention3which eventually passed with key additional support 

from Peru, Ecuador, and Haiti. The efforts of Argentina and Chile 

to persuade the General Assembly to call for "reform" of the commission 

to meet the challenge of terrorism were defeated. Venezuela, which 

emphasized that human rights have been violated for centuries by 

nations who use terrorism as their justification, played the leading 

role through the entire conference. 

Panama Canal Treaty. The negotiations for*a new treaty' broke 

down briefly this week. General Omar Torrijos called his negotiators 

home because he felt the U.S. delegation displayed too little flexibility. 

Talks resumed June 23. Torrijos reportedly instructed his negotiators 

last weekend to remain firm on the question of compensation by the 

U.S . for use of military bases in the Canal Zone and on the issue of 

Panama's freedom to select its own representatives to the Canal 

entity's governing council. 

Hopes persist that we will have a Treaty by this summer. 

CONFIDENTIAL 

t 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-9-3....


■CONPIDEN-T-fcAfc-" 2 

Sit-in at EGLA Headquarters in Chile. The group of 24 women and 

two men who began a sit-in at headquarters of UN ECLA in Santiago on 

June 14, and whose demands included (1) the disclosure of information 

as to list of "disappeared" Chileans, and (2) the entry into Chile of 

a special UN representative, peacefully evacuated the building at noon 

today. 

t 

Upon learning of the incident, UN Secretary General Waldheim had 

cabled President Pinchet asking that reassuraVices be given as to 

the fate of the detainees and Btating that - an unconditional agreement 

to receive a visit from the Ad Hoc Working Group on Human Rights in 

Chile would be a constructive move. Although die U.S . had indicated 

its hope that Pinochet would be as responsive as possible to Waldheim's 

request, the Chilean President initially had described the UN effort as 

an "interference." 

Eventually, however, the Chilean Government agreed to "forgive" the 

demonstrators and provided the Secretary General with what information 

it could find about the cases of the relatives of the persons occupying 

the ECLA building. In addition, the Chileans have invited the Secretary 

General himself to visit Chile. 

< 

CONFIDENTIAL 

N_? Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-9-3 

t


SIT-IN AT ECI.A HF.ADQUAnTEKS IN CHILE 

On June 14, a group off 24 women and two men represcntlng 

families of individuals^dcLaincd by Chilean 

authorities began a oit-in at the headquarters of the 

UN's Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) 

in Santiago, Chile. The whereabouts of the detainees 

— . —fj, a 

- >r%Cv .tfTHig J 

is unkpownônd~£h«r’dcmonaLraLorB arc demandings 

(1) information on the welfare and whereabouts 

of a list of individuals who have disappeared, 

(2) entry into Chile of a special representative 

of the UN Secretary Ccncral, and (3) assurances of 

their own enfety. 

Upon learning of the demonstrat Ion, Secretary 

Ccncral Waldheim sent a cable to Chilean President 

Pinochet asking that reassurances be given as to the 

fate of the detainees. He also stated that an 

GSfrOsntAJr • 

unconditional qûment to roccivo a visit from the 

Ad-Hoc Working Group on Human Eights in Chile would be 

a constructive move. 

In response to a request for support from Waldheim, 

our Embassy in- Santiago toJ.d the Chief of Staff of the 

Presidency that we hoped that Pinochet's response to 

the Secretary General would be as forthcoming as 

possible and that it would be considered in the context 

of our recently initiated dialogue with the Chilean' 

Government 

Pinochet's- initial reaction, as viewed by our 

« 


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- 2 - 

Charge' in Santiago, was to describe tho Waldheim 

f 

initiative as "interfcrence". Latent reports indicate, 

however, that the Chileans have agreed to "forgive" 

the dcmonatrolora and provide Waldheim with what information 

it can find about specific eases of relatives of 

the demonstrators. In addition, the Chileans have 

issued an invitation to the Secretary General, himselft 

to visit Chile. Waldheim is considering sending.an 

emissary to Chile, and the Chileans seem receptive — 

on the condition that the frame of reference for the 

visit be broadened so that not only the fate of tho- 

missing Chilcann would ba discussed, but other human 

rights conditions as well. 1 

rt«.s t* &y°- ^ /7o0/v 



' Weexiy Keport - March U, 1977. 

Reporting Items (Pastor) 

Olu i \ 

Human Rights DOS REVIEWED 07-Jun-2010: D£CLASSTfTeD f6r"RELEASE l\ FULL. 

Guatemala and El Salvador have followed the path blazed by Brazil, 

Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile in renouncing U.S . foreign military 

assistance because of the way in which aid was tied to human rights. 

Peru's Prime Minister also said that a country's (i.e. , the U.S .) policy 

on human rights should not interfere in the internal affairs of another 

country. * 

Chile has also tried to spread rumors of an impending conference 

among military regimes to coordinate a response to the U.S ., but her 

efforts have been resisted, particularly by Argentina, because (I think) 

the governments are waiting for additional indications of the direction 

of U.S. policy. 

Panama 

Our initial strategy to hold the question of the termination date of a 

treaty in suspension while we explore Panama's position on neutrality 

and post-treaty defense arrangements has apparently failed. The 

President's reference on March 6 to the year 2000 as the date after 

which we will be concerned with the Canal's neutrality was taken by 

the Panamanians as an indication that the only issue worth focusing 

on is neutrality, and we have been thrown on the defensive. 

Torrijos was ill this past week, but yesterday told an Italian newspaper 

that he wanted the United Nations to control the waterway . Unless he 

accepts a special role for the U.S . within this guarantee-system, we 

are back to the beginning. 

a 

Negotiations promise to be difficult in the months ahead unless we can 

convice Peres and Lopez Michelsen to get Torrijos to accept our requirements 

on neutrality. 

Cuba 

A Presidential Directive was sent out on Cuba on March 15 directing 

the State Department to begin direct and confidential talks with Cuban 

officials. Such direct talks began on March 10 in New York to set a 

time, place, and agenda for talks , 

M L.C- *a‘4-(#"7-e)-3-4V 

ftPP.RFT'- 



Early Warning Signals (Pastor) 

Panama 

The Negotiators are planning to make a trip to Venezuela and Colombia 

next week to discuss the status of the negotiations with the two Presidents, 

Those visits, coupled with erroneous press reports of the testimony of 

Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz before the House Merchant Marine and 

Fisheries Committee, may conceivably evoke a negative reaction in 

Panama. Public opinion there might interpret the visits as an attempt 

to pressure Panama to accept a Treaty permitting us some form of 

perpetual rights on neutrality — not an inaccurate interpretation. 

Cuba 

I 

The Cuban community in Miami is likely to begin heating up with the 

increase in press reports andrumors about U.S .-Cuban discussions. 

Terrorism in any form should be met with an immediate and sharp 

Presidential response. Otherwise, the terrorists will succeed in 

frightening all those Cubans (and there are great numbers), who 

believe there is a need for a new U.S . policy. 

t 



Critical Observation and Recommendation 

Public Diplomacy 

(Pastor) 

» 

To an extent that few people would ever believe, the U.S . has been 

conducting its diplomacy publicly. There is relatively little that 

an astute reader of the best newspapers in the U.S . does not know — 

that I do — about the current state of negotiations on Panama and Cuba, 

for example. And the rest will probably be in the newspapers in a 

matter of days or weeks . 

I personally think that this new development is a good one and clearly 

in line with President Carter's objective of greater openness (though 

not in line with his objective of restricted confidentiality on some 

issues) . But I do not believe that we have thought through the 

implications of public diplomacy or its difficulties . For example, 

on those relatively difficult negotiations like Panama and Cuba 

where you are dealing with two constituencies who are headed in 

diametrically opposite directions, a public statement in one's own 

country may set back negotiations with the other. 1 am not sure there 

is any easy way to cope with this problem. Certainly, I do not 

believe that an attempt to keep better controltf secrets will work, 

but the entire question of how public diplomacy relates to private 

negotiations, and whether secrecy is irrelevant is something which 

should be explored at greater depth. 

Human Rights 

The new Administration has succeeded in credibly projecting a concern 

for human rights abroad which is at least as sturdy as that of Congress. 

There is no question that the American people feel better about U.S. 

foreign policy than in any recent period. 

^ 

Therefore, the time has come to begin a second phase in our human 

rights policy — this one focused on alleviating the repression abroad. 

We must begin, of course, by realising that the U.S . cannot determine 

events in less developed countries, but we can influence the debate 

between moderates and hard-liners in different governments. The 

question is: how? And I have been tasking the bureaucracy on this 

question with no success . 

f 

Part of the reason for the lack of success is the difficulty of the question. 

Another part may be that I am very skeptical when the bureaucracy says 

we cannot do anything. The first step, I believe in getting good answers 

to the question is in choosing new Ambassadors who share our objectives. 

But in the meantime, we should re-focus our approach to this issue from 

projecting our own interest to weighting the debate in foreign governments. 




Key Foreign Reactions (Pastor) 

Venezuela 

t 

Venezuelan President Perez praised the Presi dent in his March 11 

annual address to the Congress. Specific references in the three-hour 

presentation included: 

reference to the President's February 22 letter as a "categorical" 

refutation of the assertions in the New York Times of CIA payments, 

and indicative of the President's "noble moral stature"; 

a description in glowing terms of the "tremendous progress" 

being made in the Panama Canal negotiations and of the President's 

emphasis on the global observance of human rights and effort 

to bring a halt to nuclear proliferation. 

The praise reflects the extent to which Administration initiatives have 

Btruck a responsive chord with Perez . The Venezuelan leader not only 

refrained from criticizing us, an action always popular in nationalistic 

Venezuela, but showed himself willing to take international flak — Brazil 

reportedly has already postponed a May Foreign Minister visit over his 

nuclear proliferation remark — in order to identify ideologically with 

specific policies of the Administration. * 




MEMORANDUM 


X 




FROM: JESSICA TUCHMAN ’ 

ROBERT PASTOR^,- 

SUBJECT: 

Nuclear Talks in Brazil and Argentina 

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from State laying out a proposed strategy 

for nuclear proliferation talks with Brazil and Argentina during Secretary 

Vance's forthcoming trip. It arrived after Nye ai^d Smith had already 

arrived in Argentina for preparatory talks, f 

The memo says little about Argentina—only that we will seek a decision to 

ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco, but may have to settle only for a declaration 

of intent to ratify (judging from recent intelligence reports, we may not even 

get that much). 

With regard to Brazil, State believes that time is on our side (growing 

Brazilian dissatisfaction with the German deal; the next Brazilian President 

seems to be more flexible on this issue; and increasing French pressure on 

Pakistan) and that "Geisel is likely to reject cut of hand any package of 

proposals we present at this time". State concludes therefore that we should 

not present our proposal on the FRG/Brazil agreement and instead confine 

these discussions to a general discussion of the "hemispheric security 

problem". 

We believe that this is a mistake. Since the Brazilians know that we have 

already presented the proposal to the Germans, and since the President's 

letter to Geisel made reference to Smith's presenting the details on this trip, 

the Brazilians might be understandably offended if, after inviting Smith at 

Carter's request, they find he has little to tal& about. 

We also believe that the proposal should be sweetened by the addition of a 

proposal for joint US-Brazil cooperation in non-nuclear energy R&D projects. 

This is the proposal you approved in Pastor's recent memo. 


That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I. 

SECRET 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority ^ ~~ 3>vA-L»~l-M-2> -*4 

NAHA £•?=• 

Data

No Oojection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-2-4-5 


(Entire text) 

BILATERAL PAPER» 

DOS REVIEWED 08 Jun 2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL: 

............... . “ARGENTINA ' 



The Secretary 




II. INTRODUCTION 

Argentina was helpful in the OAS vote on the ^ 

Nicaraguan resolution. The GOA wants a high-level 

bilateral exchange with ub during the course of the 





public action to bolster President Videla's and General 

viola's prestige and authority. 

III. ISSUES 

t 




have been 13 unaccounted-for disappearances since February 1 





persons. Legal efforts to force the Government to show 

cause for holding alleged subversives have not been 

successful. 


-- We are pleased with moves to curb disappearances, 







DECLASSIFIED 


'■ No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-2-4-5 

- 2 - 



continued detention of Jacobo Timerman, 


— We hope to see greater numbers of prisoners 








Point to be Hade 





« 



Point to be Hade 



both will continue to work with ‘the Vatican. 

t 






be a condition, but Canada is 'unwilling to require 



safeguards requirements, effective in Harch 1980, 

needed for us to continue nuclear cooperation. We 


• 

Point to be Hade (If raised) 

— We want to cooperate with Argentina in the 




August 1979 

■CONFIDENTiftE-- 

t 

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No Objection To Declassification in rull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-1- 

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UGS~REViEWED'08-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 

884 *»**»*■*■(»■ qntidbndia L***»***E COPY 

OP IMM.ED /ROUTINE 

UE RUEHC #2082 2262315 

0 R 142220Z AUG 79 

EM SECSTATE WASHDC 

TO AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 0000 

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 0000 

AMEMBASSY MANAGUA IMMEDIATE 0000 

INFO ALL AMERICAN REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC FOST.S 

XMT AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 

T 

AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 

AMEMBASSY QUITO 

■CONFIDENTIAL STATE 212082 

EXDIS 

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/10/85 (VARY, 7IRON ?.) 

GOV , PINT, PORS, PARM, XK, XM, AR 

THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER 

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT 

SUMMARY: SECRETARY VANCE HAD EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE 

OF VIEWS WITH FONMIN PASTOR IN QUITO. PASTOR EXPRESSED 

CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN NICARAGUA AND THE "DANGEROUS 

CENTRAL AMERICAN SITUATION. HE SAID TBAT ARGENTINA 

HOPES TO PROCEED TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN NEAR tFUTURE BUT 

NOT UNTIL IT GETS ITS HOUSE IN ORDER. HE APPEALED FOR 

BETTER TIES WITH USG AND ASKED THAT ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 

NOT 3F SOLE CRITEHIA IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. SECRETARY 

VANCE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR ARGENTINA'S VOTE IN 

OAS ON NICARAGUA, AND NOTED THAT U.S. VALUES HIGHLY 

ITS FRIENDSHIP WITH ARGENTINA AND CONSIDERS IT A 

FRIEND — AN ALLY. HE CHARACTERIZED HUMAN RIGHTS 

PROBLEM A "FESTERING SORE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. ON 

NICARAGUA, SECRETARY VANCE STRESSED NEED TO PUSH NEW 

GOVERNMENT INTO DIRECTION OF BEING IND .PENDENT, UNALIGNED 

COUNTRY. WITH RESPECT TO CENTRAL AMERICA, HE POINTED 

3 

ii 

*************** *^4 SR CO MENT *************** 

DEN 

FOB :PASTOR,BLOOM,COCH 

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"0 NEED TOE COLLECTIVE HEMISHPERIC EFFORT TO PERSUADE 

THESE COUNTRIES TO MOVE IN A RESPONSIBLE VAT. TURNING 

TO THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, THE SECRETARY PRESSED PASTOR HARD 

ON THE URGENCY OF ARGENTINA RATIFYING TREATY OF 

TLATELOLCO AS PRESIDENT VIDELA HAD ASSURED PRESIDENT 

CARTER WOULD BE THE CASE, PASTOR RESPONDED THAT 

TLATELOLCO WOULD BE RATIFIED AFTER GOA COMPLETES 

ARRANGEMENTS FOR PURCHASE OF HEAVY WATFR PLANT AND 

"FEW OTHER STEPS." END SUMMARY. 

3. DURING RECEPTION AT NATIONAL PALACE IN QUITO AUGUST 

10, SECRETARY VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

VAKY AND MR. PASTOR OF NSC (WITH DCM FIMBRES AS NOTETAKER) 

HAD AN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH ARGENTINE FOREIGN 

MINISTER PASTOR. FULL TEXT OF MEMORANDUM OF "CONVERSATION 

OF THAT MEETING FOLLOWS: 

t 

CENTRAL AMERICA 

THE SECRETARY ASKED HOW THE GOA &Ai TFE CENTRAL 

AMERICAN SITUATION AND WHAT STEPS THE FOREIGN MINISTER 

BELIEVED SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THIS AREA. 

IN RESPONSE, THE FOREIGN MINISTER GAVE AN HISTORIC 

SKETCH OF THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM, BEGINNING WITH ITS 

BIRTH IN 1917 AND ITS EXTENSION TO CHINA AND EASTERN 

EUROPE. HE ASSERTED COMMUNISM HAD REACHED NICARAGUA 

AND NOW THREATENED SALVADOR AND GUATEMALA. HE 

CHARACTERIZED THE CENTHAL AMERICAN SITUATION AS VERY 

DANGEROUS. HE BELIEVED THE NEW NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT 

IS UNDER SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM CUBA TC LAY LOW AND 

TO SEEK AS MUCH HELP AS POSSIBLE FROM AN ARRAY OF SOURCES. 

AS NICARAGUA RECOVERS ON THE BASIS OF THIS ASSISTANCE 

IT WILL BECOME A SEVERE MENACE TO ITS NEIGHBORS. AGAIN, 

BROADENING HIS PERSPECTIVE, HE SAID THAT ARGENTINA IS 

AWARE THAT IN COLOMBIA, FOR EXAMPLE, TERRORISM IS BOILING 

UNDER A CALM SURFACE. THERE ARE ALSO SIGNS OF GREAT 

INSTABILITY IN BOLIVIA, AS WELL AS IN PERI*. 

IN SYNTHESIS, A RED STAIN IS SPREADING OVER A LARGE 

NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, AND A GREATER NUMBER OF COUNTRIES 

ARE "INTENSE PINK". HE CONTINUED THAT ARGENTINA KNOWS 

THE PROBLEM BETTER THAN OTHERS BECAUSE OF ITS INTERNAL 

STRUGGLE. THE GOA KNOWS THE TECHNIQUES THAT COMMUNISTS 

USE IN SUBVERTING GOVERNMENTS. TO COUNTER COMMUNISM 

ARGENTINA IS TAKING STEPS IN AREAS SUCH AS THE 

UNIVERSITIES AND IS REVAMPING ITS ECONOMY. THE GOA 

HOPES IN THE NEAR FUTURE TC PROCEED ALONG THE DEMOCRATIC 

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PATH HUT NOT UNTIL IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE iPROBLEMS THAT 

BEFELL PERON WILL NOT REVISIT THE COUNTRY. 

HE MAINTAINED THAT THE CRUCIAL QUESTION IS THAT 

THE SOUTHERN CONE COUNTRIES RECOGNIZE THE U.S. AS THE 

LEADER OF THE WEST. ARGENTINA, ESPECIALLY, HAS A SIMILAR 

CONSTITUTION TO THAT OF THE U.S. AND WANTS TO BE TREATED 

AS AN ALLY. THE GOA DOES NOT WANT THE ONLY THING TO 

MATTER IN BILATERAL RELATIONS TO 3E THE ISSUE OF HUMAN 

RIGHTS. IN ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS 

DONE EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER: FOR EXAMPLE, IT HAS INVITED 

A VISIT BY THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. 

IF THIS COMMISSION APPLIES OBJECTIVE CRITERIA, IT WILL 

SEE MARKED PROGRESS IN THE COUNTRY AND THAT THE TREND 

IS ONE OF IMPROVEMENT. THIS MATTER OF HUMAN HIGHTS 

SHOULD BE PUT IN PERSPECTIVE AND SHOULD NOT BE INTERPOSED 

AS A BARRIER BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. 

ARGENTINA RECENTLY SUPPORTED THE U.S. IN THE OAS 

AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. ALTHOUGH THE VIEWS OF 

ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE AND URUGUAY DO NOT COMPLETELY 

COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF THE U.S., THESE COUNTRIES ARE 

THE U.S.' TRUE ALLIES IN THE HEMISPHERE, fAFTER THE 

U.S., THE FOUR MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRIES ARE MEXICO, 

BRAZIL, VENEZUELA AND ARGENTINA. IF THIS GROUP CAN 

ESTABLISH BETTER COMMUNICATION WITH THE U.S., INDEED 

THEY HAVE A HEALTHY DESIRE FOR COLLABORATION WITH THE 

U.S., THEY CAN SERVE TO GUIDE THE SMALLER LATIN AMERICAN 

COUNTRIES. 

THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. APPRECIATED 

ARGENTINA'S RECENT VOTE IN THE OAS. ARGENTINA IS 

CONSIDERED A FRIEND — AN ALLY. THE U.S. VALUED HIGHLY 

ITS FRIENDSHIP WITH ARGENTINA AND EXPECTED THIS TO 

CONTINUE INTO THE FUTURE. HE FRANKLY CHARACTERIZED 

THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES AS A FESTERING SORE. THIS 

AND OTHER ISSUES SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AS FRIENDS AND 

ALLIES. THE U.S. SHARED THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S VIEW 

REGARDING ARGENTINA'S IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE 

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. BUT, TBE SECRETARY CONCLUDED, 

THE U.S. CANNOT IGNORE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS IS A FESTERING 

SORF IN OUR RELATIONS. 

TURNING TO NICARAGUA, THE SECRETARY SAID NO DOUBT 

THERE ARE SOME MARXIST/LENINISTS IN TH NEW GOVERNMENT 

AND THAT CUBA SUPPORTS THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL 

RECONSTRUCTION. BUT THERE ARE ALSO MODERATE ELEMENTS 

IN THE GNR? CONSEQUENTLY, THE COUNTRY CAN GO EITHER 

WAY. NICARAGUA HAS TO BE PUSHED IN THE DIRECTION THAT 

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WE WANT, TO BECOME AN INDEPENDENT AND INALIGNED COUNTS!. 

THE NICARAGUAN SITUATION ALSO AFFECTS ITS NEIGHBORS 

WHO ABE ALSO UNDER POLITICAL TENSION. TflF U.S. FEELS 

THAT COLLECTIVELY THE HEMISPHERE HAS TC HELP THESE 

NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES FACE THEIR PROBLkMS. IF THESE 

TENSIONS ARE NOT EASED AND THERE CONTINUES TO BE 

SUPPRESSION OF RIGHTS, THERE WILL LIKELY EE AN EXPLOSION 

OFFERING CUBA NEW OPPORTUNITIES. THE LATIN AMERICAN 

COUNTRIES SHOULD SEE VHAT THEY CAN DO ABOUT THIS AND 

TRY TO MOVE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY SINCJ WE ALL HAVE 

A COMMON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE GOOD OF THE HEMISPHERE. 

THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HIS ANDEAN GROUP 

COLLEAGUES HAD REPORTED TO HIM THAT NICARAGUA WILL NEED 

A LONG PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION WHICH WILL ABSORB ALL 

THE ENERGIES OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THAT THE NEW 

LEADERSHIP WILL HAVE MO TIME TO THINK GF EXTENDING ITS 

MARXIST VIEWS. BUT, THE MINISTER WONDERED WHAT THE 

RESULT WOULD BE IF IT IS THE SANDINISTAS WHO 

DISTRIBUTE HUMANITARIAN AID AND CHANNEL RECUPERATION 

ASSISTANCE. WHO WILL GET ALL THE CREDIT FOR THIS EFFORT, 

RE ASKED, BUT THE SANDINISTAS. THE RESULT CAN ONLY 

BE THAT THE LEFTISTS WILL END UP ENLISTING THE MAJORITY 

OF THE PEOPLE IN THEIR BEHALF SO THAT IN TWO OR THREE 

YEARS, SHOULD THE GNR ACCEDE TO 

FLECTIONS, THE SANDINISTAS WOULD BE THI LOGICAL WINNERS 

AND COMMUNISM WOULD TAKE OVER. 

THE SECRETARY ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER IF HE 

HAD AN ANSWER TO THIS DILEMMA. THE FOREIGN MINISTER 

REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE AN ANSWER. HE WENT ON 

TO COMMENT THAT NICARAGUA'S NEIGHBORS LACKED FAITH IN 

THE U.S. HE ASSERTED THESE NEIGHBORS WANT AND NEED 

THE U.S. TO BE FORTHCOMING IN ASSISTANCE TO THEM TO 

ASSURE THAT NICARAGUA OVER TIME WILL NCT BE ABLE TO 

TOPPLF THEM. THE MINISTER SAID EE PERCEIVED THIS IN 

"IS TALKS WITH HIS CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLEAGUES. HE 

FELT THERE SHOULD BE GREATER COMMUNICATION ON IDEAS 

OF HOW TO STOP NICARAGUAN ENCROACHMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA. 

THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE FELT HONDURAS HAD A 

GOOD CHANCE TO SURVIVE ANY THREATS. BUT WITH RESPECT 

TO SALVADOR, THE TIME IS SBORT TO RESPOND TO THAT 

COUNTRY'S POLITICAL PROBLEMS. THE SECRETARY SAID HE 

FELT THAT UNLESS SALVADOR RESPONDED QUICKLY ITS GOVERNMENT 

WAS IN PERIL. 

THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED 

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AT NEWS THAT THE U.S. IS SERIOUSLY STUDYING PROVIDING 

MILITARY AID TO THE GNR. HE THOUGHT THE EFFECT WOULD 

PE INDIRECTLY TO ARM CUBA. 

THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE GENERAL QUESTION 

HAD BEEN RAISED, BUT THERE HAVE BEEN NO SPECIFIC REQUESTS 

AND TEAT IS WHERE THE MATTER NOW STANDS. THE U.S. 

WILL CONTINUE TO TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AID, BOTH FROM 

A MORAL NECESSITY AND FROM THE PRACTICAL INFLUENCE IT 

COULD GIVE THE U.S. IN THE FUTURE THROUGH EXTENDING 

A HELPING HAND. THE U.S. ALSO HOPES TC CHANNEL ANY 

RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE THROUGH THOSE MINISTRIES RUN 

BY MODERATES. FRANKLY, EE OBSERVED, SHORT-TERM AID 

AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE CAN BE EXTENDED BOTH TO 

MEET IMMEDIATE HUMAN NEEDS AND TO SERVI OUR LONGER-RANGE 

OBJECTIVES. 

THF TERRITORIAL SEA 

THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED ABOUT A WIRE SERVICE 

ACCOUNT REGARDING A SHIFT IN THE U.S. POSITION ON WATERS 

BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL THREE MILES. REPORTEDLY, THE 

TT.S. WOULD DELIBERATELY EXERCISE TRANSIT RIGHTS BEYOND 

THE THREE MILES AND WITHIN THE 2i)0 MILES TO AFFIRM ITS 

VIFVS ON THIS ISSUE. 

t 

THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN THE NEWS ACCOUNT 

AND WAS NOT AWARE WHAT IT MIGHT REFER TO. HE COMMENTED 

THAT IT MIGHT BE A GARBLED STORY COMING OUT OF THE LOS 

NEGOTIATIONS. -- 

TREATY OF TLATELOLCO 

THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD UNDERSTOOD FROM 

THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PREDECESSOR THAI ARGENTINA WOULD 

MOVE ON TLATELOLCO, AND HE ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF 

IT . 

THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID EE WANTED TO BE FRANK. 

ARGENTINA HAD VARIOUS SOURCES OF ENERGY, AMONG THEM 

NUCLEAR PLANTS SOLELY INTENDED FOR PEACEFUL ENDS, FOR 

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE }COUNTRY, AND TO COMPLEMENT THE 

COUNTRY'S HYDROELECTRIC CAPACITY. ARGENTINA HAD NOW 

REACHED THF STAGE OF BEING ABLE FULLY 10 IMPLEMENT ITS 

ENERGY PLAN. AN OBSTACLE TO THIS IS THE STRONG PRESSURE 

BEING APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO SAFEGUARDS. HE BELIEVED 

T*E GOA'S POINT OF VIEW IS A JUST ONE. IF ARGENTINA CAN 

COMPLETE ITS ENFRGY OBJECTIVES IT HAS NO OBJECTION TO 

FULL AND COMPLETE SAFEGUARDS. ARGENTINA IS FULLY DETER- 

PSN:00752? PAGE 05 TOR :227/02:37Z DTG:142220Z AUG 79 

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• * 


*******£..0 d e a T' I A- l****»**F COPT 

MINED TO SIGN TLATELOLCO BUT WANTS TO BE IN A POSITION 

TO TA*E A FEW STEPS TO FULFILL ITS ENERGY PLAN. IT 

HOPES TO FINISH NEGOTIATIONS FOR A HEAVY WATER PLANT IN 

THE NEXT TWO MONTHS. ONCE THESE MEASURES ARE ACHIEVED, 

ARGENTINA PLANS ADHERENCE TO THE BAN ON BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 

AMD TO THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO. 

THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THERE 

’■'ERE CONDITIONS IN THE PREVIOUS JOINT ."OMNUNIQUE. 

THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT AT THE TIME THE 

CIRCUMSTANCES HE REFERRED TO HAD NOT EXISTED. 

TEE SECRETARY AGAIN ASKED WHEN ARGENTINA COULD 

SIGN. 

THE FOREIGN MINISTER REPEATED THIS COULD BE IN 

A COUPLE OF MONTHS AFTER ARGENTINA HAS ARRANGED PURCHASE 

OF THE HEAVY WATER PLANT. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT 

HE HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THAT ARGENTINA WAS PRESSED ON 

THE MATTER SUCH THAT IT COULD NOT ARID' BY THE COMMUNIOUE. 

FE ASSUMED ARGENTINA'S STATED INTENTION WOULD BE CARRIED 

OUT AS INDICATED IN THE COMMUNIOUE. THE FOREIGN 

MINISTER'S RESPONSE WAS THE FIRST INDICATION OF A 

DIFFERENT VIEW PREVAILING IN ARGENTINA. PRESIDENT 

VIDELA HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER THAT ARGENTINA WOULD 

RATIFY TLATELOLCO AND THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THE 

COMMUNIQUE. 

' THE FOREIGN MINISTER INSISTED THI "CENTRAL CONCEPT" 

HAD NOT CHANGED,* WHAT WAS DIFFERENT WERE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES 

WHICH ARGENTINA HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE SIGNING. 

VANCE 

RT 

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i. 

MEMORANDUM 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-6-5-3''- / ; * ■1' 

4140 


IteOBJST - GPS July 7, 1977 

ACTION 

DOS REVIEWED 02-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


ROBERT A. PASTOR 

Human Rights in Argentina 

We have just received a short paper (Tab A) from State responding to 

your memorandum of June 27 asking that State acknowledge the improvement 

in the Argentina picture. ARA, which probably drafted the 

memorandum, is not exactly known for its reluctance to compliment 

Latin American governments when given the chance; and therefore, 

their note of caution carries great credibility. I have attached at 

Tab B the cable, which I recommend be sent to the post, and at Tab C, 

a cable on the meeting between Videla and Mendez of Uruguay which 

lends support to State's conclusion. 

I recommend you send the memorandum at Tab I because the President 

raised the point about acknowledging the Argentine case a second 

time during his conversation with President Peres of Venezuela. 

RE COMMENDATION 

1. That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President. 

Approve _______ Disapprove___________ 

2. That you instruct me to clear the cable at Tab B. 

Approve 

Disapprove 

t 

Jessica Tuchman concurs 

GDS 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O. 13526 

Authority 

La -5 ~ S 

NARA_3L5c__ Date ------ 



MEMORANDUM 



July 30, 1980 

INFORMATION 

t 


FROM: 


LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor) 

SUBJECT: 


Bolivia/Argentina. The Bolivian Junta la trying desperately to convey an appearance 

of normality In La Paz; but It la falling. Resistance by mlnerB, curfews, shortages, 

and the omnipresence of the military make It impossible. Resentment of the 

Argentine presence and involvement is also increasing. The evidence is pretty 

clearly that Argentina's 30-man military advisory mission in Bolivia planned and 

directed the coup, and is now directing the repression. Argentina is also considering 

a $200 million credit (in the form of higher prices for Bolivian gas). Even the 

Brazilians have been surprised by the Argentine involvement. The Argentine Charge 

informed the State Department that the cancellation of Bawdier's .visit was a serious 

setback.in. US-Argentine.relations. They deserve more of the same. (S) 

Peruvian Inauguration. Despite the fact that there were nearly 10 heads of state 

at the Peruvian inauguration, Bawdier informs me that Mrs. Carter was the focus 

of attention, with Belaunde making special gestures of friendship and appreciation 

to her during his addresses and at all of the occasions. I spoke to Mrs. Carter 

at some length, and she was pleased with her discussions with all of the heads of sr v 

who were there. She was pleased with the extent to which the Venezuelans were 

playing a large role in the Caribbean and Central America, and encouraged the 

Colombians to do the same. Bawdier will go down to see Turbay to discuss this in 

greater detail in a couple of weeks. By the sounds of her readout, she clearly did 

an excellent Job conveying our policies and persuading the various heads of state of 

the President's deep interests in a wide range of Latin American problems. (C) 

Cuban Sugar Sales to Japan. In response to indications that Cuba will seek to 

double its current annual sugar saleB to Japan (300,000 tons worth $200 million) 

in connection with an upcoming Trade Mission, our Embassy in Tokyo has discretely 

approached the GOJ and urged that the Japanese consider alternate sources such as 

Brazil for additional supplies. Japanese officials told us they believed current 

negotiations between Japanese companies and the Cubans over a contract to replace 

the current five-year pact were stymied. The Japanese preferred a three-year 

deal at present levels while the Cubans sought a five-year deal with considerably 

higher annual sales. It was not known whether agreement would be reached. (S) 

Press Contacts. None (U) 

t 

SECRET 

Review 7/30/86 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.G.H3526 

- ■a'4 -SS - V 

f E- Drtn -A^Vvj 

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-1-53-5

3 

& i 

MEMORANDUM 


July 29, 1980 

INFORMATION 

□OS REVIEWED 01-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 




Argentina/Bolivia. This morning's press carried the news that the Argentine Government 

•had 'resumed normal relations" with Bolivia, thus becoming the first country to extend 

recognition to the new regime. We had already take! the decision to postpone Bowdler's 

visit to Buenos Aires, and had instructed the Embassy to so inform Argentine officials. 

Judging from the strongly negative reactions of Argentine officials yesterday when postponement 

was still only a possibility, we are probably in for another severe chill in our 

relations. While the degree of damage limitation, which will be required is not clear, 

much of the slow improvement since the Gaodpaster visit may be in jeopardy. Similar 

decisions on recognition can now probably also be expected shortly from Bolivia's other 

neighbors (Paraguay, Brazil, Uruguay). (S) 

Bolivia. La Paz appears to have returned to normal, with the exception of certain areas 

such as the university which remain dosed and guarded. The Embassy has picked up unconf i.r: ' 

reports from several sources that Hernan Slles, who won a plurality in the June 29 voting, 

is setting up an underground government and intends to announce on August 6 (the scheduled 

Inauguration day for the new President) that he is the legitimate President of Bolivia. 

The Papal Nuncio has made representations to the new authorities in favor of humane 

treatment for detainees, but has received no response. It is reliably reported that the 

regime is shaking down businessmen for contributions. (C) 

At the OAS the Nicaraguans withdrew their request for a Permanent Council meeting to 

decide whether to convoke a Meeting of Foreign Ministers on Bolivia. They were apparently 

responding to advice from those who backed last week's resolution that the time was not 

propitious for another session on the Bolivian situation at this time.(C) 

I * 

Cuban Refugees. A personal sweep by USINT personnel of the Mariel Harbor area yesterday 

failed to turn up any evidence of large numbers of US boats or detect any unusual movement 

of people into the area. Meanwhile, in San Jose, statements by Evelio Estrella to the 

effect that "all" refugees remaining in Costa Rica would be permitted to enter the US 

legally have raised expectations in the Cuban community and greatly increased crowds at 

the Consulate. (C) 

El Salvador. Senior officers of the IMF, IBRD and IDB have told State in confidence that 

they were visited by an FDR delegation recently and advised not to continue operations 

with the current GOES. All'three institutions took the approach as a direct threat to 

their personnel. State has suggested that the Embassy talk privately with trhsted GOES 

officials to pass on above information and suggest that quiet and inconspicuous security 

measures be instituted for IFI personnel. (S) 

Cuba. Castro's three hour speech to the faithful on July 26 is characterized by USINT as 

a curious mixture of revolutionary fire and cool pragmatism. On the one hand, Castro 

praised pluralism in Nicaragua, including private sector participation and aid from capitalis1 

countries. Yet at the same time he returned to themes from the sixties by citing armed 

revolution as the only way open to oppressed peoples. From available reports it appears 

that Castro did not mention the refugee situation, but did lambast the Republican platform 

and candidates. I am getting the full text and will reserve further comment until I've had 

a chance to study it in detail. (C) 

footer Family business (a delayed arrival) kept me out of the office most of the day. (U) 

SECRET 



MEMORANDUM 


-SECRET-’ 


May 8, 1979 

State Department 

review completed 


FROM: 



JCS Review 

Completed 

, SUBJECT: Evening Report (U) 

, Argentina. The U.S.-Argentina Conference was very informative with 

frank and useful exchanges on human rights, democratization, 

economic problems, the NAM, etc. The Argentines have clearly passed 

through a national trauma, and the memory of the civil war will 

unquestionably have a salving and moderating influence as they 

begin the task of re-building a more democratic society. There is 

a feeling among them that they have just turned the corner, though 

they are not in a hurry to re-discover politics. Today, the human 

rights officer from our Embassy in Buenos Aires stopped by, and 

while agreeing that disappearances have declined sharply, encouraged 

us to press the Argentines on three concerns: Timerman, torture, 

and an accounting of the disappearances. He also provided an 

interesting statistic on the civil war: (559 Argentine soldiers or 

police were killed (according to GOA sources) and 10-15,000 

civilians. (S) 

Caribbean. Called a meeting of representatives from Treasury, AID, 

State, World Bank, IDB, and OMB to discuss the U.S. position at the 

donors' meeting of the Caribbean Group (CG) in Paris next week. 

Given the changed political circumstances in the Caribbean, it is 

, essential that the donors have their act together when the full CG 

meets in June. The World Bank has set a^target of $650 million for 

i the region's requirements this year for project aid and for the 

Caribbean Development Facility (CDF). We are going to have to come 

up with some more money if we will be able to maintain our 1978 

level of 30% of the CDF. (S) 

Two ofEicers from the JCS stopped by to discuss their study of the 

security implications of Cuban military modernization and of the 

PRM on Central America. I asked them tc do some work on the 

implications of the Cuban build-up on the "basin" countries and cn 

NATO. (S) 

X1 

Mexico. STR is sending a team down to Mexico to try to complete 

negotiations. The tomato issue is looming ominously on the horizon. 

Treasury is supposed to make a preliminary determination by July 17 

on anti-dumping charges, and we are looking for ways to avoid that. 

Talked to Frank White of DPS about a joint memo from Stu and you to 

the President on the undocumented workers issue. (C) 

a 

r i 

rt 

tn*P 

w.._ 

t A v-TT 

adni 

r- 

i 

H 

i 

•SECRET.. 

j May 3. 19 8 5 

....... ...... *_____________ 

2 Vl 

No Objection To Declassification 2009/03/02 : NLC-24-54-7-2-7 _ 

r, rv*

-*£STno Objection To Declassification 2009/08/04 : NLC-24-54-6-4-6 

MEMORANDUM 

INFORMATION 



April 11, 1979 


~ J 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 



Ch_:_]^. Attended a meeting at State chaired by Christopher 

to discuss whether there should be a Presidential determination 

in accord with the Chafee amendment on the Export-Import Bank 

to lift the $750,000 ceiling on loans to Chile. The decision 

needs to be made before April 22nd because of an application 

to Export-Import and this is on the eve Of the Chilean government's 

decision on Letelier. It is ap extremely tough decision. 

The human rights situation in Chile does,not in my opinion, 

justify a Presidential determination, but then our interest 

in combating terrorism as reflected by the Letelier case 

might justify such action. My inclination would be not to 

make a determination, but also to make clear to the Chilean 

government (and to the American people) that our concern over 

the Letelier case remains very strong. (C) 

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The OAS met 

today and decided to hold an early election for the new 

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Such an election 

will permit someone other than a hard line Brazilian to 

lead the Commission in its visit to Argentina. (C) 

Bob Pastor went to Cambridge to give a speech at Harvard 

University on the United States' Human Rights Policy 

to Latin America. (U) 

f 

I 



. _____ _ 

State Department review 

completed 

EGRET— 

''TI^LYAL CL EY__ R_. Pastor 

E777 C:r April II, 19H5 

t.' ey:zi fTv -~ ----— 

-JiAEOlf 

■ 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority wr 

NARA__Je£L_ Dato --- 



i. 

MEMORANDUM 

SECRET- 


May 16, 1977 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


NORTH-SOUTH 



Daily Activities instructions APPLY 

CP as tor) 

T 


completed 

1. Friday night I spoke at the American University on U.S . human 

rights policy to Latin America, and met with a somewhat skeptical but 

quite knowledgeable audience. Questions were raised about our policies 

in Argentina, Uruguay, and particularly Chile. One person asked me 

whether or not the President would meet with Eduardo Frei, or whether 

our policy was to deal solely with the military junta. I begged off answering 

those, questions. 

2. Met with Diego Aria, Minister of Communications of Venezuela, and 

his special assistant Antonio Hererra, to discuss President Perez' trip.* 

In particular, we focused on the agenda of the trip, and Aria listed the 

obvious issues with the exception of human rights. Aria said that the U.S . 

has now suddenly discovered human rights, but Perez has been advocating 

a more forthright policy on human rights for many years. In addition, he 

said that he thought that the idea of a Western Hemisphere Energy Institute 

in which the U.S ., Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil and perhaps 

Argentina, could pool their technology in or Jer to increase the production 

of petroleum and alternative energy resources was a good one. 

3. The informal and small interagency meeting involving people from 

Treasury, CIA, State, and Jessica Tuchman and I from NSC, to discuss 

future U.S . policy to Chile and in particular the question whether the 

President should meet with Eduardo Frei went very well. Frei has served 

us a very difficult decision. If Carter doesn't meet with him, some will 

analogize the snub with Ford's decision not to meet with Solzheintsyn. 

If he does meet with Frei, the Pinochet regime will unquestionably take 

it as an afront with the likelihood of harsh consequences. Q will send 

you a memorandum on this shortly.) 

4. Prepared and attended Mrs . Carter's briefing an Latin American, and 

worked on briefing book. 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

-SECRET- Authority ^ * 314 

2 

NARA_&E------Data n 

No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/03 :tNLC-24-52-8-3-7 ;--------- --------

No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/03 :tNLC-24-52-8-3-7 

^SBGREf* 2 

5. Representative Dante Fascell called me this morning and said that 

he was hearing reports from many Latin Americans that they were confused 

about the purposes of Mrs . Carter's trip. He asked whether the trip would 

in fact be substantive. I answered that I thought the distinction between a 

substantive trip and a goodwill trip may be a bit artificial. Mrs. Carter 

was going to Latin America to convey a sense of what the new Administration 

stood for , what its goals and priorities were. She would be talking about 

the President's speech at the OAS and seeking comments from the hemisphere's 

leaders on the new directions sketched out by the President. And following 

from the President's pledge to consult with Latin America, she would be seeking 

to elicit from the Latin Americans ideas on ways in which our countries can 

cooperate on the issues — particularly human rights — that concern all of us. 

He said that he thought the list of purposes which I mentioned was appropriate 

and correct for her trip, and he urged me to make sure that these purposes 

, would be conveyed to a larger audience so that the Latin Americans would 

not misinterpret her trip. 

g 

I 

(Hansen) 

V/ill spend most of the week writing a major paper ("Basic Human Needs") 

for PRM 8 Track II. The paper will be longer than necessary for PRM 8 

meeting purposes , but will attempt to develop a set of propositions and 

proposals on the subject that may be of use to the Front Office in a variety 

of ways (speech material, ideas for your own consideration, etc.) . If 

Hormats is correct in his assumption that little if anything will result 

from the PRM 8 process (in terms of a PRC paper of any interest); and 

if Thornton is correct that the PRM 8 process is more of a "sensitivityraising11 

exercise than anything else; then this paper may end up serving 

as a first draft paper from me to the Front Office on one possible North-South 

set of initiatives. 

Significant Information/Intelligence 

(Pastor) 

i * 

■ 

Panama. Apparently, Torrijos is reasonably satisified with our new position 

on the Canal Treaty negotiations. He is sending his negotiators back tomorrow, 

and negotiations are expected to resume on Wednesday. 

Venezuela. In a conversation with Assistant Secretary Todman, President 

Perez of Venezuela expressed great support for the U.S . position on nonproliferation, 

and said that he would raise the issue of ratification of the 

Treaty of Tlatelolco with President Videla when he visited Argentina soon. 

. Perez also spoke about the Caribbean and the problem of Belize, and the 

need to stem Soviet influence in Africa. 

^SECRET 



-SECRET 

i -------- 

3 

i » f 

Cuba. On Friday, the Treasury Department announced that it is allowing 

travel agents in the U.S. to make group hotel reservations in Cuba and pay 

the Cuban Government or businesses directly. 

El Salvador. The situation in El Salvador is quite tense after the assassination 

of the Foreign Minister. Rightist groups are said to be merging to avenge the 

death of Borgonovo. 

25X1 

Ethiopia and the Soviet Union granted each other most-favored-nation status. 

Zaire. The Nigerian mediation effort has been dropped reportedly because 

of Angola's unwillingness to discuss reopening of its border with Zaire. 

i 

T 

CWhite) 

Sudan. While demonstrations agains both Ethiopia and the USSR continue in 

Khartoum, the government decided to reduce Soviet presence in Sudan. 

Only those Soviet nations who are attached to the Embassy will be allowed 

to remain. 

Somalia. Somali President Siad announced that Somalia would go to war' 

if Ethiopia invades the French Territory of the Afars and Issas. 

i 

.^SECRET- 

. _ No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/03 : NLC-24-52-8-3-7

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0(\, 

^ ■ * 

- 

-eftWFTDEWTTnT. 

Argentina 


DOS REVIEWED 19 May 2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL. 

DATE : 

TIME: 

PLACE: 

September 9/ 1977 

9:00 am 

White House 

SUBJECT: President Carter/President Videla Bilateral" 

PARTICIPANTS: 

ARGENTINA * US 

Lt. General Jorge Rafael Videla 

President of Argentina 

Oscar A. Montes, Minister of 

Foreign Affairs and Worship 

Jorge A. Aja Espil, Ambassador 

to the United States 

Julio Cesar Carasales, 

Ambassador to OAS 

Enrique Quintana, 

Chief of Protocol 

Cdr. Eduardo Alberto Traid, 

Aide-de-camp 

President Carter 

Vice-President Mondale 

Secretary Vance 

D*r. Zbigniew Brzezinski 

Assistant Secretary Todman 

Robert PaBtor, NSC 

Charge Maxwell Chaplin 

President Carter opened the conversation by expressing 

his pleasure at the attendance of the Argentine President 

and emphasizing its significance as a demonstration of hope 

for the Panama Canal Treaty. He was alBo pleased that it 

provided an opportunity for the hemispheric leaders to have 

conversations about issues of common concern. 

President Videla expressed his satisfaction over the 

opportunity to witness an event of such ipajor importance as 

the Canal Treaty Signing, as well as the opportunity to have 

a face-to-face discussion with the President. He observed 

that the signature of the treaty not only denotes the end of 

one era but opens a new one in which the United States has 

demonstrated its sincerity and goodwill toward Latin America. 

He added that the Argentine presence was his government's 

effort to establish its goodwill in response. He observed 

that while US-Argentine relations have had their ups and 

downs throughout history, the temporary circumstances which 

impeded close relations have always been overcome 'by the 

basic identity of interests of the two nations. 

GONFIDENfriAL/GDS 



■êwrrnMfiAL 2. 

As a parenthetical comment, President Carter observed 

to Videla that his Spanish was the clearest and easiest 

to understand he had ever heard - the President either 

chose simple words or had an unusually clear manner of 

expressing himself. He found this typical of Argentina 

which he and his wife had visited some years previously. 

President Carter also added his thanks for the hospitality 

that President Videla had shown to Assistant Secretary 

Todman during the latter's recent visit to Argentina. 

President Carter said he hoped to have a frank discussion 

of two major issues with the objective of improving 

relations between the two nations. 

Non-Proliferation 

President Carter considered the threat of nuclear explosives 

the greatest problem facing the hemisphere. 

Because Argentina leads the Latin American nations in nuclear 

technology - which is a great credit to Argentina - he hoped 

that Argentina could also lead in the establishment of a 

nuclear free zone in the area and the prevention of introduction 

to nuclear explosives. He observed that all hemispheric 

countries but Cuba and Argentina had Bigned and 

ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that Chile and Brazil 

had conditioned their approval of that treaty upon Argentina's 

ratification and acceptance of it. He expressed the hope that 

Argentina would ratify this treaty which would provide unrestricted 

use of nuclear energy for power but no introduction 

of nuclear explosives. 

President Carter said that the United States, the 

European Community, Canada and Australia were now evolving 

a study of fuel cycle from ore to reactor wastes and safeguards. 

On October 19 there will be a three-day meeting on 

this subject, and it would be helpful if the GOA could be 

represented at this meeting. He envisaged establishing 

common policies with regard to the export of nuclear technology 

heavy water and enriched uranium. He said this 

policy envisages restriction of sale of these items to 

countries which do not cooperate in the non-proliferation 

effort. President Carter said he understood that Argentina 

was cooperating with Canada with respect to limited safeguards 

but stressed the importance the United States places 

on the Tlatelolco and the NPT. Thisjis very serious to the 

United States, and it would remain of constant concern. 

JSGNPIDENTI-ftI7 



CflMF-TDENTl-Air 3. 

President Videla responded by observing that the two 

countries' coincidence of interest was mirrored by the fact 

that the two Presidents' agendas were the same. He did not 

perceive these issues as problems but as opportunities for 

progress. He reviewed Argentina's 25 years' work in developing 

the peaceful use of nuclear energy, noting that one power 

reactor is currently in use, a second under construction 

and a third in the planning phase. Hfe understood President 

Carter's concern over the misuse of nuclear energy and said 

Argentina had offered to establish safeguards beyond those 

which were really needed. However, he understood that even 

this may not be sufficient reassurance for Latin America and 

the world. 

president Videla said the GOA had considered ratifying 

the Treaty of Tlatelolco but stressed that President Carter 

must be aware of the great need for proper political timing 

of such an action. Argentina was only 18 months away from 

its gravest national crisis, so the government must be 

particularly careful not to disturb the progress toward 

normalcy. He stated that as soon as political conditions 

permit - perhaps before the end of the year - he would give 

proof of the GOA goodwill with regard to non-proliferation 

by ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He asked if this 

reassured President Carter. 

President Carter said it did, and stated that if the 

GOA decided to send a delegation to the fuel cycle conference 

it would be particularly exciting if it would be 

possible to announce intended ratification of the treaty 

at that time, but he would defer to President Videla on 

the best political timing. With Argentine ratification, 

the treaty would be in effect for all countries but Cuba, 

and the United States would be raising this issue with 

the Cubans. The President added that Argentine ratification 

would also remove our concerns about technology and 

heavy water supply to Argentina from the United States 

and other suppliers. The President had discussed this very 

issue the previous day with Prime Minister Trudeau in the 

interest of establishing a common export policy. 

Human Rights 

The political changes in Argentina have been given 

careful study by the American government, and recent developments 

there said President Carter, have impressed 

me as much as the natural beauty of the country. He stated 

his admiration for the achievements of President Videla's 

mNFTDFNTT**- 

No Objection To Declassification in F*ll 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0


£flMf-IHENTIAIr 4. 

government in dealing with the problem of terrorism and 

the reconstruction of the Argentine economy. He said the 

study of the achievements of President Videla's government 

led to the conclusion that the GOA had achieved great 

strength, stability and influence. He hoped that the security 

and the strength of the government would lead to the 

alleviation of concerns expressed by many about the observation 

of human rights in Argentina. The President stated 

he did not have a way to assess the many charges of human 

rights violations and noted the particularly high press 

interest in this subject in the United States. Certain 

cases drew particularly intense interest here, such as that 

of editor Jacobo Timerman and the Deutsch family, who have 

many relatives in the California area? He said that a Washington 

group concerned with the subject of human rights had 

provided a list of 3,000 people being detained in Argentina 

without public notice of their arrest or charges against 

them. The President acknowledged that some of these allegations 

may be false or exaggerated, but he felt that in the 

privacy of the room he could express our concerns about the 

state of human rights in Argentina. He would make the list 

available so the State Department could provide it to President 

Videla's government for its use. President Carter felt 

that the friendly bilateral relations of over a hundred years 

were of great value, and he was concerned that this issue 

could come between the two countries. He felt that more 

progress in this area would be welcome. In summary, he said 

he had great admiration and appreciation for what President 

Videla has been able to do for his country, and asked 

what additional steps could be taken to alleviate the concern 

in the United States (which, indeed, may have been 

exaggerated) about the state of human rights in Argentina. 

President Videla recounted the situation in which 

Argentina found itself in March 1976, with an economic, 

political and social crisis aggravated by terrorism, which 

led the armed forces as an institution reluctantly to take 

over to fill the power vacuum and protect those enduring 

values and human rights of which President Carter spoke. 

Those who recognized that man was created in God's image 

must recognize his dignity as an individual. Terrorists 

wanted to change that view of man, and Argentina had faced 

what amounted to a war over the issue. All wars have their 

undesirable consequences, and President Carter as a military 

man would know of this. Argentina has suffered all of these 

misfortunes of war. 

■CONF-IDENTI-AL 



CONFIDENTIAL- 5. 

President Videla said that the war, while virtually 

over in a military sense, continued in the political arena, 

both domestically and internationally. The terrorists wish 

to isolate the GOA from a civilized world, but their charges 

were not true; the people of Argentina opposed terrorism 

and the system it advocated. They were dedicated to democracy. 

Argentina faced the intentionally exaggerated publicity 

abroad of admittedly unfortunate incidents. President Videla 

said there were incidents for which the government was 

responsible, and he accepted that responsibility for them 

and stressed his efforts to control abuses of power. He 

said, however, that he could not accept the image of a 

brutal and uncivilized Argentina and the attempt to isolate 

his country from those other nations which shared its basic 

values. He stressed that he would do his utmost to reestablish 

order and control, and meanwhile he needed the 

understanding of Argentina's friends, especially natural 

friends such as the United States. 

With the war almost over, President Videla felt that 

the need for repressive action was less. He felt that within 

a short period the negative consequences of the repression 

would be eliminated. 

He agreed to accept the list of names of those who were 

reportedly detained in Argentina and welcomed the opportunity 

to comment on the Timerman case. He assured President Carter 

that Timerman was detained under due process, charged with 

dealing with subversive elements. He1was not detained because 

of his name - there was definitely no anti-Semitic connection 

to this detention. The same was the case of the detention of 

the Deutsch family: they were detained for investigation of 

possible connection with subversion, not for racial reasons. 

President Videla Btated that 1,990 persons had been detained 

under the national executive power in the first year 

of his government and 2,020 in the subsequent six months. 

Since March 1976, 300 of these cases had been tried in the 

civilian courts with 73 found guilty, and 370 in the military 

courts with 187 found guilty. In the last two months, 300 

persons detained on suspicion of terrorist activities have 

been liberated. President Videla was most reluctant to give 

a date, but he hoped and wished the problems of the detainees 

might be resolved by Christmas 1977. He would make a major 

effort to achieve this and meanwhile hoped for US understanding. 

COHFlublimMo^'objection To Declassification in F*ll 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0

No Objection To Declassification in Filill 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0 

-gONTTBENTIAIr-- - 6. 

President Carter ventured a question about the Argentine 

judicial system, noting that one of the great concerns 

expressed in the United States is the fact that there are no 

announcements of the arrest of Argentines or the charges on 

which they were being held. He asked if this is customary. 

President Videla responded that the Argentine courts are independent 

institutions and operated beyond the control of the 

executive. In cases dealing with subversives and their detention 

as a preliminary security measure, no announcements of 

the detentions were made. As soon as the case was investigated 

it was turned over to the military or- civilian.. courts 

or the individual was released. While for security reasons 

it is not convenient to provide public information on detentions 

at the initial stage, the GOA has an office charged 

with providing information to relatives about the possible 

detention and charges against family members. President 

Carter expressed his desire to help r&store world appreciation 

of Argentina and what its government stands for. He hoped 

that President videla would give the United States the opportunity 

to do so. As President, he said he knew how much 

opportunity he had to preserve the liberties of the US citizens. 

He asked if, at sometime in the future after Christmas, 

it might be possible for representatives of the OAS or the 

UN to visit Argentina, not to check on you but to certify 

the progress made by the GOA. 

President Videla said he was pleased to respond with 

the same frankness shown by President Carter and observed 

that facts were infinitely more important than words. 

The visits of Hr. Todman, Mrs. Derian, the Congressmen and 

the Senators are the best way to show that Argentina is 

not ashamed of its record. He thanked President Carter for 

sending these groups and for providing lists of detainees. 

He admitted that there were disappearances in Argentina 

for four reasons: first, when an Individual joins the subversive 

underground; second, when a terrorist is killed by 

his associates who may suspect betrayal; third, terrorists 

were killed in battle; and fourth, people were killed by 

excesses committed by forces of repression. He said this 

fourth case is under our control, and it is his responsibility 

to eliminate it. He said he was not troubled by 

visits or lists or any future visit made in goodwill which 

can testify to the facts in Argentina. 

President Videla regretted that xt was necesesary to 

to devote the short time available to discussion of the 

two fundamental issues raised. Since there were a number 

of important remaining bilateral issues, which should be 

covered, he wished to invite Secretary Vance to viBit 

Argentina after his trip to Brazil to complete the' consultations. 

-CONFIDENTIAL ■ 



CONFIDENTIAL- 7. 

President Carter and Secretary Vance both accepted the 

invitation for Secretary Vance to vis^.t Argentina. President 

Carter said he regretted that the two items had dominated 

this discussion, which would have to be ended because 

the President of Uruguay was arriving shortly. Should President 

Videla wish, he said that Vice President Hondale could 

meet with him now, or the conversations could be continued 

during the Secretary's visit. President Carter expressed 

his hope he could return to Argentina before long and presented 

President Videla with his book and a collection of 

satellite photographs of the world. The meeting terminated 

with expressions of mutual goodwill. 

f 

t 

J.nNFTDF.NTIAL 



b'PS REVIEWED 16-Apr-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL. 

{RATIONAL. SECURITY COUNCIL 

February 16, 197? 

TO: 

DR. 

Attached a: 

starving u: 

live the Zb 

Memorial/ 

nemo for the 

gston. Long 

ineki 

Wetbacks! 

t 

Authority 

NARA— 

declassified 

E.0.13526 

M LX- - 

Date 

\i~ r\u: t~ rv i* c. .it on4 0/n4Me . mi n nA ntz a e o

No Objection To Declassification in 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

JESSICA TUCHMAN 

ROBERT KIMMITT 

ROBERT PASTOR 

Security Assistance 

1. While I agree with State that security assistance to Uruguay should 

be eliminated and t-Ec Argentina reduced by half, I also agree with 

OMB's assessment that Congress will regard that as "tokenism" . I 

think the best way to reconcile the two positions, however, is not 

in asking State for alternatives but in asking it for a framework to 

justify these cuts, Since Argentina and Uruguay have two of the 

worst human rights records of all those Latin American nations 

receiving security assistance, I don't believe it should be especially 

difficult to justify these as opposed to other cuts. 

2. Jamaica Assistance. $31.5 million in supporting assistance will not 

be sufficient to realize the extravagant claims made by'the State Department 

like relieving their economic crisis or reversing the leftward drift 

of the government. But some assistance from the new Administration is 

essential to send a new signal to Jamaica, to other Latin American and 

Caribbean countries. and to the international community about Jamaica 

and about the U.S. It will indicate a new tolerance in U.S. foreign 

policy for ideological pluralism which will be well-received in the 

Caribbean and in the developing world. (And we should remember that 

Jamaica has a democratic government.) The U.S. does not need $31.5 

million to send a signal, however,' half of that would be sufficient. 

If the U. S. were interested in improving relations with Jamaica, 

the worst thing it could do is begin a bilateral assistance program 

because before too long, we would raise unrealistic expectations in 

the U,.S. that we could transform their government at the same 

time that we aggravated nationalistic predispositions in Jamaica. 

Even worst would-be to use the money to try to get Jamaica to 

accept the IMF S t dsilization package because Jamaica will probably 

accept the package anyway arid because $31. 5 bdllion is not su fficafcnt 

to persu a;de them and would not be welcomed" as a reward for "good 

behavior. " For the moment, then, I woultf recommend that the 

President agree to grant only enough assistance to send a signal. 

A soft loan for a new hospital in Kingston would be perfect. At the 

same time, he should appoint a new Ambassador and make clear 

that we are undertaking a compreh ensive review of U.S. policy to 

h I ' HI 

|n.>ejni

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/06/16 : NLC-24-1 -8-3-3 


-SECRET— 1 

INFORMATION 

NSS Review Completed. 

POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING 

May 14, 1980 

TIME AND PLACE: 

SUBJECT: 

10:30-11:15 a.m.; White House Situation Room 

Summary of Conclusions -— PRC Meeting 

on Argentina (C) 

PARTICIPANTS 

State 

Warren Christopher, Dep. 

Secretary 

John Bushnell, Dep. Ass't. 

Secretary 

Defense 

W. Graham Claytor, Jr., 

Dep. Secretary 

Frank Kramer, Principal 

Dep. Ass't. Secretary 

Agriculture 

James Starkey, Dep. 

Under Secretary 

Commerce 

Luther Hodges, Dep. Secretary 

Abraham Katz, Ass't. Secretary 

for Internet. Economic Policy 

and Research 

Energy 

Woody Cunningham, Ass't. 

Secretary for Nuclear Energy 

Arms Control and Disarmament j 

Spurgeon Keeny, Dep. Director ' 

Richard Williamson, Nuclear 

? Exports Div. Chief, Bureau 

of Nonproliferation 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Lt. General John Pustay 

Central Intelligence 

Jack Davis, NIO for Latin Americe. 

White House 

David Aaron 

Henry Owen 

National Security Council ! 

Thomas P. Thornton > 

Robert Pastor 

The PRC met to discuss US-Argentine relations in light of your 

concern about the development of closer ties between Argentina 

and the Soviet Union. It was. agreed that we should continue to 

seek improvement in our relations wi^h Argentina, recognizing 

•SECRET 

Review on May 14, 2000 

Extended by Zbigniew Brzezinski 

Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e) 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority 

------- j 

NARA_EE___ Date -A«\\\.yg---------------- i 

r\u: i :x: i—. .ii on44inc/4o . ah r* ni a a n o

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/06/16 : NLC-24-1 -8-3-3 

SECRET* 2 

that probably no dramatic progress (or, for that matter, deterioration) 

is likely until there is a new government in Buenos 

Aires in early 1981. In the next few weeks we may have to 

show our displeasure over Argentina's likely failure to be 

cooperative on the grain embargo; on the other hand, we can 

justify some positive steps in the relationship by the improving 

trend of Argentina's human rights performance. (S) 

Looking to the longer-term, and assuming -continuing improvement 

in human rights matters, we would propose a systematic effort 

to strengthen our ties with Argentina. This could ultimately 

lead to full normalization and perhaps repeal of legislative 

restrictions on military supply. (S) 

This timetable should help deflect the Argentinians from too 

close a relationship with the Soviets — a relationship that 

is in any event probably self-limiting due to the nature of 

the Argentine regime. (S) 

All agencies supported this consensus; both Commerce and Defense 

however, made clear in the course of the discussions that they 

want to press for more rapid improvement in the relationship 

than do the other agencies. Defense was particularly concerned 

that our human rights and nuclear policies were forcing Argentina 

to draw close to the USSR. An interdepartmental Group will 

be set up to provide an opportunity to fine-tune our policies to 

meet the needs and concerns of individual agencies in line with 

the broad policy structure agreed uppn. (S) 

t 

r\u: 

r. .ii nn* a ir\a ia n . am r* n jt a a n n

■’ No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/02 : NLC-24-102-2-7-3 *ri 

MEMORANDUM 


Add-on 

^3? 

-fineRET 

INFORMATION 

t 

POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING 

May 14, 1980 



SUBJECT: 

PARTICIPANTS 

Minutes — PRC Meeting on Argentina (C) 

OSD Review Completed 

" ' 

ON-FILE COMMERCE 

RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS 

APPLY 

State 


Secretary 


Secretary 

Defense 





Agriculture 



Commerce 



for Internat. Economic Policy 


JCS review completed 

Energy 



Arms Control and Disarmament 

Spurgeon Keeny, Dep. Director 


Exports Div. Chief, Bureau 

* of Nonproliferation 




Jack Davis, NIO for Latin America 

White House 

David Aaron 

Henry Owen 

National Security Council 

Thomas P. Thornton 

Robert Pastor 

Bushnell began the meeting by discussing Argentinian relations 

with the Soviet Union. He pointed out that the current government 

is unlikely to get close to the Soviets and this provides a certain 

implicit limitation on the process of Soviet/Argentinian 

ties. The Argentine Government is playing a short-term game in 

the grain, trade and perhaps nuclear area. The only point of 

contact between the Soviet Union and Argentina that raises 

longer term concerns is a possible fishing agreement although 

SECRET 




.State Department review 

completed 

Authority 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O.13S26 

NARA_££___ Date.. 

NSC review(s) completed 

L-C. - aA—'~2> 

k i«. nu: .i f—, ,ii nn-in/no/nn . km r* na Ann n -7 o

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/02 : NLC-24-102-2-7-3 , 

1 £.3 1*. nuQ-on 

■SECRET-* 2 

OSD Review Completed 

even here the Argentine Government is moving to limit its 

impact on their people. In addition we are very much concerned 

about Argentinian/Soviet cooperation in United Nations 

organs. Originally the Argentinians only wanted to prevent 

the Montaneros from mobilizing Soviet and Cuban support against 

the GOA. Over time however this has developed into a cooperative 

vote trade-off between the two* sides. In the coming 

months, Bushnell continued, Argentina will have a hard time 

taking any positive actions whatsoever due to the imminent 

retirement of President Videla. This is certainly true until 

the decision on a successor is made in September and probably 

the period of inaction will continue until early next year 

when a new government is in place. We will not be able to 

force major decisions on them in this time. In the shorter 

term the main issue is the Argentine fear of condemnation as 

a result of the report of the Inter-American Human Rights 

Commission. They might make some minor steps on the human 

rights front to avert condemnation. The other important 

short term consideration is the question of the grain embargo 

where they have not been supportive of our interests. 

Hodges asked whether Argentine human rights performance has 

improved. 

Bushnell replied that there has been a major improvement but 

there are still gross violations and the system of repression 

remains in place. One could say that they have probably killed 

most of the people that they wanted to kill, but there are now 

fewer political prisoners and in somia instances the rule of law 

is being followed better. 

Hodges reported that the Argentine Economics Minister had assured 

him that the current economic policies would continue under a new 

government next year. Hodges pointed out that we have a great 

economic potential in relations with Argentina and we should do 

everything we can to maximize that. 

Owen, speaking of the grain situation, said that the Argentinians 

have undoubtedly made their decision and will follow the same 

policy next year as they did this year. They have almost certainly 

reached an agreement with the Soviets which would provide 

only a floor, not a ceiling, on Soviet purchases. This in effect 

will mean no limit on Argentine sales to the Soviet Union other 

than that provided by crop conditions. 

^SECRET 

Mn 

In nnrlnpplfimlinn in Ci ill H/HQ/m • Ml T/ ^ HO T T Q

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/02 : NLC-24-102-2-7-3 i-on 

.SECRET- 3 

Starkey agreed with this conclusion. 

Aaron said it was not clear from the paper what the issue is — 

are we seeking a decision on overall tone or individual policy 

decisions? He asked whether the wheat embargo will be circumvented 

. 

Owen replied that once Argentinian policy is clear, and no doubt 

the Canadians will be equally uncooperative, other countries will 

not support us. 

Christopher agreed and said that in any event the whole question 

is irrelevant if the Soviets have a good crop. We may have to 

find a way to announce a one-year policy success. 

Aaron. Do we want to take some move against Argentina because 

of this or simply forget it? Bear in mind that Martinez was 

lectured at the highest levels of government here about the 

need for Argentine cooperation. 

Owen said that we should certainly take a tough line on Argentina 

to match the warnings that were given to Martinez. 

Aaron observed that it is clear that Argentina doesn't care very 

much about its relations with the United States. 

Christopher, discussing the purpose of the meeting, said that the 

real decision to be addressed is one of tone. The paper should 

then be submitted to an Interagency Group which could work out 

the individual implementing decisions in line with the broad 

decision on tone to be made by the PRC. Mr. Christopher also 

observed that the Argentinians are not going to do anything to 

court us. 

Claytor said he did not blame them; our'policies are forcing them 

to the Soviets. 

t 

Owen said that they are sensitive to our concern about being a 

major supplier for their hydroelectric project. Martinez had 

said that he would favor the United States if all other factors 

were equal. 

Hodges noted that OPIC insurance would be important in this regard. 

Owen agreed and said this would be discussed with Deputy Secretary 

Christopher tomorrow. 

SSGRBT 

i 

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/02 : NLC-24-102-2-7-3

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/02 : N LC-24-102-2-7-3_ 3_on 

•SECRET-- 4 

--------------- t 

Keeny, discussing nuclear matters, said it is not clear what 

the options are. The Soviets are interested in some nuclear 

cooperation with the Argentinians but there has been minimal 

activity to date. Thus there does not seem much to preempt 

there. Our own relations with Argentina are another question. 

We do not want to (indeed legally we cannot) expand these relations 

unless they accept full-scope safeguards and ratify the 

Tlatelolco Treaty. We do have some flexibility though on whether 

we should continue to cooperate in marginal ways within the law. 

The question is whether we are willing to supply things that at 

some future date might be related to a nuclear weapons program. 

Bushnell said there is no problem because what we are supplying 

is for their research program. The issue is whether we want to 

break a nuclear dialogue with them completely and perhaps turn 

them to the Soviets. He hopes that we might be able to make 

greater progress next year when there will be a new administration 

and leadership on nuclear matters. Thus he asked, 

should we break the dialogue now or continue to do "minor" 

things. ? 

Keeny said it depended on which items were involved. 

Claytor said that the nuclear non-proliferation policy is bankrupt 

in general and that we should do absolutely everything we 

can under the law to cooperate with Argentina. 

Keeny inquired whether that would include the provision of 

tritium. Perhaps the only thing the Argentinians want are 

things that cause no problem for us. We should look at the 

specifics. 

Christopher pointed out that the President has certainly not 

abandoned the nuclear non-proliferation policy. 

Claytor countered that the policy had been ineffective and that 

the Soviets are always ready to jump in where we are unable to 

extend cooperation. 

Bushnell observed that there were very few license requests pending 

from the Argentinians and there probably would be no problem 

over the next six months or so. { 

Christopher, returning to the general topic, said he believed 

that the group should support the middle option. We should 

give due weight to positive trends in the human rights area 

but should not try to repeal the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment 

SSCIU3T-* 

K I n O W • « nil 

c. .ii on4n/no«nn . kii r* nil nnn n *7 o

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08.02 : NLC-24-102-2-7-3 

■SECRET- 

S 

at this time since that would be impossible with the present 

Congress and politically unwise. This Option B needs fine 

tuning from the Interdepartmental Group; what we should do 

in the coming months is to warm up our relationship with 

Argentina. Perhaps in 1981 we will be able to have an 

initiative on the military side, including training at 

least. 

Hodges said he was encouraged by Christopher1 s summation, for 

the trends in human rights are important. The Commerce Department 

also supports Option B. 

Aaron said that we needed a specific program to improve our relations. 

The options as stated in the paper are too static. 

Our goals should be first, to maintain a nuclear relationship 

that will result in Argentine accession to the Tlatelolco 

Treaty; secondly, a commercial policy that makes clear that 

we want the hydroelectric contract and will pursue it; third, 

there is no possibility of changing the military legislation 

now; fourth, there is a major OAS vote coming up and how we 

react will be a signal to them. We should relate that to the 

policy issues. Overall, we should have a tone that rests 

somewhere between Options B and C, leaving out for the time 

being any change in our military supply policy. The Interdepartmental 

Group should set up an 18-month program with 

benchmarks for our progress and for Argentine performance. 

At the same time Aaron noted that there is no reason to improve 

relations dramatically with Argentina now directly after they 

have stuck their finger in our eye on the grain issue. We 

should make clear our irritation with them at this time and 

then pick up the pieces with a new administration when it 

comes into office. We will not be able to get very far with 

Videla. We should take the opportunity .of the new administration, 

however, for turning a new page. If we move to improve 

our relations with them now we will simply not have the 

respect of the Argentinians. 

f 

Claytor said that he saw Option C as the desirable goal, less 

the repeal of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment which would be 

impossible. We should do all that we can with the Argentine 

military to restore relations between our two armed services. 

At the moment we are driving them to the Soviets. The Soviets 

are our greatest global problem and we are simply letting small 

things interfere with our dealing with this problem. 

-6eeRET—* 

ki_ r>u: 

i"..ii nnxn/nn.nn . k i i r* n a a nn n *? n

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/02 : NLC-24-102-2-7-3 d-on 

6 

Pustay supported Claytor1s statement* and noted that we now have 

a number of opportunities to increase contacts with the Argentine 

military and JCS would like to pursue them. He noted for instance 

the Galtieri (sic,r) invitation which is being held up in State 

Department. Pustay said that Galtieri is prepared to come. 

Bushnell said we had received mixed signals. Galtieri, for his 

own political purposes, would like to receive the invitation but 

not actually accept it until after the Presidential decision is 

made in September in Argentina. Whatever we do we are likely to 

become involved in Argentine politics. He also asked whether, 

following so close on their poor performance on grain, we want 

to give this signal of reward to them. 

Owen cautioned that we should be careful about assuming that the 

Argentinians will do the worst possible things on grain. It is 

conceivable that even if they have signed an agreement with the 

Soviets they may have some marginal flexibility. We should not 

take reprisals against them until they publicly announce the 

content of their agreement with the Soviets. 

Bushnell said that the announcement will not tell us very much 

in all likelihood. In any event thet reality will depend on the 

Argentine harvest levels and we will not know that for some six 

months. 

Aaron pointed out that we had pushed the Argentines very hard on 

the grain issue and wondered whether we are now going to let them 

undermine us. 

Owen pointed out that nobody else is likely to cooperate with us 

either next year. 

Pustay, returning to the question of General Galtieri's visit, 

said that it should be borne in mind that Galtieri had been 

instrumental in the positive decision that Argentina made on 

the Olympics. 

Keeny observed that we should maintain a nuclear relationship 

but we should not push it to the brink of what the law permits 

if this would undercut our non-proliferation efforts elsewhere. 

Christopher summarized the meeting by pointing out that there 

seemed to be no stark alternatives that' need to be put to the 

President. It was generally agreedithat: 

SBGHET 

Mr* OhirtMinn frs r^r»/*loe»r»ifio«-i+i«n in Ci ill 0010/00/00 • Mi C* 0>! 1 OO O T O

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/02 : NLC-24-102-2-7-3 

2S/2 Add-on 

SECRET-- 7 

1. There is enough human rights progress to justify movement 

towards improvement in our relationship. 

2. Over the next six months events will be conditioned by the 

electoral situation in Argentina. 

3. We will also have to see whether* we need to react to the 

Argentinian decision on grain. 

These are short-term items which the Interdepartmental Group 

can review as it goes along. On the longer term: 

4. If there is continued improvement in the human rights situation 

in Argentina we should seek improvement in our relations 

with the new regime. 

The Interdepartmental Group will work out in detail what this 

improvement might involve. 

_SE€£ET 

k i ^ i • r- ii ah m iaa i 11 ^ n 4 4 nn n m n


MEMORANDUM 

CONFIDENTIAL 


WASHINGTON 

June 10, 1980 

9 



Zbig, 

I gather that Secretary Muskie will ask approval for Gerry 

Smith's exploration with our allies of ways of meeting 

their concerns regarding nuclear power at tomorrow's meeting 

with you and Harold Brown. Gerry would then talk quietly 

about this issue with our allies at an international energy 

meeting he is attending at Vienna next week. (c) 

Substantively, I believe that Gerry is on the right track: 

This exploration will help to reduce bitterness between Europe 

and the United StatBS about this issue, and eventually produce 

policies that will strengthen non-proliferation. It is the 

intent to conduct this exploration in low key, so that it will 

not arouse political controversy in this country before the 

election. (c) 

Procedurally, you will recall that this issue was discussed 

at a PRC, where all the agencies concerned (except the Council 

on Environmental Quality) supported Gerry's proposal, and it 

was agreed that his paper should be revised, prior to being 

discussed at a Becond PRC. Secretary MuBkie then concluded 

that it would be better to launch Gerry'b exploratory discussions 

without the bureaucratic formality inherent in a PRC, 

in order to preserve our flexibility and avoid leaks. If you 

now decide that a second PRC meeting is needed before we do 

anything, it will be impossible for Gerry to undertake these 

discussions at the Vienna International Atomic Energy Meeting 

for which he is leaving Saturday, and a major opportunity will 

have been lost to begin this exploration before the Venice 

Summit and in the right multilateral forum. (C) 

I recommend that you support Secretary Muskie's proposal to 

allow Gerry Smith to begin these exploratory discussions next 

week without fanfare in Vienna. (c) 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.Q.13526 

Authnritv N U L - n ~ / U l - 1 

NARA_££____ Data 7 )«?/>/. 

No Objection To Declassification in ;-ull 2012/12/12 : NLC-17-141-3-9-5

No Objection To Declassification in :-ull 2012/12/12 : NLC-17-141-3-9-5 

MEMORANDUM 


3^ 

June 10, 1980 

•GQNFIDENTIAIT 

INFORMATION 


THROUGH 

FROM 

SUBJECT: 


CHRISTINE DODSON 

THOMAS THORNT^^'''” 

M-B-B Lunch - Hidalgo (U) 

I 

We should turn off the Hidalgo atops in Argentina and Chile 

for the following reasons: 

1. We do not want to deflect attention from Bdwdler's visit 

to Argentina in July. This will be the key step in our policy 

execution in the area and the Argentines should get no mixture 

of signals. Another "symbolic" visit will not impress the 

Argentines. 

2. It will be very hard to keep a visit to Chile from appearing 

to be a gesture to make up for the UNITAS decisions. There 

is no reason for us to apologize for that decision. 

Note, by the way, that there is no substantive reason for 

Hidalgo to go to Latin America and it diverts him from the 

Caribbean area where such a visit could be useful . At least 

the visit could be postponed. 

If the decision is to go ahead, however, it is critically 

important that Hidalgo be under close control from the 

political side so that he correctly enunciates our policy. 

Mechanically this would involve: ( 

1. Thorough briefings from State and NSC. 

2. No contacts with Senior Argentine or Chilean officials 

or the local press unless in the company of the Ambassador 

or DCM. 

3. Perhaps a competent, Spanish-speaking Department officer 

along on the trip. 

CONFIDENTIAL— 

Review on June 10, 1986 

No Obiection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-17-141-3-9-5

No Objection To Declassification in ?-ull 2012/12/12 : NLC-17-141-3-9-5 

CONI1 IDENTIKIT 2 

What can we get out of the trip7 

t 

1. There might be some mileage in showing that we have a 

Spanish-speaking (albeit not Latin American) person in 

this senior position, although thiB is not likely to be 

the reaction in Argentina or Chile, which view themselves 

as better than Mexicans. 

2. In Argentina, Hidalgo will be one more signal that we are 

seeking to normalize our relations with Argentina and will 

give their military something to be happy about since there 

is no chance that we can move on repeal of Kennedy-Humphrey. 

3. In Chile, it is probably useful to give an occasional signal 

that our ostracism of Chile is neither total nor permanent. 

If there is to be near-term political movement within Chile 

it will probably come from the military. 

4. HidaTgo should, in Argentina, ensure that the human rights 

message is stated firmly and clearly. If he does this, it 

may have added effect, coming from'a person of mixed political 

and military credentials, t 

5. In Chile, this mixture of credentials could also be useful 

in getting across the depth of concern here over the Letelier 

case, even among people who are not rabidly opposed to the 

current Chilean Government. If Hidalgo were diplomatically 

adroit, he might even be able to convey the idea that we 

could deal more readily with a military government under 

some other leadership. 

BUT, I have no evidence that Hidalgo is adroit and I don't know 

what his personal views (if any) are on these matters. As I 

look at the balance of what good he could do as opposed to how 

much harm, the latter is clearly greater. (C) 

Why doesn't he stay home and campaign for the President? 

This was coordinated with Pastor who will also write an additional 

memo. 

t 

■CONFIDENTIAL 


No Objection To Declassification in :rull 2012/12/12 : NLC-17-141 -3-9-5 

MEMORANDUM 

-SfiGRET- 


June 10, 1980 

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ‘ 

FROM: 

ROBERT PASTOR 

SUBJECT: Hidalgo's Visit: DOD and Latin America — 

MBB Lunch (S) 

DOD's decision to press Secretary of Navy Hidalgo's trip to 

Argentina and Chile is symptomatic of their continued efforts to 

undermine the President's human rights and security objectives in 

Latin America. I hope you will oppose Hidalgo's visit, and urge 

Harold Brqwn to focus his department's energies on the Caribbean 

area and on strengthening our ties to the military in democraticcountries 

in the region. (S) 

There are two serious consequences, which follow from DOD's 

persistent preoccupation on the Southern Cone: (1) our human 

rights policies to the region are weakened; mixed signals of US 

intentions are sent, playing into the hands of those who seek 

proof of Carter's inconsistency; and (2) they have no time or 

strategy for dealing with the real security problems in the 

Caribbean area or for developing warm relationships with thee 

military in democratic nations, like Venezuela or Colombia. The 

President has repeatedly said he wanted us to reserve our warmest 

relationships for the democracies in the area and have cooler, 

more distant relations with military governments. We have been 

reasonably successful in doing this, although DOD has not been helpful. 

(S) 

While I think it's a good idea to move gradually toward a more 

normal relationship with Argentina, and this includes a military 

dimension, I think it's practically obscene and definitely makes 

us look wildly inconsistent for DOD to gallop off at such a quick 

pace to a new relationship. The Inter-agency group has agreed to 

more military measures for cooperation than I think is appropriate, 

but a visit by Hidalgo will break the camel's back. The only 

thing we will get out of his visit is grief. We've got enough. (S) 

As we move toward an improved relationship with Argentina, it is 

of the greatest importance that our two galloping horses — 

Commerce and Defense — be encouraged to stress the continuity of 

our concerns about human rights; otherwise, it will look like 

another zig in our policy. DOD and Commerce will not even mention 

human rights , except to say that we're o.k., you're o.k., unless 

they are told to do so. (S) 

cc: Tom Thornton/Linc Bloomfield f 

JSJSGRET 

Review 6/10/90 

Extended by Z. Brzezinski 

Reason: NSC 1.13(f) 

No Obiection To Declassification in -ull 2012/12/12 : NLC-17-141-3-9-5


> iri ..n.dum 

4- *0 / 4* ~\Jll 

•SECRET 

INFORMATION 


POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE "MEETING 

May 14, 198 ft 


SUBJECT: 


Summary of Conclusions — PRC Meeting 

on Argentina (C) 

PARTICIPANTS 

State 


Secretary 


Secretary 

Defense 





Agriculture 



Commerce 



for Internat. Economic Policy 


Energy 



Arms Control and Disarmament 

Spurgeon Keeny, Dep. Director 


Exports Div. Chief, Bureau 

of Nonproliferation 




Jack Davis, NIO for Latin America 

White House 

David Aaron 

Henry Owen 

National Security Council 

Thomas P. Thornton 

Robert Pastor 

The PRC met to discuss US-Argentine relations in light of your 

concern about the development of closer ties between Argentina 

and the Soviet Union. It was. agreed that we should continue to 

seek improvement in our relations with Argentina, recognizing 

NSC review(s) completed. 

■SECRET ? 




■ No Objection To Declassification 2009/07/31 

MORI/CDF C03314786 

□cCLASSIFiEL 

E.0.13526 

NAHA -----Date_jml*------- 

ILC-15-3-2-2-8 .


SB 2 

that probably no dramatic progress (or, for that matter, deterioration) 

is likely until there is a new government in Buenos 

Aires in early 1981. In the next few weeks we may have to 

show our displeasure over Argentina's likely failure to be 

cooperative on the grain embargo; on the other hand, we can 

justify some positive steps in the relationship by the improving 

trend of Argentina's human rights performance. (S) 

Looking to the longer-term, and assuming continuing improvement 

in human rights matters, we would propose a systematic effort 

to strengthen our ties with Argentina. This could ultimately 

lead to full normalization and perhaps repeal of legislative 

restrictions on military supply. (S) 

This timetable should help deflect the Argentinians from too 

close a relationship with the Soviets — a relationship that 

is in any event probably self-limiting due to the nature of 

the Argentine regime. (S) 

All agencies supported this consensus; both Commerce and Defense 

however, made clear in the course of the discussions that they 

want to press for more rapid improvement in the relationship 

than do the other agencies. Defense was particularly concerned 

that our human rights and nuclear policies were forcing Argentina 

to draw close to the USSR. An interdepartmental Group will 

be set up to provide an opportunity to fine-tune our policies to 

meet the needs and concerns of individual agencies in line with 

the broad policy structure agreed upon. (S) 

CECIU5P 

? 


' No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/23 : NLC-133-8-3-20-0 


WASHINGTON 

____ . _ ___ __________ February 1. 1980 

DOS REVIEWED 10-Feb-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT ! 

FROM: 

Cyrus Vance C¥^ 

1. Harrlman Dinner for Fraser - l received a report 

this morning about the dinner last night by Averell Harrlman for 

Malcolm Fraser. Muskie made the observation that never 

in his memory since the end of World War U had the country been 

more unified behind the President as a result of die response 

to the State of the Union. Glenn, while using more cautious language, 

echoed the same sentiments. 

2. Argentina - I received a cable from Buenos Aires 

this afternoon which reports a meeting between Foreign Minister 

Pastor and our Ambassador. The Foreign Minister went out of 

his way to scotch the rumors that the Argentinians were 

backing off of the understandings reached with Andy. He said 

that he had heard some of these rumors but they were not reliable. 

Pastor indicated he would probably call m& in the next day or so 

to let ub know the Argentinians are not backtracking, and that they 

want to support and be with the United States. 

3. Rhodesia and the Security Council - In close cooperation 

with the British, Don McHenry negotiated major changes in the 

African draft resolution of January 31. Early this morning, London 

requested a series of further changes and renewed its plea 

that we vote '’No" if the UK does. McHenry reported that the 

Africans are disposed to consider further alterations but that 

they will remain firm on the paragraph condemning South African 

intervention. We expect that something close to the present draft 

will be tabled. Don believes that the text has been improved to the 

—SECRET 

RDS - 2/3 2/1/00 (Vance, Cyrus) DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

* Authority ~ 

NARA__££___Data ------ 

Nn Ohiprtinn Tn Dprlasssifinatinn in Full 2012/11/23 ■ Nl P.-133-R-3-2D-0


• SEGREP* 

-2- 

point where we should support it. The BritishMission 

in New York favors a UK abstention, but their instructions 

are clear in insisting on deletions of the condemnation of South 

Africa. I will talk to Don again in the morning and be in touch 

with you. The vote won't come until tomorrow afternoon. 

4. Summer Olympics - Within the past 24 hours we have had 

a strong confidential message of support Jjrom the PRC, a public 

statement from Japan, and evidence that public opinion is slowly 

moving the French government in our direction. Equally encouraging 

are the courageous public stands taken by the governments of 

The Netherlands and Norway. Muhammed All's five-nation trip 

to Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, Liberia and Senegal, is now set. 

Indications are that Ali will receive an enthusiastic welcome 

even from nations inclined to go to the Moscow games. The impact 

of his mission in Africa should be considerable. African and US 

press interest is mounting and a number of reporters and a network 

pool are expected to join the party in Dar-es-Salaam or Nairobi. 

5. Greek Reintegration and Resumption of Base Negotiations - 

Matt Nimetz met with the Greek Ambassador today to respond to 

Prime Minister Karamanlis' message to me. He told the Ambassador 

that we continue to attach great importance to Greek reintegration, 

that we are willing to resume negotiations for a new 

agreement on our bases in Greece, and that Bernie Rogers would soon 

be in touch with Greek military leaders to discuss his latest proposal. 

Matt urged the Greeks to cooperate with Rogers. 

Karamanlis’ message urged that the base negotiations consider 

a US pledge to maintain the existing ratio in our future military 

assistance to Greece and Turkey. Matt told the Ambassador 

we could not enter the negotiations with preconditions, but were 

aware of the need to design our military assistance programs in 

a manner which preserved the military balance in the region; our 

legislation required this. The Ambassador thought Athens would 

need some commitment on aid proportionality. We are considering 

ways to meet the Greek concerns while not committing ourselves to 

any fixed ratio. 

-SEORET - 

Nn Dhiprtinn Tn Dpr.laîfinatinn in f-iill PD12/11 /?3 ■ Nl P.-133-8-3-20-0'


-SECRET 

6. FRG Proposal for International Assistance to Turkey - 

German Finance Minister Matthoefer gave Ambassador Sloes sei the 

following FRG preliminary thinking on the International assistance 

effort for Turkey: The FRG envisions a five-year program subject 

to annual review but with a "big start" the first year. The total economi 

assistance the FRG is contemplating as its contribution for 1980 

Is $290 million (US FY-81 request for economic assistance is 

$200 million). The US would have to exceed the FRG (perhaps by 

$50 million) but this could be in the form of military assistance. 

The FRG is also considering making a commitment for $347 million 

in military assistance in 1980 (US FY-81 request for military 

assistance is $250 million FMS). The FRG believes that three times 

the combined US and FRG contributions (fan be elicited in the total 

program. This would mean $3.5 billion in economic and military 

assistance from all sources in 1980. Matthoefer wants to complete 

the program by April, 

7. Victor Paknieri's Report - We have sent you Victor 

Palmieri'B report on hts January trip to Southeast Asia, 

which focuses on the Indochina Refugee program, and the 

complex Kampuchean relief situation in particular. The report 

makes clear that the food situation in Kampuchea is very likely to 

take a major turn for the worse in early spring without more 

effective distribution of the relief supplies now coming into the 

country under the ICR C/UNICEF program. This could add to the 

serious refugee pressures in Thailand. 1 commend the report to 

your attention. 

\ln nhipntinn Tn npnla«5«?ifir.atinn in i-nll 2D19/11/23 • Nl G-133-R-3-20-D

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/07/18 : NLC-133-43-6-4-6 J72 

to 

r -MEMORANDUM 

■ SECRET- 

INFORMATION 


Hay 12, 1980 



FROM: THOMAS THORNT — 

SUBJECT: 

Briefing Memorandum - Argentine PRC (U) 

1 

* 

State has generated a lot of paper for this meeting. At Tab B 

is a "discussion paper" that was written for the planned, but 

cancelled, meeting on Argentina two weeks ago. You can skip 

it. (U) 

At Tab A is the issues paper for the current meeting. Although 

it makes reference to the earlier "discussion paper" it is 

essentially self-contained. After a three-page discussion of 

the setting, the paper goes into the mid-range issues in some 

detail and then concludes with three broad options for policy 

(pp. 10-11). Not surprisingly, the middle of these options 

is the policy that waB proposed in the old discussion paper. 

The two surrounding options can be characterized as the "Pat 

Derian Option" — a very cool approach to the Argentinians 

and the "DOD Option" — which would press ahead more rapidly 

than we are doing now. There is an annex on Soviet-Argentine 

relations that you can skip. (S) 

I would not recommend that you get involved in the discussion 

effective by ensuring that some basic considerations are kept 

in view: 

1 

— We are concerned about the growtî of Soviet influence in the 

Southern Cone, Brazil as well as Argentina. We should avoid 

forcing Argentina to turn to the Soviets, but our main thrust 

(in private discussions as you did with Martinez, but also 

publicly) should be to point out that Argentina is approacha 

basic choice in its orientation. There iB only one way 

that choice can go, given Argentine history and the anticommunist 

rationale used to justify the regime's policies. 

We should enlist the support of our allies in this. (S) 

3ECRET 


DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority 

NARA__£6___ Data. ^VvVwi

* 

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/07/18 :J\ILC-133-43-6-4-6_ 72 

KnnTiifT - 

9IILXU& X 2 

t 

— Argentina has given us little to be thankful for on grain 

sales to the USSR. Their exports have substantially weakened 

the effectiveness of the grain suspension, and we have no 

reason to believe they will be more cooperative in the next 

crop year. Within our overall strategy, we should keep 

strong pressure on them; attempt to elicit their support 

(however unlikely); and not be apologetic about our own 

actions (as State has tended to be). (C) 

— We should not gratuitously offend Argentina on human rights 

and should pay attention to ways of rewarding improvement in 

their behavior. We should not make a major shift in our policies, 

however, for their performance is still among the worst 

in Latin America (see the summary on p. 2 of Tab A). We also 

must keep the overall credibility of our policy in mind and 

should not trade off human rights concerns against loosening 

of their Soviet ties or a cutback in grain sales. Our focus 

should be on improvement of current practises. The need for 

an accounting of the "disappeareds" cannot be swept aside 

although it should not be the prime focus of our approach. 

(S) 

— Military contacts are important and should be encouraged 

in an inconspicuous way. They should be done in a way 

that underscores, rather than weakens, our human rights 

policy. It would be foolhardy to seek any revisions in 

the legislation at this time to permit us to sell military 

equipment to Argentina. That would be too clear an 

abandonment of our human rights policy. This is true 

even for sale of training, as desirable as that may be 

in itself. (Madeleine agrees.) (S) 

Overall, the choice has to be for Option B. Much, however, 

will depend on the manner of our presentation. We should be 

tough with Argentina, not approach them as a suppliant. 

Through the three visits to B.A., we have made a serious 

opening bid and have gotten nothing in return except perhaps 

their decision on the Olympics. If some of our human rights 

people have been overly zealous they mety need to be reined in 

a bit, but the essence of the problem is in Argentine performance, 

not our reaction to it. (S) 

Bob Pastor points out that Argentina was not helpful to us at 

San Jose, partly in deference to Cuha. Add to this their 

failure to carry through on their promises to ratify Tlatelolco 

and their other shortcomings and we have a picture of a pretty 

-jjBCIlST—


-SECRET 3 

tough case. We should handle it th^t way, while trying to get 

Argentina to shape up on issues of importance to us. (S) 

Addendum (I) : Our commercial relations with Argentina are not 

part of the agenda but may be raised by Luther Hodges. The 

most important pending item is OFIC guarantees for US involvement 

in a hydroelectric project, affacting both Argentina and 

Paraguay. The relevant human rights legislation is apparently 

ironclad and precludes OPIC support. Yet Hodges has just completed 

a trip to Argentinta to promote US sales of hydroelectric 

equipment! The Christopher committee will meet on this one 

Thursday and Line and I will try to find a reasonable solution 

to this silly situation. It lookB, however, like we may be in 

a legal straight-jacket. (C) 

Addendum (II) i Brazil ±b also not specifically on the agenda 

and although we are of course concerned about Soviet blandishments 

there, I see no issue that needs PRC consideration. 

Ambassador Sayre wrote to Harold Brown (who sent a copy of the 

letter to you — Tab C) about exchange of military visits. 

That, however, can be handled routinely. (C) 

\ 

Clearances: 

Lincoln Bloomfield (in draft) 

Tim Deal (" " ) 

Jerry Oplinger (" " ) 

t 

SECRET

foos REVIEWED io-JanÔ'TlTDECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE INVuLffl16 '■ NLC-133-22-30-3-3 

* MEMORANDUM 


TOMl'11DliMTlAL/LIMDI S 

XGDS-4 August 28, 1978 

T 



FROM: ROBERT PASTOR A. 

SUBJECT 

Human Rights in'*Argentina 

Our Embassy in Buenos Aires has sent us a 14-page, singlespaced 

Memorandum of Conversation with Alfredo Bravo, co-* 

President and one of the founders of the Argentine Permanent 

Assembly for Human Rights. Bravo spent four hours 

with our Embassy officials detailing the horrors of his 

'imprisonment and torture by the Buenos Aires police. 

Bravo's story is a compelling one, and I found myself 

reading through the entire 14-page Memcon, though I had 

intended only to skim it. 

Because I believe his story is important as we begin to lay 

the groundwork for a new strategy to Argentina, I have prepared 

below a short summary of that Memcon. 

Bravo's account is that of a classic "disappearance"—plainclothosmen 

entered the classroom where he was teaching, took 

him for "questioning" blindfolded and in an unmarked car. 

Then begins, the horror. 

Bravo was held for ten days in various detention centers. 

During that time he was hooded constantly, naked, and denied 

food and water. The list of tortures he experienced and 

witnessed reads like a primer of cruel and unusual punishment. 

He himself was: 

— beaten, both by hand and rubber clubs; 

— subjected to electrical shocks via a four-pronged 

electric picana until his mouth and jaws were paralyzed; 

— subjected to a bucket treatment where his feet were 

held in a bucket of ice water until thoroughly chilled and 

then shoved into a bucket of boiling water; 

( 

— subjected to "the submarine"—repeatedly being held 

under water until almost drowned. 

’CONTIDHHTIAL/L IMP.ES 

XGDS-4 (Classified by Z. Brzezinski) 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority N L^>-~~ I 

MARA F-P _DetoJllSilk_________

XGDS-4 

Objection To Declassification in

No Objection To Declassification in trull 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-2-4 

MEMORANDUM 


•fpflMF I DFN'T1 T a r. - GDS 




DAVID AARON 

f 

FROM: ROBERT PASTOR ■ - 





Southern Cone, and if so, how we got i^to it, and whether the 




i 

I. Argentina1s Human Rights Situation 

Argentina is still one of the world's most serious human 

rights problem countries. Just this month, Amnesty International 









correct that. 











II. 

U.S. Policy 




Authority. 

NAHA_!£Jt- 

declassified 

E.0.13528 

.Doto 

o 

A


” VJUw) Ct 




^ 



on Human Rights/ and there is no deterioration in the human 








which would permit the enormous back-lcg of credit to be committed 

before then. (There are over 7.5 pending FMS cases for 





Our current objectives are to urge the G0A-: (1) to permit the 

IAHRC to visit in accordance with the IAHRCl's regulations; 

(2) to begin releasing large numbers oij prisoners (without rearresting 


those which have occurred; and (4) to seek a return .to the rule 

of law. 

Everything is stuck now pending Argentina's reaching agreement 

with the Inter-American Commission or moving on one of the 



consulting NSC. 

III. Future U.S. Policy: who Blinks at the Brink? 





The last question is definitely the easiest. First of all, 



working to restore the rule of law. Terrorism has not’ left 

Argentina, but it is now the exception{ not the rule. And 





his OAS speech last year, "The surest way to defeat terrorism 


the future it seeks to promote, rt produces only more 

violence..." 

CONFIDENTIAL-- -GDS

No Objection To Declassification in pull 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-2-4 

COMrIDEMTIitt. - GDS -3- 

I, myself, believe that we may have overloaded the'■‘circuits 





that with respect to Argentina we tie our X-M credits, oppose 




_ cjnr-piy as a different decision on Dresser. 

Personally, I am most disturbed about the decision not to 

finance $270 million worth of Export-Import Bank credits. 

I don't believe that this is either a legitimate or an effective 

instrument, though I do agree with State that the law gave us 

little choice. The decision did have,an unintended positive 

impact in that it has finally aroused the business community 

(there are $600 million worth of credit applications pending 

in' X-M), and they have descended on met and I have deflected 

them to Capitol Hill, where they helped defeat more restrictive 

amendments to the X-M bill last week. 

I had sensed that we were approaching the brink when Newsom 

told me he had decided to hold everything up until the 

Argentines agreed to a visit by the‘Inter-American Commission. 

Newsom, Bushnell, and our Ambassador Castro all thought 

Argentina would reach agreement soon, but I had my doubts and 

still have them. Vaky agrees with me, and we both are looking 

into ways to step back from the brink without appearing as if 

it is we who blinked first. 

It is not at all clear that the Argentines won't blink first. 

For one thing, the Europeans made a joint demarche in March', 

and they seem to be behind us. Secondly, world public opinion 

is becoming conscious that Argentina is this year's Chile, and 

the Argentines have become so nervous that they took out a half 

dozen pages of ads in the Times and have given at least 

$1 million to a Madison Avenue P.R. firm to improve its image. 

Most important, Videla, for the first time in a very long time, 

i-s in charge. And he keeps saying he is eager to move forward 

on his own to restore the rule of law/ As he takes those steps, 

I will make sure that we are quick to respond. 

So I will work closely with Pete Vaky to try to develop a strategy 

to make sure we don't totter over the brink. Since we will have 

to act before October 1, I am conscious of a quick turn-around, 

and as soon as we have a strategy, I will get back to you. 

IV. The Southern Cone: 

Are We Winning or Losing? 

I think Kissinger's observation that if we don't turn our policy 

around to the Southern Cone soon,.we will have them allied against 

rnNFTnENTTftr T- GDS


‘JSQNF-fBENTTftL - GDS -4- 

V 

us is out-of-date and wrong. For a short .time, in early 1977, 

the Southern Cone countries -- led by Brazil but including 

Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay — tried to.establish 





Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are big countries with extremely 








at'any time since January 1977, and they are as good as can 



tried through the working groups and the yisits by the President 

and Vance to develop a cooperative relatiohship, but that will 


■ • t 


the military leaders in Argentina and Brazil, is that ^Jimmy 




in the universities because'of his strong anti-Communism and the 

Bay of Pigs intervention. Carter is clearly viewed as a man of 

great moral stature in Latin America, and that inspires the' 


sometimes infuriates .some of the conservatives and the military. 




which we had almost lost'. 







ask the U.S. to bestow upon them the m&ntle of legitimacy would 




gOMriDEMTIAL— GDS


-CONFiBENTTTCL - GDS -5- 

V 



and I will take care that we don't cross them, but I think 


around at this time. 

t 

■CONFIDENTIAL— GDS 

t





Delegation: Foreign Minister Carlos Washington 

Pastor will head the GOA delegation. Other members 

unknown. A retired, 56 year-old, Air Force Brigadier 

General, Pastor was appointed Foreign Minister 

in November 1978 by President Videla. He had 

no previous diplomatic experience, and his appointment 

was attributed to his close ideological affinity 

with Videla and his marriage to the President's 

sister. Pastor is not believed to be well versed 

in foreign affairs and has not won wide respect; 

he is regarded, however, as hard working and 

conscientious. He is generally pro-U.S., but 

strongly disagrees with U.S. human rights policy. 

He speaks no English. 

Indochina Refugee Policy: The GOA expressed 

its intention to receive 100 Indochinfese in 1978 

and recently announced that it woifld receive 

300 family groups from Indochina. It also recently 

doubled its financial contribution to the UNHCR 

for assistance to Indochinese refugees. 

Rescue of Refugees at Sea: The GOA has 

instructed its Merchant Marine to rescue refugees 

encountered at sea. We have no reports of specific 

incidents of rescue and do not know what procedures 

would be followed. 

Likely Future Policy: The GOA can be expected 

to continue its willingness to receive small 

numbers of refugees, conditioned on its resettlement 

experience with those it is already pledged to 

receive. 


July 16, 1979 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.Q. 13526 

GDS 7/16/79 Authority M S-a -1 

NARA—fib P___Date 



MEMORANDUM 


■6ECHET.-JCS Review Completed MORI 0)3316040 

May 8, 1979 




FROM: 



State Department 

review completed 

SUBJECT: 


* 

Argentina. The U. S.-Argentina Conference was very informative with 

frank and useful exchanges on human rights, democratization, 

economic problems, the NAM, etc. The Argentines have clearly passed 

through a national trauma, and the memory of the civil war will 

unquestionably have a salving and moderating influence as they 

begin the task of re-building a more democratic society. There is 

a feeling among them that they have juBt turned the corner, though 

they are not in a hurry to re-discover politics. Today, the human 

rights officer from our Embassy in Buenos Aires stopped by, and 

while agreeing that disappearances have declined sharply, encouraged 

us to press the Argentines on three concerns: Timerman, torture, 

and an accounting of the disappearances. He also provided an 

interesting statistic on the civil war: 659 Argentine soldiers or 

police were killed (according to GOA sources) and 10-15,000 

civilians. (S) 

Caribbean. Called a meeting of representatives from Treasury, AID, 

State, World Bank, IDB, and 0MB to discuss the U.S. position at the 

donors' meeting of the Caribbean Group (CG) in Paris next week. 

Given the changed political circumstances in the Caribbean, it is 

essential that the donors have their act together when the full CG 

meets in June. The World Bank has set d target of $650 million for 

the region's requirements this year for project aid and for the 

Caribbean Development Facility (CDF). We are going to have to come 

up with some more money if we will be able to maintain our 1978 

level of 30% of the CDF. (S) 

Two officers from the JCS stopped by to discuss their study of the 

security implications of Cuban military modernization and of the 

PRM on Central America. I asked them to do some work on the 

implications of the Cuban build-up on the "basin" countries and on 

NATO. (S) 

Mexico. STR is sending a team down to Mexico to try to complete 

negotiations. The tomato issue is looming ominously on the horizon. 

Treasury is supposed to make a preliminary determination by July 17 

on anti-dumping charges, and we are looking for ways to avoid that. 

Talked to Frank White of DPS about a joint memo from Stu and you to 

the President on the undocumented workers issue. (C) 

SSeRET 

EYT T1Y1TD 6 YEARS BY 


Authority 

naraJsE. 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.1352B 

\JL- (7- O- 

Dsto

MEMORANDUM 



•SBCRET- March 21, 1977 

INFORMATION & * 

a 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


NORTH-SOUTH 



ON-FII.E NSC RELEASE 

instructions apply 

(Hansen) 

OSD REVIEW 

cinU nlrJ 

Continued preparation for PRM 8. P9MPL_ETED ------- — 

(Thornton) 

Met with Gene Kramer, who will represent AP in New Delhi, for general 

background discussion. 

In the afternoon, attended the South Asia Working Group meeting for 

PRM 10 at the State Department. 

(Pastor) 

1, On Friday night I attended a dinner with the Argentine Ambassador, 

and with two Ministers of his Embassy. We spoke about many issues, but 

the two which we spent the moBt time on were the current political situation 

in Argentina and U .S . policy on human rights. They told me that they were 

well aware of President Carter's great concern for human rights, that they 

were presently undergoing a serious political problem in Argentina, and 

they hoped that the United States would understand, and that they wanted 

to continue to have good relations and a dialogue with the United States. 

Privately one Minister told me that he personally hoped that the U.5 . 

commitment to human rights would not waiver. 

SEGRET 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority ^ P X -O 

NflRA 

Dpte nW\\l# 

I 

I 



SBCRET 

2. Attended a discussion where there were two delegates to the Cuban 

mission to the United Nations present. I discreetly overheard one conversation 

where one delegate expressed his concern that jurisdictional problems ^ 

preventing terrorist actions by Cuban exiles. 

3. Lunched with Sergio Motta Mello, a journalist with O Eatado da 

Sao Paulo, Brazil's leading newspaper, and discussed the current state 

of U.S .-Brazilian relations. He said that Brazilian politics were in turmoil 

at the present time, and it was not clear to him whether the forces of 

moderation or the forces of repression would win. He said that in the 

short term, U.S . policies on human rights may cause some problems, 

but he thought that in the long term it would be beneficial both to Brazil 

as well as to the United States. Like me, he expressed uncertainty about 

how the nuclear problem would work itself out, but he suggested a cooling 

off period might be in order. 

4. Met with Eugenio Velasco, one of the two Chilean lawyers who was 

exiled recently because they were defending political prisoners in Chile, 

and discussed the current political situation in Chile. 

5. Worked on Pan American Day speech, letter to Echeverria, background 

memo for credentials ceremony (Chilean Ambassador), and 

various memoranda. 

Significant Infbrmation/Intelligence 

(Thornton) 

t 

a 

My batting average slipped to 500 as Mrs. Gandhi went down to crashing 

defeat at the palls. There are other unfortunate implications of this, also, 

but they will require detailed analysis . It is not completely certain yet 

that the Congress could not form a government, but given the trend, it 

seems highly unlikely. The opposition has yet to organize itself and is 

much of an unknown quantity although we know the individual leaders 

very well. 

In Pakistan, the violence over the weekend has abated somewhat, but the 

Embassy now believes Bhutto's days to be numbered. 

SBCHET- 

No Objection To Declassification 2009/07/31 ! NLC-10-1-7-2-0


• • 

REGRET" ■ -3- 

i 

The situation on the ground in Zaire shows no marked change. Nigeria 

has apparently taken on responsibility to mediate. This is obviously the 

most desirable outcome. Nigerian Foreign Minister Garba was here today 

and has left for the UN. Bill S chaufele tells me that the meeting was 

productive, and a report is on its way over. I am aware of nothing further 

in the military supply front since the SCC Working Group met on Saturday. 

The Turnhalle Conference being held in Southwest Africa has ended, 

It has produced the basis of a constitution which leaves all real power 

in the hands of the South African Government and provides for an interim 

government that may be in place by summer but will be subject to consensus 

procedures and hence very limited in what it can 4° ■ 

SWAPO remains unreconciled, and the results of Turnhalle do not look 

like a basis for building a Namibia settlement. 

CPastor) 

Panama. In a discussion with Secretary of the Army Clifford Alexander, 

General Torrijos of Panama said that he was prepared to accept some form 

of bilateral security assurance in a post-Treaty period if the United States 

would be more forthcoming on disposition of lands and facilities to Panama 

during the Treaty's life. 

Chile. The Catholic Church in Chile reacted violently to the Government's 

decision to dissolve the remaining political parties, and it feels that a return 

to democracy almost impossible. The Chilean Government has apparently 

given up on its interest in trying to influence the Government, and 

one indication of that is its support for the Panamanian Government in 

international fora. Previously, Chile has supported the United States on 

Canal-related issues, but because of our tough position on human rights 

at the UN Commission and because Panama also voted against Chile, Pinochet 

apparently thought it would be easier to gain the support of Panama. 

Foreign Reaction to U.S, Human Rights Policy: 

( 

In Brazil, the recent silence by the government has given pro-human 

rights elements an opportunity to voice their support for U .S . policy 

on human rights. This is best seen in editorial pages of several 

newspapers and among the congressional leadership of the opposition 

party. MDB Deputy Carreira delivered a speech congratulating 

Jimmy Carter and declared that the West owed Carter thanks for his 

desire to give force to the idea of liberal democracy. 

SECRET 


No Objection To Declassification 2009/07/31 . NLC-10-1-7-2-0 

c:irr*nr.Trr -4- 

In Nicaragua! the Samoa a family newspaper, NovedadeB, included a 

vituperative editorial page attacking Carter's hypocritical policy 

on human rights. 

In Costa Rica, Foreign Minister Fado, said that the Carter Administration's 

policy on human rights "was logical for the country that 

proclaims to be a leader of the free worlti." 

i 

I 

t 

-SECRET' 

I 

No Objection To Declassification 2009/07/31 . NLC-10-1-7-2-0 

t


No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/01/15 : NLC-10-13-4-19-2 

Daily Activities (Pastor) July 11, 1978 

Met with our Ambassador to Argentina Castro today to diBcusB 

the gamut of U. S.-Argentine relations Jt On Tlatelolco, he 

explained the complex ratification process, but said that it 

is virtually completed, and he expects the foreign ministry to 

send the ratified treaty to Mexico. On the Beagle channel 

dispute, he expressed concern over the possibility of war, 

said that we should make our interest in a peace settlement 

known, but should stay away from the problem, and perhaps 

recommend that the Canadians mediate. On human rightB, he said 

that Argentina had made a good deal of progress, and he expected 

it to complete agreement with the Inter-American Commission 

for a visit soon. After that, we could go ahead with 

military training and creditB, etc. He also plans to press 

them on releasing prisoners ft) 

With Mathews, I met with Governor Peabody and aide who were 

lobbying on behalf of the Haitian government for a couple of . 

small military assistance items. 

Attended a session on Puerto Rico between Stu Eizenstat, Jose 

Cabranes, and State people. Henry and I will send you a short 

memo on it. 

* 

Met with Jan Kalicki of Kennedy's staff and discussed a variety 

of human rights issues. He said that'he will try to get 

Kennedy to work on the human rights conventions more. Also 

worked on a possible compromise on the Quito Sueno treaty 

with Pete Vaky and Senate staff. Sparkman has answered the 

President's letter on the subject and I will send you a memo 

on it. 

Worked on letter to Dominican President-elect Guzman, the nonaligned 

cables, a memo on energy discussions with Venezuela. 

At North-South meeting this morning wo discussed the Jamaican 

Cooper trip and a possible address by the President on Northouth 

issues. 

CQNF-IDENTIAI* - GDS 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

ffliithnritv NILC-1D- ~ 3, 


- No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/07/19^: NLC-10-12-1 -16-9 

■SECRET-- GpS 

Daily Activities (Pastor) May 30, 1978 

At the North-South meeting, we discussed the future of Zaire 

and agreed there wasn't much. Then attended, with Tom Thornton, 

the interagency meeting at State on the new PRM on Cuban/Soviet 

Involvement in Africa. Newsom chaired it, and Moose suggested 

that we proceed by keeping our Africa policy, that we not keep 

our head in the sand, but that we also don't run off halfcocked. 

(s) 

Lunched with Paul Kreisberg, Tony Lake's Deputy, and talked 

about ways to put the Cuban cat back in the bag. He raised some 

interesting questions about my ideas on cutting European credits 

and working through the NAM, and I will refine a memo on the 

subject to you. Also talked about USr-Brazilian military relations, 

and I suggested that now was not the beBt time to formulate 

a grand initiative on the subject. (In a later conversation 

with Mort Abramowitz, he told roe he would send DOD's idea 

for a new "minimal military relationship" to the President 

through NSC when it was ready.) 

Met with Gregory Wolfe of American University who was Don 

Fraser's representative observing the Dominican elections, and 

he felt assured that outside pressure facilitated Balagu^r's 

decision to respect the elections. He suggested that Guzman 

might come to the U.S. to meet with U.S. business and Congressional 

leaders to talk about the Dominican Republic's future. 

I said that provided it was clearly understood by all that a 

meeting with the President would not. occur, I thought the idea 

seemed fine. Kirby Jones called and tried out the same idea on 

me so something must be cooking. (C) 

With Guy Erb, I met with Steve Lande and Jon Rosenbaum of STR 

to discuss their latest round of consultations on the MTN with 

selected Latin American countries. They met with mixed success, 

but I think the fact that they discussed these issues with the 

Central American Secretariat, the Andean' Pact, and several 

Latin American countries is, in many trays, more iiSportant than 

reaching agreement at this stage. 

The President received a letter, dated May 10, from Luis Pinerua 

Ordaz, the Presidential candidate from Perez's party in Venezuela, 

thanking him for the President's letter of March 30 and for his 

wonderful visit to Venezuela. The State Department recommends 

that the President does not need to respond to the letter, and 

I concur. 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

SECRET « GDS 

Authority ^ L£,-\0 -ya. -N-\Yrf 

NAHA_££__ Deto__ 



S3B€RET-=- 'GDS 

Significant Intelligence: 

(Pastor) 

Argentinat In follow-up to Newsom mission, Ambassador 

CaBtro told President Videla that US would consult with 

Congress and grant military training application if the 

Argentines invite IAHRC visit in near future under 

mutually acceptable ground rules. Videla was apparently 

pleased and, hopefully, will take firm action to rally 

support for an IAHRC visit, 

Brazil; President Geisel's handpicked candidate Figueiredo 

faces an uncertain future. The broad spectrum of opposition 

is still divided: most likely opposition candidate at the 

moment is Euler Bentes Monteiro—left, of center but 

possibly attractive to Brazilian military. Figueiredo 

meanwhile gave a series of interviews which emphasized 

his inflexible support of current Brazilian foreign 

policy and sought to justify his selection by Geisel— 

on several issues Figueiredo came out so badly that his 

staff decided he won't give any more interviews for a while 

and then only in written form.($J 

m 

Dominican Republic; In delivering the messages from 

President Carter, Ambassador Yost met|. with PreBident-elect 

Guzman, who was very pleased with supportive role of US 

during the electoral crisis, and with Balaguer. Both 

meetings provide a reasonable basis for the still potentially 

difficult transition period. Perez of Venezuela also 

sent congratulations to Guzman. 

Chile; Reports from Chile emphasize that Pinochet's future 

rides on the outcome of the Letelier investigation. 

Belief is that Pinochet will be forced from joffice if 

the investigation reveals DINA involvement. (£■) 

Peru: Although the details are not yet clear, the Peruvian 

Government, in apparent response to the general strike, 

exiled a number of individuals. This is a deplorable, 

but understandable, regression in Peru's hitherto admirable 

progress on human rights.CfJ 

SECRET— GDS 


^ r .No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/17 : NLC-24-35-7-9-0 

744 *******0 0 'H I H H I ~A' L*»*»***E COPY 

CF IMMED 

UTS418 

DZ RUESBA #5172/1 17721ZZ 

C 262017Z JUN 7? 

TM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 

DOS REVIEWED 12 VIAY 2010 DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL,1 


i * 

-CONF-IDEN-TiAT. SECTION 1 OF 2 BdENOp AIRES 5172 

V.C. 12065 XDS-1 6126109 (CASTRO, RAUL E) CR-M 

TAGS AR, SHUM 

SIT EJECT (C) AMBASSADOR DISCD3SES HUMAN RIGHTS -/ITH GENERAL 7ICIA 

REE: A BUENOS AIRES 4721} B STATE 1636Z2 

1. (C-FNTIRE TEXT) 

2. SUMMARY: GENERAL DENIAL ENTERED BY GENERAL VIOLA 

ON JACOBO TIMERMAN'S REPORTED IMMINENT RELEASE. HE 

LABELED RECENT NEWSPAPER STORIES AS TOTALLY INACCURATE. 

VIOLA AGAIN PROMISED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WOULD BE 

REDUCED SUBSTNATIALLY. HE ALSO PREDICTED GREAT MOVEMENT 

IN RIGHT OF OOPTION CASES. VIOLA EXPRESSED GREAT 

CONFIDENCE IAHRC WOULD EIND. IMPRESSIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN 

FUMAN RIGHTS FIELD, BUT OFFERED NO HOP 5 FOR "DESAPARECIDOS 

PE EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN ABOUT NICARAGUA STRESSING 

nOA'S WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH USG IN ITS OBJECTIVES. 

"ICL-A FELT AN OAS MILITARY PEACE FORCE PROBABLY NEEDED 

BUT NOT ACCEPTABLE TO LA COUNTRIES. END SUMMARY 

I 

3. APPRECIATION FOR MFM SUPPORT: GENERAL ROBERTO VIOLA, 

JUNTA PRESIDENT AND ARMY COMMANDER, REQUESTED I MEET 

WITH HIM ON MONDAY, JUNE 25 AT 1715 HOURS AT HIS OFFIC.-S. 

DUE TO MY 3EING OUT.OE COUNTRY, I HAD NOT SEEN GENERAL 

VIOLA SINCE ABOUT MIDDLE OF APRIL. HE MET ME WITH THE 

TRADITIONAL "ABRAZO" AND INQUIRED ABOUT HOW THINGS STOOD 

IN WASHINGTON, DC. HE EXUDED FRIENDLINESS BUT YET 

RTTCWEr CONCERN ABOUT RECENT WAVE OF NEGATIVE NEWSPAPER 

ARTICLES ON ARGENTINA APPEARING IN CONUS. 

4. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES: VIOLA WAS SPECIFIC IN HIS 

DISDAIN FOR NEW YORK TIMES SERIES WRITTEN BY MR OAKS 

AND ENSUING EDITORIAL. HE TERMED WASHINGTON POST 

EDITORIAL CONTEMPTIBLE AND IRRESPONSIBLE. RE HOPED 

.-it##*#*#*#:):*#*## *WHSR COMMENT sfc*##:}'*#*#*#***# 

FOB :PASTOR,BLOOM 

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*******C ONFIDIX' TIA x.*******® COPT 

UrFARTMENT WOULDN'T ACCEFT VERACITY OF ARTICLES "IN TOTO", 


IT CLEAR TC VIOLA AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS ARE INDEPENDENT 

AND ATTRIBUTION SHOULD NOT BE TO EMBASSY OR DEPARTMENT. 

”E ACKNOWLEDGED TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF NEWS MEDIA AND 

STATED NO LINKAGE OR ATTRIBUTION SHOULD BE MADE TO USG. 

VIOLA'S CONCERN WAS THAT DUE TC IMPORTANCE OF NEW YOR'A 

TIMES AND WASHINGTON POST, DEPARTMENT MIGHT CATE IN 

ASSUME AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS POSTURE TOWARDS GOA. 

I AILAYED VIOLA'S FEARS BY TELLING EIM DEPARTMENT AND 

USG TOOK AN OBJECTIVE AND JUDICIOUS VIFW ON ARGENTINA. 

I REMINDED VIOLA THE STRAIN IN RELATIONS IS DUS TO HUMAN 


EMPHASIZED "BALL NOW IN THEIR COURT"ND IMPROVED 

RELATIONS WERE CONTIGENT ON MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS, 

ftp ACCEPTED THIS AS A FACT. 

I 

~. IAHRC VISIT: VIOLA REMINDED ME IAHRC WOULD BE VISIT 

ING ARGENTINA gag are g, ^ STATED THIS 

DATE WAS CHOSEITbY IAHRC AND NOT BY GOA, WHO HAVE 


STATED PRISON CONDITIONS HAVE IMPROVED'TREMENDOUSLY 

AND RELEASES WILL OCCUR IN LARGE NUMBERS. HE SAID ALL 


VIRTUALLY NO DISAPPEARANCES, NO TCRTURF AND NO IRREGULAR 

ARRESTS. I REMINDED HIM OF SIX DISAPPEARED STUDENTS 

AS OF A FEW WEEKS AGO. HE AGREED THIS jfAS A BLACK 

MASK IN THEIR RECORD, BUT DESPITE ALL INVESTIGATORY 

EFFORTS NO INFORMATION EXISTED ON THIS BIZARRE OPERATION. 

*. DESAPARECIDOS: VIOLA STATED IN 1978 THERE WAS AN 

AVERAGE OF ABOUT FIFTY "DESAPARECIDOS". AT THIS POINT 

FE LOCKED AT HE WITH DIABOLICAL GRIN — FROM EAR TO EAR 

— JOINING HIS GREY MUSTACHE WITH HIS SIDEBURSNS, AS IF 

THOUGH HE HAD ONE ON ME AND SAID: "i TA*”* YOUR FIGURES 


YEAR. IT'S ONLY SEVENTEEN DISAPPEARTD IN SIX MONTHS." 

I INTERRUPTED EIM STATING OUR FIGURES INDICATED'TWENTY- 

TWO DISAPPEARANCES. HF SAID EVEN SO, YOU MUST ADMIT 

THERE IS A MAJOR IMPROVEMENT." I ACKNOWLEGED THE 


FROM USG UNTIL THE FIGURE WAS ZERO. HIS REPLY WAS 

THAT THEY WERE GETTING THERE AND WAS CONFIDENT BY 

TIME IAHRC ARRIVED GOA VOUID REACH THE ZERO STATUS. 

VIOLA MADE IT CLEAR TO ME THE DESPARECIDOS" WOULD NOT 

RFTURN. I INQUIRED ABOUT HIS STATEMENT. HF REPEATED 



HVFLY WAS THAT GOA LACKED INFORMATION CN THE DISAPPEARED 

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*#**#**c_0- N -F I—B-E -K--I A l**+****E COPT 

ANT IN VIEW OF THE EXTENDED PERIODS OF DISAPPEARANCE 

HR DOUBTED ANY OF THESE PEOPLE WERE ALIVE. HE SAID THERE 

MIGHT BE A FEW CASES SURFACING - THOSE UNQCCCUNTED 

FOR IN PRISON DUE TO ERROR — BUT THIS! WERE RARE EXCEPTIONS. 

VIOLA STATED GOA WOULD PROBABLY HAVE SOME SiATEMENT ON 

DISAPPEARED WREN IAHRC ARRIVED. HE SAIL IT WOULU'BE A 

STATEMENT WITHOUT SPECIFICS, BUT. HOPEFULLY WOULD BE 

FALATABLF TO SOCIETY. 

7. RIGHT OE OPTION: I TOLD VIOLA THE RIGHT OF OPTION 

PROGRAM HAD BEEN A FIASCO UP TO NOW. Hi WAS REMINDED 

GOA ~ THROUGH ITS APPROPRIATE AGENCIES — EAD NOT GIVEN 

EMBASSY REASONABLE COOPERATION, BUT TO CONTRARY HAD 

RAISED ALL KINDS OE BARRIERS. AMAZINGLY ENOUGH, HE AGREED 

WITH MY STATEMENT, BUT RETORTED RIGHT OE OPTION CASES 

WOULD PE MOVING EAST FROM NOW OR, HE SAID THESE CASES 

WERE HIGH ON THE AGENDA. 

BT 

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OP IMMED 

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f 


TIMRMAN CAST: RECENTLY "CONVICCION", NAVf ORIENTED 

NEWSPAPER, AND THE BUENOS AIRES HERALD, ENGLISH-AMSHICAN 

NEWSPAPER, FRONT-PAGED TIMERMAN'S IMMINENT RELEASE.I 

TOLD VIOLA USG ROPED THESE PREDICTIONS WERE. ACCURATE. 

HE DENIED ANY TRUTH TO THE REPORTS. HE SAID TIMIRMAN 

WAS NO CLOSER NOW THAN HE WAS SIX MONTHS AGO TO BEING 

RELEASED. VIOLA AGAIN EXCULPATED HIMSELF EY STATING 

IE IT WERT LEFT UP TO HIM TIMERMAN WOULD HAVE BEEN 

RELEASED A LONG TIME AGO, IN A JESTING IASBION, I SOGGCSTED 

TO VIOLA THAT AS ARMY COMMANDER AND PRESIDENT OF THE 

JUNTA BE WAS IN A UNIQUE POSITION OF AUTHORITY TO LEAD 

THE WAY. El SMILED AND REPLIED HIS 0LS1ACLSS WERE 

'■'!PLL KNOWN TO ME. IT WAS THEN I INQUIRED IF IT WOULD BE 

PROPER TO DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE *H IH GENERAL SUAREZ 

MASON, CPIYF OF STAFF AND TIMERMAN'S NEMESIS. I 

EXPECTED A MINOR EXPLOSION CN THIS SUGGESTION FOR A5 

LONG AS I HAVE DEALT WITH VIOLA Hi HAS NFVER ADMITTED 

SUAREZ MASON TO BE ONE OF HIS PROBLEMS. MUCH TO-THE 

Contrary, viola lowered eis voice and told me Hi strongly 

RECOMMENDED I DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE ITH* SUAREZ MASON, 

f TOLD VIOLA THAT RECENTLY SUAREZ MASON HAD INVITED 

WIMSFIF TO MY RESIDENCE FOR AN "ASADO" - ”GAUCHO 


BARBECUE I DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE. VIOLA INDICATED 

PVEN THOUGH TIMERMAN'S RELEASE IS NOT IMMINENT, THERE 

IS ST III SOME HOPE. 

9. SARAGOVI CASE: I REMINDED VIOLA OE RENEWED AND 

CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST ON THE PORACIO SARAGOVI 

CASE. BE APPEARED NOT TO BE FAMILIAR WITH THE .CASE. 

I TOLD HIM THE CASE WAS DIRECTLY IN BIS LAP AS IT WAS A 

MILITARY TRIBUNAL CASE. THE CASE WAS UP FOB REVIEW BY 

DIM. HE TOOK NOTES AND PROMISED TO L007 INTO THE, MATTER. 


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****** 0 N I I JLI Js, iV” !TT A COPY 

FLAYED AGAINST A TEAM, COMPRISED OF OUTSTANDING PLAYERS 

FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD. ARGENTINA LOST 2 TO 1 WITH A 

FULL STADIUM OF OVER 75,020 PEOPLE. I ATTENDED THE GAME. 

I WAS PREPARED TO SIT WITH THE REST OF THE "COMMON HERD" 

RUT AS I 'fALFED INTO THE STADIUM AN UNKNOWN GENTLEMAN 

SPOTTED ME AND TOLL ME I WAS TO SIT IN THE "PALCO DF 

pQNOR" (VIP BOX 1. I TOLD THIS PERSON MY TICKETS WERE NOT 

Tr?E VIP AND I WAS PERFECTLY CONTENT TO SIT AT MY 

DESIGNATED PLACE. THIS GENTELMAN WAS ÔITE STERN IN TELLING 

ME I BFIONGED IN THE PRESIDENT'S EOX. I WAS THE ONLY 

AMBASSADOR IN THAT SPECIFIC AREA. THERE WFP.F SEVERAL 

AMBASSADORS IN ATTENDANCE, BUT I WAS THEONLY ONE PERMITTED 

TO SIT NEAR THE PRESIDENT AND- THE JUNTA. I THOUGHT THIS 

WAS AN UNUSUAL TWIST CONSIDERING SOMEWHAT STRAINED 

RELATIONS DUE TO NEGATIVE NEWSPAPER STORIES FROM USA. 

11. COMMENT: THROUGHOUT THE MEETING VIOLA (EP TELLING 

ME HIS PURPOSE IN WANTING TC SEE ME WAS TO DISCUSS 


ONLY AN EXCUSE TO DISCUSS MULTIPLE OTHER MATTERS. HE 

SAID GOA WAS FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH USG ON NICARAGUAN 


NOT BF ACCEPTABLE TO LA COUNTRIES. HIS REASONING 

WAS MOST OF LA COUNTRIES HAVE INTERNAL PROBLEMS JtND EACH 

Country feared a precedent would be established in sending 

military units to settle basic DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. 

Viola said the nicaraguan problem was now beyond dialogue 

AND NECESSITATED CURTAILING THE INFILTRATION OF MATERIAL 

AND TROOPS THROUGH PANAMA AND COSTA SICA. VIOLA 


PEACE FORCE, BUT THE ARGENTINE PUBLIC EOULD NEVER BUY IT. 

IT APPEARED TO ME HE WAS GRCPING C-R SOWING FOR ME'TO GIVE 

PIM SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR SENDING A PEACE FORCE TO 

NICARAGUA, WHICB WOULD INCLUDE ARGENTINA. 

12. ADMIRAL MASSERA: STRANGELY ENOUGH AS I WAS LEAVING 

VIOLA' OFFICE I RAN INTO ADMIRAL MAS SERA, ;-Z0 -’’AS 


VA SSERA WAS CON PLFTELY SURPRISED TO SEE ME AS I WAS TO 

SFE HIM. TEE ONLY ONE NOT SURPRISED WAS VIOLA AND I FELT 

HE HAD PLANNED IT THAT MASSERA AND I WOULD MEET. IT 

APPEARED VIOLA WANTED MASSERA TO KNOW I HAD WITH HIM. 

IT'S JUST THE CASE OF TEE OLD ARGENTINE INTRIGUE" JUST 

AS SUAREZ MASON WANTED VIOLA TO XNOli TtAT I WAS HAVING 

"ASATO" WITH HIM. 

CASTRC 

J IT ‘ 

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' A. **~ 

MEMORANDUM 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/16 : NLC-24-3-4-11-5,$*, 

i w i • V * 


CONFIDENTIAL 


DOS REVIEWED 25-Aug 2009: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL: 

-------- V* 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

ROBERT PASTOR U‘ 

I 

Trip of Secretary Vance 

Al ^ 

Secretary Vance was trapped Into this trip by the request of Argentine 

President Videla and the comedy of circumstances that followed— 

announcement of President's trip, then postponement. Still, it could 

be an important trip for several reasons: 

In Argentina: 

— A breakthrough on Tlatelolco is possible. 

— The Secretary could strengthen die cause of human rights, and 

the hands of the moderates. 

in Brazil: 

i 

— He can help create an atmosphere where more solid achievements 

would be possible,say during the President's trip in March. 

— If he obtains agreement on Argentine ratification of Tlatelolco, 

then the chances of gaining some agreement from Brazil Increase as 

well. But I rather doubt this will occur. 

In Venezuela: 

— He can make a strong demarche on oil prices. 

These are the principal points which could be accomplished on the trip. 

I am not sure I know the best way to plug into this trip, but for your 

benefit, while I am travelling, let me sketch some impressions. 

CONFIDENT! AL-OTTS 

i 


CONFIDENno Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/16 : NLC-24-3-4-11-5 


Clearly, Argentina's leaders are hungriest for U.S. recognition. That is 

why Videla dared to make his request in the middle of the bilateral. 

The political climate is confused in Buenos Aires. The Army and the Navy 

seem caught in an explosive and dangerous struggle for power. Navy 

Chief Massera has shown himself capable of extraordinary excesses to try 

to embarrass Videla and enhance his own chance for leadership. He ordered 

the bombardment and boarding of Chilean, Soviet, and Bulgarian ships; 

he is said to have ordered the kidnapping of the Argentine Ambassador to 

Venezuela when he was on home leave and several important labor leaders 

when Videla was in Washington. Still, no one seriously believes that 

Massera or any other Admiral can ascend to be head of the Junta. 

The Argentines are still a very proud people, but'they are not as sensitive 

to U.S. intrusions as they were in the 1940's,* or the Brasilians are now. • 

The power to confer legitimacy on Videla is our most powerful bargaining 

chip, and we should be careful how it iB done. The potential for improving 

the human rights picture in Argentina is great, and we can press hard 

there, as well as on non-proliferation. 

Brazil 

In Brazil we have three objectives, with die third being the moBt important: 

— to state our policies on human rights and non-proliferation 

clearly and forcefully; 

— to restate our interest in good bilateral relations; and 

— to try to clear up the atmosphere so that we can, in time, move 

forward on the two previous goals. 

One way to clear die atmosphere would be to approach the nuclear issue 

differently. Instead of focusing on non-proliferation, we should concentrate 

on developing arrangements for cooperative research on alternative energy 

technologies. State and Energy Departments have set up pilot programs 

with Egypt and Indonesia, but the concept seems perfectly suited to Brazil. 

Jose Goldenberg, one of Brazil's most noted nuclear physicists, told 

Jessica and I that much of the disillusionment which Brazil's scientists feel 

towards the Brazil-German nuclear agreement is that it would transfer 

CONFIDENTIAL 

-2- 



CONFIDENT ial, 

technology but not science. Goldenberg said that., the U.S. would be much 

more effective if we concentrated on positive $reas of future cooperation. 

The two of us believe that it would make sense to negotiate an agreement on 

the precise allocation of scientific work in the following areas: coal 

mining technology, coal conversion and fluidized technology, bioconversion 

(Brazil has done some work in this area), and solar energy. 

There is currently a Joint US-Braeil Group in Energy Technology, which was 

established under the Memorandum of Understanding, which has met several 

times, but has never really obtained the kind of attention it deserves. 

Secretary Vance'B trip provides an opportunity to probe about Brazilian 

interest in this area. If you approve, I could relay this strategy to him 

during the trip . , 

** Approve _______ Disapprove 

or alternatively, you could bring it up with the Secretary directly. 

Approve 

Disapprove 

I plan to prepare a detailed report, suggesting a step-by-step strategy 

for US-Brazilian relations when I return. If {here are any other questions 

you would like me to address on this trip, please contact me. 

Venezuela 

In Venezuela, our objective 1b quite Bimple: to state with considerable vigor 

our concern that the price of petroleum should stay frozen through 1978. 

There is little else which 1b necessary, but a full agenda to cover nonetheless 

because Perez is such an important ally. 

CONFIDENTIAL 

» 

-3- 





1 

Subject: Request for Appointment with Vice President 

Mondale by Emilio Massera, Military Junta 


On September 26, a private individual recommended 

to Vice President Mondale that he meet with Admiral 

Emilio Massera of the Argentine Military Junta who is 

visiting the United States October 9-11. 

* 

Earlier on September 15, his last day as the Navy 

member of the Argentine Military Junta, Admiral MaBsera 

had written President Carter concerning relations between 

Argentina and the U.S., and requested a meeting with 

the President. Our recommendation on the latter is 

attached. 

Our recommendation on a presidential appointment, 

and the reason for it, are fully applicable to the 

Vice President as well. Our Ambassador specifically 

recommended that Admiral Massera not be received by the 

President, Vice President, or Secretary of State. 

( 

As indicated in our earlier memorandum, we believe 

that it would be appropriate for Admiral Massera to meet 

with Robert Pastor of the NSC staff and Assistant 

Secretary Vaky. * 

5. 

Veldt- 

Peter Tarnoff 


Attachment: 

Tarnoff/Brzezinski Memorandum of October 2, 1978. 

declassified 

(

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-B-10-2 

> • 

I 

DEPARTMENT OF 5TAT& 

WsihmglG*. D C 23&21 » 

7818470 

confidential 

October 2, 19/8 

COPIES TO: —-î> ;' • 43 

P 

MEMORANDUM FOfC'DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 

ARA 


TMC 

RF (jhw) 

SUBJECT: Letter to President Carter from Admiral Emilio 

Massera, Military Junta, Argentina 

On September 15, his last day as the Navy member of 

the Argentine Military Junta, Admiral Emilio Massera wrote 

President Carter concerning relations between Argentina 

and the U.S., and requested a meeting with the President. 

i 

■ 

The Admiral has now retired from military service and 

is trying to build a political base in Argentina. A talented 

opportunist, Massera will soon travel tb Europe and the 

United States in an attempt to gain tinternational recognition 

to further his domestic ends. Massera is viewed with 

suspicion and some hostility by the Argentine Army, which 

is the dominant partner in the Junta. Our Ambassador in 

Buenos Aires has been told that Argentine President Videla 

and the Army would not favor a meeting between Admiral 

Massera and President Carter. The Ambassador has personally 

recommended against such a meeting, suggesting Instead that 

Massera speak with a lower ranking U.S. official. The 

Department agrees with -thiB view; we do not want to 

antagonize the Army by arranging a meeting between Massera 

and President Carter, but we do believe that Massera 

should meet with appropriately high-level U.S. officials. 

We believe that it would be appropriate for Admiral 

Massera to meet with Robert Pastor of the NSC staff and 

Assistant Secretary Vaky. 

Attachment: 

-Suggested Draft Reply 

F,eter Tarnoff 


*/aS/l*7S It 

• -•CONFIDENTIAL’


Admiral Emilio M^PSera, 

Military Junta, 

Argentina, Buenos Aires 

□ear Admiral Massera: 

f 

I have been asked to respond to your September 

15 letter to President Carter concerning relations 

between our two countries. 

* 

As you suggest, there is a need for continuing 

dialogue between Argentina and the United States 

so that the problems which exist can be discussed 

and resolved. 

We are hopeful that the conversations held 

between President Videla and Vice President Mondale 

will lead to actions which will make it possible 

to bring about closer cooperation and better under** 

standing between our two countries. * 

Like you, we believe that it is essential for 

all countries to work toward a world in which .the 

dignity of all is acknowledged and observed. 

» 

President Carter's schedule is very filled in 

the next few months but I would be pleased to have 

an opportunity to talk with you when you visit 

Washington. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 

American Affairs Viron Vaky has also expressed a 

desire to meet with you during your stay here. 

With my best regards. 

Si nee rely 

____Robert Pniatnr


VhmmdrnnA M d* 4 8^whh& ’ BUENOS AIRES, 15 de setlembre de 1978. 

Excelentlslmo seRor Presldente de los Estados Unidos de America 

Dn. JAMES EARL CARTER 

WASHINGTON - ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA 

SeRor Presldente: 

A1 cesar ert mis fundones como mlembro de la Junta 

MlUtar de la RepQbUca Argentina^ he creldo convenlente d1r1g1rme a usted para 

hacerle partTdpe de algunas refiex1 ones sobre la sltuadfin de ml pals. 

Asl como los argentlnos tenemos dlflcultades para 

comprender en plenitud las acdones de la politics norteamericana, de la misma 

manera debemos admltlr que por parte de su gobierno deben exlstir slmllares 1n^ 

convenlentes para vlsuallzar los reales problemas que nos aquejan a los argentj^ 

nos. 

Elio, como es lflglco, produce dlferentes enfoques 

de un pals con respecto a otro. Pcro es deber de los gobernantes vlsuallzar cual 

es la verdadera Intendfin con que se 11 even a la prActlca esas 1nterpretac1ones 

dlferentes, con el objeto de adecuar el acclonar proplo a los mejores Intereses 

naclonales. 

En tal sentldo, me slento obUgedo a manlfestar que, 

afln cuando personalmente he llegado a dlsentlr con algunos aspectos de la polity 

ca exterior de su gobierno con respecto al mlo, jamfls abrlguA la menor duda de 

que sus pasos estaban 1nsp1rados por un noble cuan genulno Interfis por el bienes 

tar de la RepQbUca Argentina, en el contexto global de las naclones que tradlcvo 

nalmente han sentldo y actuado como Integrantes del mundo occidental. ~ 

T?T* -?■ \ ■•'r'-'T' '.>p"'“ »•>;• respeto al honor, al trabajo, al talento. Pero 

Occldente es tamdfin el amor, es la esperanza, y es la mlserlcordla. 

Esta inslstenda en sacar a la luz ese esplrltu dormj_ 

do de Tiuestros pueblos, ha side acogldo slempre con beneplAdto. Results extraRo 

entonces comprobar que, paradojlcamente, el tema central de las presentes divergencies 

argentlno-norteameHcanas sea el mlsmo que nos ofrece la mayor pos1b1l1dad 

de una comprenslfin total entre nosotros, 

Comprendo que exlsten dlflcultades para promover una 

generosa campaRa de promodfin de los derechos humanos en el mundo, que no roce en 

algunos aspectos la sens1b1!1dad de los proplos amigos. Pretender que esto no ocu 

rra serla cas1 utfiplco y falto de reallsmo politico. Yo mlsmo he sentldo la 1ncom 

prenslfin de los esfuerzos por promover dentro de ml proplo pals un camblo de 

outlook. 

Ill a a • 

f 

«

% *i 


. X •ft /•a . yf C*i 

■ umanetonir tn 

^ ^ Ofttfntu/a 

-,.///2. 

Es por tal razdn que interpreto debidamente -y en 

tal convenclmiento se la agradezco- la generosa mencifln que usted hizo el 27 de 

enero, ante un grupo de periodistas de la Nueva Inglaterra reunidos en la Casa 

Blanca, sobre nuestro rol en la cuestifin de los derechos humanos, 

. Esa actitud.nuestra que. mereciera tal. mencifin suya, 

es firme y decidida. Puede usted tener la certeza de que no habrS desviacifin de 

ese propdsito bajo la Comandancia de mi sucesor, el Almlrante Armando Lambruschini. 

SeRor Presidente; al despedirme de usted como miembro 

del maximo firgano de poder de la RepQblica Argentina, lo hago persuadido de 

que debo seguir bregando -desde el llano- por la consecusifln de los objetivos que 

se propusleron las Fuerzas Armadas al hacerse cargo del poder, Como he manifestado 

recientemente ante la IX Conferencia Naval Interamericana, las Ideas no pasan a 

retiro, Yo puedo asegurarle que las nrfas no lo harln y que por tal razfin seguirl 

bregando para restablecer a breve plazo la estructura 1nst1tucional de mi pals, 

His recientes conversaciones en Caracas con el Presj_ 

dente Carlos Andris Plrez y con los ex-Presidentes Betancourt, Caldera, Sanabria y 

LarrazSbal, han robustecido mi convencimiento sobre las posibilidades del afianzamiento 

democrfitico en la Amirica Latina, 

Espero que en los prfiximos meses, oportunidad en que 

tengo planeado "a brief sentimental return to Washington11 en donde v1vf por dos 

afios en la dlcada del 60, pueda tener la ocasifln de conversar personalmente con usted 

sobre la evolucifin de la situacifln argentina. 

i 

Slnceramente,


» 


DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES 

(TRANSLATION) 

LSNO. 69089 

WD/BP 

Spanish 

Military Junta 

Chief of Naval Operations 

Buenos Aires, September 15,. 19 78 

His Excellency 

James Earl Carter, 

President of the United States of America, 

Washington, D.C. 

I 

Mr. President: 

Now that I have ceased to be a member of the Military 

Junta of the Argentine Republic, I should like to share with 

you some thoughts about the situation in my country. 

Just as we Argentines have difficulty in fully understanding 

United States policy actions, your Government must, of course, 

have similar trouble in visualizing the real problems that 

confront Argentina. The natural result is that differences in 

points of view develop between the two countries. But it is 

the duty of those in power to seek to understand the true 

intentions with which those differing interpretations are put 

into practice, in order that they may make their own actions 

consistent with their countries' best interests. 

In that connection I feel impelled to state that, even though 

I have personally disagreed with some aspects of your Government's 

foreign policy with respect to mine, I never harbored the slightest


2 ............... 

doubt that your course was inspired by a noble and genuine 

interest in the well-being of the Argentine Republic as one 

i 

of the nations that have traditionally felt and acted as members 

of the Western world. 

On my frequent visits to all the South American countries, 

I have laid special emphasis on the need for all the American 

countries to recapture the Western spirit as the only way to 

safeguard our continental identity. I have thus repeatedly 

stressed that the West is not to be sought on the map, because 

today it is a spiritual attitude independent of geography. 

The West is mankind acting out the essential dignity of life. 

The West is freedom of thought and action. The West is respect 

for honor, work, talent. But the West i*s also love, hope, and 

t 

compassion. 

This insistence on bringing to light that sleeping spirit 

of our peoples has always been favorably received. It is therefore 

strange to note that, paradoxically, the central theme 

of current U.S.-Argentine differences is the very one that 

offers us the greatest potential for complete mutual understanding. 

I realize that it is difficult to conduct a generous human 

rights campaign in the world without occasionally bruising the 

sensibilities of one's own friends. To pretend otherwise would 

be almost Utopian and politically unrealistic. I myself have 

felt the lack of understanding for-efforts to promote a change 

t 

in outlook within my own country.


3 

It is in that light that I interpret—and appreciate— 

your generous reference, on January 27 to a group of New England 

journalists gathered at the White House, to our role in the 

matter of human rights. ( 

We remain firm and determined in the attitude that inspired 

your comment. You may rest assured that there will be no departure 

from it under my successor, Admiral Armando Lambruschini. 

I take my leave of you, Mr. President, as a member of the 

supreme governing body of the Argentine Republic, convinced 

that I must continue to strive—from afar—for tJie attainment 

of the objectives undertaken by the Armed Forces when they took 

power. As I recently stated before the Ninth Inter-American 

Naval Conference, ideas do not retire. I can assure you that 

mine shall not and that I will therefore continue to strive 

* 

for the early reestablishment of my country's institutional 

structure. 

My recent conversations in Caracas with President Carlos 

Andres Perez and with former Presidents Betancourt, Caldera, 

Sanabria, and Larrazabal strengthened my conviction regarding 

the possibility of assuring democracy in Latin America. 

I hope that in a few months' time, when I am planning "a 

brief sentimental return to Washington," where I lived for two 

years in the 1960's, I may have the opportunity for a personal 

t


mm 

H 

4 

conversation with you on the development of the Argentine 

situation. 

Sincerely, 

[Signature] 

f 

»

• V' 


7818470 

DEPARTMENT OF S'fATE 

W*iMn,lon. D.C. 20520 

COPIES TO: 

RF:WEB 


.MEMORANDUM FOR-. 

SUBJECT: 

MS. CHRISTINE DODSON 


Alerting NSC on Presidential 

Correspondence 

Enclosed -is a copy of a letter -to President 

Carter from Admiral Emilio Massera, Military Junta, Argentina 

which is transmitted for your information. 

I 

This document was received in -the Executive 

Secretariat Information Management Section 

on September 21, 1978. 

Infi 

iirector, S/SÎ 

ition Management Section 

Executive Secretariat 

ext. -23836 

I 

t


^MARY TRANSLATION 

Letter from Admiral Emilio Massera, Member of the Military 

Junta of Argentina to President Carter. 

Admiral Massera notes that he is writing this letter on 

the date of his retirement from the Junta. He states that 

he believes there may have been misunderstandings between 

our two countries because of a mutual misinterpretation of 

the policies that have been implemented. He does not, 

however, doubt the sincerity of the U.E. in adopting these 

policies. He believes there is a community of interest 

between Argentina and the U.S., both of which are dedicated 

to the dignity of human life. He states that his successor 

as Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Navy also believes 

in these values. He hopes to speak with you personally 

in the next few months when he visits Washington. 

t 

% 

7S38470 

t

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2 ^ 

hlUUSh UUL.UJMH.1N 1 / 

Executive Secretariat E&A- 

tofe* 

ACTION: 

INFO TO: 

X 

X 

s 

.D 

/f/9 

URGENT 

D/LOS 

.M/DG 

CA 

Date. 

7 f/pro-3 

*/a 7/7? 

.ACDA 

.AID 

P 

.E 

M/CT 

.M/MO 

_CU 

EB 

i 

T 

_T/D 

H 

, M 

.UNA 

.HA 

.S/S 

C 

-INR 

S/S-0 

S/MS 

.10 

.S/S-S 

S/CPR 

AF 

, L 

.Team A 

. S/NM 

ARA 

.OES 

.Team B 

S/P 

EA 

.PA 

.Team C 

S/PRS 

.EUR 

PA/FOI 

.Team D 

.NEA 

.PM 

Action Requested: 

I Remarks: 

______ Memorandum for the President 

^ Memorandum for the White House: 

Bureau Handling 

Other 

Due Date in S/S: 

~7~ 

&J- 

Authorized by:: confident 

« 

f

No Objection To Declassification'in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-1^33-57-8-10-2 

MBMOftANDU... w ' 9 7&fg03 

ACTION(ARA) 

office of the VICE PMESiDEN'r 

WASHINGTON 

ACTION 

-CUNF JUifiUTIK’ 

Memo No. 916-78 September 2*> 

COPIES 

S 

D 

P 

S/P 

INR 

RF (rs) 

TO: 

MEMORANDUM FOR CHRISTINE DODSON 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

Denis Clift 

Proposed Meeting with Member of 

Argentine Junta, Admiral Meaner* - 

it has been recommended to the Vibe President by a private 

individual tKat the Vice President agree to meet with. 

Admiral Mmuera when the latter is in the U.S. October 9-11. 

Given the current state of play of US-Argentine relations# 

I have questions about this recommendation. Z would greatly 

eppreciate a S t a tn.-NST-. recommendation--on- thi-ar- gvapumX’i 

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE NO. 

FROM 

CLASSIFICATION tG 

No. Pages 

(P** + i 

f M »V1 o V * 

(Name) (Extension) (Rortn number) 

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION 

TO(Agency) DELIVER TO: Extension Room No. 

Pf^-er TflLrnn-^/________ ______ 

REMARKS:---H 

_____ Qdr_ 

jCl K_______ biM1.- 

____________________ 

t 

Hhio^tinn Tn nQr>laecifir>atin 

Cull *3019/19/1 *3 • Ml P_199_^7_R_m_9 

i

No Objection To Declassification in mil 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2 

^ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNcW* 

REFERRAL, 

Dates 9/27/78 


STATS SECRETARIAT 

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION; 

» 

Xoi 

Christitui Dodson 

From: 

DendLa.- Clift 

Date: September 26, 1978 

Subject: Proposed Mtg w/ Member of Argentine Junta, Admiral 

Masaera 

ACTION REQUESTED: 

Draft reply for: 

_______ Direct reply 

______ Dispatch 

xxxxx Recommendations/ 

Other 

T 

President's Signature 

White Kousa Staff 

OthesL- 

Furnish info copy 

Tgauslation 

Appropriate Handlin 

ZnferaatiaB 

DUE DATE: **** October 3, 1978 

COMMENTS: 

W • rjnff|pF| 

^ fort CJSUSTI5C 3 CD SON 

mnr seglstary

mkmorancNo Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12m : NLC-133-57-8-10-2 

OFFICE CF THE V.CE PRESiDEWT 

WAIHINOTON 

ACTION 

Memo No. 916-78 

CQOTIPBBWAfc- 

SaptartWff- 2&» 1578^ 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

Denis Clift 

Proposed Meeting With Member of 

Argentine Junta, Admiral Masses* 

It has been recommended to the Vice President by A private 

individual tHat the Vice President agree to meet with. 

Admiral- Mtnraera when tne latter is in the D.S. October 9-11. 

Given the current state of play of US-Argentine relations, 

I have questions about this recommendation. I would greatly 

appreciate a StatR-NET-recowasadatioe -sn -thia- proposal. 

( 

» 

i


MEMORANDUM 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL " 

5738 

Of3tober 6, 1978 

MEMORANDUM FOR DENIS CLIFT 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

Christine Dodson 

Admiral Massera 

The NSC staff concurs with the attached State Department 

recommendation against a Vice Presidential meeting with 

Admiral Massera. 

NTIAL ATTACHMENTS 

t 

' 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O. 13526 

Au:i-.crity Ki L£ - r?A-S"l - la - 

NARA. 

Date *\\^\u#____


MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBZGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 


Subject: Request for Appointment vAth Vice President 







Earlier on September 15, his laBt day as the Navy 

member of the Argentine Military Junta, Admiral Massera 


Argentina and the U.S«, and requested a meeting with 

the President. Our recommendation on the latter i6 

attached. 



Vice President as wbII. Our Ambassador specifically 






Secretary Vaky. 

Peter Tarnoff 


Attachment: 

Tarnoff/Brzezinski Memorandum of October 2, 1978

COPIES TO: 

P 

ARA 

TMC 

RF (jhw) 

SONTIDENTIftfc 

Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-6-6 -9 

DEPARTMENT OF STAT^P 7818470 . 

W*l»>i«E!on. 0 C 

rOiM 

Octonei 2, 19/8 



SUBJECT: .Letter "to President Carter from Admiral Emilio 


On September JL5, his last day as the Navy member of 




t 


is trying to build a political base in Argentina. A talented 

opportunist, Massera will soon travel to Europe and the 

United states in an attempt to gain international recognition 

to further his domestic ends. Massera Is viewed with 


i.s the dominant partner in the Junta. Our Ambassador in 




recommended against such a meeting, suggesting instead that 

Massera speak with a lower ranking U.S. official. The . 

Department agrees with this view; we do not want to 

antagonize -the Army by arranging a meeting between Massera 




MasBera to meet with Robert Pastor of the NSC staff and 


« 

Peter Tarnoff 


- Attachment: 

SuggestedJDraft 

M 

* S' 

C r M f 1 • 61 AS A ft C A SV9%m |>w a I J ** 

Jt/as/if7s ■ tmi iiTiiMii 

Reply 

. JeONTiPEMTIAL— 

GDS

t 

No Objection I u Ueflabbifii. nlkin in full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-1-5 

DOS REVIEWED 10-Jan-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE'lN FULLj 

THE DYNAMICS OP ARGENTINE DECISION-MAKING 

Conclusions 

Our analysis of the Argentine decision-making mechanism 

indicates that: 

—emphasis is always upon the tri-service nature of 

the government with the Navy and the Air Force 

over-represented in an effort to maintain the degree 

of military cohesion necessary for effective rule; 

—nonetheless, the Army is the predominant service, 

capable of forcing implementation of its preferred 

policies if compromise is imposstible; 

—each service formulates its own policy positions 

based on service consensus, and differences are 

ironed out at the top; 

—compromise in the interest of unity is always sought 

and usually achieved; 

—while often slow and cumbersome, the process has 

worked, and Videla is comfortable with it; 

—the Army's potential power and the tri-service 

arrangement will continue to be the significant 

factors under the new junta-president formula; and 

—outsiders seeking to influence the decision-making 

process must seek access at the top through, in the 

US case, the Videla-Viola channel. 

* * * 

Army predominance is the crucial element in the present as 

in past Argentine military governments. The post-March 1976 

government has been a tri-service affair in structure and 

operation. The Army, Navy and Air Force have shared office- 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

v ritj 

CONFIDENT IAL/EXDI0 C Ui'rU-.J&r____ DatO ----- 


1 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 ; NLC-133-22-30-1-5 

- 2 - 

holding responsibilities as equitably as the manpower of the 

two junior services permits, and all three services have 

participated fully in the decision-making process. All 

participants, however, conduct themselves with the knowledge 

that a unified Army is the "most equal" of the services, 

capable of forcing implementation of its preferred policies 

if compromise with Air Force and Navy views cAnnot be reached. 

Army willingness to accept a tri-service governing format 

in which the other two services are, in fact, over-represented ' 

rests on the belief that armed forces unity is critical to the 

viability of military government. Past experience (especially 

the 1966-73 Ongania, Levingston, and Lanusse governments) has 

demonstrated that military governments dominated by one man or 

one service run a high risk of alienating significant elements 

within the armed forces and thereby, forfeiting the chance for 

prolonging effective rule. Establishing the Air Force and 

Navy as equal parties in the governing process ensures that 

they will have a stake in its success and presumably act 

accordingly. 

Within the tri-service format, the decision-making process 

basically involves each service developing-its own policy 

positions, with differences of opinion jaeing compromised through 

discussion in one of several formal and ad hoc forums. When 

a tri-service consensus cannot be reached, the matter is 

decided by majority vote in the junta (a president's selection 

or removal requires an unanimous vote.) At each step in the 

decision-making process, votes are cast in representation of the 

officer's particular armed force. 

Within each service, the task of canvassing opinion and 

drafting policies usually falls to the office of the Chief of 

Staff or the Secretary General, insofar as that process is 

formalized. On political matters, the service secretaries 

general (Army-Brigadier General Reynaldo Bignone;.Navy-Rear 

Admiral Eduardo Fracassi? Air Force-Brigadier General Basilic 

Lami Dozo) have shouldered much of the burden not only for formulating 

policy but also for conducting inter-service bargaining 

to compromise differences. For example, recent negotiations 

to delineate the power relationship between the junta and the 

president after Videla retirement as army commander were 

handled by the secretaries general. In essence, the general 

secretariat in each service has become a cabinet for the 

service commander. The secretary general is a trusted subordinate 

of the commander, and the secretariat i^ staffed by carefully 

selected officers, often at the colonel1level. 

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIG—- 


No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-1 -5 

- 3 - | 

When disagreements are not resolved prior to junta consideration 

of the issue at hand, it is extremely important 

for all three junta members to enter discussions with the solid 

backing of their subordinates. Thus, important junta meetings 

are often preceded by intra-service gathering chaired by the 

relevant commander and attended by all senior.officers of the 

service. These are closed meetings involving frank, extended, 

and often heated discussions. Nothing beyond possibly the 

topics discussed is disclosed to the public. Service discipline 

is usually strong enough to ensure almost unanimous 

support for whatever service position emerges from senior 

officer conclaves. 

With the emphasis always upon compromising differences, 

ad hoc decision-making instrumentalities are employed without 

hesitation when the circumstances demand. In late April, for 

instance, during the deliberations over the choice of a 

president, the key meeting may well have been that of the "big 

junta" on March 28-30. Senior officerS| from the services (9 

Army Major Generals; 3 Vice Admirals; 6 Air Force Brigadiers) 

met in ad hoc fashion, settled on Videla, and left the details 

on the president-junta relationship to be ironed out by the 

secretaries general. At that meeting, Army Major General and 

Interior Minister Ablano Harguindeguy bluntly informed his 

Air Force and Navy colleagues that the Army represented 70% 

of the armed forces' power and therefore, like it or not, 

Videla would be president. It was one of the few occasions of 

which we are aware, that the Army has so bluntly wielded itB 

recognized power advantage. 

Decision-making centers outside the junta are also 

characterized by the tri-service arrangement. The Legislative 

Advisory Commission (CAL) advises the presidency concerning 

armed forces' opinion on proposed legislation. The nine CAL 

members (3 senior officers from each service) seek and reflect 

the views of their own services, and votes are cast by service 

with the majority deciding. Should the presidency disagree 

with the CAL, the matter is decided by majority vote in the 

j unta. 

The cabinet ministries are divided{ among the services (3 

Army, 2 Navy, 2 Air Force, 2 civilian) and tend to become the 

preserve of the presiding service. Navy control of the Foreign 

Ministry, for instance, has led Videla at times to conduct 

foreign policy outside Foreign Ministry channels. Even here, 

however, the tri-service rule is evident in form if not in substance. 

Each service is entitled to place what are called 

Junta Delegates in each of the ministries and presidential 

secretariats, and in the government of the City of Buenos 

Aires. 

CONrTPENTIAL/EXDIS 


» 


- 4 - 

The apparent anomaly in this governing system lies in the 

ability of the junior services to outvote the more powerful 

Army two-to-one at almost every turn. jChat this has not 

happened often, and never on a major issue on which the Army is 

unified, can be attributed to: 

» 

—the wide area of inter-service and intra-service 

agreement on the general parameters of the National 

Reorganization Process, a crucial factor which lends 

cohesion to the entire process; 

—tacit recognition of the Army's strength in any 

forced showdown; and 

—the knowledge that schisms would be the harbinger of 

a near-term end to military rule. 

Generally, the Navy has been more prone to challenge the 

Army on a variety of issues, often because of the personal 

interests and ambitions of Commander Hassera. Air Force 

Commander Agosti has supported the Navy insofar as challenge 

has been useful to maintain the independence and influence of 

the junior services. But the Air Force has generally been 

inclined to side with the Army when a confrontation looms. 

Agosti has no desire to test the Army's^ power, nor does he want 

to appear to be endangering the military's reconstruction process 

by backing a navy boss whose motivation is suspect in most 

military quarters outside the Navy. 

It is a cumbersome decision-making process, often slow to 

function, and almost bound to give the appearance of indecisiveness 

and, at times, of officials working at cross purposes. 

The problem is complicated by the difficulty that the Army 

often experiences in developing positions acceptable to senior 

officers with varying political and policy preferences. 

Moderates like Videla and new Army Commander Viola must work 

carefully to ensure the continued support of hardline generals 

like Suarez Mason (Corps I, Buenos Aires); Menendez (Corps III); 

and Laidlaw (Planning Ministry.) Without a coherent Army 

position on key issues, the whole tri-service pattern begins 

to disintegrate. 

However slow and seemingly inefficient the process may be, 

it has worked. Tri-service support for the government remains 

solid, and there is little indication of grumbling in the ranks 

because officers or groups of officers feel their opinions are 

not being at least heard. The system has the added virtue of 

fitting neatly with Videla's personal style and temperament. 

Cautious and reticent about acting without careful preparation, 

Videla has not been uncomfortable with the tri-service arrange- 

■G0NFIDENTIAL/EXDI3 



- 5 - 

ment. Argentines as well as Argentine-watchers have questioned 

the viability of his low-key style in a country that has always 

demanded and usually received strong presidential leadership. 

Nonetheless, his success to date in preserving armed forces 

cohesion argues the wisdom of his tactics. 

Massera's machinations have often added a discordant note 

to the governing process since the March 1976 coup. Politically 

astute and ambitious, the admiral has been" building a political 

base that he hopes to parlay into the presidency, perhaps within 

two or three years. Seen in this light, Massera's criticisms 

of Videla's and the Army's handling of affairs emerge as an 

attempt to compile the basis for a subsequent Massera challenge 

to military government. He apparently plans to present himself 

as a former junta member who dissented from unpopular policies 

(e.g., human rights violations and labor repression.) 

There is little doubt that Massera has complicated the 

junta's governing task, but his experience reflects the two-key 

characteristics of this military government, army predominance 

and tri-service participation. 

—Massera has never pushed Videla to the point of an 

open confrontation that would force one or the other 

from power. Massera knows he would lose. He cannot 

obtain sufficient Army support to oust Videla in his 

favor. 

—Massera has been effective because he has maintained 

the support of his own service. 

Impact of the Fourth Man Scheme 

I 

Videla's August 1 assumption of the presidency as a retired 

officer has necessitated changes in the decision-making process. 

Some new guidelines have been established to regulate the 

president-junta relationship, but little is clear beyond the 

fact that: 

—the junta will remain the supreme governing body, 

setting policy guidelines and reviewing presidential 

actions to ensure that they remain within those 

guidelines; and 

—the president will be responsible for daily government 

operations, enjoying considerable powers of 

appointment (often with junta consent.) 

■SONFIDENTIMi/EXPIG * 

t 



- 6 - 

Videla's latitude to set as well as execute policy will 

probably be decided in an ad hoc manner over the coming months. 

Critical to Videla's success will be the degree to which he 

retains Army support through Army Commander Viola. The two 

share moderate policy outlooks and have a close working 

relationship. Viola, however, will have to work assiduously 

to placate hardline Army elements and maintain their support. 

If he can do so, the Videla-Viola alliance can be expected to 

reflect, and wield when necessary, the Army's power edge. The - 

Air Force and Navy, on the other hand, will be seeking to 

guarantee continuation of the tri-service governing arrangement 

by ensuring that the Videla-Viola connection is not translated 

into a de facto government by the Army. 

Pressure Points. The only feasible tactic for outsiders 

interested in influencing the Argentina decision-making process 

is to attempt to gain access at the top. Since the US cannot 

directly influence the number of officers in any service 

necessary to create a consensus behind our preferred policies, 

the alternative is to work through moderate leaders in the hope 

that they will be able to sustain the support of their subordinates 

. 

At present, the selection process is complicated by: 

—the blurring of lines of authority that has accompanied 

installation of the junta-president formula? and 

—the imminence of the annual military promotion/retirement 

cycle; it could alter the political complexion of the 

armed forces, especially the Army. 

Nonetheless, the most promising alternatives remain Videla, 

Viola, and moderate army officers close to those two, particularly 

Army Secretary General Bignone and Brigadier General Jose 

Villarreal, Secretary General of the Presidency. 

A possible pressure point may emerge in the figure of Vice 

Admiral Armando Lambruschini who is expected to replace Massera 

as Navy commander on September 15. A Navy chief disposed to 

cooperate with Videla would simplify and expedite the governing 

process. Most importantly from the US perspective, it might 

obviate the Army's felt need to circumvent the navy-controlled 

Foreign Ministry and thereby prevent the lack of communication 

within the Argentine government that has complicated, among 

other things, the Argentine-IAHRC negotiations. 

Lambruschini will not indulge in the kind of political 

machinations characteristic of Massera. However, his political 

views are not well-known, nor is the extent to which he will be 

rtAMTiTnn\Tm tut /mVnTr* 



- 7 - 

susceptible to manipulation by a retired Massera. Likewise, 

we cannot judge the degree to which the brutal murder of 

Lambruschini's daughter will be reflected in the new commander's 

attitudes and actions. 

IAHRC Visit. We have no information on the Argentine-IAHRC 

negotiations not contained in Embassy reporting (see appended 

copy of Buenos Aires 6425 of August 18 for the most recent 

account of Argentine attitudes.) 

Timing is a crucial element. The nationalistic response 

to recent US actions (or at least how US actions were perceived) 

provides a pretext for rejecting an IAHRC visit that can be 

convincingly used by hardline officials who would not accept a 

visit under any terms. The current Argentine atmosphere makes 

it extremely difficult for Videla to issue an invitation without 

provoking charges of "vende patria" from disgruntled military 

and aroused citizens. 

The chances of a visit will increase if the IAHRC can 

justify something less than a totally uncohditioned presence in 

Argentina. We understand that a precedent for a visit under 

previously agreed guidelines may exist in the form of the 

Commission's 1974 visit to Chile. The Commission may also be 

inclined to compromise because of the area-wide implications 

of an on-site visit to any Southern Cone country. By accepting 

half-a-loaf, the IAHRC might fatally undermine the reported 

mid-1977 agreement among Southern Cone governments to ban IAHRC 

visits to the area. 

Drafted: 

Approved: INR/RAR/OD:Hunter L. Estep 

ÔWFIDENTIAL/DXmS— 


MEMORANDUM 

I . • 

1 

£QNP£BENTIAL 


WASHINGTON 6275 

ACTION 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


THE PRESIDENT 


Jacobo Timerman (U) 

Jacobo Timerman, the Argentine newspaper editor and publisher, 

who was recently released from house arrest and expelled from 

Argentina, has asked to see you. He has been in New York 

since October 29 to receive the Hubert Humphrey Freedom Award 

from B'nai B'rith. In light of your personal intervention 

with President Videla on behalf of Mr. Timerman, the Department 

of State believes you should meet with him. (C) 

Timerman last week told our Press Attache in Tel Aviv that he 

is now reluctant to write about his experiences in Argentina 

because he fears reprisals by the military against friends 

still in Argentina. For a similar reason, I believe a meeting 

could be counterproductive to our efforts to encourage human 

rights improvements in Argentina. Timerman's release was the 

culmination of such a vicious struggle between moderates and 

hardliners in the Argentine military that it provoked a coup 

(which was unsuccessful) by the hardliners. I believe that 

the moderates would consider your meeting with him as an unfriendly 

(rather than an appreciative) gesture, and they would 

be less likely to be accommodating to future cases. (C) 


That in liew of a meeting, you sign the attached letter to 

Timerman conveying your congratulations. 

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ 

The letter has been cleared by the speechwriters. 

’ -GQMriDENTIAL ■ 

Review 10/30/85 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.Q. 13526 

i.wav-. £-£ n~tn -\\q\ui--------

MEMORANDUM 

5498 

CQNPjEBBNTlAir 

ACTION 


FROM: 


September 25, 


LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIEL 

1979 

SUBJECT: 

Department of State Request for Meeting 

between Mrs. Carter and Mrs. Timerman 

State has sent a rather half-hearted recommendation (which 

was, however approved in principal by both Christopher and 

Vance) that Mrs. Carter see the wife of the detained 

Argentine newspaper publisher Jacobo Timerman. ARA is opposed 

but Patt Derian (who is after me in full cry) strongly recommends 

it. Bob Pastor thinks we should give the Argentines 

two more weeks to release Timerman, prospects being a little 

brighter now. Patt insists that Mrs. Carter be asked to make 

the decision. I feel the urgent need to pass the buck. (C) 


Option 1. Mrs. Carter sees Mrs. Timerman tomorrow (evidently 

the only possible day). 

APPROVE ______________ DISAPPROVE ______________ 

Option 2. A visit be postponed to see if Timerman is released 

(We recommend Option 2/) 

APPROVE _______\/ 

A&Y'* DISAPPROVE _______________ 

CONFIDENTIATT 


Authority 

NARA— 

declassified 

E.0.13526

MEMORANDUM 

CONFitHLlV. i 1AI7 

ACTION 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 



Z3IGNIEW BRZEZ 

ROBERT PASTOR 

Meeting with Admiral Massera (U) 

•J 

At your suggestion, I called Boleslaw Wierzbianski about his 

recommendation on Massera. Wierzbianski met Massera briefly, 

but does not really know him. The suggestion of meeting with 

you probably was made by Massera and conveyed to Boleslaw 

Wierzbianski through a mutual friend. (C) 

I would recommend that you not meet with Massera for the 

following reasons: * * 

In short 

have the 

ernment 

believe 

override 

— When Massera was the Argentine Navy's representative 

on the junta, some of the worst human rights violations 

occurred, and many then attributed that to the 

rivalry he pressed against the Army in the junta. (C) 

— I have not met Massera, but Vaky, Kissinger and many 

others have, and their nearly unanimous impression 

is that he should not be trusted, and that his principles 

do not extend any further than his own 

ambitions. (C) 

— The Argentine government would probably be more 

disturbed at a meeting between you and Massera than 

by anything Pat Derian could do. Videla and the 

Army Chief, Viola, view Massera as their most 

dangerous rival, and would fear that a meeting with 

you would endow him with more legitimacy than he 

deserves. They would also probably fear the possibility 

of Massera's conspiring with you. There is 

little question that he would exploit such a meeting 

for his own purposes. (C) 

, I think that a meeting between you and Massera would 

paradoxical effect of angering both the Argentine gcvand 

the human rights lobby in the US, and I don't 

that anything you could learn from the meeting could 

that. (C) 

CONFIDEN?Tm 


declassified 

E.0.13526 

nara_££—Mc-tSiSVu*.

CONFIDENTIAL 2 

RECOMMENDATICN 

Therefore, I recommend that I respond to Boleslaw Wierzbianski's 

letter on your behalf and express regrets that you will be 

unable to meet with Admiral Massera on the grounds that a meeting 

could be misinterpreted in Argentina as you trying to get 

involved in domestic politics in that country at a delicate 

moment in our relationship. (I will also repeat our strong 

and positive interests in promoting human rights in that country 

and elsewhere.) (C) 

Approve __________ Disapprove __________ 

CONFIDENTIAL


MEMORANDUM 


March 5, 1979 

DOS REVIEWED 22-Jun-2010: SANITIZED FOR RELEASE INPARTj 

? 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSgl IZINSKI 

ROBERT PASTOR 





should adopt a tougher approach to Argentina. From ' 

October - December 1977, we voted "no" on loans to Argentina 

in the IFI1 s. We changed our position to abstention in 


would induce some improvement in the human rights situation. 


now believe that we should vote "no" on loans in the IFI's; 

lobby OECD countries to follow our example; and assess 

whether further action in X-M and OPIC should be taken. (S} 

Assessment 

The report was prepared by INR—not HA— and it is a sobering 


worst in the hemisphere, and despite repeated promises 

in 1978 by the Argentine government, it has not improved. 


There are 2900 acknowledged political prisoners; 


held by the military; and a smaller group is being "rehabilitated." 

There is no effort underway to substantially reduce 


— "Physical and psychological torture apparently 

remain standard treatment." | 

lestimated that 

90% of the political prisoners are tortured, and some are 

executed. (S) 

Disappearances — probably by security units — 


(Argentina's Interior Ministry claimed 40 per month; while 

'::gi:TH

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81 -1-6-8 




than with terrorists. Both international NGO's 'and 



— Illegal invasion of the home — including theft 




using the Argentine government's statistics. Argentina’s 



Videla has admitted that the war is over. INR concludes 

that the explanation for continued official terrorism is 

army politics. (S) 

Policy 






law requires that we vote "no" on non-basic human needs 


law only requires that we "oppose” such loans, and "opposition" 







(2) What approach will permit us to sustain in the U.S. 

our overall human rights policy? When we take punitive steps 





should move carefully and explain our position to a wide-range 

audience before taking any steps, least we jeopardize our 

overall human rights policy. (S) 




&BCRL.T 

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2Q13/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8 

t

6ECRKP- 

«- - - •-------- 





for three reasons: (1) our historical, reasonably close 

relationship; (2) the U.S. under Carter has the prestige and 

the morality which could contribute to the idea that the 

Argentine military government is legitimate; and (3) such 








area at home. 1 think our cool and correct posture has been as 

effective as any policy could be. I think negative steps as 



t 

In short, I would recommend that we maintain a cool and correct 


opportunity both directly and through third countries to encourage 

them to clean up their act. They will continue to try to lure 


evident. (SJ 

But even if you believe aB Vance and Christopher do, that we 


delay. (S) 



a bit longer: (1) The Argentine government has been paralyzed by 

the Beagle Channel conflict for the past eight months; now that 


Argentina's most hard-line GeneralB have been transferred, and 





Commission is going there in May. We (Should wait and gear any 

new policy shifts to their report. That may mean a delay of six 




recommend you call him and ask him to re-consider. If he 



Approve_______ Disapprove 

SECRET— 



■SECRET—» 4 

cc: 

Jessica Mathews Views: 

Bob is right that our primary concern should b& what will work with 





that in the near term nothing will work until and unless Videla gets 

much more secure or there ia a strong change in Argentine public opinion. 

However, there is one important consideration missing here, namely the 

relationship of Argentina to the rest of our human rights policy. As 



terrorist threat if not in absolute numbers). While it is impossible 

to compare events in say Argentina and Indonesia, we do have to struggle 

to make the policy consistent Insofar as we cart, and by these standards 

there is a general consensus that we should be taking a firmer stand 


If neither posture 1b likely to be much more successful vis-a-viB the 

GOA, we should pick the one that is more consistent with the human rights 

policy — returning to the tougher "no" vote position. 

t 

4^ 

t 

^secret 


No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81 -1-6-8' 

ARGENTINA: 

ASSESSMENT OP CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION 

(C) Parameters and problems. The following assessment 

covers the Argentine governmentJs 1978 performance and the 

current situation wirth respect to category-one human rights. 

Inevitaoly, efforts have been hampered somewhat by the US. 

Government.'s limited capacity for monitoring human rights 

events in Argentina and verifying reports*of either positive 

or negative developments. 

t 

(C) Imprecision is most clearly a problem with statistical 

material. Frankly stated, we do not know exactly how many 

people have been tortured or killed, how many are now being 

held prisoner, how many prisons are being used, etc. We 

are forced, in many cases, to reply upon estimates whose 

credibility stems from their relatively wide acceptance among 

groups interested in and informed upon Argentina human rights 

developments. 

(C) We do not believe, however, tnac timely, precise 

and verifiable information would fundamentally alter the 

assessment offered below. 1 The record of Argentine human 

rights events is sufficiently complete to produce a convincing 

cumulative picture of the government;s performance. And 

while precise statistics might alter somewhat the quantitative 

dimensions of that picture, its qualitative aspects would 

remain unchanged. 

(C) Current situation. With respect to category-one 

rights, conditions can be summarized as follows? 

(C) — political prisoners: Approximately 2,9QU persons 

purportedly guilty of security violations are being detained 

at the disposition of the national executive branch under 

state-of-siege powers provided for in the Argentine constitution 

(PEN prisoners).w 

(C) ** The current state of siege was instituted on 

November 6, 1974 by the Isabel Peron government. Under the 

state-of-siege, the national executive is empowered to detain 

prisoners indefinitely, but it can neither judge nor punisn 

detainees. The Argentine courts ruled in 1977 and 1978 that 

the executive branch must cite specific causes for detention 


: No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81 -1-6-8 

There are two other groups of prisoners, neither of whicn 

is publicly acknowledged by the government. One group is 

being held at the disposition of military authorities (DAM 

prisoners) and prooably includes about 500 persons. According 

to Embassy Buenos Aires sources, most of these prisoners are 

either former terrorists now cooperating with security units 

or new detainees undergoing interrogation and not, therefore, 

listed as PEN detainees. The final group involves prisoners 

who have been selected for a rehabilitation program run by 

the security services. We have no reliable figures, but the 

program appears to be relatively small, encompassing at most 

a few hundred persons. 

(C) No sustained official effort is being made to substantially 

reduce the number of political prisoners-by (1) 

< releasing those against whom there exists' no evidence of 

terrorist or criminal involvement nor ipending charges; (2) 

1 trying those charged with specific offenses; or (3) permitting 

political prisoners to exercise their constitutional rights 

to choose exile over imprisonment (r ig’nt-of-option). The 

right-of-option program initiated inlate 1977 has resulted 

in few approvals of prisoner petitions for exile. 

(C) There is little evidence to substantiate persistent 

rumors that thousands of political prisoners are being 

held in clandestine camps located throughout the country. 

(C) — Torture and prisoner mistreatments Physical and 

psychological torture apparently remain standard treatment 

for alleged subversives, or persons believed to have information 

about subversion who refuse to cooperate with security 

in response to habeas corpus petitions covering PEN prisoners. 

However, the Executive does not always respond to court 

order. While we have little information that would permit 

categorizing detainees according to types'of offenses, the 

PEN list probably includes few if any {terrorists suspected 

of having committed violent acts against persons or property. 

Such individuals, when capturea by security units, are routinely 

killed after interrogation. The alleged security violations 

of most of those listed as PEN detainees probably include 

sucn things as (a) non-violent actions undertaken in support 

of subversive (broadly defined to include action or teachings 

contrary to the military.'s conception of social order) 

groups# e.g., poster and pampnlet distribution and a variety 

-sjb€«et; 

Tro-gpNTllAC'J------ 


i


officials. Torture generally occurs during interrogation, 

prior to official listing of a detainee as a PEM prisoner, nr 

^his or her summary execution. I 

^ 

|reportedin 

August cnac as many as 90 percent of PEN detainees were tortured 

curing interrogation- ** 

(C) Prisoner treatment beyond tbe interrogation stage 

and after PEN listing appears to vary considerably depending 

upon such factors as the prisoner's alleged offense, the 

proclivities of the regional military commander, and the 

character of individual jailors. Reports of severe mistreatment 

(beatings, denial of adequate food, medical care, exercise, 

etc.) are most often associated with specific military 

jurisdictions and prisons, or with tbe transfer or release of 

prisoners. In at least five reasonably documented instances 

in early 1978, tor example, prisoners released from a La Plata 

jail were immediately either murdered or kidnapped, presumably 

by security elements. Official actions appear to have prevented 

recurrences of this particular type of abuse, but in late 1978 

an ICRC official reported to the Embassy..his belief that 

prison conditions and prisoner treatment had deteriorated during 

the year. . * 

(C) — Disappearances; Reports of disappearances continue 

to accumulate. In the vast majority of cases, responsibility 

almost certainly lies with one of the many security units. In 

the absence of evidence of clandestine camps housing thousands 

of allegedly disappeared persons, most must be presumed dead. 

of other support activities; (b} economic actions perceived 

by the autnorities as directly having supported subversion. 

(the Graiver case} or otherwise endangered national interests; 

(c) affiliation with groups vaguely defined as “leftist"; or 

(a) actions that contributed to an intellectual-cultural 

environment conducive to the growth of "subversion" (herein 

lies the danger to journalists, writers, teachers, performing 

artists, etc.}. Thus, the term ''security violation" has no 

specific meaning. Its operative definition is largely left 

to the discretion of regional and local authorities with arrest 

powers. 

(C} Reports received from released prisoners tend to 

substantiate the 

on the frequency of torture. 

-secke? 

'NO. CONTRALT 

No Objection To Declassification in Port 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8 

............................................................. . vr____________________ :

No Objection To Declassification in Port 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8 

(ti) Non-governmental human rights organizations tend 

to use the figure of 15, 000 for disappearances over the 

past 3-4 years. Argentine groups share: that estimate and 

have presented the government with documentation on almost 

5,000 cases. In truth, however, no one knows precisely 

how many people hav


regularly accept habeas corpus petitions concerning alleged 

aisappeareo persons/ but they have reruseci to accept' 

jurisdiction in suen cases. 

(C) The Mothers of the Plaza ae Mayo Crelatives of 

disappeared persons,) one of the most persistent and cohesive 

groups seeding information on disappeared persons, has 

recently been prohibited from conducting what had ueen a' 

weekly Thursday vigil in front of Government Douse in downtown 

Buenos Aires. The demonstrations apparently had become 

too large ana potentially disruptive in tne judgment of 

government officials who do not intend to satisfy their demands 

tor information. The Mothers ere now holding their gatherings 

at smaller and less conspicuous sites. 

(C) Given the diffusion ot authority that has characterized 

the counterterrorist effort, it is highly unlikely that 

any government agency either has collected or will be able to 

collect definitive files on alleged, disappearance cases. The 

various security units have an obvious interest in withholding 

or destroying information on cases for which their operatives 

nave been responsible. 

CCJ> "Reappearances" emerged as a new.and possibly underreported 

facet of the human rights scene in 1978. There are 

no reliable figures, but the number of cases is probaoly 

quite small in relation to the reported numaer of disappearances. 

As of mid-September, the Embassy had received reports of 15 

cases ana by mid-November Argentine human rights groups placea 

tne figure at over 100, with a UNHCR representative suggesting 

it might oe as high as 300. During 1978, the government 

published 4 lists with the names of hundreds of persons who 

hao allegedly reappeared. In roost cases, however, the 

individuals appear to have been the subjects of regular “missing 

persons" cases. Their names did not appear on the lists of 

disappeared persons maintained by the Embassy and Argentine 

human rights organizations. 

(C) — Fair public trial. All who have been detained by 

official security agencies and subsequently disappeared have 

obviously been denied a fair public hearing of the charges 

against them. 

4»DCItET/N0J?0RN-/ti0 CONXEACT 

No Objection To Declassification in Port 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8


(C) Insofar as alleged security violators are charged 

and tried in civilian or military courts, w*1** there are two 

notable problems: the often extended period between detention 

and judicial processing and the reported predominance 

of convictions based on confessional evidence extracted 

through torture. Professional legal groups such as the 

ICJ intend to investigate the question of confessional 

evidence. 

(C) — Invasion, of the home. The detention practices of 

operational counterterrorist units regularly involve illegal 

invasion of the home. In addition, tnere are numerous reports 

of arresting officers ransacKing private residences and 

stealing the personal property of the detainee. 

(C) Trends. 1978 produced no substantial quantitative 

improvement or aeterioration in category-one - terms. The year 

featured a variety of positive and negative factors, but the 

net result was to leave the situation*little changed. 2 

Violations of category-one rights at the hands of official 

security personnel were, frequent throughout the year, and 

there was no evidence'of a concerted, effective government 

effort to halt the abuses. 

(C) It is difficult to refine the trends analysis .to 

reflect possible patterns of the incidence of certain kinds 

or abuses because the available statistical material is not 

always reliable. The question of disappearances provides a 

good example. In June 1978, Embassy Buenos Aires .and 

Argentine human rights groups believed that disappearances 

during the first third of 1978 had declined in frequeny 

(about 15 per month) in comparison to 1977. by later in 

(C) *K* The status of PEN prisoners with respect to 

judicial processing is quite complicated because a prisoner 

nelci under a PEN decree can simultaneously be processed on 

charges in civilian or military courts and, if convicted, 

serve and complete the imposed sentence. Perhaps half 

or more of the current PEN detainees are either being 

tried or have been sentenced by judicial authorities. 

This is significant because, among other reasons, PEN 

detainees who are under the concurrent jurisdiction 

of judicial authorities are not eligible to petition, 

for exile under the right-of-option program. 

feB€«eT/rJoroRN/wo contra 



I 

the year, however, additional information forced upward 

ad’justiuents in the figures. Interior Ministry records showed 

a rate ot 40 per month for January to October (as compared to 

150 per month in 1977 and 250 per month in 1978) ana a Foreign 

Ministry source placed the ten-month 1978 figure at aoout 

80 per month. By November, the Embassy had reports of disappearances 

averaging aoout 34 per month for the January-Apr il 

period. The Embassy has since concluded that a figure of 

55 per month would be a reasonable estimate for 1978. 

(C) On the basis of such evidence, the only conclusion 

that can be drawn is that disappearances occurred with relative 

frequency throughout the year with month-to-month variations 

reflecting tactical considerations rather than policy 

oecisions. In essence, the situation changed little 

auring 1978. 3 

(S/NF/NC) Counterterrorism, uncontrolled. The 

conclusion that conaitions did not improve in 1978 is 

cased, in part, on evidence that the security forces 

continued to operate without effective central control. 

Numerous reports during the year from variety of intelligence 

sources stated that: 

— President Videla and his moderate supporters 

were attempting to establish rigid command and 

control over security operations; 

— new orders had been issued with respect to conducting 

jjolice and military operations within 

the bounas of the law; or 

— police and military operatives had oeen dismissed 

or disciplined for abuses. 

(C) Some of the reported efforts were probably undertaken. 

Some improvements may well have occurred, particularly in 

areas under the jurisdiction of officers disposed toward 

reform. Nonetheless, at the close of 1978 it was apparent 

that counterterrorist actions were generally being conducted 

in accord with orders issued by regional and local military 

authorities who viewed themselves as unconstrainea by the 

law or the directives of national authorities. In late 

October, an admiral with counterterrorist responsioilities 

in the Buenos Aires area stated to an Embassy officer that 

there was almost no central control over operational 

counterterrorist units. 

-SECRET/ M U1- .URN'/ H 



(C) The political context. The "dirty war*1 ary ament 

so frequently employed by Argentines to rationalize human rights 

aouses is no longer relevant. According to estimates drafted 

by the Argentine Federal Security Service in late 1978, there 

were only about 400 active terrorists iri Argentina; no single 

group was estimated to have more than 245 resident activists, 

ana no group was judged a serious and immediate security 

tnreat. High government officials, including President Videla, 

have repeatedly stated both publicly and privately that the 

7war" is over, i.e, tnat there is no continuing high-level 

internal security threat. 

(C} The explanation for the continuing human rights 

abuses lies' in armed forces, and especially army, politics 

rather than in internal security problems. The army is 

the predominant service, and its political heterogeneity 

is reflected in the conduct of government affairs. President 

Vibela leads a group of military and civilian moderates who 

woulo preter to see human rignts abusers halted. Videla.'s 

priority concern, however, is to maintain the maximum degree 

of army and military unity, because the development of 

irreparable internal splits probably would spell his own quick 

demise and the end of the military's National Reorganization 

Process. Videla is not power hungry, but he is committed 

to the military government's reform program and believes 

his own role important. Thus, Videla's preferences give way 

to his long-term political goals when his preferences 

threaten military cohesion. 

(C) In the case of human rights anuses, neither Videla 

nor any other significant military figure, has questioned 

the pre-March 1976 decision to physically eliminate hard 

core terrorists. Videla's differences with the so-called 

hardliners center on violations of the rights of non—terrorists- 

The hardliners are philosophically authoritarian and inclined 

to label a wide range of political activity and sentiment 

as subversive. They oo not entirely share the moderates 

perception tnat the "war" against suoversion is over.4 

Powerful corps commanders like Major General Carlos Guillermo 

Suarez Mason (formerly Commander, Corps I", Buenos Aires) and 

Maôr General Luciano Benjamin Menendqz (Corps III, Cordoba) 

continued throughout 1978 to condone counterterrorist tactics 

that ensured human rights abuses. 

(C) Other factors that diminished Videla.'s cnances of 

achieving human rights reforms in 1978 included his August 

retirement as an active-duty officer and Army Commander and 

■SfiCKLT/HPrORH/HO. COWTKftCT- 

No Objection To Declassification in Purt 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8


' -9- 

a gradual increase in military ana civilian disenchantment 

with the general economic and political performance of his 

government. Those conditions, plus ttfe degree ro whicn the 

beagle Channel controversy with Chile dominated official 

attention during the last quarter of the year, created highly 

improbable circumstances for bold human rignts initiatives on 

Videla‘s part. 

(C) The results of the recent array promotion/reassignment 

cycle appear to offer mixed prospects for human rights reforms. 

Moderates politically in sympathy with Videlaana Army Commander 

Viola now may be. in a position to exert more effective control 

over the service. Particularly notable changes involved 

the following officers: 

— Suarez Mason has been shifted from his Corps I 

commanoer slot to Army Chief of Staff. His 

new post is a prestigious one from which he 

might be able to advance to the Commander in 

Cnief's slot. Nonetheless, since he no longer 

has a troop command nor, mure importantly, 

direct control over counterterrorist units, his 

promotion is probably a net shorty—term, human 

rights gain.. 

^ 

— Major General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri has 

replaced Suarez Mason as Corps I commander. 

Galtier! most recently commanded Corps II 

(Rosario) where he established a reputation for 

reasonableness and restraint in human rights 

matters. It has been in his geographic jurisdiction, 

for example, that the most progress has been 

registered with respect to the judicial processing 

of PEN prisoners. If he displays the same 

tendencies as Corps I Commander, he will be a 

needed improvement over Suarez Mason. 

— Major General Santiago Omar Riveros, another 

officer notorious for his permissive attitude 

toward human rights abuses, has been snifted from 

his sensitive buenos Aires command (Military 

Institutes) to the Inter-American Defense Board. 

— Major General Jose Montes will replace Riveros. 

A Viaela-Viola loyalist, Montes could combine with 

Galtieri to give the moderates the potential for 

cucuing the abuses heretofore "characteristic of 

S£i:ftliT/NQFnr

*• No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81 -1-6-8 

*' 

counterterrorist operations in the buenos Aires 

area. 

— brig. General Juan Bautists Sasslain* s appointment 

as Cnief of the National Police is an ominous 

move in human rights terms. A counterterrorist 

expert, Sassiain is reputedly rough and cruel. 

— Major General Luciano B. Mer.encez, a fanatic on 

suoversion who has condoned hitman rights violations 

by those under his command, remains the Corps III 

commander (Cordoba). Militarily, Menendez.'s retention 

may_ be attributable to the need for nis services 

in the event of hostilities with Chile over 

the Beagle•Channel. In human rights terms, 

however, it means that the situation in Cordoba 

is not liable to improve in the near future. 

In all likelihood, the army command shifts will not 

result in immediate and drastic human rights improvements, 

but the political context appears to be more favorable than 

it has been since the March 1976' coup.5 Much will depend 

upon whether the Viaela-Viola tandem chooses to exercise 

the necessary- leadership, and perhaps ultimately upon whether 

the Argentine public becomes sufficiently exercised over 

continuing aouses to demand cnange. 

(C) IAHRC visit. From the Argentine government's 

perspective, the next critical human rights deadline is May 29 

when the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) will 

i begin a week-long on site investigation. 

t 

> It is questionable, however, whetner the prospect of ' 

the IaHKC visit will lead to fundamental cnanges in tne tactics 

employed by the security forces and, thereoy, open the way to 

long-term numan rights advances. In this critical area, the 

army command changes probably offer more hope for reform than 

the lAHkC visit.6 

HliiCRLrl/NOPOKN/NO CONTRACT 

( 

t 



FOOTNOTES 

1. HA Note: HA prefers the following wording for 

the text from sentence two of paragraph 

1 tnrough first sentence of paragraph 3» 

"Although it is difficult to quantify precisely 

certain aspects of the situation - such as 

the exact number of people killed and tortured 

and the number being held in clandestine* 

military camps - we receive a steady flow of 

„ detailed information from a wide variety of 

credible sources in Argentina about human 

rights events and conditions. These sources 

include our Embassy, international non-governmental 

organizations such as the International 

Committee of the Red Cross ana Amnesty International, 

Argentine Government officials, 

Argentine human rights organizations, 

victims of arrest and torture, eyewitnesses 

to incidents of abduction and torture, and 

relatives of victims." 

2. HA Note: No overall trend of improvement in category - 

one terms can be shown. There was substantial 

qualitative deterioration in at least two areas — 

the widening scope of the victims of disappearance, 

and' the worsening of treatment 

of political detainees. Tne simple passage 

of time can also be reviewed as a negative 

factor - another year of widespread violations 

long after any terrorist threats has passed. 

3. HA Note: HA would again emphasize that despite uncertainties 

with quantitative materialr the shift in targeting 

noted above is a significant negative development. 

4. HA Note: However, Videla himself said last year that 

"A terrorist is not ûst someone with a gun 

or boatb but also someone who spreads ideas that 

are contrary to Western and Cnristian civilization" 

(Reported in the London Times, January 4, 1978}- 

INR and AKA view the inclusion of this statement 

attributed by the press to Videla as potentially 

misleading when used in the above context. The 

■BUCKET 

HO CONTACT 

No Objection To Declassification in Purl 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-81-1-6-8

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-B1-1-6-8 

quote invites tne inference that Videla 

supports the application of extreme security 

measures against those who have not committed 

violent terrorist acts. There is no evidence 

to support that contention. 

5. HA Mote: The avmy command changes present a mixed 

picture from which it is not possible to conclude 

that the overall political context for human 

rights improvement is more favorable than in 

the past. 

6. S/P and 

11A Note*: 

S/P and HA would delete this last sentence 

because it contradicts the assessment that 

the command changes are “mixed". 

i 

X 

i 

x 

sjb€*et;mi 

TTO UJNTACT 


MEMORANDUM 


Outsic ;he System 

jeONFIDENTTAr 

ACTION 

June 9, 1980 

/ 

DECLASSIFIED 

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI c.u. E.0.13526 idaeo i i 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

Visit to Argentina (U) 

Authority 

NARA Ja£____ Dato ---------- 

I enquired further about the possibility of your wife going to Buenos Aires 

(see attached). I did this in a low key through State, so there are still 

gaps. I don’t, however, want to be higher-profile unless you are more 

firmly committed. (U) 

Mrs. Mondale will definitely not go. (U) 

There would be no need to go to the other cities. (U) 

The host, as I wrote, would be the Mozarteum Argentino, the head of which, 

incidentally, is Martinez de Hoz. The normal way this sort of thing is 

handled (Nancy Kissinger is the modell) is lots of parties, concerts, 

museums and receptions in B.A. followed by a couple of days on a ranch. 

There would be no expenses involved in all of this; even if the Mozarteum 

didn't pick up the hotel bill, that would be irrelevant since your wife 

would probably stay with the Ambassador anyway. (U) 

i'Vv/'I - \y 

It is not specified who pays the air fare but that would be paid up by the 

Argentine Government. (U) 

^ 

I did not directly raise the question of taking one of your children along. 

That is beyond the scope of the invitation. I have no doubt that the Argentine 

Government would fall all over itself to broaden the invitation, but I recommend 

that you not pursue this. That would make you too beholden to the GOA and open 

you up to criticism from the human rights lobby here. (Indeed, even without 

a child along, there will be some flak.) (C) 

If you want to pursue this seriously, I will contact the Argentine Ambassador 

and pin down the details. I think you should give this some further thought, 

however, as to the political implications. (C) 

GUIDANCE REQUESTED: 

Shall I contact the Argentine Ambassador? __ 

_ 

Or, wait for them to make another move? _____ 

Or, drop the idea? 

_____ 

CD^glDUNTiAtr-- 

Review on June 9, 1985

s t ?t”Yi/sTO/S 

■SOMPIDUNTIAfr 

May 28, 1980 

Or. Brzezinski Only (Thornton) 

At lunch with the Argentine Ambassador, he pressed the point that Mrs. 

Mondale should visit Argentina during the visit there of the National 

Symphony Orchestra. This would be at the invitation of the Moznrfmm 

Argentine and would commemorate the 400th Anniversary of the founding 

of Buenos Aires. I said that this would probably result in US-Argentine 

relations becoming an unwelcome campaign issue and that I thought it a 

poor idea. (I will check this out later with Dennis Clift.) He then 

wondered if your wife might like to come instead. I made no comment. 

The dates are July 24-26: the NSO then goes on to Uruguay and Brazil 

for three more days. Would she be interested? It is all expenses paid 

and might be fun. She would be less of a target for the human rtguts 

lobby than Mrs. Mondale, but it would still come up. How should I 

reply if he asks again? (C) 

\ JjJ- JUk «-">*• 

u. i Kf 

* 

•Jj \ toby 

-OeNPinKSTTAL— 

Declassify on May 28, 1986

■No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8 

ft: 

DEPARTMENT OP STATE 


bOS REVIEWED D7-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 

s/s 

TO: 

The Secretary 

FROM: 

ARA - Terence A. Todmetn 

f 

Your Visit to Argentina November 20-22, 1977 

I. Objectives 

O.S.-Argentine relations are increasingly strained. 

Basic differences on human rights have led to a de facto 

OS refusal to sell arms and to a "no" vote on an 

Argentine loan application in the Inter-American Development 

Bank. Meanwhile, Argentina's rush toward nuclear 

reprocessing raises the spectre of its becoming a 

member of the nuclear club. 

President videla offers the beBt hope on the nuclear 

issue, and the possibility, though by no means the certainty, 

of the progress on human rights improvements basic to 

other issues. But Videla's position is not secure, 

and there are indications that the Argentines expect 

to make some basic decisions on their relations with us 

after evaluating their talks with you. 

* 

In this context, our objectives tare to: 

— strengthen Videla's position vis-a-vis military 

elements who oppose him on human rights and nuclear 

issues (the "hardline" nationalist constituencies 

on these issues overlap); 

— obtain Videla*s agreement to ratify Tlatelolco, 

preferably at a date certain in the near future, and 

to set the stage for possible movement on the reprocessing 

issue; 

— encourage Videla to follow through on his promise 

of significant improvements in the Argentine human rights 

situation through (a) release of detainees or affording them 

due process, and (b) ending "disappearances" and torture./^ 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 ' 

nuVi' P, -aa-iji-u-Vv 

Author! 

frjfc Date --- 

NARA 

CBCRBT 

"Ads 



Argentina's objectives are twofold: 

~ the government wants a clarification of what 

Argentina may expect from us on issues on which they 

would like our cooperation, including military sales; and 

— President Videla will try to make the talks 

appear cordial and substantive and hence* to demonstrate 

to Argentine public opinion that .his 'government has our 

ear and respect. 

II. Setting 

Although Argentina is Latin America's moBt European 

country, chronic political instability and exaggerated 

economic nationalism have long impaired its otherwise 

significant achievements. At the time of the military 

takeover in March 1976 the civilian government had 

disintegrated: fanatical qroups of leftist and rightist 

terrorists fought pitched battles, the country was nearly 

bankrupt, and inflation exceeded 600% per year. 

The three-man Junta, of which President Videla 

is the Army member, came to power with two primary 

goals: elimination of terrorism and restoration of 

the economy. 

Organized terrorist movements are now largely under 

control. The once powerful Peronist-inclined Montoneros have 

been reduced to some 700 combatants, and* the Trotskyite 

People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) to'only 120. Both 

groups have been forced to confine themselves to low risk, 

high visibility operations such as assassinations of military 

officers and businessmen, and bombings of public buildings. 

The defeat of large-scale armed groups has not 

brought peace, however. Acts of violence are still 

relatively common, and respond to various motives, 

including personal vendettas, political radicalisms 

of all kinds, and even cynical maneuvering^ to weaken 

contending government factions, and may on occasion 

be designed to embarrass Videla himself. 

Under these conditions, official and unofficial 

abuses are common. Armed Forces units hunt down 

suspected terrorists. Nonviolent citizens are sometimes 

imprisoned or killed under circumstances difficult 

to ascertain. Homes of detainees are often looted, 

and torture is fairly common during the first days 

of detention. We have been told repeatedly that excesses 

of the security personnel have been punished, but 

there is no public record of it. 

i 

—SECRET—• 


■ .-No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8 

o&wAa4i 

Economic performance has improved under the Junta. 

Foreign currency reserves now exceed $3 billion, inflation 

has been reduced, a balanced budget may be possible in 1978, 

serious distortions in relative pricers have been corrected 

and record level crops' and exports were reached in 1976-77. 

On the negative Bide, the government has not been able 

to force inflation below 150%, and wage restraints have 

reduced real income by 40%. As a result, consumption has 

decreased, and worker dissatisfaction is increasing. Strikes 

for higher salaries have rocked the country in recent weeks 

and more unrest is likely. 

Problems or not, Argentina's international economic 

position is improving steadily. Exports should reach $4.5 

billion this year, compared to imports of about $4 billion, 

including more than $700 million from the US. Interestingly, 

while the Argentine-US trade balance will be some $400 million 

in our favor this year, Argentina's balance with the Communist 

countries in 1976 was almost as much in its favor, and may 

lead to some pressure to increase Argentine purchases from 

the Soviet Union. 

Recent improvements in Argentina's economic situation 

have led to considerable new interest and some new 

activitity by foreign investors. US învestment now 

stands at $1.4 billion and loans by US banks to 

Argentina exceed $3 billion. 

The military dominate the Argentine political 

scene: Armed Forces officers act as governors, mayors 

and managers of nationalized companies. With the exception 

of Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz, civilians are 

excluded from major decision-making positions. 

Internal military rivalries are endemic. President 

Videla mediates pragmatically among military factions, 

but cannot impose his will. Several "hard-line" Army 

generals remain in key command positions even though 

their retirement would relieve right wing pressures 

on the President. The politically adroit but unscrupulous 

Navy Junta member, Admiral Massera, who is associated 

with the Navy's hard-line human rights practices, 

takes advantage of every opportunity to embarrass 

Videla and boost his own chances for the Presidency. 

The Junta has not committed itself to restoring 

civilian rule, but consultations between prominent 

citizens and military leaders are taking place. Meanwhile, 

political party activities are suspended, and the 

-SfiefWT— 


■ No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8 

OCiUACii.' 

-ZJZpowerful 

labor unions are largely under the control 

of military interventora. 

Argentina's international actiyity has been 

limited by concentration on its own chaotic internal 

politics and by a general disinclination to identify 

closely with the problems of the Third World. However, 

Argentina does have an exceptionally able diplomatic 

service which could help build better understanding 

between the DCs and LDCs in international fora. 

As noted above, the U.S. is the country which 

presents the most significant challenges for the 

Argentines. They are deeply disturbed by our conditioning 

of weapons sales and IFI loans on their human 

rights performance, and may be on the verge of 

making basic decisions to reduce their ties to us. 

Argentina has Latin America's most advanced nuclear 

technology, and probably has the capacity to produce 

a nuclear explosion within the next two years. The 

Argentines are fully aware of our nuclear preoccupations 

and may hope that cooperation on that front might 

strengthen our relations and diminish tensions on 

other.fronts, including human rights. 

The historic rivalry with Brazil continues (e.g. 

the dispute over rights to Parana River water.) 

There is, however, no great tension now. An April 

U.K. international arbitration decision awarding 

ownership of Tierra del Fuego to Chile raised 

nationalist sentiments in-Argentina, (already resentful 

of the British presence in the Falkland Islands. 

The Argentine Navy has increased its patrols in 

the area, but the other elements in the GOA seem 

more inclined toward negotiation. The Wavy .. 

apprehended nine.Russian and Bulgarian fishing 

boats in October, but the seizures do not seem 

to have had a lasting impact on Argentiue-Soviet 

relations. 

III. Key IssueB 


U. S. Objective: To convince the Argentines that 

better relations are dependent upon their making human 

rights improvements, i.e., (a) releasing or affording 

due process to detainees, and (b) ending torture and "disappearances." 

SECRET 



-SBGMTCT 

' -$-■ 

Argentine Objective: To convince the US that the 

human rights violations which have taken place were 

a result of a bloody civil war, that official violations 

were an unfortunate but necessary part of the fight 

against terrorism, that such violations are being 

gradually brought under control, and that a full return 

to the rule of law will take time. 

Essential Factors: U. S. reactions to Argentine 

human rights violations have severely strained our relations. 

The Argentines claim not to understand why we 

have limited arms sales and voted against Argentine IFI 

loans. They believe that we overemphasize official 

violations and underestimate the terrorist actions 

which triggered - them. "... 

Hundreds of members of the Armed* Forces and innocent 

civilians have been killed by leftist terrorists. The 

military, aided by fanatical rightist civilians, have reacted 

brutally. Many terrorist activists and suspects 

have been summarily executed. Torture to produce confessions 

and obtain information is commonplace. Military authorities 

have frequently allowed off-duty security personnel 

to terrorize leftist sympathizers and human rights 

advocates not involved in the bloodletting. 

Supreme Court writs of habeas corpus concerning 

the disappeared are often ignored by the government. 

A group of "Mothers of the Plaza" assemble weekly 

in downtown Buenos Aires to petition for information 

about disappeared family members. We have received 

a letter signed by 178 of them aBking for your intercession 

with the Argentine government. 

« 

« 

The State of Siege provisions of the Constitution 

enable the government to detain prisoners without 

charges or set trial dates. President Videla pledged 

to President Carter to try to resolve,the cases of 

the 4,000 prisoners held under these provisions by 

Christmas, but there has has been little progress. 

A recently reinstated "right of option", which would 

allow political prisoners to choose exile instead 

of jail, has resulted in the release of only a few 

prisoners. 

There is considerable U. S. public and Congressional 

interest in the fate of Argentine political prisoners 

and the disappeared: five members of the Senate Subcommittee 

on Western Hemisphere Affairs wrote you asking your inter- 

■fi-BCRET - 



■SECRET-- 

-6-* , . 

vention on behalf of jailed newspaper*editor, Jacobo 

Timerman, and some 25 Congressmen have expressed interest 

in the Deutsch family. (These cases are covered in 

the Background Paper on Human Rights.) Congressman 

Harkin has asked that you inquire'about the application 

of the right of option. A U.S. human rights group 

has just given us an unverified'list containing the 

names of 7,500 people they claim have disappeared 

or have been detained in Argentina. 


— Incidences of prolonged detention, disappearances and 

torture strain our relations with Argentina. We do not wish 

to tell Argentines how to run their country, but we feel 

compelled to express our concern. 

— President Carter was heartened by President Videla's 

desire to resolve the status of political detainees by 

Christmas; we know that it is difficult to process 4,000 

individual cases, but we hope that they yill soon be 

decided. 

■ 

— We were encouraged by the decision to restore 

the "right of option." We hope that its provisions will 

allow many detainees to be freed from prison. 

— We are especially concerned about the fate of Jacobo 

Timerman and the Deutsch family. Both cases have aroused 

great interest in the U.S., as did the detention of 

the AP reporter Serrat. 

— The government should clarify what has happenned 

to individuals who have disappeared without explanation. 

We know some may be victims of terrorists, but the 

security forces appear to have been involved in many 

instances. 

— A public accounting of all prisoners held 

by the government would help resolve questions 

about disappearances and would considerably improve 

Argentina's world image. 

— We still frequently hear reports of torture, 

especially during the first days of detention. We 

understand that the fight against terrorism has been 

brutal, but torture of prisoners is not acceptable 

under any circumstances. Torture should be forbidden 

and future cases tried in the courts. 

■BBCRET 


• No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8 

-7- 

2. Terrorism 

0. S. Objective; To remind the Argentines that we, too, 

abhor terrorism but that we cannot condone counterterrorist 

measures that violate human rights. 

Argentine Objective; To focus U.iS. thinking on 

terrorism as a prime violator of human rights, and 

as the origin of what most Argentines privately consider 

"shameful" conditions of internal disorder. 

Essential Factors: The Argentines contend that U.S. 

concentration on human rights violations by government 

authorities has forced attention away from terrorism, 

which they say also violates human rights and is the 

real threat to Western civilization. They have forcefully 

pressed a campaign in international organizations 

to combat terrorism. This was the principal theme 

in Foreign Minister Montes' speech to the UNGA in 

October and a major concern of Deputy Foreign Minister 

Allara during his calls at the Department in early 

November. The Foreign Minister will have especially 

strong feelings about terrorism; his predecessor, 

Admiral Guzzetti, was almost killed by an assassin 

in May. 

A recent upsurge in terrorism in Argentina heightens 

their concern; two Armed Forces officers‘were assassinated, 

three businessmen were killed, and the office of the Labor 

Minister and the home of a Chrysler executive have been 

bombed in the last month. 

* 


— Terrorist attacks against government officials 

and innocent civilians are deplorable. We wish 

to express our sympathy to these men and their families. 

—. We are 'as deeply troubled as the Argentines by the 

actions of the international terrorists. We cannot, however, 

condone counterterrorist actions that violate human rights and 

due legal process. 

3. Ratification of Treaty of Tlatelolco 

U. S. Objectives: To have Argentina ratify the Treaty 

of Tlatelolco, bring its nuclear program under fullscope 

safeguards, defer reprocessing and forego nuclear 

explosions. 

( 

SfieSBT--- - 


’No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8 

— O — 

Argentine Objectives; To complete its nuclear fuel cycle 

in order to have greater energy independence, to become a 

nuclear technology exporter and to maintain cooperative 

ties with the U.S. « 

Essential Factors: Argentina is now proceeding apace 

to construct a reprocessing plant which in two years 

could produce plutonium in sufficient quantities to 

support a nuclear explosive capability. Argentina, 

which is by far Latin America's leading nuclear state, 

views nuclear technology as a source of both energy 

and international status. It was the first to have 

a research reactor (1958), the first and so far only 

state to operate a power plant (1974), and is a major 

exporter of technicians under IAEA programs.. 

If Argentina were to defer its reprocessing plans, 

accept fullscope safeguards and forego nuclear explosions, 

we would consider the transfer of sensitive heavy 

water technologies. Failure to defer reprocessing 

could scuttle the chances of establishing a Latin 

American nuclear-free zone and lead to the proliferation 

of nuclear weapons in our own hemisphere. The President 

has approved a long-range nuclear strategy involving 

both Argentina and Brazil which is outlihed in the background 

papers, but a key immediate objective! of our foreign policy 

and your trip is to get Argentina to ratify the Treaty of 

Tlatelolco now. 


— The United States is determined to do all it can to 

halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear 

weapons. 

— Ambassador Smith is available to brief your 

officials on our efforts to achieve a new SALT agreement 

and a Comprehensive Test Ban. 

— It is not our policy to dissuade Argentina or any 

nation from acquiring nuclear technology. On the contrary, 

if steps can be taken to ensure the safe uses of such 

technology, we have indicated to your government a readiness 

to assist you in the sensitive field of heavy water. 

— Any cooperation on heavy water would, of course, 

( involve your deferral of reprocessing plans while an urqent 

world study is conducted on how to reiprocess in a safer 

1 manner. 

&£CR££ 


I 


'~=9=~ » 

— We accept and support Argentina's expectation 

that its Latin American neighbors should also 

make sacrifices on behalf of safe nuclear technologies. 

— What we ask now, therefore, is that Argentina take 

a bold step on behalf of continental security and mpve 

now to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 

— We were heartened by President Videla's conversation 

with President Carter, and President Videla's commitment 

to consider Argentine ratification of the Treaty 

of Tlatelolco. 

I 

— Ratification and entry into force of the Treaty 

would give dramatic impetus to Latin America's efforts 

to create a nuclear free zone, and would demonstrate 

Argentina's dedication to peace. 

4. P. S.-Argentine. Military Relations 

P. S. Objectives: To assure the* Argentines that we 

want a good military relationship, but to get them to 

understand that this depends on their human rights 

performance. 

• 

Argentine Objective; To inform us that it values 

its military ties to the U. S., but that without a 

clarification of P.S. arms policies, particularly on 

spare parts, Argentina will be forced to reorient 

its military procurements and relationships. 

I 

Essential Factors: P. S.-Argentine military relations 

have deteriorated sharply'as a result of P. S. actions taken 

to disassociate the P. S. from the GOA's human rights 

violations. As a result of our strictures, Argentina 

has refused all military sales financing for fiscal 

year 1978. We will not request funds from the Congress 

for fiscal year 1979. In addition, Congress has prospectively 

banned military training and arms sales as of October 

1, 1978 unless human rights conditions improve. Already, 

the Department has been refusing almost all Argentine 

military requests. 

t 

While our policy has little real military significance 

for Argentina, our actions have damaged relations 

with the armed forces who run the country. Argentina 

dropped out of PNITAS fleet exercises this year. Pritil 

substantial progress is made on human rights considerations— 

release or the affording of due process to detainees, 

and the ending of torture and disappearances — Argentina 

can expect our military relations to remain paralyzed. 

uSJEfiRET-- - 



-16- 


— The United States values its military relations 

with Argentina and regrets the circumstances which 

have led to the current situation regarding military 

sales and training. 

— Our willingness to provide equipment is directly 

related to internal security policies. Given the present 

situation in Argentina, it is virtually impossible for the 

Administration to justify military Bales to Argentina. 

— We hope earnestly that the restoration of due 

process in Argentina will pemit us to develop more normal 

military relationships. 

— This would permit us to advise the Congress of a 

changed situation and to recommend abrogation of the law 

which will prohibit military transfers to Argentina after 

October lr 1978. 

5. Argentina and the International Financial 

Institutions 

_ 

• 

U.S. Objectives; To explain to the* Argentines that 

we cannot support their loan requests, except those which 

meet basic human needs, until they demonstrate substantial 

human rights improvements. 

Argentine Objective; To persuade the U.S. to vote 

"yes" or abstain on Argentine loan requests in the IPIs. 

Essential Factors: In June we abstained instead of 

voting *rio'? on one loan and told the Argentines that 

this was due to improvements in their human rights situation. 

We added, however, that it would be difficult for us 

to support their loan requests in the IFIs. They held 

back loans until October when they submitted a $36 

million gas pipeline project to the IDB. We voted 

"no", and informed the Argentines that without human 

rights improvements we would vote "no" on future loans 

not clearly meeting basic human needs. (We have since 

voted "yes" on a potable Water loan in the IDB that 

met our basic human needs criteria, but decisions 

on two more Argentine loan requests in the IDB, 

$60 million for science and technology development 

and $50 million for electrical transmission lines, 

have been delayed until after your visit.) 

The Argentines claim, somewhat disingenuously, 

to be confused by our voting record in the IFIs. They 

ask how we could abstain on a loan in June and now, 

-afiCRET— 



^-TT='7 

after significant improvements in human rights have 

taken place, vote "no". 

Points to be Hade 

— We do not seek to intervene in the internal 

affairs of other societies; but we believe that no 

member of the United Nations can claim that violations 

of internationally sanctioned human rights are solely 

its own affair. 

t 

— .We will continue to use our vote in the IFIs . 

to promote human rights and hope that conditions in 

Argentina will permit us to take a more positive stance 

in the World Bank and IOB when future loans come up. 

(If raised) Eximbank is encouraged by Argentine 

progress on economic questions and this is revelent 

to the Bank's decisions. However, Exim is required by law 

to consider human rights factors in passing on all loans. 

6. North-South Issuss 

U.S. Objectives: To encourage Argentina to use its 

influence within the G-77 on issues where our 

interests overlap. 

Argentine Objective; To e.ncourage the U. S. to 

cooperate with Argentina on economic issues affecting 

middle-income developing countries. 

% 

Essential Factors; Although outfwardly supportive 

of Third World positions on North-South issues, Argentina 

has been quietly but energetically arguing against many 

G-77 proposals. Along with other large Latin American 

countries, Argentina is concerned about important 

aspects of the New International Economic Order, and 

increasingly sees itself as a potential "swing" country 

between DC's and LDC's. 

Argentina believes that the UNCTAD Integrated Program 

for Commodities favors Africa and Asia. It is not a major 

exporter of any of the 18 core commodities. * Last September, 

it opposed the African countries' demand for an immediate LDC 

pledge of financial support for the rapid creation of the 

Common Fund to finance the Program. Argentina feels that 

any generalized debt moratorium for all LDC's would jeopardize 

the Latin American region's vitally important credit standing 

with private lenders. 

■SECRET - 


'No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8 

~n~ 

As a middle-income country, however, Argentina 

has strongly criticized bur "basic human needs strategy” 

as a no growth ploy designed to divide the LDCa. 

Points to be Made; 

— The United States appreciates the constructive, 

moderate position Argentina has taken an many economic 

questions in the international fora. We hope they will continue 

to use these fora to speak out constructively on issues 

of importance to the world community as a whole. 

— Argentina is a country with strong ties to both 

the G-77 and the developed countries; we look forward to 

working with the Argentines in seeking practical solutions 

to North/South issues. ' 

f 

— We look forward to cooperating closely with 

the Argentines in the MTN- negotiations, and would 

be interested in exchanging views on ways in which 

developing countries can become more involved in international 

economic decisions generally. 

— Our support for the basic human meeds 

approach is not designed to supplant programs to 

develop infrastructure and productivity, which are 

obviously essential to meet basic human meedB 

in all developing countries 

7. U. S. - Argentine Mixed Commission 

U. S. Objective; To be receptive to Argentine requests 

for closer economic consultations. 

Argentine Objective. To reactivate the- U.S.-Argentine 

Mixed Commission on Economic Relations. 

Essential Factors; A U.S-Argentfine ISixed Economic 

Commission was established in 1966, but as moribund. The 

Argentines proposed its reactivation when Assistant Secretary 

Todman visited Buenos Aires in August and we have since 

agreed to meet with the Argentines in Washington at an 

unspecified date, possibly in January. 

We consider a consultative group useful, but 

would prefer to organize it at. a relatively low level, 

e.g., Deputy Assistant Secretary, to avoid the appearance 

of too close a relationship to Argentina at this time. 

■Bfi€RET— 


.’No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8 

-rrjrt 

The Argentines may wish to use a reactivated 

Commission to consider ways to improve their negative 

trade balance with the U.S. — some $400 million in 

1977. Our restrictions on beef imports and countervailing 

duty cases against Argentine leather and clothing exporters 

may also be raised by the Argentines in the Commission. 

(Although the incidence of hoof and mouth disease in Argentina 

limits raw beef trade, we did import some $100 million 

worth of cooked-frozen and canned beef in 1976). On 

our side, the Commission could be used to raise investment 

disputes: Deltec International (a major meat producer) has a 

claim pending in the Argentine courts. 

Points to be Made: 

— The U. S. views the Economic Commission as a useful 

instrument to achieve shared economic interests. 

Our health restrictions against Argentine beef 

are not a device to deny access to U, S. markets. We 

welcome discussions with Argentina regarding health and 

sanitation matters. 

I 

The Treasury Department appreciates the cooperation 

of the GOA in providing information relevant to pending 

countervailing duty cases and is taking that information 

into consideration in making its decision. 

8. Bilateral Commission on Malnutrition (If raised) 

U. S. Objective: To consider Argentine proposals 

for cooperation. 

Argentine Objective: To discuss the establishment of 

a U.S.-Argentine Commission on Malnutrition. 

Essential Factors: The Argentines finest suggested this 

Commission during the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister's 

visit earlier this month. They seemed undecided about what 

they want the group to do and gave the impression that they 

may have included it on the agenda to divert attention from the 

harder issues of human rights and nuclear non-proliferation. 


The U. S. will listen with interest to Argentine 

proposals on a Bilateral Commission on Malnutrition. 

— We would like to cooperate with Argentina to 

alleviate malnutrition in the hemisphere. 

#i nrtnnmj 

•xj ISvJnci j. 



-6B0RBT 

-14- 

9. Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries 

U. S. Objectives; To encourage greater technology i 

development in LDCs, but to restrain discrimination : 

against U. S. suppliers of technology. To insure that // 

IFI and USAID money is used to finance the best technologyI 

available, regardless of origin. . // 

Argentine Objective: To foster greater utilization of 

Argentine technology by other LDCs through multilateral 

agreements. 

Essential Factors: A United Nations Conference on 

Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries will be 

held at Buenos Aires from August 30 to September 12, 1978. 

The GOA has long been the prime proponent of such a con** 

ference, which it hopes will help promote greater use of 

technology developed in advanced LDCs like Argentina. 

Points to be Madei 

— We will attend the Buenos Aires Conference with 

the goal of cooperating with LDC's 'to enhance use of technology 

available in their countries. 

— We hope to work with Argentina to direct the 

Conference toward that goal. 

f 

— We would not favor a Conference attempt to justify 

use of LDC technology for its own sake at the expense of 

superior technology available elsewhere. 

10. Malvinas/Falkland Islands 

U. S. Objective; To urge negotiations aimed at 

a peaceful settlement and avoidance of incidents, 

while staying out of the middle of this Argentine- 

U. K. question. 

Argentine Objective: To solicit U. S. support for the 

return of the U. K. held Malvinas Islands to Argentina. 

(The Argentines would prefer you use the name Malvinas.) 

EBBential Factors: The Malvinas have been governed by 

the U. K. since 1833. Argentine-UK conversations 

will take place in New York in December, but there is 

basic disagreement on a date. The Argentines want them 

now but the U. K. is thinking of an end-of-century turnover. 

The negotiations are complicated by the 2,000 inhabitants' 

SfieRET- 


• 'No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8 

-15- 

unwillingness to be ruled by Argentina and the possibility 

that large oil deposits may exist in the area. 

We have consistently urged both parties to seek 

a solution through negotiation. The Argentines, 

however, may be thinking of other tactics: Deputy 

Foreign Minister Allara told Assistant Secretary Todman 

in early November that an "incident" was possible 

so long as the matter remained unsettled. The Argentines 

urged that we pressure the British to return the Malvinas 

to Argentina. The British have asked that we urge 

restraint on the Argentines to permit* an evolutionary 

approach. 

Points to be Made? 

(In view of Argentine interest and the UK request, 

we believe you could profitably take the lead in 

raising this issue.) 

The U. S. hopes that the U. K. and Argentina can 

work out a suitable agreement on the Malvinas. 

-- Argentina should show restraint: any "incident" would 

only make the future of the islands more difficult to resolve. 

t 

.SBratET 


I

No ObjectiorTTo UecldSSinudliui! in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-56-1-6-6 

up.partmem oj dime • itLLliKAl/l 

PAGE 81 SUE'iSS (4937 12 or 92 2721232 

ACT.CN ARA-14 

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70 SECSTATE UASHCC PRIORITY 6281 

tJl 9 t I 11 E A 7 I 4 k 6E6TI0M 2 OF 2 1UE.10S SIRES 4937 

1. EARL * THL'4'341 PCRNI'IG Cl. K'SSIhGER NET VITH OR. iSRGE 

LUTS EDASES, NOTED ARSE7ITI HE POET AMU WRITER. THIS PROMPTED 

MUCH NEWS CQVErocE. LATER IN Oft' KISSINGER MID FM1ILY 

DEPARTED UI'H I'.i'IISTER OF ECONOMY MARTINET DC HOI TO OVER 

NIGHT AT AN ESTAIiCIA IFARNI. THIS HAS MOSTLY A SOCIAL EVENT. 

9271 B'JENOS 04937 II OF 92 272123Z 

j CONCEPT OF ATTEMPTING TO IMPLEMENT HUNAN RIGHTS I'l LA. 

HE SAIC HE UOJIG WAIT AlOUT TWO WEEKS AFTER HIS P*TURK TO 

,. I US BEFORE SPEAK.IIG OUT. KISSINGER WORKED CLOSELY UMH 

ENBASSI PERSON’>FL. THEY WERE GCOC GLESTS AN3 MACE III*Y 

EFFORT TO GiVE APPEARANCE THEY WERE NOT EMISSARIES CF 

OPPOSITION TO CURRENT US ADMIN I STRAY,ON. 

NY ONLY CONCERN IS THAT KISSINGER'S REPEATEO H!3» PRAISE 

FOR IRGEHTINA'S ACTION IN ViriHG OUT TERRQRISH AII3 nIS 

STRESS OH THE "IPORTRNCE OF ARGENT I HA NAY HAVE GONE TO SCHE 

CSHSIOERAELE ECEIIT TO HIS HOSTS’ HEADS. DESPITE HIS 

OISCLAiHEAS THAT THE NETHODS USED III FIGHTING TERACRISN RUST 

NOT BE PERPETUATED, THERE IS SOrE DANGER THAT ARGENTINES 

MAY USE YISSINGFA-S LAUDATORY STATEMENTS AS JUSTIFICATION 

FOR HARDENING THE1R HUHAH RIGHTS STANCE. 

CASTRO 

S.1 CN HIS RETURN FROM THE FIRM. -XlSSiNGER SPOKE TO ENSASSY 

PERSONNEL. hE CAVE A PEP TALKS TO ARE RICAN FOREIGN SERVICE 

PERSONNEL AS HELL AS LOCALS. HI NARRATEO 50RE OF HI5 

EXPERIENCES WHILE IN USG SERVICE. HIS HUR3A0US APPROACH 

WAS WELL RECEIVED 8T ».L. 

bOS REVIEWED 03-Jun-2D10: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL 

IB. ON FRIDAY EVENING R RECEPTION WAS GIVEN AT EMBASSY 

RLSICLIICE HONOR'NG KISSINGER AND FAMILY. APPROXIMATELY TWO 

HUNOREO PERSONS ATTENDED. GOA TOP OFFICIALS WERE WELL 

REPRESENTED. 

11. AFTER THE RECEPTION, KISSINGER ATTEN3ED A DINNER GIVEN 

BY MINISTER OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOZ. THIS GROUP WAS 

COMPOSES OF BA! HERS, ECONOMISTS AN3 III3U5YRIRLISTS. THE MAIN 

DISCUSSION CONCERNEO MEANS TO ATTRACT FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL AND 

OTHER INVESTMENT TO ARGENTINA. THE LONG TERN LACK OF POLITICAL 

STABILITY AND INFLATION SEEMEO TO IE THE MAIN CONCERN OF 

THE GROUP. LITTLE ELSE DEVELOPED FROM THE DINNER. 

12. ON JUNE 24 KISSINGER PARTICIPATED III AH OFT TNE RECORD 

PRESS COIN EVENLY AND WAS MADE AN HONORARY HE TIBER OF ARGENTINE 

COUNCIL ON INTERNAnC'iAi RELATIONS. TNIS GROUP IS COMPRISED 

OF FOB"EH FOREIGN MINISTERS, UNO HOLD THEMSELVES UP TO THE 

PUBLIC AS THE "ELITE GROUP" ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. OR. KISSINGER 

GAVE AN OFF THE CUFF TALK. IE STRESSED THAT THERE WAS NO 

CUESTiOi: BUT TnAT AMERICANS LACKED KNOWLEDGE ABOUT 

ARGENTINA'S HISTORY. ESPECIALLY, ANE3UCAU3. LACKED FAMILIARITY 

W T1 ARGENTINA'S EXFERIflt!Ol riiKTJJlt.UJliniUW.- HE EXPLAINED 

n; His DP III1 OH GOA naD DONE all OUTSTANDING JOB III WIPING 

CJY TFVRSRIST FORCES, BUT ALSO CAUTIONED THAT METHODS 'JSfcO 

"n"f\SITING "TE’HOTTS” BUST MOT BE PERPETUATED. jE EXPLAINED 

A rOVEMEUT *CWARDS 'iSRNAICY MUST TAKE'PLSCE IF DEMOCRATIC 

IDEALS ARE TO PREVAIL. 

13. OR. KISSINGER ALSO APPEARED III A QUESTION AND AIISUEH 

PERIOD WITH O'/E OF ARGENTINR'SPOPUIAA NEWS COMHEIITERS. 

DURING THE mTt»mcu_«M:ciim» ci-irtn yrapBRiHr; IT-Bf fluY 

OF THE GREATEST VIOLATORS OF HUMAN RiMIS^- HE SAID IT WAS 

UNFORTUNATE fiSTjIT .Sqift'nmTUHlia kwa'i rights was 

BEING USED AS A WEAPON AGAiNST ITS F«IElkOS. 

COMMENT: THE X'SSINSER FAMILY ATTENDED A FOOTBALL GAME >U 

ROSARIO, WHERE HE WAS INTRODUCED TO THE PUBLIC. IHDICAT'ONS 

ARE HE WAS WELL RECEIVED B* THE AUDIENCE. HE ALSO ATTEN3E0 

TWO OTHER GAMES IN BUENOS AIRES AS’A GUEST OF PRESIDENT 

ViOELA. THE ARGENTINE MEDIA GAVE FAVORABLE AND HEAVY 

COVENAGE TO THE KISSINGER VISIT. 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority NLr-iiN-yigi-i-k--^ 

nara_£L£L_ Qsto —llli*--------- 

COMMENT: 

OR. AiSSHiSER TOLB THE AMBASSADOR HE WOULD NOT 

CRITICIZE THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION SO LONS AS HE WAS OVER 

SEAS. HE SPC*E HIGHLY OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY 

TO THE AMBASSADOR, BUT FElT HE WOL'lQ SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE 

No ObjectionTo TJeclassiticatibb in hull 2Q13/02/04 : NLC-24-56-1-6-6 

t

No Objection To Dedabbifiidtiun in rull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-7-4- 

Afghanistan 

May 19, 1977 

IDA Agricultural Bank - $12 million 

The Committee recommended that a demarche be made to the GOA Unking 

our support for their loans In the International financial institutions 

to human rights considerations. 


May 19, 1977 

IBRD - $100 million 

IFC - $ 7 million 

IDB Gas Pipeline - $35 million 

IDB Petro-chemlcal Program - $83 

IDB Urban and Rural Potable Water - $40 million 

The Committee agreed that Secretary Blumenthal should ask Econonty 

Minister Martinez de Hoz, when he sees him on June 1 at the Annual 

IDB meeting in Guatemala to postpone an upcoming $100 million industrial 

credit loan 1n the IBRD. He will also inform the Minister that, because 

of human rights considerations, we may have problems with other loans 

in both the IDB and the IBRD and that we would like to avoid a 

confrontation on them by having them delayed until a more propitious 

time. It was also agreed that the U.S. Executive Directors 1n the IDB 

and IBRD would indicate to their colleagues that the U.S. was seeking 

a delay on consideration of these loans. 

June 9, 1977 

The.Committee was appraised that despite U.S. urging, the Argentines had 

refused to withdraw the $100 million loan In the World Bank. Another 

small $7 million loan was scheduled to come up for consideration at the 

same time. The Committee agreed that the U.S. s'hould abstain on these 

two World Bank loans and make a statement alt the Bank Board meeting 

explaining our action. The rationale for not deciding to vote no was 

that a graduated approach was considered to be more likely to obtain 

positive results from the Argentines. It was agreed that the U.S. Bank 

Director could let other Bank Directors know a few days In advance that 

we would not be supporting this loan. 

CONriDLNTIAL 

Authority 

NABA 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13528 

Dato nn\il£---- 



'ACOBINI CHARLES QOS REVIEWED 02-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RFl farf im cin i 1 ^ fi 

’7 BUENOS AIRES 4638 ' — H VT- 

TnNFTDT'iNT IflL__ 

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3AGE 01 

BUENOS e4638 01 07 02 222034Z 

ICTION ARA-14 


H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 


10-13 ( ISO ) V 

------------------051032 230357Z /64 

R 221858Z JUN 77 



JC-Q-NFIDENT I—ir~Tr"SECTI ON 1 07 2 BUENOS AIRES 4638 

E.O. 11652: GDS 

TAGS: PORG, SHUM, AR, US, E7IN 

SUBJECT: GOA NOTES HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS 

REF: (A) STATE 138380, (B) BUENOS AIRES 4444, (C) BUENOS A3RES 4483 


BUENOS AIRES (RE7TEL B) AND AMBASSADOR AJA ESPIL IN 

WASHINGTON (RE7TEL A), ARGENTINE 077ICIALS ANNOUNCED A 

NUMBER 07 ACTIONS JUNE 14 THAT BEAR ON THE COUNTRY'S HUMAN 


07 342 PERSONS FROM EXECUTIVE CUSTODY, PROCESSING OF ALMOST 

1,000 SUBVERSIVE CASES IN FEDERAL AND MINITARLY COURTS, 



OF, A FAR RIGHT, RACIST MAGAZINE. WHILE THE ANNOUNCEMENTS IN 




IMPROVEMENTS DEMONSTRATES ITS RISING SENSITIVITY TO THE 



END SUMMARY 

CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL 

PAGE 02 

BUENOS 04638 01 OF 02 222034Z 


PRESENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS DEMONSTRATES BASICALLY 



RESPONSE TO U.S. REPRESENTATIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION. THE 


AS ANTICIPATED, THE GOA ACTIONS AND COMMUNIQUES WERE RELEASED 

JUNE 14 AND PUBLISHED IN JUNE 15 PRESS. 

2. AS A 15-DAY COMPENDIUM THE LISTING OF 342 PERSONS CITED AS 


CONSIDERABLY LARGER THAN THE TYPICAL WEEKLY LISTS PUT OUT BY 

THE INTERIOR MINISTRY. FURTHER, THERE IS NO WAY "IMMEDIATELY 




DETENTION AND NOT JUST PASSED TO OTHER AUTHORITIES.) 

""ffUNl J.DENT1 A-4--- / ' PAGE ' 1 

DECLASSIFIED 

E .0 .13526 

Authority AJL£ 

NARA— £/=• D*tn 7 / 9l Um 





-CONFIDENTW~ 

3. AS FOR SPECIFIC CASES, THREE OF THE NAMES WERE FAMILIAR— 

DAVID DIVINSKY AND HIS WIFE ANA MARIA MILER, BOOK PUBLISHERS 

LISTED AS RELEASED FROM EXECUTIVE CUSTODY FOR SUBVERSIVE 

CRIMES? AND JUAN CARLOS ROUSSELOT, LISTED AS RELEASED FROM 

CUSTODY FOR ECONOMIC CRIMES. AS OF JUNE 16, NEITHER MILER NOR 

BlVINSKY HAS YET BEEN RELEASED ACCORDING TO FAMILY FRIENDS. WE 

ARE TRYING TO VERIFY THESE CASES AS POSSIBLE, INDICATORS AS TO 

USUAL FATE'OF LISTED PERSONS. SINCE THE LISTS BEGAN BEING 

PUBLISHED WEEKLY IN JANUARY, WE HAVE VERIFIED AND REPORTED ■ 

SEVERAL ACTUAL RELEASES, ALTHOUGH MANY EMBASSY SOURCES, 

INCLUDING VISITORS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF CHURCH AND HUMAN 

RIGHTS GROUPS, CLAIM THAT THE MAJORITY OF PERSONS LISTED REMAIN 

IN-DETENTION. (THIS COULD RESULT PARTIALLY FROM DEFIANCE OF 

INTERIOR MINISTRY ORDERS, AND PARTLY FROM BUREAUCRATIC , 

INCOMPETENCE OF FEDERAL AND MILITARY PRISON AUTHORITIES.) 

CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL 


PERMANENT ASSEMBLY DIRECTOR JOSE WESTERKAM? (WHO HOSTED 

PATRICIA DERIAN'S MEETING WITH ASSEMBLY IN MARCH) TOLD EMBOFF 

ON JUNE 14 ABOUT THE PARTICULAR CASE OF A BOY JAILED WITH ' 

WESTERKAMP'S SON IN SIERRA CEICA PRISON WHOSE NAME HAS APPEARED 

TWICE ON THE RELEASE LISTS AND ONCE ON THE LIST OF PERSONS 

NEWLY DETAINED BY THE EXECUTIVE. THE BOY HIMSELF WAS NEVER 

INFORMED OF THE PUBLICATION OF ANY OF THE LISTS AND HIS STATUS 

AS A DETAINEE UNDER STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS HAS IN FACT 


(CONFIDENTIAL 

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4. THE INTERIOR MINISTRY STATEMENT THAT 667 ^SUBVERSIVE CASES 

HAVE BEEN REMANDED TO THE FEDERAL COURTS (WITH 327 SENTENCES 

PASSED) AND 305 CASES SENT TO SPECIAL MILITARY COURTS MARTIAL. 

(WITH 158 SENTENCES HANDED DOWN) APPEARED IN PRESS 

WITHOUT NAMES OR COMMENTARY. AS VERY FEW OF THESE TALKS AND 

SUBSEQUENT SENTENCING HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS OR 

INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMED BY EMBOFFS, WE CANNOT COMMENT ON THE 



TO ANALYZE THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE SUSPENDED CONSTITUTIONAL 

OPTION FOR PERSONS BEING HELD UNDER STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS 

TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY RECALLS HIS EARLIER APPOINTMENT OF A 




THE SUSPENSION FOR ANOTHER 150 DAYS BEGINNING MAY 1, 1977. IT 





6. GOA SUSPENSION OF THE DISTRIBUTION, SALE, AND CIRCULATION OF 

THE MAY-JUNE CABILDO ISSUE NO. 8 WAS OF INTEREST. THE MAGAZINE 

CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL « 


WAS ACCUSED OF "PROPAGATING IDEOLOGICAL-RACIAL CONFLICT’IN 

OPPOSITION TO THE NATION'S OBJECTIVES.” THE DECREE FURTHER 

PROHIBITED THE PRINTING AND CIRCULATION OF THE JULY ISSUE AND 



CAPACITY BEYOND THE TWO ISSUES, AND THIS SHORT TERM SUSPENSION 




INTERNATIONAL PRESS COMMENTARY (SEE BA 3370 AND 3631). ' 


WAS UNDERTAKEN WITH THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF INFLUENCING THE U-S. 


COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT-INTERVENED LA OPINION ON JUNE 16 


CONFIDENTIAL / PAGE 



Fyll 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-6-3 



-GONFTDENTIAL— 

"SIGNIFICANT MEASURES TO COUNTERACT ACCUSATIONS FROM ABROAD AND 

IMPROVE THE COUNTRY'S IMMAGE OVERESEAS". (NO OTHER PAPER HAS 

COMMENTED EDITORIALLY ON THE GOVERNMENT'S ANNOUNCEMENTS TO DATE.) 

OF INTEREST, IS WHETHER THIS INITIATIVE WAS NOTHING MORE TRAN 

WARMED OVER STATISTICS AND SMOKESCREEN GESTURES OR WHETHER SOME 

NEW ELEMENT HAS BEEN ADDED TO ARGENTINE EFFORTS IN THIS FIELD. 

OUR CONCLUSION AFTER STUDYING THIS LATEST "EVIDENCE” —MUCH LIKE 

OUR INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REPORTED IN REF B—IS THAT THE 

INITIATIVE IS HOLLOW FROM THE SUBSTANTIVE SIDE, BUT INTERESTING 

AND-ENCOURAGING IN WHAT IT DEMONSTRATES ABOUT RISING ARGENTINE 

BURFACRATIC SENSITIVITY CONCERNING THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE U.S. HUMAN 


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No Objection To Declassification in Full 

2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-6-3-5

No Objection To DSCtaasificationin Full 2012/06/18 : NLC-15R-3-1-1-1 

tlLUHL I — l ••wvm . j 

Department of State telegrams 

DOS REVIEWED 18-Feb-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL 

PAGE I! GUAXEU B3MS B1 OF (2 0111132

./ 

/ No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/06/18 : NLC-15R-3-1-1-1 

OUUItL I 

i iiuuiii i ii w 


TELEGRAM 

PACE 21 GUAIEil 23US (2 Or >2 >110322 flSS 

AC 11 ON AIA-BS 

INFO c:r-l! 5S-1I ISO-IB SP-02 0HA-R2 H-e: INR-15 

RSC-Di NSCE-ll ClAE-BD SSC-BN iNRE -PI /IIS 11 

............ I12P4SZ IZSI6I /St s 

0 iiittw jl*i n 

Ml AMLM3ASSY SuATEUALA 

1C SICSTSIl WJSljC IMMEDIATE 6233 

TRIAS CEP 1 IVVIC'AIE 

GUAUK B3US 02 OF BZ 1111322 

CONGRESS'S POSITION FIRMLY TO MARTINEZ OE HOZ SUBSEQUENT 

TO THE A. ATT til'S BILATERAL WITH SECRETARY BUMENTHAl. U.S. 

EXECUTIVE C - FT E C TCR RALPH jUXSAN UADE THE SAVE CASE ON A 

DIFFERENT OCCASION TO MARTINEZ DE HOZ. 

ROSIER 

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 CUATEUAEA 3ttS 

LIUDIS 

TREASl'RT FOR FIT It PIIDCES 

BlliMENTHAL SAID THAT WHILE « ARE UNDERSTANDING OF ARGENTINA'S 

PROBLEM ANO lit COh'I WISH 10 INTERFERE INTERNALLY. THE. CARTER 

ADMINISTRATION MUST IF CONSISTENT IN THE PURSUIT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. 

THE NAPKIN AMENDMENT REOUIRES US TO VOTE (GAINST LOANS IT THE III 

FOR COUNTRIES HITH GROSS VIOLATIONS EXCEPT 'N THE CASE 0F THE 

HE For. THE BADILLO MENOI-'ENT. WHICH ALREADY HAS PASSED THE HOUSE 

WOULD {XTtHO THIS LAW TO OTHER iFl'S. WHILE HUMPHREY 

AMEfyOUiNT W9U1D PROVIDE MORE FLEXIBIL IT?. THE ADMINISTRATION IS AS 

A MAHER OF ITS OKI POLICY ANO CONVICTION. COMMITTED TO THE 

ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE SUGGESTED. THEREFORE, THAT IT 

MIGHT EE ADVISEABLE FOR ARGENTINA TO POSTPONE APPLICATIONS FOR 

LOANS UNTIL IT COULD SHOW SOME DEFINITE IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS. 

I 

.MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAID THAT PRESIDENT VIDELA IS COMMITTED TO 

RESTORING HUMAN RIGHTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ARGENTINA HAS TWO 

LOANS IN THE PIPELINE FOR 101 CONSIDERATION WHICH COULD IE HELD 

UP. BUT KF IS CONCERNED AIOUT A SUP KILL ION LOAN FOR THE NATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT SANK MUCH IS BEING CONSIDERED ST THE IBRD. HF_ 

EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ARCEHTINA WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO UTILIZE ITS 

S3ri Mill 191 QUOTA WITH THE IBRD IT THE ICAN WERE DELAYED TO THE 

hrxi FISCAL TEAR. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT THIS LOAH MIGHT GET 

IHROUGH THE -REEOr LOOFHOlE ON THE GROUNDS OF EMPLOYMENT GENERATION. 

BLUMENTHAL RESPONDED BY INDICATING THAT THE IBID LOAH IS VEIT 

LIKELY TO PILSENT PROBLEMS FOR US. 

MARTINEZ Dt H02 BECAME SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE ANO ASKED TWO 

WORRIES ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE VICTIMS GF THE TERRORISTS. 

ARElIANO SAID THERE IS NO WAT OF RATIONALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS 

VIOLATIONS. 

IN RESPONSE TO RlUHEHTHAl'S CUE ST I Oil ABOUT ASSERTIONS OF 

ANTI-SEMI!ISM IN ARGENTINA. MARTINEZ CLAIMED THERE WAS HO SUBSTANCE 

TO THF CHARGES. 

f 

BlUMFNTHAl S«ID HE BELIEVES THAT THE U. S. POSITION IS CLEAR. 

WE HOPE TO SEC IUPVOyEUENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS MADE QUICKLY AND WOULD 

LIKE 1C BE INFORMED CONCERNING PROGRESSIVE. 

RIUUEIiTHAl REITERATEC U.S. OPPOSITION TO A'.T INCREASE IN 

SALARY FDN 101 EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND ASKED FOR ARGENTINA'S 

SUPPORT. 

MART INF Z DE H92 AGREED TO DISCUSS SALARV ISSUE WITH ORTIZ MENA 

WITH THI 09JECllVE OF HAViNC IT PUT A5I5E. «E THEN BROUGHT UP THE 

POSSIBILITY CF IKTAI BE’h'G ELIMINATED. CN TRANSFORMED. SINCE 

INTAl IS THE CULT INTERNATIONAL ORCAVZATlSN LOCATED IN ARGENTINA 

MART INEZ DE HOZ IS AHXlCUS THAT IT REMAlH THERE IN SOME FORM. 

BERCSIEN SAID THAT AS THE SECRETARY INDICATED IN HIS ISB 

MIEIING SPEECH, THE U.S. WISHES TD STUOl T"E FUTURE OF INTAL. 

MARTINEZ DE HOZ TH*'IFED THE SECRETARY FOR BE'hG AHE TO SPEAK 

FPA.Nf.LY AECIil THE SITUATION IN ARGENTINA. 

AS Nfl'jRTLD PEFTEl CC.'iCPESSWN EASILLO EX’.A,I,ED 

?—"Y 

JIIIMJM V* 

SKftff 

**"No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/06/18 : NLC-15R-3-1-1-1r*YWy ^

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-1-3i r 

DENTIAL 

□OS REVIEWED 21-Aug-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL) 






taken to promote human rights'. Thi's latter category 


financial institutions, a subject which the 

Argentine Minister of Economy Burely will raise with 

you. 


- Human Rights: Wanton violations of human rights 

are taking place in the name of counterterrorism. We 


processes. 







- Petroleum: The U.S. Geological Service has estimated 




t 







and agricultural fields.} 


Antarctic research program and an eventual claim to polar 

resources. 


wholly literate, generally Belf-sufficient industrial 


CONFIDENTIAL 

Authority ^ 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

NARA Deto — 

|No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-1-31


CONFIDENTIAL ...... 

- 2 - 

Political Violence and Human Rights 

The Argentine military inherited an almost impossible 


Isabel Peron in March 1976. Terror and-inflation were 






the contrary, they are polarising society. The government 






government, anti-Semitism is also a problem. However 


and Marxists, continue to murder military personnel, 





attempt, last month. 








influence.) 








to internal security are now denied routinely. Other 







JCONFTDENTTSL


-GQNFI DENT I AIT 

♦ 

- 3 - 






the World Bank before voting for a $105 million highway 

project. 


of how to vote on $265 million in five loans soon to 


Bank and the World Bank. This issue was raised by 











was particularly difficult for us (because it may be 



Martinez de Hoz may well make a plea for greater 

understanding of Argentina's difficult problems and 



— Compliment the Minister for his achievements to 

date in restoring Argentine economic stability (notably 



— Inquire about the health of the former Foreign 


attempt. 

-- Ask why it has not been^possible for the government 



guerrillas. 





■CONFIDENT IMT 

Mn Oh'Rotinn To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-1-3


eONP-IBENTIAfc 

- 4 - 

— Refer to Secretary Blumenthal's suggestion 

that it would be helpful if Argentina deferred loan 



t 

CONFIBSNTIAL 

|No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-1-3


• ' V 

t 

4lL\t 


WASHINGTON 

April 18, 1979 


FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 

Warren Christopher, Acting 

Panama Canal. I met with Jafck Murphy today to 

discuss plans for gaining House approval of the 

implementing legislation. Murphy said the crucial 

vote would probably occur on a motion by George Hansen 

to recommit the Murphy bill to committee, or on a 

substitute Hansen bill which would contravene the 

treaties. 

We had a good talk, and (I hope) established a 

basis for working more closely together in subsequent 

stages. Murphy urged us to undertake a major educational 

campaign to convince House members, particularly 

Republicans, that the treaties cannot be overturned 

and that the Hansen approach would jeopardize efficient 

operation of the Canal. Ed Derwinski's excellent piece 

on the Op Ed page of the POST today, entitled "Panama: 

from No to Yes," should be helpful with Republicans. 

Bill Rogers has been asked by Panama President 

Royo to come to Panama to provide counsel on the 

implementing legislation. I gave Bill our appraisal 

of the legislative situation this afternoon. It will 

be good to have his wise and calming counsel available 

to the Panamanians. 

THIS DOCUMENT MAY CONTAIN CONGRESSIONAL 

MATERIAL 

eat rev ev, completed 

RDS 2/3 

4/18/99 (Christopher, Warren) DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority 

NARA Dato --------- 



w 

•-secret 

- 2 - 

Southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Army force was 

deployed to southern Lebanon today. Haddad's artillery 

continued to shell UN positions in protest until 

about 7:00 p.m. our time. A Norwegian UN soldier 

was killed and another wounded in today's shelling. 

An American officer serving as a IjN observer was 

briefly held by Haddad's forceB and released only 

after Israeli intervention. 

At the UN, work is continuing on Waldheim's 

report to the Security Council on the implementation 

of UN resolutions on Lebanon. We understand Begin's 

decision to cooperate with UNIFIL is likely to soften 

criticism of Israel in the report. The possibility 

of Security Council action will depend on whether the 

shelling resumes tomorrow. 

The Shah. A campaign remains in progress to 

change our position with respect to the Shah's admission 

to the U.S. John McCloy, following up conversations 

with Cy and Zbig and a long letter to me, 

is continuing to call influential people throughout 

the country. We understand that McCloy's effort continues 

to be stimulated by Henry Kissinger and by the 

efforts of Ardeshir Zahedi. 

The Shah has turned down PanamaWe are awaiting 

a response to an inquiry t to 

President Lopez Portillo oh behalf of "the" Shah-. 

25X1 

Our belief that we must encourage the Shah to go 

elsewhere, at least for the time being, is further 

strengthened by Khomeini's verbal attacks on American 

influence and the withdrawal of two-thirds of the 

Iranian guard force from our Embassy compound. A new 

evaluation has just come in from Tehran confirming 

our assessment that the safety of official and unofficial 

Americans would be jeopardized if the Shah 

comes here. 

Argentina - I saw Ambassador Castro today to 

discuss the recent significant improvements in the 

human rights situation in Argentina. In the first 

months of 1979, the Argentines have almost eliminated 

the abductions by official security units which had 

occurred at a rate of almost 50 per month in 1978. 


No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/2* : NLC-7-'31-5-22-2 

3 

They appear to be investigating the few reports of 

recent abductions that have been received. The 

Argentine Supreme Court is also beginning to play a 

more active role in pressing the regime for information 

on missing persons. We believe these and other 

encouraging developments are partly attributable to 

our policy of pressing firmly for improvements and 

to the anticipated visit of the Inter-American Commission 

on Human Rights (now scheduled for late next 

month). 

U.S.-Mexico Consultative Mechanism. U.S. participants 

in six of the eight-working groups have 

now had organizational meetings and are preparing 

for meetings with their Mexican counterparts in 

April and May. 


t

No 

Full 2012/11/23 : NLC-7-21-1-15-3>T 

DOS REVIEWED 09-Apr-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL 


WASHINGTON 

f 

t 



FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 

Warren Christopher, Acting tO.C. 

Guyana- The Guyanese Ambassador called on me 

today to express the condolences of his government 

and people, and to pledge full cooperation. In thanking 

him, I asked that his government reconsider its 

decision not to permit an FBI team to assist in the 

investigation in Guyana. I noted the FBI's statutory 

responsibility in cases of assassination of public 

officials, as well as the possibility of other crimes 

under U.S. law, and I assured him the FBI team would 

work in a cooperative and sensitive manner in Guyana. 

]Jc promised to contact his government. 

Rhodesia. Nyerere and Khama have reacted favorably 

to Callaghan's proposal for a Cledwyn Hughes 

mission to see whether conditions favor a call by 

Callaghan for an all-parties meeting in London early 

next year. Nyerere said the mission is the proper 

way to proceed and that it would fit well with other 

similar exploratory efforts. Both the Rhodesians 

and the South Africans have also indicated their 

readiness to receive the Hughes mission. In response 

to a UK request, Andy Young has agreed to delay his 

travel to Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia 

by a week in order not to conflict with Hughes. This 

will enable him to reinforce Hughes' presentation and 

to take an independent sounding of Front Line 

reactions. 

r>rf»ni 

iTf^rSnri 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13528 

Authority 

NARA_££_-- Data—H\aAaU 

iNn Ohier.tinn To Declassification in Full 2012/^/2^^^^^^^^^


- 2 

Nicaragua. There has not yet been any definitive 

response tothe plebiscite proposal presented to both 

sides by the mediation team. While Samoza's initial 

reaction was not positive, he did not reject the proposal 

and told his Cabinet that "we are beginning a 

new process of negotiation." 

The opposition coalition (I’AO) issued a communique 

saying that the mediation has not achieved its 

fundamental objectives for democratization of the 

countryr but adding that they would respond later to 

the plebiscite proposal. 

OAS. The Permanent Council met today to begin 

consideration of the Costa Rican charge that Nicaragua 

violated its frontier yesterday^ Costa Rica is pushing 

for an OAS fact-finding team, a commission of 

observers on its side of the frontier, and the return 

of a Costa Rican prisoner and the bodies .of two killed. 

Nicaragua maintains the violation was into its own 

territory and is welcoming a fact-finding group and 

the concept of a border force. In preliminary consultations, 

agreement was reached to name the Dominican 

Republic, Grenada and Uruguay to the fact-finding 

team. 

Angola. In further discussions with Dick Moose 

and Don McHenry in Luanda today, the Angolans related 

Cuban withdrawal from Angola to a Namibia settlement 

and left no doubt that removal of South African forces 

from their southern border is their basic security 

objective. The Angolans said they feel Cuban forces 

in Angola should not intervene in Zambia, Rhodesia 

or Namibia and told Moose there is no flow of Cubans 

from Angola to Zambia. 

Argentina. We have no confirmation of last 

nightk s report that Argentina is about to occupy three 

islands in the Beagle Channel aêa. Ambassador Castro 

reports that positions have probably hardened in recent 

days among the Argentine military but that there are 

no indications of imminent military action. Ambassador 

Landau in Santiago tells us the Chileans do not 

appear unduly concerned and have not taken additional 

military readiness moves. We are considering at what 

stage wo might wish to take the situation to the OAS, 

preferably in conjunction with other governments. 

jêEeRET

No Objection To Declassification in hull 2U12/11/23 : NLD-7-21-1-15-3, 

t DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

WASHINGTON 



FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 

Warren Christopher, Acting CO-C, 

Guyana. The Guyanese Ambassador called on me 

today to express the condolences of his government 

and people, and to pledge full cooperation. In thanking 

him, I asked that his government reconsider its 

decision not to permit an FBI team to assist in the 

investigation in Guyana. I noted the FBI's statutory 

responsibility in cases of assassination of public 

officials, as well as the possibility of other crimes 

under U.S. law, and I assured him the FBI team would 

work in a cooperative and sensitive manner in Guyana. 

He promised to contact his government. 

Rhodesia. Nyerere and Khama have reacted favorably 

to Callaghan's proposal for a Cledwyn Hughes 

mission to see whether conditions favor a call by 

Callaghan for an all-parties meeting in London early 

next year. Nyerere said the mission is the proper 

way to proceed and that it would fit well with other 

similar exploratory efforts. Both the Rhodesians 

and the South Africans have also indicated their 

readiness to receive the Hughes mission. In response 

to a UK request, Andy Young has agreed to delay his 

travel to Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia 

by a week in order not to conflict with Hughes. This 

will enable him to reinforce Hughes' presentation and 

to take an independent sounding of Front Line 

reactions. 

SECRET 

iNn Ohiection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/23 : NLC-7-21-1-15-:

No Ubiection lo ueciassmcation in hull i'Uii'/'iWJ : NLU-f-2‘i-'Mi>-3|* i 

— « uifivnu I — 

- 2 - 

Nicaragua. There has not yet been any definitive 

response to the plebiscite proposal presented to both 

sides by the mediation team. While Somoza's initial 

reaction was not positive, he did not reject the proposal 

and told his Cabinet that "we are beginning a 

new process of negotiation." 

The opposition coalition (p’AO) issued a communique 

saying that the mediation has not achieved its 

fundamental objectives for democratization of the 

country, but adding that they would respond later to 

the plebiscite proposal. 

OAS. The Permanent Council met today to begin 

consideration of the Costa Rican charge that Nicaragua 

violated its frontier yesterday. Costa Rica is pushing 

for an OAS fact-finding team, a commission of 

observers on its side of the frontier, and the return 

of a Costa Rican prisoner and the bodies of two killed. 

Nicaragua maintains the violation was into its own 

territory and is welcoming a fact-finding group and 

the concept of a border force. In preliminary consultations, 

agreement was reached to name the Dominican 

Republic, Grenada and Uruguay to the fact-finding 

team. 

Angola. In further discussions with Dick Moose 

and Don McHenry in Luanda today, the Angolans related 

Cuban withdrawal from Angola to a Namibia settlement 

and left no doubt that removal of South African forces 

from their southern border is tlieir basic security 

objective. The Angolans said they feel Cuban forces 

in Angola should not intervene in Zambia, Rhodesia 

or Namibia and told Moose there is no flow of Cubans 

from Angola to Zambia. 

Argentina■ We have no confirmation of last 

night1s report that Argentina is about to occupy three 

islands in the Beagle Channel area. Ambassador Castro 

reports that positions have probably hardened in recent 

days among the Argentine military but that there are 

no indications of imminent military action. Ambassador 

Landau in Santiago tells us the Chileans do not 

appear unduly concerned and have not taken additional 

military readiness moves. We are considering at what 

stage we might wish to take the situation to the OAS, 

preferably in conjunction with other governments. 

SEGRtT 

iNr^hifir.tinn To Declassification in Full 2012/11/23 : NLC-7-21 -1-15-31

No Objection i u uyuiyyyiiKjanun in hull wznmi : NLU-b-4-b-n-^j^ 

IMpartment of State W TELEGRAM - 

page s: 

m>-i4 

B-EH05 14937 II OF 17 272116Z 

NFC OCT-11 ISO-18 ClAE-RB D0DE-I3 PH-85 H-Bl INR-IG 

.-83 NSIE-II NSC-85 PA-81 SP-IZ SS-1S ICA-11 

HA-85 MCT-81 TRSE-B8 A10-85 El-81 /887 W 

.................................... 157531 272717! /73 

P 272I12Z JUN 71 

FN ANENBASST IUEN0S AIRES 

TO SECSTATE VASHDC PRIORITY 6213 

6277 BUENOS 84937 81 OF 82 2721161 

THEN. THE FORMER SECRETARY TOLD VI DEL A HE GAVE HIS FULL 

SUPPORT TO PRESIDENT CARTER Oil HIS AFRICAN POLICY. 

6. HUNAN RIGHTS WERE DISCJSSEO BRIEFLY. KISSINGER SAID IT 

WAS UNFORTUNATE MARY AMERICANS STILL THOUGHT ARGENTINA WAS 

A SOFT DRINK. HE SAID THIS INDICATED THAT *1c||ICf"* *** 

NOT AWARE OF ASSENT I RE HISTORY NOR OF ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST 

TENWRisiT m LHPHA5IHU IHAI TlEkORISH WAS NOT SOLELY OF 

' ARGENTINE*ORIGIN BUT INSTEAD IT NAD BEGONE AN INTERNATIONAL 

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 IUEN0S AIRES 4937 

E.O. 11652: GOS 

TASS: OVP 

SUBJECT HENRY KISSINGER VISIT TO AROENTINA 

SUMMARY: 

FROfl ARRiVAL TO DEPARTURE HENRY KISSINGER AND HIS 

FAMILY SENE WELL RECEIVED IT ARGENTINE POPULACE. THE GOA 

LA.0 OUT RED CARPET, PULLING OUT STOPS. OR. KISSINGER SPOKE 

to DIVERSIFIED GROUPS—FROfl RANKERS TO GAUCHOS. IN HOST 

INSTANCES, HE CDHPLI RENTED GOA FON DEFEATING TERORISTS IUT 

HE WARNED THAT TACTICS USED AGAINST THEN THEN ARE NOT 

JSTIFIAILE NOW. GENERALLY, DR. KISSINSER PURLICLY AFFIRMEO 

HIS SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH A 


1. DR. KISSINGER, HIS WIFE ANO SON ARRIVED 

WEDNESDAY HORNING (JUNE 211. HE WAS NET AT THE AIRPORT BY 

A FONOFF REP WHO DOGOED HIM THROUGHOUT HIS VISIT. KISSINGER 

WAS THE GUEST OF PRESIDENT VIDELA, SUPPOSEDLY INVITED TO VIEW 

WORLD CUP. THE FORMER SECRETARY MADE IT CLEAR DURING HIS 

FIVE-DAY STAY HE WAS IN ARGENTINA AS PRIVATE CITIZEN ANO NOT 

A SPOKESMAN FOR USG. 

CONCEPT. UJUIH6ER APPLAUDED ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS IN 

COMBATTING.TERRORISM HUpHE Ai SO, STRESSES THAT TACLLCS-USEO 

II. JIF EATING-TERROR I STS HAD NO PLACE IN ARGENT INA-TOOAY. 

7. THROUGHOUT LUNCH VIDELA SEENEO RELAXED AND FRIENDLY. 

HE TENSED UP C’iLY WHEN ARGENTINA'S PROSPECTS IN THE WORLD 

CUP WERE DISCUSSED. HE DISPLAYED NO ANNOYANCE AT USG. 

pOS REVIEWED 15-Aug-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULLj 

H BA EARLY 

2. KISSINGER'S FIRST ACTIVITY WAS TO LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT 

VIDELA, COL. MALLEA GIL IINTERPRETERI AND AMBASSADOR CASTRO 


PREARRANGED IT SO KISSINGER AND THE INTERPRETER WOULD MEET 

WITH HIM PRIVATELY HALF HOUR BEFORE AMBASSADORS ARRIVAL. 

IMMEDIATELY ON AMBASSADOR'S ARRIJIA1 AT 1388 LUNCH WAS -SERVtft. 

3. KISSINGER INFORMED AMBASSADOR THAT DUR'NG PRIVATE 

SESSION WITH PRESIDENT HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED. ALLEGEDLY 

VIDELA WANTED SUGGESTIONS FROM DR. KISSINGER IS TO HOW TO 

IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH USG. THE AMBASSADOR WAS NOT INFORMED 


,4 IT luich, VIDELA ASKED KISSINGER FOR HIS VlEUS Ok LATIN 

‘“ERICA. FARMER -FCRFYIRY RFSPnHDFH THAT HOW MORE THAN EVER 

'■'>5 TIME TD BE CONCERNED ABOUT DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF WESTERN 

tiEH^SPHERE. HE IQDED uMI * OF ACTION AMONG jHL LX~~EMlRLfS 

;(~»Eou.HF3~'iralCaBeO*!! countrtes"heTojurv'ive.. he 

STRESSED that CURING Hl7 TENURE IS"S£CIIETa1(V OF STATE, LATIN 

AMERICA WAS NOT -.IS TOP PRIORITY. HE SAID THIS WAS TRUE 

BEFORE HE WAS SECRETARY AND IT IS TRUE HOW. KISSINGER POINTED 

OUT THAT THIS WAS NOT MEANT TO BE A REFLECTION ON ANY 

ADMINISTRATION. THE LACK OF~A«£flTIDN TOWARDS LA WAS NOT A 

DELIBERATE ACT DH ANYBODY'S PART. fTTHfe-UHI A FACT THAT 

WITH TUt RFT**!fF*~,Mt u"aln “*rTM>MUV “FfiLFQT fhsuF 

5 jrfsS'iiGER EMPHASIZED LATIN AHERICAU MAY RE NEXT 

RUgllTTNS-CPBrTlgHEinirr HE ADDED IN VIEW OF EVENTS IN 

AFIN(AIT iS IMPERATIVE THAT THE USG FOCUS ON LATIN AMERICJ 

HE ““T^Tff- "1** nrHT |,,°TFa «"■ HIS ANNAPOLIS SPEECH. 

K SSI.MGER STRESSED HIS SUPflim UP HUH milUITEN'R-nUlflON 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O. 13526 

Authority ~~ ~~U~ 

NARA_£JL_ DEto_Z»A3bk_ 

PC.iCY, ESPECIALLY THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY AND SALES OF AIR 

CRAFT TO HlD-EAS’ERN JOtfflTflES. KISSINGER SAID IT 1 

n6CMjNABLE THAI A Wth HAWAII FO THAT CUBAN SOLDIERS" 

INVINCIBLE SlNdf WHEN, HE ASKED, CAN CUBAN SOLOIERS MARtH 

FROM SOUTH TO kORV IN AFRICA AND EXPECT THE WORLD TO APPLAUD 

CONFIDENT Ht 

iNn Obifir.tinn To Declassification in Full 2012/12/11 : NLC-6-4-6-11-21

I 

v- ■- No Objection 10 ueciassmcation in hull zurznzni : NLU-b-4-b-n-^ 

_ 

IMpartment of State V TELEGRAM 

PAGE 01 BUENOS 14937 02 OF 12 272123Z 1271 , BUENOS 04137 02 OF 02 272123Z 

ACT 101 AAA-14 

INFO CCT-01 130-83 CIAE-00 OO3E-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 

l-BJ NSAE-EB HSC-B3 PA-01 SP-02 SS-1S ICA-’l 

HA-08 MCT-01 TASE-18 AID-09 E8-88 /0I7 W 

................................... 037572 2722072 /73 

P 272R12Z JUN 71 

FH AHEHSASSY BUENOS AIRES 

TO SECSTATE UASiOC PRIORITY 8284 


3. EARLY THURSDAY HORNING OR. KISSINGER NET WITH DR. JORGE 

LUIS BORGES. NOTED ARGENTINE POET AND WRITER. THIS PROMPTED 

NUCH NEWS COVERAGE. LATER IN DAY KISSINGER AND FAHILY 

DEPARTED WITH HiNISTER OF ECONOHY HART INEZ DE HOI TO OVER 

NIGHT AT AN ESTANCIA EFARHI. THIS WAS HOSTLY A SOCIAL EVENT. 

CONCEPT UF ATTEMPTUULTO INBISMSKT WHAN EIGHTS IN I A. 

HE SAID,IE WOULD WAIT ABOUT TWO WEEKS AFTER Hlj RETURN TO 

US BEFORE SPEAKING OUT. KISSINGER WORKED CLOSELY WIT? 

ehbassyIersonnel. they were good guests aho hade every 

EFFORT TO GIVE APPEARANCE THEY WERE NOT EHISSARIES OF 

OPPOSITKH TO CURRENT US ADHINISTRATION. 

NY ONLY CONCERN IS THAT KISSINGER'S REPEATED HIGH PRAISE 

FOR ARGENTINA'S ACTION IN WIPING OUT TERRORISH AND HIS 

STRESS Ok THE IMPORTANCE OF ARGENTINA HAY NAVE GONE TO SORE 

CONSIDERABLE EXTENT TO HIS HOSTS' HEADS. DESPITE HIS 

DISCLAIMERS THAT the P.ETHODS USED IN FIGHTING TERRORISH MUST 

ROT BE PERPETUATED, THERE IS SOKE DANGER THAT ARGENTINES 

NAY USE KISSINGER'S LAUDATORY STATEMENTS AS JUSTIFICATION 

FOR HARDENING THE'R HUMAN RIGHTS STANCE. 

CRSTRO 

9. CX HIS RETURN FROM THE FARH, KISSINGER SPOKE TO EMBASSY 

PERSONAL. HE GAVE A "EP TALKS TO AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE 

PERSONNEL AS WELL AS LOCALS. HE NARRATED SOME OF HIS 

EXPERIENCES WHILE IN USG SERVICE. HIS HUMOROUS APPROACH 

WAS WELL RECEIVED BY ALL. 

10. 011 FRIDAY EVENING A RECEPTION WAS OIVEN AT EMBASSY 

RESIDENCE HONORING KISSINGER AND FAMILY. APPROXIMATELY TWO 

HUNDRED PERSONS ATTENDED. GOA TOP OFFICIALS WERE VELL 

I REPRESENTED. 

, 11. AFTER THE RECEPTION, KISSINGER ATTERDEO A DINNER GIVEN 

BY HIH'STER OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ OE HOZ. THIS GROUP WAS 

COMPOSED OF BATHERS, ECONOMISTS AND INDUSTRIALISTS. THE MAIN 

DISCUSSION CONCERNED MEANS TO ATTRACT FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL AND 

OTHER INVESTMENT TO ARGENTINA. THE LONG TERM LACK OF POLITICAL 

STABILITY AND INFLATION SEEMED TO BE THE MAIN CONCERN OF 


t 

■ 

12. ON JUNE 24 KISSINGER PARTICIPATED IN AN OFF THE RECORD 

'RESS CONFERENCE AND WAS MADE AN HONORARY MEMBER OF ARGENTINE 

COUNCIL DN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THIS GROUP IS COMPRISED 

OF FORMER FOREIGN MINISTERS, WHO HOLD THEMSELVES UP TO THE 

PUBLIC AS THE 'ELITE GROUP' ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. OR. KISSINGER 

SAVE Ah OFF THE CUFF TALK. HE STRESSED THAT THERE WAS HO 

CUESTIO'i BUT THAT AMERICANS LACKED KNOWLEDGE ABOUT 

ARGENTINA'S "I STORY. ESPECIALLY, Rf"'-«"« 1 ftCKED FAMILIARITY 

W-TH-AKSENTIHt'S FXPtRlEHEt ill FfGHfrimi Tfmim.—(tf-EXPLAINEO 

US HIS OPINION GOA HAD DONE AN OUTSTANDING JOB IN WIPING 

jut TERRfimV FORCES, BUT-ALSO UAUIIWEITTpAT mEtHODS UStO 

T7i riGWIHlt' Tt.BROR ISM-MUST HOY HE PERPETOATED. ~"E ‘EXPLAINED 

A MOVEMENT TOWARDS iioiMALlY MUST TAKE PLACE IF DEMOCRATIC 

.DEALS ARE TC PREVAIL. 

13. DR. KISSiIIGER ALSO APPEARED IN A QUESTION AND ANSWER 

PERIOD WITH ONE OF ARGENT INA'SPOPULAR NEWS COMMENTERS. 

DURING THE INTERVIEW 

JUPWaigTs IMF flfc’F 

OF THE GREATEST VIOLATOR « 

K'HP----- HP-SAID IT WAS 

UNFORTUNATE THAT IN SOME ITLIARLtb MWAH RIGHTS VAS 

BEING USED AS A WEAPON AGAINST ITS FRIENDS.~~ 

COMMENT: 

THE K'SSINGZR FAMILY‘ATTENDED A FOOTBALL GAME IN 

ROSARIO. WHERE HE WAS INTRODUCED TO THE PUBLIC. INDICATIONS 

ARE HE VAS UELu RECEIVED BY THE AUDIENCE. HE ALSO ATTENDED 

TWO OTHER GAMES 'N BUENOS AIRES AS'A GUEST OF PRESIDENT 

VIDELA. THE ARGENTINE MEDIA GAVE FAVORABLE AND HEAVY 

COVERAGE TO THE KISSINGER VISIT. 

COMMENT; DR. KISSINGER TOLD THE AMBASSADOR HE WOULD NOT 

CRITIC.ZE THE CARTER ADHINISTRATION SO LO’iO AS HE WAS OVER 

SEAS. HE SPOKE HIGHLY OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY 

TO THE AMBASSADOR, RUT FELT *E WOULD SHEAH JUT-JUUIUSI-THE 

JHMFIDENTI4 

Ino Obiar.tinn To Declassification in Full 2012/12/11 : NLC-6-4-6-11-2

No Objection Io Ueclassitication in hull 2U1 2/11/23 : NLU-B-24-B-2-U 

^ 

OtPAhlMI Nl :)i 'JB- 

AMnA5"AJOK *M 1 /.r:.;r 

VSASMUi 

jDOS REVIEWED 05-Apr-2012{ DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULLJ 

""coRn&swgiAL__ 

February 28, 1979 

TO: 

OES - Assistant Secretary of State Pickering 

Tom: 

I would like to add a further thought to 

my earlier memo of today on heavy water production 

technology sales to Argentina. Ambassador Castro’s 

recent reports thaL Argentina omitted mention of 

reprocessing in its twenty year nuclear energy 

master program may also be a significant element 

worthy of analysis in a review of our position. 

Gejrar^'Smi th 

-rnnrTmrTiiTTnT. 

GDS 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.Q.13520 

Authority 

NARA EF___ Dato —--------- 

iNn Ohiection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/23 : NLC-6-24-6-2-01

no uojection 10 ueciassmcanon in -un zui tiu/Lim : inla,-^4-»‘i-j-i i-a 

_ ___ _ ________ *____ 

pos REVIEWED 29-Jun'-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION 

DRAFT 

DOS REVIEWED 29-Jun-2010: REFER TO OSD 

__ SECIU3T (Entire Text) 

MBtORANDUM FOR: 

THE PRESIDENT 

OSD REVIEWED 18-Jan-2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION: 

From: 

Warren D. Christopher 

Subject: 

Steps to Improve U.S.-Argentine 

t 

Relations 

■'.Pursuant to your instructions* the Inter-Agency 

Group for the American Republics has prepared a plan 

of action for 198(1, which I am submitting for your 

approval. 

*» • ■ • • 

+ ' ' “ ' ■ i ' 

■ ■ r? 

I. OBJECTIVES 

Our principal objective^will be improve our relation- 

ships so as to foster'Argentina*a identification with 

the West; to seek assistance on appropriate East-West 

issues (e.g. grains): to foster increased sensitivity 

among Argentine leaders to global nonproliferation 

concerns: to encourage further specific 

K 

■ *■* 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority 

MAH ft £■?____DfltO ~* l\°liU

i\o uujecuori iu uuuassmuaiiuM m -un ûio/u^/uh . inlu-^h-si-o-i i-a 

-2- 

improvement in current human rights practices (e.g. 

due process for all persons suspdcted of subversion 

t 

or terrorism); and thus to contain Soviet political 

and economic influence. We also wish to encourage 

continued Argentine cooperation with the Papal Mediation 

of Argentina's dispute with Chile over territorial 

limits in the Beagle Channel a dispute that very nearly 

led to war between the two countries in late 1978. 

Finally, we wish to encourage Argentina to play a 

constructive role with respect to developments in 

Central America and in other Hemispheric issues. 

*• . 

II. ACTIONS 

1 i 

FOB 

1 1 

1980 

. 

» ' * 

* • 

t • . * 

1. The Consultative Process 

We will continue the process of political and 

economic consultations begun with General Goodpaster's 

visit to Buenos Aires in January. We contemplates 

—A visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter- 

American Affairs to Buenos Airesl possibly about August 1 

Nn Ohinr.tinn Tn Dpr.lassifinatinn in -nil 7013/07/04 1 Nl C-74-91-3-11-9

no uojection i o ueciassmcaiion in -un Û'U/U4/U4 : NLU-^-yi-j- i i-y 

-3- 

—A meeting of the 0.8.-Argentine Mixed Economic 

Commission in October, the D.3. delegation to be 

chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Economic 

Affairs. 

t 

—Periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric 

issues, with the first round of such talks to be held 

during the visit of the Assistant Secretary for Inter- 

American Affairs. 

2. nuclear Relations 

We want to Jceep open the dq$r for such cooperation 

as Argentina may desire for l\:s nuclqar program, as 

a way to maintain Influence for the longer-term. 

In particular, we should try to meet our commitment 

to provide highly and moderately enriched fuel for 

Argentina's research program. We should: 

—Try to resolve promptly, in accordance with 

U.S. lav, the remaining safeguards issues to permit 

t 

Nn Ohinr.tinn Tn Hfidassifinatinn in rnll P013/0P/04 ' Nl C-?4-91-3-11-9

no uojection 10 ueciassmcation in -un zu ij/u^/u

No Objection lo ueclassitication in -uli wwzm : NLU-^-yi-a-n-y 

-5- 

t 

— there be no nev disappearancea, (i.e., extra- 

legal abductions of persons suspected of association 

with terrorism or subversion, Including persons believed 

to be active terrorists); 

—all persons suspected of terrorism or subversive 

activities be processed through normal judicial channels 

thus ensuring due process to such detainees; and 

—there be substantial progress in advance of 

the OASGA,' in reducing the numbeV of political prisoners 

f 

held without charges through release, trial, or exile 

(during his recent .visit. Ambassador Smlthft»B assured 

that half of thepe prisoners—1,300 at the time—would 

be released or sentenced by the end of the year). 

- The Inter-Agency Group noted that an accounting 


in OR fora, and concluded that this should not be 

a central requirement for improving our bilateral 

relationship. 

i 

Nn Dhinntinn Tn nanlassifinatinn in —nil 3/07/94 1 Nl C-74-91-3-11-9

No UDjection i o ueciassmcauon in -un zv i j/u^/uh ; 

i-j- i i-a 

-6- 

4. Military Relatione 

He will begin to rebuild1 relations through increased 


progress on human rights will be essential to the 

more fundamental improvement in relations (Including 

a modification of the Humphrey/Kennedy amendment, 

as reported in the conclusions of the PRC meeting), 

we plan tox 


Argentina} the fi£s*t round, to be held this year in 

— t 


the South Atlantic! 

—invite an Argentine Armed Forces team to make 


discuss global defense issues! 

—invite Argentina to send a guest Instructor 

to the P.S. Army School of the Americas. (The Executive 

Branch will consult with members'of Congress on this 

t 

initiative.) 

Nn Ohinrtinn Tn HfinlaRRifinatinn in .-nil ?ni3/0?/04 : Nl C-?4-91-3-11-9

ino UDjection i o ueciassmcation in -uii i j/u^/u4* : iNL^-^-y i-j- i i-y 

-7- 



We will keep under review*the desirability to 

proceed with an invitation to a senior Argentine military 

leader (such as the Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine 

Army or the Army Chief-of-Staff) to visit Washington 

this year. A final decision on this (including the 

question of timing) should take into account the implications 

of Buch.a move on the selection of the nest 

Argentine president now under way within the Argentine 

* 

Armed Forces, as well as developments in human rights 

and U.S. -Argentine* relations. 

• - 

— Sale of P~3 Aircraft. T » 


the sale of ocean surveillance aircraft .to the GOA. 

We see no possibility, however, to seek special legislation 

to permit the sale of these aircraft to Argentina 

this year. 

Nn Ohinr.tinn Tn nfidassifinatinn in —nil ?D13/n?/04 1 Nl C-P4-91-3-11-9

"° UDjeciion i o uecassmoanon in -uu ansnunn 

- 8 - 



—Sign the pending g.S.-Argentine Agricultural 


Secretary for interAmerican Affairs; 

r 

—Seek to conclude the negotiations for the bilateral 


—Seek to negotiate a consular convention. 


■ • • 

The Inter-Agency Group also^considered whether 


our NATO allies.and Japan about issues of common concern 



We believe recent Soviet activities are a subject 

for the NATO experts group on Latin 

n Dh.fintmn Tn nfirtassifinahnn in -,j|| ?M3/0?/n4 ■ Nl C-74-S1-3-11-9

i\o uDjeaiori i u ueuassmcaLiun in —uu io/u/vuh ; inlvwh-w i-o- i i-s 

- 8 - * 

t 

America and should be addressed in that forum. Human 

rights are discussed by the WEO group in the appropriate 

UN fora, such as the UN Human RightB Commission. 

A majority of the Inter-Agency Group recommended against 

any new bilateral approaches to our Allies on these 

issues. 

7. Implications for U.S. Policy Toward Brasil and 

Chile 

i 

^ The Group alpo-considered the implications for 


e 


. t 

As a general point, the Group noted that many 

of these steps will merely restore a better balance 

in U.S. relations vith the tvo countries since the 


vith'Brasil (Including, most recently, security consultations). 

There vas agreement that Brasil would not 

respond favorably to a proposal for trilateral security 

talks at this time. 

Nn Ohifirtinn Tn Hfidassifinatinn in -nil ?013/03/04 : Nl C-?4-91-3-11-9

No Objection 10 ueciassmcation in -un zw\ J/UZ/U4 : NLo-^-yi-j-ri-a 

9 

Not addressed by the Group, but a problem of 

some consequence, nonetheless, is the Chilean perception 

that we have "tilted” toward Argentina. Chile sees 

our warming relationship withÂrgentina as being directly 

threatening in the context of the Beagle Channel dispute. 

He have attempted to persuade the Chileans that what 

we are doing with Argentina has nothing to do with 

Chile or with our position on the Beagle Channel, 

which is to encourage acceptance of the outcome of 

Papal mediation and avoid war. However, the Chileans 

seem to fear that the Argentines, enjoying improved 

relations with the U.S., and seeing Chile Increasingly 

Isolated, will.be encouraged toward adventurism. 

This" problem of art, imbalance in our relationships 

in the Southern Cone, and of *he dangers that this 

could pose to peace in the region, will need to be 

looked to in the not-too-dlstant future. 

AKA/SC :CWRuser: Is 

Disc 1 

( 

Nn Ohinrtinn Tn Dfidassifinatinn in -nil ?f)13/f)?/04 • NI.C%?4-91-3-11-9

INO uujecuun iu ueuasbiiiumiuii in run £U i jfu^/un . inl.o-^*+-u/-j 

MEMORANDUM 

CONFIDENTIAL 


ecembar 21, 1978 

DOS REVIEWED 09-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE! I\ FULL.' 

• .. ... ______ ______________ , _ __________ i 


FROM: 

SUBJECT 


LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (PastO 

Weekly Report 

Beagle Channel 

Within a few hours time, an important switch by the Argentines 

seems to have averted hostilities, once again, over the Beagle 

Channel dispute. This morning Ambassador Castro in Buenos Aires 

was informed by General Viola that it was the view of the GOA 

that "no option other than war remained."1 The decision had 

apparently been taken following the retceipt of a Chilean note 

which agreed to accept the Pope as mediator, but which did not 

bend on the terms of the mediation. (C) 

We sent a flash cable instructing Castro to express our deepest 

concern over the Argentine position and to remind them that 

should they take hostile military action, we would view it as 

"aggression." We took concurrent action with the Pope in Rome, 

who responded by offering to send a papal emissary to Argentina 

immediately to explore the possibilities of mediation. The 

Argentines accepted the Pope's offer, and barring a last minute 

change of mind by the Chileans, the emissary’s presence should 

serve to defuse the situation sufficiently to enable both sides 

to stand down and start talking again. (C) 

declassified 

E.0.13526 

•CONFIDENTIAL— 

Review on December 21. 1984 


INU VJUjfcJUllUI 1 I U UfcJOId&ljlllUcUlUl I III run £.\J I «J/U£/\s*t . INI_V->“£*t-U I I 

MEMORANDUM 

rnwwTnEwrTAT. 


December 21, 1978 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


DAVID AARON 

ROBERT PASTO 

Nicaragua Update (U) 

With the direct negotiations between the two aides at a standstill, 

the NG took matters into its hands today and presented a 

"compromise proposal" to both sides for their approval (or rejection) 

by next week. The NG proposal contains provisions which 

had been discussed in earlier negotiating sessions, and which, it 

is hoped, will be acceptable to both sides. The principal compromise 

modifications advanced in this latest document are: (C) 

(1) Somoza's brother and son, who occupy key command 

positions in the National Guard, will be relieved and named to 

posts abroad before the plebiscite is conducted on February 25, 

1979. (C) 

(2) Should Somoza win, he would be obligated to form a 

"national government of reconciliation" and the FAO would be 

obliged to maintain a peaceful, democratic, and constructive 

opposition. (This is changed from the earlier drafts which required 

the FAO's participation in the government.) (C) 

(3) Should Somoza lose, he would resign immediately and 

voluntarily absent himself from the country three days later, and 

remain abroad until at least May .1, 1981. (C) 

(4) Following the election by Congress of an interim President, 

Congress would adopt certain constitutional changes by 

April 15, 1979, which would permit the election by Congress (FAO 

nominates and PLN approves) of a new President on May 1, 1979, 

who would serve with legislative and executive powers until May 1, 

1981, with the help of a fifty-person "Committee of Notables," who 

in turn will be charged with drawing up a draft of a new constitution. 

A Cabinet will be named by the new President composed of 

one-third FAO, one-third PLN, and one-third independents chosen 

by mutual agreement between the FAO and PLN. (C) 

(5) A constituent assembly will be fleeted on November 1, 1980, 

(Note: Although it is not mentioned, presumably a new President 

will be popularly elected under the t&rms of the current constitution, 

to assume power on May 1, 1981, to replace the interim 

President.) (C) 

COMFIBEWTTA^. 

Review on December 21, 1984 


No UDjection i o ueciassmcaiion in i-uii zv i j/u^/u^ : 

COWPIPFNTIAL 

• ■■---t------- -— 

-2 

The other major ideas of the NG proposal, \i.e., the reorganization 

of the Supreme Court and the National Guard, the particulars 

and timetable of the carrying-out of a fair plebiscite under the 

control of an international authority — have not changed from 

earlier positions tabled by the NG. (C) 

Initial reaction to the compromise plan has been negative on the 

government side. General McAuliffe and Ambassador Bowdler met with 

Somoza today and informed him that we have been disappointed in 

the government's unyielding position during the discussions of the 

past several days. It appears as if Somoza believes that by 

stalling long enough, he will be able to create sufficient divisions 

among the FAQ to cause it to break off negotiations, and thus bear 

the onus for having failed to reach an agreement. (C} 

I just learned that the meeting between Bowdler and McAuliffe and 

Somoza went very poorly. Somoza apparently stonewalled, and tried 

unsuccessfully to persuade McAuliffe that 30 years of a military 

alliance should not be repaid in this manner. McAuliffe and 

Bowdler are cabling their recommendations for tough action on our 

part. McAuliffe believes that half measures will not persuade 

Somoza anymore. They may be recommending withdrawal of the entire 

MILGROUP, the entire AID Mission, the Ambassador, and I would not 

be surprised if they included the furniture. We will have to have 

an SCC meeting to discuss this tomorrow. Christopher will probably 

raise it with you at your 6:45 a.m. meeting. (C) 

i 

? 

60 NETPENTSAI^, 


PISE B! 

ACT I On ARA-14 

no UDjection i o ueciassmcanon in i-im j/u^/U4 : nlo-^-oo- i-o-//>cjuujjuriniaui 

uj otute ' 

■ illluhhih 

(WENOS B4937 I'. CF B2 2711151 1277 

INFO OCT-ai .SC-SB C RE-80 D0DE-B3 PM-Di H-Bl IIIR-lfl 

i-ai IISAE-BB NSC-8: PS-81 SP-82 SS-IS ICA-11 

PA-0S PCT-S1 TR3E-88 m'D-35 EI-BS >W W 

................................. BS7531 2722872 /73 

P 272BIZZ .1*1 78 

FM SHE*18ASSY BUENOS AIRES 

TO SECSTATE VAShDC PRIORITY 62S3 


E.O. llbSZ: GDS 

TAGS: DiiP 

SUBJECT: HENRY HiSSIHGER VISIT TO ARGENTINA 

SUMMARY: 

FROM ARR'VAL TO DEPARTURE HENRY H'SSINGER AND HIS 

BUENOS 1*337 11 OF 82 2721161 

ThEI. THE FORMER SECRETARY TOLD VI3ELA BE GAVE NlS FUu 

SUPPORT TO PRESIDENT CARTER Oil BIS AFRICAN P01ICY. 

6. HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY. KISSINGER SAID IT 

WAS UNFORTUNATE MANY AMERICANS STILL THOUGHT ARGENTINA BAS 

A SOFT DRINK. Hf SAID THIS I NO 1 CATES THAT _AH£R_IJAHS-ARE 

NOT AWARE OF ARGENT IDE HISTORY NOR CF ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST 

TERROR lllT' HrElPnASinO THAT TERROR ISH WAS NOT SOLELY OF 

ARGENTINE ORiGIH RUT INSTEAO IT RAO BECOME All III7ERUATIONAL 

CONCEPT. RISSINJER APPLAUDED ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS IN 

COHIATTING TERROR I SI RUT HE'ALSO STRESSED THAT TACTICS USED 

IN DEFEATING TERRORISTS HAD NO PLACE IN ARGENTINA. TODAY. 

7. THROUGHOUT LUNCH VIDELA SEEMED RELAXED AND FAIENDLY. 

HE TEIJSEO UP OMY WHEN ARGENTINA'S PROSPECTS IN THE 'WORLD 


I.P.ILY WERE WELL F.ECEIVEC IT ARGENTINE POPULACE. THE GOA 

LAID OUT RES CARPET, PL'Li I NS OUT STOPS. DR. K.SSINGER SPORE 

TO DIVERSIFIED GROUPS--FROH BANKERS TO GAUCHOS. IN' HOST 

INSTANCES, HE COUP,INERTED GOA FOR DEFEATING TENOR I STS BUT 

HE WARNED THAT TAC'ICS USED AGAINST THEN THEN ARE NOT 

JSTIFIA1LE NOW. GENERALLY, OR. KISSINGER PUBLICLY AFFIRMED 

HIS SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY VlTH A 

FEW EXCEPTIONS, ,---------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 

1 DOS REVIEWED Q3-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL. 

1. OR. KISSINGER, HIS WIFE AND SON ARRIVED IN IA EARLY 

WEDNESDAY MCRIIIHG (JUNE 211. HE WAS MET AT THE AIRPORT IY 

A FOHOFF REP UNO DOGGED HIM THROUGHOUT HIS VISIT. KISSINGER 

WAS THE GUEST OF PRESIDENT VlCELA, SUPPOSEDLY IHVITEO TO VIEW 

WORLD CUP. THE FCRIER SECRETARY MADE IT CLEAR DURING HIS 

FIVE-OAT STAY HE WAS IN ARGENTINA AS PRIVATE CITIZEN AND NOT 

A SPOKESMAN FOR USG. 


VIDELA, COL. HALLER GIL (INTERPRETER! AND AMBASSADOR CASTRO 


PREARRANGED IT SO KISSINGER AhO THE INTERPRETER WOULD MEET 

WITH HIM PRIVATELY HALF HOUR BEFORE AMitSSADOR'S ARRIVAL. 

IMHEulATElT OH AMBASSADOR'S ARRIJ1AL_AI .1308. LUNCH WAS.SERVED. 

3. KISSINGER INFORMED AHBAS3A0GR THAT DURING PRIVATE 

SESSION WITH PRESIDENT HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED. AHEGED17 

VIDEkl WAVED SUGGESTIONS FROM CR. KISSINGER AS TO tOW TO 

IMPROVE RELATIONS W|Tw USG. THE AMBASSADOR WAS NOT INFORMED 


4 AT LUNCH, I|OELA ASHED KISSINGER FON NlS «IEUS ON LATIN 

A-ERICA. tBRIEPjJCRETA’Y RElfSHCED.THAT fiOV/ORE THAN EVER 

WAS TIME TC BE CONCERNED nBOUT DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF WESTERN 

HEMISPHERE." HE ADC£D~L"11 tt"o"f IDTIOM AMONG THE LA COUNTRIES 

>C REOv'IRED IF ALL AMERICAN COUNTRIES ARE TO SURVIVE. HE 

STRESSED THAT CUR'IiG HIS TENURE AS SECRETARY OF STATE, LATIN 

AFRICA WAS NOT HIS TOP PRIORITY. HE St'D THIS WAS TRUE 

BEFORE PE 'WAS SECREtART S',0 'T ;S TRUE NOW. H'SSINGER POINTED 

CUT THAT THIS WAS NOT MEANT TO IE A REFLECTION ON RNY 

ADMINISTRATION, The LACK 0F~*H£flTlO(l TOWARDS L* MRS NOT A 

DELIBERATE ACT OH ANVBCJT 5 PARYîT-WAt-.IIIST A FACT THAT 

WITH The HW'Sf'TaF WORiTTUrmWAtÛGLECTEHSUEBr 

DECLASSIFIED 

' E.0.1352Q 

AjithlvrHy KA UC - 

NflRfl 

nwta ^WVuj---------- 

5 JflSS'HGER EMPHASIZED LATIN AM.ERICA!IJ1AY_J£_J£JSI {II 

RUSSIA AHO CUBA $ SCHEDULE,. nE ADDED

“ ,NU WUJCULIVJI i iu L/cuaaaiiibQLiui i ii i i an £~\j i i/ iuiui . 

Erven mg Report 

w i i t 

July 24, 1978 

Significant Intelligence: 

(Pastor) 

Bolivia: In the wake of the coup that put Pereda in power 

a variety of reports pose decisions. Ambassador Boeker 

has recommended that we hold up all assistance for FY 78 

pending clarification of the Pereda government's intentions. 

Perez of Venezuela has written to Carter proposing that 

the QAS be asked to urge that new elections be held. 

The Embassy summarized events: "No one could plan a 

debacle so complete. Bolivia backed into it by a day-today 

succession of disjointed decisions." (C) 

, Chile: Army generals baaked 

Pinochet: ■ s move to oust-Air-Farce junta member Gustavo 

Leigh. Embassy reports that Leigh had hoped to hang on 

until Letelier indictments were issued, trusting that 

they would shift balance of opinion in his favor and 

that Pinochet knowing this appears to now be making his 

move. (C) 

Ecuador: Embassy and DIA reporting indicate that military 

is determined to allow Roldas to participate in run-off 

election. Embassy reports that Poveda and the Navy are 

determined to have a clean election. A DIA summary sees 

some possibility of tinkering the outcome for the second 

slot in the run-off since Huerta would have a better 

chance of defeating Roldas than the current apparent 

second place candidate Duran. (S) 

Argentina: Ambassador Castrft indicates that Videla 

and Viola are moving to respond to the 1AHRC letter 

concerning the potential visit. General Bignone, Army 

, Secretary General, indicated such a visit would be 

positive and that Videla and other sj would do battle 

< with the recalcitrant Foreign Office as necessary. (C) 

Argentina: On other subjects the Embassy reports that 

the Supreme Court ruled that Timerman, former editor 

of La Opinion, could not be detained under one of the 

charges against him. The other is still pending. 

Also, the fallout from Ex-Im rejection of a credit 

for Argentina continues. The latest repurcussion was 

the refusal of a leading Argentine economist who is 

a prime candidate to replace Martinez de Hoz to accept 

an IV grant from the US. (C) 

Dominican Republic: Antonio Guzman called a > US Embassy 

official to report his (Guzman's) intention to challenge 

the Dominican military immediately after his election. 

Balaguer has been assigning particularly supportive 

military men to high positions, two of whom are obnoxious 

to Guzman. He intends to fire them and wants to be assured 

of our support should this provoke the military. (S-Exdis) 

JSCCHET/EXD-IU • ‘ DECLASSIFIED 

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/07?: NLC-24-53-8-11-7 p q 1359a 

NARA__ n.gtn iWViu

IÎW WWJOUUWI I | u UWUIUUMIIIWUUWI ■ kWWti 

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V CONTAIN CONGRESSIONAL 

T TRIAL 

3 7/7 

8012956 

-SECRET 

3717 


WASHINGTON 

r/ 

C review! s) 

rtpieted 


From: 

Subject: 

THE PRESIDENT 

June 14, 1980 

fa* ffT 

Warren Christopher, Acting UJ (7^ 

y 

Steps To Improve U. S.-Argentine 

Relations 

D REVIEW 

MPLETED 

Pursuant to your instructiuns, the Inter-Agency 


of action for 1980, which I am submitting for your 

approval. 

I. OBJECTIVES 

ute Department review 

mpleted 

Our principal objectives in moving to improve 

our relationship with Argentina are to: 

— foster Argentina's identification with the 

West and thus to contain Soviet political and economic 

influence? 

— encourage further specific improvements in 

human rights practices? 

— seek assistance on appropriate East-West issues 

(e.g. grains)? and 

f 

— obtain progress on nonproliferation objectives, 

particularly full-scope safeguards and ratification 

of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and foster increased 

sensitivity among Argentine leaders to global nonproliferation 

concerns. 

MOR'l/CDFper 

C03337518 

We also wish to encourage continued Argentine 

cooperation with the Papal mediation of Argentina's 

dispute with Chile over territorial limits in the 

Beagle Channel, a dispute that very nearly led to 

war between the two countries in late 1978. Finally, 

we wish to encourage Argentina to play a constructive 

role with respect to developments in Central America 

and other Hemispheric issues. 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.1352B 

Authority ^ ~ *3^ ^ ’^r=L~ 

NARA. 

Data 

_____

iû wujculium iu L^coiaaoii iwauui i ^.uuuiu / / l -r . nuu^r 

«■> r/ 

II. ACTIONS FOR 1980 

_ 2 - . 

f 




visit to Buenos Aires in January. We contemplate: 

— a visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter- 

American Affairs to Buenos Aires, possibly about August 

l"i during which he will review our policy concerns 

and the state of our relations and will be prepared 

to discuss steps we would plan to take to strengthen 

cooperation in selected areas, depending on the nature 

of the Argentine response. 

— a meeting of the O.5.-Argentine Mixed Economic 

Commission In October, the U. s"! delegation possibly 

to be chaired by the Under Secretary of State for 

Economic Affairs. The meeting would include discussion 

of ongoing efforts to resolve bilateral trade issues 

and to expand commercial relations. 

-- periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric 

issues, with the first round to be held during the 

visit of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American 

Affairs. 

2. Military Relations 




more fundamental improvement in these relations (including 

consideration of modification of the Humphrey/Kennedy 

Amendment, as reported in the conclusions of the PRC 

meeting). We plan to: 


Argentina; the first round, to be held this year in 


the South Atlantic; { 


a return visit to Washington later in the' year to 



to the U.S. Army School of the Americas after consulting

I qu WUJUliUUI I | \J L/UUIUdOllIWUUWI I bUWWIWII I 'T • I1UW ^"T 

3 •) in ^ ft ( 

3 - 

with members of Congress to ensure that this initiative 

would not be regarded as conflicting with the spirit 

of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment. 



We will keep under review the desirability of 

proceeding with an invitation to a senior Argentine 

military leader (such as the Commander-in-Chief of 

the Argentine Army or the Army Chief-of-Staff) to 

visit Washington this year. A final decision on this 

(including the question of timing) should take into 

account the implications of such a move on the selection 

of the next Argentine president now under way within 

the Argentine Armed Forces, as well as continued improvements 

in the observance of human rights and developments 

in U.S.-Argentine relations. 



the sale of ocean surveillance aircraft to the GOA. 

We see no possibility, however, of seeking special 

legislation which would modify the Humphrey-Kennedy 

Amendment to permit the sale of these aircraft to 

Argentina this year. , 


We will continue the dialogue on human rights 

with Argentine leaders, principally but not exclusively 

through Ambassador Castro and during the visit by 

the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, 

Ambassador Bowdler. In these consultations we will 

attempt to obtain assurances that: 

— the GOA will accept an OASGA resolution which 

recognizes the role of the OAS Commission on Human 

Rights and which encompasses a call for further improvements 

by Argentina; 

— there will be no new disappearances, including 

no disappearances of persons alleged to be terrorists; 

— all persons suspected of‘terrorism or subversive 

activities, including unacknowledged detainees, will 

r> r.o.nrT

37 f7 

- 4 - 

be processed through normal judicial channels and 

ensured due process; 

— guarantees will be instituted to prevent the 

torture of detainees; and 

— there be substantial progress, in advance 

of the OASGA, in reducing the number of political 

prisoners held without charges through release, trial, 

or exile (during his recent visit, Ambassador Smith 

was assured that half of these prisoners--l,300 at 

the time—would be released or sentenced by the end 

of the year) 



in ON fora and concluded that, while this should not 

be a central requirement for the improvement of our 

bilateral relations, it should remain an important 

U.S. objective. We should urge Argentina, in bilateral 

discussions, to cooperate with these multilateral 

efforts, particularly with the ON Human Rights Commission's 

new expert working group on disappeared persons and 

with other groups such as the Catholic Church. 

In addition to human rights discussions initiated 

by the Ambassador and by Assistant Secretary Bowdler, 

the O.S. side of the Mixed Economic Commission will 

be prepared to raise or respond to human rights concerns 

in discussions with their Argentine counterparts, 

and will be fully briefed for this purpose. 

4. Nuclear Relations 

We want to move Argentina* over time to accept 

IAEA safeguards on future as well as current facilities 

(including the reprocessing facility) and to ratify 

the Treaty of Tlatelolco. To do this, we need to 

keep open the door for continued cooperation with 

Argentina's nuclear program to the extent commensurate 

with your policy. We should: 

— try to resolve promptly, in accordance with 

U.S. law and our nonproliferation objectives, the 

remaining safeguards issues to permit delivery of 

highly and moderately enriched fuel for Argentina's 

research program, as well as components for its power 

program; 

I

- 5 

— once this is done, undertake a review of the 

conditions under which we could facilitate expanded 

participation by U.S. industry in Argentina's nuclear 

program. (A major case currently at issue is an export 

license application for the sale of a pressure vessel 

for the Atucha II power reactor.) 



—Sign the pending U. S.-Argentine Agricultural 


Secretary for Inter-American Affairs; 

—Seek to conclude the negotiations for the bilateral 


^ 





our NATO allies and Japan about issues of common concern 



These subjects and our policies thereon could be discussed 

within NATO fora such as the Political Advisors Committee, 

the Permanent council, and the NATO experts group 

on Latin America. Depending on the results of these 

consultations, we could consider further actions in 

Buenos Aires. A majority of the Interagency Group 

recommended against new high-level bilateral approaches 

to our Allies on these issues, we would continue 

the practice of consulting on human rights in the 

appropriate UN fora, such as the .UN Human Rights Commission. 


Chile 

The Group also considered the implications for 



With respect to Brazil, the Group noted that 

many of these steps will restore a better balance 

t 

h i_ r>w: 

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CCT'D 

nnnn/r>7M a . km r* n a a n o n

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MWl I kWWWI W I I I I • l« *• * 

6 

in U.S. relations with the two countries, since the 

U.5. already has a comprehensive consultative process 

with Brazil (including, most recently, security consultations). 

Chile is concerned about our improving relationship 

with Argentina, which it sees as threatening in the 

context of the Beagle Channel dispute. We have attempted 

to persuade the Chileans that what we are doing with 

Argentina has nothing to do with Chile or with our 

position on the Beagle Channel, which is to encourage 

acceptance of the outcome of Papal mediation and avoidance 

of war. This issue will be more fully addressed in 

the review of our relations with Chile later this year.

I\U uujeuuuii i u ueudasmoeuiuM ûua/u// i*t . 

i-or-a-*. 

P ■■ 

T.',* t~*--- ^ 

* * i *1^1 fc 

7 v'/ 7 •' 

i 

- 7 - 

Concurrences; 

H - Mr. J. Brian Atwood 

EB - Mr Deane Hinton 

HA - Ms. Patt Derian \ 

OES - Mr. Louis Nosenzo 

PM - Mr. Daniel O'Donohue 

EUR/SOV - Mr. Robert Perito 

EUR/RMP - Mr. Stephen Ledogar 

S/P - Mr. Anthony Lake 

10 - Mr. Michael Newlin 

S/AS - Mr. Allen Locke 

USOAS - Mr. Herbert Thompson 

AID/RDP - Mr. David Raymond 

NSC - Mr. Thomas Thornton 

OPIC - Ms. Caryl Bernstein 

STR - Mr. Robert Hormatz 

DOD/ISA - Col. Patrick Briggs 

JCS - Admiral. J.Aj.- Lyons.... 

CIA - 

Commerce - Mr. A'. 'Katz..... 

Treasury - Mr. Fred Bergsten 

USDA - Mr. Dale Hathaway 

DOE - Mr. Les Goldman 

EXIMBANK - Mr. Crafton 

ACDA - Mr. Charles Van Doren 

ICA - Mr. Victor Olason 

L/PM - Mr. T. Borek

INU UUjeUUUM I U UfcJUIclbblllUdLlUl l ill ~Uli £.\J IJ/U 1/ IU N I l/"IW"l“0 

MEMORANDUM 

■ r 




FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Paste 

Weekly Report 

Beagle Channel 

Within a few hours time, an important switch by the Argentines 

seems to have averted hostilities, once again, over the Beagle 

Channel dispute. This morning Ambassador Castro in Buenos Aires 

was informed by General Viola that it was the view of the GOA 

that "no option other than war remained." The decision had 

apparently been taken following the receipt of a Chilean note 

which agreed to accept the Pope as mediator, but which did not 

bend on the terms of the mediation. (C) 

We sent a flash cable instructing Castro to express our deepest 

concern over the Argentine position and to remind them that 

should they take hostile military action, we would view it as 

"aggression." We took concurrent action with the Pope in Rome, 

who responded by offering to send a papal emissary to Argentina 

immediately to explore the possibilities of mediation. The 

Argentines accepted the Pope’s offer, and barring a last minute 

change of mind by the Chileans, the emissary's presence should 

serve to defuse the situation sufficiently to enable both sides 

to stand down and start talking again. (C) 

Review on December 21, 1984 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13S26 

Authority HUC- - ‘aA -VV-\ -t - iX 

NAHA___ ______ D3te_3SW

* MEMORANDUM 

No uojecuon i o ueciassmcanon in —un 

io/u 1/10 . inlv^-^h- i 1 / -iu-1-0 

«£QNEIDEN*£ftfr’ 




FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

ZBIGNIEW BR2EZINSKI 

DAVID AARON 

t 

ROBERT PASTO 

1 

V 

Nicaragua Update (U} 

With the direct negotiations between the two sides at a standstill, 

the NG took matters into its hands today and presented a 

"compromise proposal" to both sides for their approval (or rejection) 

by next week. The NG proposal contains provisions which 

had been discussed in earlier negotiating sessions, and which, it 

is hoped, will be acceptable to both sides. The principal compromise 

modifications advanced in this latest document are: (C) 

(1) Somoza's brother and son, who occupy key command 

positions in the National Guard, will be relieved and named to 

posts abroad before the plebiscite is conducted on February 25, 

1979. (C) 

(2) Should Somoza win, he would be obligated to form a 

"national government of reconciliation" and the FAQ would be 

obliged to maintain a peaceful, democratic, and constructive 

opposition. (This is changed from thd earlier drafts which required 

the FAO's participation in the government.) (C) 

(3) Should Somoza lose, he would resign immediately and 

voluntarily absent himself from the country three days later, and 

remain abroad until at least May 1, 1981. (C) 

(4) Following the election by Congress of an interim President, 

Congress would adopt certain constitutional changes by 

April 15, 1979, which would permit the election by Congress (FAO 

nominates and PLN approves) of a new President on May 1, 1979, 

who would serve with legislative and executive powers until May 1, 

1981, with the help of a fifty-person "Committee of Notables," who 

in turn will be charged with drawing up a draft of a new constitution. 

A Cabinet will be named by the new President composed of 

one-third FAO, one-third PLN, and one-third independents chosen 

by mutual agreement between the FAO and PLN. (C) 

(5) A constituent assembly will be elected on November 1, 1980, 

(Note: Although it is not mentioned, presumably a new President 

will be popularly elected under the terms^ of the current constitution, 

to assume power on May 1, 1981, to replace the interim 

President.) (C) * 

JgQNJ: 1 DENT IAL—" 

Review on December 21, 1984

INU vûjtJOUUM l u L/eoicaaoMivâuuii m uii c-\j ufu 1/ iw . m*_v*-£.-T- 11/- 

\J“ I ~W/ 

^KnPTnPMicjft^ -2- 

The other major ideas of the NG proposal, i.e., the reorganization 

of the Supreme Court and the National Guard, the particulars 

and timetable of the carrying-out of a fair plebiscite under the 

control of an international authority — have not changed from 

earlier positions tabled by the NG. (C) 

Initial reaction to the compromise plan has been negative on the 

government side. General McAuliffe and Ambassador Bowdler met with 

Somoza today and informed him that we have been disappointed in 

the government's unyielding position during the discussions of the 

past several days. It appears as if Somoza believes that by 

stalling long enough, he will be able tfo create sufficient divisions 

among the FAO to cause it to break off negotiations, and thus bear 

the onus for having failed to reach an agreement. (C) 

I just learned that the meeting between Bowdler and McAuliffe and 

Somoza went very poorly. Somoza apparently stonewalled, and tried 

unsuccessfully to persuade McAuliffe that 30 years of a military 

alliance should not be repaid in this manner. McAuliffe and 

Bowdler are cabling their recommendations for tough action on our 

part. McAuliffe believes that half measures will not persuade 

Somoza anymore. They may be recommending withdrawal of the entire 

MILGROUF, the entire AID Mission, the Ambassador, and I would not 

be surprised if they included the furniture. We will have to have 

an SCC meeting to discuss this tomorrow. Christopher will probably 

raise it with you at your 6:45 a.m. meeting. (C) 

GONrIDENTIAL -

MEMORANDUM 

No Objection I o UeclassiTication in hull zui3/U2/U4 : 

* * *■ ' 


SHTRET-SENSITIVE Washington December 21, 1978 

NSS_Ryw Completed - Released In Full - Refer to QOS -11/13/12 

, 1. Beagle Channel Conflict Looms Closest General Viola 

called in Ambassador Castro thisfmorning to advise 

■ 

him that in view of Chile's latest communique, Argentina 

had no other option but to resort to military action. 

The general went on to ask that the U.S. help explain 

to the world why Argentina had no other recourse. 

Castro recommended patience and pointed out that papal 

mediation was still a possible option. Viola, however, 

did not desist from his line that Chile's response 

had terminated any prospects for further diplomatic 

movement. (Buenos Aires 9958, PSN 54104) 

DOS REVIEWED lTjam2013? NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION! 

2. Meeting with Von Staden on Cruise Missile Definition: 

During a meeting with Deputy Secretary Christopher 

yesterday, Ambassador Von Staden expressed his government's 

serious concern with the possibility that the 

U.S. might consider agreeing that ALCMs on non-heavy 

bombers would fall under the same limits as nuclear 

ALCMs as a solution to the cruise missile definition 

issue. He said the Germans would see serious problems 

with such a solution, since a non-nuclear element would 

be introduced into the SALT negotiations for the first 

time. Von Staden asked whether Such a solution would 

create precedents for the Soviets to demand that other 

non-nuclear elements be included in future negotiations 

and whether the U.S. would share German concern that 

the whole non-circumvention question would have to 

be seen in a different light, with non-circumvention 

applying to non-nuclear weapons. He also asked whether 

the new U.S. language in the "Declaration of Intent" 

could lead to a situation in which the Soviets could 

demand nuclear elements not subject to the negotiations 

be taken into account. Christopher assured Von Staden 

that his questions and comments would be transmitted 

to the U.S. delegation before they left, and also pointed 

out that if an agreement was reached, the President 

would take great pains to make clear that what was 

in the agreement and the protocol would not constitute 

precedents for future negotiations. (State 320329 

TOSF.C 150002, NODIS Cherokee, PSN 54076) (S) 

—SSGftfiT— 

REVIEW ON DECEMBER 21, 2008 


. Jt 


DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority — 

Nana E-F___Date T\°i\lU

MEMORAND______ 

’JS REVIEWED21 Dec 2012: NO OBJECTION; TO DECLASSIFICATION. 

THE WHITE HOUSE /* 

WASHINGTON 

•~5EGmj'tU November 22, 1978 

\SS Rvw Completed - Released In Full - Refer to DOS 11/9/1 ^ 

Approach to Sadat on Statue of Negotiations; Ambassador 

Elite met with President Sadat today to emphasize 

our hope that he would accept the present treaty text 

and annexes and also pointed out that his acceptance 

could be conditional upon satisfactory resolution of 

a West Bank/Gaza timetable if necessary. Sadat's 

preliminary reaction was that ittwould be difficult 

to accept the treaty as it stands since Boutros Ghali 

had been careless in the negotiations and had not 

adequately protected Egyptian interests, particularly 

with regard to articles IV and VI. Sadat said he was 

not prepared to give a firm answer at this time and 

that he planned to discuss the matter with Mubarak 

and other advisers before giving us his considered 

judgment. Blits comments that with the November 19 

anniversary over, Sadat is in no great rush to complete 

the treaty negotiations until he is satisfied that 

they will adequately protect his interests, as he sees 

them, in the Arab world. (Cairo 25496 NODIS, PSN 

17793, 17800) 

i 

Iranian Opposition Proposals for Political Crisis: 

Dr. Nasser Minatchi informed an embassy officer today 

that all religious leaders in Iran, including strong 

Khomeini supporters, have agreed to urge Khomeini's 

acceptance of a solution which involves the Shah giving 

powers to a regency council which would then appoint 

a prime minister and coalition cabinet. He claimed 

the members of a cabinet had been agreed on by the 

opposition but would not provide any names. Minatchi 

also said a vast majority of the religious faithful 

and "all leaders except Khomeini" wanted the monarchy 

to remain, and that the goal of his group was a constitutional 

monarchy. Sullivan comments that in spite 

of intense talk over the past days, Minatchi's effort 

has not advanced much, but that perceived time pressures 

of the approach of Moharram are beginning to 

work on the moderate opposition as well as the Iranian 

government. (Tehran 11501, PSN 17503, 17507) 

No Objection To DeolQaaificbillUII in hull 2Q13/01/16 : NLC-1-8-6-5-1 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority .fckV-fr" ------- 

NARA__£JL_ Data 

_...

no uojecuon i o ueciassmcauon in rnn -'u io/u 1/10 ; i\Uu»- i-o-o-o-1 c- 

(MB ^ O' l 

O pnngi rrt—^ 

-2- 

3. Beagle Channel Difepute; Ambassador Castro reports. 

that he is more concerned than at any previous point 

about the Beagle Channel dispute. He is doubtful that 

the Argentines retain enough confidence in the negotiat 

ing process to follow a conciliatory path and adds 

that they are close to becoming a prisoner of their 

tactic of the threat of force. He also speculates 

that the brusgueness of the recent Chilean reply to 

Argentina could indicate that the Chileans view the 

possibility of limited hostilities as being beneficial 

in rebuilding their International image. He strongly 

recommends that we take a firm and active position 

at this point to induce the parties toward serious 

mediation in order to reverse the current trend. 

(Buenos Aires 9239, PSN 17500, 17501) 

% 

4. Reestablishment of Relations with Iraq; According 

to Ambassador Veliotes, senator Cranston asked King 

Hussein yesterday for his estimation of the possibility 

that Iraq might be ready to reestablish relations with 

the U.5. Hussein responded that although the Iraqis 

might be receptive to the idea, he would be reluctant 

to recommend such an initiative unless.he could be 

certain they would respond positively but added, however, 

that he would be willing to probe Iraqi attitudes 

on the matter. Veliotes, commenting that Saddam 

Hussein's visit to Jordan next week would provide 

an excellent opportunity for Hussein to broach the 

subject, requests guidance as soon as possible on 

Hussein's offer. (Amman 8915 NODIS, PSN 17494) 

t 

5. Soviet PCM in Havana Comments on MIG-23s: D.S. Interest 

Section Havana reports that the Soviet DCM yesterday 

indicated that the MIG-23 problem will be "solved 

positively." He commented that the Soviets are aware 

of U.S. concerns, however, the Cubans now "are not 

like they were in 1962." The Interest Section comments 

that the Soviet official may have been trying to create 

the impression that the USSR is highly interested in 

the conclusion of SALT and that this desire will be 

translated intg_efforts to solve small scale problems. 

" He" safcTTihe UiST‘should note carefully the statement 

by Ponomarev to U.S. Senators that conditions must 

be created for prompt signature of a SALT treaty by 

Brezhnev and President Carter. (Havana 3786, PSN 17833) 


imu wujtiL.uui i i u ueuasainuemuii in run 

. ’ , Mi:.M()R\\nrM_ 3D...-____________________ 

JOS REVIEWED 21 Dec 2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATIONi 

THE WHITE HOI'SE 

i 

l\ \SHI\OTOX 

SECRET 


2 J 

£ssj*vw Completed - Released In Full - Refer to DOS -11/9/1^ 

1. Embassy Tel Aviv Comments on the Egyptian-Israeli Talks: 

Ambassador Lewis believes that indications be slowing 

down the pace of negotiations raises the question of 

how the U.S. should proceed following Khalil's visit, 

especially if it turns out that the Egyptians want 

to reopen the text of the treaty and continue negotiations 

on the linkage issue. If Egypt accepts the 

treaty, there is some chance of persuading Israel to 

find a formula on linkage; however, if Egypt equivocates, 

the hope of getting the cabinet to accept something 

further on linkage will shrink to about nil. 

Lewis also has "the gravest doubts" that a slowdown 

by Sadat will produce what he wants from the Israelis; 

it will have the opposite affect. Lewis adds that 

Begin agreed to only a ninety day settlement freeze 

and that, with the conclusion of this period in mid- 

December or January, Begin might renew settlement 

activity. The U.S. cannot afford an extended delay 

and Lewis recommends that a new U.Sl initiative, obviously 

required to break the impasse, be launched 

no later than mid-December. (Tel Aviv 18266 NODIS, 

PSN 24694, 24695) 

2. Somoza Discusses His Difficulties: A Nicaraguan official 

informed Ambassador Solaun today that Somoza, 

for the first time, openly admitted to his cabinet 

on Monday that he was under tremendous pressure. Somoza 

allegedly characterized the plebiscite proposal as 

a means to "kick him out of the country" and raised 

as alternatives the calling of a national constitutent 

assembly or simply his resignation. Solaun comments 

that, if true, the apparent change of attitude by Somoza 

could augur well for a resolution to the Nicaraguan 

problem. Somoza is apparently starting to believe 

that the U.S. means business. (Managua 6156, PSN 24866} 

3. Beagle Channel-Ambassador Castro Talks with General 

Viola: General Viola told Ambassador Castro yesterday 

that, although there were still serious problems ahead, 

the Argentine government intended to negotiate in good 

faith and would strive to settle the channel dispute 

No Objection To Declassmcation in hull zuid/01/16 : NLC-1-8-6-18-7 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority " \ ~ "~1— 

NARA__L£ Dsto—nVSliLe

i\o UDjecuon i o ueciassmcauon in run io/u 1/10 IN LC.- I-O-O- 10-f 

-ftRfWWP-. -2- 

by peaceful and honorable means, viola emphasized 

that Argentina wants a peaceful solution and not a 

confrontation and indicated that the recent troop movements 

were carefully controlled so as not to place 

them close enough to the border where "temptations" 

could cause an incident. Viola again stressed the 

defensive nature of the troop deployments and made 

the suggestion that, during the negotiating or mediation 

period, there should be a mutual freeze on troop movements 

or even perhaps a withdrawl. (Buenos Aires 9361, 

PSN 24704, 24706) 

» 


- 5 

no UDjection 10 ueciassmcaLiori in “un cui

imu wujtjuuuii iu ueoidijaiiiucniuii m r-un

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SENSITIVE 

PAGE 71 SITUATION^*) MISSAQI(S) LISTING DATS 01/SS/B0//02I 

DOS R EVIEW E DIO - Mar- 201 1T0EC LAS SIFIE D FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 

~ rrmnm afohan 

subject cataooryi SIT IV 

MESSAOE / ANNOTATION! 

message I 

, IMMEDIATE 

Q 11U4TZ..JAN 80 ’ 

PM AHEMBAlSY MOSCOW 

TO 5IC8TATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6411 

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 8156 

jC 0 N F I'D B N-T-I A t-SICTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 00607 

EXDIS 

PNGEp SO FAR AS FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS WERE CONCERNED'. 

9, K0RNIY8NK0 REJOINED THAT jF WB WERE IN FACT INSISTING 

THAT THE NYAP PEOPLE GOULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO FILL 

VACANCIES.WHICH MIGHT ARISE IN WASHINGTON OR SAN tRANCISCO 

THAT IN SftPBCt WOULD AMOUNT TO PNG ACTION»«AND WOULD* OF 

COURSE* Bl AN EXTRA COMPLICATION FOR BOTH SIDES. KDRNI- 

YENKQ THIN ADDRD THAf BOTH CQUNTRlBS AT THE MOMINf FOUND 

THEMSELVES WITH THEIR AMBASSADORS AT HOMR', IF Wl WERE 

TO DRCIDI TO FREIEE EMBASSY STAFFS AT PRESENT LEVlLS* 

WOULD THAT MEAN THE AMBASSADORS COULD NT RETURNt CHARGE 

commbnted he Thought !t Clear that.that was not the intention 

OF the u.s. position* and kornsyenko hastened to 

ADD THAT IN MENTIONING THE AMBASSADORS HE INTINOID NOTHING 

MORE THAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE ABSURDITY OF THE U.S. POSI 

TION, 

}0. KORNSYENKO ONCE MORE MADE THE OBSERVATION THAT IT 

WAS NOT PERMISSIBLE TO SPEAK TO EACH OTHER XN LANGUAGE 

SUCH AS THAT USED BY THE UiS. IN UNIL'ATERALliV DETlRMXNING 

HOW THE ISSUES WOULD BE RESOLVED. AS WAS STATED IN THE 

SOVIET NOTES* HE ADOEO# THE SOVIETS RESERVED THE RIGHT 

TO RETURN ‘TO tHE QUESTION OP MATERIAL DAMAGES RESULTING 

PROM THE U.S. ACTIONS WHICH WERE IN VIOLATION OF SPtCtPiC 

AGREEMENTS. 

ILi CHARGE REPEATED THAT HE WCjULD SEEK RESPONSES TO 

KORNJYBNKQIS QUESTIONS ON LEGAL AND PRACTICAL MATTERS* 

BUT THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE REASON 

PSNieiEBBE DTO1 111 TDRT01IE119 

SENSITIVE 


no UDjeciion i o ueciassmcanon in f-un i £j iu/u^ : i\l^- io-h-^- io-£ 

SENSITIVE 

PACE 76 SXtUATION'(S) HEISAOE(I) LISTING DAT! 01/21/B0//0Z3 

AFGHAN 

SUBJECT cataqoryi SIT IV 


FOR THE ACTIONS WHICH HAD BEBN TAKEN, THEY HAD HOT BEEN 

TAKEN FRIVOLOUSLY* THEY WERE SERIOUS MEASURES WtTH 

SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES* TAKEN FDR THE REASON STATED BY THE 

PRESIDENT, 

12, KORNtYENKO RESPONDED THAT THE REASONS GIVEN BY THE 

PRESIDENT PRQVIOBD NQ BASIS FOR THE MEASURES TAKEN AND 

THAT THERE WERE IN FACT NQ GROUNDS FDR SUCH ACTIONS UNDER 

ANY INTERNATIONAL LAW OR AGREEMENT, THE' SOVIET $|DE# HB 

CONTINUED* COULD SAY A GREAT DEAL AOtfUT THE POLITICAL 

ASPECTS OF THE MATTER AND COULD PINO EXPLANATIONS NO LESS 

HARSH THAN THOSE USED BY U>S, OFFICIALS* BUT HE THOUGHT 

THERE WAS NO NEED TO GO INTO THOSE ASPECTS AT THIS TIME, 

CHARGE AGREED, 

13, FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL TRANSLATION of NOTE CONCERNING 

IT 

SENSITIVE 


no uojection 10 ueciassmcanon in run tu\a iu/uz : inlo-io-h-

no UDjecuon 10 ueciassmcauon in '-un ûiiu/u^ : inlo-io-h-^-io-^ 

SENSITIVE 

PAGE B| SITUATIDN(S) MBSIAGC(S) LISTING DATE 01/2I/BO//O2S 

SITUATION! 

AFGHAN 

subject CATA80RY! SIT IV 

MESSAOE / ANNOTATION! ? 

RESERVING TO ITSELF THE RIGHT TO PULL' RESTITUTION OF 

MATERIAL DAMAGE CONNECTED WITH THE ACTIONS OF THE AMBRI* 

CAN f{DI# THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE POSITION THAT 

PRACTICAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE GUARANTEEING OP tHE 

SECURITY AND THE PRESERVATION OP THE PREMISES AND PROPERTY 

QF THE SOVIET CONSULATE GENERAL IN NEW YORK WILL BE AGREED 

UPON IN THE PROPER MANNER, 

IN THE LI#HT OP THE SAID UNILATERAL: ACTIONS OP THE USA# 

THE SOVIET SIDE INTENDS TO OITERMINE AT A FUTURE TIME ITS 

GINIRAL POSITION TOWARD THE QRIGINAL AGREEMENT ON THE 

QPBN|NO Of CONSULATES GENERAL OP THE USSR AND THE USA IN 

NEW YORK AND KIEV/ RESPECTIVELY. 

MOSCOW# JANUARY il# 1980, END TEXT, 

14, FOLLOWING IS XNpORM&C TRANSLATION OF THE NOT® CONCERN 

ING AlAOPfOT FREQUENCIES! 

BEGIN TEXT, 

NO, 2/QSSfA 

THE MINISTRY OP FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR REFERS TO THE 

NOTE OF THE DEPARTMENT OP STATE OP THE USA OF JANUARY 7# 

1980# AND'CONSIDERS IT NICESSARY TQ STATO THE FOLLOWING. 

THE DECISfQN DP THE GOVERNMENT OP THE USA TO POSTPONE FOR 

AN UNDETERMINED PERIOD THE CONDUCT OP BILATERAL QlVIL 

AVIATION tALKS# WHICH HAD ISBN PROPOSED BY THE AMERICAN 

SIDE ITSELF#' AND UN!LATERALLY TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF 

REGULAR PLIGHTS TO THE USA OP AEROFLOT AIRCRAFT lj| COM 

PLETELY ILLEGAL AND IS A FLAGRANT VIOLATION BY THE UNITED 

STATES OP THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH IT HAS ACCEPTED; INCLUD 

ING THOSE RESULTING PROM THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING REACHED 

IN AN EXCHANGE OP AIDE-MEMOIRES IN MARCH 1979. SUCH 

PROVOCATIVE CONDUCT CAN ONLY SB VIEWED AS INCOMPATIBLE 

WITH GENERALLY ACCEPTED NORMS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES', 

THE SOVIET SIDE PLACES ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UlA ACL 

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SAID MEASURES 

FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES AND RESERVES TO ITSELF 

THE RIGHT TO DEMAND PULL RESTITUTION OF MATERIAL DAMAGE'. 

MOSCOW# JANUARY U# 1980, ENO T|XT, 

15. FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THE NOT§ CONCERN 

ING FISHERY ALLOCATIONST 

BEGIN TEXT, 

NO, S/OSSHA 

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF TH« USSR# REFERRING TO 

THE NOTE OP THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE USA OF JANUARY 7 

1980# CONSIDERS IT NICESSARY TO STATE THE FOLLOWING, 

i 

BT 

SENSITIVE 


t V INU uujeuuun iu L/oL'iaaoiiiiseuiuii m i un c-\j i*-i iw/ul . u —r c. > \j c- 

SENSITIVE 

PAGE 87 SITUATIONS) MESSAGES) LISTING 

DATE 0I/2S/80//02J 

situation! 

APGHAN 

SUBJECT CATAGGRVI SIT IV 

MESSAGE f ANNOTATION! 

MESSAGE! 

IMMEDIATE 

Q U1867Z f JAN BO ’ 

PM AMIMSAISY MOSCOW 

TO SECSTAtE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6*11 

INFO AMCQNSUL LENINGRAD 8198 

J.n N F I-DEN T—f--A~- L 81CTI0N 0* OP 06 MOSCOW 00607 

SXDIS 

THE DECISION OP THE GOVERNMENT OP THE USA CONCERNING A 

SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OP tHE QUOTAS CUSTOMARILY ALLOCATED 

TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR PWH CATCH IN COASTAL WATIRS OP 

THE USA CAHNOt BE QUALIPIEO AS ANYTHING OTHER THAN AN 

ILLEGAL ACTION IN RELATIONSHIP TQ: THE USSR. THIS STEP IN 

REALITY SlONlpiES THE INTRODUCTION Of A BAN QN THI 

FISHERY OR SOVIET SHIPS ANO MILL (,'EAD TO A PREMEDITATED 

WRECKING OP THE MUTUALLY PROFITABLE COOPERATION JN THIS 

FIELD WHICH HAS DEVELOPED..BETWEEN THE CORRESPONDING SOVlEt 

AND AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS. THE SAID ACtlONS BY tHE 

AMERICAN SIDE ARE THUS A DIRECT VtOLAfldN OP THE AGREE- 

MENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OP THE USSR AND THE GOVERNMENT 

DP THE USA CONCERNING FISHERIES OFF tHE COASTS OF THE 

UNITED STATES OF NOVEMBER 16# 1976. 

THE SOVIET SIDE PLACES ON THE GQVENRHENT OF THE USA ALL 

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OP SUCH A UNILATERAL 

STEP AND RE5ERVES TO ITSELF THE RIGHT TO DEMAND FULL COM 

PENSATION »POR DIRECT AND INDIRECT DAMAGE CONNECTED WITH 

IT. 

MOSCOW# JANUARY 11# 1980, 

END TEXT. GARRISON 

BT 

PSN1028999 DTG'l 111867 T0RT011Z225 

SENSITIVE 


y/ 

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I 


WASHINGTON 

DOS RE\7iEWED'02~Feb^)11: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL) 

—SECRET 

May 3 0, 

1978 


FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 

Cyrus Vance C-^- 

Genscher. At breakfast toda**, I briefed Genscher 

on SALT and recent developments in the Middle East. 

We discussed MBFR and agreed that progress on a forthcoming 

response from the Soviets on our proposal is a 

necessary precondition to a meeting of Foreign Ministers, 

Neither of us had a clear picture of what the 

French are trying to do — especially to MBFR — with 

their new proposals for a European disarmament conference. 

We agreed the subject should be discussed 

at our next four power meetings with Owen and De 

Guiringaud in Paris and Bonn, We decided to raise 

the question of an appropriate forum for negotiation 

of grey area systems at the same time. 

Genscher underlined the importance he attaches to 

your forthcoming visit to Germany. He urged that enough 

time be allowed in your schedule for "intensive political 

discussions,” and expressed his hope that you will agree 

to meet separately with the leaders of the four political 

parties represented in the Bundestag. 

* 

Ecevit. An exclusive interview with the New York 

Times and an appearance on the Today Show unfortunately 

focused attention on Ecevit's visit to Moscow next month 

and his belief that detente has diminished the Soviet 

threat to Turkey. Ecevit did stress that Turkey is not 

seeking to obtain military equipment from the Soviet 

Union and he emphasized Turkey's continuing commitment 

to NATO. His opening address at the NATO Summit conveyed 

a much more helpful and balanced position, and 

will be helpful on the Hill. 

Authoriitv 

MARA 

E.O. 13526 


i

INO UOjeUllUd I U UUUdbblllLidUUI I III mil £U \£J \£J \ £. . l^LV*- I JJ-U-fJO-/ 

-2- 

Ecevit's two-hour meeting last night with 

Karamanlis at Blair House resulted in an agreement 

that senior officials from the two Foreign Ministries 

will meet in Ankara July 4-5 to continue the Greek- 

Turkish dialogue. This is a favorabie development/ 

although we doubt that Cyprus was(discussed at any 

length. Ecevit will meet with the HIRC on Thursday 

and address the National Press Club before going to 

New York to speak at the Disarmament Session and meet 

with Waldheim, bankers, and journalists. He will 

return to Washington next Monday for a session with 

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee before returning 

to Turkey. 

Four Power Meeting. I met with my colleagues from 

the UK, France and Germany on Sunday evening to consider 

matters relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole. We 

noted that the Berlin situation was essentially calm 

and that the Soviets had shown relative restraint on 

Berlin over the past few months. Genscher reported 

that, while no progress was made on specific Berlin 

issues during Brezhnev's visit to West Germany earlier 

this month, the Soviets had discussed Berlin in a nonpolemical 

way and had sought to avoid friction. Genscher 

thought it a positive sign that Brezhnev had resisted 

East German entreaties to stop in East Berlin on his way 

home and had sent Gromyko instead. Genscher expressed 

concern that East Germany is seeking a voice in the 

interpretation of the Quadripartite Agreement (US,UK, 

France, USSR) and urged the Allies to take every opportunity 

to rebuff their efforts. 

Argentina. We have had our first indication that 

Under Secretary Newsom's trip to Argentina may be sparking 

needed action on human rights. Subsequent to Newsom's 

return. Ambassador Castro informed Videla that military 

training would be resinned when Argentina announced publicly 

that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission was being 

invited. Videla was obviously pleased, and responded 

that in addition to the announcement, positive strides 

would be made in prisoner releases before September 30, 

and that by year end an impressive number of people would 

be released. Such action could enable us to resume some 


A -* 

no uojection i o ueciassmcanon m i-uii zu iz/ iz/ iz : imlo- i 

3 

shipments to Argentina and hopeful Ly ultimately create 

conditions which could allow us to recommend repeal 

of the Kennedy /Humphrey new arms embargo. Videla 

seems genuinely to want improved relations with the 

US, and the question is whether his political situation 

will give him room to take the necessary steps. 

I 

Icelandic Elections. Prime Minister Hallgrimsson's 

Independence Party, traditionally the cornerstone of pro- 

American, pro-NATO views as well a3 Iceland's largest 

political party, suffered heavy losses in Sunday's municipal 

elections. The big winner is t’fie communist-dominated 

Peoples Alliance which polled 24.5%, up from its 17.1% 

in 1974, while the Independence Party dropped from 49% 

to 39.9% and the other coalition partner in the present 

government, the Progressive Party, fell 3.6% to 15.2%. 

The setback for the coalition partners could have an 

important psychological and political effect on the 

national elections scheduled for June 25 and is certain 

to alter the nature of the campaign now underway. 


t


- "Zinu 

'-/UjtJL.nui i iu Lêoitasamocuiui i m i uu £.\Ji£.njmri iu . iî_v_,-—r 


V 

fnNFTPFNTTATi - GDS 



FROM: 


DAVID AARON 

ROBERT PASTOR • 









i 

I. Argentina's Human Rights Situation 

t 











correct that. 


there has been some improvement in recent months. We underhand 





prisoners to request exile has been re instituted. On a number 




II. 

U.S, Policy 



€QNFIDENTIAL - GDS 

declassified 

E.0.13526 13S“ —-te-a-A

INU WUjCL/llUil IU ucoiaooilioaituil Ml 

\JUiJ 

«• 

uii c~\j i c./ u-r/ i vi 

JW' LL' uu Cm ~r 




We have informed the Argentine government that If they reach 


on Human Rights/ and there is no deterioration in the human 




t 





which would permit the enormous back-lcg of credit to be committed 

before then. (There are over 7.5 pending FMS cases for 





Our current objectives are to urge the GOA*: (1) to permit the 

IAHRC to visit in accordance with the IAHRCi's regulations; 




of law. 






III. Future U.S. Policy: who Blinks at the Brink? 








working to restore the rule of law. Terrorism has not left 

Argentina, but it is now the exception, not the rule. And 







the future it seeks to promote. rt produces only more 

violence..." 

gOWFIPENTTRib- ~ GDS

INO UUjeCUUIl IU L/BUdbblllUUUUII III UH dUIOUl/ IU 

eeNKEBENTTAL - GDS -3- 

NL-O- I 

I, myself, believe that we may have overloaded the'■‘circuits 









Burply as a different decision on Dresser. 





little choice. The decision did have'an unintended positive 



in' X-M), and they have descended on me, and I have deflected 

them to Capitol Hill-, where they helped defeat more restrictive 




Argentines agreed to a visit by the'Inter-American Commission. 







For one thing, the Europeans made a joint demarche in March', 







i-s in charge. And he keeps saying he is eager to move forward 

on his own to restore the rule of law. As he takes those steps, 

I will make sure that we are quick to respond. 









i 

CONFIDENTIAL - GDS

inu uujecuuri iu ueuasbiiicauuii m run eui^juhi io . i\lo-ioo-^-ou-^-m 

CONJEUDENTIAL ’ - GDS -4- i 

V 


the Southern Cone countries — led by Brazil bat including 








narrowness of their view is reflected :.n, among other things, 






at" any time since January 1977, and .they ^re as good as can 




and Vance to develop a cooperative relatiohship, but that will 



the military leaders in Argentina and Brazil, is that Jimmy 




in the universities because'of his strong anti-Communism and the 


great moral stature in Latin America, and that inspires the* 


sometimes infuriates some of the conservatives and the military. 




which we had almost lost’. 











qpMTIDENTIAL - GDS

INU UUjeCLIUI I IU UBUdbblllUetLIUM III '"Ull £UI£IUtl IU . INLV-,- l jj-CA-JU-d-i 

CONFIDENTIKE - GDS -5- 

than in the days of Peron when they locked- for foreign scapegoats. 





V 

t 

1 

CQBlFlDEHTIAfi— GDS

WASHINGTON 

QP.PBPn1 January 24, 1980 

DOS REVIEWED 04-Jan-2013: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION, 

1. Chaban Delmas' Meeting with Brezhnev; French National Assembly 

President Jacques Chaban met with an embassy officer prior 

to his departure yesterday from Moscow and confirmed that 

he had cut short his official visit to the Soviet Union 

because of the Soviet actions against Sakharov. He commented 

that he had little choice but to do so and quipped that 

"this shouldn't upset you Americans." Concerning his conclusions 

on the Soviet leadership, Chaban believes that 

Brezhnev is still very much in charge and that there is 

no critical power struggle going on within the Politburo. 

He does not interpret the decision to go into Afghanistan 

as proof that the military has ascended to power within 

the Soviet leadership. In his opinion, it is more a question 

of military advice tipping the balance within the leadership 

in favor of the decision. Chaban noted during his meeting 

on Tuesday that Brezhnev displayed a great deal of sensitivity 

to the international reaction to the Soviet intervention 

in Afghanistan. The major thrust of Brezhnev's 

approach was that the Soviet Union has not changed its basic 

policy orientation toward establishing a more stable international 

environment and avoiding the risks of war. He 

repeatedly returned to the theme of the necessity of maintaining 

equilibrium in world affairs and avoiding "disequilibrium." 

Responding to Chaban's remark that the Soviet move 

in Afghanistan represented a departure in Soviet policy 

that has had a major impact on international relations, 

Brezhnev reverted to the basic Soviet argument that there 

was "major external intervention in Afghanistan's affairs 

aimed at establishing a 'command post' by the forces of 

imperialism on the soviet Union's southern borders." The 

"other major factor" which compelled the Soviet Union to 

act decisively was the Muslim question and the effect this 

would have on the Soviet Union itself. On U.S.-Soviet relations, 

Brezhnev was highly critical of U.S. actions and 

decisions aimed at destroying the carefully structured fabric 

of East-West relations. He cite^l for particular criticism 

the Soviet brigade issue in Cuba and the NATO TNF modernization 

decision. (Moscow 1226, PSN 46216, 46218) (S) 

□ ECRBT- 



DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Mr> Ohior-tiru"! Tn norlaccifir'ni'inn in .-nil 

• Nil P—1-1'^-Q-R'^-1

ino UDjecuon i u ueciabsmuauun m -uu ûi o/u 1/10 . inlv^- 1- io-»-oo-1 

■BfiGREV' -2- 

t 

2. UK Forces East of Suez; British receptiveness toward the 

possibility of an increased UK miLitary presence east of 

Suez has recently become more apparent, according to Charge 

Streator. Embassy soundings continue to indicate that at 

the military, official and ministerial levels, the UK is 

well disposed to some expansion in the UK military presence 

in the Indian Ocean, although no real planning has yet been 

initiated. The general assumption is, as Lord Carrington 

has suggested, that any such expanded presence would largely 

take the form of naval visits. FCO Defense Department head 

Gillmore, who formerly downplayed the possibility of any 

significant shift in British resources, now favors such 

a move and indicated that a basic review of the UK's posture 

in this regard was very much in order. Charge Streator 

comments that the January 26 Bartholomew/McGiffert consultations 

on the Indian Ocean provide a well-timed opportunity 

to stimulate Britain's review of the UK role "east of Suez," 

and recommends that we use the occasion to assert support 

for an expanded UK presence. (London 1658, PSN 46469) (S) 

3. Iranian Ambassador Assessment of Iran Crisis; Ambassador 

Haynes reports from Algiers that Iranian Ambassador Razi 

contrived a meeting with him this past Monday in order to 

relay his reading of the situation prevailing in Iran.' 

Razi contends that Khomeini, quite apart from having control 

in Iran, has actually been swept along by events over which 

he knows he has no control. The detention of the hostages 

is a case in point. In order to.give his countrymen and 

the world the impression that he does control, Khomeini 

has adopted the pattern of endorsing whatever is done in 

the name of the Iranian revolution. In this sense, Razi 

said, Khomeini is very much in touch with reality, but that 

reality is limited to his complete preoccupation with internal 

developments. In Razi's opinion there is no government 

in Iran; what reigns is anarchy. It is clear to Razi 

that Khomeini is fast losing popular support, noting that 

fewer and fewer mass gatherings are taking place in front 

of his Qom residence. Hence, Khomeini's present two-week 

vacation will undoubtedly be devoted to figuring out how 

he can salvage this situation which is personally threatening 

to him. Razi said that our patience and restraint in 

this matter is paying off over time as the international 

situation in Iran disintegrates. ’ Prospects for the ultimate 

release of the hostages should improve. (Algiers 268, PSN 

45474, 45483) (S) 

Mn Ohinntinn Tn noHaccifir*ntir\n in Pull 9fin/fM/1R • \ll P.-1

No UDjection i o ueciassmcanon in -un zu io/u 1/10 . inlo-i-io-»-oo-i 

■BSCRF.T i -3- 

4. Greek Reintegration into NATO: Senior CDU member Leisler 

Kiep told Embassy Bonn officers that he believes one of 

NATO’s highest priorities now should be a high-level political 

impetus to reintegrate Greece into NATO. With Tito 

seriously ill, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and 

growing economic and political problems in Greece, Kiep 

believes time is running out for a successful reintegration. 

Kiep’s observations were the resftlt of his pre-Christmas 

trip to Greece during which he met with Rallis and Karamalis. 

Rallis told Kiep that Greece is willing to issue a solemn 

and binding declaration upon reintegration to the effect 

that it does not consider the reintegration as prejudicing 

in any way other negotiations pending with Turkey. Rallis 

claimed that recent events made this a propitious time to 

act, especially since Athens had received favorable signals 

from Turkey. Now Greece needs a reply from NATO to its 

signal of cooperation. (Bonn 1351, PSN 46450) (C) 

5. Argentine Proposal on Grain Export Restraints: General 

Goodpaster met with'Argentine Foreign Minister Pastor and 

Minister of Economy Martinez de Hoz yesterday during which 

de Hoz outlined an approach for informal Argentine cooperation, 

to be kept on a confidential basis, while refusing 

to consider formal controls. Pastor and de Hoz initially 

presented a negative position and questioned U.S. grain 

sales into traditional Argentine markets. After thorough 

discussions de Hoz proposed that the* Argentine government 

reach an understanding with the Soviet trading companies 

under which the Soviets would agree to limit their direct 

purchases from Argentina to historic levels. The problem 

of resale of Argentine crops would be one between the U.S. 

and other governments. Buenos Aires would not object if 

we approached those governments (e.g. Italy) and obtain 

their agreement not to resell Argentine crops. De Hoz emphasized 

that once this arrangement became known in the trade, 

it would cost Argentina money since the present premium 

on Argentine contracts would presumably disappear. While 

Argentina wished to be helpful in the West's response to 

the Soviet challenge, de Hoz felt that such an arrangement, 

entailing substantial economic sacrifice, should be part 

of a broader political understanding between Argentina and 

the U.S. Martinez de Hoz stressed that time was of the 

essence, and Ambassador Castro asked that Washington respond 

promptly as to whether de Hoz's proposal is an acceptable 

basis for an understanding with the Argentine government. 

(Buenos Aires 692 NODIS, PSN 46586) (C) 

t 

Mn Ohiontir\n Tn naHaccifinntinn in -nil 9H1 

• Nil P-1 -l^-Q-^^-l

INU WUJfcJUUUl I I u ueona&aiiiocaiiui in i _un i Jiut/u*t . i n i - i *t-u-vi i^ 

mm M _’W in. 1 fr-M= 

w w OL ■ * K ■* 

__ __ — 

\SS REVIEWED 08/23/2012 DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL BY MIR EO 13526j 

REFERTOJDOSj 


-SBCREff-SENSITI VE 

washincton 

March 21, 1980 

I 


FROM: 

Y 

THE PRESIDENT 


SUBJECT: 

Daily Report 

'DOS’ REVIEWEDlb-"jan-’2013rNO~OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION) 

Information 

Proposed Hussein visit and Subsequent Integrity Problem: According 

to Ambassador Veliotes, the invitations to Begin and Sadat 

present us with an "integrity problem" in addition to our already 

difficult one of retaining credibility as a mediator. He believes 

Hussein will conclude that we were trying to "set him up" by 

extending the April 17 invitation, especially in view of media 

reports which are conveying the impression that the Sadat/Begin/ 

Hussein invitations are jinked, and that Hussein's acceptance 

was a foregone conclusion. He adds that Hussein was clearly 

upset with the situation yesterday after learning of your invitations 

to Begin and Sadat, and asked that his counter proposal 

i for a late May-early June visit-be withdrawn? Hussein added 

that "it would be best under the circumstances just to leave 

< it open to see what develops." (S) 

Letter from Sadat to Begin: Ambassador Atherton forwards the 

text of a letter dated March 17 from President Sadat to Prime 

Minister Begin. In conveying the letter yesterday. Vice President 

Mubarak stressed that it was being provided to us in confidence 

and that Egypt had no intention of publicizing it or telling 

the Israelis that it was given to us. Sadat's letter consists 

of an expression of deep concern over the present state of the 

negotiations, especially over the likelihood that agreement will 

not be reached before May 26, He notes that failure to do so 

will make it difficult for Egypt to oppose or prevent any moves 

within the UN for the purpose of establishing new terms of reference, 

and will give credence to allegations that the peace accords 

constitute a separate peace agreement. Sadat concludes by calling 

for the establishment of a committee that would be charged with 

the task of resolving the issue of security. (S) 

—SECSEEt" 

REVIEW ON MARCH 20, 2000 


Authority 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13520 

^ 

NARA_£i___ Deto - . .. 

- - "lUU 'l- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - j- - - - - - 

Mn Ohinntinn Tn DoHaccifirntinn in -nil 9H1 *Vn9/fM • Nl P—1 -1-S

|NJU V^/UJtSOLIUI I iu LVCUICIOOIIIOailUl l III Ull £-\J IO/U6/v;t . INL-O- *t“U“0 I “O 1 D'r 

OD 

■SECRET-g -2- 

NSC Activity 

Meeting with HFAC 

At Chairman Zablocki's request I met informally with 12 members 

of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Thursday morning. The 

discussion went extremely well. Given the fact that there has 

been a spate of articles critical of our foreign policy, I expected 

to be grilled. I was asked to respond to Bundy's and Ball's 

comments, but the reaction was not at all hostile. I believe 

I was fairly successful in explaining that we had not deliberately 

shot ourselves in the foot by offering the Faks aid. Interestingly 

enough Solarz said that he did not understand why -we had to reverse 

ourselves on the UN vote given the fact that it had not gone 

beyond the Tost statements on Jerusalem. Fenwick was particularly 

disturbed about leaks and willing to admit that the Hill shared 

responsibility; she hoped we were investigating. (C) 

Mn Ohiontinn Tn noHaccifinaf-inn in — 1111 

• Ml f'—A 4.-R-T1 -Fi

INU VJUJHi:ilMM I tj IJnniritilJlML.rll.llJI I III -Ull iU IO/Ut/V/t . INI_V->- I" l*t"U-wl 1-iJ 

MEMORANDUM 


WASHINGTON 

b 


■SECRET—* March 21, 1980 

1. Alternate Market for Italian CH-47 Helicopters; Ambassador 

Gardner reports that the subject o£ the remaining CH-47 

helicopters originially included in the contract with Iran 

was raised yesterday by Count Agusta, who said he would 

have to lay off 2,500 workers if an alternate market was 

not found within the next few days. Agusta pointed out 

that this would precipitate a major furor and seriously 

exacerbate the situation for everyone involved. Even allowing 

for exaggeration, Gardner believes Agusta's estimate of 

the difficulties resulting from such a layoff deserves to 

be taken seriously. He adds that, if there is a possible 

deal with Egypt in the works, it would be distinctly to 

our advantage to initiate discussions as soon as possible. 

In addition to increasing the chances of averting a layoff 

at Agusta, Gardner believes this would serve as a positive 

indication of our intentions and would do more to encourage 

Agusta's continued cooperation in withholding shipments 

of spare parts than our continued blandishment of the consequences 

of this failure to do so. He is fully-satisfied with Agusta's 

role in this episode and would like to be able to tell him 

precisely what the current prospects are for a sale to Egypt. 

(Rome 7620, PSN 12483) (S) 

2. Visit of Senior PLO Official to Amman; According to Ambassador 

Veliotes, PLO "foreign^ minister" Qaddumi visited Amman earlier 

this week for political discussions outside of the context 

for regular meetings of the joint PLO-Jordanian committee 

on the West Bank. Various sources have reported that the 

major topics of Qaddumi's discussions were Giscard's visit 

to Amman, next political steps by the PLO and Jordan, Lebanon, 

and* a PLO request for Jordanian assistance on documentation 

of Gazans. In comments to veliotes. King Hussein said the 

conversations were in the context of a PLO policy review 

involving the recall for consultations of UN representative 

Terzi. Hussein said he cautioned the PLO to go slow during 

the U.S. pre-election period, drawing Qaddumi's attention 

to the lack of utility of pushing for a new UN Security 

Council resolution. Hussein also said he and Qaddumi had 

agreed to an early Arafat visit to Amman. In separate remarks, 

prime Minister Sharaf told Veliotes that Qaddumi had expressed 

PLO support for the EC initiative. Veliotes comments that 

SECRET 

review on March 21, 2000 

Classified by Multiple Sources 

Mn Plhior'tinn Tn norlaccifiratinn in -nil 901*^/07/04 • Nil P—1 -1 /L-R-^1

I\IU VJUJtitJlIUI I I U UtiUldtiCjlllUcUiui I M i “UH £.\j i vj/u^./un . nn_v*- i" i -r“U" U“»J i -%j . 

4 

SECRET -2- 

Hussein's advice to Qaddumi reflects the king's constant 

general concern that the PLO avoid uncoordinated "knee jerk" 

initiatives in the UN which could harm, rather than help, 

the Arab cause. He adds that Hussein is obviously pinning 

his hopes on an eventual EC initiative after May 26 and 

believes a move to the Security Council now by the PLO would 

introduce needless controversy with the U.S. and possibly 

some ’Western Europeans which could complicate a later EC 

move. (Amman 1918, PSN 12437)' (S) 

3. Thai Refusal to Participate in Khmer Relief Meeting; Foreign 

Minister Sitthi told the press today that Thailandwould 

not participate in the forthcoming March 26 conference of 

donors to the Khmer relief program. He reportedly expressed 

Thai unhappiness that the UN had not responded to a number 

of pending Thai proposals related to Cambodia and Khmer 

relief. According to Ambassador Abramowitz, senior Foreign 

Ministry officials have given a different cast by claiming 

that the UN did not invite Thailand to attend the meeting. 

They asserted that Thai officials in New York had been told 

that the meeting was for donors and unless Thailand wished 

to consider at least a "token contribution” to program funding, 

they were not in the "right category" .fcp attend. The foreign 

ministry's immediate reaction was that Thailand had long 

done a great deal to help the refugee relief effort and 

the question of even token contribution verged on insult. 

Abramowitz cannot explain the inconsistency between the 

foreign minister and the working level on this issue, but 

suspects the Thais would participate if the invitation 

question is resolved. He believes the presence of Thailand 

would be very useful and hopes it can be achieved in the 

end. (Bangkok 13021, PSN 12357, 12360) (C) 

l 

Mn Ohiontinn Tn noHaccifiratinn in -nil 901 3/09/04 • Ml P-1 -14-R-31

I\U WUJtJUUUI I IU UeuabblllUdllUII III "Ull £UIO/U£7UH . INLW-I - I *t-0-0 1-0 

MEMORANDUM 



Washington 

If 

i__ 

rSKCRET-SENSTTTTfE I March 21, 1980 

1. Iran Hostages: During a meeting with Ambassadors McHenry 

and Vanden Heuvel on Wednesday, Algerian Ambassador Bedjaoui, 

co-chairman of the UN inquiry commission, said he was convinced 

the hostages would be released within fifteen days. 

Bedjaoui deplored the fact that the commission's work appeared 

so rapidly in the press, and directly accused the French 

lawyers of being unhelpful on this score. He expressed 

belief that Bani-Sadr was acting in good faith and had Khomeini's 

backing in his desire to effect a rapid release of the hostages. 

In Bedjaoui's view, Khomeini's announcement that the newly 

elected parliament would decide the fate of the hostages 

amounted to a concession on his part, since the militants 

would no longer retain control over the hostages. Bedjaoui 

agreed that different channels must be explored in attempts 

to reach Khomeini directly, but he underscored the need 

to work in conjunction with Waldheim "who was deeply engaged 

in Beeking a solution to the crisis." (USUN New York 1048 

NODIS Cherokee, LDX Copy) (S) 

* 

2. U.S.-Argentine Relations — A Rocky Road; According to 

Ambassador Castro, Gerard Smith's mission will be seen by 

the Argentines as one more important event in what is viewed 

in Buenos Aires as a U.s. "courtship." He adds that the 

Argentines have read the series of high level American 

visitors as a sign that times have changed, and the government, 

which no longer feels itself under global.siege as 

a human rights pariah, has faced the prospect of better 

U.S.-Argentine relations with a combination of hope and 

rising self-confidence. Castro adds that in some quarters, 

this hope has become so unrealistic as to cause serious 

speculation that the Humphrey-Kennedy amendment may soon 

be repealed. He notes, however, that the dominant theme 

in our bilateral relations remains one of uncertainty. 

The atmosphere is warm, but there are major and serious 

differences on matters of substance. Castro does not believe 

the U.S. has anything to lose in accepting this two-tiered 

approach — so long as we make sure that the Argentines 

understand we will not sacrifice our interests or concerns 

simply to keep a diaphanous spirit of friendship alive. 

(Buenos Aires 2469, PSN 12705 , lf2707) (C) 

SECRET—- 



( 

r-’i 

Mn rM-\irantinn Tn noHnccifinaHnn in -nil 9017/07/0/1 • Ml P_1 _14.-R-71

ino UDiecuon 10 ueuassincauori in -uii ûio/u^/uh . i\l^- i-i^-o-o i-o 

SECRET-SENSITIVE -2- 

3. Cutler's Meeting with Brltiah Olympic Official; During 

a brief meeting with Lloyd Cutler on Wednesday, sir Denis 

Follows indicated that the British Olympic Association would 

definitely reach a decision on the Moscow invitation at 

its March 25 meeting. He remained unconvinced by arguments 

in favor of postponing a decision and left little doubt 

that the invitation would be accepted. In a meeting with 

Follows today, Foreign Secretary Carrington and Michael 

Heseltine strongly urged the BOA to either postpone a decision, 

or to hedge acceptance by including the proviso that 

the ultimate decision would depend on the situation in 

Afghanistan nearer the time for the games. ' Helseltine 

stressed to Follows that precipitate action by the BOA would 

undercut efforts by the British government to find a 

solution to the Afghan dilemma and could seriously damage 

British standing in the West and the world. Follows made 

no promises as to his ultimate recommendation, however, 

he agreed to present the government's strong views at the 

March 25 meeting. (London 6363, 6366, PSN 12712m 12723, 

12725) (C) 

4. Pershing Guidance Components and Pakistan: In response to 

our information that the Pakistanis were still in contact 

with Mueller's export firm concerning the purchase of Pershing 

guidance components, FRG foreign office official Pabsch 

informed our Embassy today that he had discussed the possibility 

of calling in the Pakistani ambassador with colleagues 

at the deputy assistant secretary level, who agreed they 

were prepared to recommend this course if the U.S. agreed. 

Pabsch said they would like to be in a position to cite 

to the Pakistani ambassador the conversations between Ambassador 

Hummel and Foreign Minister Shanawaz. According to 

Ambassador Stoessel, there are advantages in this idea, 

which would reinforce the level of warning to the Pakistani 

government, and might provide an avenue for confronting 

Mueller with sourceable evidence concerning activities which 

he has denied to German officials. He requests immediate 

guidance. (Bonn 5548, NODIS, PSN 12908, 12909) (S) 

t 

t 

r - ■ .......... 

Mn Ohinntinn Tn norlaccifii-atinn in -nil 9nig/n9/fl4 • Ml r*—1 -1

inu wujeuuuii i u ueoiciaaiiioctiiui i m uii tuuiut/ut 

MEMORANDUM 


^ 


WASHINGTON 

r.QNvTJDBtHHrftlT March 21, 1980 

1. Mexican Commerce Official Comments on GATT Decision; While 

discussing the GATT decision with our economic officers, 

Under Secretary of Commerce Hector Hernandez expressed his 

disappointment about the Portillo decision, noting that 

"a lot of work involving government officials had gone down 

the drain." Hernandez emphasized that both the U.S. and 

Mexico should avoid hasty reactions and that if a decision 

affecting U.S.-Mexican trade is made it should be explained 

in sufficient depth and detail so that the Mexican public 

does not perceive the action as a U.S. retaliatory measure 

against the GATT decision. He acknowledged that the MTN 

bilateral agreement with the U.S. was dead and that the 

Japanese and EC also appeared to be viewing their MTN agreements 

with Mexico as null and void. Hernandez emphasized 

that the initiation of a bilateral trade negotiation with 

the U.S. would be a major political step for Mexico and 

suggested that a formal meeting of the trade working group 

be held at the end of April or in May. The embassy officers 

comment that Hernandez left them with the clear impression 

that he intends and expects, to continuedto manage Mexico's 

foreign trade policy within the guidelines President Portillo 

has delineated. Hernandez clearly indicated that he places 

a priority on managing the difficult trade issues with the 

U.S. in such a way as to avoid possible reactions and counter 

reactions as fallout from the GATT decision that would disrupt 

the orderly mutually advantageous trade relationships 

with the U.S. {Mexico 4853, PSN 11786, 11817) (C) 

2. Implications for U.S. Over Mexican Decision on GATT: In 

determining how Washington should proceed with our bilateral 

trade relationship with Mexico, Charge Ferch comments that 

Mexico's decision has far reaching implications for the 

U.S. and requires us to make far reaching decisions regarding 

both our relations with Mexico and our broad trade policy. 

Ferch believes that because of the dominance of the U.S. 

market in Mexico trade it is probable that Mexico's new 

policy will be directed first at the U.S. He feels that 

Mexico should "pay a higher price" than they paid in the 

1979 MTN negotiations and that we should make it clear that 

special and differential treatment as enunciated in the 

Tokyo declaration would not apply to a new negotiation with 

■eeWFIPENTIAL 1 



nmirmarnni- 

Mn r\hinotir*n Tn noHaccifiratinn in -nil 9017/09/04 • Nl C-1 -1 A-fi-71 -R

INU VJUJUU.1UII I U UBUdbiJlIlUlllUII III “Ull £.\J ld/U£/U*t . INL.O- I" l*+-U-vJ |-«J| 

w 

' m ouhnuLmmL 

-2- 

Mexico. Perch asks for guidance as how to proceed in approaching 

the upcoming scheduled textile consultations, 

winter vegetable negotiations and setting the date for the 

trade working group meeting. He notes that these meetings 

will take on new and considerable more importance as a 

consequence of Portillo's GATT decision. (Mexico 4795, 

PSN 11514, 11500) (C) 

Saudi Egyptian press Attacks; Ambassador Atherton reports 

that there has been a lull in the personal attacks on the 

Saudi leadership over the past two weeks bat believes it 

might still be useful for him tcJ raise the issue again with 

Vice President Mubarak to prolong the trend. In light of 

Egyptian moderation and relative escalation by the Saudis 

he recommends that the Egyptians be informed that we are 

also making clear our concerns with the Saudi government. 

(Cairo 6336, PSN 11912) (C) 

f 

erne* 

Mn nWontinn Tn noHaccifiratinn in -nil 9017/07/04 • Ml P.-1-14-R-71-S

MEMORANDUM 

inu wujtjuuun i u L/eueasaniGcuiuu n i rai l z.u ij/u k iu 

1VLO- I - Id-U-wl |-*t. 

— l J ‘.‘jJ 

THE WHITE HOI SE 

SECRET—* 

WASHINGTON 


1. Afghanistan Expels All American Journalists* Embassy Kabul 

was informed today by the foreign ministry that all American 

journalists have been ordered to depart Afghanistan on the 

first available aircraft. The Afghan official stated that 

this action had been taken because of the "American journalists' 

interference in the internal affairs of Aghanistan and their 

biased reporting." Our embassy estimates that there are 

30 to 50 American journalists and cameramen in Afghanistan, 

and it is now In the process of informing the journalists 

and assisting them to exit the country. (Kabul 175, PSN 

36409) t C) 

2.' Chrlstopher/Genscher Meeting; Christopher outlined to Foreign 

Minister Genscher yesterday our strategy toward Iran, explaining 

the need to implement economic sanctions and requesting 

FRG assistance. He clarified that we hope sanctions will 

obviate the need for other, more risky measures, and stressed 

the importance of European support. Genscher expressed 

an FRG willingness to help as much as possible bn sanctions, 

indicated coordination with the other Europeans, and promised 

an early decision.. The foreign minister stressed the need 

to consider our decisions and the developments in Iran carefully 

to ensure that European nationals are not taken hostage. 

The foreign minister stated it is important that Iranian 

leaders not see the conflict with the U.S. as more important 

than the Soviet threat; therefore, Western public statements 

should not diminish the Soviet conflict with the Islamic 

world. Genscher proposed that the Western reaction to the 

events in Afghanistan be incorporated into an overall political 

strategy, and outlined some steps the EC is considering 

in this regard, including new arrangements with Yugoslavia 

and consideration of a possible political arrangement with 

the Gulf states and Iraq modeled on the EC-ASEAN cooperation 

agreement. Genscher further stressed the need to reach 

a comprehensive Middle cAot peace settlement, and described 

Israel's security concerns as small compared to the threat 

now posed by the Soviets to all countries of the region. 

(Bonn 916, PSN 35795, 35800, 35802, 35806, 35810) (S) 

SECRET 



DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority h4Ud— \ — ^-3\—M 

NAHA_SL£___ Dato r7\^\Ue 

■-—-—= “—H- 

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2013/01/16 : NLC-1 -13-8-31 -4

INU WUJtiUUUII I U UtiUdbblllOdUUII III -dll IJfU 1/ |U . INL.I*,- I- IJ-O'O I “H 4 

f It I 

.fiBeWST-- -2- 

3. Cooper Meeting with French Economic Officials: On Iran, 

the French identified legal problems in applying the Security 

Council resolution in the face of the Soviet veto, and recommended 

we consider putting the Soviets in a corner tactically 

by pressing them on what "measures" they would be prepared 

to take under Resolution 461. They questioned the tactical 

advisability of countries other than the U.S. imposing further 

measures at this time, but conceded that they probably have 

the legal ability to take some additional actions. Cooper 

proposed three areas where concrete support from our allies 

would be extremely useful in the Soviet/Afghanistan situation: 

no undercutting of U.S. actions; no new official export 

credits; and, strict application of COCOM criteria. The 

French will not undercut U.S. measures; will continue normal 

commercial relations, will not cut off official credits, 

and will take a tough line but act slowly in renegotiating 

the Franco-Soviet credit agreement. On COCOM, the French 

did not know what cases they might be submitting and promised 

to get back to us soon. (Paris 1739, PSN 3576B, 35772, 

35776, 35780) (S) 

4. U.S./Argentine Relations: Ambassador Castro met on Tuesday 

with former Junta member General Viola, who is expected 

to succeed Videla as president in 1981, for a genreral review 

of U.S. Argentine relaitons. Viola appeared deeply perturbed 

about the adverse turn of events in our bilateral relations, 

and attributed this to the lack of communication between 

the executives and foreign ministers of both countries. 

He feels it is imperative that a dialogue be established 

as soon as possible between the President and President 

Videla and also between Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister 

Pastor. Viola stated that both countries should see each 

other on the basis of conditions as they exist on and look 

into the future rather than base their policy on past acts. 

The general expressed serious concern over the State Department's 

human rights report on Argentina and felt the wording 

of the report could precipitate a wave of emotionalism and 

anti-Americanism if Argentines felt the report was an unfair 

evaluation of their country. Viola agreed to do whatever 

he could to get the government's cooperation on the restriction 

of grain sales to the USSR. (Buenos Aires 472, PSN 35961) 

(C) 

t 

f— r' 

i V. 


m 

m ulv 

|VU tJUJBUUUI 1 IU UeUdSblllUGUIUI I III ■" Ull £.U IO/U£JU*t . mi V-- I - 1^-H-d I -u 

MEMORANDUM 

NSS REVIEWED 08/22 2012 DECLASSIFIED IN FULL BY MIREO 1352^ 

' "THE WHITE HOUSE 

REFER TO DOS 

-SECRET 

WASHINGTON 

DOS REVIEWED 09-Jan-2013: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATIONj 


4 

1. President Videla'3 View on Entry of the Shah into Argentina; 

In a meeting with Ambassador Castro, President videla indicated 

his mind remained open on entry of the Shah but ' 

at present the negative aspects appear to outweigh the 

positive, videla questioned Castro on the need'for urgency 

in considering this matter. Castro responded that the shah 

was "a very sick man who had to find a place to land permanently 

for continuity of medical aare" and the shah felt 

guilty for the present problem with the hostages. Concerning 

the negative aspects, videla noted such a decision would, 

cost Argentina support., of., nonaligned and Arabic countries; 

though economically the move wpuld have little effect, he 

had to consider the political implications. He added that 

the military might be concerned, especially in light of 

the Timerman, Lorman and Campora releases. In essence, 

.the "shah was an added burden Afcgentina didn't need." Castro 

pointed to the potential positive factor in improving Argen- - 

tina's "tarnished" image and noted that humanitarian reasons 

far outweigh everything. Castro believes that Videla is 

"shaken-up" over this problem and finds himself in a quandry 

about his decision. Videla wants to discuss this issue 

with Castro again this week and it is likely that an Argentine 

decision will come before the ambassador leaves for 

consultations in Washington on December-7 th.'. (state 310239 

NOD IS Cherokee, PSN 31418; and Buenos Aires NODIS.981‘5) 

(S) 

2. Hussein's Views on .Situation in Saudi Arabia* . In briefing - 

Ambassador Vellotes on his recent- trip to Saudi Arabia, 

King Hussein indicated-that the Saudi authorities are confident 

of their ability to control.the security situation. 

However, Hussein observed that recent events.-have taken 

a heavy physical and mental toll on King Khalid. Additionally, 

Khalid appreciated, but refused Hussein's’offer of military 

assistance. Prom his conversations with the Saudi hierarchy, 

Hussein believed it significant, that the dissidents were 

from Nej-d.- Since the incident-* happened in a He-jazis area, 

little sympathy for the insurgents occurred;, however, if 

the revolt had erupted within the Nejd area, Khalid had 

doubts whether a significant number of Saudi soldiers■would 

fight. Hussein is convinced that communists■are manipulating 

the religious‘fanatics and. has1 found only tenpous evidence 

of any Shi-a involvement in. the current■ events*. .Hussein 

noted that the Saudis remain confident in their ability 

-SECRET- ■ • DECLASSIFIED 

Review on December 3 , 1999 E.0.13526 « 

Classified by Multiple Sources t-. ,::'J ^ * 

—■— i 

Dnte tWuLj 

No Objection To Declassllicauon in -ull 2U13/02/04 : NLC-1 -13-4-31 -8

i xu WkJjCÛUi I luuv/uujgiiiwuuuii m 

kill &.U I \JI UCf w T . I1L.U | I \J T W I W 

•SSSflET » -2- 

to handle their internal security situation; however, any 

precipitious American evacuation woyld gather wide-spread 

media coverage and be "a devastating blow to Saudi selfconfidence 

at this time." (AmmaVi 7527, PSN 31423 , 31426, 

NODIS) (S) 

3. King Hussein and Iran: Responding to Ambassador Veliotes 

concern that the Jordanian government has yet to officially 

address the Iranian situation, Hussein stated his intention 

to meet with the local media to "set the record straight" 

and plans to make a "broader declaration" which would focus 

on "the current problem in the Islamic and Arab world stemming 

from Iranian attitudes...and the attack on the Grand 

Mosque in Mecca." Veliotes provided Hussein with copies 

of the President's statement and press conference of November 

29 which he had not yet read. (Amman 7525, PSN 31439) 

C s) 

4. King Hassan and OAU Summit; President Tolbert and Foreign 

Minister' Dennis expressed their disappointment Sunday to 

Ambassador Smith over King Hassan's'apparent decision not 

to attend the OAU Wisemen's meeting on the Saharan dispute. 

The foreign minister predicted that Hassan*s "no show" would 

generate an angry African response which could result in 

decisions by the wisemen more harmful to Morocco than.would 

otherwise have been the case. Dennis again appealed for 

U.S. assistance in reversing Hassan's decision. Liberian 

ambassador-at-large Mitchell, who had just returned from 

Rabat, indicated that Hassan had not told him that he would 

not go to Monrovia but reiterated Morocco's earlier request 

for a postponement. Nevertheless, Mitchell stood firm in 

his belief that Hassan had no intention of going and never 

had any intention of doing so. Ambassador Smith, noting 

the linkage in some African minds between our arms decisions 

and the King's present intransigence, underscores the need 

to stress to King Hassan that it would be in both our interest 

and the Moroccans for-him to attend the Monrovia meeting. 

(Monrovia 9356, PSN 32400, 32403) (S) 

5. Charge Eagleton's Initial Assessment of Embassy Tripoli 

Yncident; Charge Eagleton believes^that while evidence 

"exists that a well-organized group was behind the demonstration, 

the extent and level o*f government involvement 

No Objection To Declassification in ■-ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-1-13-4-31-8

niu wujcoiiui i i u uooiuojiiiuukiwi i n i uii t.u i \ji uu w t i i iuv i i u rwi ui r 

^SBGRET -3- 

remains unclear. Eagleton speculates that the Libyan authorities 

did not expect the compound to be penetrated,- especially 

in light of recent attempts of at least part of the government 

to improve relations with the U.S. Eagleton has informed 

the American community that it can no longer rely on Libyan 

assurances of protection and recommended immediate thinning 

of staffs and dependents; further, khe has told Libyan authorities 

that if another demonstration occurs, we will have 

to "close the embassy." Eaglet&n recommends that we maintain 

formal relations at least until our nationals have departed. 

He concluded that Qadhafi's role: remains uncertain, but 

the next 24 hours should indicate the nature of the Libyan 

government involvement in this incident. (Tripoli 0001, 

PSN 32923) (C) 

6. Assessment of sino-Amerlean Relations Vis-a-yis Kampuchea; 

In an overview of how the Kampuchea problem impinges on 

Sino-Amerlean relations. Ambassadors Abramowitas and Woodcock 

believe that for the present we should continue cooperation 

with the PRC by placing maximum diplomatic pressure on the 

SRV, pursue the concept of safehavens and preserve the 

psychological and political stability of Thailand. Though 

the PRC and U.S. both seek to generate diplomatic'pressure 

on the SRV, the U.S. diverges in terms of the ultimate fate 

of the SRV leadership and the use of force in achieving 

our goals. In the area of humanitarian relief of the.Khmer 

people, the PRC has little concern for their fate; further, 

a difficulty remains in finding a leadership alternative 

to Pol Pot, who the Chinese continue to support. At present, 

both countries are working to preserve the stability of 

Thailand; however, U.S. interests are not tied as closely 

to the Kriangsak government as are the Chinese. In general, 

the U.S. should avoid too close an association with the 

PRC in dealing with Kampuchea to prevent both a restriction 

of options and maneuverability for our diplomatic efforts 

and a perception of Sino-Amerlean collusion by the ASEAN 

states. Our immediate objective — reduction of Vietnamese 

influence in Cambodia — remains parallel to the PRC's; 

however, in pursuing our efforts in a still "fluid" situation, 

we should place some distance between ourselves and the 

Chinese. (Bangkok 9427, PSN 31725) (S) 

No Objection To Declassification in =ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-1 -13-4-31 -8

inu uujtjuuun iu ueueiaaiiioeuiuii in i mi ûi nn i i^.~ i-

■ J /---' 

No UDjecuon 10 ueciassmcauon in run rui^/ia \e.. inl^-i-i^-i-*/-/ 

INU wuifcfuuun i u ueua&siiH-emu!i m r uii c-v i*-> ■£-> \t- • i- \e~~ 1 ~c-1 ~1 , J L. I 

MEMORANDUM m 

m uL-wfttl I 


VS'ASHIX C1TON 

■SECRET-SENSITIVE 

f August 14, 1979 

Id 

1. Nicaraguan Fnreign Minister Plans to Visit Washington; 

During discussions with Ambassador Pezz'dllo today. 

Foreign Minister d’Escoto said he was very pleased 

by the reception the Nicaraguan delegation received 

in Quito, and by the cordial discussions held with 

Mrs. Carter and other members of the U.S. delegation. 

D'Escoto then indicated that he would be traveling 

to Washington next week with some members of the junta, 

and hoped to meet with the President and members of 

the banking community. At Pezzullo's urging, he agreed, 

that it might be best to make the visit alone and to 

consider a meeting with the President at a later time. 

Pezzullo comments that the foreign minister clearly 

wants to take immediate advantage of the spirit of 

Quito to cement closer ties with the U.S. He recommends 

that we not delay in offering an invitation to the 

junta to visit Washington in September, and that it 

should include a call on the President since he is 

an important symbol of change ip U.S.-Nicaraguan policy. 

He believes now is the best time to extend an Invitation, 

before d'Escoto's trip, and requests immediate authorization 

to do so. (Managua 3723, 3713, NODIS STADIS, 

PSN 7203, 6854) (C) 

2. Implications of Israeli Cabinet Decision on 242; According 

to Charge Viets, the Israeli cabinet statement on UN 

resolution 242 constitutes an open-ended warning that 

Israel may consider some passages in the Camp David 

framework to be "null and void" if the U.S. fails to veto 

a Palestine rights resolution. While the statement 

does not appear to suggest that Israel will terminate 

the autonomy negotiations, they could choose to make 

the point that the provisions in 242 on the "inadmissibility 

of the acquisition of territory by war" and "withdrawal 

of Israeli armed forces from territories occupies in 

the recent conflict" would explicitly be rejected by 

them in the negotiations. Thus, Israel could still 

claim to accept the goals it committed itself to in 

the joint letter of March 26, 15J79, and at the same 

time adopt the position that the "changing" of 242 

no longer obligates them to withdraw from the occupied 

-SSGRgT- 

REVIEW ON AUGUST 13, 1999 


r* rr*ns—r 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-1 -12-1 -27-7

i\o uDjecuori 

_SfieRBT-SEWSITT\^P 

I U ueudbblliuauuil III run iU \ £-! \£J \i. . INL.O- I- I-*-' 

y.L-'-' A 

territories. In conclusion, Viets. suggests that on 

the basis of the cabinet statement, the Israelis coul 

justify virtually any action, from selective negation 

of portions of resolution 242, to outright suspension 

of the autonomy negotiations on the basis that the 

operative paragraph of the Camp David framework has 

been "nullified." (Tel Aviv 17542, PSN 7033, 7036) 

(S) 

3. Dayan Keeps the Pot Boiling; Charge Viets reports 

that Foreign Minister Dayan made a vigorous effort 

yesterday to keep the political pot boiling with his 

remarks to a meeting of the Likud Knesset faction. 

Among other things, Dayan informed the group that the 

U.S. was prepared to "replace" resolution 242 as a 

means of bringing the PLO into the peace process; claimed 

that the U.S. accepted Israel's policy of preemptive 

strikes at terrorist bases in south Lebanon; and asserted 

that the U.S. was willing to permit Soviet observers 

to participate in supervision of the peace treaty 

implementation. Dayan did admit, however, that the 

U.S. had reservations about hitting civilians in Lebanon, 

"mainly when this is done with fi.S. equipment." Viets 

comments that Dayan managed to insinuate a distorted 

U.S. angle into each of the topics addressed. He concludes 

that the Israeli foreign minister evidently believes 

there is still political capital to be made in the 

Likud by continuing to ping away at America at every 

opportunity. (Tel Aviv 17555, PSN 6923, 7924) (C) 

t 

q 

r) s—r 


Ḷi 11 LU 14.1 ICJ 14. . I | - 14." I -*-! 

MFMC)RANDll>IU WUJBL'LIUI 1 1 u ......................................... 

THE WHITE HOUSE /V 

WASHINGTON 

SECRET SENSITIVE August 14, 1979 

1. Pakistani Protest of U.S. Actions; Foreign Secretary 

Shahnawaz summoned Ambassador Hummel to the foreign 

ministry today to deliver a strong protest over Richard 

Burt's recent New York Times .article. Shahnawaz 

expressed Pakistan's "deep disappointment," stating 

that such threats of commando raids, economic reprisals, 

and other strong U.S. sanctions against Pakistan would 

only serve to further Soviet interests in the region. 

He cited a number of incidents as "evidence of the 

U.S. propaganda campaign" against Pakistan, including 

Gerard Smith's statement to Agha Shahi on May 4 that 

"Pakistan was risking its total relationship with the 

U.S.," and "entering into the valley of death." The 

foreign secretary said Pakistan may take the matter 

to an international fora and. closed his formal protest 

by appealing to the U.S. to "stop these attacks forthwith 

as it is in neither country's interest." Hummel comments 

that although most of Pakistan's "evidence" is from 

press and unsubstantiated rumors, it is unfortunate 

that they were able to use statements such as Gerard 

Smith's as evidence from a U.S. official source that 

there is a danger of preemptive strikes against Pakistan's 

nuclear installations. He requests immediate guidance 

for responding to the protest. (Islamabad 9257 NODIS, 

PSN 6815, 6820} (S) 

SECRET 



No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-1 -12-1 -27-7

MEMORANDUM 

INU C/UJtSUUUII 

I u ueudsamuemuii m i un iu i£.1 \ej \e. . mi_o- i- \e.~ i-e-i -» 

j0j 

THE WHITE HOUSE *------- 

£ONF I PENT I ATT 

WASHINGTON 

* August 15, 1979 

1. Effects of Kraft Article on Gas Negotiations; Charge 

Perch comments that yesterday's Joseph Kraft article 

on the recent gas negotiations is particularly unfortunate 

in view of the Mexican request that we keep the negotiations 

private and keep the details out of the press. The 

revelation of details of the talks will almost certainly, 

perhaps very seriously, complicate Mexico's ability 

to deal with the domestic sensitivities of the gas 

issue. Ferch continues to believe, however, that Mexico 

wants to reach an agreement on the gas issue. He recommends 

that Katz/Vaky make a high-level call on the Mexican 

ambassador to reassure his government that the leak 

was unauthorized, that we continue to hope for a inutally 

beneficial agreement, and that we have no Intention 

of carrying on these negotiations in the press. (Mexico 

13778, PSN 7739) (C) 

t 

2. Argentina on Verge of Crucial Nuclear Decisions: Ambassador 

Castro notes that within the next few weeks Argentina 

will make several crucial decisions regarding its nuclear 

development. He suggests that the State Department 

contact the governments of Canada, Switzerland and 

Germany in a final effort to coordinate safeguard requirements. 

Castro feels that Argentina will ratify 

the Treaty of Tlatelolco in order to negotiate a FSS 

agreement with the IAEA on Tlatelolco language. (Buenos 

Aires 6637, PSN 7741) (C) 

CQMFI-BENT-IAL 


pr ACGTTJ»TT«ir"* ***** jirvr mmr n n 

classm ieNo obj-cctjon To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-1 -12-1 -27-7

No UDjection i o ueciassmcauori in run cu io/u^/u*+. inlv>-^*+-» i-o-^-o 

pOS~REVlWwED29-Jun-201Q: DECLASSIFIED FOR'RELEASE IN FULL 

&3F 

41? il N M U I H I I A COM 

PH TORITT 

STD666 

DE RUESBA #0892 0301955 

P 301936Z JAN 80 

PM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 

JC-e-N M D U ! I A' L^BPXNOS AIES$J 0892 

NOBIS 

E,0. 12065* XDS-1 1/29/10 (CHAPLIN, MAXWELL) OR-M 

TAOS * PIPR AR 08 

SOBJICT* (0) PORRIGN MINISTRY QPPICIAL REVIEWS 000DPA8TSR MISSION 

1 "" .... 1 1" — 

1.‘ (0 - I NT IRX HIT.) 

2/ POLCODNB (HALLMAN) TALKED WITH OFPICIR ON THE STAPP 

07 DIPUTT PORIION MINISTER CAVANDOLI (B1AOOI) ON 

JANUARY 29 ABOUT RESULTS 07 000DPA8TIR VISIT. BOTH 

WRE NOTITAKERS DURING GOODPASTER-PASTOR-MARTINEZ DE BOZ 

CONVRRSATIONS. 

3, XXAUOE WAS PL1A8ID THAT BITENOS AIPES PRESS COVERAGE 

07 THE VISIT HAS BEEN SYMPATHETIC — "NO PROBLEMS HERE 

TOR TIE GOVERNMENT, .HE. SAID. 

4. HE WAS LESS SANGUINE ABOUT BEHIND-THE-SCENES FALLOUT 

— NOT, HE SAID, BECAUSE ANYTHING HAD GONE WRONG,. BUT 

BECAUSE HI SENSES THAT ElPXOTATIONS WERE BUILT «TH HIS 

BOSSES HE PEARS WILL NOP BE SATISFIED. THESE DEAL WITH: 

A. THE DEPARTMENT'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT TO THE 

CQMOUSS. THIS. BIAUGE SAID. IS 60MiTfTNC~----- 

PASTOR AND CAVANDOLI BELIEVE THE ADMINISTRA 

TION DIPT NT TELT CAN CONTROL. TRET WILL PE--- _ 

iI TTllLT_mrpyr-rrTiilLpE PONTES nNTuvnftliT.R 

fjrar^P ’CONSTITUENCIES" WITHIN OUR ADMINISTRA 

TION AND BUREAUCRACY SIMPLY PALLS ON DEAF EARS, ‘ 

BEAU01 SAID. (BXAUOX LIVED SEVERAL YEARS IN , 

WASHINGTON AND UNDERSTANDS THE WORKINGS 07 

OUR GOVERNMENT.) ANOTHER PROBLEM IS THAT WHAT ^ i 

THI U.8. BELIEVES IS SCRUPULOUSLY PAIR MAY BE r.,0Ri 

INIURIATING HERE. 

R. ACTION BEPORI THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS 

DECLASSIF/ED 

E.0.13526 

iritvJjUL-3

No Objection I o ueciassmcation in run ij/u^/u*t: inlo-^-» i-o-^-a 

, pfjTTTfnNTT ft-r*******ff COPY 

t 

COMMISSION, bxauoe SAID cavandoli had given too 

1UCH WISH IS SAID THAT GOA COULD ACCEPT 

KEEPING tTSM 12 1 UNDER REVIEW. ON 

RXELIOTION, THAT COUHSS WOULD KEEP OPEN 

THE "ARGENTINA CASS," AN INDlTIDUALIZATION GOA 

DOSS NOT WANT. GOA WILL TASS THE 

POSITION THAT REJROTION IS TIX ONLY PRACTICABLE 

COURSE IN ORDER HOT TO MIX TIX MATTER WITH THE 

INVESTIGATION 07 THE INtBD-AMIRICAN COMMISSION 

ON HUMAN RIGHTS "WHICH, AJTTSS ALL, WILL CONTINUE 

UNTIL TEE COMMISSION'S REPOST IS ACTED UPON AT 

TIE NEXT OAS MINISTERS MISTING. GOA WANTS O.S.G* 

HELP IN THIS POSITION. WON;HALLMAN ASKED WHETHER 

Till WAS AN 077IGIAL CLAftfrltiiTION 07 

CAVANDOLI'S PRESENTATION 

.-________ 

TIS IT WAS. 

C. TIE 1NTEI-AMERICAN COMMISSION'S REPORT. 

BEAUG1 SAID IS AMD HIS BOSSES ENOW THAT ANT 

SUGGESTION THAT THE U.S.O«:TIT TO SWAT PARER 

7R0M HIS STERN VIEWS ON AJtSXRTINA IS A 

NON-STARTER. HE ADMITTED HOWEVER THAT A 

STRATEGY 07 TRYING TO PERSUADE OAS MEMBERS ' 

TO VOTE MODI71CATIONS TO THE REPORT MAT 

EMXIOX — ESPECIALLY COUNTRIES HAVING 

CITIZENS WIO PARTICIPATE IN TIX COMMISSION. 

ZIECALL THAT PASTOR SAID, BEAUGE REMINDED, 

THAT IT SEEMS POINTLESS 70R A GOVERNMENT TO . 

CHOOSE BAD RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA JUST 

BECAUSE QP TIE VIEWS 07 A CITIZEN 07 THAT 

COUNTRY. MEANWHILE, BEAUGE SAID, THE 

"OFFICIAL GROUP" NAMED TO WRITE ARGENTINA'S 

REPLY TO THE COMMISSION'S REPORT LABORS 

MANFULLY WITH LEGAL ARGUMENTSr1".... ~ ... 

5. ASHED HOW HE 701%RES ARftflKWYD'A WILL APPROACH 

UNDERTAKINGS ON SRJ3NS EXPORTS"MADE DURING SQQDRlSTER'S 

VISIT, BEAUGE AT 7IRST POUND IT PUZZLING SOMEONE SHOULD 

BELIEVE THERE WILL EE A PRECISE SUM DETERMINED FOR 

ARGENTINA'S COARSE GRAINS SALES TO THE’SUVHT UNION. 

CONCEDING AT LAST THAT MARTINEZ DE HOZ-:'S AGREEMENT 

TO PUT A LIMIT ON SALES TO SOVIET GRAIN TRADING 

COMPANIES INDICATED THAT AN AMOUNT ACTUALLY.BE 

PIXEL, BEAUGE WENT ON TO SAT HE DOUBTED THAT MANY 

BEYOND THE ECONOMY MINISTER HIMSELF WOULD EVER 

LEARN WHAT WAS TIE DETERMINED SUM. BEAUGE WAS UNCERTAIN 

ABOUT MODALITIES 07 ARGENTINA'S PRESENTING INFORMA 

TION ABOUT GRAINS EXPORTS-TO TIE MONITORING GROUP, 

BUT SAID THIS WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT HIS MINISTRY. 

0. ONE OTHER SUBJECT CAME=UP: ARGENTINA'S P41TICI- 

PSN:055934 PAGE 02 TOR:030/23il5Z DTG:301936Z JAN Bg 

0 N F I D- E N T I A COPY 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91 -3-2-9

INU wujtsouui i i u ueoidoamocaLiui i 111 r un £.u 10/ui/u‘f . 1 î_v>-£.*t-o 1 -^-£.-0 

.=!■ ^ 1 ' *' • 

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copr 

PATION IN TFr OLYMPIC GAMES. ATTER ARGENTINA rS 

STRENU0E8 WO?TS TO "Di:-P0LITICT~? THE *0*0,0 CUP 

GAMES HELD HER* IN 1978 AJ|D ’THE WORLD CA"CYR onii***- 

ENCE HELD TU TOlinwiMG TEAR IT WOULD RE ET»*EMELY 

DI'TTICULT TO BACK AWA* TPOM THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS. 

BEAUffE KNEW OT NO CURRENT BISHUSSION OT mRE POSSI 

BILITY THAT AEGENTINA BOYQOtT THE GAMES, RUT ALSO 

SAID THAT A RECENT STATEMENT BY THE ARGENTINE 

OLYMPICS COMMITTEE PRESIDENT THAT ARGENTINA DE7INITELY 

WOULD PARTICIPATE HAD NOT )EEN CLEARED WITH HIGHEST 

GOA AUTHORITIES. 

CASTRO 

BT 

t 

! 

t * 

■ f 

I 

1 

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PSN-.0 5593* PAGE 03 07 03 TOR:030/22:15E DTG»301936Z JAN 3a 

0 N f-t-ji E N T I A !,»»»♦»»»£ COPY 


No uojection 10 ueciassmcaiion in hun û u/u^/u4 : 

0NFID1NT -£-l 

COPT 

OP IMMED 

STU381 

DE RUXSBA #0869/1 0301659 

0 301525Z JAN 80 

TH AMXMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 

TO SECBTATX WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4044 

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 07 3 0869 

NOBIS 

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 1/26/10 (CASTRO, SAUL H.) OR-M 

TA OBt PIPS AR 

SUlJXOTl (Cl DRAFT MXMOIANDUM 07 CONURBATION* GENERAL GOODPASTER'S 

VISIT TO ARGENTINAT 4lHiU TJIAlJli/GKIA NT 1!Of IDSi JANUARY gg— 

1. (C - INTIRE TEXT.) 

2. MEMORANDUM 07 CONVERSATION 

3. SUBJECTI GENERAL &00BPASTEP'S VISIT TO ARgXNTINAt 

LIMITING ARGENTINA'S GRAINS SHIPMENTS TO TEE SOVIET UNION 

4. PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS: BRIGAPIES (RET) CARLOS'R1ST0R, 

7ORII0N MINISTER ‘ ■ 

DR. JOSE AL7RSD0 MARTINEZ DE HOI. MINISTER 07 ECONOMY 

COMODORO CARLOS CAVANDOLI, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER 

MR. VICTOR 1XAUCX, MINISTRY 07 FOREIGN AFFAIRS (NftBTAKER) 

GXNXRAL ANDREW J. G0ODPASTXR, PRESIDENTIAL IMlSSAft . 

RAUL I. CASTRO, U.8, AMBASSADOR IN ARGENTINA 

ClfAUS V. RUSIR. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (ARA/ECA) 

WILLIAM H. HALLMAN, 0*8. EMBASSY BUENOS AIRIS. (NOTITAXER) 

» T- 

5. ' TIME AND PLACE* 1ANUARY 23 AND 24, 19801 THE 

MINISTRY OF FOREIGNJAPFilRS, BUENOS AIRES 

/*■ 

6. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY, GENERAL GOOD?ASTER 

MET ON TWO CONSECUTIVE DATS AT TAB MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 

AFFAIRS. THE MINISTER, OF ECONOMY LSD ARGENTINA')) ' 

PART OF DISCUSSIONS PEALING WITH SHIPMENTS OF GRASN& 

FROM ARGENTINA TO TEE SOVIET ONION AND OUR EFFORT! 

TO GST ARGENTINA TO ElMIT THESE SHIPMENTS. TIB * 

MINISTER FOUND MANY-REASONS FOR ARGENTINA'S NOT 

ATTEMPTING LIMITATIONS, TIE. GREATEST BEING IIS 

+ *«************ ttfgsi COMMENT *•’*.*********** 

FILE 

70EIDEAL,THORN f OKS,X1MAR,11M,BRIM,HUN?' 

PSN1055800 *AGE 01 TOR 1030/20i3SZ DTGi301525Z JAN 30 

F I -P- E N T I A L**WM»E COPY 


T» . 

No UDjection I o ueciassmcauon in run tu i j/u^/u^t: 

***** flHTMHM COPI 

BEL IIP THA* INTERNATIONAL ..REPORTS TO SENT GRAINS 

ro TIE SOVIET UNION USE'BOOHS TO TAIL AND HIS 

INWILLINGNESS TO INT9&BUPT ARGENTINA'S POLICY AND 

PROPITS TO THIS 

AftfUFTP HOMlTliH TO HI pi 

PRIVATE REQUESTS TO THE SOVIET GRAINS TRADINS. 

TqiTOgr^grLIMIT PTOCMEB IN ARGENTranrCTTlST LEVELS 

(ngQ^bVTS P ACTOR") AMS to cooperate IN SEARING 

INPORHATION RIGAIDINO ARGENTINA GRAINS SHIPMENTS. 

7. A SEPARATE MEMORANDUM OP CONVERSATION GOVERN - 

Til POIXTON MINISTER'S PRESENTATION OP POLITICAL 

SUBJECTS. END MEMCON INfROEOCTXON ANS SUMMARY* 

* i 

?. WIDERSBAY( JAWJART 23l ;|XRST PRESENTATION. 

GENERAL OOODPASTER LX» tlijjLRESENTATIO* OP 001 ~ 

REGIONINE OP tarTTlATiSllTtlOiTTOlTTfilT EVULVIF^' 

WITH TIE SOVIET ONION'S INVASION OP APGfANXSTAN. 

RI 8AIS TEAT IB WANTED TOiRZPLAlN ROW WE RELIEVE 

RS8TEICTX0N8 ON TIE BIPORftf OP GRAIN TO Til SOVIET 

UNION PIT WITIIN TIE CONBIT OP OTHER ACTIONS 001 

GOVERNMENT IS TAXING TO BCE THIS NEW SITUATION. 

IE BATS THAT KX ALSO HAD NOME TO DISCOS! WAYS TO . 

DEEPEN ANS STRENGTHEN ARffllNTINI-U.S. RELATIONS. 

9. IT WAS ORGE«Tt OOODPASTER CONTINUED, TO TAKE’?' 

AN IMMEDIATE, PIRM AND SUSTAINED STAND IN PACE OP 

TIE SOVIET ACTION — AND fO? TO REPEAT THE COURSE* 

TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO TXX SOVIET UNION'S EARL HSR 

irrCUlStON INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIAN WHEN IMPETUS HAD . 

BEEN LOST. THIS LATEST SOVIET ACT WA8 PAR MORE BUT ANT 

TV THAT IT WAS TIE PIRST MILITARY INVASION OUT MR* 

EASTERN EUROPE, AND PRACTlQALLT PROM TSE BEGINNING 

INVOLVED SIX AIM! DIVISION* AND ULTRA-MODERN AIRCRAPT. 

THOUGE VE CONCEDE THAT IlfMflDIATS GOALSANND LOCAL .'EGNa>> 

CI1NS MAI HAVE MOTIVATED;ill SOVIET UNION, THE . .. 

STRATEGIC-DYNAMIC IPPSCT WAS NSTSltllLXSS ONE OR;; 

THREAT TO PAXIBTAG AND TK* PERSIAN GULJN REGION A*^, 

PROM TUT, TO ILL THE VESf* 

i 

10. OUR. IMMEDIATE RESPONDS. USING GRAINS SHXPMRWffi 

AND TEE PROSPECT:OP BOTCRffTING TIE OITHRlC GAMER,7WAS 

K QUICK SIGNAL f6 THE SOVIET UNION AND OUR ALLIti THAT THE 

U.8. WILL NOT TOLERATE RGWIET CONDUCT.. NOW WR ill 

INVOLVED IN EXTENSIVE CWERSATIONS WfTH ALL OUJt 

ALL IRS, INCLUDING PAKISf|N ANDNATO — fPlUS THE ■' 

REPUBLIC OP CHINA —■ TO COORDINATE ACTION. VS ■ 

BELIEVE A SOVIET TACTIC KILL NOV BE TO PLAT A . 

WAITING GAME, RIP1CTIN0 fSAT TEE ALLIES CAN RE 

DETACHED ONE PROM ANOTHER. THIS MUST NOT HAPPEN., v 

t 

i 

PSN1055800 PAGE 02 TORI030/20I38Z DT&J301525Z JAN 80 

♦****»».g_0 N T I D~E N T 

COPT 


i\o UDjecuon i u ueuiassmcauufi m run ûio/uûh . 

i-o-^-s 

\ 

i n i i i****+**i (j^r 

11. LIMITATIONS or 0-HA I NS 'SHIPMENTS ARE SIGNIFICANT, 

EVEN 17 TEX R1SULTS 07 TXXBl ARE PRINCIPALLI VO PROCLAIM INTEN 

TIONS. OUR SKINNING, VX ADMIT, WAS CLUMSY IN TEAT 

VX TAILED TO CONSULT TULLf, BUT NXITSX1 SXCRETART 

▼ANUS NOI TEX NATIONAL SXQBIIST GOBNOH HtSCTOR 

INTXN98 TO ASUSX TRIBNDSHI*.. VX LOOK TOWARD-TO 

EXTSNSm, TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS VITH- A1GEK&INA 

REGARDING SUPPLY, STORAGE,. SHIPMENT--AND-POSSrIBLS 

DITIXSIONS 07 GRAINS, ___ __ i- - 

12. G1NIXAL GOODPASTXR VINT ON TO REMIND TXAT TEE 

U„S. HAD NOT CALLED TOR A BOYCOTT AND WOULD FULFILL 

COMMITMENTS MADE 1AGX IN t*75 TO SEIF TIE USSR 

S .MILLION TONS 07 GRAIN, ECONOMY MINISTER MIITINEZ 

DI 10Z ASKED TOR A LEGAL EXPLANATION OT COMMITMENT" 

AND XOV VS JUXTAPOSED TRlI’fIfH AUTHORIZATIONS** 

ALSO POUSSIN IN TEX 1975 • JSlltEMSNfMB', RUSER ' 

EZPLAINXB TXAT STATE DEfAlfMENT LAWYERS HAD STUDIED 

TIE QUESTION AND MADE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN VHAT 

WAS PROMISED AND VHAT HAD;BEEN MADE CONDITIONAL ON 

PU1THXS AGEEIMXNT. 

BT 

t 

n 

f 

PSN1O558O0 PAGE 03 OT 83 TORI03B/2E|S6Z DTG*3015g5Z JAN. 80 

ONTIDINT ITL*1111*****! COPT 

■ 

, No Objection To Declassification in ûll 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-2-9

INO uujeuuuil l u utiuicibbiiit>ciLiuii ill run £u uiuciun . 

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i 

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3P IMMXD 

ITS 597 

DR 151811 #0859/2 0301720 

3 381525Z JIN 80 

PH AMXHB188Y BUXN08 AI Ilf'., - i 

FO S10ST1T1 WASHDC iMMUtlTl 4045 

SONTIDINTIAL WCTION 2 01 3 BDIN08 HUS 0869 

NOBIS 

13, FiBT

i\o UDjection 10 ueciassmcauun m -un ûij/uûh . inlo-^h-o i-o-^-o 

*++*++*£^0 H"f IDS -N-T I ACOPr 

HI UTAH THRUSTS? PASTOR ADDED TEAT HI WAS SQUALL! 

OURIOUB ABOUT THI IPPECTIYSNISS OP AN OLYMPICS BOYCOTT. 

V \ 

17. MARTINIS DI HOZ TOOK THI PLOOR TO DlYUOP TH£SI 

THIMX8. HI DISAPPROVES, IN PRINCIPLE, Of USING 

ZCONOMIC SANCTIONS IN MILITARI-POLITICAL CONFRONTATIONS 

B1CAUS1 THI ONLY REALLY Cl MAIN SIfSCT IS TOT DSST&OT 

AN ECONOMIC ORDER• IP ANYTHING* HI SAID, LEE ECONOMIC 

SANCTIONS B1 USIL AGAINST XCONOMIC CRALLENGIHT 

18. PUITHU, TIX MINISTIR DOUBTED HE HAS TURN INTO 

ACCOUNT THAT ORLY THX U.S. AND A&CXNTINA AIR SIGNIPICANT 

TXXO GRAINS XXP01TXR8. EX TUNED AS BOLLOV THX WILLINGNESS 

op Australia, Canada and txx xusopxan community to axidx 

BY GRAINS XXPOST LIMITATIONS, SINCE THX EXPQRTAILS 

SURPLUS OP THOSX AHXAS WOULD IN ANY XTINI BX DlSTlNID 

TO OTI1X KINDS OP MAXKXTS. 

10. PIRPXCTION OV A LIMITATIONS POLICY HILL XX DIPPICOLT 

OR IMPOfllllE, TNI MINISTER RAID. EX PRXDXCTRD *RAT 

*L14KAG1 POST TIOM U.S. SURPLUS COULD AMOUNT *0 TERXZ 

OR POOR MILLION TONS. AND If;THIS HSU TRUX OP «RI 

U.S.. If VOULS XI XtlN LlKBtill IN TIX CASI OP ARGENTINA 

AND OTRXl EXPORT*!*. XI DSOSTID TUT THX SOYIXT UNION 

COULD Bfl HURT TO TXX POINT OP ORANGING ITS POLIQY TOR 

A PIV MILLION TONS OP GUI*. 

Rl. MARTINil 91 HOZ VINT ON TO 1ZPLAIN THX WORKINGS OP 

TXX A1G1NTZNI GRAINS TRAD*. THIS S0Y1RMMXNT. DILI RXR AT XL I 

S0U01T TO 9I8MANTLX Til GRAINS MONOPOLY INIXIITXD PROM 

XARtltl OOYXRWttNTS. TXX POLICY Xg PUNDAMXNIAI, AND 

IT XA8 LID TO TIXll CONSRCDIXTX 1UMP1R CROPS. SUPPORT 

P1IC1S All U81D TO THX SftiLLl&T STINT POSSXBLX AND, 

GXNXIALLY IPXAKXNO, THRU; ARE NON* OUTBIDS XRI VHIAT 

TRAD1. UNLIKX IN 80MX COR*TRIES (TXX MINISTflr CITED 

CANADA) THX G1AXN8 10ARD ,POXS NOT BUY UP CRGVS BUT 

MXRXLY XlGIsmi INTENDED: JXPORTB HI TROUT HOARD TO 

DS8TINATION. DRPORTXRS Bit DIRECTLY PROM PRODUCERS, 

USUALLY ON P.O«X. (BUXNOS'ilRXS OX ROSARIO) TRIMS. 

IT 18 Til LARGS I NT UN At ION AL TRADING C0MPANI1S. THAT 

USUALLY POICHASI ON C.I.f^ TERMS 'AND DOING THIS 

ACQUIRE RESPONSIBILITY f(* PINAL DESTINATIONS. TXX 

SOYIXT GUI NS TRADING INfXTY BUTS IN ARGENTINA LIKX 

ANY BIG INTERNATIONAL DIALER. 

II • A SUGGESTION TUT THIS PATTERN BX ALTERED IS 

YXRY 8XXI0US BUSINESS. RAD YOU A8KXD US HI COULD 

HATE EXPLAINED ALL THIS, MARTINIS DE HOZ SAID. AT 

AN EARLIER POINT PXRUPS HE COULD HAY1 TAKEN INTO 

PSN*0558432 PAGE 02 TORl03i/EG»3BT DTGi301525Z JAN 80 

»♦»»»»*&. 0N-T-ID1NTI A!L***»*»*r COPr 

No Objection To Declassification in ,-ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91 -3-2-9

ixu wujbouui i u ucuiaodiiiâuuii 111 Ull £-\J IO( \J£-I U~T . | * 4-"T"i^ I "O' o 

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OP IMHIS 

ST0457 

01 lUfBlA #0469/3 0341735 

0 2 1525Z JAN 80 

PH AM1M1AS8T 101NOS AIRIS 

TO BIGSTAT1 VA8HSC XHHISIATI 4046 

j 

ConniNCAL SICflON 3 OP 3 lUlNDS AIRIS 0869 

NOBIS 

22. Til MXNXSTB1 POINTIS TO 0Till PRACTICAL 0Z7PICULTIIB. 

IX AlinTlS THAT ON Til SAT 07 MI C0NTIR8AMDN TUBS 

VAS A T1X1TT B01U1 SP1IAS 11TVI1N IH1ARG0W- ANS fill” 

OX A INI • TUB 01BAT1S S1TM T1AS1 ANS HANABMftfft PH01LIHS, AND 

IT ALIO CUATXf Til |DIIfl{l VHITIU ARIINflUj FARMERS 

MIOIT NOT L081 TUB PIXOijABTANTA01 — NOT TO.' AN » 

ITFlOfXVl POLIO! 07 HMJttTJONS 1ST RATHE T0,P*ITATS 

T1A911B IN OTIll CODNTXtV. 

23. MAITINI2 01 10Z CONTAINED THAT CU1I1NT N4HIIT 

SI1T01TI0N8 OIXASIO IT Uj. POLICT AL11AST IAS COST 

AIOONfXNA HMKltS. lOLlfll, El SAXB, IAS CANC&L1B 

01AINI OONTIAQSS VIT1 AlltNTlNA VIIN 0771110 fTpiAiaoUT 

0.1. S1AINS ON OONCSSBIoIAL TI1H8. THIS TOOK HAGl, 

11 SAISp A7T11 AlOlNTINAfAB OOH7LAIN1S TO TSt H.S. 

SOU NO 1ILATUAL OONBULTIfXONB. CONURBATIONS WTI 

MIXI00 IAS STBlfll VII0 IttXXCO TOONS IT COOLS 01T 

0.8. VB1AT POf 80SS1NLT # til H AIK IT. AROINTINA'S 

TIASITIONAL 8014I0H HAIM VITI JAPAN SLUMPIS : 

VI1N 0,8. 8014I0M PIIC18Tf*U. 

24. SOOlPASm BlPlNBlSt VI IAS NOT SAID THAT 01AXN8 

LIHITAT10NB TOOLS POLL Tig SOTIIf BNION 00T 09 ITBllN- 

ISTAN. BUT I7HCTITI 114KICTI0N — RESTRICTIONS, 

THAT 18, NOT 07?S1T 710H 111 8091C18 — BINS A GLftAH 

BI0NAL 07 BOLUlilTT TO i SOU*f 00T1RNMM*. IT Xl 

SOLISAllTT, APTll ALL, T EX8TXAINB THS BOTH* ONION 

FROM 08IN8 701C1 TO GAIN 8 1NS| IN E010P1, $0# JLSX 

Should sotiit atTIntion commakmd? with bjoaid to 

A*61NTINA'B LOBf 8ALIS X AS CL1A1LT NOT Til* MINT ION 

OP Til 0,1* TO A10PT A BgUAR-T«f-FIXOlBOR POLIBT. 

Til MINIITIR'B PRESENTATION AL11AST HAKES AttflUtiffA'S CONCERNS 

PSN1053807 PAGE 01 I 01 TOR 1030/20r40Z' STG|301525Z JAN 80 

n-P-I D 1 N T I A 

COPT 


»* Ik no UDjeciion i o ueciassmcauon in run u/u^/u

INU ÛjtJUUUlI iu ueud&amuemuii in run &uu(uû,t . 

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COPT 

No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91 -3-2-9;

4. 

“No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/23 : NLC-7-34-5-2-9 

-SECIUSTT'EYES ONLY 

OFFICE OF THE VICE 

t 

PRESIDENT 

WASHINGTON 

September 5, 197B 

MEMORANDUM POR AMBASSADOR VAKY 

Assistant Secretary and.US Coordinator.Alliance 

for Progress, Department of State 

SUBJECT: 

Memorandum of Conversation 

Pete, as promised 1 am forwarding a written report of the 

Vice President's meeting with President Videla for yourself 

and Under Secretary Newsom. I would stress our belief that 

distribution of this document should be» tightly controlled, 

on a need to know basis. 

t 

Denis Clift 

Assistant to the Vice President 


cc: 

David Aaron 

Robert Pastor 

t 

—SSeRET/EYES ONLY 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority ^ ^ 

~ ^ 

NARA_Jc£_— Dcto__“ASLVVj----- 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/23 : NLC-7-34-5-2-9__


y 

SEGRET/CB»agPrVE7NODIS/XGDS 

OFFICE OFTHE VICE PRESIDENT 

WASHINGTON 


MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, AMBASSADOR GARDNER'S RESIDENCE, 

ROME, ITALY 

September 4, 1968, 1:50 p


■SECRgT/SENSITIVE/NQDIS/XGDS 

The Vice President said we want to work with you to have good 

relations. The Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment is coming into effect. 

We must soon take decisions on the Allis-Chalmers deal. We want 

to be helpful. It would be important if Videla could have the 

Inter-American Human Rights Commission received in Argentina on 

terms acceptable to the commission. We would not link Argentine 

actions with our own. 

The Vice President added that the U.S. press covers developments in 

Argentina closely. There are certain human rights cases with the 

people known to the press — people such as Jacobo Timerman. To 

the extent that Videla makes progress cp these cases, it will help 

us to make progress. 

Videla Baid he understood, and government-to-government relations are 

not easy. His concern is when a problem is raised to the level of 

a public or popular issue. This leads to situations where Argentine 

citizens adopt partisan positions against the United States, to 

situations where Argentine businessmen adopt partisan positions 

because they cannot conclude deals when Ex-lm does not grant a loan. 

The Vice President repeated that it was important to put our 

relations on a more positive course. He suggested that it would be 

good if Assistant Secretary Vaky could come to Argentina to meet 

with Videla or with a person of his choice for a review of our 

relations. Videla asked if this would be after the Inter-American 

Commission or before. The Vice President said he thought it should 

be as soon as possible. Videla said perhapB he could arrange a 

visit by the Commission- by mid-October. The Vice President asked 

if he could announce the visit earlier. 

Videla then said he would like to point out that since the meeting 

at the Panama Canal signing, there have been a series of events 

showing the efforts on the part of the?Argentine government: 

they have-issued a list and names of all the detained; 

— they have published a list of all of those who disappeared 

and then reappared; 

last Christmas they released approximately 500; 

this last week, 65 individuals were freed? 

— they have indicated that they are prepared to give a favorable 

response to the Commission on Human Rights; 

-- Timerman1s situation has changed; he is now out of jail and 

under house arrest; 

SJJCRIiT/ijENBITJVE/NnniC/KCDC 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/23 : NLC-7-34-5-2-9 ■


'WWIS/XGDS 

— Professor Bravo is now under house arrest and they expect the 

court to lessen the charges against him. 

He said officials of the U.S. government are welcome in Argentina, 

but they cannot give the impression that they are coming to inspect 


The Vice President said Mr. Vaky was a man of experience and would 

exercise discretion. He said it will bk important to have the 

announcement on a visit by the Human Rights Commission on the terms 

acceptable to the Commission. 

Videla said he we could have done so last month, but Mrs. Darien's 

statement before the Congress forced him to suspend the announcement. 

In the course of a few days, he believed he could develop a satisfactory 

announcement. 

Mr. Clift said that in considering the announcement, it is important 

to remember the timing in the United States. The Ex-Im Bank must 

take its decision by September 15. The Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment . 

comes into effect on October 1. The Vice President said we would 

hope the announcement could be taken care of before then. He said 

this might enable us to move on the Ex-Im letter before the 15th 

deadline. Videla said this was his intention. He did not think it 

could be done, however, before September 15. 

The Vice President said we are encouraged that you will receive the 

Commission. Will you authorize me to tell the President that this 

will be done. Videla said yes. The Vice President asked when 

Assistant Secretary Vaky may come. Videla said' after his announcement 

on the commission. He said he would prefer to have Vaky to 

visit Argentina alone. The Vice President said he wouldn't give a yes 

on this, but he would recommend it. Videla asked if the U.S. will 

let him know ahead of time what Vaky's mission will be to permit him 

to prepare for it. The Vice President said we would communicate this. 

President Videla observed that US-Argentine relations proceed in 

multiple channels — economic, political, cultural. Now our 

relations are focused solely on human rights. He said he can 

understand this problem if it is addressed in the broader spectrum 

of our overall relations and is not the single focus. 

The Vice President said that if we can get on the road to progress 

in human rights, this whole other vista will open. He said he 

thought we are now at a point where we can turn the right way. 

Videla said "I think we can. Mr. Vice President, I know your time 

was limited. I appreciate this meeting. Please give my greetings 

and best wishes to President Carter." 

«SEGaET/CENGITIVE/NODI0/X6BS 3 

• - No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/23 : NLC-7-34-5-2-9'

• . No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-10-6 

COWFIDENTTftfc— 

Human Rights Cases 

f 

There has been widespread civil violence in Argentina 

since 1970. The unique quality of the present situation 

is the very large number of people detained and "disappeared" 

Bince the military came to power in 1976. A worldwide storm 

of criticism has resulted. Some of the pases of greatest 

interest are: 

i 

Detained DOS REVIEWED QB-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL. 

Deutach Family; Jewish groups, human rights organizations 

and some 25 Congressmen have aslced our assistance 

for the family. President Carter raised the case of the 

Deutsches with President Videla during their bilateral. 

I 

The father, mother and three daughters were arrested 

in September. A son and his family fled and are now in 

the U.S. The Deutsch home was looted by the troops that 

arrested the family and there are reports that the family 

was tortured during the first weeks of confinement. In 

October, the mother and two daughters were released, but 

the youngest daughter and the father are still held. 

President Videla wrote to President Carter in October to 

say that the detained daughter was a member of a terrorist 

organization and that the father had known this yet 

had covered, up for her. They would both be tried by 

military courts, the President said. 

« 

Jacobo Timerman; Editor and publisher of one of 

Argentina's largest newspapers, Timerman has become a 

cause celebre for Jewish groups and newspaper editors 

worldwide. Five Senators—Javits, Case, Sarbanes, Stone 

and Church—wrote you asking for your intercession on 

Timerman's behalf while you are in Argentina. He was 

arrested in April and there are reports that he was mistreated. 

No charges have been placed against him, and 

his arrest is more surprising in that his paper generally 

took a-pro-military line. Last week, Timerman's civil 

rights and control over his property were cancelled by 

the government. The U.S. Jewish community sees Timerman's 

case as a specific example of the anti-semitism which 

they believe is rampant in Argentina. The government 

forcefully denies it is anti-semitic and has passed a 

law prohibiting the incitation of racial violence. 

Alfredo Bravos Vice President of a major Argentine 

human rights group and President of the Argentine 

Teachers Union, Bravo was arrested in September. Because 

CONFIDENTIAL 

DECLASSIRED 

E.O. i3526 

Authority ~ ~i 

NARA__ fcP Date ______ 



confidentiait^ 

-2- 

he had met a few dayB before hia arrest with a viaiting 

AFL-CIO delegation, the U.S. labor movement ia very 

interested in hia case. 

Adolfo Perez Esquivel; A deeply religious and non- . 

violent man, Perez Esquivel was the Coordinator of the 

ecumenical movement "Peace and Justice.” He was arrested 

in April and has been imprisoned without charges since 

then. The Catholic Church and human rights groups have 

pressed strongly for his release. 

Vogler Family; Liliana Vogler was arrested in June 

1975 ana her father was arrested later*that year, 

reportedly because he was making inquiries on her behalf. 

Liliana was tried on charges of subversion, but not 

allowed to renounce a confession which had been obtained 

under torture. The sentence should be given in the next 

few months. Guillermo Vogler has been granted permission 

to leave the country, (he will come to the U.S.) but 

has not actually been released. The Foreign Ministry has 

promised to try to speed up his release. There has been 

White House and Congressional interest in the case. 


Mauriclo Lopez: Another ecumenical leader, Lopez 

was rector of San Luis University when he disappeared 

in January. Church groups in the U.S. and Europe have 

shown great interest in his case. 

Eduardo Sajon; The former press secretary to 

Argentine President Lanusse, Sajon disappeared. in April.. 

Dagmar Hacfelin; A dual national Swedish-Argentine 

student. Hagelin disappeared in January. The Swedish 

Prime Minister wrote to Videla about her, but was told 

the Argentines had no information. The Swedish government 

has now appealed to us for assistance. 

Procedures for Reporting Human Rights Cases 

The Argentine Foreign Office Working Group on 

Human Rights, to which we have made known our interest 

in specific cases, has been generally unresponsive to our 

requests for information. This week, however, they did 

reply to a backlog of our requests, but provided little 

new information. Their failure to provide information 

may be a reflection of the GOA'b indecision as to 

how to handle the cases of the "disappeared." 

■CONFIDENTIAL - 


f

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/21 : NLC-1-6-7-36-8i 

JjUfHitSJnlflL 

MEMORANDUM 

■\3S Rvw Completed Released In Full - Refer To DOS -11/6/1 ^ 

. ....--------------- THE WHITE HOUSEt 

;lfr 

''' J 

WASHINGTON' 

■eGWPlDEMGJIAL June 24, 1978 

JS REVIEWED OS \ov 2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.1 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

THE PRESIDENT 


information Items 

Information 

Weizman's Visit to West Bank: Our Jerusalem Consulate General 

reported that Weizman, during his June 20 visit to Nablus, 

Hebron, and nearby Israeli settlements exhibited unprecedented 

Israeli flexibility. 

— In Nablus, he approved the purchase of new generators 

to expand the municipal electrical plant, reversing 

Israel's longstanding policy. Hetalso gave the goahead 

for the drilling of new water wells, and promised 

to curb the overzealous security searches conducted 

by IDF troops in the area. 

— In Hebron, he approved the return of two prominent 

deportees, local hospital improvements, and increases 

in electrical power. 

Regarding the Jewish settlements, he gave his general support, 

but affirmed the Israeli government's respect for private 

Arab property. West Bank mayors were very pleased with 

Weizman's pronouncements, but the West Bank press took pains 

to disassociate municipal cooperation with Weizman from 

collaboration with Begin's autonomy scheme. 

Trends in Human Rights in Argentina: According to a State 

analysis, Argentina's human rights record in 1978 displays 

some improvement over the 1976-77 period, but conditions 

have changed little in the last six months. Serious abuses 

still occur, despite reports of efforts by'military officials 

to curb renegade counterterrorist activities. There is 

a reasonable prospect for gradual but significant improvement 

over the next year or so, however. In the meantime, 

the Argentines will probably pursue a damage-limiting strategy 

in their relations with the U.S. 

XOMttfWt 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.1352B 

Aii'-SiCriiy ^ — 

NARA—&C— Date 1\V^-------- 


_PBMFIDENIIAir -2- 

In recent weeks. President Videla's government Has taken 

several noteworthy steps that are designed primarily to 

defuse human rights criticism during the GAS General Assembly 

— On June 20, the IAHRC was invited to pay a "special 

visit" to investigate "legal-judicial conditions." 

— President Videla is said to have informed an archbishop 

on June 19 that 14 labor leaders would be released 

and the cases of others reviewed. 

— Alfredo Bravo, a well-known labor leader and rights 

activist, returned home on conditional liberty on June 

16 after 10 months in jail. 

— Two restrictions on press freedom were rescinded 

on June 5. 

State notes that implementation of well-timed human rights 

"concessions" has been a consistent Argentine tactic over 

the past two years. The prospects for gradual improvement 

over the coming months will be enhanced by the continued 

diminution of the terrorist threat and the likelihood that 

Videla and his fellow moderates in the armed forces will 

consolidate their control over the security forces. 

Your OAS Speech: Latin American media headlined and commented 

on your address to the OAS meeting, emphasizing your comments 


— Gazeta Mercantil of Sao Paulo considered the speech 

"one of the most important, if not the most important," 

you have ever delivered before a Latin American audience 

The article said you made one of your strongest defenses 

of human rightB, not only reaffirming your human rights 

principles, but pronouncing them with even greater 

energy. 

— Headlines in Buenos Aires read: "Carter's Stern 

Warning — Governments Violating Human Rights Will 

be Punished". "Carter Reaffirms Human RightB Policy". 

— Leftist-nationalist Excelsior of Mexico City approved 

of the proposal "to create a technical committee" to 

help raise living standards, but noted that to do this 

it would be necessary "to overcome the very powerful 

interests of those who uphold exploitation, frequently 

by U.S. companies." 

i 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/21 : NLC-1 -6-7-36-8

no uojection io ueciassmcation in hull zuizm/z’i 

■CONFIDENTIAL » -3- 

uunnuamflL 

N LU-'I -b-/ - Jb-tJ' 

— The English language daily Journal of Caracas stated* 

"Latin America is one part of the world where the push 

for human rights seems to be going well....even some 

of the worst violators of human rights in the hemisphere 

appear to be restraining themselves..." 

r 

No Objection To Declassification in Fi^ll 2012/11/21 : NLC-1-6-7-36-8

ARA-O^ 

COPY 

No Objection I o Declassification in Hull 'lUVUVAVl \ NLC-6-4-6-9-bi nu 7^ 

w^Tlin/m:/a(;j ,.nuw! TELEGRAM. . 

uimm him mun «»7 

NFO OCT-91 IM'll oil'll UC-IS ISCC-II Sl-ll JlO-gl 

iii-n mt'ii ciae-ii sp-ii pii'ii /hi v 

------1-.---------- ---—1HSI7 1111511 /II 

e ini in jul 77 

IK Wit Hill ST IUEN0S HIES 

TO ItCSTITE VA5H0C IMMEDIATE 1111 

IUEI0S Hill 11/1 lit 

I. A DCSISIOK 01 AIT POSITIVE CDMEITS 01 TIE LOCH NIMAI 

11 SHI S SCtNt SHOULD AWAIT.TIE MICTIONS.OF HE fllllSTCR OF ECOTSflT. 

MAPI IK 

i. , 

lutNoi nit* mi 

E.O. UHli CBS 

IMS: SKIM, M, POIP 

II/1JECT: HUMAN IIMTI IMPROVEMENTS II AKGENTINA 

l,"» 

pos^REV/FeWEDT5-Aug-2012: DECLASSTHED FOR RELEASE IN FULLj 

SEFi STATE mm * 

1. Ml OF us KEIE WHO KATE RESPONSIIIL ITT FOI NOTING ARGENT I It 

PROGRESS IN HUNAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE, AND THOSE IN MISSION WHO 

SAVE THE ASST MEANS OF DISEIVING THE ARGENTINE VAR AGAINST TIE 

GUERRILLA MOVEHEIT, NAVE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO REFTEL 

AND TO POSSIIIE EFFECTS SOME STA1EHENT OF PRESIDENTIAL INTEREST 

AM ACRNOULEDGMENT OF inPROVEMEHT HERE RIGHT NAVE, yt CONCLUDE. 

THAT AN INITIATIVE INVOKING THE PRESIDENT'S NAME WOULD NOT SE 

'ADVISABLE AT THIS TIME. THIS COURSE IS, HOWEVER, ORE VE MAT 

WANT TO TAKE IN THE VERT NEAR FUTURE. 

1. WE AGREE THERE ARE ENCOURAGING SIGHS IN FACT THAT HUMAN 

RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AND ARGENTINE EXCESSES IN THE WAR AGAINST 

Terrorism have diminished, it is almost impossible to comment 

’on A SIGNIFICANT SAMPLING OF THE 141 NAMES LISIEC RECENTLY 

AS THOSE OF PERSONS RELEASED FROM CU5T00T HERE AND CITED R/ 

REFTEL. WE CAN POINT, HOWEVER, 10 KNOWLEDGE THAT THREE PRESETS 

OK THIS LIST HAVE ID FACT GAIHED THEIR FREEDOM. WHAT INTERESTS 

US EOUALLT IS FACT THAT THEM IS INCREASING OFFICIAL RECOGNITION 

THAT HVIttH RIGHTS REUSES NAVE OCCURRED. A1 VAR AGAINST TERRORISM 

VINOS DOWN, IT APPEARS TO US THAT THERE IS SETTER CONTROL IT 

THE GOVERNMENT OF THOSE OF ITS OWN FORCES WAGING THE WAR. 

VE FURTHER BELIEVE THAT GENERAL VIDELA AND HIS MODERATE MILITARY 

COLLERGUES ARE GAINING INFLUENCE IN THE LONGER INO LARGER 

GUEST I OH OF WHO ULT1MATELT WILL RULE IN ARGENTINA. BEE IUENOS AIRES 

Mill 

1. ON THE OTHER HANO, THERE IS MUCH THAT DISTURBS US. DIS 

APPEARANCE ”0F EIGHT PERSONS FROM MAR CEL PLATA, All LAWYERS OR 

WIVES OF LAWrCRS, IS A BROOD I hi SCAIIOAL WHICH DAILY ATTRACTS MORE 

ATTENTION HERE. OVER WEEKEND EMBASSY WAS GIVEN NEW INFORMATION 

CONCERN I NS HARASSMENT ST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OF RANKING UNION 

hEHBERS. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO FIRH DATA CN THIS, VE CREDIT STORIES 

TO trFECl THAT AT LEAST FIVE LABOR UN I C!l LEADER: HAVE EC E N 

THREATENED WITH HARM UNLESS THEY PULL OUT OF LASCR AFrillI 

AND, ACCORDING TO ONE SOURCE, LEAVE THIS COUNTRY. THE GRRIVER 

AFFAIR APPEARS TO IE HEADED TOWARD A RESOLUTION WHICH VE FEAR 

VlLl It UNSETTLING FOR THOSE WATCHING PUNiN RIGHTS PROGRESS IN 

ARGENTINA. *LA OPIHIDN’ FORMER EDITOR TIMMERMAN HAS, VE ASE TO.D, 

BEEN RECENTLY TRANSFERRED TO LA PLATA WHERE NE IS AGAIN .IEIRG 

HELD INCOMMUNICADO AND AGAIN WE.FEA*.THE.OUTCOME VlLl IE DISTIEIS- 

JNC. 

4. All THIS LEADS US TO HESITATE IN USING A PRESIDENTIAL 

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF AN IMPROVING SITUATION, LEST SUBSEQUENTLY 

Vt DISCOVER THAT HUMAN RIGHTS CAIIIS HERE WERE IUUSORV. CHANCE 

WILL IE SEEING MINISTER OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ OE HOI TO OUESTICN 

THE MIUmCR VNAT ADVANCES IN HUMAN RIGHTS CCSERVANCES ARE, 

IN HIS OPINION, VCR IK OUR TAKING ROTE OF XliD REPORTING TO OUR 

GOVERNKL111. CHARGE VlLl AT THAT TIME TafE NOTE OF SEVERAL 'STRAWS 

IN THE VINO' WHICH LEAD US TOVARO ENCOURAGEMENT. 

Authority 

NARA— 

declassified

No Objection To Declassification in Pull 2013/01/16 : NLC-1-13-7-34-2 

_____ Mi'.\fnn.\\niTM_________________________________________________________________________ 

\SS REVIEWED 08/22/2012 NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION BY MIR EO 1352^ 

REFERTO OOS 'THE WHITE HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 

SF.rHF.T-SENSITIVE January 8, 1980 


FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 


SUBJECT: 

Daily Report 

DOS REVIEWED 31 -Dec-2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIF'ICATiON] 

Information 

West Bank settlement Plans: The Israeli government-world Zionist 

Organization has approved plans to more than double the Jewish 

West Bank settlement population, at an estimated cost of $300 

million, in the fiscal year beginning April 1, This target 

appears to be the first step in fulfilling the grandiose settlement 

scheme approved by the cabinet in November. Embassy Tel 

Aviv comments that it is still not clear whether this money 

actually will be in the budget which is in preliminary stages 

of preparation. (C) 

Status of Departure of Iranian Diplomatic Personnel: In explaining 

the delay in departure of Iranian diplomatic personnel, State 

has informed Civiletti that a note has been passed to the Iranian 

embassy advising them that effective today all Iranian embassy 

and consulate staff personnel affected by the reduction who have 

not made arrangements with INS will be considered illegally in 

the u.s. and thus subject to arrest and deportation. Civiletti 

has been asked to help implement this action. (U) 

State has asked INS to get in touch with keach Iranian not carried 

on the new embassy or consulate list to arrange on an individual 

basis their departure or, in some special cases, an adjustment 

of status. State and INS agreed that the customary 30 day delay, 

when there is sufficient cause, would be granted to allow any 

Iranian to settle his affairs before departure. Of the 226 

persons listed as staff members at the Iranian embassy, INS to 

date has been unable to trace at least 150 of them at the addresses 

oziginally supplied by the Iranians. (U) 

ECflET 



DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Aiithnrity ~~ V- ~~~l — T 

NARA_£d£_ Deto 

__ 

T—r 

No Objection To Declassification in --ull 2013/01/16 : NLC-1-13-7-34-2

-SSeftET=5feNSITlVE 

Pakistani Military Assistance; Ambassador Hummel advises that 

whatever military assistance package is developed in Washington 

for Pakistan should be tailored for the locale of the threat 

and must be funded, since Pakistan has no money for the largescale 

cash purchases it will need to engender a feeling of politi 

cal support and security. After enumerating a list of equipment 

that would remedy glaring Pakistani military deficiencies, the 

ambassador asks that we not indulge in the familiar American 

desire to rely only on our own decisions on what is best for 

Pakistan. Thorough consultations with the Paks are essential 

before we reach final conclusions, not only because they will 

have useful ideas, but also because we know little about Pak 

capabilities due to their secretiveness. This includes Pak 

production capability; Chinese inputs past and future; and other 

Pak plans for procurement. (S) 

Proposed Japanese Response to Moscow's Invasion of Kabuli According 

to foreign ministry official Donowaki', Tokyo’s proposed answer 

to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan twill include negative 

responses to Moscow's request for conclusion of a comprehensive 

credit line, trade representative offices, joint ventures and 

offices of public corporations, and increased aviation flights. 

In addition, Donowaki said Tokyo will suspend new aid and technical 

cooperation with Kabul, as well as refuse to recognize the new 

government. He added that Japan supported efforts to tighten 

technological exchanges, but said they need clarification on 

whether we intend to strictly relate this to COCOM, or go beyond 

that to high technology in general. Regarding other suggested 

actions, Donowaki said Japan was not contemplating recalling 

their ambassador from Moscow, scaling down their embassy in Kabul, 

boycotting the Moscow Olympics, or restricting Soviet fishing. 

(C) 

Possible Australian Reaction to Afghan Crisis: A member of my 

staff has learned from the Australian embassy that the following 

are some of the responses under consideration by Canberra in 

response to the Afghan crisis: 

— to divert some 5000 tons of wljeat intended for Afghanistan 

to Pakistan (possibly for Afghan refugees there); 

— possibly to provide additional commodity support for 

Afghan refugees; 

— to look sympathetically at an application by Pakistan 

to rejoin the Commonwealth. (C) 


No Objection lo Declassification in -ull 2013/01/16 : NLC-1-13-f-34-2j' 

££CRBP*SENSITIVE -3- 

NSC Activity 

President Nimieri's Support for Middle East process 

in response to your question concerning Sudan's commitment to 

support Egypt and the peace process. Ambassador Bergus saw President 

Nimieri, who reaffirmed support for Egypt and asked that 

you be told, "Sudan will not hinder the process of peace." As 

a result of State's belief that Nimieri's commitment is sufficient 

to warrant $130 million in bilateral assistance, 0MB has been 

instructed to include it in the FY-81 budget. (S) 

No Objection To Declassification in =ull 2013/01/16 : NLC-1-13-7-34-2

1 M&MORANDUM 

No Objection I o Ueclassitication in Hull 2U13/U1/lb : NLU-l-liW-a4-2 

9 


WASHINGTON 

pfm""jrgMSITItra January 8, 1980 

1. Australian Reaction to Wheat Embargo on USSR: Embassy Canberra 

reports that there are sharp differences ofopinion among 

senior level officials on the proposed embargo of wheat 

sales to the Soviet Union. Afghan coordinator Dalrymple 

commented that "it was not within Australia's power to ensure 

shipments denied by the U.S. to the Soviet Union will not 

be replaced by other suppliers." While the option paper 

for the prime minister's action has been forwarded, it is 

unlikely that any decision will be reached til after the 

meeting of major grain exporting nations in Washington on 

January 12. In another cable, the embassy reports that 

opposition party leader Bill Hayden has issued a statement 

calling the proposed embargo on wheat sales to the soviet 

Union "an empty gesture." Hayden believes that the soviet 

takeover of Afghanistan is essentially complete and any 

embargo will have only a very limited punitive impact on 

the Soviet economy. (Canberra 0170, PSN 23293; Canberra 

0174, PSN 23317) (S) 

2. Australian Wheat Sales to Iran: Dalyrmple also relayed 

Australia's serious misgivings about fulfilling our request 

that they not negotiate any new sales of wheat to Afghanistan. 

Canberra is primarily concerned about theeffectiveness 

of such steps because of the failure of past efforts to 

embargo trade; Iran has ample resourced to obtain food on 

1 the world market; and, the fact that grain importers in 

France and Turkey have already entered into new contracts 

to sell grain to Iran. Additionally, he felt the U.S. policy 

was inconsistent in declaring its intent not to embargo 

food sales then ask the Australian government to embargo 

new sales. Dalyrmple concluded that Australia understands 

the problem posed for the U.S. by a public perception of 

an ally improving its grain exports at the expense of the 

U.S. and will delay any decision on new grain sales to Iran 

until February 1. (Canberra 0172, PSN 23417) (S) 

3. _ Egyptian Response to soviet Invasion of Afghanistan; In 

response to the Soviet invasion, Egypt will implement a 

drastic cut-back of Soviet personnel, axpal remaining Syrian 

and South Yemen diplomats, close the Afghan interest section, 

and offer Afghan insurgents military material and economic 

assistance. Egypt has already begun discussions with Pakistan 

SECRET 


.CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES 

1 

SECRET-


j 

SECTim OEWUITIVE 

concerning* developing channels to direct military and economic 

aid to the Afghan rebels; however, no consideration is being 

given to despatching troops. Sadat is also seeking a means 

to convene an Islamic conference to condemn Soviet intervention 

and "bring home the soviet threat to Islam.” Sadat feels 

the timidity of Islamic governments is inexcusable and will 

do everything possible to shame them irto action. One Egyptian 

cabinet official adds that any thought of rapproachment 

with the Soviets "is in the deep freeze.” (Cairo 0364, 

PSN 22685, 22687, 22688) (S) 

4. Argentina and Human Rights; Ambassador Chaplin believes 

the Argentine government would be open to a U.S. effort 

to negotiate some specific human rights improvements in 

exchange for a U.S. vote not to condemn them in the forthcoming 

UNCHR meeting. Their behavior on the Cuban UNSC seat issue 

and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan combined with the 

recall of their representatives to the UN, the OAS and European 

countries reveal a great anxiety over the possibility of 

condemnation and a willingness "to go almost any lengths 

to escape the consequences of their human rights violations. 

Chaplin believes Buenos Aires' concern with avoiding censure 

opens an avenue for the U.S. to offer to trade support for 

the milder resolution in exchange for parole or release 

of political prisoners, improvement in prison standards 

and a beginning in dealing with the problem of the "disappeareds. ” 

i The ambassador concludes this is an "opportunity which we 

should not let get away." (Buenos Airefs 0163 NODIS, PSN 

■ 23387) (C)

Nlf-.MORANDl M 

CQNFIDSNTiAtr 

ACTION 



wmuqi^ 

THE WHITE HOI SK 

W \MIINi. [ tl\ 

66ZJr 

&&■•* l 

■ 

WWSiitc. f" 

October 28, 1977 ^ /A*** 

tf- "4£Z-Ca^) 5 

THE PRESIDENT j ** 

J 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


U' 

Follow-Up Letters to Your Bilaterals 

With Latin American Leaders 

The memoranda of your eighteen conversations with Latin American 

leaders during the Canal Treaty signing have just been completed. 

For a number of your bilaterals, State and NSC felt it would be very 

useful for you to follow up your conversations with letters which confirm 

the commitments made during the meeting and underscore areas 

where we have a continuing interest. * 

t 

In certain cases for example, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay — our 

intelligence indicates that their Presidents may have gained an inaccurate 

impression of your concern about human rights. Apparently Pinochet, 

Stroessner, and Mendee felt that you were in agreement with them that 

their countries were victims of politically-motivated and inaccurate propaganda, 

and that the human rights policy which iB being implemented, in. 

your name doesnot jceally. r-efleot your Views. No doubt this, may‘be 

a result of wishfyl thinking on their part. Nevertheless, our Ambassadors 

in the field, State* .and NSC'believe it would be useful for you to re-state 

clearly your continuing commitment in this area. 

• i ’! 

I #.*ll 

• 

Since the drafting of these letters had begun, you have received letters 

from the Presidents of Argentina, ‘Chile, and Peru, and we have included 

references in your letters. The letter from President Videla was delivered 

directly to the'White House on October 18, and It refers to the 

Deutsch case which you raised with him. 

There are a numbed of specific commitments made or repeated in the 

letters. Let me* outline them briefly^fpr you h^re, and flag-, atoy potentially 

controversial sections: 

I: 

l 

SONPiBENTTAL 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority - 

Mann BP- Deto 

Lp

"No Objection To Declassification in Full 

rv-:r- 

-t7jUirlUhtt lnt» 

2013/02/04 : NLC-24-49-4-1-6 

2 

labucs Or Points Which Are Noted In The I.ettera 


t 

1. While not deciding to invite representatives from human 

rights organizations, Videla did say that he was not troubled by such 

visits. Your letter repeats that point. 

2. Argentina and Chile are involved in an effort to try to curb 

or prohibit the activities of non-governmental organizations -- particularly 

human rights groups -- at the United Nations. 

3. Videla said that he hoped the problem of people being detained 

by the emergency laws would be resolved by the end of the year. Your 

mentioning this point will add an additional incentive for him to do it. 

4. With regard to Videla's statement that Argentina would ratify 

Tlatelolco when the political timing was opportune, which he hoped would 

be by the end of the year, there may have been some misinterpretation. 

The Argentines are reported to believe that he only said that he would 

"consider" the possibility of ratification at th^ proper time. Nonetheless, 

we believe that it would be helpful to re-Btate our interpretation of his 

statement bo as to insure his awareness of our continuing concern on that 

issue. 

Bolivia 

1. Your letter reiterates the continued interest of the U. S. in 

the peaceful settlement of the problems related to Bolivia's desire to 

achieve access to the sea. 

2. It states U. S. continued support for integration in Latin 

America by congratulating him on the new Andean Pact agreement on the 

automotive industry. 

3. Most importantly, it reminds Banzer that he promised you to 

give priority attention to seeking the release of those American prisoners 

whose circumstances warrant special treatment. We have already given 

the Bolivians the list of names. 

jSeNFlUENTIAL 

orsi tr-i 

\L 

t

---------------------Nn Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-49-4-1-6 

'"TfiEMr- 

S./'l Jl 

Chile 

1. The letter states that ’’friendly and close relations" between 

the U. S. and Chile can only occur if there is increased evidence of 

improvements in the human rights situation in Chile. 

2. On the question whether Chile would permit two UN human rights 

observers to visit, the Chileans are currently negotiating with the United 

Nations, and both parties may have some problems in agreeing to the procedures 

which Chile requires for their visit. We believe that Pinochet 

promised to permit two UN observers to visit provided they do so "without 

publicity" and meet with Pinochet before returning to the UN, The Chileans 

(would like to) believe that they agreed to such a visit only "under certain 

circumstances, " which might include comparable visits by the UN to Cuba 

and the Soviet Union. Similarly, Pinochet worked out an agreement with 

the UN on providing a report on the people who "disappeared, 11 but hiB 

report is not considered satisfactory. Your note of continued interest in 

both matters should help. 

3. Finally, you note Pinochet’s pledge to bring Tlatololco into 

effect if Argentina ratifies the treaty. 

Paraguay 

1. Stroessner’s pledge to receive the Inter-American Commission 

on Human Rights if they desire such a visit is^ noted, and you add that 

U. S. officials would also like to meet with Paraguayan officials "should 

that be helpful. " 

On the loans from the Inter-American Bank and A.I. D,, you 

re-state decisions which were made by the Christopher Committee to 

approve a number of loans for the needy in recognition of Paraguay’s 

decision to permit a visit of the IACHR, but others are withheld until 

the visit, in fact, occurs. 

Peru 

1. You repeat your interest in the Bolivian corridor issue, the 

FcuadoreaivAmazon issue, the limiting of arms purchases, and your 

hope for the continued success of Andean integration. Morales needs to 

GeNFTI7ENTjb*t-. 

t

.nN mw^ferTitsin Objection To Declassification in rull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-49-4-1-6 

ULffaHUCW I IriL 

4 

hear of your interest in the first three, and will be glad to hear of the 

fourth. 

2. You reiterate U. S. interest in Peru's economic difficulties, 

and mention your hope that we can help Peru in obtaining food assistance. 

This is currently under review, but our expectation is that we will be able 

to give $5**10 million of food assistance. 

Uruguay 

1. You state the difficulty because of human rights considerations of 

having close relations with Uruguay. 

% 

2. Mendez's assurance of removing the "special security authority" 

and establishing an information commission, which will hopefully cooperate 

with our embassy, are good decisions which necessitate the comment in 

the letter. 

3. You repeat your hope that Uruguay will invite a human rights 

commission. 

# * * # # 

These letters were coordinated and drafted by State and NSC, and cleared 

by Jim Fallows. 

RECOMMENDATION 

That you sign the letters to the Presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 

Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. 

Approve^ 

v ; i,; V 

■ • 

\ .. • ‘ 

t j 

u Disapprove^ 

CQNI-TDEIM UAL ’ 

-fflfiflENM-

* - •* No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-6-3-5 

- ACOBINI CHARLES pOS REVIEWED 02-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RElpasp in phi n n 

•7 BUENOS AIRES 4638 --- -------------^ 

, TTTTfrrUTiNTTflT, 

CONFIDENTIAL 

?AGE 01 BUENOS 04638 01 OF 02 222034Z* 

LCTION ARA-14 

tNFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EB-0? DHA-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 



10-13 ( ISO ) W 

051032 230357Z /64 

R 221858Z JUN 77 




E.O. 11652: CDS 

TAGS: PORG, SHUM, AR, US, EFIN 

SUBJECT: GOA NOTES HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS 

REF: (A) STATE 138380, (B) BUENOS AIRES 4444, (C) BUENOS AdRES 4483 


BUENOS AIRES (REFTEL B) AND AMBASSADOR AJA ESPIL IN 

WASHINGTON (REFTEL A), ARGENTINE OFFICIALS ANNOUNCED A 

NUMBER OF ACTIONS JUNE 14 THAT BEAR ON THE COUNTRY'S HUMAN 


OF 342 PERSONS FROM EXECUTIVE CUSTODY, PROCESSING OF ALMOST 

1/000 SUBVERSIVE CASES IN FEDERAL AND MINITARLY COURTS, 



OF A FAR RIGHT, RACIST MAGAZINE. WHILE THE ANNOUNCEMENTS IN 




IMPROVEMENTS DEMONSTRATES ITS RISING SENSITIVITY TO THE 



END SUMMARY 

CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL 



PRESENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS DEMONSTRATES BASICALLY 



RESPONSE TO U.S. REPRESENTATIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION. THE 


AS ANTICIPATED, THE GOA ACTIONS AND COMMUNIQUES WERE RELEASED 

JUNE 14 AND PUBLISHED IN JUNE 15 PRESS. 

2^ AS A 15-DAY COMPENDIUM THE LISTING OF 342 PERSONS CITED AS 


CPNSIDERABLY LARGER THAN THE TYPICAL WEEKLY %ISTS PUT OUT BY 

THE'INTERIOR MINISTRY. FURTHER, THERE IS NO WAY IMMEDIATELY 




DETENTION AND NOT JUST PASSED TO OTHER AUTHORITIES.) 

"“CUNi'iDENTI Ai--- / ' PAGE 





fiflMMDENTIAfe 

3. AS FOR SPECIFIC CASES, THREE OF THE NAMES WERE FAMILIAR— 

DAVID DIVINSKT AND HIS WIFE ANA MARIA MIXER, BOOH PUBLISHERS 

LISTED AS RELEASED FROM EXECUTIVE CUSTODT FOR SUBVERSIVE 

CRIMES; AND JUAN CARLOS ROUSSELOT, LISTED AS RELEASED FROM 

CUSTODY FOR ECONOMIC CRIMES. AS OF JUNE 16, NEITHER MILER NOR 

DIVINSKT HAS YET BEEN RELEASED ACCORDING TO FAMILY FRIENDS. WE 

ARE TRYING TO VERIFY THESE CASES AS POSSIBLE*INDICATORS AS TO 

USUAL FATE'OF LISTED PERSONS. SINCE THE LI5TS BEGAN BEING 

PUBLISHED WEEKLY IN JANUARY, WE HAVE VERIFIED AND REPORTED ■ 

SEVERAL ACTUAL RELEASES, ALTHOUGH MANY EMBASSY SOURCES, 

INCLUDING VISITORS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF CHURCH AND HUMAN 

RIGHTS GROUPS, CLAIM THAT THE MAJORITY OF PERSONS LISTED REMAIN 

IN'DETENTION. (THIS COULD RESULT PARTIALLY FROM DEFIANCE OF 

INTERIOR MINISTRY ORDERS, AND PARTLY FROM BUREAUCRATIC . 

INCOMPETENCE OF FEDERAL AND MILITARY PRISON AUTHORITIES.) 

CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL 

PAGE 03 

BUENOS 04638 01 OF 02 222034Z 

PERMANENT ASSEMBLY DIRECTOR JOSE WESTERKAMP (WHO HOSTED 

PATRICIA DEBIAN'S MEETING WITH ASSEMBLY IN MARCH) TOLD EMBOFF 

ON JUNE 14 ABOUT THE PARTICULAR CASE OF A BOY JAILED WITH ' 

WESTERKAMP'S SON IN SIERRA CEICA PRISON WHOSE NAME HAS APPEARED 

TWICE ON THE RELEASE LISTS AND ONCE ON THE LIST OF PERSONS 

NEWLY DETAINED BY THE EXECUTIVE. THE BOY HIMSELF WAS NEVER 

INFORMED OF THE PUBLICATION OF ANY OF THE LISTS AND HIS STATUS 

AS A DETAINEE UNDER STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS HAS IN FACT 


'CONFIDENTIAL 

I 

^ ISYi hi.'t'y 0/ iIH£ CC

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04.; NLC-24-55-6-3-5 



.CONFIDENTIAL - 

CONFIDENT I Air 

PACE 01 BUENOS 04638 02 OE 02 222035Z 

ACTION ARA-14 


H-01 INR-07 L—03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 


10-13 ( ISO ) V 

------------------051019 230354Z /64 

R 221858Z JUN 77 


TO SECSTA.TE WAS HD C 1041 


4. THE INTERIOR MINISTRY STATEMENT THAT 667 SUBVERSIVE CASES 

RAVE BEEN REMANDED TO THE FEDERAL COURTS (VITH 327 SENTENCES 

PA55ED) AND 305 CASES SENT TO SPECIAL MILITARY COURTS'MARTIAL. 

(VITH 158 SENTENCES HANDED DOVN) APPEARED IN PRESS 

WITHOUT NAMES OR COMMENTARY. AS VERY FEV OF THESE TALES AND 

SUBSEQUENT SENTENCING HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE-PRESS OR 

INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMED BY EMBOFFS.VE CANNOT COMMENT ON THE 



TO ANALYZE THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE SUSPENDED CONSTITUTIONAL 

OPTION FOR PERSONS BEING HELD UNDER STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS • 

TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY RECALLS HIS EARLIER APPOINTMENT'OF A 




THE SUSPENSION FOR ANOTHER 150 DAYS BEGINNING MAY 1, 1977. IT 





6. GOA SUSPENSION OF THE DISTRIBUTION, SALE, AND CIRCULATION OF 

THE MAY-JUNE CABILDO ISSUE NO. 8 WAS OF INTEREST.. THE MAGAZINE 

CONFIDENTIAL 

CONFIDENTIAL * 


WAS ACCUSED OF "PROPAGATING IDEOLOGICAL-RACIAL CONFLICT IN 

OPPOSITION TO THE NATION'S OBJECTIVES." THE DECREE FURTHER 

PROHIBITED THE PRINTING AND CIRCULATION OF THE JULY ISSUE AND 



CAPACITY BEYOND THE TWO ISSUES, AND THIS SHORT'TERM SUSPENSION 




INTERNATIONAL PRESS COMMENTARY (SEE BA 3370 AND 3631). 


WAS UNDERTAKEN VITH THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF INFLUENCING THE U.S. 


COUNTRY. THE GOVERNMENT-INTERVENED LA OPINION ON JUNE 16‘ • 


€ONFIDEN?t*Ir / PAGE 3 

l 

. 


.... t ..... ....

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-6-3. 

I 

JACOBINI CHARLES 1 


SONFlDENTOr 

"SIGNIFICANT MEASURES TO COUNTERACT ACCUSATIONS FROM ABROAD AND 

IMPROVE THE COUNTRY'S IMMAGE OVERESEAS". (NO OTHER PAPER HAS 

COMMENTED EDITORIALLY ON THE GOVERNMENT'S ANNOUNCEMENTS TO DATE.) 

OF INTEREST, IS WHETHER THIS INITIATIVE WAS NOTHING MORE THAN 

WARMED OVER STATISTICS AND SMOKESCREEN GESTURES OR WHETHER SOME 

NEW ELEMENT HAS BEEN ADDED TO ARGENTINE EFFORTS IN THIS FIELD. 

OUR CONCLUSION AFTER STUDYING THIS LATEST "EVIDENCE"--MUCH LIKE 

OUR INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REPORTED IN REF B—IS THAT THE 

INITIATIVE IS HOLLOW FROM THE SUBSTANTIVE SIDE, BUT INTERESTING 

AND>ENCOURAGING IN WHAT IT DEMONSTRATES ABOUT RISING ARGENTINE 

BUREACRATIC SENSITIVITY CONCERNING THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE U.S. HUMAN 


CHAPLIN 

CONFIDENTIAL 

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IVCCilKI CHVBrE2 


memorandunivio objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/12 : NLC-133-43-6-5-5 

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT 

WASHINGTON 

Memo No. 510-80 

—rnNFTnttwr&T. 

• ij'uljT'li 1980: 


FROM: Denis Clift ----- 

jt‘ ■ * . 

SUBJECT: Ambassador of Argentina*s'Appointment Request 

Further to your memorandum of June 10 (NSC Log .3448) would 

you please aBk the Department of State to inform Ambassador 

Espil of Argentina that regretfully it will not be possible 

to arrange for an appointment in the near future because of 

other scheduling demands. As the Ambassador may know, 

Mrs. Mondale's staff has already regretted,an.invitation to 

Mrs. Mondale to visit Argentina this year in connection with 

the visit of the US National Symphony Orchestra. 

rONPTDUNTTnT 

CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT 

REVIEW ON JULY 1, 1986 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O. '13526 

Authority 

N^RA_£e5ll— Date-----U'ViAtf----------- 

Nln Dhiprtinn Tn riRnlaRsifiratinn in Full 2012/04/12 ■ Nil fJ-133-43-R-5-5

MEMORANDUM 


3448 


June 10, 1980 

CONFIDENTIAL—. 

ACTION 


DENIS CLIFT 

FROM: CHRISTINE DODSON .P » 

SUBJECT: 

Request for Appointment with the Vice 

President from the Ambassador of Argentina 

■ 1 a 

• In—I ■ • I |,IW 

We concur with State Department's position that, because of 

the Vice President's heavy schedule, Ambassador Aja Espil 

be informed that the request for appointment must be declined. 

t 

Nn Dhiprtinn Tn DfinlaRRifiratinn in pill 2012/04/12 • Nl H-133-43-fi-S-5

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/12 : NLC-133-43-6-5-5" J 

DEPARTMENT CfF STATE ' 

Wsjfnjton. O.C. 20520 

June 7, 1980 



Subject: 

Request for Appointment with the Vice President 

from the Ambassador of Argentina 

Argentine Ambassador Jorge Aja Espil^has . asked 

for an appointment with the Vice President. We understand 

the Ambassador wants to discuss a possible visit to 

Buenos Aires, Argentina, by Mrs. Mondale to coincide 

with the visit of the U.S. National Symphony Orchestra 

on the occasion of the 400th anniversary of the City 

of Buenos Aires. The Argentine Embassy believes Mrs. 

Mondale's presence will make an important cultural 

and political impact contributing to better U.S.-Argentine 

relations. 

We understand from the NSC that the Vice President's 

office has been made aware of the invitation and that 

Mrs. Mondale will be unable to visit Buenos Aires. 

We therefore recommend that Ambassador Aja Espil be 

informed that, because of the Vice President's busy 

schedule, the request for appointment has been declined. 

t 

GDS 6/6/86 

Nn Ohiprtinn Tn Dfidassifiratinn in Full 2012/04/12 ; Nl 0-133-43-6-5-5 

4 ■ ........................ ....

MEMORANDUM 


\ / 


WASHINGTON 

* t ■ “• • r-‘»f •*! • ■ . « 

Memo No. 453-80 t June 4, 1980 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

Denis Clift 

Request for Appointment with Vice President from 

Ambassador of Argentina 

Argentine Ambassador Jorge Espil has asked for an appointment 

with the Vice President. May we please have a State/NSC 

recommendation on this request. 

6 - h - 

s* i • 

■cJj*. 

(1 

* 3 m 

Ca. Ji 

)■. /• 

» 

•a .■ !.• -i 

Nln Dhiprtinn Tn npr.lasfiifip.atinn in Full 2012/04/12 ■ Nl (%133-43-6-5-5


MEMORANDUM 



SECRET--- 

INFORMATION 


FROM 

SUBJECT: 


THOMAS THORU^^ 

M-B-B Lunch — Argentina and Chile (U) 


As you will remember, there was an exchange of memos between 

Muskie and Brown — the former wanting to leave our relations 

with Argentina essentially on ice, the latter wanting to proceed 

with some military cooperation gestures (see attached 

package). An IG was held last week to confirm the State 

position, with the understanding that Brown could appeal if 

he wants to. He apparently does. (C) 

The issue is whether we should show willingness to move ahead 

with various minor military cooperation matters (e.g. joint 

talks, inviting an Argentine instructor to our school in Panama) 

despite the Argentine position on grain and their actions in 

Bolivia. Nobody sees the possibility of taking any major steps 

(e.g. the repeal of Kennedy-Humphrey) even if we wanted to. (S) 

RECOMMENDATION; Support State1s position that there should be 

no further moves made towards Argentina by this Administration, 

on the following grounds: 

— They have behaved very poorly towards us. 

— There is no time urgency to any of the issues at stake. 

— The Argentines are unlikely even* to respond to feelers 

from this Administration, preferring to wait for the 

Republicans. 

— To the extent that we have cards to play, let's leave them 

for the next administration, who might get something in return 

for them. The Carter Administration certainly won't. 

(S) 

Review on Nov. 18, 1986 

declassified 

E.o. 13526 

\ln nhiortinn Tn npr.laQîfiratinn in -nil ?D13/n?/D4 • Nl r*.-94-99-3-7-fi


-SECRET— 2 

Chile 

A year has passed since the LetelieV sanctions were imposed 

and we had agreed among ourselves to review policy towards 

Chile about now. State had, in fact, begun to do so, when 

Christopher put a stop to it. I asked to have this item put 

on the agenda so that we could get a determination whether 

or not we want to go through with the policy review or simply 

leave matters for the next administration to deal with. It 

is a fairly close call: 

Con 

— There are no pressing issues at stake for the next several 

months. 

— The Chilean Government remains fairly odious and has recently 

perpetrated a mockery of the democratic process, 

perpetuating the rule of Pinochet. It may also be retrogressing 


— By leaving changes to the next administration, we give 

them some cards to play. 

— The Leteller sanctions have had no effect, were never intended 

to be kept on permanently, and are now counterproductive 

to our own interests (e.g. the UNITAS issue). 

— Despite some recent setbacks, Chilean human rights performance 

with regard to violation of the person has improved 

greatly and in the course of events this should 

have been recognized. The Letelier sanctions have overlaid 

this, however, with the result that we are much 

tougher on Chile than on Argentina where Basket I 

violations are much worse. This is anomalous and 

discredits our human rights policy. It also leaves 

us badly out of balance as between these two Beagle 

Channel contestants. 

— Since we said that we would review our policy, let's do 

it. We are still the Government. (S) 


on two grounds: 

I think we should go ahead with the review 

t 

— Let's leave a credible policy behind, and 

.SECRET— 

Mn Dhiprtinn Tn nprlpîfiratinn in -nil 9(113/02/114 • Nl P.-24-PP-3-7-R


-SEGaBT* 3 

— If we don't sort things out better, we will be inviting 

the next administration to throw the baby out with the 

bathwater, for we should continue considerable restraint 

in our relationships. (S) 

I am not disturbed by the idea that there may be no specific 

actions that this Administration will be taking towards Chile; 

what I am concerned about is leaving behind appropriate guidelines 

(e.g. reaffirming the President's decision on 1981 UNITAS 

participation; how to vote on IFI loans to Chile). (S) 

t 

Mn nhiprtinn Tn npr.la«;«;ifir.atinn in ^nll 9013/02/04 • Nl n~94-P9-3-7-R

a 

’’ No Objection To Declassification in rull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-3-8 

OP inn*]) P°SReviewed 29-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 

STU269 

DE HUESRA #0888/1 3201595 ABI057038 - MCN SFCDf PROCESS 

0 2914172 JAN 80 

PM AMEMSASSY BUENOS AIRES 


-C-9 N P--1-B HI I A ■ L -SECTION 1 01 a^BUENOS A1BSsSb828 

_ 

NODIS 

E.O. 12065: XDS-1 1/28/18.,(CASTRO, RAUL Hi) OH-M 

TAOS5 PEPR, AH 

SUBJECT: (C) DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION: GENERAL GOOD?ASTER'S 

visit to AR&EiffTTnn Tnnwra'^cnTirii twmy. jawuik! as 


2(. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION 

3. SUBJECT: GENERAL GOODJN&ER'S VISIT TO ARGENTSliAS 

general political topics *.; 

4. PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANT!’* .BRIGADIER (RET) CARLOS PASTOR, 


DR. JOSE ALFREDO MARTINS*-DI HOZ, MINISTER iOF ECONOMY 

COMODORO CARLOS CAVANDOLl. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER 

MR. VICTOR BEAOGE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFfpRS (lOTSlAXBR) 

GENERAL ANDREW J. GOODBAATER, PRESIDENTIAL flMISSART 

RAUL H. CASTRO, U.S. ANSAE SADOR IN ARGENTI-ifr 

CLAUS W. RUSH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE (ARA/I® 

WILLIAM I. HALLMAN, U.8«'HKMlA8SY BUENOS AIRIS (NQTETAXER) 

5. PLACE AND TIME: JANUARY.83 AND 24, 19801 THE MINISTRY 

OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BUENO? &SRES 

i 

6. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. GENERAL GOODPlRTlR 

MET ON TWO CONSECUTIVE Wf$.AT THE MINISTRY! MMOIEIGN 

AFFAIRS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER LED GENERAL PWJ$j&£|L 

DISCUSSIONS FOR ARGENTINA,. INCLUDING HUMAN imF 

Concerns, political-military affairs and matters-?; 

HAVING TO DO WITH NUCLEAR': COOPERATION*. IT WAS HIT. 

GENERAL CONTENTION TEAT AtfeRCCRSTlON OF MISUNDERSTAND 

INGS TROUBLES U.S.HLRGENTINXdpUTIONS, AND THAT .U.S. 

PSN:054627 PAGE 01 TOR-S030/01:302 DTGt 201417Z JAN 80 

»*»**»»C OmiBliri’i L**»f»»E COPT; 

DECLASSIRED 

E.O. 13S26 

Authority V^L-C- 3A~~*S 

NARA_E=£_ Deto "MVlU 

IMn Dhiortinn Tn npnla«;«;ifir.atinn in Full 9018/07/04 • Nl fi-94-91-3-3-B

’’’ No Objection To Declassification in :"ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-3-8 

MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF ARGENTINA HAVE LED OS TO MISCALC 

ULATIONS IN POLICY. MOST TROUBLING, HE ASSERTED, HAS 

BEEN OUR MISUNDERSTANDING OE ARGENTINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS 


BRIGADIER PASTOR SUGGESTED SPECIFIC REMEDIES FOR 

RESTORING TULL CONTIDENCE AND COOPERATION.■ 

7. A SEPARATE MEMORANDUM OT CONVERSATION COVERS 

ECONOMY MINISTER MARTINEZ DI HOZ'S RESPONSE TO OUR 

EETORTS TO ENLIST ARGENTINA'S HELP IN KEEPING GRAINS 


LEVELS. END MEMCON INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. 

8. WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23: FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR'S 

FIRST PRESENTATION. 

f 

PASTOR RESPONDED TO GENERAL GOODPASTEE'S EXPLANATION 

OF PROBLEMS RISING FROM THE SOVIET INVASION OF 


DISCUSSING ARGENTINA'S ROLE IN THESE, WITH TEE VISE 

AT SOME POINT TO COVER THE FULLEST RANGE OF POLITICAL 

PROBLEMS EXISTING BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED 

STATES. 

9. LATER PASTOR LED INTO HIS SUBJECT WITH A RHETORICAL 


JUST NOW IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS — EVEN AS WE ADMIT 

THAT THIS PROBLEM IS TRANSITORY AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL — 

HOW MUCH MORE IMPORTANT IS IT TO HAVE RELATIONS ON SUCH 

BASIS THAT IN FAR MORE SERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES, WAR FOR 

EXAMPLE, THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA WOULD STAND 

TOGETHER? 

10. WE CANNOT ARRIVE AT THIS HOWEVER WITH "ON-THE-SPOT" 

DISCUSSIONS. WE NEED TIME, AND IT IS REQUIRED THAT VE 

ADDRESS A SERIES OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AND OTHER QUESTIONS. 

Unfortunately, pastor continued, mediocre or bad' relations 

ARE THE NORM BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE U.SJ THE UNITED 

S’TATES HAS SELDOM UNDERSTOOD ARGENTINE REALITIES, AND 

BAD INFORMATION AND MISJUDGMENT HAVE LSD TO ERRORS OF 

U.S. POLICY, AND INADMISSIBLE U.S.G. ACTIONS. 

1. A GREAT U.S. ERROR WAS FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THAT 

ARGENTINA FOUGHT A VAR AGAINST TERRORISM-COMMUNISM THAT 

LASTED BETWEEN TWO AND THREE YRKARS. AND ARGENTINA VON 

THE VAR — UNLIKE, FOR EXAMPLE. NICARAGUA. THE U.S. 

SHOULD BE PROUD OF ARGENTINA FOR HAVING DONE THIS — 

RATHER THAN ASSUMING THAT "VIOLENT REPjARSSION WAS 

THE HALLMARK OF THIS GOVERNMENT. YET IS IS iTHIS 

SYMBOLISM, PASTOR VENT ON, THAT HAS BEEN TAKEN SO 

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SERIOUSLY BY HUNAN RIGHTS GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES — 

RATHER AS THOUGH "ATOMIC BOMB DROPPER" SHOULD 

CHARACTERIZE THE UNITED STATES BZEORE ARGENTINES. 

VHEN THE U.S. HAD POUND IT NECESSARY TO USE THAT 

INSTRUMENT ONLY IN ONE BRIEf SET Of CIRCUMSTANCES. 

12. FURTHERMORE, THIS U.S. CHARACTERIZATION OP 

ARGENTINA LED TO MANY UNPAIR POLICY DECISIONS: TO THE 

HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT, TOWARD CONDEMNATION OP 

ARGENTINA AT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND 

OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORUMS — EVEN, PASTOR ASSERTED, 

TO U.S. OPPOSITION TO ARGENTINE NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT. 

13. COULD THE U.S. NOT HAVE RECALLED THAT IN 1962 

ARGENTINA VAS FIRST TO SEND SHIPS TO HELP THE FREE 

WORLD IN THE CARIBBEAN? (WE DIDN'T EVEN GET A 

THANK-YOU NOTE.") ARGENTINA BACKED TH U.S. IN 

PAKISTAN'S DISPUTE WITH INDIA? THIS COUNTRY HELPED 


NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT CONFERENCE? WE WERE THE PIRST 

LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY TO TAKE IN EAST ASIAN REFUGEES? 

WE VOTED WITH THE U.S. IN TOKYO ROUND TRADE MEETINGS? 

WE ALIGNED WITH THE U.S. AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN A 

RESOLUTION ON AFHGANISTAN. 

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TM AMEMBASST BUENOS AIRES 


-C 0-ft- F I D-B N T I A I-SECTION 2 OP 2 BUENOS AIRES 0828 

NODIS 

14. U.S. BACK 0? APPRECIATION IS NOT UNDERSTANDABLE 

TO THE ARG-INTINE "MAN ON THE STREET," WHEN HE LEARNS 

FOR EXAMPLE THAT YOU WANTED TO USE US TO TAXE IN THE 

SHAH 0? IRAN. GOVERNMENTS CHANGE, BUT ARGENTINES 

REMEMBER ALL THESE PROBLEMS. 

15. FOR THIS REASON, PASTOR CONTINUED, GOA MUST ASK 

NOW FOR PROFOUND CHANGES IN U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD US, 

PASTOR SAID. AND NOT ONLY MUST ATTITUDES TOWARD ARGENTINA 

BE CHANGED, BUT ATTITUDES.TOWARD MOST OF LATIN AMERICA. 

THESE CHANGES OF ATTITUDES IN POLICY HOPEFULLY WILL BE 

REFLECTED AT THE WHITE HOUSE, IN THE CONGRESS, XT INTER 

NATIONAL MEETINGS. PASTOR ASftP THAT THE 0.St STOP PRESSING 

ARGENTINA SO HARD fN'NUCLEAR AFFAIRS ("IN RESPUNSETRTTHICH WE 

frOULD-COSSmBfR RECOMMENDING. THAT-TflE .PRESIDENT POSTPONE A TRIP TO 

wtrsavr 

HE PLANS TO MAAS LATER THIS YEAl 


SPECIFIC POSSIBLE ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES, WHICH 

HE DEVELOPED MORE FULLY THE FOLLOWING DAY. THEY ARE 

RECORDED IN THAT CONVERSATION^) 

17 PASTOR THEN ADDED: AND YOU MUST NOT CATEGORIZE US 


THIS GOVERNMENT IS WORKING HARD TO ARRIVE AT REAL. 

DEMOCRACY — AND NOT OF THE LAUGHING STOCK KIND OF 

THE LAST PERONIST PERIOD, EVEN THOUGH THAT "DEMOCRACY" 


GOVERNMENT WHOSE FIRST ACTS WERE CO-SI&NED BY CUBAN • 

PRESIDENT DORTICOS AND CHILEAN PRESIDENT ALLSNDlf 

ITS LATER DATS WERE CHARACTERIZED BY DISORDER AND 

KIDNAPPINGS. NOW WE HAVE NO HUNGER, RACE PROBLEMS OS 

SERIOUS CRIME. *VE WANT TO BE CONSIDERED AS A SERIOUS 

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COUNTRY" PASTOR SAID. 


IP. A NEW PATH WILL LEAD TO A FULL ALLIANCE; THE 

EXISTING COURSE WILL LEAD TO A NEW NEUTRALITY WITH 

WHICH NEITHER THE U.S. NOR THE ARGENTINES WILL FEEL 


WILL BE UNCERTAIN. THEN HI ADDED: TOUR REVISIONS 

OF THOUGHT MUST BE TOWARD LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 

OTHER THAN MEXICO AND VENEZUELA — ALL OF LAWN AMERICA 

NfcEDS U.S. ATTENTION, HOWEVER MUCH WE MAY APPRECIATE 

TOUR ATTENTION TO THE MID-EAST, SOUTH ASIA AND OTHER 


19. IN RESPONSE, GENERAL GOODPASTER ASSURED PASTOR 

THAT ARGENTINA HAD EARNED ITS PLACE AMONG RESPECTED 

NATIONS, AND THAT WE SHOW THIS APPRECIATION IN WORKING 

WITH ARGENTINA IN THE OAS, AS WE DID EARLIER IN THE 

ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS. WE UNDERSTAND ARGENTINA'S 

TRADITIONAL CONCERN FOR HUMAN DIGNITY — IT IS PART 

OF OUR SHARED HERITAGE — AND CURRENT EFFORTS TO 

RESTORE THIS SITUATION. 

20. FURTHER, GOODPASTER CONTINUED, PRESIDENT CARTER 

HAS SAID HE SHARES HOPES FOR BETTER RELATIONS. THERE 

IS AN UNDERSTANDING OF PAST UNITED STATES ERRORS. 

IN NUCLEAR AFFAIRS FOR EXAMPLE: KNOWING OF ARGENTINA'S 

LACK OF INTENTION TO DEVELOP A WEAPON WE WANT ARGENTINE 

PROGRESS — BUT WITH APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS. WE MADE 

THE POINT OF PROPER SAFEGUARDS WITH EUROPEAN SUPPLIERS 

NOT TO DELAY ARGENTINE PROGRESS, BUT TO ACHIEVE AN 

OBJECTIVE SHARED BY ALL. SHORTLY ARGENTINA WALL RECEIVE 

A* LETTER FROM THE UNITED STATES REGARDING PROVISION OF 

FUEL FOR RESEARCH REACTORS. 

21. RECOGNIZED TOO ARE STRIDES MADE IN RESTORING, 

AUTHORITY AND SUPPRESSING TERRORISM, GOODPASTER WENT 

ON. UNFORTUNATE MEASURES WILL SURELY CONTINUE TO BE 

DISCARDED AS THE ARGENTINE SITUATION BECOMES LESfi 

EXTRAORDINARY. DISAPPEARANCES WILL BE STOPPED AND 

POLITICAL PRISONERS FREED OR GIVEN RIGHT OF OPTION. 

(COMMENT: PASTOR LET THE TERM "POLITICAL PRISONER" 

GO BY AT THIS MOMENT. BUT PROTESTED ITS USE ON THE 

FOLLOWING DAY. YOU WERE REFERRING TO TERRORISTS 

AND GUERRILLAS", HE SAID.) 

22. FURTHERMORE, GENERAL GOODPASTER SAID, WE ARE 

MAKING EFFORTS TO BE SCRUPULOUS AND FAIR IN IMPORTANT 

AREAS: THE LEGALLY REQUIRED REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 

HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN ARGENTINA WILL BE REVIEWED 

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AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS 01 GOVERNMENT. I TALCED WITH 

SECRETARY VANCE ABOUT SOME OF THIS THE DAT BEFORE 

LEAVING WASHINGTON. HE IS CONCERNED FOR BASIC 

LEVELS OF HUMAN TREATMENT, BUT KNOWS TOO OF YOUR 

PAST DIFFICULTIES AND ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS TO RESTORE 

LEGAL PROCESSES." (COMMENT: GENERAL GOQDPASTER 



TION. ) 

23. GENERAL GOODPASTER REFLECTED ON THE NEED FOR 

TIMELY CONSULTATION, AND RECALLED WHAT THE LACT OF IT 


AND USING THE EMBASSY AS A CONSULTATIVE DEVICE.-HI' 

CONCLUDED: "WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE RIGHT OF ftITIZENS 

TO BE PROTECTED FROM VIOLENCE IS AN IMPORTANT RIGHT, 

AND WE FEEL ARGENTINA HAS COME FAR TOWARD ACCOMPLISHING 

THIS. THE UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDS THIS — BUT YOU 


MADE THE U.S. STRONG. AMONG THEM IS A FREE PRESS, 

VITAL TO OUR SOCIETY EVEN WHILE WE ADMIT THE PRESS TENDS 

TO 'ACCENTUATE THE NEGATIVE.' 


ON JANUARY 23. SEPTEL WILL CONTINUE WITH PASTOR'S 

PRESENTATION AND GENERAL GOODPASTER'S RESPONSES ON 

JANUAHY 24.) 

CASTRO 

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bos REVIEWED 29-Jun-2010: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION. 


Wuhlniton, D.C. 20S20 

TO: 


bOS REVIEWED 29-Jun-2010: REFERTO OSCj 

SEE DISTRIBUTION 

FROM: Luigi R. Einaudi, Director, ara/nsc-ig 

I 

SUBJECT: 

Revised Report on ARA/NSC-IG Meeting on Argentina 

The Interagency Group for Latin America met November 

14 under the chairmanship of Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State John A. Bushnell and reached agreement on the 

following: (jSD REVIEWED 18-Jan-2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION. 

1980 Action Plan 

It was agreed that the timing of the more highly 

visible initiatives (ARA Assistant Secretary visit, periodic 

security cosultations, periodic policy talks, and highlevel 

military visits) could not be addressed. The Defense 

representative planned to consult further within DOD 

on this point. DOD will alBO decide whether to seek 

Inter-agency agreement for early action on certain lowervisibility 

steps, such as an invitation to an Argentine 

guest instructor for the U.S. Army school of the Americas. 

IAHRC Resolution on Argentina at the OASGA 

( 

In view of Argentina's active lobbying for a noncountry 

specific resolution on the IAHRC Report on Argentina, 

the IG decided to instruct our Ambassadors to make a 

high-level demarche in favor of specific resolutions 

on individual IAHRC reports. If separate resolutions 

are out of reach, it was agreed to wbrk for an omnibus 

resolution with country-specific paragraphs. 

f 

U.S. Military Sales to Argentina 

It was decided that possible initiatives in this 

area should await the new Administration. Such sales 

are prohibited by the Humphrey-Kennedy amendment, and 

any future sales would be dependent on modification of 

that legislation. DOD urged that planning for possible 

modification be undertaken in timely fashion. 

President-designate Viola's Visit to Washington 

There was a consensus that December was not a propitious 

moment for General Viola to visit Washington. However, 

should General Viola decide to visit Washington during 

his visit to the United States, USG offie-tAls will receive 

him cordially. 

declassified 

E.0.13526 

11717/90 

■iY r_-34-^0 

Authority 

NARA_££------ Dsto 

Nn Ohiectinn To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-90-7-4-4 

^

No Objection To Declassification 2009/07/14 : NLC-24-1 -9-3-2 

8012956 

3A' 

3 7/y 

AY CONTAIN CONGRESSIONAL 

a:e RIAL 3717 

SC review(s) 

i”iuieted 

51) REVIEW 

3MPLETED 


From: 

Subject: 

THE PRESIDENT 


WASHINGTON 

June 14, 1980 

^ J '*** 

fa PfT 

Warren Christopher, Acting LL> -t~. ftmefc ^ 

/ A . (i//7x 

Steps To Improve U. s.-Argentine j£wfa7ca 

Relations 

Pursuant to your instructions, the Inter-Agency 


of action for 1980, which I am submitting for your 

approval. 

Cat//* fa' ** 

I. OBJECTIVES 

fate pepartmerrt review 

impleted 

Our principal objectives in moving to improve 

our relationship with Argentina are to: 

t 

— foster Argentina's identification with the 

West and thus to contain Soviet political and economic 

influence; 

— encourage further specific improvements in 

human rights practices; 

— seek assistance on appropriate East-West issues 

(e.g. grains); and 

i 

— obtain progress on nonproliferation objectives, 

particularly full-scope safeguards and ratification 

of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and foster increased 

sensitivity among Argentine leaders to global nonproliferation 

concerns. 

We also wish to encourage continued Argentine 

cooperation with the Papal mediation of Argentina's 

dispute with Chile over territorial limits in the 

Beagle Channel, a dispute that very nearly led to 

war between the two countries in late 1978. Finally, 

we wish to encourage Argentina to play a constructive 

role with respect to developments 

and other Hemispheric issues. 

in Central America 

mori/cdf per 

C0333751B 

^classified 

E.U.I352B . 

» a --aOir-\-val 

AUihoriiy 

~RA——.Dais


•SECRET 

- 2 - 

II. ACTIONS FOR 1980 




visit to Buenos Aires in January. We contemplate: 

— a visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter- 

American Affairs to Buenos Aires, possibly about August 

during which he will review our policy concerns 

and the state of our relations and will be prepared 

to discuss steps we would plan to take to strengthen 

cooperation in selected areas, depending on the nature 

of the Argentine response. 

-- a meeting of the D.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic 

Commission in October, the U.S. delegation possibly 

to be chaired by the Under Secretary of State for 

Economic Affairs. The meeting would Include discussion 

of ongoing efforts to resolve bilateral trade issues 

and to expand commercial relations. 

-- periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric 

issues, with the first round to be held during the 

visit of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American 

Affairs. 

2. Military Relations * 




more fundamental improvement in these relations (including 

consideration of modification of the Humphrey/Kennedy 

Amendment, as reported in the conclusions of the PRC 

meeting). We plan to: 

— begin periodic security consultations with 

Argentina; the first round, to be held tflis year in 


the South Atlantic; 





to the U.S. Army School of the Americas after consulting 

r at 

t

No Objection To Declassification 2009/07/jl 4 : NLC-24-1-9-3-2 

37 n 

3 - 

with members of Congress to ensure that this initiative 

would not be regarded as conflicting with the spirit 


Other Issues are: 


We will keep under review the desirability of 

proceeding with an invitation to a senior Argentine 

military leader (such as the Commander-in-Chief of 

the Argentine Army or the Army Chief-of-Staff) to 

visit Washington this year. A final decision on this 

(including the question of timing) should take into 

account the implications of sîch a move on the selection 

of the next Argentine president now under way within 

the Argentine Armed Forces, as well as continued improvements 

in the observance of human rights and developments 

in U.S.-Argentine relations. 



the sale of ocean surveillance aircraft to the GOA. 

We see no possibility, however, of seeking special 

legislation which would modify the Humphrey-Kennedy 

Amendment to permit the sale of these aircraft to 

Argentina this year. 


We will continue the dialogue on human rights 

with Argentine leaders, principally but not exclusively 

through Ambassador Castro and during the visit by 

the Assistant Secretary for Ifiter-American Affairs, 

Ambassador Bowdler. In these consultations we will 

attempt to obtain assurances that: 

— the GOA will accept an OASGA resolution which 

recognizes the role of the OAS Commission on Human 

Rights and which encompasses a call for further improvements 

by Argentina; 

— there will be no new disappearances, including 

no disappearances of persons alleged to be terrorists; 

— all persons suspected of terrorism or subversive 

activities, including unacknowledged detainees, will 

r—*T


- 4 - 

• 3 7/7 

t 

be processed through normal judicial channels and 

ensured due process; 

— guarantees will be instituted to prevent the 

torture of detainees; and 

— there be substantial progress, in advance 

of the OASGA, in reducing the number of political 

prisoners held without charges through release, trial, 

or exile (during his recent visit, Ambassador Smith 

was assured that half of these prisoners--l,300 at 

the time--would be released or sentenced by the end 

of the year). 



in UN fora and concluded that, while this should not 

be a central requirement for the improvement of our 

bilateral relations, it should remain an important 

U.S. objective. We should urge Argentina, in bilateral 

discussions, to cooperate with thbse multilateral 

efforts, particularly with thet UN Human Rights Commission’s 

new expert working group on disappeared persons and 

with other groups such as the Catholic Church. 

In addition to human rights discussions initiated 

by the Ambassador and by Assistant Secretary Bowdler, 

the U.S. side of the Mixed Economic Commission will 

be prepared to raise or respond to human rights concerns 

in discussions with their Argentine counterparts, 

and will be fully briefed for this purpose. 

4. Nuclear Relations 

We want to move Argentina over time to accept 

IAEA safeguards on future as well as current facilities 

(including the reprocessing facility) and to ratify 

the Treaty of Tlatelolco. To do this, we need to 

keep open the door for continued cooperation with 

Argentina's nuclear program to the extent commensurate 

with your policy. We should; 

— try to resolve promptly, in accordance with 

U.S. law and our nonproliferation objectives, the 

remaining safeguards issues to permit delivery of 

highly and moderately enriched fuel for Argentina's 

research program, as well as components for its power 

program; 

ki 

A 4 % 11 ^ n i A n w n


-SECRET 

- 5 - 

— once this is done, undertake a review of the 

conditions under which we could facilitate expanded 

participation by U.S. industry in Argentina's nuclear 

program. (A major case currently at issue is an export 

license application for the s^le of a pressure vessel 

for the Atucha II power reactor.) 



— Sign the pending U.S.-Argentine Agricultural 


Secretary for Inter-American Affairs; 

— Seek to conclude the negotiations for the bilateral 






our NATO allies and Japan abojit issues of common concern 



These subjects and our policies thereon could be discussed 

within NATO fora such as the Political Advisors Committee, 

the Permanent council, and the NATO experts group 

on Latin America. Depending on the results of these 

consultations, we could consider further actions in 

Buenos Aires. A majority of the Interagency Group 

recommended against new high-level bilateral approaches 

to our Allies on these issues. We would continue 

the practice of consulting on human rights in the 

appropriate UN fora, such as the UN Human Rights Commission. 


Chile 

The Group also considered the implications for 



* 

With respect to Brazil, £he Group noted that 

many of these steps will restore a better balance 

ki_ u: 

ecr©onnrwr\7/4 

a 

kii r> nA 4 n o n


6 

in U.S. relations with the two countries/ since the 


with Brazil (including, most recently, security consultations) 

Chile is concerned about our improving relationship 

with Argentina, which it sees as threatening in the 

context of the Beagle Channel dispute. We have attempted 

to persuade the Chileans that what^we are doing with 

Argentina has nothing to do wit.jp Chile or with our 

position on the Beagle Channel, which is to encourage 

acceptance of the outcome of Papal mediation and avoidance 

of war. This issue will be more fully addressed in 

the review of our relations with Chile later this year.


t 

- 7 - 

Concurrences: 

H - Mr. J. Brian Atwood 

EB - Mr Deane Hinton 

HA - Ms. Patt Derian 

OES - Mr. Louis Nosenzo 

PM - Mr. Daniel O'Donohue 

EUR/SOV - Mr. Robert Perito 

EUR/RMP - Mr. Stephen Ledogar 

S/P - Mr. Anthony Lake 

10 - Mr. Michael Newlin 

S/AS - Mr. Allen Locke 

USOAS - Mr. Herbert Thompson 

AID/RDP - Mr. David Raymond f 

NSC - Mr. Thomas Thornton 

OPIC - Ms. Caryl Bernstein 

STR - Mr. Robert Hormatz 

DOD/ISA - Col. Patrick Briggs 

JCS - AdmiraJ. J.A. Lyons. 

CIA - 

Commerce -Mr. A."Katz 

Treasury - Mr. Fred Bergsten 

USDA - Mr. Dale Hathaway 

DOE - Mr. Les Goldman 

EXIMBANK - Mr. Crafton 

ACDA - Mr. Charles Van Doren 

ICA - Mr. Victor Olason 

L/PM - Mr. T. Borek


ISSUES PAPER - ARGENTINA 

-SECRET' 

I. THE SETTING 

The United states has three major interests in 

Argentina! East-West relations, nuclear nonproliferation, 

and human rights. It also has significant interests 

in a peaceful solution of the Beagle Channel dispute, 

Argentine support in Hemispheric matters, and in trade 

and investment relations. 

The GoodpaBter, Hodges and Smith visits have 

introduced new balance into our relations with Argentina. 

They have substantially improved the tone of the relationship 

while making a promising start at reducing the differences. 

The current status of our interests*is as follows: 

East-West Relations. As part of its probings 

to expand political and economic influence in South 

America, the Soviet Union is consciously courting 

both Argentina and Brazil. Argentina has responded 

to a limited degree because of: 

a strong interest in Soviet trade opportunities; 

— a strong desire for Soviet support in international 

fora on human rights matters} 

— an interest in keeping open the possibility 

of nuclear supplies; and 

— some desire for greater balance in its foreign 

relations between East and West. 

However, the Argentine military regimes in prospect 

for at least the next four to Beven years have no 

desire to emulate the Soviets or to align themselves 

with the Soviet Union, although there is a natural 

inclination for economic and political reasons toward 

warmer bilateral relations. Our improved dialogue 

with Argentina since January has produced} 

— repeated affirmation of Argentina's basic 

commitment to the Westy 

SE6REF 

GDS 5/10/86 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority-hsLUC. -1 "7-*41 -a- 

rs * -» j *


-2- 

— a degree of cooperation on grains exports 

despite our late start on consultations; and 

— greater evidence of Argentine desire to consult 

and cooperate on Hemispheric matters, such as accepting 

Cuban refugees and consulting on Central America. 

The dialogue also contributed to Argentina's 

decision to join the Olympics boycott. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation. It is clear that Argentina 

will insiBt on the continued development of its nuclear 

technology capabilities, of which it is very proud, 

and the maintenance for the foreseeable future of 

a nuclear explosive option. It has demonstrated that 

it will not respond to pressure on these matters. 

Our best hope is that a calmer assessment of its own 

long-term self-interests will lead it more tovard 

safeguards and away from keeping an explosive option 

open. Closer Brazilian-Argentine relations, Bymbolised 

by President Figueiredo's visit to Buer\ps Aires scheduled 

for Hay 13-15, may be helpful in this regard. Argentina 

is still considering whether to proceed now with the 

ratification of Tlatelolco. Although the Argentine 

interpretation that the Treaty permits the development 

of peaceful nuclear explosives is unhelpful, its ratification 

could be an important step. The smith visit was useful, 

and we hope to reach agreement with Argentina on arrangements 

to maintain limited nuclear cooperation. 

Human Rights. The status of human rights remains 

a matter of deep concern. While there is broad agreement 

on the facts of the situation, views differ on the 

scope and significance of the improvements that have 

occurred, especially over the past year. Disappearances, 

a central human rights concern, have declined, as 

have the number of political prisoners, we are aware 

of at least 2 disappearances thus far in 1980. (There 

reportedly were 44 disappearances last year; 55 a 

month the year before.) Our Embassy recently reported, 

however, that suspected active terrorists would continue 

to be dealt with Bummarily. There is no present prospect 

that the Argentine Government plans to respond positively 

to pleas for information about the fate of the thousands 

of people who have disappeared in rtecent years. GOA 

officials recently told Ambassador Smith that about 

half of the 1300 remaining political prisoners would 

be tried or released by the end of the year. GOA 

officials say that, although there is insufficient 

evidence to try the others, the security forces regard


-3- 

them as dangerous and do not plan to release them. 

The latter group includes some persons who benefitted 

from the 1974 amnesty of President Campora (who, elected 

with Peronist support, opened the door for Peron's 

return) and therefore cannot be tried. The state 

of siege and lack of due process continue. The military 

government has committed itBelf to eventual return 

i to civilian, democratic rule, but no one expects this 

. to occur before the mid or late 1980s, and few in 

1 Argentina are pressing for a more rapid timetable. 

A basic issue that remains unresolved is the future 

form of Argentina's political party system, especially 

the future role and orientation of Peronism. A dialogue 

with political leaders is now beginning, although 

political party activity remains prohibited. 

In the economic area, the government continues 

to reconstruct the economy on the basis of free market 

principles, to remove the burden of controls accumulated 

under Peronism, curtail the role of the public sector 

while strengthening the functions of provincial and 

local governments, progressively bring inflation under 

control, and encourage foreign investment as part 

of a drive for greater productivity and a higher rate 

of investment. In the short term, these policies 

have resulted in belt-tightening for lower and lowermiddle 

income groups. However, full employment has 

been maintained as part of a deliberate government 

policy to cushion the impact of these measures. In 

the longer term, these policies could produce sustained 

dynamic Argentine economic performance and a decentralized 

economic system more compatible witrf a pluralistic 

political order than the statist centralism of the 

Peron period. 

Argentine officials and human rights activists 

have praised our human rights report thiB year as 

balanced and objective. There were difficulties between 

the Argentine and U.S. Delegations to the UN Human 

Rights Commission meeting in Geneva last February- 

Harch. These reflected honest differences over substantive 

issues such as the new disappearance procedure and 

the draft torture convention. The Argentines will 

be very sensitive to what occurs in OAS and UN considerations 

of their human rightB performance later this year 

and early next year; they want to see an end to the 

Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment against military sales, 

and positive U.S. votes in the international financial 

institutions. 

-SECRET 

»ll «


-4- 

The discussion paper previously distributed described 

our continued political and economic consultations 

and military and nuclear relations over the next few 

months. is there more that could and should be done 

in this period? 

II. ISSUES FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS 

1. Significance of Argentine-Soviet Ties and 

the Appropriate U.S. Response! 

The discussion paper draws a distihction between 

expanding trade ties and political dooperation. The 

expansion of bilateral trade is a normal phenomenon 

and will continue, irrespective of U.S. action. The 

Argentine interest in political cooperation with the 

Soviets, on the other hand, Is related to the Argentine 

deBire to assure Soviet bloc support on human rights 

issues and reduce the danger of censure in UN fora. 

A possible interest in Soviet nuclear supplies is 

related to U.S. safeguards conditions (this issue 

appears to be approaching solution). 

The basic approach proposed in the discussion 

paper is a political onet to manage U.S.-Argentine 

relations in a way that strengthens Argentina's sense 

of identification with the West, to pursue U.S. interests 

in a balanced fashion and in a manner that takes into 

account Argentine deep-seated nationalism, and to 

achieve these goals without compromising our human 

rights objectives by diminishing or appearing to have 

diminished our interest in human rights conditions. 

Is the approach advocated in the paper an adequate 

one, in terms of the significance of expanding Argentine- 

Soviet relations? In terms of the balance of the 

various U.S. interests? 

2. How can the U.S. obtain meaningful Argentine 

cooperation in restraining exports to the U.S.S.R7 

for the 1980/81 crop year? 

The Acting Secretary of State asked the Argentine 

Economic Minister on May 6 for GOA cooperation in 

a program of tighter restrictions on grain shipments 

to the U.S.S.R. in the coming crop year. Strategy 

and tactics for cooperation among all the major grain 

exporting countries are currently under consideration 

in the SCC, including the explicit ceilings we would 

seek from each exporter.


a. An Argentine-U.S.S.R. grain agreement is 

in the offing (contrary to the discussion paper, it 

has apparently not yet been signed). Reportedly it 

will state Argentine intentions to supply certain 

minimum levels of grain. Can the U.S. .take advantage 

of such an agreement to secure an understanding that 

Argentina will regard the minimum specified in the 

agreement as a maximum as well? Or would such levels 

be too high to constitute "meaningful restraint"? 

b. How can the D.S. persuade Argentina to announce 

publicly any ceiling agreed upon? To do so would 

reinforce the commitment and would help reduce the 

current premium on prices on Argentine grain which 

have resulted in the loss of traditional Argentine 

markets. If the minimum levels contained in the Soviet 

agreement are consistent with a meaningful Argentine 

ceiling, the conclusion of the agreement could provide 

the pretext for a public announcement helpful to the 

cooperation effort. 

3. What is the appropriate human rights Btance 

for the P.s. in this period in the light of Argentine 

performance and our other interests^ 

a. In bilateral demarches and contacts 

with Argentina? 

t 

One approach would Btrongly press for improvements 

in all areas, including strong pressure for a serious 

accounting to families, either directly or indirectly, 

of the fate of disappeared personal the other would 

proceed more selectively, with emphasis on further 

reform of current security and judicial practices 

rather than an accounting for the disappeared and 

other past violations. One approach would include 

occasional strong public criticism of the GOA's practices; 

the other, while maintaining our public posture of 

criticism and concern, would do so in a lower key, 

and place greater emphasis on quiet but persistent 

dialogue to press for specific reforms, taking advantage 

of an improving atmosphere and closer bilateral relations. 

b. In the OAS and the UN? 

The GOA is greatly concerned over the potential 

work of the new group of experts on disappearances 

established by the UNHRC with strong U.S., West European, 

-SECRET 

i


and Canadian support. It feela that the group's principal 

effort will be directed at Argentina, for an accounting 

of the fate of disappeared persons. The GOA undoubtedly 

fears that specific data, if available, on disappearances 

(i.e., torture and summary executions} would lead 

to demands that those responsible be identified and 

punished. Although the methods of the working group 

remain to be worked out, the GOA fears that the group's 

work will be the basis of moves next year to seek 

the appointment of a special rapporteur on Argentina 

and the GOA's public condemnation in UN fora. This 

fear is a principal reason the GOA seeks to strengthen 

political cooperation with the Soviets in UN fora. 

The OAS has recently released a report on the 

human rights situation in Argentina based on the visit 

of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights last 

September. The report is highly critical of Argentina 

and has been attacked by the GOA as biased and an 

interference in Argentina's internal affairs. The 

IAHRC report will be taken up at the OAS General Assembly 

this fall. 

The Argentine position on how to deal with the 

IAHRC report is still under study in Buenos Aires. 

One view circulating within the regime — reportedly 

angered by the report's alleged failure to properly 

acknowledge the history of pre-1976 terrorism and the 

improvements accomplished since 1978 — is that Argentina 

should withdraw from the OAS, thus perhaps triggering 

an exodus by other countries, including Braxil. In 

private conversations, Argentine diplomats have warned 

of this possibility, stressing the depth of feeling 

on the issue in Buenos Aires. We have.no evidence as 

of this time, however, that this vi^w is about to be 

adopted as the Government's policy. 

How should we deal with these matters in OAS 

and UN fora? 

c. With our NATO Allies? 

One approach would be to initiate a series of 

high-level consultations with our NATO Allies for 

the purpose of Bharing information about human rights 

developments and about the Soviet-Argentine relationship, 

and of discussing the most effective way of dealing 

with these matters, including possible joint or parallel 

demarches, public statements, and coordinated action 

in international institutions (including the multilateral 

t


OELOrcHI. 

-7- 

banks) 

d. With regard to sanctions (vote in the 

IFI's, military training, and military sales)? 

Our abstentions in the IFI's have not prevented 

ordinary capital loans to Argentina. The prohibition 

of military sales has shifted Argentine purchases 

of new equipment to European sources; it is, however, 

beginning to create problems for the Argentines with 

respect to spare parts for O.S.-supplied equipment. 

On the other hand, our measures have considerable 

political significance as a tangible expression of 

disapproval of Argentine human rights violations. 

Any possible modification of our posture in this area 

would have to take into account the implications for 

our stance toward other countries with major human 

rights violations, as well as the message this would 

send to human rights groups in Argentina and to other 

countries who have joined us in criticizing human 

rights violations in Argentina. 

4. How far should we carry milltary-to-military 

contact and cooperation under present circumstances? 

Cooperation involves three possible levels* 

— visits, joint exercises, consultations on 

security matters; 

— the sale of military training; 

— a military supply relationship (new equipment 

and spares). 

The sale of training under FMS and military supplies 

(FMS and Munitions List items) are prohibited by the 

Humphrey-Kennedy amendment. In additiovn, under current 

policy, the U.S. Executive limits sales' of non-Munitions 

List items to the Argentine military and the police 

through the Comimnerce export control licensing system. 

The PRC discussion paper argues for limited contacts 

(visits, joint exercises) but opposes a change in 

our military supply policy at this time. 

A second view is that we should avoid the political

No Objection To Declassification 

>ShUKtil 

2009/07/06 : NLC-17-41-2-2-4 

-> 

-8- 

symbolism of support which these contacts imply, or 

minimize them until there is a definitive breakthrough 

on human rights. A third view, on the other hand, 

argues that, because of our strategic interests and 

the improvement in human rights, we should streamline, 

liberalize, or lift altogether, the restrictions on 

the military supply relationship. This would involve 

a) an elimination of restrictions on Commerce export 

licences; and/or b} the modification or elimination 


The denial of training (the sale of training 

under FM5 is now prohibited by the Humphrey-Kennedy 

Amendment) involves a separate issue: Argentine officers 

traditionally sent to the U.S. are officers with promising 

careers. (videla, Viola, and Galtieri all received 

training or served in the U.S.) Shortly the Argentine 

Armed Forces will have no officers of the rank of 

major or below who have received U.S. training. One 

view questions whether the U.S. should continue to 

deny itself this avenue of influencing the outlook 

of the next generation of Argentine military leaders. 

Another view argues that the present generation of 

military leaders is responsible forfthe government's 

repression of the past four years and questions the 

premise that U.S. training has had a significant positive 

influence on their outlook. It also argues that a 

military training relationship is a clearly visible, 

high-profile means of demonstrating U.S. political 

support for a government. 

5. Are our present policies with regard to nuclear 

relations with Argentina adequate? 

The issues are: 

— At what level can we and should we pursue 

nuclear cooperation? 

— Is there anything more we can and should do 

to encourage Argentine ratification of Tlatelolco 

and acceptance of full-scope safeguards? 

— How would possible actions in these areas 

impact on our general relationship and would they 

be worth the cost? * 

The discussion paper argues: 

-6E6RET


— Nuclear Cooperation. We should try to resolve 

the pending safeguards issue on the basis of what 

is required by U.S. law. Official Argentine interest 

in further cooperation, beyond the research fuel, 

appears to be modest at this time. Once the safeguards 

issue is resolved, we would probe to see what interest 

there might be in Argentine nuclear circles in U.S. 

cooperation (see also below). * 

— Tlatelolco. We should continue a dialogue 

with Argentina's most senior leaders on global and 

regional proliferation concerns. Nothing more specific 

to encourage Argentine ratification appears feasible 

or desirable at this time. (We should, of course, 

on appropriate occasions, continue over the next few 

months to remind the GOA of President Videla's commitment 

to ratify.) 

In addition, looking beyond the issue of safeguards 

assurances, the Administration must also address the 

issue of licensing of U.S. components for Argentine 

nuclear projects. This issue carries with it the 

possibility of a continuing role of U.S. industry 

in Argentina's nuclear program even though the position 

of prime contractor has been lost to German, Canadian, 

and Swiss companies. Por example* 

— the U.S. firm. Combustion Engineering, working 

with the Argentine firm, Pescarmona, wishes to bid 

as a subcontractor for the pressure(vessel for Atucha 

II. Siemens/KWU argues against Combustion Engineering's 

qualifications on grounds that the U.S. firm, in view 

of the uncertainties of whether a U.S. export license 

can be obtained, is not a reliable supplier. 

— Sulzer Brothers, the SwisB prime contractor 

for the heavy water plant, has approached Canadian 

firms about components, some of which may be U.S. 

controlled. 

The issue is whether the U.S. should encourage 

or discourage such industrial collaboration. The 

current U.S. stance has been to discourage Combustion 

Engineering, partly because of our concern to keep 

good faith with the Canadians who — unsuccessfully 

— insisted on full-Bcope safeguards as a condition 

of the Bale of a nuclear power reactor and heavy water 

plant.


oc\/r\E.i 

-10- 

Significant D.S. exports, the future of U.S.- 

Argentine industrial cooperation in this important 

sector, and U.S. nonproliferation policy are at stake 

in this issue. 

III. THE BROAD CHOICES 

Option A. Continue strong concentration 

on human rightB. 

We would maintain a cool and correct posture 

until the human rights situation shows substantial 

further progress, making clear that we hre prepared 

to improve relations when and to thti degree that fundamental 

human rights problems are solved. Military relations 

would be kept to a minimum; political relations should 

be cool arid correct. 

Rationale! The human rights situation remains 

exceedingly grave and outweighs the practical significance 

and relevance of other interests in our relations 

with Argentina. The essential elements of Argentine 

human rights violations — the apparatus of repression, 

the lack of due process, the prohibition of meaningful 

political and labor union activity, and the failure 

to provide information about disappeared persons - 

-all remain in place. Expanding Argentine-Soviet 

cooperation thus far has been pragmatic and self-limiting. 

It is not now a significant threat to U.S. strategic 

interests, but we should continue to watch Argentinesoviet 

relations closely. 

Option B. Continue the current level of 

effort for'more balance In the treatment of our interests 

in Argentina. 1 ‘ 

t 

We would continue the present efforts to strengthen 

working relations with the GOA, principally through 

Btepped-up political consultations, but also through 

some increase in cooperation and increased military 

contact, we would continue to stress the importance 

of human rights, but need to establish priorities 

in terms of benefits to Argentine society and attainability. 

We should seek further specific improvements through 

dialogue in the Improved atmosphere, but maintain 

our present policy on votes in the IFI’s and the restrictions 

on military supplies. We should, however, seek to 

reopen the sale of training (which would require modification 

of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment). Our general approach, 

especially in the UNHRC, should seek to avoid pushing 

Argentina into cooperation with the Soviets. 

» i i • i' *r r* ■ >r* 

fc 11 a •*» 4 a n a a


SE6Rfc+- 

-11- 

Rationale: Our approach to limit Soviet influence 

should be basically a political one. There has been 

progress in human rights — notably, few new security 

cases and a new assertiveness by the judiciary and 

in public expression and a general decline in violence 

and repression. Our approach should acknowledge this 

progress. Certain issues in the relationship which 

have not been linked in the past should be kept delinked. 

There is no strategic need to relax^military supply 

restrictions at this time. Training, however, is 

important to try to influence the next generation 

of Argentina's military leaders. We do not want to 

create too much of an imbalance in our relations with 

Argentina and with Chile, however, while the Beagle 

Channel issue is still outstanding. 

Option C. Move a step further toward normal 

relations. 

We would seek further to strengthen working relations 

with the GOA by lifting the restrictions on Commerce 

licences and by initiating a move to lift the Humphrey- 

Kennedy Amendment restrictions on the military supply 

relationship. We would stress to the GOA that human 

rights remain important to us and would continue our 

abstention on IFI loanB. But we would more explicitly 

and unconditionally reaffirm General Goodpaster's 

general assurances that we were not interested in 

seeking the GOA's public censure at the 1980 UNHRC 

meeting, and would not support future'moves for cenBure 

in UN or OAS fora in view of current and prospective 

progress. 

Rationale: The deteriorating international security 

situation makes Argentine cooperation important. 

We must take seriously Soviet probes to establish 

influence in Argentina and Brazil and to foBter mutually 

profitable economic relations. Argentine fears of 

public censure in the UN, essentially for past human 

rights violations, are a principal reason for increasing 

Argentine-Soviet political cooperation. Many political 

observers agree that a solution to the problem of 

past disappearances is not feasible at this time and 

will come, if at all, as part of a broader political 

settlement, including a general amnesty. The 8mith 

mission, in its report, noted that no major Argentine 

political leader is pressing for an accounting at 

this time. The measures contemplated under this approach 

are the strongest card we can play to counter Soviet 

probing for influence, to reestablish close working 

relations, to obtain Argentine cooperation on grains 

and other East-West issues, and to elicit further 

Argentine cooperation in Hemispheric matters. 

» i 

ft 11 ^ -? < ^ n s

. •- ■ 

No Objection To Declassification in Full ^012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-2-4 

MEMORANDUM 

( 


fTtNFinFNTTATi - GDS 



FROM: 


DAVID AARON 

ROBERT PASTOR ■ 






NSC was involved; and (3) an alert iteiti for the President. 



i 

I. Argentina's Human Rights Situation 











correct that. 

i 






have been published; and a limited riglSt of option for political 





II. U.S, Policy 




declassified 

E.0.13526 

-A 

NAHA.

‘____________ No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-2-4 

.CONFIDENTIAL - jJ 





agreement on terms for a visit by the Inter-Amencan Commission 

on Human Rights, and there is no deterioration in the human 








which would permit the enormous back-log of credit to be committed 

before then. (There are over 75 pending FMS cases for 


There are also, funds for military training, which are being 

held up, and which the President noted (on June 29} that he had 


Our current objectives are to urge the GOA* (1) to permit the 

IAHRC to visit in accordance with the IAHRd's regulations? 




of law. 






III. Future U.S. Policy: Who Blinks at the Brink? 








working to restore the rule of law. Terrorism has not' left 

Argentina, but it is now the exception, nqt the rule. And 







the future it seeks to promote, rt produces only more 

violence..." 

■CON-PIDENTTOL - GDS

No Objection To Declassification in cull 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-2-4 

CONFIDENTIAL GDS -3- t 

I, myself, believe that we may have overloaded the v*circuits 









_ ejnr-p.iy as a different decision on Dresser. 





little choice. The decision did have'an unintended positive 



in' X-M), and they have descended on me, and I have deflected 

them to Capitol Hill, where they helpe^ defeat more restrictive 




Argentines agreed to a visit by the'Inter-American Commission. 







For one thing, the Europeans made a joint demarche in March*, 







I-s in charge. And he keeps saying he is eager to move forward 

on his own to restore the rule of law. Ad he takes those steps, 

I will make sure that we are quick to tespond. 









CONFIDENTIAL-^.GDS

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-3U-2-4 

CONFIDENTIAL — GDS -4- 

V 


the Southern Cone countries — led by Brazil but including 













• ! 


at'any time since January 1977, and they are as good as can 




and Vance to develop a cooperative relationship, but that will 



the military leaders in Argentina and Brazil, is that .Jimmy 




in the universities because ‘of his strong anti-Communism and the 


great moral stature in Latin America, and that inspires the* 


sometimes infuriates .some of the conservatives and the military. 


the U-S. has had since we turned in»our gunboats, and at 

the same time, it has given the U.S. af future in Latin America, 

which we had almost lost’. 











rriMffTnPKTTAT. GDS


^QMFTnFNT-^ft-L - GDS -5- 

’ t V 






i 

i 

t 

COMF1 PKMTXAL -/ GDS



rc 

WAS HINQTON 

MINUTES OF THE CABINET MEETING 

Monday, June 20, 1977 



The nineteenth meeting of the Cabinet was called to 

order by the President at 9:04 a.m., Monday, June 20, 

1977. All members of the Cabinet were present except 

Mr. Bergland, who waa represented by Deputy Secretary of 

Agriculture John White. Other persona present were: 

Joe Aragon 

Zbig Br'zbzinski 

Doug Costle 

Stu Eizenstat 

Jane Frank 

Rex Granum 

Joanne Hurley 

Jim King 

Tim Kraft 

Bob Lipshutz 

Bunny Mitchell 

Dick Moe 

Frank Moore 

Frank Press 

Jay Solomon 

StanBfield Turner 

Charles Warren 

Bill Cable. 

Jack Watson 

The President asked for commentstfrom Cabinet members, 

beginning with the Secretary of Interior: 

1. Mr. AndruB said that he haB just returned from 

several days in the West fully confirmed in his opinion 

that "Washington, D.C., is not the real world." 

— He does not anticipate any problems with the opening 

of the Alaskan North Slope pipeline today. 

— The President said that he would like to discuss 

several water projects with Mr. Andrus. 

2. Mr. Califano reported that he addressed the Ameriaan 

Medical Association in San Francisco this past weekend on 

the economics of health care. He also attended several 

AMA meetings and described that organization as "unhappy 

with this Administration." 

— Mr. Califano reported that the House lived up to 

its agreement on the HEW appropriations bill and held addons 

to $1.8 billion, $1.1 billion of which is in the education 

area. The Senate begins mark-upôn the bill today, 


1 * 

T ._^ 

Q> 

to_L 'r 

i? 

o 

d > 

ti 

a 

-J 

2 

o 

sz 

? i 

rtf 

ci 

: 32

No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/17 tNLC-7-11-7-1-4 

and Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Magnuson has 

agreed to oppose the add-ons and to try to change certain 

other language added by the House. For example, 

Mr. Califano said that he is very troubled by the "affirmative 

action" rider added by the House which bans "ratios 

and other numerical requirements" as well as "quotas." 

Another amendment bars HEW's interpretation of the Byrd 

amendment pertaining to funds for school desegregation. 

Mr. Califano noted that the parliamentary situation on 

the House floor forced a blanket prohibition against 

abortion. He predicted that the Senate would modify this 

language. 

— The President inquired about the level of funding 

for cancer research. Mr. Califano thinks it is too high, 

despite the testimony of Benno C. Schmidt, Chairman of 

the President's Cancer Advisory Panel. Mr. Strauss pointed 

out that Mr. Schmidt is an able and impressive advocate 

and suggested that it would be helpful for the President 

to meet with him to discuss the subject. Mr. Califano added 

that several influential Senators are also advocates of 

the high funding figures for cancer research. He noted 

that Congressman Obey, on the other hand, has stated that 

the funding level is too high. 

3. Mr. Vance summarized the comprehensive test ban 

discussions held in Washington last week: The Soviets 

seemed more forthcoming in their discussions on 

the banning of nuclear text explosions. It was agreed . 

that multi-country discussions would begin on July 3, 

1977. 

— Talks will begin Wednesday in Moscow on arms control 

in the Indian Ocean. 

— The Belgrade Conference is underway. The U.S. has 

suggested dividing the group into three working committees 

for in-depth review of each of the following topics: 1) 

principles and confidence-building measures; 2} cooperation 

in economics, science, technology, and environment; 3) human 

contacts, information, culture and education. The Soviets 

want a plenary session, which, according to Mr. Vance, would 

prevent any detailed focus. He described the general atmosphere 

of the meeting as "businesslike." 

— Mr. Vance said that Germany has made an important 

change of position by pledging not to transfer sensitive 

nuclear technology in the future. ThiB brings Germany into 

line with France on the BUbject. 



— Australian Prime Minister J.^Malcolm Fraser will 

visit the United States later this week. 

— Mr. Vance noted a problem over the weekend with 

the Canadian Fisheries Agreement. In response to a U.S. 

communique on salmon fishing in the State of Washington, 

the Canadians threatened to seize American shrimp boats. 

The U.S. has forwarded a new proposal which should clear up 

the situation. 

— The State Department has received a number of 

unconfirmed reports that Ugandan President Idi Amin Dada 

has disappeared and possibly has been assassinated. 

— In response to a question from the President, 

Mr. Vance commented briefly on the recent Organization of 

American States meeting in Grenada. The U.S. spoke third— 

after Argentina and Chile. Both of those countries urged 

the need to fight international terrorism with counterterrorism. 

In his remarks, Mr. Vance stressed that counterterrorism 

was not the way to deal with the problem and 

spelled out the U.S. view on how violatiqns of human rights 

should be approached. He also apoke about the need for 

organizational change in the OAS and &rged that the threepart 

structure of the organization be merged into one 

committee. Additional discussion focused on cutting back 

the bureaucracy and reviewing the dues structure. Mr. Vance 

also described his personal discussions with Trinidad's 

Prime Minister Eric Williams, a senior OAS spokesman, about 

streamlining the OAS. Mr. Vance suggested that Ambassador 

Young follow up on the contacts made at the Grenada meeting 

on his forthcoming trip to the Caribbean. 

4. Mr. Schultze was in Paris last week for a meeting 

of the Economic Policy Committee of the Organization of 

Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). He summarized 

the world economic outlook for industrialized countries as 

follows: Growth of OECD countries will be 4% in 1977 and 

3% for the first quarter of 1978. Outside the U.S., 

unemployment will rise in 1977 and 1978—it now stands at 

15 million, approximately half of which is in the U.S. He 

noted that Japan and Germany are not likely to meet the 

growth targets they set at the International Economic 

Summit. The President and Messrs. Schultze and Blumenthal 

discussed ways to spur countries to meet'their growth 

targets—focusing now primarily on 19?8 since it is too 

late to influenoe results for 1977. 

5. Dr. Brzezinski Baid that in two major areas the 

Administration's foreign policy is already having global 

impacts: nuclear non-proliferation and human rights. 



— Last week, the NSC held internal meetings and 

worked with the Vice President and members of Congress 

on the Middle EaBt. The most explicit statement of the 

U.S. position on the Middle East is contained in the 

Vice President's speech delivered in San Francisco last 

Friday. 

— The NSC also reviewed a comprehensive report 

on reorganizing the Intelligence Community. A review 

committee is working on legislation in this area. 

Dr. Brzezinski said that there are eight basic options under 

review, and that a proposal will be ready next week. Other 

issues currently being studied by the NSQ are arms limitations 

in the Indian Ocean; chemical warfare (where the 

NSC proposed and the President approved seeking a total 

ban); and follow-up on Mrs. Carter's trip to Latin America. 

6. Mr. Young said that the Security Council is 

meeting this week on the Rhodesian incursions into 

Mozambique. 

— Ambassador Don McHenry is back from South Africa 

and met with the Vice President and Mr. Vance last week. 

The Vice President and Mr. Young discussed the new, more 

flexible attitude of South African Prime Minister Vorater 

on Namibia and the role that South West African People's 

Organization (SWAPO) can be expected to play. Mr. Young 

pointed out that the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 

will be a key force in persuading SWAPO to accept a settlement 

in the area. The OAU is meeting in Gabon next week, 

and several U.S. representatives will be present. 

— Mr. Young described frequent social contacts with 

the Soviets in New York. Mr. Vance said that the Soviets 

are also in frequent touch with the State Department in 

Washington. The President Baid that he favors our keeping 

every possible avenue open with the Soviets. He alBo 

commented that it was good that Mr. Brezhnev is now the 

official leader of the USSR. The President indicated his 

desire to find a convenient time to conduct broad-based 

discussions with Mr. Brezhnev. 

— Mr. Vance suggested that Cabinet members read an 

article by Peter Osnos on the USSR in yesterday's Washington 

Post. 

7. Mr. Marshall has just returned from four days at 

the International Labor Organization (ILO) Conference in 

Geneva. Although results are "mixedn, the U.S. has 



^ -5- ^ 

accomplished most: of what it set out to do at the meeting, 

and several foreign leaders were publicly supportive of 

our aims. 

— Mr. Marshall also met in Geneva with the labor 

ministers of several countries. They expressed a strong 

desire to keep the U.S. in the ILO and predicted that a 

U.S. withdrawal from the ILO would, in all likelihood, be 

fatal to the organization. The labor ministers yrere also 

interested in expanding technical cooperation and in our 

approach to the problems of youth unemployment. 

1 

— Mr. Marshall explained that frequent wildcat strikes 

have depleted the health and welfare funds of the UMW, and 

that the union may now be forced to cut health benefits. 

The UMW board meets today; if such a decision is made, a 

series of protest strikes might follow. Mr. Marshall said 

that plans are underway to form a committee within the 

government to review the situation. 

8. Attorney General Bell was in Canada last Friday 

and Saturday negotiating with the Minister of Justice concerning 

the extra-territorial effect of U.S. laws. 

— He said that the Korean CIA investigation is still 

underway in the Justice Department, and that there is 

absolutely no truth to recent press reports that Justice 

is "playing politics" with the investigation. 

— The president discussed the burdens imposed by a 

requirement in the Landrum Griffin Act that the Justice 

Department monitor union elections. The Attorney General 

stated that these monitoring requirements were more extensive 

than in the Voting Rights Act and {that he would look 

into the situation with Mr. Marshall. 

9. The Vice President reported that Mr. Andrus' trip 

to California was extremely well received, and that, during 

his own recent trip to San Francisco, he heard many compliments 

on Mr. Andrus. 

10. Mr. Blumcnthal said that he will testify later 

this morning on legislation to establish NOW accounts 

(checking accounts that pay interest). The idea has been 

tried in New England and will require uniform reserve 

requirements as well as a role by the Federal Reserve Board 

regarding initial interest payments. Mr. Blumenthal said 

that Arthur Burns would also testify on the bill. He estimated 

that the legislation has a 50/50 chance of passage. 

There is considerable disagreement among Federal financial 

institutions on the bill. 

No Objection To Declassification 2009/08/17 : NLG-7-11-7-1-4 

t

No Objection T> Declassification 2009/08/17 : NLCJ-7-1 ‘'-7-1-4 

' 

t 

-6- 

— Treasury officials have been meeting with various 

groups on the tax reform package. Later today, Mr. Blumenthal 

will brief Mb. Kreps and Messrs. Califano and Marshall on 

the subject. 

11. Mr. John White said that Mr. Bergland is winding 

up his Par East trip. 

— The Agriculture appropriations bill is on the 

House floor today, and the sugar provision will be controversial 

. 

— Late last Friday, 130 counties in Georgia were 

declared eligible for drought assistance. The President 

and several Cabinet members discussed the length and severity 

of the drought. 

12. Ms. Harris described her recent visit to the U.S. 

Conference of Mayors meeting in Tuc-aon. A resolution was 

passed unanimously complimenting HUD and the Administration 

for their urban initiatives. 

— The HUD appropriations bill passed the House. 

— The conference begins this week on the HUD authorizations 

bill, and Ms. Harris said that some minor questions 

are complicating the situation. 

— The President noted that virtually every resolution 

passed by the U.S. Conference of Mayors in the last six to 

eight years—with the exception of this recent Conference— 

has condemned the Administraton. He expressed sympathy 

for the difficult problems with which mayors must constantly 

deal and appreciation for their support. 

13. Dr. Schlesinger said that the utilities are lobbying 

against the coal conversion proposal in the energy plan. 

The liberals are raising environmental objections, and the 

Republicans are offering flat opposition Notwithstanding 

these problems, results of the recent voteB in the Ways 

and Means Committee were excellent. Ae asked the President 

for permission to negotiate on the gas guzzler tax, and the 

President noted that the Senate was more strongly in favor 

of the Administration's position than the House. 

— Dr. Schlesinger said that sentiment in the Congress 

was strongly in favor of retention of the nuclear fission 

option, and that the Clinch River power plant could only be 

killed on efficiency grounds. The President said that he 

has heard comments that the Administration speaks with an 

"uncertain voice" on Clinch River. Dr. Schlesinger said 

that ERDA had supported the Clinch River project for five 



-7- 

years, and -that although now the top people at ERDA are 

doing everything they can to reinforce the President’s 

position, there are some problems of support at the lower 

levels in the Agency. Dr. Schlesinger said that he would 

speak to the President about additional steps that might 

be taken to improve the situation. 

14. The President told Hr. Strauss that he likes the 

idea expressed in Mr. Strauss' weekly summary of putting 

together a trade group to visit Latin American aa a followup 

to Mrs. Carter's trip. The President said that concern 

was expressed about U.S. beef import quotas; he asked 

Mr. John White to look into our allocation program. The 

President made it clear that he was not proposing an 

increase in overall levels, but rather a review of the 

U.S. allocation among countries. 

15. Mr. Lance said that the spring budget review 

process will be completed this week, and that Bpending 

ceilings will be released next week. 

— Employees' ceilings were approved by the President 

and sent out over the weekend. Mr. Lance said that Jim 

King will be calling Cabinet Secretaries concerning some 

people who need to be placed. 

16. Mr. Adams will complete work within the next ten 

days on an automobile legislative package. He asked to 

meet briefly with the President on the issue of passive 

restraints in automobiles since a decision on that subject 

must be made by July 1. He underscored the comprehensive 

nature of his automobile proposals and said that emissions, 

mileage and safety features will all be included. 

— In recent speeches, Mr. Adams has tried to illustrate 

and emphasize the connection between the human rights 

theme and U.S. energy policy. Basically, he has pointed 

out that the U.S. is attempting to Bhow by its own affirmative 

actions that it will conserve the world's resources. 

— The DOT appropriations bill should be finished 

this week and should be held within the Administration's 

budget level. 

— Today is the final day for U.S./U.K. air negotiations. 

Mr. Adams is still optimistic*that an agreement 

will be signed. In his opinion, an extension of time would 

not be helpful Bince the basic issues have been under hard 

consideration for six months. He haB conferred with every 



-8- 

affected U.S. airline, all of which are prepared to move to 

alternate routes as of midnight Tuesday if an agreement is 

not reached. The President said he wants to be kept up to 

date on this issue and stressed that the American people 

do not yet understand it. Hr. Strauss observed that our 

positions on these issues and on airline deregulation are 

extremely politically saleable if they? are properly explained. 

Mr. Adams said that a statement has been prepared in the 

event that the U.S. and U.K. fail to reach agreement. The 

President emphasized that a clear and simple explanation of 

the primary issues will need to be made to the public. 

17. Ms. KrepB said that she has sent the President a 

memorandum on cargo preference. 

— The Commerce Department has been working closely 

with Stu Eizenstat's staff on regulations to implement 

the anti-boycott legislation which recently passed the 

Congress. Mr. Vance said that the reactions of many foreign 

governments to the legislation have been good, and that the 

Saudi's need to be kept informed. Attorney General Bell 

emphasized the importance of letting foreign governments 

know how they can comment on the regulations. The President 

suggested that Ms. Kreps invite foreign ambassadors in for 

a briefing on the proposed regulations, and Mr. Vance said 

that this procedure would be most helpful. Mr. Califano 

pointed out that most foreign governments have Washington 

counsol who represent their interests in formal administrative 

proceedings, and that any special meetings should not 

be inconsistent with these formal legaS. channels. Ms. Kreps 

said that the legislation is specific and does not leave 

much flexibility for the regulations, but Mr. Strauss said 

that perception is the opposite and that most observers 

believe there ij! considerable flexibility. 

18. Dr. Brown said that plans are going forward regarding 

his consultations with Korean officials next month. 

He reported that the Koreans and the Japanese appear to be 

adjusting well to our new policy in the area. Dr. Brown 

is also developing recommendations on arms transfers and 

credits. Congress has set a number of hearings on our Korea 

policy—both in the House and Senate. Admiral Turner, 

General George Brown and others have been called to testify. 

Dr. Brzezinski said that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

wants the NSC to release a CIA document on the withdrawal 

of ground troops from Korea. He has declined the 

request on grounds that this would compromise the President's 

decision-making process. He plans to brief the Committee 

on the subject. 


f

No Objection To Declassification 2009/0B/17 : NLC-7-1W-1-4 

-9- 

— The House and Senate committees have finished 

hearings on the DOD authorisation and are working on 

their reports. Their money totals are close to Administration 

figures, but many details are quite different. 

It is already clear that the appropriations committees will 

not include everything in the authorizing legislation. 

The House appropriations committee has reduced the DOD 

budget by $2.5 billion; the Senate is waiting to see what 

the final decision on authorization is before it acts. A 

key issue will be adding back funds for a nuclear carrier— 

presently not in the House appropriations committee draft. 

Dr. Brown then commented briefly on the length of the 

House appropriations committee report. Virtually everyone 

of the 300+ pages in the report contains detailed instructions 

to the Department. Other members of the Cabinet 

discussed similar problems their departments have with 

detailed Congressional directives in committee reports. 

— DOD will meet the 0MB employee ceilings. 

19. The President described Congressional cuts to his 

foreign aid proposals as "drastic" and said that some of 

the restrictions imposed are "debilitating." 

— He reiterated his request to Cabinet members to 

fill regional appointments promptly. 

— He urged Cabinet members to attend the Democratic 

fund raiBer in New York on June 23. A special plane will 

be going up in the afternoon, and space may also be available 

on Air Forae 1 and Air Forae 2. 

The meeting was adjourned by the President at 11:07 a.m. 


f . 

No Objection To Declassification in Full £012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-7-1-2 

^ 

* W NSC#6032 


Aaih rjta-. 3.C. 2C5ZJ 

-60HFIBEMTW. 


'!& 



QOS REVIEWED 01-Feb 2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 

Subject: Non-Proliferation: Proposed Public Statements 

on Swiss and FRG Contracts with Argentina 

Ref: 

Your Memorandum to Secretary Vance of October 

18, 1979 

i 

We have carefully considered the action proposed 

in your memorandum of October 18 in the context of 

further diplomatic efforts we are contemplating to 

influence the safeguard condi tior^s to be applied by 

Switzerland and the FRG to nuclear sales to 

Argentina. Our judgment is that we should hold off 

public statements until it is clear that our diplomatic 

efforts have been unsuccessful. We plan to undertake 

the following next steps: 

— We will consult as called for by the London 

Suppliers Guidelines with Canada, the FRG, the Swiss 

and possibly the UK on the safeguard requirements. 

The FRG has already agreed in principle to such consultations. 

Gerard Smith, when he is in Bonn this 

week for post-INFCE discussions, will say to 

Genscher that we wish to consult with the above states 

on Argentina. We expect Genscher will assent to this. 

We will then contact the Swiss and other participants 

to arrange the consultations. 

— In these consultations we will emphasize that 

Argentina is an exceptional case in order to avoid a 

debate about the merits of requiring full-scope 

safeguards on a generic basis: sensitive heavy water 

technology as well as reactor sales are involved; 

Argentina has split its order among a number of 

suppliers in part to avoid the full-scope safeguard 

requirement; and suppliers have a shared responsibility 

to prevent this "divide and conquer" strategy from 

succeeding. 

declassified 

E.0.13526 

RDS-1 10/25/99 Authority-frlv ^ 

NARA__JdE----- Deto 

u 

OIf- • *r 

■ r r t m * . i 

-V


2 

— We are considering letters from the Secretary to 

Genscher and Swiss Foreign Minister Aubert to reinforce 

our concerns on this matter. 

We believe our diplomatic efforts have some chance 

for success and would be endangered by going public now 

with our concerns. Upon Gerry Smith's return about 

November 8 we will assess whether diplomatic efforts are 

still worth pursuing and how and when to make this matter 

public. 

Peter Tarnoff 


QONRBBffltfr 

\lr» Ohiertinn Tn nerlafisifinatinn in Full 7012/12/12 ■ Nl G-R-4-7-1-2

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-16-7,*- 


WASHINGTON 


POS REVIEWED~6l -FBb-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 


From: 

Subject: 

THE VICE PRESIDENT 

Cyrus Vance 

Meeting with Argentine President Videla 

You are scheduled to meet with Argentine 

President Videla September 4 In Rotas to discuss U.S.-Argentine 

relations and ways to reverse a precipitous deterioration 

in our relations* The basic point you should make 

is that we seriously wish to improve relations as conditions 

permit and that a comprehensive and thorough review of our 

total relationship may be desirable* Assistant Secretary 

Vaky has been designated to undertake this task and is prepared 

to make arrangements with President Videla for this 

purpose * 

SETTING 

Faced with a once Bevsre terrorist threat* the military 

government in Argentina has seriously abused basic 

human rights (Attachment 1}* The United States has as a 

result restricted military Bales (gji embargo on the sale of 

Munitions List items will go into effect October 1* Attachment 

2T7"TTe'JLa hack approval of Argentine transactions in 

the Export-import Bank, and voted against Argentine loan 

proposals in the International Financial Institutions 

(Attachment 3}. We have sought to induce improvement by 

indicating that Argentine steps in this direction would 

result in relaxing these restrictions. 

Initially, the Argentine Government reacted to our 

pressure with some restraint and sought to convince us 

of the necessity of itB actions. More recently, however, 

it has moved rapidly to diversify its international ties, 

reassess its relationship with ub, and prepare to adopt 

an adversarial course. 

In a major attempt to encourage progress in human 

rights and improve "relations, Under Secretary Newsom 

visited Argentina last May and suggested that some 

r* .n r— 

1—»lrf r*—it 

i ^ La 3 

XGDS-3 

NuClS 

Authority 

MARA— 

declassified 

E.O.13526 

^V-C. -It 

Date. 

^ 

|No Objection To Declassification in (Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-16-7


W W IT\C- 3 nod i s 

2 

relaxation of our restrictive actions would be possible 

if the Argentine government would take one or more of 

the following steps (Attachment 4): 

-- Agreement with the Inter-American Human Rights 

Commission (IAHRC) on a visit to Argentina; 

— Try, release, or allow exile for the prisoners 

held without charge; 

-- Establish a mechanism to inform families of the 

fate of the disappeared. 

While Mr. Newsom was given a courteous and sympathetic 

reception, the Argentine authorities have not taken any 

significant steps forward Bince his visit. Reaction in 

Argentina to our pressure, on the other hand, has been 

severe. Contrary to our own view, many Argentines consider 

that the situation has measurably improved in the last 

two years. The recent denial of an Ex-Im letter of 

interest to AlliB-Chalmers for the sale of hydroelectric 

equipment, in particular, was seen âs a deliberate escalation 

in our sanctions. 

As the most powerful Spanish-speaking country of 

South America, Argentina could become a significant negative 

force in areas important to us such as nuclear proliferation 

(Attachment 5), regional security arrangements, 

conventional arms restraint, and Third World issues. 

Videla'B Approach 

We do not know exactly what Videla will say* He may 

simply give the standard Argentine exposition -- that 

human rights violations are an unfortunate, if unavoidable 

and necessary, by-product of the effort to Buppresa a vicious 

terrorist campaign, which threatens Argentina with anarchy. 

On the other hand, there is also the possibility that he 

might bring some new concrete points, explain steps they 

are now prepared to take (particularly in regard to the 

Human Rights Commission), and suggestions on the future 

evolution of U•S.-Argentine relations. 

Your Approach 

----- ------- ? 

Your approach should be sympathetic. You would wish 

to avoid commitments in response to specific suggestions, 

if any, but would note that you will carry Videla's 

NOD IS

No Objection To Declassification in l-ull 'IWHVAVl: NLU-b-4-b-lb-/T 

w oj_^rsc.! 

- 3 - 

liODIS 

message back to President Carter. 

We recommend you say specifically: 

— On our side, we seriously wish to improve relations; 

-- As a token of this, we have taken — and are taking 

Borne modest stepB, such as release of export 

licenses for ambulance aircraft as well as Army 

helicopters, airport radar equipment, voice 

security communications equipment and other items 

on our Munitions Export Control List. 

— While we understand the tragic history of Argentina's 

domestic political conflict, we remain 

concerned over the human rights situation, specifically 

the treatment of the human person* 

-- We wish to maintain normal relations in as many 

areas as possible, as is evidenced, for example, 

by the forthcoming bilateral economic consultations 

(Attachment 6), and are prepared to expand 

these relations aB conditions permit* 

— We believe a thorough and comprehensive review 

of the whole gamut of our relations would be 

desirable. The President and the Secretary of 

State have asked Assistant Secretary Vaky to 

undertake this* 

— The place and format for such consultations would 

be for President Videla to decdde. Assistant 

Secretary Vaky is willing tô come to Buenos Aires, 

as previously proposed. 

NODI S 

|No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-16-7|


( * MEMORANDUM 

CQfrFlDENTTAEr 




FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSK1 



Mexico. Owen chaired a meeting last evening to task different agencies 

on follow-up activities after the President's trip. I am combining 

these tasks into a single follow-up memorandum from you to the agencies, 

and hope to get that to you by tomorrow. In addition, I have met with 

Joseph Friedkin, Chairman of the U.S. side of the International 

Boundary anc( Water Commission, to discuss the agreement by the two 

Presidents to find a permanent solution to the sanitation problem. He 

has a specific proposal, but apparently, ETA must clear it. I drafted 

a short memo from you to the President on this issue, and subsequently 

called the EPA Administrator's office to ask that they expedite their 

clearance of the IBWC proposal. (C) 

t 

I met with Governor Askew, who will be the Chairman of the President's 

Commission on Immigration and Refugees, to discuss his trip to Mexico 

on March ’7. The President has decided to defer making any decisions on 

legislation until after Askew speaks to Lopez Portillo and reports to him. 

Askew is learning about these issues very quickly, and intends to run a 

taut Commission, and although he realizes there is no permanent solution 

to the problem, he intends to try to press for a consensus report. He has 

spoken to Rodino and Kennedy, and both agreed on the need to postpone the 

Commission's report until after the 1980 elections. $tu Eisenstat has 

apparently changed his position on this issue as a result of his trip to 

Mexico with us last week; he- now supports our position of deferring a 

decision until the Commission issues its report. (C) 

Mexico's first political party, PRI, is celebrating its 50th Anniversary 

soon, and has invited delegates from the Democrat and Republican Party. 

I spoke to John White about trying to get some high-level delegates to 

the Anniversary, but White had already asked three Mexican-Americans to 

represent the Democratic Party. Ambassador Linowitz called and said that 

Mexican Ambassador Margain had congratulated Linowitz for being appointed 

the President's coordinator on Mexican affairs. ‘ Linowitz wanted to know 


f 

CQitflDCWTIjar -2- 

Phil Weiss asked me to take care of a problem which has emerged as a 

result of the President's agreeing to a proposal that Dolph Brisco, 

rormer Governor of Texas, be designated the President's personal repre— 

sentative for agricultural programs in Mexico. Lucey and State oppose 

the idea, but USDA and John White want it. For reasons which go beyond 

the comprehension of a city slicker like myself, Brisco is also interested 

in becoming the President's personal representative for the US-Mexico 

screwworm program, and State Department's objections do not seem to be 

too valid. I will try to work this out next week. (C) 

Feheuer has asked for another briefing on the President's immigration 

policy, and I have asked whether it would be possible to put it off until 

after the President gives the briefing next Wednesday. I called Congressman 

Wolfe to tell him that we had implemented his recommendation 

on narcotics in the communique as well as in the private conversations 

and he was pleased. (C) 

Francis Mason, Senior Vice President of Chas& Manhattan, stopped by and 

asked whether US policy on three financial issues to Mexico would change 

as a result of the President's visit. I told him that the three issues, ' 

which are quite specific, were not raised, but I will try to follow UP 

with Treasury. (C) 

Vice President's Trip. I met with Denis Clift and Pete Vaky to discusa 

additional papers which the Vice President requested for his trip to 

Venezuela and Brazil. It looks as if there will be many heads of state 

and foreign ministers at both inaugurations, and we will try to prepare 

the Vice President for meetings which are likely to occur in the course 

of events. (C) 

Ecuador. The Ecuadorian Charge Sevilla Borja came in to express great 

Ecuadorian concern about the increasingly provocative.gestures of Peru 

towards Ecuador as well as towards Chile. He believes that the Peruvian 

military may be making these gestures for internal political reasons, or 

perhaps because they have some belligerent intentions. He also said that 

the Ecuadorian election is on stream and he expects it will be a fair 

election. (C) 

| * 

Human Rights. Spoke with John Spiegel of Christopher's office who 

informed me that Christopher has decided to continue our policy of abstaining 

on loans to El Salvador until after we receive the response from 

President Romero to our demarche. On Argentina, he said that Christopher 

and Vance have been persuaded by a human rights assessment paper which 

has been prepared in State, and they are prepared to begin voting "no" 

on loans to Argentina. I asked whether it would be possible to see 

such a paper, and informed him of your interest and the President's interest 

in any decision on Argentina, requesting that they suspend a decision 

until after we have had an opportunity to review the paper. He agreed to 

send the paper and to try to get a postponement. (C) 

60NFIDEHTIAL 


CK( 2lSV9^' 


5-' Central America. Had a good talk with Erb and Gert Rosenthal, 

Director of Mexico City office of ECLA, about the impending crisis in 

Central America. I am working with Vaky on a PRM on Central America, 

but State is not anxious for a PRM? they would prefer to do it themselves {C) 

G. NAM. State has reworked the paper which I sent them on a suggested 

approach to the NAM, and our differences are very minor at this point. 

I made some suggestions, and they will send the final version over 

shortly. I will then distribute it to staff for discussion at that point(C) 

7. France/Brazil. A French official of the CNES told a NASA representstive 

in private that his organization is under strict instructions from 

senior government levels not to assist the Brazilians in developing 

rockets with military weapons capability. He said that.the French were 

fully aware that the GOB had obtained significant powder technology from 

an Italian source, filament winding machinery from German•sources and so 

on. The French, he indicated, would not provide the Brazilians with the 

necessary technology to enable the GOB to put all the components together 

for a missile with military capability. (S) 

8. Mexico/US/Canada. In response to a question from the floor of the 

Canadian House of- Commons about the possibility «.of a North American 

Common Market, the Canadian Minister of Energy replied that Canada would 

want to be "very chary" about such a proposal because it might be no 

more than a "disguise for a continental energy policy of a different 

kind." The question arose when an M.P. read the Reston interview with 

Lopez Portillo who referred to the possibility of creating a common 

market of customs union. (U) 

• i 

t 

-3- 

seesET- 



__£3QNHSENTT>CC 


MEETING 

President Carter with President Jorge Rafael Videla 

of Argentina 

September 9. 1977 - 9: 00 a.m. 

Cabinet Room - White House 

Checklist and Follow-up Items 

1. Videla said that as soon as political conditions permit — perhaps 

before the end of the year, Argentina would ratify the Treaty of 

Tlatelolco. 

2. President Carter told Videla the USG wfuld talk to the Cubans 

about signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He asked whether Argentina 

would send representatives to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation 

Conference on October 19 - 21, 1977. 

3. President Carter said he would provide the Department of State 

for onward transmission to the Government of Argentina, a list 

prepared by a Washington human rights group containing the 

names of 3,000 individuals being detained in Argentina. 

% 

4. Videla said he hoped that the problem of detainees might be 

resolved by Christmas 1977. 

5. In response to President Carter's inquiry whether it might 

be possible to send representatives of die OAS or UN to confirm 

human rights progress in Argentina sometime after Christmas, 

Videla referred to recent visits by USG officials and said such 

visits are the best way to show that Argentina is not ashamed 

of its record. Videla said he was not troubled by visits by 

international human rights commissions ^which testify to the 

facts in Argentina. 

6. The President and Secretary Vance accepted Videla's invitation 

for the Secretary to visit Argentina after his trip to Brazil to 

complete bilateral consultations. 

■CONFIDENTIAL 

DECLASSIFIED 

Authority 

Nara_££— Del°

— inu vjujeuuuii i u ueuassmuauun zuua/uo/ iu . in/u-o-1- i 

PAGE 01 

ORIGIN ARA-14 

CONFIDENTIAL 


STATE 13B133 

OUTGOING 

TELEGRAM 

2B16 

iV' 

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EB-07 DHA-02 IGA-02 L-03 H-01 

SCS-03 10-13 CIAE-00 OODE — 00 PM-04 INR-07 NSAE-00 

NSC-0 5, PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-13 U5IA-0B /087 R 

DRAFTED BY ARA: ECA: FERONDON: LK 

APPROVED BY ARA: ECA: R WZ I MMERMANN 

EB/IFD/ODF: F THOMAS IDRAFTI 

D/HA: MBOVA (DRAFT) 

---------------------------------------------------1 3 2 0 03 Z 033060 /7 3 

P 131723Z JUN 77 

FM SECSTATE WASHDC ? 

TO AMEMBAS5Y BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 

•C-O-N PiULNTIAL 'STATE 136133 

E. O. 1 1652: GD5 

TAGS: 

EFIN, AR, US, PORG, SHUM 

SUBJECT: 

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ZFIS 

1. ARGENTINE POLITICAL COUNSELOR BEAUGE RAISED $100 

MILLION WORLD BANK LOAN FOR ARGENTINA WITH ARA/ECA ON 

JUNE 13. BEAUGE A5KEO HOW U. S. WOULD VOTE. DEPTOFF 

REPLIED THAT HE COULD ONLY SAY WE WILL NOT SUPPORT THE 

LOAN. BEGIN FYI: WE ARE PLANNING TO ABSTAIN AND MAKE A 

STATEMENT. END FYI. 

2. BEAUGE ASKED IF IT IS TOO LATE FOR ARGENTINE DEVELOP 

MENTS TO INFLUENCE VOTE. DEPTOFF ANSWERED THAT IT IS NOT 

TOO LATE. BEAUGE THEN ASKED WHAT KIND OF EVENTS WOULD 

INFLUENCE US. DEPTOFF REMINDED BEAUGE THAT WE HAVE BEEN 

RAISING SEVERAL PRIORITY CONCERNS FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. 

DEPTOFF SPELLED OUT NEED FOR ACTION IN FOLLOWING AREAS: 

NEED TO PUBLISH A LIST OF ALL PRISONERS BEING HELD 

BY GOVERNMENT. 

NEED TO BRING PEOPLE TO TRIAL OR FREE THEM. 

NEED TO REGULARIZE DETENTION PROCEDURES AND END 

DISAPPEARANCES. 

DESIRABILITY OF REINSTITUTING "RIGHT OFtOPTION. " 

WHICH ALLOWS INDIVIDUALS BEING HELD WITHOUT CHARGES 

TO OPT FOR VOLUNTARY EXILE AS LONG AS STATE OF SIEGE 

LASTS. 

NEED TO PUNISH EXCESSE5 INCLUDING TORTURE. 

3. DEPTOFF ALSO RAZ5ED POSSIBILITY OF INVITING INTER- 

AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. BEAUGE ASKED IF U. S. 

WOULD REFRAIN FROM UNILATERAL CRITICISM WHILE IAHRC WAS 

STUDYING ARGENTINA. DEPTOFF SAID THAT HE COULD NOT REPLY 

BUT THAT U. S. SUPPORTS COMMISSION STRONGLY AND WOULD DO 

NOTHING TO UNDERMINE IT5 WORK. FURTHERMORE, AN INVITATION 

TO THE COMMISSION WOULD TEND TO LESSEN NEED FOR U. S. 

ACTION. DEPTOFF WARNED, HOWEVER, THAT. ABOVE ALL, EVENTS 

IN ARGENTINA WOULD DICTATE U.S. ACTION. BEAUGE COMMENTED 

THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE 

POLITICALLY FOR ARGENTINA TO INVITE IAHRC. VANCE 

. • 

QECLASSIRED 

E.O.:iSS2B 

Authority . 

NARA—fcJc___ Data------ ------------------- - 

-ftWF IDENTIC- • 

No Objection To Declassification 2009/06/10 :?NLC-24-70-6-1-1

* jm V No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-9-8-4- 

/“j 

Weekly Report - Thursday, June 16, 1977 

DOS REVIEWED 08-Jun-'20:Q: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE i\ FULL. 

i 

Recent Developments (Pastor) 

Mrs. Carter's Trip. Mrs. Carter returned from her seven-country, 

12-day junket on Sunday, having won over ail the Latin American 

Heads of State she visited. Relations were improved with every country. 

U.S . commitment on major issues was restated with great eloquence 

and forcefulness . Staff work was impeccable. 

OAS General Assembly. Secretary Vance 's remarks at the OAS General 

Assembly defined the terms of the conference in his stress on human 

rights and OAS organizational reform. Costa Rica, Peru, Ecuador, 

Venezuela and Mexico are the supporting the initiatives mentioned in 

Vance's remarks, while Argentina, Brazil and Chile rather predicably 

opposed them. 

Panama. Canal Treaty negotiations are moving quite quicky and as 

a result each obstacle appears major and more difficult than it 

might were negotiations moving more gradually. The Negotiators, 

however, have reached a compromise on the issue of whether U.S . 

Naval vessels should receive preferential treatment over other 

vessels in times of emergency. The next issue which will cause 

perhaps the biggest problem will be the problem of compensation. 

Panama would like $1.0 billion down and $300 million on an annual' 

basis while Congress believes that the United States should be 

compensated for giving up the Canal. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

E.O. 13526 

mqlv--. 

Data__-------------------- 


r

No Objection I o Ueclassitication in hull 2in3/U2/U4 : NLU-24-b/-y-8-4 

CONMDENHAtr 

Alort Items (Pastor) 

The Perez State Visit in less than two weeks will probably be the most 

important State Visit by any Latin American in the next few years. 

President Perez has given us a quite specific agenda, and we should 

be prepared to either accept his proposals or offer other equally concrete 

ones . The United States and Venezuela have mucî in common on the 

major issues of human rights, nonproliferatioî and arms control, and 

cooperation between our two countries may be the best way to pursue 

these goals. 

Guatemala is becoming increasingly worried lhat the UK will announce 

the independence of Belize before there is an opportunity to reach a 

compromise. If this occurs, Guatemala appears to be prepared to go 

to war. Guatemala believes that U.S . intervention is necessary for 

settlement, and we are presently exploring different proposals with 

Mexico, the UK, and Venezuela. This may be another important 

item for the State Visit of the Venezuelan President. 

t 

COWFIDENTfrtL 

l 



MEMORANDUM 

-ECItET 


V> 


, FROM: 


. SUBJECT: 

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSK1 

LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor) ^ 

Evening Report (U)* 

Nicaragua: The Nicaraguan Junta has scheduled a meeting with OAS 

Secretary General Orfila tomorrow to sign the American Convention 

on Human Rights. Attached is a memcon of the meeting this morning, 

and a preview of the supplemental. (C) 

El Salvador: Attacks on five separate National Guard posts indicate 

a significant departure from past guerrilla operations and a new 

capability of guerrilla groups to jointly plan and conduct operations 

using heavier weapons. (S) 

Caribbean: Met with State's Caribbean country director to discuss 

next steps in our Caribbean Policy. Vaky will chair an interagency 

group to review our bilateral relations with Guyana, Jamaica, 

and Grenada, to discuss how we can contribute to a regional Coast 

Guard, and to discuss ways to expand ICA's program in the region. 

A British team will stop in Washington■in October to give us its 

preliminary assessment of the Coast Guard. Then Habib will lead 

a team to London a week later to firm up security arrangements. (S) 

i 

v 

Jamaica: The Cuban Ambassador held a ifress conference to accuse 

• the opposition Labor Party and Jamaica's major daily of lying 

about him and Cuba. Labor Party leader Seaga will reply to the 

Cuban Ambassador in a big rally planned for September 30, when 

he plans to make public more evidence of Cuban activities. 

According to Seaga, the press conference was the best thing that 

happened to the Labor Party in some time. Sent you a memo 

describing the strategy we are pursuing to react to Manley's 

new direction. (C) 

Panama: Met with the Vice President and his staff to discuss his 

schedule in Panama and the issues that will come up in his 

bilaterals. (C) 

Press Contacts: None. Worked on Vance's speech on Latin America 

for FPA on Thursday. It still needs a lot of work. (C) 

Argentina: The members of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission 

certainly succeeded in raising the consciousness of the 

Argentine public. It will not be easy for the government to slip 

backwards after this visit. Even the Peronists will be watching 

i closely and will not hesitate. (C) 

t DECLASSIFIED 

■ CECrr.T___ 

Review on 9/24/85 Authority 

E.O. 13526 

-t 

I 

NAHA_£E__ Data _______

'TIA^° Objection To Declassification in =ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-54-6-7-2 

INFORMATION 


April*18, 1979 


FROM; 

SUBJECT; 

DAVID AARON 



Mexico. Attended a meeting chaired by Jules Katz with the 

industry and consumer representatives interested in the gas 

negotiations. He briefed them in a very general way and asked 

as well as solicited some questions. It went well. He are 

sending the proposal down to the Mexicans tonite with talking 

points for Lucey to use if the Mexicans initial response is 

very negative. Two new problems on the horizoA on U.S./Mexican 

relations are: tomatoes and mixed credits — the French 

have arranged an agreement on mixed credits with the Mexicans 

which upsets Treasury and they want to make a demarche to the 

French. I think that will be as effective as our demarche to 

Bonn in January 1977 on the Brazil nuclear agreement. I will 

try to turn Treasury off. (C) 

Argentina. Lunched with Ambassador Raul Castro, who informed 

me of the recent inprovement in the human rights situation and 

said he expects further improvement as Videla gets stronger. 

The Argentines promised him for the umpteenth time that they 

would ratify Tlatelolco at the end of this month; we spoke 

about the possibility of his returning to Argentina with a 

letter from Vance to Videla repeating our great concern. Labor 

problems will be more troublesome this year but he thinks the 

Argentine government will be able to manage it, although they 

will have to dismiss their Finance Minister. (C) 

Nicaragua. Two important leaders of Nicaragua's business sector 

met with me and informed me of recent developments which have 

strengthened the middle. They urged us to appoint a good new 

ambassador soon and I assured them we will. They said that such 

an ambassador will help the middle in Nicaragua and we should 

look for additional symbolic ways to strengthen the middle; 

they suggested a meeting with the Vice President. (At the 

right time I think this is a good idea.) They also suggested 

that we should take some steps to counter Somoza propaganda 

that Solaun's resignation represents a Sdmoza triumph. I will 

suggest that State draft a Presidential letter to Solaun thanking 

him for his excellent service. (C) 

Science and Technology. Briefed a group of people from different 

agencies on the Vice President's conversations with Figueiredo and 

Herrera on S s T, suggested some ideas for ways to package an overall 

approach on S & T to Latin America 

(C) 

E.0.13526 

Authority.-TS!■(* r1*-1-H 

NARA_££____Date tHllk------------


CONFIDENTATr— 

MEETING 



September 9, 1977 - 9: 00 a.m. 





Tlatelolco. 

2. 

President Carter told Videla the USG would talk to the Cubans 

about sighing the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He asked whether Argentina 



a 

President Carter said he would provide t?he Department of State 


prepared by a Washington human rights group'containing the 

names of 3,0Q0 individuals being .detained in Argentina. 

l 

4. 

•5. 

V 

V^dd^;»aid the problem of detainees might be ; 

res^vedby1^77. ‘ 

In res^gnse to President (barter's inquiry.■sêther & Flight 

be possible to s?Snd Representatives of tlê UlAS or‘UN to confirm 

human, rights pnjêea in Argentina somefinxq'after Christmas, 

Vidîa Referred fcbrr^fcent yîts by USG offitdAlS’and’said sujph 

visits are the'ttest vUay' to show, that .ArgentinaHe net ashamed 

of its.recordv' Videla' $aid he w^s not troubled by visits'hy 4 

international humah rights commissions wbidh testify to the 


6. The President-and Secretary Vance accepted Videla1 s invitation 

for the Secretary to visit Argentina! after hijp/tHp tci;Brazil to 


^ 

CQNEUBffNTT AT 

ft. 

DECLASSIRED 

E.0.13526 

Authority 

NARA_Jce&— Data—Ml\i-----

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29 NLG-21-25-2-3-6 

i'AB 1 

CONPffHSNTTAL 

CONSULTATIONS 

The President's OAS pledge to consult closely with 

our American neighbors in advance of major global policy 

decisions has been widely welcomed. Hir. personal consultations 

on sugar and Mrs. Carter's trip demonstrate that 

prior contacts can advance our interests. 

The Latins doubt, however, that we will actually 

hold prior discussions with them on'major issues — at 

an adequate level and in a timely manner. *They have 

heard this pledge before. And they kno^ genuine consultations 

are rare. 

Such procedures do not imply a "special relationship" 

with Latin America; on the contrary, they should be 

applied to all areas, as a matter of sound diplomatic 

practice. They do mean, in our own self interest, giving, 

such countries a seat at the table when global issues 

which affect them are being decided. 

Proposed Approach 

We should promote informal, businesslike discussions 

among neighbors on common problems and'differing perceptions. 

This would set a style for Inter-American affairs 

4 which all sides have wanted but never achieved. It 

would greatly strengthen our relations with Latin America. 

Action Program 

1. to initiate a carefully orchestrated program 

of high-level visits, including1: [ * 

Andy Young's trip to the Caribbean basin; 

- Bob Strauss' swing to major countries on 

trade issues; 

- a series of visits to South and Central America 

later this year by Terry Todman, Gale McGee 

and Secretary Vance, focused on major political 

issues; a special visit to Brazil and Argentina 

this fall by Gerard Smith to discuss nuclear energy 

DECLASSIFIED 

E-O. 13526 

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29 : NLC-21-25-2-3-6 

• I

no UDjection to ueciassitication in i-uii ûiu/uo/â : nlu-^wq-^-j-o 

^CpNFXDBMTTTOT^ 

alternatives; and trips by John Gilligan and 

Abelardo Valdez to selected countries, on 

aid matters; 

intensified contacts by Mike Blumenthal and 

Tony Solomon on financial issues; a similar 

program by Jim Schlesinger on energy, both 

with full participation by State; and possible 

visits by senior officials of NASA and other 

agencies on scientific matters; and 

- a coordinated series of visits by senior 

civilian and military officials to explain 

our arms transfer policies and our unified 

posture on human rights; 

Above and beyond the substantive progress we hope 

to achieve through such visits, they will have a 

significant public impact which itself should 

serve to underscore our policy Objectives. 

! 

2. to establish more effective interagency coordination 

procedures, to assure that U.S.officials 

in all agencies convey consistent and up-to-date 

Administration policy in the many forums in which 

we interact with Latin America; 

3• to strengthen bilateral consultations with major 

nations: Mexico (already fuiictioning), Brazil 

(modified meetings are planned for this fall), 

and Venezuela; 

4. to reform multilateral hemispheric institutions 

(primar ily'within theOAj> system) : we plan jbo 

review all bodies to determine which should be 

strengtheneS -- institutionally and financially — 

as a basis for more effective consultations, and 

which should be dropped; 

5• to consult with Latin American and other developing 

countries1, at appropriate levels, regularly and on 

a meaningful'basis, on major issues in advance of ' 

multilateral meetings at the UN ", IMF,' M(£n, etc; and 

{ 

6. to assure that persons representing a broadened 

spectrum of Latin American opinion have regular 

access to U.S. policy makers, in all agencies. 

t 

¥ 

OCQMflDDNTIAL 

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29 : NLC-21-25-2-3-6 .

CQHW-DEN5-IAL-- - 

----r$z----- 

to demonstrate our interest in non-official 

perspectives (to be developed^ also through 

the cultural initiatives proposed in Tab 4). 

t 

■CONFIDEHTTATi . 

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/06/29 NLC-21-25-2-3-6

mm 

■No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/09/28 : NLC-15R-7-3-1- 

--COHMDENTiAL . OUTGOING 30 

Department of State TELEGRAM-""^ 

DOS REVIEWED 28-FBb-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 

PAGE 01 STATE 130133 2110 

ORIGIN ARA-14 

2NFO OCT-01 

SCS-03 

B5S.TW 

ISO-00 EB-07 DHA-02 IGA-02 L-03 H-01 

10-13 CZAE-00 OODE-00 PM-04 XNR-07 NSAE-00 

PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 S5-13 USXA—00 /0B7 R 

DRAFTED BY ARA: ECAi FERONDON: LK 

APPROVED BY ARA; ECA: RWZXMMERMANN 

EB/XFD/ODFi FTHOMAS (DRAFT) 

D/HAi MBOVA DRAFT) 

---------------------------------------132003Z 033000 /78 

P 131723Z JUN 77 

FM SECSTATE WASHOC 

TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AXRES PRIORITY 

G N F ■■ I O -E -N-- T..J A-fc- STATE 13B133 

E. O. 1 10521 GOS 

TAGS: 

EFIN, AR, US, PORG, SHUM 

SUBJECTi HUMAN RXGHT5 AND THE XFXS 

1. ARGENTINE POLITICAL COUNSELOR BEAUGE RAISED 5100 

MILLION WORLD BANK LOAN FOR ARGENTINA WITH ARA/ECA ON 

JUNE 13. BEAUGE ASKED HOW U. S. WOULD VOTE. DEPTOFF 

REPLIED THAT HE COULD ONLY SAY WE WILL NOT SUPPORT THE 

LOAN. BEGIN FYI: WE ARE PLANNING TO ABSTAZM AND MAKE A 

STATEMENT. END FYI. 

2, BEAUGE ASKED IF XT IS TOO LATE FOR ARGENTINE DEVELOP 

MENTS TO INFLUENCE VOTE. DEPTOFF ANSWERED THAT IT IS NOT 

TOO LATE. BEAUGE THEN ASKED WHAT KINO OF EVENTS WOULD 

INFLUENCE US. DEPTOFF REMINDED BEAUGE THAT WE HAVE BEEN 

RAISING SEVERAL PRIORITY CONCERNS FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. 

DEPTOFF SPELLED OUT NEED FOR ACTION IN FOLLOWING AREAS: 

- NEED TO PUBLISH A LIST OF ALL PRISONERS BEING HELD 

BY GOVERNMENT. 

NEED TO BRING PEOPLE TO TRIAL OR FREE THEM. 

- NEED TO REGULARIZE DETENTION PROCEDURES AND END 

DISAPPEARANCES. 

- DESIRABILITY OF REINSTITUTING "RIGHT OF OPTION," 

WHICH ALLOWS INDIVIDUALS BEING HELD WITHOUT CHARGES 

TO OPT FOR VOLUNTARY EXILE AS LONG AS STATE OF SIEGE 

LA5TS. 

NEED TO PUNISH EXCESSES INCLUDING TDRTURE. 

3. DEPTOFF ALSO RAISED POSSIBILITY OF INVITING INTER- 

AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. BEAUGE ASKED IF U. S. 

WOULD REFRAIN FROM UNILATERAL CRITICISM WHILE XAHRC WAS 

STUDYING ARGENTINA. DEPTOFF SAID THAT HE COULD NOT REPLY 

•BUT THAT U. S. SUPPORTS COMMISSION STRONGLY AND WOULD DO 

NOTHING TO UNDERMINE ITS WORK. FURTHERMORE. AN INVITATION 

TO THE COMMISSION WOULD TEND TO LESSEN NEED FOR U. S. 

ACTION. DEPTOFF WARNED, HOWEVER, THAT, ABOVE ALL, EV6NTS 

IN ARGENTINA WOULD DICTATE U. S. ACTION. BEAUGE COMMENTED 

THAT HE DZD NOT KNOW WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE 

POLITICALLY POR ARGENTINA TO INVITE IAHRC. VANCE 

declassified 

V/:- *£.0,13526. ;■•■■■ . ^ 

atthaity V11 r—rti- r,T1> ■* — 

NARA__&£— OSAO --- ;— 

----------«Aiir i fir ut i n 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/09/28 : NLC-15R-7-3-1-5

a m 



WASHINGTON 

DOS REVIEWED 02-Fob-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE l\ FULL] 

May 26, 1978 


THE PRESIDENT 

FROM: * Cyrus Vance 

t 

Argentina. On Wednesday, Under Secretary Newsom 

met with President Videla in Buenos Aires concerning 

human rights conditions in Argentina and the effect 

they are having on our relations. Newsom reports 

that there is reason for some optimism that the human 

rights situation in Argentina will improve, but it 

is still unclear how fast the government will or can 

move. He made it clear to Videla that in the absence 

of genuine human rights improvements, we will not be 

in a position to approve pending armB transfer requests. 

Videla confided that at the OAS General 

Assembly next month Argentina will announce that it 

is inviting the Inter-American Human Rights Commission 

to visit Argentina. In view of this development and 

as a means of encouraging further human rights improvements, 

we are informing Videla that when the invitation 

is announced, and after we have consulted with Congress, 

we would expect to grant Argentina's pending application 

for the purchase of military training. 

SALT. I testified on SALT beforh the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee today with Patti Warnke. Considerable 

bi-partisan support was expressed for your statements 

yesterday on the need to separate our interest in a new 

SALT agreement from condemnation of the Soviet role in 

Africa. In their questioning, Glenn, Percy and others 

stressed the importance of our being able to make a 

strong case that the agreement was verifiable. Percy 

and Javits emphasized the necessity to build public 

and Congressional support for SALT. 

K 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority hit-E- ~ •V1 ' 

NARA 

Prrta 

-SCCRCT— 



- 2 - 

Kenya. This week we briefed Kenyan Foreign 

Minister Waiyaki in Nairobi on our intention to 

send a military survey team to Somalia as a step 

toward possible US supply of defensive equipment. 

Waiyaki was told of the assurances we' had received 

from Siad, and we emphasized Siad thad been advised 

that Somalia * s continuing material support for insurgents 

in the region would prevent our establishing 

an arms supply relationship with Somalia. 

Waiyaki did not object to the step we are taking, 

but he cautioned that Kenya remained convinced that 

Somalia would never abandon irredentism. He cited 

Kenyan intelligence reports that Somalia was continuing 

its active support for the Ogaden insurgency and that 

Somalia was maintaining surreptitious contact with the 

Soviet Union. Waiyaki appeared to appreciate that, as 

we seek to limit Soviet influence in the Horn, we do 

not intend to sacrifice Kenya's interests. 

f 

¥ 

SEGRtf 



t 


WASH INGTON 

■GONF rfiEftl'PTat. r.nc:_ September 1, 1978 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


HENRY OWEN>RP 

Allis Chalmers 

The Allis Chalmers bid is to supply 20 turbines worth 

$400 million for a $4.6 billion hydroelectric facility 

between Argentina and Paraguay. Allis Chalmers says 

that the contract would provide over 18 million man-hours 

of employment (in the US, of which 1*0% would be minorities, 

primarily in the steel industry). 

There is no thought of Exlm Bank giving a commitment at 

this stage. All that is needed is "a letter of interest", 

such as Exlm routinely issues, and which says that this 

is the kind of project in which Exlm generally takes an 

interest but that it will have to be judged, when application 

is made (probably about 18 months hence), in light 

of the situation existing at the time, including whether 

the requirements of relevant legislation are fulfilled. 

We need some Argentine movement to explain why we are 

issuing such a letter, when we refused to issue it earlier; 

but we should be satisfied with the kind of limited 

progress that we might reasonably expect Videla to signal 

in his meeting with you. Then when the issue has to be 

decided, a year and a half hence, we could judge whether 

more far-reaching progress has been achieved. 

i 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority -* gt - ao -Sjz) 

NARA_ije___ Dato. ________ 

CONFIDENTIAL GDC


ummvt 

President Videla and the Decision tyaking Process 

On August 1, Lieutenant Genera'. Jorge Videla retired 

from the Army, resigned his position on the ruling Junta 

and became the full-time civilian President of Argentina. 

This new role haB modified, but not radically changed, a 

decision making system in which: 

-- the tri-service (Army, Navy and Air Force) nature 

of the government is stresBiid; 

— the Army is, nonetheless, the predominant service 

(60% of Armed Services personnel) and can enforce 

its will on the two junior services if it chooses; 

— compromise to preserve military unity is generally 

achieved; 

-- Videla seems comfortable with the dynamics of the 

government, which often require drawn-out interservice 

negotiations before decisions can be 

reached. 

* 

Since the Junta took power, Vifiela has had to confront 

sniping from the politically ambitious Navy CINC, Admiral 

Massera. Willing to compromise on Diost issues, Videla has 

been able to maintain a decent working relationship with 

Massera, often in the face of considerable provocation. 

Videla's relations with Massera have mirrored his handling 

of the rival factions within the Army. The military hard 

linerB, who have apposed the President's relatively moderate 

Btance on human rightB, have been restrained from 

carrying out widespread purges of ex-politicianB , but they 

have been able to maintain their positions in key posts, 

such as Commander of the Buenos Aires and Cordoba Army 

CorpB. 

Because he does reflect a consensus of military views 

on how to handle terrorists — eliminate them — Videla 

has been able to move on peripheral questions such as 

publishing lists of prisoners and restoring the right of 

option (see Human Rights). His thinking on the equally 

difficult question of how to revitalize the economy has 

also reflected a military consensus toward the de-emphasis 

of the role of the Btate in the economy and a loosening 

GDS

No Objection To Declassification in fcull 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-5-1 

of controls over the exchange rate. Again, however, 

Videla has supported populist-like measures to control 

unemployment. 

Videla rules by compromise; he is not a classic 

Latin American dictator. Given the potential inter-service 

rivalries and the divisions within the Army, it is 

likely that he would not be able to govern in any other 

fashion• 

Videla's latitude to set as well as execute policy 

will probably be decided in an ad hoc manner over the 

coming months. Critical to Videla's success will be the 

degree to which he retains Army support through Army Commander 

Viola. The two share moderate policy outlooks and 

have a close working relationship. Viola, however, will 

have to work assiduously to placate*hardline Army elements 

and maintain their support. If he can do so, the Videla- 

Viola alliance can be expected to reflect, and wield when 

necessary, the Army's power edge. The Air Force and Navy, 

on the other hand, will be seeking to guarantee continuation 

of the tri-service governing arrangement by ensuring 

that the Videla-Viola connection is not translated into a 

de facto government by the Army.


- 3 - 

Drafted:ARA/ECA:JNBumpu8:deh 

9/1/7B Ext. 29166 

No Objection To Declassification in =ull 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-5-1 

VIDELA'S STYLE 

President Jorge Videla 1b known as a devoted family 

man, a devout Catholic and a man who values traditions. 

These are traita he shares with many of his brother 

officers. In many other ways, however, he is not at all 

typical of the Argentine officer establishment. He did 

not want to be President. Quiet and unassuming, he sometimes 

gives the impression of being self-effacing rather 

than forceful, a characteristic sonfe of his military 

colleagues find hard to understand: 

weakness. 

they mistake it for 

A moderate, Videla appears genuinely to abhor the 

excesses of which elements of the military have been 

guilty during his presidency. Some of these excesses, 

indeed, have been directed at his own people. The Secretary 

General of the presidential office was recently bombed 

by right-wing elements, for example, and Videla's ambassador 

to Caracas waB kidnapped and murdered while on 

leave in Buenos Aires. 

Videla's style is to avoid confrontation. He is 

a consensus leader. Thus, sines most military leaders 

advocate harsh measures against terrorism, he would have 

difficulty opposing the consensus. Moreover, he is 

probably unsure of his own strength in the military 

and would thus fear to confront and demand obedience 

of the hardliners, even if he were so disposed, for fear 

that thiB might lead to dangerous schisms in the Armed 

Forces and possibly to his own ouster.' He has therefore 

opted to work quietly and carefully! to strenghten his own 

hand and exert only gradual pressure on the hardliners. 

Whether this tactic will in the end prove successful is 

an open question. 

Videla is personally disposed to be friendly to the 

U.S. Growing disagreements over the human rights issues, 

however, have irritated many of hiB brother officers and 

forced Videla's government toward something of an 

adversary relationship. Videla would probably like to 

limit thiB trend to the extent possible. 

GDS 

i

No Objection To Declassification in l-ull 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-5-1 

VIDELA'S STYLE 

Drafted:ARA/CCA:WSmithij ma 

9/1/1978 

Clearance:ARA/ECA!NMBouton 

t 

t

i 

No Objection To Declassification in *rull 2012/04/16 

ummuLK 

: NLC-133-22-30-5-1 

JACOBO TIMERMAN 

Arrested in April 1977,Timerman published one of 

Argentina's leading daily newspapers, ta Opinion. 

There were accusations that Timerman waB involved 

with deceased Argentine financier David Graiver, 

who reportedly financed La Opinion from money supplied 

by the MontoneroB terrorist group. However the 

Argentine Supreme Court has ruled that there are no 

grounds for holding him in custody and ordered his 

release. A Military Tribunal has cleared him of 

accusations that he supported radical leftist groups. 

l 

Timerman was released to house arrest in 

this year, although this was a considerable 

over jail, he still is unable to communicte 

anyone but his immediate family. 

Ap ri1 of 

improvement 

with 

Timerman is a leader of the Argentine Jewish community 

and his arrest led to public complaints of 

anti-Bemitism from the American Jewish community. 

(Argentine Jewry is very concerned about Timerman, 

but less outspoken). 

The Department has repeatedly brought up his case 

with the Argentines . President Carter spoke to 

President Videla about Timerman during their 1977 

bilateral and Secretary Vance brought it up when 

he visited Buenos Aires in November. 

i 

f 

LifTH IFfUUL


JACOB TIMERMAN 

I ‘ 

ARA/ECA:JNBumpus:jma ( 

9/1/197 8 x 29166 

ARA/ECA:NKBouton 

l 

I 

t


-6DCRET/EYES ONLY 


WASHINGTON 


i 

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR VARY 

Assistant Secretary and US Coordinator Alliance 

for Progress, Department of State 

SUBJECT: 

Memorandum of Conversation 

Pete, as promised I am forwarding a written report of the 

Vice President's meeting with President Videla for yourself 

and Under Secretary Newsom. I would stress our belief that 

distribution of this document should be tightly controlled., 

on a need to know basis. 

Assistant to the Vice President 


DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13528 

Authority Nll-A ~1 

NARA_££L__ Date— 

cc: 

y 

David Aaron 

Robert Pastor 

__SfleftET/EYES ONLY 

I 

f ’ r : 1 1 t lp n ■ P |f*r # "J • C n / < O . | .7. ,r_ _Q


y 

^fiErPFT,'SENSITIVE/NODIS/XGBS 

OFFICE OFTHEVICE PRESIDENT 

WASHINGTON 



ROME, ITALY 

September 4, 1968, 1:50 p.m. 

ARGENTINE SIDE 


Col. Miguel A. Mallea Gil 

Dr. Ricardo Yofre 

» 

U.S. SIDE 

Vice President Walter F. Mondale 

A. Denis Clift 

Anthony J. Hervas, Interpreter 

The Vice President opened saying he was pleased to have the pleasure 

of the meeting. He recalled the meeting with Videla in.the White 

House at the time of the Panama Canal Treaty ceremony. He said 

we want good relations but there are strains now — human rights 

are a central concern. He added that he would report to the 

President personally on Videla's views. 

President Videla thanked the Vice President for the meeting — an 

extremely important opportunity to discuss these matters because 

he feels our relations are deteriorating. He fully concurs with 

President Carter's position on human rights. Argentina has belief " 

in the democratic process so that men can live with dignity and 

freedom. He said Argentina is with the United States and not 

troubled by criticism when it is objective". However, he is concerned 

by attitudes projecting intervention irt domestic affairs. He spoke 

with President Carter about this at the time of the Panama Canal 

Treaty signing, but since that time he has had to delay announcement 

of an invitation to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 

because of U.S. criticisms projecting intervention. 

A second problem — Argentine politicans were invited to visit 

the United States, but they, too, did not visit because of the 

U.S. statements intervening in our affairs. Mrs. Darien's statements 

are contributing to a deterioration in our relations. 

The Vice President asked if these we re statements made in Argentina 

or in Washington. 

President Videla said in Washington before Congress. He said the 

western world must be united, and the United States must lead the 

western world. At the same time, the people of Argentina cannot 

tolerate intervention. This is his concern. 

■SEGRBT/SENGITIVB/NODIS/XGDS 

n l« * ^ n p r*


. * ^grRilT/SSWBCTIVg/NODIS/XGDS 



We must soon take decisions on the Allis-ChalmerB deal. We want 








the extent that Videla makes progress on these cases, it will help 


i 

Videla said he understood, and government-to-government relations are 


a public or popular issue. This leads to .situations where Argentine 


situations where Argentine businessmen *adopt partisan positions 

because they cannot conclude deals when Ex-lm does not grant a loan. 


relations on a moire positive course. He suggested that it would be 





be as soon as possible. Videla said perhaps he could arrange a 

visit by the Commission- by mid-October. The Vice President asked 




showing the efforts on the part of the Argentine government: 

they have-issued a list and names of all the detained; 

i 

they have published a list of all of those who disappeared 



this last week, 65 individuals were freed; 

they have indicated that they are prepared to give a favorable 


Timerman's situation has changed; he is now out of jail and 


SFCWtT/QiaigiTIVB/woDls/XGDS 

i I , r -■ .


ÊCRBU/CEWBIfglVE/NODIS/XGDS 

Professor Bravo is now under house arrest and they expect the 






exercise discretion. He said it will be important to have the 




statement before the Congress forced hifn to suspend the announcement. 


announcement. 



take its decision by September 15. The Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment 



this might enable us to move on the Ex-Im letter before the .15th 

deadline. Videla said this was"his intention. He did not think it 





Assistant Secretary Vaky may come. Videla said after his announcement 

on the commission. He said he would prefer to have Vaky to ~v 





i 







in human rights, this whole other vista will open. He said he 



was' limited. I appreciate this meeting. Please give my greetings 


aiiiCRBT/CENCITIVE/NODIS/XGDS 3

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-1 fl-3-1 

4I(> 

DEPARTMENT OP STATE 

WASHINGTON 

May 19, 1977 

\ n* 

—SECRET 

jDOS REVIEWED 0B-Feb-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 


FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 


Arms Transfer Policy. The text of your statement 

on conventional aims transfer policy, was sent to all 

diplomatic posts this afternoon. \Embassies in countries 

where we have supply relationships were instructed to 

inform their host governments promptly of the nature 

of the new policy. We provided key Embassies with 

guidance on matters of special interest to their 

respective host governments. 

Nixon Letter. We told the Vietnamese today in 

Paris that the Nixon letter to Lester Wolff was not 

related to the normalization negotiations, and we 

downplayed the story in today's press briefing. The 

timing and content of Mr. Nixon's letter to Wolff 

seems to be part of his effort to regain a measure 

of public acceptance. 

Todman Trip to Latin America. Assistant Secretary 

Todman returned thiB week from a quick swing through 

Latin America. In Colombia, President Lopez MichelBen 

pressed for the helicopters which we promised him in 

1975 under our narcotics assistance program, but which 

we are hesitant to deliver because of reported 

narcotics-related corruption in the Colombian Government. 

Lopez generally supports our human rights policy but 

warned that we should not try to be the "world1 s moral 

policeman." He urges that wet internationalize the 

-SECRET 

GDS 

hutiioriiy.hu r -1 ~ l 

NARA__£L£:------ Dato 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O. 13526 .


- 2 - 

effort (which of course we are*trying to do). 

Colombian officials pressed their view that we should 

give special preferences to Latin American goods to 

offset the preferences the European Community extends 

to former European colonies. 

In Venezuela, President Perez, looking forward 

to his forthcoming state visit, is anxious to cooperate 

with us in all areas and to take a strong stand on 

human rights. The Venezuelans stressed that the 

single most important issue in our bilateral relations 

is the removal of Venezuela (and Ecuador) from the 

list of OPEC countries excluded from our system of 

generalized trade preferences. 

Todman talked with President Videla of Argentina 

who was also visiting Venezuela. Videla said that he 

understood our human rights position and did not argue 

with its importance, but that Argentina just could not 

meet the highest standards until it wins the war against 

terrorism. Videla asked for our understanding of 

Argentina's difficulties. . 

Foreign Minister Silveira stressed that Brazil 

attaches great importance to the Memorandum o? 

Understanding signed with the United States in 1976. 

He was obviously concerned that ambiguity on its 

future would not only hinder bilateral problem-solving, 

but could lead to a further deterioration in U.S.-Brazil 

relations. Cy will be meeting with Silveira next week 

during the CIEC meeting and will try to put his doubts 

to rest on this Bcore. Although not discussed 

extensively with Todman, the nuclear issue remains of 

primary concern to the Brazilians. 

Bolivian President Banzer and other Government 

officials promised to speed up adjudication of the 

cases of Americans held on narcotics charges. Based 

on our pledge of assistance, the Bolivian Government 

is now fully committed to a program of crop substitution 

for the cocaine-source coca now produced there. 

SECRGfr- 

H3GRBT- 

----- I


SfiGRET* 

3 

Japanese Aid Policy. Embassy Tokyo reports that 

Japan will increase itsforeign assistance budget to 

almost $2 billion in fiscal 1977, up 21.7 percent 

over last year. The bulk of the increase will go to 

multilateral agencies. Actual disbursements lag 

increasingly behind budget levels, however, causing 

Japan to look for ways to accelerate use of its aid 

as well. 

Japan's wealth, North-Sou*th pressures, and 

prodding from trading partners are gradually loosening 

Japan's traditionally tight purse strings. Fukuda 

reportedly even considered announcing a doubling of 

aid over five years at the Summit. If Fukuda and the 

Foreign Ministry continue to win out over the Finance 

Ministry and its allies, marked improvements in Japan's 

aid budget and disbursement levels over the next few 

years will result. 

Panama Canal. In discussions yesterday and today, 

the Panamanian negotiators indicated acceptance, in 

principle, of a treaty provision under which both 

Panama and the United States would jointly maintain 

the neutrality of the Canal in accordance with 

established rules. The negotiators also indicated 

an awareness of the U.S. understanding that neutrality 

provisions would apply to threats to the Canal 

originating from within Panama as well as from third 

countries. The talks will continue tomorrow. 

EGRET1 

. n: nt i i -» . -1

i 



WASHINGTON 


DOS REVIEWED 06 Apr-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL, 


FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 

Warren Christopher, Actingl^C. 

Nicaragua. Pete Vaky briefed the House and 

Senate foreign affairs committees today on Nicaragua. 

He found a general consensus that a mediation effort 

initiated or supported by the United States was urgent. 

Costa Rican efforts to open mediation have thus far 

been hampered by Somoza's opposition, coolness from 

other Central American governments, and the alleged 

attack by a Nicaraguan plane on a Costa Rican border 

area. We are undertaking steps to revive and promote 

the Central American mediation effort. We are also 

lobbying for an OAS call — sponsored by Venezuela 

and Costa Rica — for a meeting ojj Foreign Ministers 

which could send a fact-finding mission to review the . 

cross-border attacks. 

Argentina. In his meeting with the Vice President, 

Videla indicated that Argentina will agree to receive the 

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in return 

for the issuance by the Ex-Im Bank of "letters of 

interest" on two projects. (These letters are preliminary 

steps and do not finally commit Ex-Im to authorize 

the financing.) The Argentines have said that they would 

want the letters of interest issued before they announce 

the IACHR visit, in order to avoid the appearance of 

responding to U.S. pressure. We are planning to agree 

to Ex-Im's issuance of the letters this month, and the 

Argentines have told us that in October they will agree 

to the visit. Assuming the IACHR visit is announced and 

assuming there is no deterioration in human rights conditions 

in Argentina in the interim, Ex-Im would then proceed 

to make a preliminary commitment to finance the 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526

I n ' i • 

✓ • - 


w SECRET 

- 2 - 

projects in question and to resume certain other Ex-Im 

programs as well. This approach was worked out yesterday 

in a meeting in which John Moore and Henry Owen 

participated. 

Iran. I asked Ambassador Zahedi, who is just back 

from Tehran, to come in today to reassure him of our 

continuing support for Iran and to seek his assessment 

of the present situation there. Zahedi claimed that 

the recent highly-organized demonstrations are a new 

phenomenon, stimulated by the communists and quite 

different from the disjointed protests led by the 

religious leaders in recent months. He said the 

government declared martial law when it appeared that 

a coup by younger officers was a possibility. I expressed 

the hope that the current martial law measures 

and related steps are only temporary; he assured me 

they were. I assured him unequivocally that the U.S. 

was not involved in any respect in the plotting against 

the Iranian Government.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/11 

W —frtUKb I W 

Department o f State 

NLC-6-4-6-2-2 

inuumiNG 

TELEGRAM 

If- 

DOS REVIEWED 15-Aug-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL 

( 

PAGt i: GUATEM B3U6 II SF 12 1111:32 1172 

ACT:GK ARA-A6 

'NFO OC'-ll SS-1* 'SO-JI SP-B2 0HA-B2 H-ll I NS-13 

ISC-15 NSCE-BI ClAE-ll SSC-li NRE-SI /IBS W 

....................................I12WSI 123539 /S* S 

0 IllaiU JUS 77 

FM A'JEUfiASS' GUATEMALA 

TC 5LCSTATi ms-ac IMIAEDiATE S23Z 

TREAi D E P T .WE: I ATE 

S E C R t ’ SECT I OR 1 OF 2 GUATEMALA 3**6 

LlMOiS 

TREASURY FOR PETER RRDGES 

E.O. 11652 SOS 

TAGS: OCOI. EFIM. ShUH. CT 

S'JBJ: SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL' S BILATERAL MEETING WITH ARGENTINA 

GUATEM 13 AA3 ll OF 12 1111132 

OE HOE IF HE GAR A HAY TO MOVE FROM EXTRA LEGAL METHOOS OF CON 

TROL TO THE NORMAL LECAL PROCESS IN HANOI 110 TERRORISTS. 

MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAI9 THAT MILE ARGENTINA ADMIRES U.S. TRADIT.ONS 

AND LAIS AND CITED THE COMMON HISTORY, THE PRESENT SITUATION 

IS HiGHLY ABNORMAL STEMMING IN PART ST INhiBITIGN OF THE JUDICIARY 

TO SENTENCE TERRORISTS BECAUSE OF FEAR OF RETD(BUT.OR AGAINST 

THEMSELVES AND THEIR FAMINES. THE POLICE BECAME DISCOURSED HHEN 

TERRORISTS BROUGHT TO TRIAL HERE ALWAYS SET FREE. THUS, A POLICY 

OF TARING NC PRISONERS WAS ADOPTED. LIKEWISE, YOUNG MILITARY 

OFFICERS TOGA MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS. MARTINEZ DE HOZ 

SAID PRESIDENT VIQELA IS COMMITTED TO RESTORING HUMAN RIGHTS. 

CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN HAOE IN WIPING OUT THE TWO MAIN 

TERRORIST GROUPS ANO HE ANTICIPATES 6RA0UAL IVROVEMENT IN 

RESTORING HUMAN RIGHTS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. 

BOSTER 

REF: 

CUATEMAiA 3*13, BRIOGES-BITTNER TELECOM 

AS PER RESUEST BY MX. PETER BR.OCES THERE FOLLOWS HEUCCH OF 

SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL'3 BILATERAL MEET.NS WITH ARGENTINE MINISTER 

OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOZ: 

'MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION 

PARTICIPANTS: 

ARGENTINA: JOSE ALFREDO MARTINEZ DE HOZ. MINISTER OF ECONOMY 

ALDOLFO CEXAR DlZ, PRESIDENT OF THE CENTRAL BANK 

DANTE SIMONE. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, IMF 

U.S. 

MICHAEL BL'JMENTHAL. SECRETARY OF TREASURY 

C. FREE BERCSTEN. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF TREASURY 

ARNOLD SACHUANOFF, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF TREAS'JRY 

RI CHAP 3 AREL.ANO. DEPUTY ASSlSTAN* SECRETARY OF S’ATE 

EDWARD B.TTYER. QFFiCE OF DEVELOPING NATIO'.S FINANCE, TREASURY 

TiHE AND PLACE: MAY ![, 1977 - U.S. C-ARCER*, GUATEMALA 

SUBJ: 

BILATERA. MEETiNG WITH ARGENT'hA 

MARTiNEZ OE HOZ SAIO HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN 

PERSONALLY TO SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS THAT 

( ARGENTINA HAS MADE SINCE THE ADMINISTRATION OF VlDELA. HE BEGAN 

by Giving a oetailed description of the ”olitical machinations 

LENDING UP TO THE MILITARY TAXE0VER IN MAR 197S, EMPHASIZING 

• THA' THE U'LITARY RELUCTANTLY ASSUMED POWER WHEN PERON'S WIFE HA0 

LGSt CONT’Ol CF t«e political SITUATION AND 'HE ECCSOU* HAD REACHED 

'PCC* BJ"CU'. HE SA D HE AGREED TO BE U.NiS'EP CF ECC'ICL'Y CNLY 

if -l ha: the cd»»lete pd. t;:a. backing of the uil.tary aac if 

HE WCUlC have CSN'ROl Over a.. U'lA'STR ES .SiOLY'NS THE ECCNCUT. 

THE Military NhERiTED A LEGACY OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS WHICH 

PtRCN HAD BACHED iN ORDER TO OPPOSE THE 'REY.OUS GCfERNMERTS. 

BU' WH.CH Ul'VATELV GOT OUT CT CONTROL. 

I 

UAR'iliEZ DL HOZ RECREATED THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS WHICH. HAS 

BEEN MADE UNDER HiS LEADERSHIP. OIRECTlKG OUR ATTENTION TO BOON 

Wl’H CHARTS SHOWING INTER ALIA DECREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT, 

OECREASE IN MONETARY EXPANSION. INCREASE IN AGRICULTURAL PRC- 

OLCT.GN. ENERGY PRODUCTION AND EXFORT S»IP1CENTS. REDUCTION :N 

GCYF»HW:r BEHC*. CECL:NE iN RATE of NFLATiDN. AND INPiOVE- 

UER' IN EXTERNAL SEC73R. HE SAIC HE WAS ABLE '0 CONVINCE THE 

POP.lA'iCN ABC.' *HE TiECESS.T* CF A CEC’LASED CRDWTH iN PEAL WAGES 

AC 'HI P( Ct fJp ICh EV,M S'ABlTY. 

Bl-VFK'HA. SA : HE ACM.RED >E PROGRESS IN THE EDDNOHY WH.CH 

HAD BEEN UAOi ANC UNCLPS'ANDS 'lE PQ. I' :»l 5'UA'lON S'EVJING 

(i:v 'Hi 'ERFC= SV 'i“ER!TED fpDB PFFV OUS COYEPN1,E!iTS. “E C tEC 

THE FACT 'HA' 'HE BENDIX CORPORATION W:TH WiiCh HE PREv'C.'SlT HAC 

BEEN JS.CC'ATID iQSr THPEE EIRO'ES '0 'HE TERPORISTS. NEyER- 

Th-iFSS. THE l.S. iS VERY CONCEFNEO ABOUT DUE PFCCESS DF LAW 

AND T-( GENERA'. FPCTECTION OF HUUA.'I N■ G«TS. HE ASKED MARTINEZ 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority 

MARA ___ Data__ ~m\\tr___ 

t 

SEME* 

I

No Objection To Declassification inrull 2012/12/11 

' —- * 


NLC-6-4-6-2-2 

INCOMING 

TELEGRAM 

PiSE I', GUATEU 13446 12 OF 12 11:3322 fill 

ACT iCh ARA-J5 

■AFO OCT-11 SS-14 IS9-H SP-»2 0HA-*2 H-»i INR-15 

N5C-J5 NSCE-II ClAE-M SSD-ff .NDE-fl /I36 I 

....................................*12*432 *2(264 /(4 S 

0 *111412 JUK 27 

FH AHEMBASS* GUATEMALA 

TC SECSTATE KASHQC MEDIATE 6233 

TR£AS CtPF IKiEC.ATE 

GUATEM 13441 12 OF 12 (113322 

CONGRESS'S POSITION FIRMLY TO MANTINE2 DE HOE SUBSEQUENT 

TO THE LATTEN’S BILATERAL HITH SECRETARY BLUUENTHAL. U.S. 

EXECU'IVE D'RECTOR RALPH CUNGAN MADE THE SAME CARE ON A 

DIFFERENT OCCASION TO MARTINET OE HOZ. 

BOSTER 

S E C I E T SECTION 2 CF 2 GUATEMALA 3446 

LIMOIS 

TREASURY FOB PETER BRIDGES 

BLUUENTHAL SAID THAT wile HE ARE UKDERSTANDING OF ARCENTIRA'S 

PROBLEM AND HE DON'T WISH TO INTERFERE INTERNALLY, THE CARTER 

ADMINISTRATION MUST BE CONSISTENT IN THE PURSUIT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. 

THE KARA IN AMENDMENT REQUIRES US TO VOTE AGAINST LOANS BY THE IDB 

FOR COUNTRIES HITH GROSS VIOLATIONS EXCEPT IN ThE CASE OF THE 

1 NEEDY. THE BADILLO AMENDMENT, WHICH ALREADY HAS PASSED THE HOUSE 

MOULD EXTEND THIS LAW TO OTHER IFI'S. HR lit HUMPHREY 

AMENDMENT MOULD PROVIDE MORE FLEXIBILITY. THE ADMINISTRATION IS AS 

A HATTER OF ITS OHM POLICY AND CONViCTlOS, COMMITTED TO THE 

ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE SUCGESTEO, THEREFORE, THAT IT 

MIGHT BE ADVISEABLE FOR ARGENTINA TO POSTPONE APPLICATIONS FOR 

LOANS UNTIL IT COULD SHOW SOME DEFINITE IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS. 

MARIINEE DE hOZ SAID THAT PRESIDENT VlOELA IS COMMITTED TO 

RESTORING HUMAN RIGHTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ARGENTINA HAS TWO 

LOANS IN THE PIPELINE FOR IDB CONS 13ERAT.OH WHICH COULD BE HEiD 

LP. BUT HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT A Sill UILlION LOAN FOR THE NATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT BANK HPICH IS BEING CONSIDERED BY THE IBRD. HE 

EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ARGENTINA WOULO NOT BE ABLE TO UTILIZE ITS 

S31I MILLION C’JOTI WITH THE IBRD IF THE LOAN HERE DELAYED TO THE 

NEXT F SCAL YEAR. NE SAID HE HOPED THAT THIS LOAN MIGHT GET 

THROUGH THE NEEDY' LOOPHOLE ON THE GROUHOS OF EMPLOYMENT GENERATION. 

BLUUENTHAL RESPDNOED BY INDICATING THAT 'HE IBRD LOAN IS VERY 

L'lELY TO PRESENT PROBLEMS FOR US. 

MARTINEZ DE HOZ BECAME SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE AND ASKEO WHO 

WORRIES ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE VICTIMS OF THE TERRORISTS. 

ARELLANO SAID THERE IS NO RAY OF RATIONALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS 

VIOLATIONS. 

IV RESPONSE '0 BLUUENTHAL*S QUESTION ABCJT ASSERTIONS OF 

ANTI-SEMITISM IN ARGENT I HA, MARTINEZ CLAIMED THERE WAS NO SUBSTANCE 

TO THE CHARGES. 

B.UMEN'HAl SI D HE BELIEVES THAT 'HE U.S. POSITION IS CLEAR. 

I HE HOPE '0 SFf IMPROVEMENT IN HJUAN RIGHTS MADE QUICKLY AND MOULD 

LIKE TO BE INFORMED CONCERNING PRCGRESSMADE. 

Bl .’VEl'Hlw Rt ’ERATEO U.S. OPPOSI’.CN TO ANY INCREASE IN 

Si.ARY FOR IDB EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND ASKED FDR ARGENT HA'S 

Support. 

MART:NF2 DE HDZ AGREEO '0 DISCUSS SALARY ISSUE H T« CRUZ MENA 

H 'H >E CBJ'LT YE 0> HAY NG l’ PJ' AS HE *“EN BROUGHT UP THE 

PCSS’B 11TV V IN'AL BEING EliMlNA'ED. DR TRANSFORMED. SINCE 

INTAI IS 'HE ONLY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION LOCATED IN ARGENTINA 

MARTINEZ DE HDZ IS ANXIOUS T-AT ir REMAIN THERE IN SOME FORM. 

tfRGSTTN SAID THAT AS THE SECRETAR' iNDCATED IN HlS OR 

MEE'NG SPEECH. THE u.S. WISHES TC STUDY THE FUTURE OF INTAL. 

='i'|F2 CE "CZ THA'I.ED T-E 5EC«E’ARY r»p BEING ABLE 'C speak 

F'AV.L' ABUyl ’HE Sr.AT,OK 171 ARGENT hi. 

as re9:»:ed we^te. co’iGressman bad'.lo explained 

SEBREf



v 

v ujuvjsau NOD IS 

- 2 - 



the following Bteps (Attachment 4): 

— Agreement with the Inter-American Human RightB 

Commission (IAHRC) on a visit to Argentina; 

— Try, release, or allow exiê for the'prisoners 



fate of the disappeared* 



significant steps forward since his visit. Reaction in 




two years. The recent denial of an Ex-In letter of 

interest to Allis-Chalmers for the sale of hydroelectric 

equipment, in particular, was seen as a deliberate escalation 






conventional arms restraint, and.Thirds World issues. 

VidelatB Approach * 

We do not know exactly what Videla will say* Be may 

simply give the standard Argentine exposition -- that 

human rights violations are an unfortunate, if unavoidable 

and necessary, by-product of the effort to suppress a vicious 

terrorist campaign, which threatens Argentina with anarchy. 

On the other hand, there is also the possibility that he 


are now prepared to take (particularly in regard to the 

Human RightB Commission), and suggestions on the future 

evolution of U.S.-Argentine relations. 

Your Approach 

Your approach Bhould be sympathetic. You would wish 

to avoid commitments in response to specific suggestions, 

if any, but would note that you will carry Videla’s 

Mn nhiprtinn Tn Dfidassificatinn in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-B-4-6-16-7

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-16-7’7" 

— w otUilL. i 

- 3 - 

HDD IS 


We recommend you say specifically: 

— On our Bide, we seriously wish to improve relations 

; 

( 

As a token of this, we have taken -- and are taking 

some modest steps, Buch as release of export 




on our Munitions Export Control List. 

— While we understand the trigic history of Argentina's 



the treatment of the human person. 

— We wish to maintain normal relations in as many 




these relations as conditions permit. 





undertake this. 

( 


be for President Videla to decide. Assistant 

Secretary Vaky is willing to come to Buenos Aires, 


a 

"iJODIS 

a r »#-»!—*r* n * I *

t ■ * 

No Objection Tu DudayyiriuaLiun in Full 2012/12/11 : NLC-6-4-6-11-2}^ 

JLMpartment of State TELEGRAM 

P1GE II I'■ENOS 14937 II OF 12 7771161 1277 BUENOS 14137 II OF n 2721181 

ACTION AR1-14 

Nfo OCT-ei !S0-II Cl12-II 3ODE-II PH-IJ H-Bl < HR-11 

L-I3 NSAE-II X8C-B5 Pl-Il SP-12 SS-15 ICA-11 

I HA-15 nCT-11 TRSE-II A13-15 EI-0* /t|7 W 

P 272I12Z .jN 71 

FH AMEMBASSY IUEI0S AIRES 

TO SECSTATE VASHDC PRIORITY 6213 

................................... 157531 2722I7Z /73 

Ifj I ( I 0 C W T l-rr SECTION 1 OF 2 SUENOS AIRES 4937 

E.O. 11652: GOS 

TAGS: OVIP 

SUBJECT: 

HENRY KISSINGER VISIT TO AROENTINA 

SUnP.ARY: FR0I1 ARR: VAL TO DEPARTURE HENRY KISSINGER AND HIS 

FAMIIY HERE WEIL RECEIVED |Y ARGENTINE POPULACE. THE SOA 

LAID OUT RED CARPET, PULLING OUT STOPS. OR. KISSINGER SPOKE 

TO DIVERSIFIED GRCJPS--FROH 1ANKERS TO GAUCHOS. IN HOST 

INSTANCES, HE COHPlIHERTEO GOA FOR OEFEATING TERORISTS IUT 

HE WARNED THAT TACTICS USEO AGAINST THEN THEN ARE HOT 

JSTIFIAILE NOW. GENERALLY, OR. XISSIN1ER PUBLICLY AFFIRHED 

HIS SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH A 

FEW EXCEPTIONS. r-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- 

pas REVIEWED 15-AUQ-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL. 

1. DR. KISSINGER, HIS WIFE AND SON ARRIVED IN IA EARLY =* : 1 

WEDNESDAY HORNING (JUNE 21). HE WAS NET AT THE AIRPORT BY 

A FONOFF REP WHO DOGGED HIH THROUGHOUT HIS VISIT. KISSINQER 

WAS THE GUEST OF PRESIDENT VIDElA, SUPPOSEDLY INVITED TO VIEW 

WORLD CUP. THE FORMER SECRETARY HADE IT CLEAR DURING HIS *. 

FIVE-DAY STAY HE WAS IN ARGENTINA AS PRIVATE CITIZEN AND NOT 

A SPOKESMAN FOR USG. * 

THEM. THE FORMER SECRETARY TOLD VIDElA HE GAVE HIS FULL 

SUPPORT TO PRESIDENT'CARTER ON HIS AFRICAN POLICY. 

I 

6. HUMAN RIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY. KISSINGER SAID IT 

WAS UNFORTUNATE MANY AMERICANS STILL THOUGHT ARGENTINA WAS 

A SOFT DRINK. HE SAID THIS INDICATED THAT ‘Iffl'Sf »"* 

NOT AHARE OF ANIENT INE HISTORY NOR OF IT! STRUGGLE AfillHIT 

TERpoiTftl. HI EMPHASIZED IHAI TbWtUHISM WAS NOT SOLELY OF 

ARGENTINE* ORIGIN BUT INSTEAD IT HAD BECOME AN INTERNATIONAL 

CONCEPT. HIMI MGER APPLAUDED ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS IN 

OOHBATTI NO TERRORISM BUT~HF Al SO ITIFSSEO THAT TACTICg-UIEG 

)M~BEfElIllULTERRORISTS HAD NO PLACE IN ABSENTIMA.TODAY. 

7. THROUGHOUT LUNCH VIDELA SEEMED RELAXED AND FRIENDLY. 

HE TENSED UP C'iLY WHEN ARGENTINA'S PROSPECTS IN THE WORLD 



VIDELA, COL. MALLEI GIL IINTERPRETER) AND AMBASSADOR CASTRO 

AT LOS OLIVOS, OFFICIAL PRESIDENTIAL RESIDENCE. VIDElA 

PREARRANGED IT SO KISSINGER AND THE INTERPRETER WOULD MEET ... .. .. 

WITH HIH PRIVATELY HALF HOUR BEFORE AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL. 

IMMEDIATELY ON AMBASSADOR'S DHHIVAI |U HIM MJfICH WAY "ERYFfti 

3. KISSINGER INFORMED AMBASSADOR THAT DURING PRIVATE 

SESSION WITH PRESIDENT HUMAN NIGHTS WERE DISCUSSED. ALLEGECLY 

VIDELA VA'ITEO SUGGESTIONS FROM DR. KISSINGER AS TO HOW TO 

IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH USG. THE AMBASSADOR WAS NOT INFORMED 


4 AT lunch, VIDELA ASKED KISSINGER FOR HIS VIEWS ON LATIN 

AMERICA. FORMER SECRETARY RESPOHOED THAT NOW MORE THAN EVER 

WAS TIME TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF WESTERN 

HEMISPHERE. HE ADDED UNITV OF ACTION AMONG 1HE LA CgjJUlRLES 

iOeouired' if~al. AMijTClH CDUWTHlES'WrfiTsiiRVivE. he 

STRESSED THAT DURING HIS TEHURrAS SECRETARV OF STATE, LATIN 

AMERICA WAS NOT HIS TOP PRIORITY. HE SAID THIS WAS TRUE 

BEFORE ^ WAS SECRETARY AND IT IS TRUE NOW. KISSINGER POINTED 

OUT THAT THIS WAS NOT MEANT TO BE A REFLECTION ON ANY 

ADMINISTRATION. THE LACK OF^t«EjmOH TOWARDS LA WAS NOT A 

DEL I BERATE ACTOR ANYBODY'S PART. PTWAfe-lUST A FACT THAT 

WITH THE mr umi ■"cGWryum, a>fi| fn xnsiiT 

5. jnSSINGER EMPHASIZED LATIN AMERICAN HAT BE HETCTt 

RUaSlA AMU UUHTrsCHmtr HE ADDED IN VIEW OF EVENTS IN 

AFKCAIT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE USG FOCUS ON LATIN AMERlC^ 

i.e 

■*T*,nfHT runTF" "" his annapolis speech. 

KISSINGER STRESSED HISluEFBIII UP HOST fir..rillTtH>fr-nmEiaH 

POLICY, ESPECIALLY THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY AHfr-SM-ES OF AIR 

CRAFT TO MID-EASTERN JOORTlfTES. KISSINGER ‘_________ 

ABOMINABLE THAT A irfru AAFWAIl f n~~THAT CUBAN SOLDIERS VER 

INVINCIBLE. SINS WHEN, HE ASKED, CAN CUBAN SOLDIERS MARtH 

FROM SOUTH fO NORSK IN AFRICA AND EXPECT THE WORLD TO APBLAUD 

^CDNriDEHTlAb 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O. 13526 

Authority -U ~2d 

nara__£LE:— Dato --------

„• * 


IMpartment of State • TELEGRAM 

PAGE II BUENOS 14937 02 OF R 272123Z 1279 BUENOS (4137 12 OF R 2721237 

ACTION ARA-14 

INFO CCT-tl ,IQ-01 CIAE-90 DOSE-80 PH-fS H-ll INI-18 

L-83 NSAE-BB NSC-15 PA-01 SP-12 SS-15 ICA-11 

HA-05 KCT-81 TIIE-II AID-05 El'll /HI W 

................................... 057572 2722077 /73 

" 2722177 JJ'I 71 

FN ANENBASSY IbENOS AIRES 

TO SECSTATE HAS«0: PRIORITY 5214 

C 0-N-F I 0 F R T I AL -SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4137 

I. EARLY THURSDAY HORN I NO DR. KISSINQER MET WITH DR. JORSE 

LUIS 80RGES, XC1ED AR8ENTINE POET AND WRITER. THIS PROHPTED 

HUCH NEWS COVERAGE. LATER IN DAY KISSINGER AND FANILY 

DEPARTED WITH lliNISTER OF ECONOHY HART INEZ DE HOI TO OVER 

NIGHT AT AN ESTANCIA IF ARID . THIS WAS HOSTLY A SOCIAL EVENT. 

9. CN HIS RETURN FROH THE FARH, KISSINGER SPOKE TO EHIASSY 

PERSONLEL. HE GAVE A PEP TALKS TO AHERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE 

PERSONNEL AS WELL AS LOCALS. HE NARRATED SOHE OF HIS 

EXPERIENCES WHILE IN USG SERVICE. HIS HUHOROUS APPROACH 

WAS WELL RECEIVED IT ALL. 

CONCEPT OF 

HE'SAIO HE WOULD WAIT ABOUT TWO WEEKS AFTER HIS RETURN TO 

USI BEFORE SPEAKING OUT. KISSINGER WORKED CLOSELY WIT? 

EHIASSY PERSONNEL.THEY WERE 0000 GUESTS AND HADE EVERY 

EFFORT TO GIVE APPEARANCE THEY VERE NOT EMISSARIES OF 

OPPOSITION TO CURRENT US ADMINISTRATION. 

HY ONLY CONCERN IS THAT KISSINGER'S REPEATED HIGH PRAISE 

FOR ARGENTINA'S ACTION IN WIPING OUT TERRORISM AND HIS 

STRESS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ARGENTINA HAY NAVE GONE TO SOME 

CONSIDERABLE EX’EIlT TO HIS HOSTS' READS. DESPITE KIS 

DISCLAIMERS THAT THE METHODS USED IN FIGHTING TERRORISM MUST 

NOT IE PERPETUATEO, THERE IS SOME 0ANGER THAT ARGENTINES 

HAT USE KISSINGER'S LAUDATORY STATEMENTS AS JUSTIFICATION 

FOR HARDENING THE'R HUMAN RIGHTS STANCE. 

CASTRO 

10. ON FRIDAY EVENING A RECEPTION WAS GIVEN AT EHIASSY 

RESIOEKCE HONORING KISSINGER AND FANILY. APPROXIHATELY TWO 

HUNDRED PERSONS ATTENDED. GOA TOP OFFICIALS WERE WELL 

REPRESENTED. 

{ 

II. AFTER THE RECEPTION, KISSINGER ATTENOED A DINNER GIVEN 

BY HIHISTER OF ECONOHY HARTINEZ OE HOE. THIS GROUP WAS 

GOHPOSEO OF BANKERS, ECONOHISTS AND INDUSTRIALISTS. THE MAIN 

DISCUSSION CONCERNED HEARS TO ATTRACT FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL ANO 

OTHER INVESTHENT TO ARGENTINA. THE LONG TERN LACK OF POLITICAL 

STABILITY AND INFLATION SEEHED TO BE THE HA IN CONCERN OF 

THE GROUP. LITTLE ELSE DEVELOPED FROH THE DINNER. 

12. ON JUNE 24 KISSINGER PARTICIPATED IN AN OFF THE RECORD 

PRESS CONFERENCE AND WAS HADE AN HONORARY HEHBER OF ARGENTINE 

COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THIS OROUP IS COHPRISED 

OF FORHER FONE'HI MINISTERS, WHO H0L3 THEHSELVES UP TO THE 

PUBLIC AS THE 'ELITE GROUP* ON FORE I ON AFFAIRS. DR. KISSINGER 

GAVE AN OFF THE CUFF TALK. HE STRESSEO THAT THERE WAS NO 

CUESTIO'l BUT ’HAT AKER I CANS LACXED KNOWLEDGE ABOUT 

ARGENTINA'S HISTORY. ESPECIALLY, Amlll‘->F I ACHED FAHILIARITY 

umÂKFNTiKfs fxPEtTENCE IIfTfBIfriHfl " F»n»iwtn 

11S HIS OPINION GOA HAD DONE AN OUTSTANDING JOB IN WIPING 

cut' TERP6H1ST'VUKCES, BUI ALSO CAUIIUNEITTHAT METHODS into 

Tr. I>IGF’iNO TtMBHISH mm NOV 0E PEHPETUHTTD. ""E 'explained 

a MOVEMENT TOWaTuT RUNHALLY MUSI-TAtt-mCE IF DEMOCRATIC 

IOEA.S ARE TC PREVAIL. 

13. DR. KISSINGER ALSO APPEARED IN A QUESTION ANO ANSWER 

PERIOD WITH ONE OF AROENTI NR' SPOPULAR NEWS COMKEHTERS. 

OF THE GREATEST YI 111" 

BH”-—WAS 

UNFORTUliATE THAI IN'SBHE IRSIANLL5 WUHAN RIGHTS WAS 

BEING USED AS A WEAPON AGAINST ITS FRIENDS.~ 

, COMMENT: THE X>SSINCCR FAMILY"aYTENDED A FOOTBALL GAME IN 

ROSARIO, WHERE HE WAS INTRODUCED TO THE PUBLIC. INDICATIONS 

ARE HE VAS WEL- RECEIVED BY THE AUDIENCE. HE ALSO ATTENDED 

' TWO OTHER GAMES IN BUENOS AIRES AS'A GUEST OF PRESIDENT 

VIOELA. THE ARGENTINE MEDIA GAVE FAVORABLE ANO HEAVY 


COMMENT: DR. KISSINGER TOLD THE AMBASSADOR HE WOULD NOT 

CRITICIZE THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION SO LOUO AS HE WAS OVER 

SEAS. HE SPOKE HIGHLY OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY 

TO THE AMBASSACOR, RUT FELT HE WOULD SPEAjLffl)T_A6AHUH-JNI 

COHHDENTIAL


k^c.1-**r» i rvic;rx i r » 1 a rt ■ , 


'' 

CONFIDENTIAL (Entire text) 

BILATERAL PAPER 

ARGENTINA 



The Secretary 




II. 

INTRODUCTION 

Argentina was helpful in the OAG vote on the 

Nicaraguan resolution. The GOA ânts a high-level 

bilateral exchange with us during the course of the 





public action to bolster President Videla's and General 

Viola's prestige and authority. 

III. 

ISSUES 




have been 13 unaccounted-for disappearances since February 1, 





persons. Legal efforts to force the Government to show, 

cause for holding alleged subversives have not been 

successful. 

t 


— We are pleased with moves to curb disappearances, 







CONFIDENTIAL 

GDS - 8/6/85 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority )4LC 

NAKA_Jfe£_ Date 1


2 - 



continued detention of Jacobo Tlmerman, 


-- We hope to see greater numbers of prisoners 













i 



Point to be Made * 



both will continue to work with the Vatican. 






be a condition, but Canada is unwilling to require 



safeguards requirements, effective in March 1980, 

needed for us to continue nuclear cooperation. We - 


• 

Point to be Made (If raised) 

-- We want to cooperate with Argentina in the 




August 1979 

GQNFIDENTIRIT


•OONrTDENTHgr^ 


MEETING 



September 9, 1977 - 9: 00 a.m. 





Tlatelolco. 

2. President Carter told Videla the USG would talk to the Cubans 

about signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco, He asked whether Argentina 


Conference on October 19 - 21, 1977. ^ 





4. Videla said he hoped that die problem of detainees might be 



be possible to send representatives of the OAS or UN to confirm 

human rights progress in Argentina sometime after Christmas, 


visits are the best way to show that Argentina is not ashamed 


international human rights commissions which testify to the 



for the Secretary to visit Argentina aftei* his trip to Brazil to 

complete bilateral consultations, 

CONFIDENTS:— 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority N ^ ~ 3*4 ~~~73 

ff— 

NflBfl EP.__ Dcto------ 1 i ------------

fc 


MEMORANDUM 


waskinoton 

mtmmm 

CONFIDENTIAL— 

““ “ September 8, 1977 

» 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

THE PRESIDENT 


The Last Five Bilaterals: Argentina* 

Uruguay, Grenada, Bahamas and Co eta Rica 


Nonproliferation 

*■ j 

i 

We would very much like to have Argentina attend the International 

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conference, October 19-21 in Washington. 

Since both Chile and Brazil said they would implement Tlatelolco ! 

Argentina did, Argentina is obviously key. If you could coax Videla into 

j 

saying, "We will do it, if they do iti' then you might want to suggest a 

simultaneous decision at the Washington conference in October. 

t 

Human Rights 

Unlike Stroessner or Pinochet, Videla is said to be aware of the way 

the world views the present human rights situation in Argentina, and more 

importantly, the validity of that view. He 1b Baid to be a moderate struggling j. 

to improve Argentina's human rights performance against unyielding hard- ! 

liners in the junta. If this 1b true, and our intelligence reports confirm 

this interpretation, then, paradoxically, the best way to approach Videla 

would be with a very firm statement on our human rights policy. His 

opponents criticize him for being too deferential to the U. S. , and thus, 

the best way to strengthen his hand would be to reiterate your strong 

commitment. Specifically, there are a number of recent arrests and 

detentions of JewB (like J&cobo Timerman, a prominent newspaper 

publisher, and the Deutsch family, who have influential relatives in Los 

Angeles) which suggest the resurgence of anti-semitiBm. More generally, 

we want to continue to urge an end to the state of siege and to urge the 

government to publish a list of all prisoners, showing their place of 

detention and the charges against them. „ DECLASSIFIED 

, E.0.13528 

Authority " 31] -1*3- ~ 

j 

j 

j 

j 

^ V’.lsft, 

€0NF1BENT1A[: NARA ^ pata n]o^w_


-CQNFIDENTIA-ir 2 

You may also want to mention that the Argentine Committee on 

Human RightSj a non-profit organization with an office in Washington 

has compiled a partial list of some 3, 000 names of people who have 

disappeared or are detained. The State Department has a copy of this 

list, and any information which the Argentine government can provide 

on the whereabouts of the people, whose names are on the list would be 

appreciated. 

One-1 other point: Fat Derlan, as well aE» Assistant Secretary Todman 

both visited Argentina recently. 

Uruguay 

Human Rights 

We understand that President Mendez will take advantage of his 

meeting with you to announce Uruguay's first major moves on human 

rights. These may include the release of some prisoners, the disclosure 

of names and charges on all political prisoners, and the announcement of 

disciplinary actions taken against military and police officials involved 

in human rights abuses. Because this represents the first step taken 

by a government that had previously refused to acknowledge that it had 

political prisoners, it is significant. 

We should reinforce this decision, while letting Mendez know that the 

international community will judge Uruguay's performance not by words 

but by deedB. You may also want to encourage lêndez to follow this 

action by an invitation to the Inter-American^Commission on Human 

Rights to visit Uruguay to see the positive steps first-hand. 

We understand that Mendez may want to make theBe announcements 

to the presB after your meeting. 

Countervailing Duties 

President Mendez will raise the issue of countervailing duties. He 

is concerned about Treasury investigations into Uruguayan subsidies 

on leather handbags and leather apparel, both important exports. A 

third investigation on leather shoes was announced on September 7. 

Together, these products account for 60% of Uruguay's exports to the 

US. Imposition of countervailing duties would thus have a significant 

impact on Uruguay’s export earnings. 

i

No Objection To Declassification in full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-72-6-12-6 

CONFIDENTIAL 3 

Officials close to Mendez tell us he believes the US Bhould do something 

to reciprocate for his support of the Panama Canal Treaty and the 

actions he is taking on human rights. He wants to be able'to show that 

he can "get" as well as "give" in his dealings with the United States. 

Uruguayan officials know that there is a waiver provision in our 

countervailing duty law, but are not adequately familiar with how it 

works. They have inquired about "an advance waiver" which is impossible. 

’'.However, Mendez can probably get all the political mileage he 

requires out of being able to announce upon his return that he discussed 

the countervailing duty issue in Washington and that agreement was 

reached to have high level officials on both sides consult at an early 

date about how the imposition of such duties might be avoided. You will 

want to point, out, however, .that the law is Btrict, and that a waiver is 

possible only if the Uruguayan government âkes steps to reduce or alter 

the subsidies. 

Grenada 

As "comic relief" we have scheduled your meeting with Eric Gairy 

in the middle of your five bilaterals. Gairy has informed our Ambassador 

that he wishes to discuss seven issues with you. Among them, are the 

following:. 

UN Resolution on UFO’s: Gairy wants your support for his UN resolution 

favoring scientific research on Unidentified Flying Objects and the 

psyche. Gairy is eager to talk about your experience with a UFO. 

US Military Base; He seeks establishment in Grenada of a US base 

of any service. 

Tax Exemption on Foreign Convention. He shares the position of the 

Bahamas on this. .................. 

Anti-Communist Fund.: He would like to see a United Stateb fund 

established to help democratic governments fight communism. 

God. Gairy is interested in your personal concept of God and would 

like your support in calling a meeting of world religious leaders to 

define "God". 

-CONFIDENTIAL 

fflfflENW1

* * No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-72-6-12-6 

• * - * ’ " ■ *—» • » M 

-CONFiDkN T 1SX,' 4 

Bahamas 

» 

We have just learned that Prime Minister Pindling may raise 

several issues not covered in your briefing book: 

US Taxaction of Foreign Conventions 

Section 602 of the 1976 Tax Reform Act placed severe limitations 

on deductions from the federal income tax of expenditures associated 

with attending foreign conventions. The Bahamian Government has 

claimed that these restrictions have had an adverse effect on its tourist 

industry and, by extension, the economy. We have responded that we 

would be pleased to study any facts which it would care to make available 

supporting this claim, and, if its case seemed justified, to support 

an appeal of Section 602. 

Duty Free Exemptions for Returning US Tourists 

Congress is considering legislation that would increase the amount 

of goods an American tourist can bring home with him duty-free. The 

Bahamian Government is extremely interested in this legislation and the 

Prime Minister may urge you to lend it youi BUpport. The Bahamian 

economy is heavily weighted toward tourism(which generates about 77% 

of its GNP) and a more liberal duty free exemption would serve as an 

additional stimulus to the local economy. State believes this needs 

further study. 

Air Route New York-NaBsau 

The Prime Minister may raise concerns on this. Adequate air 

services between New York and Nassau are highly desirable, but the 

technical nature of the subject argues that it should best be referred to 

the civil aviation experts Of the two countries. 

Costa Rica 

Meat 

Oduber seeks an increase in Costa Rica's meat quota to the US. 

You will recall that you decided not to make a decision on this until 

around November when USDA estimates are (available. 

CONFIDENTIAL-- 

pflMDnCHXUi 

i


May 23, 1977 

Mrs. Carter's Trip: 

The Western Hemisphere in Creative Flux 

Mrs. Carter's trip comes at a propitious time. President Carter has 

reasserted American leadership, and this has had a creative impact oninternational 

politics in the Western Hemisphere. By explaining the 

new directions in U.S . policy and by underscoring our determination 

to pursue these goals, Mrs . Carter will be providing the momentum for 

solidifying cooperative relationships with selected governments on 

important issues like human rights, arms control. and the North-South 

dialogue. 

* 

Low Profile 

From around 1965 to January 20, 1977, the United States, in effect 

though not in rhetoric, retreated from*Latin America. A disastrous 

war in Southeast Asia diverted scarce resources in the late 1960s . And 

the Republic Administration which took power in 1969 defined U.S. 

interests in the region so narrowly that it either ignored or resisted 

the forces of change and reform in the nations of the hemisphere. 

As significant, the U.S. was reluctant to involve itself in the 

politics among the hemisphere states. 

The great irony was that Latin America prospered during those years 

economically (manufacturing exports in this period expanded by 25 

percent annually) , institutionally, and internationally. Regional 

institutions and bilateral relations with the U.S ., however, deteriorated. 

Debate in the OAS became bi-polar with the U.S. trying to resist 

unanimous Latin American resolutions, which were in fact nothing more 

than reactions by the Latins to a U.S. policy, decision, or inaction. A 

"low profile" by the U.S . encouraged sterile debate in the OAS . Latin 

American leaders took their economic issues to global fora, like UNCTAD 

and later GIEC, for negotiating. The possibilities for constructive 

exchange went unexplored. 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13S26 

Wtoily W P---VA-1P-a-I'A-o 

NARA_£i£___Dato—----------


2 

New Leadership in the United States 

President Carter's policies have been based on the premise that the 

U.5 . should not be reluctant to lead or to bring the full weight of its 

influence on issues of morality and social reform when we feel we are 

right. I had thought that the human rights issue would unite Latin 

America against us as the investment issue had done for the last decade, 

but I was wrong. It has inspired the democracies, embarrassed the 

repressive governments, and moved transitional governments closer 

to us. Since the Carter Administration began, the military governments 

in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador have all pledged themselves to hand power 

over to the civilians in the next year or two. * 

Chile with some support from Uruguay and Brazil has tried to unite the 

Southern Cone countries against the new U.S. policy, but until now, 

Argentina and Paraguay have resisted their initiatives. (Recent reports 

have these countries planning a conference in Paraguay on June 3.) 

Most importantly, U.S . leadership is welcomed once again in those 

countries like Venezuela, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Mexico with which 

we have a natural affinity. 

Changing Political Structures 

As s a result of the President's moral leadership and determination to 

take the North-South dialogue seriously, geopolitics in the hemisphere 

have also undergone a dramatic transformation in the last four months. 

In the sense that geopolitics in the Western Hemisphere currently permit 

free floating coalitions of States, the hemisphere resembles European 

politics before Napoleon; the difference is that the .coalitions currently 

have the potential of being infused with genuine purpose, whereas 

international politics in pre-19th Century Europe had no more profound 

purpose than territorial aggrandizement or survival. 

To take the most important example, Venezuela's probable motive in 

reaching out to President Carter and giving enthusiastic support for 

his nonproliferation and human rights policies is to contain Brazil, 

and to this aim, Perez is seeking better relations with Argentina. In 

this way, the pattern of traditional balance of power politics is replicated. 

The difference is that the U.S. really has no interest in this game, but 

it has a definite interest in the pursuit of certain policies, which because 

of their greater claim to international legitimacy, attract the interest 

and support of Venezuela. 

t

No Objection To Declassification-in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-70-2-14-0 

i 

3 

Venezuela's interests are not the same as ours, but they are closer to 

ours than that of any other regional power. President Perez pursues 

three sets of goals, only the first of which directly conflicts with our 

own: (1) high prices for petroleum and OPEC solidarity; (2) containment 

of Brazil; and (3) the milieu goals of hemispheric and global 

statesman. 

I believe that we can flatter Perez with acknowledgement of his leadership, 

and infuse his leadership with our two central interests in the 

hemisphere --- human rights and nonproliferation. If we can make it 

appear as if we are supporting him rather than that he is carrying our 

water, then our leverage on OPEC pricing will be greater rather than 

less than before. (Indeed, I believe that his State visit at the end of 

June will provide us with an opportunity to persuade him of the necessity 

of keeping the petroleum price stable.) 

Because Brazil has become so closely identified with the antithesis of 

our two current hemispheric concerns, necessity has required that we 

move away from the "special relationship" which Kissinger constructed 

with Brazil. But the long-term importance of Brazil also demands that 

we make special efforts to improve our overall relationship with Brazil. 

Thus, while increasing our support for Venezuela's efforts on behalf of 

human rights, arms control, and nonproliferation, we should not permit 

ourselves to be identified with any Venezuelan-Argentine attempt to contain 

Brazil, and we should make clear that we would consider it inconsistent 

for Venezuela to let her new alliance with Argentina overcome her great 

concern for the human rights situation in Argentina. (There is some 

indication that Videla asked Perez to prevent the Inter-American Commission 

on Human Rights from "interfering" with Argentina.) 

« 

Perez has a larger role to play. Unquestionably, if we need help in 

either the Canal or the Cuba negotiations, we ought to seek his advice, 

Our strategy for dealing with the Caribbean must include Venezuela. 

(Their Minister of Communications told me that Venezuelans now know 

how Americans feel because the Caribbean countries are referring to 

them as "imperialists. ") Devising such a strategy in cooperation with 

Mexico and Venezuela, as well as the U.S . and Canada, as potential 

•donors would be a model for similar projects in other developing 

countries . 

I


f. i j \» • I* t 

t 

4 

The increased production of Venezuelan (and Mexican) energy, the 

development of alternate energy resources anA the curbing of a plutonium 

economy are all issues where U.S . and Venezuelan cooperation and 

leadership will be so important, and the U.S. should encourage Venezuela 

to take the lead. 

But Venezuela's leadership does not necessarily imply Latin America's 

follower-ship, and we should be careful not to place all our eggs in 

their basket. Indeed, we should independently seek the cooperation 

and encourage the leadership of all the countries visited on appropriate 

issues. Our strategy should be to mold coalitions around issues. 

Human Rights. Our goals in the immediate future relate to the strengthening 

of the independence, the capability, and the credibility of the Inter- 

American Commission on Human Rights (1ACHR) . Specifically, this 

means: 

1. Seeking cooperation to obtain the signing and ratification of the 

American Convention on Human Rights. 

2. Seeking a larger budgetary allocation apd administrative autonomy 

for the IACHR. 

a 

3. Seeking the support of all democratic and transitional governments 

for human rights issues to be discussed at the OAS General Assembly 

in Grenada, and particularly for an OAS Resolution which calls 

upon all governments to grant access to investigations by international 

human rights commissions. 

Nonproliferation. Our purpose is to explain the President's commitment 

to nonproliferation, as demonstrated in his decision to sign Protocol I. 

Our goal is to seek hemispheric support for removing the remaining 

obstacles to full implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 

North-South Dialogue. Instead of reacting to their concern about the 

future direction of North-South negotiations, we should volunteer 

comments about the President's commitment and desire that the Latin 

American nations play a constructive, active, and moderate role. 

t


* * * » « m ' ' * k .. 

W w’ |j 'k Lu 1 5 

( 

Andean Stability. Mrs. Carter's trip to Peru and Ecuador and our 

interest in curbing the sub-regional arms race will contrast nicely 

with the view of the previous Administration that any U.S. initiative 

or even expression of support for arms control would be "the kiss of 

death," increasing rather than decreasing tension in the region. I 

believe that her visit to the region will, by her expressions of concern, 

demonstrate U.S . interest in the stability of the region. 

Summary 

Mrs. Carter's trip will provide an opportunity for modeBt progress toward 

these four goals — human rights, nonproliferation, moderate but constructive 

progress in North-South negotiations, and arms control in the Andes. And 

the process of developing a close relationship with President Perez will be 

an important instrument in this design. Prime Minister Michael Manley 

could conceivably play a similar role in developing a coordinated response 

to dealing with the problems of the Caribbean. 

* * * * 

The shift by the new Administration from a low-profile, passive policy 

to an active, purposeful posture has had an interesting and unanticipated 

impact on international politics in the hemisphere. To take a single 

illustration, the possibility exists that Mrs. Carter's trip will prompt 

human rights demonstrations in Latin America. Who would have thought 

that Latin America would be so divided by a U.S . initiative, as it is 

on our human rights and nonproliferation policy. Five years ago, who 

would have contemplated the liberal-left in Latin America seeking the 

support and applauding the initiatives of the new U.S . Government? 

These changes will be seen more clearly as a result of her trip. 

4 4

.•No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8 



5/S 

TO: 

FROM: 

DOS REVIEWED 07-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULLj 

The Secretary 

ARA - Terence A. Todman 

Your Visit to Argentina November 20-22f 1977 

I. Objectives 

i 





Bank. Meanwhile# Argentina's rush toward nuclear 



President videla offers the beBt hope on the nuclear 



other issues. But Videla*s position is not secure, 


to make some basic decisions on theiq relations with us 


In this context, our objectives are to: 

strengthen Videla's position vis-a-vis military 



on these issueB overlap); 

— obtain Videla*s agreement to ratify Tlatelolco, 



issue; 




due process, and (b) ending "disappearances" and torture^ 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O.i3526 

, -::y MUL- aiA-Ln-»4-q-* 

Data “nMlU 

-6BCKBT 

“SDS 

i 



Argentina's objectives are tvofold: 

— the government wants a clarification of what 




appear cordial and substantive and hence to demonstrate 

to Argentine public opinion that .his government has our 


II. Setting 

% 

Although Argentina is Latin America's most European 





disintegrated: fanatical groups of leftist and rightist 






the economy. 



been reduced to some 700 combatants, and the Trotskyite 

People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) to only 120. Both 





brought peace, however. Acts of viole'nce are still 



of all kinds, and even cynical maneuverinjs to weaken 


be designed to embarrass videla himself. 



BUBpected terrorists. Nonviolent citizens are sometimes 





of the security personnel have been punisbed, but 


6E6RET- 


r

.■No Objection To Declassification in Full 2Q13/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8 




serious distortions in relative prices have been corrected 


On the negative side, the government has not been able 
















have led to considerable new interest and some new 

activitity by foreign investors. US investment now 






















» 

ggCRBT - 



acik.ncix 

-1- 

* 

powerful labor unions are largely undter the control 

of military interventors. 

Argentina's international-actiyity has been 
















Argentines are fully aware of our nucleat preoccupations 

and may hope that cooperation on th*at» front might 







ownership of Tierra del Fuego to Chile, raised 

nationalist sentiments in-Argentina, already resentful 




more inclined toward negotiation. The Navy 

apprehended nine Russian and Bulgarian fishing 


to have had a lasting impact on Argentine-Soviet 

relations. 

III. Key Issues 


i 

U. S. Objective: To convince the Argentines that 




SECRET 


• No Objection To Declassification in F&ll 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8 

BffrpnT 

“3=" 

Argentine Objective: To convince the US that the 

human rights violations which have taken place were 












which triggered - them. 

{ 

Hundreds of members of the Armed Forces and innocent 


military, aided by fanatical rightist* civilians, have reacted 








the disappeared are often ignored by thegovernment. 




a letter signed by 178 of them asking for your intercession 


I 




to President Carter to try to resolve the cases of 


Christmas, but there haB has been Tittle 'progress. 

A recently reinstated "right of optioA", which would 



prisoners. 





SBCBBT 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8.

•No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04■: NLC-24-67-4-9-8 

SECRET ‘ 

-6-“ 

vention on behalf of jailed newspaper editor, Jacobo 




Harkin has asked that you inquire 'about the application 


has just given us an unverified'list containing the 











individual cases, but we hope that they will soon be 

decided. 


the "right of option.” We hope that its provisions will 

allow many detainees to be freed from1 prison. 









instances. 











■SBGRBT 



-ryr— 

2. Terrorism 

0. S. Objective; To remind the Argentines that we, too, 



I 

( 

Argentine Objective; To focus U. S. thinking on 




i 

Essential Factors; The Argentines contend that U.S. 











Btrong feelings about terrorism; his predecessor, 


in May. 


their concern; two Armed Forces officers were assassinated, 

three businessmen were killed, 'and the office of the Labor 



V 

Points to be Made 1 




—. We are as deeply troubled as the Argentines by the 





D. S. Objectives: To have Argentina ratify the Treaty 



explosions. 

■SE6RBT' 


*





ties with the U.S. 






views nuclear technology a3 a source of both energy 




exporter of technicians under IAEA programs. 

If Argentina were to defer its reprbcessing plans, 

accept fullscope safeguards and foregb nuclear explosions, 







both Argentina and Brazil which is outlined in the background 

papers, but a key immediate objective of our foreign policy 



» 




weapons. 




% 






— Any cooperation on heavy water would, of course,- 

involve your deferral of reprocessing plans while an urqent 

world study is conducted on how to reprocess in a safer 

manner. 

SECRET 



~=5=" 

-- We accept and support Argentina'& expectation 




a bold step on behalf of continental security and move 










4. U. S.-Argentine.Military Relations 

i 

U. S. Objectives: To assure the Argentines that we 

want a go.od military relationship, but to get them to 

understand that this depends on their hufhan rights 

performance. • » 

Argentine Objective; To inform us that it values 

its military ties to the U. S., but that without a 

clarification of U.S. arms policies, particularly on 



Essential Factors: 0. S.-Argentine military relations 

have deteriorated sharply'as a result of 0. S. actions taken 

to disassociate the U. S. from the GOA's human rights 










for Argentina, our actions have damaged telations 


dropped out of UNITAS fleet exercises this year. Until 





•SECRET— 




t 







situation in Argentina, it is virtually.impossible for the 

Administration to justify military sales to Argentina. 







October 1, 1978. 

5. .Argentina and the International* Financial 

institutions 

jf 

I 

U.S. Objectives: To explain to the Argentines that 




9 

Argentine Objective; To persuade the U.S. to vote 

"yes" or abstain on Argentine loan requests in the IFIs. 


voting "no* bn one loan and told the Argentines that 

this was due to improvements in their tinman rights situation. 








.voted "yes" on a potable water loan in the IDB that 

met our basic human needs criteria* but decisions 

on two more Argentine loan requests the IDB, 







•fiSCRET------ 



after significant improvements in human rightB have 

taken place, vote "no”. 

t % 

Points to be Made % 









in the World Bank and IDB when future loans come up. 

t 






U.S. Objectives; To encourage Argentina to use its 

influence within the G-77 on issues wherte our 


t 

Argentine Objective; To encourage the U. S. to 



Essential Factors; Although outwardly supportive 










exporter of any of the 18 core commodities. * Last September, 







■SECRBg 



-12- 


has strongly criticized our "basic human needs strategy” 

as a no growth ploy designed to divide the LOCs. 



moderate position Argentina has taker* on many economic 







to North/South issues. 


the Argentines in the MTtf negotiations, and would 







obviously essential to meet basic human meeds 


7. U. S. - Argentine Mixed ComitfiBsion 

U. S, Objective; To be receptive to Argentine requests 

for cloBer economic consultations. 

Argentine Objective. To reactivate the U.S.-Argentine 


Essential Factors; A U.S-Argentine Mixed Economic 

Commission was established in 1966, but is moribund. The 








of too close a relationship to Argentina mt this time. 

JSSGBST 

t 


• .'No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8 

0Ci^CVAl 

”13—' 









worth of cooked-frozen and canned beef ift 1976). On 







— Our health restrictions againBt Argentine beef 

are not a device to deny access to U. S. markets. We 

welcome discussions with Argentina regardinq health and 







, U. S. Objective: To consider Argentine proposals 


t 



Essential Factors: The Argentines first suggested this 







— The U. S. will listen with interest to Argentine 




SECRET—■ 


»


SECRET 

--I4” 


0. S. Objectives; To encourage greater technology i 

development in LDCs, but to restrain discrimination 

if 

against U. S. suppliers of technology. To insure that 

IFI and USAID money is used to finance the best technology// 

available, regardless of origin. . I] 

Argentine Objective; To foster greater utilization of 


agreements. 

Essential Factors; A United Nations Conference on 



The GOA has long been the prime proponent of such a conference, 

which it hopes will help promote greater use of 




the goal of cooperating with LDCs 'to enhance use of technology 







10. Malvinas/Falkland Island^ 

» 





Argentine Objective; To solicit U. S. support for the 

return of the U . K '.' held Malvinas Islands to Argentina. 


Essential Factors; The Malvinas have been governed by 






■SECRET 


• 'No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8 

-15- 











restraint on the Argentines to permit an evolutionary 

approach. 


t 




— The U. S. hopes that the U. K. and Argentina can 


Argentina should show restraint: any "incident" would 


t 

see*trsr 


PAGE II GuEHOS 14137 II CF 17 2777151 1277 

ACT 1011 ISA-14 

I 

INFO OCT-31 ,55-23 C AE-B3 CC0E-33 PI-23 H-3I IIIR-'.I 

1-37 HSAE-13 HSC-Dj PA-31 SP-32 SS-15 ICA-11 

1 HA-B5 nCT-91 TR3E-33 ml-35 E8-CJ Y3B7 W 

.................................. B5JJ31 2722871 /73 

P 2720121 jjH It 

FH AnEMBASST BUENOS AIRES 

TO SECS7ATE VASmDC PRIORITY 6213 

AM f I 0 n I I n SECTION l OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4137 

E.O. 11667: CDS 

TAGS: OYIP 

SUBJECT: HENRY KISSINGER VISIT TO ARGENTINA 

SUMMARY; FROM ARRIVAL TO DEPARTURE HENRY KISSINGER AND HIS 

FkKILY WERE VEIL RECElVEO BY ARGENTINE POPULACE. THE GOA 

LAID OUT RED CARPET, PULLING OUT STOPS. OR. KISSINGER SPOKE 

TO DIVERSIFIED GROUPS-FRON HANKERS TO 6AUCH0S. IN HOST 

INSTANCES, HE COPPLIMEIITED GOA FDR DEFEATING TEROHISTS BUT 

HE WARNED THAT TACT:CS USED AGAINST THEN THEN ARE NOT 

JST1FI ABLE HOW. GEhERALLY, DR. KISSINGER PUBLICLY AFFIRNED 

HIS SUPPORT FOR P8ESI0EHT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH A 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-56-1-5-744-. 

UtifJUriniVtLl UJ Oltue 

• 1LLLUHHI1I 

BUENOS I4S17 11 OF B2 2721161 

THEN. THE FCAHES SECSEJARY TOLD VI DEL A RE GAVE SIS FULL 

SUPPORT TO PRESIDENT CARTER 011 X1S AFRICAN POLICY. 

X 

B. P'.TAN RIGA'S WERE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY. KISSINGER 5AI0 IT 

VAS UNFORTUNATE MANY AMERICANS STILL TNOUGNT ARGENTINA WAS 

A SOFT DRINR. HE SAiO THIS INDICATED THAT ANEXLtANS■ARE 

ROT AWARE OF ARGENTINE HISTORY NOR CF ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST 

TERRORiSHr' HrEIPhASIZED THAT TERROR ISN VAS NOT SOLELY OF 

ARGENTINE ORiSIN BJt INSTEAD IT HAS RECONE All INTERNATIONAL 

CONCEPT. KISSINGER APPLAUDED ARGENTINA’S EFFORTS IN 

CDHBATTING TERROR 1SI1 BUT BE*ALSO STRESSED THAT TACTICS USED 

IN DEFEAT 1 HO TERRORISTS HAD RO PLACE IN ARGEMI111A.TODAY. 

FEW EXCEPTIONS. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- , 

POS REVIEWED 03-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL 

1. DR. KISSINGER, HIS WIFE AND SON ARRIVED IK IA EARLY 

WEDNESDAY HORNING IJUNE 21). HE VAS NET AT THE AIRPORT BY 

A FQHQFF REP WHO DOGGED KIN THROUGHOUT n:5 VISIT. KISSINGER 

VAS THE GUEST OF PRESIDENT VICELA, SUPPOSEDLY INVITED TO VIEW 

WORLO SUP. THE FORMER SECRETARY HADE IT CLEAR DURING HIS * 

FIVE-DAY STAY NE VAS IN ARGENTINA AS PRIVATE CITIZEN AND HOT 

A SrOKCSIMK FOR USG. 

2. KISSINGER’S FIRST ACTIVITY VAS TO LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT 

VIDELA, COL. (1A4.LE.A GIL (INTERPRETER! ANO AMBASSADOR CASTRO 


PREARRANGED IT SO PISSINGER ANO THE INTERPRETER WOULD MEET 

WITH HIM PRIVATELY half HOUR BEFORE AMBASSADOR’S ARRIVAL. 

IMMEDIATELY ON AMBASSADOR’S ARR|JAL_AI_130B. LUNCH VAS.SERVED 

7. THROUGHOUT LUNCH VIDELA SEENED RELAYED AND FR'EKDLY. 

HE TENSEO UP ONLY WHEN ARGENTINA’S PROSPECTS IN THE WORLD 


f 

3. KISSIHGER INFORMED AMBASSADOR ThAT OURIHG PRIVATE 

SESSION WITH PRESIDENT HUMAN RIGHTS VEKE OISCUSSEO. ALLEGEDLY 

VIDELA WANTED SUGGESTIONS FROM CR. KISSINGER AS TO nOW TO 

IMPROVE PEL-TI OHS WITH USG. THE AMIASSAOOR WAS NOT INFORMED 

WETHER KISSINGER OFFERED ANY SOLUTIONS. 

4. AT LUNCH, VIOELA ASKED KISSINGER FOR HIS VIEWS ON LATIN 

AMERICA. FcRiypj^CRETFRV REiPDNDEO. THAT NOV .MORE THAN EVER 

WAS TIME TC BE CONCERNED ABOUT DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF WESTERN 

HEMISPHERE."”HE ADDED L'II'Ty'OF"tCTION AMONG THE IA COUNTRIES 

IS REQUIRED IF ALL AMER’CAH CSU.'iTRlES ARE TO SURVIVE. HE 

STRESSED THAT CUR'MG NIS TENURE AS SECRETARY CF STATE, LATIN 

AFRICA VAS NOT HIS TOP PRIORITY. HE SAID THIS WAS TRUE 

BEFORE HE VAS SECRE'ART ANO IT IS TRUE NOV. KISSINGER POINTED 

CUT THAT THIS WAS NOT MEANT TO IE A REFLECTION ON ANY 

ADMINISTRATION. THE LACK 0F~*U£1{TI0N TOWARDS LR WAS NOT A 

DELIBERATE ACT OH ANYBODY’5 paht^^TY-w* iiigr « FACT THAT 

WISH THE 3B9T*6T”ThE WORLFTxFrDDHW^jmWECT 

5., jrfSS'NSER EMPHASIZED I ATI I. IMF BI CAN HAY IE NEXT fill 

RUSSIA ANO. WBA S.SCHEOiJiE/'he ’aDDED >N VIEW OF EVENTS IN 

AFlk(AIT IS IMPERATIVE TKAT THE USG FOCUS ON LATIN AMERIC 

HE 

KISSIHGER 

‘HtT'nrHT *‘*Trl for MIS A'iNAPOLIS SPEECH 

.i« ruTtjjjmnVitm 

POLICY, ESPECIALLY THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY AND SALES OF AIR 

CPAFT TO HIS-EASTEAN COBTfiTiES. KIS_SJMER SAID IT 

ABOMINABLE THAT AjrfTH HFRA1I FC THAT cilBAH SOLDIER 

INVINCIBLE. Sill* WHEN, HE ASHES, CArYuBAH SOLDIERS MAR 

FROM SOUTH TO HCRU IN AFRICA AND EXPECT THE WORLD 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O. 13526 

Airily NLC,--a5^~\-S -~l 

NAHA _fc.P- Dcjto 

-No Objection To Declassification in FuT2tn 3/02/04 : NLC-24-56-1-5-7

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/16 : NLC-24-55-8 

CONFIDENTIAL 


BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS: 

ARGENTINA 

Political violence has wracked Argentina since the 

late Sixties. The violence was partially responsible 

for the economic and political breakdown precipitating 

the March 1976 coup, and has subsequently been used 

by the junta as a rationale for a no-holds-barred 

approach to counter-terrorism. This has resulted in 

egregious violations of human rights, despite public 

recognition by the government that the terrorists have 

been largely defeated, although businessmen and military 

officers continue to be murdered. 


although it is prohibited by law and publicly condemned 

by government officials. The victims are usually suspected 

terrorists, but leftistst -.priests and foreign• political 

exiles have been maltreated as well. The government is 

aware of such activities but generally has not acted 

effectively to limit them. 

The Argentine armed forces have committed themselves 

to the elimination of terrorist "combatants." This policy 

has led to the summary execution of prisoners who reportedly 

had "blood on their hands." These executions are - Bornetimes--' 

disguised as shootouts with the security forces or prison 

escapes.-----It should be noted that leftist ^terrorists jrarely'< 

allow themselves • to be taken “alive, in order: to avoid, 

interrogation. . - 

State of siege arrests are authorized by the Argentine 

Constitution during iperiods of internal disorder. :.-The 

President of Argentina Imay detain-and .relocate people runderc^the 

state of siege-provisions but /‘according to law;.-he may-c*- - 

not convict or apply punishment upon his own authority. - 

The state of siege powers,-which were invoked in 19.74, have . - 

been used -to hold a‘wide-'variety-.of persons ; many of- whom • 

have been held for long periods without formal charges.-.:. 

Many .arrests and abductions under the state of siege have 

taken place-in vhe middle* of the night; sometimes in the*, 

form of mysterious abductions. Some people-are-freed-after .■ 

short periods , of interrogation. - Others--are'held incommunicado 

without charges or formal- acknowledgement of their detention. 

They join.a group known as the "disappeared” whose number .- 

is estimated to range between*2,000 and 20,000%-. . 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

—f^TPTPKNTiAL * Authority ~~ 3^-yS- & 

MARA fc-E Data "\W\u# 



.CONFIDENTIAL 

- 2 - 

Recently the Government of Argentina has reinstituted 

a limited "right of option" for political prisoners 

who are being held under executive detention—i.e-, not 

charged and remanded to civil or military courts—to 

request exile. Only a few detainees to date have been 

granted exile. 

Action Taken on Human Rights 

— On October 27 the D.S. voted ito on a gas pipeline 

loan in the IDB. The Argentines have been informed that 

if they allow ' three . other loans to come forward we. will ' 

have to vote against them as well on human rights grounds. 

We supported an IDB loan for potable water on the grounds 

that it meets basic human needs, on November 3. 

— President Carter discussed human rights problems 

with President.Videla when the latter was in Washington . 

for the Panama Canal signing ceremony. Ambassador Todman 

and Assistant Secretary Derian have also discussed these 

problems directly with Videla. 

— Argentina rejected FMS credits for FY '78 after 

the Administration reduced the proposed budget request 

for human-rights grounds. The Administration declined to - 

sign the FY *77 FMS Agreement and did-not request FMS 

credits for Argentina-for FY *79. -All arms transfers (FMS 

sales and commercial sales of items on the munitions list) 

are being reviewed on a case-by-case basis,- with-only very 

few selected new items with no apparent relationship to 

human rights approved. - In addition, explosive items such r- 

as shells, cartridges, etc. are being denied. -Policy 

guidance is being sought’oh whether*spare parts will be 

sold or not.- ... 

— We have submitted over ^3>:000-names of individuals - 

who are either detained or have disappeared to the 

Argentine government and have requested that., they furnish.... 

information on these individuals.. 

Drafted: 

ARA/ECA:FRondon/HA:MBova 

•CONFIDENT! A£- 



ARGENTINA 

Loan ‘Institution Date Amount 

Science & Technology IDB 1978 $60 million (FSO) 

Transmission Lines IDB 1978 61.3 million 

Tne issue 

DOS REVIEWED 02-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL 

There are serious human rights violations in 

Practices there include detention without charge? 

and summary execution of prisoners. It also has 


torture; 

an advanced 

nuclear program and is moving toward a reprocessing capacity, 

and is potentially a major source of oil. Its economic 

weight makes it a leader in Hispanic America and one 

of the most active Latin American 'governments in global 

economic fora. 

t 

We have supported one IDB loan (for potable water) 

on basic human needs grounds, have voted against an IDB 

gas pipeline loan, and have told the GOA that we will vote 

against three other IDB loans if the GOA brings them forward. 

Argentina rejected FMS credits for FY 78 after we 

reduced the proposed budget request on human rights grounds. 

All arms transfers are being carefully reviewed on a caseby-case 

basis. President Carter discussed the human rights 

situation personally with President Videla when the latter 

was in Washington for the Panama Canal Treaties' signing. 

We have no bilateral aid program in Argentina. The 

Working Group is not aware of further loans pending in 

International Financial Institutions beyond the above two 

loans and those already considered by the Inter-Agency 

Group. 

The Working Group recommends that consideration of the 

Science and Technology loan on this agenda be delayed, since 

it is not expected to come to a vdte in'the IDB for some time. 

« 

It felt more information was needed as to whether the loan 

on this agenda for Transmission Lines would serv.e basic human 

needs. Since then the Embassy has reported that the project 

would expand electricity supplies to the urban centers of 

Rosario, Coroba, and Buenos Aires. Industrial, commercial, 

and residential consumers would benefit equally. The project 

would not supply electricity to presently unserviced groups. 

There was question within the Working Group as to 

whether we should support loans to Argentina, even if they 

do meet basic human needs. 

-eoWriDEMTIAL 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O. i3526 

.:>,ULC--a4-ss-g-s-y 

.. _Dofo_ ___ 



MEMORANDUM 

trtiUKU 

4140 


-SEfffiBT - 

WASHINGTON 

INFORMATION 



FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

THE PRESIDENT 


Your Remark That Argentine Improvements 

in Human Rights Should be Acknowledged 

The State Department has prepared a short report (Tab A) assessing 

the significance of Argentine President Videla's recent steps (on 

June 14) to improve the country's human rights image. Our mission 

in Argentina and the Department suggest that these steps — the release 

of 342 persons, the processing of 1,000 case^, the reexamination of 

the right of exile — should be "viewed cautiously." Nonetheless, the 

Department has sent a cable which instructs our Embassy to acknowledge 

and express our continued interest and encouragement for these and 

other steps which improve the human rights picture in Argentina. The 

State Department also requested further information on whether the 

announced steps have been taken. 

A recent cable summarising President Videla's trip to Uruguay appears 

to reinforce the conclusion that we should be more cautious about 

accepting announcements of reforms by the Latin American military governments 

at face value. At his press conference at the conclusion of his 

visit, Videla backed away from recent statements on democracy and 

instead Baid that his government has no fixed timetable for the installation 

of a democratic form of government. 

t 

"SECRET--------- 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O.13526 

Authority. 

NARA_L£__ Data 


'c8nnu3entia£i No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-54-6-7-2 

MEMORANDUM^ 

INFORMATION 


April 18, 1979 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

DAVID AARON 



Mexico. Attended a meeting chaired by Jules Katz with the 

industry and consumer representatives interested in the gas 

negotiations. We briefed them in a vtery general way and asked 

as well as solicited some questions. It went well. We are 

sending the proposal down to the Mexicans tonite with talking 

points for Lucey to use if the Mexicans initial response is 

very negative. Two new problems on the horizod on U.S./Mexican 

relations are: tomatoes and mixed credits — the French 

have arranged an agreement on mixed credits with the Mexicans 

which upBets Treasury and they want to make a demarche to the 

French. I think that will be as effective as our demarche to 

Bonn in January 1977 on the Brazil nuclear agreement. I will 

try to turn Treasury off. (C) 

Argentina. Lunched with Ambassador Raul Castro, who informed 

me of the recent inprovement in the human rights situation and 

said he expects further improvement as Videla gets stronger. 

The Argentines promised him for the umpteenth time that they 

would ratify Tlatelolco at the end of this month; we spoke 

about the possibility of his returning to Argentina with a 

letter from Vance to Videla repeating our great concern. Labor 

problems will be more troublesome this year but he thinks the 

Argentine government will be able to manage it, although they 

will have to dismiss their Finance Minister. (C) 

t 

Nicaragua. Two important leaders of Nicaragua's business sector 

met with me and informed me of recent developments which have 

strengthened the middle. They urged us to appoint a good new 

ambassador soon and I assured them we will. They said that such 

an ambassador will help the middle in Nicaragua and we should 

look for additional symbolic ways to strengthen the middle; 

they suggested a meeting with the Vice President. (At the 

right time I think this is a good idea.) They also suggested 

that we should take some steps to counter Somoza propaganda 

that Solaun's resignation represents a Somoza triumph. I will 

suggest that State draft a Presidential letter to Solaun thanking 

him for his excellent service. (C) 

Science and Technology. Briefed a group of people from different 

agencies on the Vice President's conversations with Figueiredo and 

Herrera on S & T, suggested some ideas for ways to package an overall 

approach on S & T to Latin America for Frank ^ 

E.0.13526 

jQiithnrlty KV-C-" Ifl "T ~ 2- 

NARA_Jte£ Jte£_ Data iIaViUt _



(Pastor) 

Prepared for and attended discussions between President Carter and 

President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela. Also working on memorandum 

of conversation of that meeting. Prepared press guidance and attended 

press briefing with Jerry Schecter and Rex Granum. Also met with two 

Venezuelan journalists to discuss the background of Hie OPEC exclusionary 

amendment to the GSP . And met with you and Foreign Minister Escovar 

of Venezuela to discuss the Carter Administration's world vision and 

where Venezuela fits in that. 

Significant Information/Intelligence 

(Trachtenberg) 

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE' 


Venezuela/Panama. A Panamanian NationS.1 Information Release which 

first appeared the evening of June 27 report^ that President Perez will 

meet at Blair House with the Panamanian Canal Treaty negotiating team 

after his meeting with President Carter. 

In Caracas, the morning headlines of June 2fJ indicate that General 

Torrijos personally informed President Perez last Sunday that a Canal 

solution is imminent. 

Peru. UPI and the Latin News Agency report that the United States has 

sold five A-37 fighter planes to Peru. 

Cuba. Premier Castro reportedly has sent a personal note to Zambian 

President Kaunda asking him. to_reconsider his opposition to the stationing 

of Cuban troops in Zambia. 

/ 

Argentina recently announced a number of moves apparently designed 

to counteract adverse publicity on human rights. Although the measures 

appear more cosmetic than substantive, they indicate that President Videla's 

administration is growing increasingly sensitive*to the U.S . position on 

human rights, and particularly to U.S . voting in international financial 

institutions. 

Chile. Upon returning from the OASGA, Foreign Minister Carvajol said 

that the Carter Administration should send high level emissaries to the 

Southern Cone countries not visited in the pre-OASGA period. His 

statement indicates that the Government of Chile seems to be keeping 

alive the idea of visits designed to minimize concern about human 

rights practices in Chile. 

DuCLASSIHED 

E.O. J352G 



Argentina - Background Paper 

The August 1 shift from government by a three-man 

Junta of Service Chiefs to a President-Junta arrangement 

had long been anticipated. Appointment of a retired 

officer as president was apparently provided for in the 

planning that preceded the March 1976 coup. Implementation 

had been delayed, however, in the face of what military 

leaders considered the emergency conditions of the post-coup 

pe riod. 

Jorge Videla's choice to serve as president (until 

March 1981} was not in serious doubt. Less clear, however, 

was how power would be distributed between Videla and the 

Junta. As matters now standi 

• 

-- the Junta will remain the supreme governing body, 


actions and appointments in light of those guidelines; 

and 

— the president will be responsible for daily government 

operations, enjoying considerable powers of appointment 

(often with Junta advice and/or consent). 

Many commentators have noted that Videla*b personal power 

is Ibbs substantial than before August 1. This may be true, 

but Videla's personal, independent power is less consequential 

than his ability to sustain the backing of the army, the 

dominant service. Ab long as he, maintains a close working 

relationship with General Roberto Viola, his successor bb__ 

Army Commander and Junta member, and as long as Viola can 

keep the Army reasonably united, Videla and the Junta are 

not likely to come into serious conflict. 

Terrorism continues to subside in the.face of the military's 

counterinsurgency efforts. The human rights abuses that have 

accompanied the battle have probably also declined in frequency, 

but they have not been halted. Disappearances continue to 

occur, along with allegations of torture and summary executions. 

It is probable that human rights abuses will continue to 

decrease in frequency, especially if the military moderates 

supporting the Videla-Viola team can consolidate their power. 

The process is liable to be gradual, however, economically, 

1978* has been a disappointing year for Argentina to date. 

Stabilization measures (reducing the fiscal deficit, 

decelarating the expansion of monetary aggregates, controlling 

wages, etc) have not prevented, continuing high inflation and 

a drop in economic growth. Argentina is a victim of severe 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

__________________________ftitfhnrlty Nlr£ " —------------------------- 

NARA__££---- Date —-------------

No Objection To Declassification in j-ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-52-6-1-0 

stagf lation. 

-2- 

Inflation during the first half of the year surpassed 

that in the comparable 1977 period and is expected to 

exceed 120 per cent for the 1978 calendar year* The fiscal 

deficit will be at least double the 1 percent of GDP 

target, and the growth rate will probably show about a 

2 percent loss* With blue collar wages continuing to 

decline, the government has a serious economic problem 

that is generating significant domestic discontent* 

The external economic sector provides a very different 

picture* Performance has exceeded exepctations, and there 

are no balance of payments, debt or foreign exchange 

problems except insofar as the influx of exchange has 

helped fuel domestic inflation* 

Bilateral relations with the U*4. have remained 

strained because of the human rights issue. By legislative 

mandate, all D.S* security assistance to Argentina was 

terminated on Septmber 30, 1978* Despite rhetorical 

flareups over specific incidents, however, bilateral 

contacts have been maintained aB 1b evidenced by the 

bilateral economic and nuclear consultations that are 

scheduled to take place in October* 

Denied certain forms of U.S. economic and military 

assistance, the Argentines have been successfully concentrating 

on efforts to diversify their sources of markets, 

financial and investment opportunities, and military 

equipment and training. 

l 

Drafted:ARA/BCAt JMBumpus > SHyles 

INR/RAR:jBuchanan 

10/12/1978 X 29166 (Tape .#14) 

* 

t


^CONFIDENTIAL 


MEETING 



September 9, 1977 - 9: 00 a.m. 





Tlatelolco. 

0 

2. President Carter told Videla the USG would talk to the Cubans 

about signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He asked whether Argentina 







4. Videla said he hoped that the problem of detainees might be 



be possible to send representatives of the OAS or UN to confirm 

human rights progress in Argentina sometime after ChriBtmas, 


visits are the best way to Bhow that Argentina is not ashamed 


international human rights commissions which testify to the 



for the Secretary to visit Argentina after his trip to Brazil to 


■CONFIDENTIAh— 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13528 

fluihorttjr 

nara Dsto —iWiit--------

-CONFIDENT! ft L. 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0^ 

Op r 


CONFIDENT!ATP 2. 

As a parenthetical comment, President Carter observed 

to Videla that his Spanish was the clearest and easiest 

to understand he had ever heard - the President either 

chose simple words or had an unusually clear manner of 

expressing himself. He found this typical of Argentina 

which he and his wife had visited some years previously. 

President Carter also added his thanks for the hospitality 

that President Videla had shown to Assistant Secretary 

Todman during the latter's recent visit to Argentina. 

President Carter said he hoped to have a frank discussion 

of two major issues with the objective of improving 

relations between the two nations. 

& 

Non-Proliferation 

President Carter considered the threat of nuclear explosives 

the greatest problem facing the hemisphere. 

Because Argentina leads the Latin American nations in nuclear 

technology - which is a great credit to Argentina - he hoped 

that Argentina could also lead in the establishment of a 

nuclear free zone in the area and the prevention of introduction 

to nuclear explosives. He observed that all hemispheric 

countries but Cuba and Argentina had signed and 

ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that Chile and Brazil 

had conditioned their approval of that treaty upon Argentina's 

ratification and acceptance of it. He expressed the hope that 

Argentina would ratify thiB treaty which would provide unrestricted 

use of nuclear energy for power but no introduction 

of nuclear explosives. 

President Carter said that the United States, the 

European Community, Canada and Australia were now evolving 

a study of fuel cycle from ore to reactoj: wastes and safeguards. 

On October 19 there will be a three-day meeting on 

this subject, and it would be helpful if the GOA could be 

represented at this meeting. He envisaged establishing 

common policies with regard to the export of nuclear technology 

heavy water and enriched uranium. He said this 

policy envisages restriction of sale of these items to 

countries which do not cooperate in the non-proliferation 

effort. President Carter said he understood that Argentina 

was cooperating with Canada with respect to limited safeguards 

but stressed the importance the United States places 

on the Tlatelolco and the NPT. This is very serious to the 

United States, and it would remain of constant concern. 

iCOMFIDSMTIAL 



■CQm'ILIILNTrRt. * 3. 

President Videla responded by observing that the two 

countries' coincidence of interest was mirrored by the fact 

that the two Presidents' agendas were the same. He did not 

perceive these issues as problems but as opportunities for 

progress. He reviewed Argentina's 25 years' work in developing 

the peaceful use of nuclear energy, noting that one power 

reactor is currently in use, a second under construction 

and a third in the planning phase. He understood President 

Carter's concern over the misuse of nuclear energy and said 

Argentina had offered to establish safeguards beyond those 

which were really needed. However, he understood that even 

this may not be sufficient reassurance for Latin America and 

the world. 

president Videla said the GOA had considered ratifying 

the Treaty of Tlatelolco but stressed that President Carter 

must be aware of the great need for proper political timing 

of such an action. Argentina was only 18 months away from ■ 

its gravest national crisis, so the. government must be 

particularly careful not to disturb the progreBB toward 

normalcy. He stated that as soon as political conditions 

permit - perhaps before the end of the year - he would give 

proof of the GOA goodwill with regard to non-proliferation 

by ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He asked if this 

reassured President Carter. 

President Carter said it did, and stated that if the 

GOA decided to send a delegation to the fuel cycle conference 

it would be particularly exciting if it would be 

possible to announce intended ratification of the treaty 

at that time, but he would defer to President Videla on 

the best political timing. With Argentine ratification, 

the treaty would be in effect for all countries but Cuba, 

and the United States would be raising this issue with 

the Cubans. The President added that Argentine ratification 

would also remove our concerns about technology and 

heavy water supply to Argentina from the United States 

and other suppliers. The President had discussed this very 

issue the previous day with Prime Minister Trudeau in the 

interest of establishing a common export policy. 

Human Rights 

The political changes in Argentina have been given 

careful study by the American government, and recent developments 

there said President Carter, have impressed 

me as much as the natural beauty of the country. He stated 

his admiration for the achievements of President Videla's 

gQNriDENTI»r 


No Objeclion To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0 

■CGNPIBCNTIAL 4. 

government in dealing with the problem of terrorism and 

the reconstruction of the Argentine economy. He said the 

study of the achievements of President Videla's government 

led to the conclusion that the GOA had achieved great 

strength, stability and influence. He hoped that the security 

and the strength of the government would lead to the 

alleviation of concerns expressed by many about the observation 

of human rights in Argentina. The President stated 

he did not have a way to assess the many charges of human 

rights violations and noted the particularly high press 

interest in this subject in the United States. Certain 

cases drew particularly intense interest here, such as that 

of editor Jacobo Timerman and the Deutsch family, who have 

many relatives in the California area. He Bald that a Washington 

group concerned with the subject of human rights had 

provided a list of 3,000 people being detained in Argentina 

without public notice of their arrest or charges against 

them. The President acknowledged that some of these allegations 

may be false or exaggerated, but he felt that in the 

privacy of the room he could express our concerns about the 

state of human rights in Argentina. He would make the list 

available so the State Department could provide it to President 

Videla's government for its use. President Carter felt 

that the friendly bilateral relations(of over a hundred years 

were of great value, and he was concerned that this issue 

could come between the two countries. He felt that more 

progress in this area would be welcome. In summary, he said 

he had great admiration and appreciation for what President 

Videla has been able to do for his country, and asked 

what additional steps could be taken to alleviate the concern 

in the United States (which, indeed, may have been 

exaggerated) about the state of human rights in Argentina. 

President Videla recounted the situation in which 

Argentina found itself in March 1976, with an economic, 

political and social crisis aggravated by terrorism, which 

led the armed forces as an institution reluctantly to take 

over to fill the power vacuum and protect those enduring, 

values and human rights of which President Carter spoke. 

Those who recognized that man was created in God's image 

must recognize his dignity as an individual. Terrorists 

wanted to change that view of man, and Argentina had faced 

what amounted to a war over the issue. All wars have their 

undesirable consequences, and President Carter as a military 

man would know of this. Argentina has suffered all of these 

misfortunes of war. 

-GONFILIE'NTIAL' 



■eetremENTiffi; 5. 

t 

President Videla said that the war, while virtually 

over in a military sense, continued in the political arena, 

both domestically and internationally. The terrorists wish 

to isolate the GOA from a civilized world, but their charges 

were not true; the people of Argentina opposed terrorism 

and the system it advocated. They were dedicated to democracy. 

Argentina faced the intentionally exaggerated publicity 

abroad of admittedly unfortunate incidents. President Videla 

said there were incidents for which the government was 

responsible, and he accepted that responsibility for them 

and stressed his efforts to control abuses of power. He 

said, however, that he could not accept the image of a 

brutal and uncivilized Argentina and the attempt to isolate 

his country from those other nations which shared its basic 

values. He stressed that he would do his utmost to reestablish 

order and control, and meanwhile 'he needed the 

understanding of Argentina's friends,êspecially natural 

friends such as the United States. 

With the war almost over, President Videla felt that 

the need for repressive action was less. He felt that within 

a short period the negative consequences of the repression 

would be eliminated. 

He agreed to accept the list of names of those who were 

reportedly detained in Argentina and welcomed the opportunity 

to comment on the Timerman case. He assured President Carter 

that Timerman was detained under due process, charged with 

dealing with subversive elements. He was not detained because 

of his name - there was definitely no anti-Semitic connection 

to this detention. The same was the case of the detention of 

the Deutsch family: they were detained for investigation of 

possible connection with subversion, not for racial reasons. 

President Videla stated that 1,990 persons had been detained 

under the national executive power in the first year 

of his government and 2,020 in the subsequent six months. 

Since March 1976, 300 of these cases had'been tried in the 

civilian courts with 73 found guilty,$and 370 in the military 

courts with 187 found guilty. In the last two months, 300 

persons detained on suspicion of terrorist activities have 

been liberated. President Videla was most reluctant to give 

a date, but he hoped and wished the problems of the detainees 

might be resolved by Christmas 1977. He would make a major 

effort to achieve this and meanwhile hoped for US understanding. 

■ceiariDENXlrcp Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-40-6-4-0


rnwFTnRWTTAi^ 6. 

President Carter ventured a question about the Argentine 

judicial system, noting that one of the great concerns 

expressed in the United States is the fact that there are no 

announcements of the arrest of Argentine^ or the charges on 

which they were being held. He asked if this is customary. 

President Videla responded that the Argentine courts are independent 

institutions and operated beyond the control of the 

executive. In cases dealing with subversives and their detention 

as a preliminary security measure, no announcements of 

the detentions were made. As soon as the case was investigated 

it was turned over to the military or civilian courts 

or the individual was released. While for security reasons 

it is not convenient to provide public information on detentions 

at the initial stage, the GOA has an office charged 

with providing information to relatives about the possible 

detention and charges against family members. President 

Carter expressed his desire to help restore world appreciation 

of Argentina and what its government stands for. He hoped 

that President Videla would give the United States the opportunity 

to do so. Ab President, he said he knew how much 

opportunity he had to preserve the liberties of the US citizens. 

He asked if, at sometime in the future after Christmas, 

it might be possible for representatives of the OAS or the 

UN to visit Argentina, not to check on you but to certify 

the progress made by the GOA. 

President Videla said he was pleased to respond with 

the same frankness shown by President®Carter and observed 

that facts were infinitely more Important than words. 

The visits of Hr. Todman, Mrs. Derian, the Congressmen and 

the Senators are the beBt way to show that Argentina is 

not ashamed of its record. He thanked President Carter for 

sending these groups and for providing lists of detainees. 

He admitted that there were disappearances in Argentina 

for four reasons: first, when an individual joins the subversive 

underground; second, when a terrorist is killed by 

his associates who may suspect betrayal; third, terrorists 

were killed in battle; and fourth, people were killed by 

excesses committed by forces of repression. He said this 

fourth case is under our control, and it is his responsibility 

to eliminate it. Be said he was not troubled by 

visits or lists or any future visit made in goodwill which 

can testify to the facts in Argentina. 

President Videla regretted that it waB necesesary to 

to devote the short time available to discussion of the 

two fundamental issues raised. Since there were a number 

of important remaining bilateral issues, , which should be 

covered, he wished to invite Secretary Vance to visit 

Argentina after his trip to Brazil to*complete the' consultations. 

CONFIDENTIAL,------ 



COMPIDEMTIM. 7. 

President Carter and Secretary Vance both accepted the 

invitation for Secretary Vance to visit Argentina. President 

Carter said he regretted that the two items had dominated 

this discussion, which would have to be ended because 

the President of Uruguay was arriving shortly. Should President 

Videla wish, he said that Vice President Mondale could 

meet with him now, or the conversations could be continued 

during the Secretary's visit. President Carter expressed 

his hope he could return to Argentina before long and presented 

President Videla with his book and a collection of 

satellite photographs of the world. The meeting terminated 

with expressions of mutual goodwill-. 

I 

CONFIDENTIAL 


i

mp:moraxduj.* 

NSS Rvw Completed - Released in Full ■ Refer To DOS -11/6/13 

--- ---- THE-WHTTE HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 

CONFIDENTIAL June 24, 1978 

)S REVIEWED OB \ov-2D12: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION, 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

THE PRESIDENT 


{information Items 

Information 

Weizman's visit to West Bank: Our Jerusalem Consulate General 

reported that Weizman, during his June 20 visit to Nablus, 

Hebron, and nearby Israeli settlements exhibited unprecedented 

Israeli flexibility. 

— In Nablus, he approved the purchase of new generators 

to expand the municipal electrical plant, reversing 

Israel's longstanding policy. He also gave the goahead 

for the drilling of new water wells, and promised 

to curb the overzealous security searches conducted 

by IDF troops in the area. 

— In Hebron, he approved the return of two prominent 

deportees, local hospital improvements, and increases 

in electrical power. 

Regarding the Jewish settlements, he. gave ..his general support, 

but affirmed the Israeli government's respect for private 

Arab property. West Bank mayors were very pleased with 

Weizman1s pronouncements, but the West Bank press took pains 

to disassociate municipal cooperation with Weizman from 

collaboration with Begin's autonomy scheme. 

Trends in Human Rights in Argentina: According to a State 

analysis, Argentina's human rights record in 1978 displays 

some improvement over the 1976-77 period, but conditions 

have changed little in the last six months. Serious abuses 

still occur, despite reports of efforts by military officials 

to curb renegade counterterrorist activities. There is 

a reasonable prospect for gradual but significant improvement 

over the next year or so, however. In the meantime, 

the Argentines will probably pursue a damage-limiting strategy 

in their relations with the U.S. 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 


CONFIDENTIAL 


-2- 

NLC-1 -6-7-36 

uuni 

In recent weeks. President Videla's government has taken 

several noteworthy steps that are designed primarily to 

defuse human rights criticism during the OAS General Assembly 

— On June 20, the IAHRC was invited to pay a "special 

visit" to investigate "legal-judicial conditions." 

— President Videla is said to have informed an archbishop 

on June 19 that 14 labor leaders would be released 

and the cases of others reviewed. 

— Alfredo Bravo, a well-known labor leader and rights 

activist, returned home on conditional liberty on June 

16 after 10 months in jail. 

— Two restrictions on press freedom were rescinded 

on June 5. 

State notes that implementation of well-timed human rights 

"concessions" has been a consistent Argentine tactic over 

the past two years. The prospects for gradual improvement 

over the coming months will be enhanced by the continued 

diminution of the terrorist threat and the likelihood that 

Videla and his fellow moderates in the armed forces will 

consolidate their control over the security forces. 

Your OAS Speech: Latin American media headlined and commented 

on your address to the OAS meeting, emphasizing your comments 


— Gazeta Mercantil of Sao Paulo considered the speech 

"one of the most important, if not the most important," 

you have ever delivered before a Latin American audience 

The article said you made one of your strongest defenses 

of human rightB, not only reaffirming your human rightB 

principles, but pronouncing them with even greater 

energy. 

j 

— Headlines in Buenos AireB read: "Carter's Stern 

Warning — Governments Violating Human Rights Will 

be Punished". "Carter Reaffirms Human Rights Policy". 

— Leftist-nationalist Excelsior of Mexico City approved 

of the proposal "to create a technical committee" to 

help raise living standards, but noted that to do this 

it would be necessary "to overcome the very powerful 

interests of those who uphold exploitation, frequently 

by U.S. companies." 

-CWPRr?JTlAI - 


No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/21 : NLC-1-6-7-36-8“,|rnil! 

w 

JSQWJP-EDENTIAJr -3- 

w uunnuolllnL 

i 

— The English language daily Journal of Caracas Btated: 

"Latin America is one part of the world where the push 

for human rights seems to be going well....even Borne 

of the worst violators of human rights in the hemisphere 

appear to be restraining themselves..." 



□OS REVIEWED 02-Fob 2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 

May 30, 1978 


FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 

Cyrus Vance C-V- 

Genscher. At breakfast today, X briefed Genscher 

on SALT and recent developments in the Middle East. 

We discussed MBFR and agreed that progress on a forthcoming 

response from the Soviets on our proposal is a 

necessary precondition to a meeting of Foreign Ministers, 

Neither of us had a clear picture of what the 

French are trying to do — especially to MBFR — with 

their new proposals for a European disarmament conference. 

We agreed the subject should be discussed 

at our next four power meetings with Owen and De 

Guiringaud in Paris and Bonn. We decided to raise 

the question of an appropriate forum for negotiation 

of grey area systems at the same time. 

Genscher underlined the importance he attaches to 

your forthcoming visit to Germany. He urged that enough 

time be allowed in your schedule fpr "intensive political 

discussions," and expressed his hope that you will agree 

to meet separately with the leaders of the four political 

parties represented in the Bundestag. 

Ecevit. An exclusive interview with the New York 

Times and an appearance on the Today Show unfortunately 

focused attention on Ecevit's visit to Moscow next month 

and his belief that detente has diminished the Soviet 

threat to Turkey. Ecevit did stress that Turkey is not 

seeking to obtain military equipment from the Soviet 

Union and he emphasized Turkey's continuing commitment 

to NATO. His opening address at the NATO Summit conveyed 

a much more helpful and balanced position, and 

will be helpful on the Hill. 

I 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority—Nl L-C - 

NAfiA_.„fcp__ Dato l\o>\n. 


«* No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-6-4-33-7 

-2- 

Ecevit's two-hour meeting last night with 

Karamanlia at Blair House resulted in an agreement 

that senior officials from the two Foreign Ministries 

will meet in Ankara July 4-5 to continue the Greek- 

Turkish dialogue* This is a favorable development, 

although we doubt that Cyprus was discussed at any 

length. Ecevit will meet with the HIRC on Thursday 

and address the National Press Club before going to 

New York to speak at the Disarmament Session and meet 

with Waldheim, bankers, and journalists. He will 

return to Washington next Monday £or a session with 

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee before returning 

to Turkey. 

Four Power Meeting. I met with my colleagues from 

the UK, France and Germany on Sunday evening to consider 

matters relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole. We 

noted that the Berlin situation was essentially calm 

and that the Soviets had shown relative restraint on 

Berlin over the past few months. Genscher reported 

that, while no progress was made on specific Berlin 

issues during Brezhnev's visit to West Germany earlier 

this month, the Soviets had discussed Berlin in a nonpolemical 

way and had sought to avoid friction. Genscher 

thought it a positive sign that Brezhnev had resisted 

East German entreaties to stop in East Berlin on his way 

home and had sent Gromyko instead. Genscher expressed 

concern that East Germany is seeking a voice in the 

interpretation of the Quadripartite Agreement (US,UK, 

France, USSR) and urged the Allies to take every opportunity 

to rebuff their efforts. 

* 

Argentina. We have had our |irst indication that 

Under Secretary Newsom's trip to Argentina may be sparking 

needed action on human rights. Subsequent to Newsom's 

return, Ambassador Castro informed Videla that military 

training would be resumed when Argentina announced publicly 

that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission was being 

invited. Videla was obviously pleased, and responded 

that in addition to the announcement, positive strides 

would be made in prisoner releases before September 30, 

and that by year end an impressive number of people would 

be released. Such action could enable us to resume some 

''•"X 7-“ 

«vV • 

r 



- 3 - 

shipments to Argentina and hopefully ultimately create 

conditions which could allow us to recommend repeal 

of the Kennedy/Humphrey new arms embargo. Videla 

seems genuinely to want improved relations with the 

US, and the question is whether his political situation 

will give him room to take the necessary steps. 

Icelandic Elections, Prime Minister Hallgrimsson1s 

Independence Party, traditionally the cornerstone of pro- 

American, pro-NATO views as well as Iceland's largest 

political party, suffered heavy losses in Sunday's municipal 

elections. The big winner is the communist-dominated 

Peoples Alliance which polled 24.5%, up from itB 17.1% 

in 1974, while the Independence Party dropped from 49% 

to 39.9% and the other coalition partner in the present 

government, the Progressive Party, fell 3.6% to 15.2%. 

The setback for the coalition partner^ could have an 

important psychological and political effect on the 

national elections scheduled for June 25 and is certain 

to alter the nature of the campaign now underway. 

i 




WASHINGTON 

SECRET 

'DOS REVIEWED 02-Feb-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL) 

+ 

May 26, 1978 


FROM: 

4 

THE PRESIDENT 

Cyrus Vance 

Argentina. On Wednesday, Under Secretary Newsom 

met with President Videla in Buenos Aires concerning 

human rights conditions in Argentina and the effect 

they are having on our relations. Newsom reports 

that there is reason for some optimism that the human 

rights situation in Argentina will improve, but it 

is still unclear how fast the government will or can 

move. He made it clear to Videla that in the absence 

of genuine human rights improvements, we will not be 

in a position to approve pending arms* transfer re-* 

quests. Videla confided that at tjjhe OAS General 

Assembly next month Argentina will announce that it 

is inviting the Inter-American Human Rights Commission 

to visit Argentina. In view of this development and 

as a means of encouraging further human rights improvements, 

we are informing Videla that when the invitation 

is announced, and after we have consulted with Congress, 

we would expect to grant Argentina1s pending application 

for the purchase of military training. 

SALT. I testified on SALT before the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee today with Paul Warnke. Considerable 

bi-partisan support was expressed for your statements 

yesterday on the need to separate our interest in a new 

SALT agreement from condemnation of the Soviet role in 

Africa. In their questioning, Glenn, Percy and others 

stressed the importance of our being able to make a 

strong case that the agreement was verifiable. Percy 

and Javits emphasized the necessity to build public 

and Congressional support for SALT. 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 



• SECRET 

- 2 - 

Kenya. This week we briefed Kenyan Foreign 

Minister Waiyaki in Nairobi on our intention to 

send a military survey team to Somalia as a step 

toward possible US supply of defensive equipment. 

Waiyaki was told of the assurances we had received 

from Siad, and we emphasized Siad had. been advised 

that Somalia's continuing material support for insurgents 

in the region would prevent our establishing 

an arms supply relationship with Somalia. 

Waiyaki did not object to the step we are taking, 

but he cautioned that Kenya remained convinced that 

Somalia would never abandon irredentism. He cited 

Kenyan intelligence reports that Somalia was continuing 

its active support for the Ogaden insurgency and that 

Somalia was maintaining surreptitious contact with the 

Soviet Union. Waiyaki appeared to appreciate that, as 

we seek to limit Soviet influence in the Horn, we do 

not intend to sacrifice Kenya's interests. 

i 

I 

* 

¥ 

SECRET 

No Objection To Declassification in Fsll 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-6-4-29-2

062 

— * 


“ ‘ “ T CmPY 

DOS REVIEWED 2B-Jan-20li: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL 

flash /op immeo 

DE R'JEHC #SSS6 2SP1 

Z 0 77145SZ SEP 7B ZFFfl 

Fm SECSTATE MSKDC 

TO AMEHBASSY B U E N n * AIRES FLASH 178B 

iKiFD WHITE H0l>8F IMMEDIATE P621 

■SEC i? -E-T STATE 226596 

* 

N0DI8 

Eyfc DV.-LY FOP AMBASSADOR CASTRQ 

âOi 11652-2 

TA38I CVI°, PGOv, BMP, AR 

SUBJECT! MEETING BETWEEN THE VICE PRESIDENT AND PRESji 

dent vipela 

1'. SUMMARY, FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE VICE PRESI 

DENTS MEETING -ITH PRESIDENT VIDELA, SEPTEMBER 5, AT THF 

residence of the African ambassador in rome, you are 

REQUESTED TO *AKE a FOlLOW-UP INQUIRY TO PRESIDENT 

VIDELA DR PR, YnFPFi IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 7 BELOW'. 

End summary. 

a', IN THE COURSE rP THE meeting, thf VICE president 

STRE8SE0-THAT WF. ’-ant QDODiRELATIONS but that human 

RIGHTS ARE A CENTRAL CONCERN. WE WISHED TO wqrk WITH 

ARGENTINA IN HAVIVG GOOD RELATIONS’, IT WAS■ IMPORTANT 

THAT VIDELA PECEIVF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS 

commission ciahrcj, on terms acceptable to thjt commission ’, 

WE'wouLP NOT l„r-W ARGENTINE ACTI0N5 WITH OUR OWN, PRO 

GRESS 0W CASES Pi’Cw AS JACOBO TIMERMAN WOULD ALSO BE 

helpful. 

3’. PRESIDED VI"FL* STATED THAT HE FULLY CONCURS IN 

PRESIDENT CARTER f8 POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE WESTERN 

WORLD MUST BE i»N7T?n AND THE UNITED STATES MUST LEAD THE 

* f 

EOBIE»P,NATWEWS,PASTOR 

PSNIiASBPft* PAGE Ml 

( 

WH5R COMMENT 

Tp*?i2S«/i5|W3Z QTQfP7lj53Z REP 78 

*S ROPY 

A> ~ U 1 - I r\ »


-e R-r f ■ *******8BEopy 

wester i'Q»L0'. ARGENTINA WAS WITH THE UNITED STATES 

and not troubled BV OBJECTIVE CRITICISM5, he was CON 

CERNED, HOWEVER* BV CRITICISM WHICH WAD THE APPEARANCE 

OP INTERVENTION T*1 ARGENTINE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS’, SUCH 

CRITICISM NAD COMPELLED HJM Tn POSTPONE AN INVITATION 

TO THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION’, HIS CON 

CERN WAS THAT PROBLEMS IN THE RELATIONSHIP AT THE‘ GOV 

ERNMENT PLANE HA" «EEN RAISEO TO THE LEVEL OFSPUBLIC OR 

POPULAR ISSUES', 

4', THE VICE PRFSIHPNT SUGGESTED THAT, TD PUT RELATIONS ON 

A MORE POSITIVE COURSE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY COME TO 

Argentina to *fft -ith videla or a person p* his choice 

POR A REVIEW OP 0"0 RELATIONS', VIDELA ASKED WHETHER 

THE VARY VISIT -n'li^ BE APTER THE IAHRC OR BEFORE', T«E 

VICE PRESIOEMT SUGGESTED THAT IT BE SCHEDULED AS SOON 

Ag POSSIBLE, 

S’, PRESIDENT VIOFLA REVIEWED STEPS TAKEN BY THE ARGEN 

TINE GOVERNMENT SI‘.'CE HIS LAST MEETING WITH PRESIDENT 

CARTER {DURING THF oAmAma CANAL SIGNING)* WHICH HE SAID 

SHOWED THAT THERF had BEEN EFFORTS BV HIS GOVERNMENT IN 

The human RIGHTS AREA, videla CONFIRMED that he would 

RECEIVE the COM-TSSION1, HE SAID IT WAS His INTENTION 

TO MAKE an Armoiiwcpwemt BEFORE OCTOBER 1, TWE EFFECTIVE 

Date OF THE HIimphRFV-KENNEDY AMENDMENT, BUT DID NOT 

TWINS IT COULD BF MNE BEFORE SEPTEMBER 15',- {AT AN EARLI 

ER POINT, HE SAin THAT HE COULD PERHAPS ARRANGE A 

VISIT OP THE COMMISSION BY MID-OCTOBER,) ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY VAKY Cn,ll.C VISIT AFTER Thf ANNOUNCEMENT’, 

VIDELA SAXO HE "REFERRED THAT VAKY VISIT ARGENTINA ONLY AND 

REQUESTED THAT tup USG LET HIM KNOW AHEAD OF TIME THE 

objectives of the vaky mission', the vice president said 

we WOULD COMMUNICATE THESE, 

8‘, IN the COURSE dp The DISCUSSION, THE VICE PRESIDENT 

NOTED THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE EX-XM rank REACH A DECISION 

QN ALLIS-CHALHERS BV SEPTEMBER IS, THE DATE OP THE BIOS 

for the vacyreta power project, an announcement of 

THE COMMISSION is VISIT BEFORE OCTOBER l FIGHT ENABLE 

US TU ACT ON A LETTER BY EX-IM IN SUPPORT OF THE ALLX5- 

CHALMERS BID BEFORE SEPTEMBER ID*, 

7\ ACTION REPUESTPO, VIDELA REITERATED SEVERAL TIMES 

that he intends to receive the commission, you are re- 

Ps'wiiJSBfJSa PARF 9!g 

TnRieBS/isijPSZ DTai«piiBsz sep 7P 

4-E-C R fc”T 

S COPY


***** y-fl-g—C -R-F- T—- **»****gpR)PY 

QUESTED Tn FOLLOW l'P IN LOW KEY FASHION WITH PRESIDENT 

VI0EL4 WIMSELF» IF POSSIBLE# OR WITH YnpRE {WHO NAS PRE3FNT 

AT THF MEETING} mAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS! ClJ WE ARE 

DELIGHTED THAT the FETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT TOOK 

PLACEf £23 -'E WAWT TO REITERATE THF I'.s'. DESIRE To BRING 

UpSfÂRGENTlwp RELATIONS BACK TO THE STATE which SHOULD 

Exist between t-*** friendly natiomsi m you have been asked 

TO BE IW TOUCH !^ ^RDER TO FOLLOW UP ON THE MONDAle«VIDELA 

conversationsi caj *e are now taking a look at where we 

STAND AS A PRELUDE TO THE TRIP TO ARGENTINA Py ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY VAKY -wIch was OISCUSSEO IN ROME! AND (Sj NOW 

THAT WIDELA is BACK, odes he have A CLEAR VIEW of the 

TIMETABLE WHICH -IGHT BE LIKELY FOR BOTH THE ANNOUNCEMENT 

OF THE INTERÂMFRieAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION .VISIT AND 

THf VAKY TRIP? 

Christopher 

bt 

i 

s 

P8NIBSB0BB PAGE *3 OF S3 T0R|2S0/lSiaSZ OTGiBMaSSZ SEP 76 

9 

******* -* E C R p-T *******8 COPY 

i 

!


PLEASE SEND THIS ALONG TO DENIS CLIFT AT CAMP DAVID 

FOR HIS CLEARANCE. 

ALSO-. WOULD YOU PLEASE VERIFY WITH DCLIFT — DOES THE 

REFERENCE TO "VAKY VISITING ALONE” MEAN NO ACCOMPANYING 

PERSONNEL OR JUST A VISIT TO THE COUNTRY OF ARGENTINA? 

THANICS • 

LOUISE 

SECRETARY TO AMBASSADOR VAKY 

5:55 P.M. 

& 

a 

/- 

r 

■■ 

l DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

(E.F- nat» nW\\V* 

n


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! 

TAGS: OVIP, PGQV, PDiPn AR 

SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN THE VICE PRESIDENT AND PRESI 

DENT VIDELA 

1- SUMMARY. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE VICE PRESI- 

| DENT'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA, SEPTEMBER S, AT THE 

* RESIDENCE OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN ROME- YOU ARE 

REGUESTED TO MAKE A FOLLOW-UP INQUIRY TO PRESIDENT 

VIDELA OR DR. YOFRE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH .PARAGRAPH 7 BELOW- 

END SUMMARY. * 

2- IN THE COURSE OF THE MEETING, THE VICE PRESIDENT 

STRESSED 

RIGHTS ARE 

THAT 

A CENTRAL 

WE WANT 

CONCERN. 

GOOD RELATIONS 

WE WISHED 

BUT THAT 

TO WORK 

HUMAN 

WITH 

ARGENTINA IN HAVING GOOD RELATIONS- IT WAS IMPORTANT 

THAT VIDELA RECEIVE THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS 

COMMISSION CIAHRO, ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO THE COMMISSION. 

WE WOULD NOT LINK -ARGENTINE ACTIONS WITH OUR OWN. PRO 

GRESS ON CASES SUCH AS JACOBO TIMERMAN WOULD ALSO BE 

HELPFUL. 

3- PRESIDENT VIDELA STATED THAT HE FULLY CONCURS IN 

PRESIDENT CARTER'S POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS- THE WESTERN 

WORLD MUST BE UNITED AND THE UNITED STATES MUST LEAD THE 

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;WESTERN WORLD. 

' AND NOT TROUBLED 

£ull 2012/12/12 NLC-133-57-8-5-8 


TK 

Ta" 

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* lljJlTV V. f T 

ARGENTINA UAS UITH THE"UNITED STATES 

BY OBJECTIVE CRITICISM. HE WAS C0N- 

| CERNED. HOWEVER. BY CRITICISM WHICH HAD THE APPEARANCE 

] OF INTERVENTION IN ARGENTINE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS- SUCH 

j CRITICISM HAD COMPELLED HIM TO POSTPONE AN INVITATION 

\ TO THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION- HIS CON- 

{CERN UAS THAT PROBLEMS IN THE RELATIONSHIP AT THE GOVjERNMENT 

PLANE HAD BEEN RAISED TO THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC OR 

{ POPULAR ISSUES . 

i 4- THE VICE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT. TO PUT RELATIONS ON 

jA MORE POSITIVE COURSE. ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY COME TO 

J ARGENTINA TO MEET WITH VIDELA OR A PERSON OF HIS CHOICE 

F^R A REVIEW OF OUR RELATIONS. VIDELA ASKED WHETHER 

£HE VAKY VISIT WOULD BE AFTER THE IAHRC OR BEFORE- THE 

VICE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT IT BE SCHEDULED AS SOON 

AS POSSIBLE. 

i 

, 5- PRESIDENT VIDELA REVIEWED STEPS TAKEN BY THE ARGEN- 

. TINE GOVERNMENT SINCE HIS LAST MEETING UITH PRESIDENT 

‘CARTER {DURING THE PANAMA CANAL SIGNING}. WHICH HE SAID 

'SHOWED THAT THERE HAD BEEN EFFORTS BY HIS GOVERNMENT IN 

THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA- VIDELA CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD 

RECEIVE THE COMMISSION- HE SAID IT UAS HIS INTENTION 

TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT BEFORE OCTOBER 1. THE EFFECTIVE 

DATE OF THE HIJMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT. BUT DID NOT 

THINK IT COULD BE DONE BEFORE SEPTEMBER IS- CAT AN EARLI 

i ER POINT. HE SAID THAT HE COULD PERHAPS ARRANGE A 

..VISIT OF THE COMMISSION BY MID-OCTOBER.} ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY VAKY COULD VISIT AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT. 

VIDELA SAID HE PREFERRED THAT VAKY VISIT ALONE AND 

.REQUESTED THAT THE USG LET HIM KNOW AHEAD OF TIME THE 

j OBJECTIVES OF THE VAKY MISSION- THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID 

•WE WOULD COMMUNICATE THESE- 

' b. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION. THE VICE PRESIDENT 

NOTED THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE EX-IM BANK REACH A DECISION 

'ON ALLIS-CHALMERS BY SEPTEMBER IS. THE DATE OF THE BIDS 

FOR THE YACYRETA POWER PROJECT- AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF 

THE COMMISSION'S VISIT BEFORE OCTOBER 1 MJjGHT ENABLE 

US TO ACT ON A LETTER BY EX-IM IN SUPPORT OF THE ALLIS- 

CHALMERS BID BEFORE SEPTEMBER IS. 

7- ACTION REQUESTED. VIDELA REITERATED SEVERAL TIMES 

THAT HE INTENDS TO RECEIVE THE COMMISSION- YOU ARE RE 

QUESTED TO FOLLOW UP IN LOW KEY FASHION UITH PRESIDENT 

6VIDELA HIMSELF. IF POSSIBLE. OR WITH YOFRE {WHO UAS PRESENT 

. AT THE MEETING} MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS: {1} WE ARE 

I DELIGHTED THAT THE MEETING UITH THE VICE PRESIDENT TOOK 

' PLACE'. {2} WE WANT TO REITERATE THE U-S- DESIRE TO BRING 

- —- ______________-...... - -■ggewEjfcl'- 

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Full 2012/12/12 


U.S^hRGENTINE RELATIONS BACK TO THE STATE liimCH SHOULD 

EXIST BETWEEN TWO FRIENDLY NATIONSi YOU flAVE BEEN AS 

TO BE IN TOUCH IN ORDER TO FOLLOW UP ON .THE NONDALE-VIDEl 

CONVERSATIONS; C4> WE ARE NOW' TAKING A LOOK AT WHERE UE 

STAND AS A PRELUDE TO THE iTRIP TO ARGENTINA BY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY- VAKY WHICH WAS DISCUSSED IN RONE; AND CSJ NOW 

THAT VIDELA IS BACK-. DOES HE HAVE A CLEAR VIEW OF THE 

TINETABLE WHICH NIGHT BE LIKELY FOR BOTH THE ANNOUNCEMENT 

OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUNAN RIGHTS COMMISSION VISIT AND 

THE VAKY TRIPf 

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r • 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority ts\~ ~ ^ 

MAH& P-P Date___----------------------- - 

--- -"inniirT/^Tg^STTIVS/NODIS/XGDS 


WASHINGTON 


V 

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, AMBASSADOR GARDNER'S RESIDENCE 

ROME, ITALY 

September 4, 1968, 1:50 p.m. 





U.S. SIDE 




The vice President opened saying he was pleased to have the pleasure 

of the meeting. He recalled the meeting with Videla in the White 





President Videla thanked the Vice President for the meeting — an. 



President Carter's position on human rights. Argentina has belief 



• troubled by criticism when it is objective. However, he is concerned 

by attitudes projecting intervention in domestic affairs. He spoke 









The Vice President asked if these werd statements made in Argentina 


S 





KF.CRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS/XGDS


-SBCRET/SEN5?¥IVE/N0DlS7xfeDS 








The Vice President added that the A.S. press covers developments in 



the extent that videla makes progress on these cases, it will help 


Videla said he understood, and government-to-government relations are 





because they cannot conclude deals when Ex-Im does not grant a loan. 



good if Assistant Secretary Vaky could came to Argentina to meet 





visit by the Commission by mid-October. The Vice President asked 



#at the Panama Canal signing, there have been a series of events 


— they have issued a list and names of all the detained; 

— they have published a list of all of those who disappeared 



— this last week, 65 individuals were freed; 

— they have indicated that they are prepared to give a favorable 


— Timerman's situation has changed; he is now out of jail and 


SBfiRRT/OEHRTTTW/MOPTaêcnc

I ««. 


.■SEGHBT/SEN01TIVE/N0DIG/XGD& 

— Professor Bravo is now under house arrest and they expect the 


He said officials of the U.S. goverrfment are welcome in Argentina, 








statement before the Congress forced him to auspend the announcement. 


announcement. 










Commission, will you authorize me to tell the President that this 






let him know ahead of time what .Vaky's mission will be to permit him 








In human rights, this whole other vista will open. He said he 




and best wishes tb President Carter." 

SECRET/6BN6-ITIVE/M0DIG/X6Bfl 3


I 


ACTION MEMORANDUM 

______________________ C'g 

JOS REVIEWED 04-Jan-201 t DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL: 


SECRET—HQDIB 

i 

TO 

THROUGH 

FROM 

SUBJECT 

The Secretary 

P - David D. Newsom 

ARA - Viron P. Vaky i « 

Vice President Mondale's Meeting with 

Argentine President Videla 

ISSUE FOR DECISION 

Whether to sign the attached Briefing Memorandum 

from you to Vice President Mondale for the Vice 

President's meeting with Argentine President Videla, 

September 4, in Rome. 

ESSENTIAL FACTORS 

Vice President Mondale has agreed to meet with 

President Videla on September 4 in Rome to discuss 

the deterioration in U.S.-Argentine relations. 

Attached is a Briefing Memorandum with Talking Points 

and several supporting Background Papers. 

Recommendation; 

That you sign the attached Briefing Memorandum. 

i 

Drafted:ARA/ECA:NBouton:mdk 

9/1/78 

'^§ECRKL^NODIS 

XGDS-3 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority T^LC-" - 2-lr ’ lllP 

NARA_J&£____Date—TflAYIg------------- 


( t

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-6-0 nodi.' 

vj£.wr\j~ i 

i 


WASHINGTON 

September 1/ 1978 


From: 

Subject: 


Cyrus Vance 

Meeting with Argentine President Videla 

You are scheduled to meet with Argentine 

President Videla September 4 in Rome to discuss U.S.-Argentine 

relations and ways to reverse a precipitous deterioration 

in our relations. The basic point you should make 

is that we seriously wish to improve relations as conditions 

permit and that a comprehensive and thorough review of our 

total relationship may be desirable. Assistant Secretary 

Vaky has been designated to undertake this task and is prepared 

to make arrangements with President Videla for this 

purpose• 

SETTING 

Faced with a once severe terrorist threat, the military 

government in Argentina has seriously abused basic 

human rights (Attachment 1). The United States has as a 

result restricted military sales (an embargo on the sale of 

Munitions List items will go into effect October 1. Attachment 

2) , held back approval of AfgentillS trSIlSflCtiOnS in 

the Export-Import Bank, and voted against Argentine loan 

proposals in the International Financial Institutions 

(Attachment 3). We have sought to induce improvement 

indicating that Argentine steps in this direction wou 

result in relaxing these restrictions. 

y/W *3 

Initially, the Argentine Government reacted to our 

pressure with Borne restraint and sought to convince us 

of the necessity of its actions. More recently, however, 

it has moved rapidly to diversify its International ties, 

reassess its relationship with us, jind prepare to adopt 

an adversarial course. 

In a major attempt to encourage progress in human 

rights and improve relations. Under Secretary Newsom 

visited Argentina last May and suggested that some 

r


v'L\l— i nodis 

- 2 - 



the following steps (Attachment 4'): " 

i 

-- Agreement with the Inter-American Human Rights 

Commission (IAHRC) on a visit to Argentina,- 

-- Try, release, or allow exile for the prisoners 



fate of the disappeared* 







two yearB. The reeant-Jenl'al'Tif an 11A" In jeLLey or-" 

“4ntnrose 1~n ftlJUn OlmlUTP'iu ter the sale of hydroelectric 



As the 

South Ameri 

tivs force 

liferation 

conventiona 

most powerful Spanish^speaking country of 

ca, Argentina could beconge a significant negain 

areas important to us such as nuclear pro- 


1 arms restraint, and Third World issues. 

Videla's Approach 

We do not know exactly what Videla will Bay. He may 

simply give the standard Argentine exposition — that 

human right s violations are an unfortunate, if unavoidable 

and necessa ry, by-product of the effort to suppress a vicious 

terrorist c ampaign, which threatens Argentina with anarchy, 

On the othe r hand, there is also the possibility that he 


are now pre pared to take (particularly in regard to the 

Human Right s Commission), and suggestions on the future 

evolution o f U.S.-Argentine relations. 

Your Approach 

Your approach Bhould be sympathetic. You would wiBh 

to avoid commitments in response t,o specific suggestions, 

if any, but would note that you will(carry Videla's 

-eecRfr-^s 


No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-6-0 :;odis 

*JiLV 3 ‘'i -»-» ! 

- 3 - 


We recommend you eay specifically: 

— On our side, we seriously wish to improve relations; 

i 

— As a token of this, we have taken — and are taking 

some modest steps, such as release of export 


helicopters, airport radar Equipment, /voice 

security communications equipmentfand other items 

on our Munitions Export Control Llst^ 

f 

— While we understand the tragic history of Argentina's 









i 








Secretary Vaky is willing to come to Buenos AireB, 


I 

NODIS 

( 

No Objection To Declassification in Fi^ll 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-6-0 

i

No Objection To Declassification in Fall 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-6-0 

jfc /NB 

Drafted:ARA/ECA; C WRu' 

8/31/78 

Clearance:P:Newsom 

on/JBu 

deh 

s 

i 


\irvoi

aMFIDENTIMr 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-4 

wi II IUL,|tfML 

".sr: ~e reaffirm the great importance we attach 

to good rclarions between our two countries, and our desire 

that we take steps to improve those relations. As a gesture 

on our part, we have recently grantefl licenses for the sale 

of Boeing Chinook helicopters. 

— We are prepared and indeed eager to move on a 

wide range of decisions as there is improvement in the human 

rights situation in Argentina and as agreement is reached 

for a visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 

■— We were encouraged to hear you say that the "war 

on terrorism" is over in Argentina^nd that your "position- i« 

the -jwrrtn in strengthpnafP 

— We are deeply interested in developing in greater 

detail an approach which would permit us to put our relationship 

on a footing more appropriate to our two countries. 

If it could be helpful, the President would instruct Assistant 

Secretary of State Pete Vaky to go to Buenos Aires to meet 

with you or your representative to discuss this in greater 

detail. 

r 

( 

WJJ.L lLUUMTl AL" 

4 

-GWBfflAt


—SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS/XGDS 

OrFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT 

DECLAT.3I-'Cl:J 

WASHINGTON £.0.13526 

September 5, 1978 Authority 'NlX' l'^?rar~3^ 

NARA_£iE__ Date—1 1 * ll Lt—------ 

^ 


ROME, ITALY 

September 4, 1968, 1:50 p.m. 





U.S. SIDE 




The Vice President opened saying he was pleased to have the pleasure 

of the meeting. He recalled the meeting with Videla in the White 





President Videla thanked the Vice President for the meeting — an 



President Carter's position on human rights. Argentina has belief 



troubled by criticism when it is objective. However, he is concerned 

by attitudes projecting intervention in domestic affairs. He spoke 









The Vice President asked if these were statements made in Argentina 






73ECRET/OENOITIVE/NODia/XGBfr


4 


relations. The' Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment is coming into effect. 









the extent that Videla makes progress on these cases, it will help 


Vide La said he understood, and government-to-government relations are 





because they cannot conclude deals when Ex-Im does not grant a loan. 

* 

The Vice President repeated that it was jimportant to put our 







visit by the Commission by mid-October. The Vice President asked 





they have issued a list and names of all the detained; 

they have published a list of all of those who disappeared 



-- this last week, 65 individuals were frefed; 

•j 

they have indicated that they are prepared to give a favorable 


Timerman's situation has changed; he is now out of jail and 


jpjCnET/aBMSXTTVE/MODICVXQDS 

2

No Objection To Declassification'in Full 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-26-6-5 

^BeRJtr/JEMajTIVE/WODI'S/XGpS 

Professor Bravo is now under house arrest and they expect the 










statement before the Congress forced him to suspend the announcement. 


announcement. 

% 

Mr, Clift said that in considering the announcement, it is important 














on this, but he would recommend it. videla asked if the U.S. will 





relations are focused solely on human 'rights. He said he can 




in‘human rights, this whole other vista will open. He said he 





JSECRKT/SENSIT-I-VE/NODI S/XGBft 3

MEMOKANIH'M 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-1 -13-9-36-8 

t 

■f.-v.'-J 3 -'i 1-.., i 

& 

TilK WHITE HOUSE 

■c;pri?p>P-qF:N.qj4^VH 

W XSWNOTON 


1. Sadat Letter to the President on Military Supply: President 

Sadat has forwarded a Tetter to the President expressing 

his deep disappointment with the results of Mubarak's 

efforts in Washington to secure more modern military hardware 

for the Egyptian armed forces. Underscoring the importance 

of Egypt's position as the only power in the Middle 

East which, if properly helped, can oppose attempts to 

destabilize and impose communist domination in the region, 

Sadat appeals to the President to give his personal and 

urgent consideration to Egyptian demands for the acquisition 

of the F-15; an increase in the number of F-16s; and the 

spare parts for the F-4s. Mubarak, in passing the letter 

to Ambassador Atherton, frequently stressed that the issues 

raised by Sadat's letter are "vital and important." He 

expressed concern about.the attitudes in the Egyptian military 

establishment toward the U.s.-Egyptian military supply 

relationship, saying U.S. responsiveness to Egypt's military 

assistance requirements was increasingly being compared 

unfavorably with the Soviets, particularly in the case of 

Libya. Mubarak was emphatic about the symbolic importance 

of the F-15, which Atherton readily admits becomes conspicuous 

when compared with what we make available to the Israelis 

and the Saudis on one hand and to Egypt on the other. 

Atherton's attempts to remonstrate with Mubarak made no 

visible dent. (Cairo 1813 NODIS, PSN 50462; Cairo 1814 

NODIS Cherokee, PSN 50469) (S) 

2. Weizman on Sadat Intent to Accelerate Normalization/Autonomy; 

Weizman confided to Ambassador Lewis on Saturday that Sadat 

is determined to wrap up a single, comprehensive normalization 

package by March with the professed objective of incurring 

the Arab world's wrath all at once rather than spreading 

the impact over a year or more. Weizman had met with Sadat, 

Hassan Ali, et al., earlier last week and, according to 

Lewis, was "just short of euphonic" about the results of 

his trip. The defense minister advised Lewis that he and 

Hassan Ali are to direct the overall effort, not the foriegn 

ministries. Weizman will not personally enter the autonomy 

arena until the normalization package is first wrapped up; 

he hopes to improve the psychological climate in Tel Aviv 

enough to produce sufficient Israeli government flexibility 

.SECRET------ 



Authority 

NARA__ 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Dst o .."\\SqVi---

No Objection To Declassification in full 2013/02/04 : NLC-1 -13-9-36-8 

SJRPffTi'T-SENSITIVE- -2- 

for an autonomy agreement by May. Lewis comments that the 

psychological strategy both with regard to the Arab world 

and the Israeli political scene has a ring of realistic 

promise. Carrying out the concept of producing a total 

normalization package in a couple of months would, however, 

be a major bureaucratic and diplomatic undertaking. Weizman 

and Hassan Ali would also have to have very strong backing 

from Begin and Sadat to resolve impasses. (Tel Aviv 1613 

NODIS Cherokee) (S) 

3. Yamani Concern Over Justice Department Investigation: While 

agreeing to receive the Justice Department team investigating 

certain supply and pricing policies of the major international 

oil companies, Oil Minister Yamanis reiteration of.strong 

legal, political and personal objections to surrendering 

any information which properly belongs to Saudi Arabia foreshadows 

the possibility of a serious confrontation with 

major implications for U.S.-Saudi relations. Yamani stated 

that his government could not allow "sensitive information 

about' their most valuable material resourcfe" to bfe scrutinized 

by anyone, including the U.S. He continued that if this 

became the case, the Saudi government would take steps to 

ensure such information would not be in the jurisdiction 

of the U.S. West indicates that Aramco sources have learned 

that sensitive information and files can no longer be sent 

to stockholders or Aramco officials in the-U.S., which will 

eventually compromise the efficiency of Aramco's operations 

here. West stresses that the sensitivity of this issue 

cannot be overemphasized; given the growing pressure on 

the Saudis to reduce production and increase prices, a confrontation 

of this issue could "seriously impair our bilateral 

relationship and could easily lead to major reductions in 

the amount of oil production which would have serious price 

effects." (Jidda 0531, PSN 50319, 5(3321) (S) 

l 

4. Goodpastor's Discussion with Videlat President Videla affirmed 

to General Goodpastor Argentina's alignment with the West 

and relayed the Argentine position on the grain embargo, 

noting his decision not to exploit the issue for Argentina's 

own political and economic advantage. He warned, however, 

of the serious, negative domestic political reaction if 

it appeared that the U.S. had imposed its. views. Videla 

indicated it was not in Argentina's interest to "deviate 

from normal pattern of trade" which would include some growth. 

Videla reiterated the Argentine position that it could not 

assure the ultimate destination of its exports and the understanding 

to limit direct exports to the Soviets must be


SWRftET- -3- 

» 

t 

held in "strict confidence." Videla indicated that this 

was only one of several issues in U.S.-Argentine relations 

and "did not wish that their participation in the grain 

boycott be the price to be paid for better relations." 

On human rights, Videla bemoaned the lack of understanding 

over the "dirty war" that had been forced upon Argentina 

but resolved that "this war had to be pursued by Argentina, 

with all its consequences." In a subsequent conversation 

with p]conomic Minister Martinez de Hoz, the minister clarified 

that a "normal export level" meant about three million tons, 

warned that the understanding could come apart because of 

the threat to the Argentine sorghum market in Japan due 

to U.S. underselling and reiterated the need to protect 

against a leak of the "agreement." (AMConsul Rio de Janeiro 

0316, PSN 50651; AMCounsul Rio de Janerio 0317, PSN 50652, 

50653) (NODIS) (S) 

5. Meeting with Gromyko on U.S.-Soviet Relations: Ambassador . 

Watson has been instructed-to convey to Foreign Minister 

Gromyko our suggestion that the^Soviets carefully study 

the President's 'State of the Union message and, while 

emphasizing our desire to keep SALT and other arms control 

processes alive, to also stress our determination to react 

strongly to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and any 

further moves which widen the conflict. Watson also will 

indicate in the strongest terms our displeasure with recent 

Soviet actions toward Andrey Sakharov and indicate this 

will have "severe effects" on relations between our countries' 

scientific communities. (State 4026, PSN 51832) (NODIS) 

(S) 

6. Linowitz Meeting with Carrington and Callaghan: Carrington 

and Callaghan reiterated to" Ambassador Linowitz their continued 

support of the Camp David accords adding, however, that 

they continue to be skeptical about any chances of success. 

Carrington, the more pessimistic of the two, stressed that 

the Arabs are increasingly impatient as they look to the 

U.S. to provide the impetus for the solution of the Palestinian 

problem. Carrington found Saudi Arabia particularly 

concerned over the Palestinian problem due to its domestic 

ramifications for them and critical of U.S. failure to move 

forcefully against Israeli intransigence on the matter. 

Former Prime Minister Callaghan was equally supportive of 

the Camp David accords and less skeptical of its chances 

for success. Callaghan was extremely concerned over the 

"air of defeatism" pervading Saudi Arabia and noted that 

the U.S. should work out some manner of defense arrangement 

with them since "if the Saudi regime goes,..there will be

K I - ■*u* «. . *' n 

« 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-1 -13-9-36-8 

r 

sseRffr 4- 

a domino effect in the Gulf states." The former prime 

minister believes the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will 

make the Arabs less likely to press \is hard , and, as a result, 

gives Washington time to mqye deliberately in the 

peace process. Linowitz comments that it is significant 

Carrington failed to broach the idea of a UNSC resolution 

on Palestinian rights supplementing or expanding on 242 

although had he every opportunity to raise it. (London 

1897, PSN 51158, 51161) (NODIS) (S) 

*

Mandatory Declassification Review 2008/06/12 : NLC-34-3-19-5-5fc/&

’.I -_Ir 

- rr’i :1 i* --S-'i ':l‘‘' s i 

.SfiGRST 

TO: 

FROM: 



The Secretary 

The Deputy Secretary 

S'i 

ARA - '/iron P. Vakyj 

HA - Patricia M. Derian 

3 AUG 1972 

: . 

1 

/6 £«

wejrET* 

o J" 

(S) Clandestine Prisoners; The question of whether 

clandestine prisoners exist in significant numbers remains 

unresoLved. If there are, they could number up to a 

few hundred as an outside limit; our Embassy considers 

it unlikely that the number would be that highj We 

have no firm evidence. Fragmentary data, however, suggest 

the existence of at least some unacknowledged prisoners 

and of some small scattered clandestine detention centers 

about to be closed. 

(C) Right of Option: Moving at a slow pace, with 

only 13 GOA approvals so far for PEN prisoners seeking 

to come to the U.S. The GOA has approved approximately 

170 applications since September 1977 for all countries. 

(C) Prison Conditions: The GOA issued nationwide 

uniform prison regulations in late April and consolidated 

PEN detainees in six facilities. In February, there 

were reports of two beatings (one fatal) and a disappearance 

in prisons and, in May, of a number of beatings and 

robberies among a group of prisoners in transit. The 

ICRC has told us that it believes prison conditions 

have improved over last year, when it crtticized*the 

GOA for poor prison conditions. 

(C) The Judiciary: The NYC Bar Association mission 

noted that the Executive continues to be uncooperative 

in responding to habeas corpus petitions. The Judiciary 

has made some attempts to force greater cooperation, 

but its effective power remains limited. 

(C) Argentine Attitudes Toward the Human Rights 

Issue: Videla and Viola appear to be trying to carry 

out commitments to us to end disappearances and reduce 

PEN detentions. Hardliners such as General Suarez Mason 

and General Menendez have recently stepped up calls 

for a new GOA offensive to root out "intellectual subversion. '* 

A political test of strength between these two points 

of view is shaping up for year's end. , } 

(U) The NYC Bar Association mission noted that 

progress is possible but would come much faster if the 

Argentine legal profession would take a more active 

interest in return to rule of law.

.SECRET- 

- 3 - 

(U) The Church and some elements oE the press 

have become more outspokenly critical in dealing with 

human rights. 

Attachment: 

Detailed Review of Current Conditions. 

Drafted: 

8/1/79 X21966 

Clearances: 

/ V 

INR/RAR:JBuchanan , 'l ^ ■ N 

L

-SECRET-- 

Current Human Rights Situation in Argentina 

(LT) Following is a description of key human rights 

developments since the Task Force completed its assessment 

in early February: 

EisaoDearances 

(C) We have received reports of seventeen 

disappearances for the period since February 1. We 

immediately communicated these reports to high GOA 

authorities and asked for information on their 

whereabouts. The GOA has provided us with information 

that three of the persons were arrested and charged 

in the courts. One person was briefly detained a^nd 

then released. The GOA has been unable to provide 

information on the thirteen other cases. In three cases, 

however, the disappeared persons have contacted relatives 

by letter or telephone call to advise that they were 

well and would eventually reappear. The last disappearance 

took place May 13. A list of unresolved disappearances, 

including those three, is attached. 

(C) The victims of these abductions/disappearances 

have no confirmed connection with terrorist groups. 

Some, such as members of the Socialist Workers' Party, 

and the Argentine Communist Party-associated Relatives 

of Disappeared and Detained Persons are related to the 

nonviolent political left. 

(C) This record since February compares to previous 

years when disappearances averaged about 55 per month 

in 1978, 130 per month in 1977, and 300 per month in 

1976. In mid-May 1979 the Argentine Permanent Assembly 

for Human Rights published a list of 5,465 disappearances 

since 1975; in the month following publication, the 

Assembly received reports cf an additional 105 previously 

unreported cases. An earlier Assembly report contained 

80 1978 disapoearances unknown to the Embassy and one 

from 1979. * . * 

Accounting for the Disappeared 

(S) The GOA has not yet taken any public step 

to account for the disappeared. The Government has 

addressed the broad issue internally and is seeking 

solutions to specific aspects of the problem, such as

SECRET. 

- 2 - 

shortening the period for legal presumption of death. 

There are also indications that it is seeking to establish 

what documentary evidence exists throughout the 

security apparatus. 

(C) Foreign Minister Pastor Driefed EC-9 ambassadors 

in Buenos Aires recently on the terms of new 

legislation and said that relatives will be able to 

petition the Government for assistance and information 

three months after the occurrence of a disappearance. 

The Government will have three months to establish 

the whereabouts of the missing person and, if no inform 

tion is developed, relatives will be able to claim 

survivors’ benefits and regularize their legal status. 

Although he did not supply details, Pastor said relatives 

will be able to claim indemnization. 

(C) General Viola reiterated to Ambassador Castro 

on June 25 that the GOA does not have information 

on the fate of the disappeared and in view of the 

extended periods of disappearance he doubted any of 

these people were alive. He said a few of the disappeared 

may reappear, but these would be rare exceptions 

In a public speech delivered on Army Day (May 29) 

Viola referred obliquely to the fate of the disappeared 

calling them "those who will be absent forever." 

Argentine human rights groups have interpreted this 

tacit statement as an admission that many of the disappeared 

were killed by Argentine police and military 

forces. 

(C) The Embassy concluded in a recent trends 

report (May 31) that "we are reasonably certain that 

the apparatus for disappearing people still exists 

although, even considering a small upsurge of disappearances 

in the past several weeks, it appears less 

used than in the past." 

PEN Prisoners . !* 

(C) The GOA has continued to release detainees 

from PEN. The Embassy estimated in mid-June that 

the political prisoner population in this category 

is now at about 2,200. The GOA announced June 29 

that there are now 1,723 PEN prisoners. At the end 

of 1978, this figure stood at about 2,900 and at the 

beginning of 1978 at about 3,500. It is not clear 

JSB6RET 1 1

.JSEGRET 

- 3 - 

how many of those removed from PEN are at liberty 

and how many remain in custody under some form of 

charges in judicial processes, or after having been 

convicted by either military or civilian tribunals. 

The Embassy and ICRC estimate the total current prison 

population of persons confined because of the GOA's 

counter-subversion campaign at just under 3,000, including 

those held under PEN and persons who have been tried 

and convicted in civil or military courts. We have 

been told by a source on President Videla's staff 

that the GOA will continue to review the status of 

PEN detainees and plans to have the number down to 

800 to 1,000 by the end of this year; these prisoners 

would continue to be held indefinitely under PEN since 

the "Campora amnesty" of 1973 makes it impossible 

to prosecute them. Other high-level Argentine officials 

have said that a certain number of persons will continue 

under PEN since the GOA considers them committed subversives 

although it lacks evidence that will stand up in court. 

(C) Foreign Minister Pastor said the COA has 

augmented its legal staff reviewing PEN detention 

from four to 30. 

Clandestine Prisoners 

(S) The Embassy has received fragmentary but 

credible data which suggest the GOA may continue to 

hold a number of prisoners that it has not publicly 

acknowledged. In a recent case a woman, who had disappeared 

in late 1978, was released by the authorities. It 

appears that most of the persons being held clandestinely 

are either the "disappeared" in process through the 

security apparatus or former terrorists who are cooperating 

with the authorities. As the number of new disappearances 

has dropped, there is little reason to think 

that there are still substantial numbers "in process," 

The Embassy believes that if clandestine prisoners 

exist, their number could not be more than a few hundred 

as an outside limit, and it considers it unlikely 

that the figure be that high. There are fragmentary 

data supporting, in the Embassy's view, that sornfe 

small, scattered clandestine detention centers still 

exist, each holding no more than perhaps 25 persons. 

It is believed that such centers would be closed before 

the arrival 'of the IACHR in November. 

«-6E€Rfi1

id&ii&iii; 

iilliiSJri li-jL. 

.... . .....i*I-i4:si!-riUi:HuNs!si:fi*SH?|jUr 

IloiikiLiki 

Right of Option 

SECRET 

- 4 - 

(LOD) Argentine Government action on the right 

of option program continues at a slow pace. The GOA 

has given permission for 18 detainees to travel to 

the U.S. under the right of option program; 13 entered 

the U.S. under our parole program. The Embassy has 

issued 95 certificates of eligibility. General Viola 

assured Ambassador Castro again that approval of right 

of option cases would proceed more quickly. GOA officials 

announced that about 170 persons have been released 

under right of 'option for travel to ail countries. 

Prison Conditions 

(LOU) The GOA has published uniform regulations 

for the treatment of detainees in a move designee! 

to end variations in treatment at different facilities. 

The ICRC urged this step and has called the rules 

a significant improvement for the treatment of detainees. 

We have reports, however, that the regulations have 

not yet been fully implemented in all facilities. 

The GOA has consolidated PEN detainees in six facilities. 

(LOU) According to reports reaching ICRC officials 

from other prisoners, in February one person disappeared 

from prison, another was tortured, and a third died 

as a result of beatings by guards. In early May, 

the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights reported that 

some of the 200 prisoners moved from Resistencia prison 

to the La Plata prison were beaten and robbed during 

the transfer. 

The Judiciary 

(U) As the NYC Bar mission noted in its report, 

the executive power continues to decline to provide 

information in response to habeas corpus petitions 

filed by the relatives of disappeared persons. Regarding 

PEN detainees, the Executive response is that "links 

with subversives" constitute sufficient grounds jEor }• 

continued detention, invoking its alleqed power ’to 

hold individuals without charge under the Constitutional 

state of siege authority. The NYC Bar mission report 

was sharply critical of the lack of professional objection 

to the denial of due process and deterioration in 

the executive power of the judiciary in recent years. 

■SECRET

^flECRE?—‘ 

- 5 - 1 

(U) The courts have recently tried a number 

of persons on pre-1976 subversive charges and sentenced 

them to prison terms. Three police officers were 

recently prosecuted for abuse of prisoners. 

Argentine Attitudes Toward the Human Rights Issue 

(C) President Videla and Army Commander Viola 

are maintaining their leadership position within the 

GOA on human rights policy and appear to have begun 

carrying out commitments made to us repeatedly in 

the past to bring disappearances to an end and reduce 

PEN detention. Hardliners in the Argentine military 

still favor repressive policies directed at a broad 

range of political dissidents. Army Chief of Staff 

General Suarez Mason, for example, recently proposed 

to the Cabinet a broad offensive against political 

subversives which clearly would include groups 

unrelated to the terrorist movements of the past. 

General Menendez, Third Corps Commander, has called 

for continued strong efforts to battle "ideological 

subversion." 

r 

(U) The prestigious daily La Prensa has joined 

The Buenos Aires Herald in championing human rights. 

However, no paper has agreed to publish the Permanent 

Assembly's latest list of disappearances. The Catholic 

Church addressed an appeal to President Videla on 

May 4 on behalf of disappeared persons, PEN detainees, 

jailed labor leaders, and lower income groups adversely 

affected by present GOA economic policy. 

(U) The New York Bar Association's report on 

human rights conditions in Argentina noted that 

ingredients are present for future progress in human 

rights observance, but that the support of the Argentine 

legal profession is essential for a quick return to 

civilized legal practices. The New York Bar Association 

exhorted its Argentine colleagues to take a morefactlve 

role in this area. 

■SECRET

■SECRET 

UNRESOLVED DISAPPEARANCES SINCE 


Roberto and Maria Rosa Barreiros 

Reported picked up by the police on March 12. 

Mr. Barreiros1s mother subsequently received 

a telephone call from her daughter-in-law advising 

that the couple was well and would reappear. 

There has been no word from them since. 

Julio Cesar Abruzzese 

Reported picked up by police on April 11. Mr. 

Abruzzese was reputed to be involved in criminal 

activities and his disappearance does not appear 

to have political significance. 

Thelma Doroty Jara de Cabezas 

Mrs. Jara de Cabezas was reported picked up by 

the police on April 27. She was a key official 

of the Argentine Communist Party-associated *Relatives 

of the Disappeared and Detained (FDD). Letters 

have subsequently been received from her (one 

by Ambassador Castro) describing in detail her 

work for the FDD and denouncing the Montoneros 

for having used her for subversive political 

ends. Family members are convinced that the 

letters are genuine. There has been no further 

word from her. 

Mario Marrero (April 20), Jorge Sabador Gulio (April 

26), and Elbio Jose Rodriguez (April 23). All are 

in their 20's. 

These three persons were reported disappeared 

in separate incidents in Buenos Aires. We havek 

received no information concerning their whereabouts. 

Jorge V. Sznaider, Jorge Perez Brancato, Hugo Malosovsky, 

Noemi Graciela Beltone, Carlos Alberto Perez, and 

Mirta Silber ‘de Perez. All are in their 20’s. 

These six persons were reported picked up by 

the police on May 13 in a Buenos Aires apartment 

while they were holding a political discussion. 

No word has been received since on their whereabouts. 

•ftECRET ■

DEPARTMENT OR STATE 

ACTION fviEMORANDUM 

3 3 

sc;::ta::’:jer 

i Q 

—He:; is 

TO 

: The 

Secretary 

THROUGH: P - 

David D. Newsom 

FROM 

: 7iRA 

- Viron ?. Vaky 

SUBJECT: 

Vice President Mondale's Meeting with 

ntine President Videia 

ISSUE FOR DECISION 

> ft jt-’J w '0 hi 

Whether to sign the attached Briefing Memorandum 

rom you to Vice President Mondale for the Vice 

resident's meeting with .Argentine President Videia, 

eptember 4, in Rome. 

SSEMTIAL FACTORS 

Vice President Mondale has agreed to meet with 

resident Videia on September 4 in Rome to discuss 

he deterioration in U.3.-Argentine relations, 

ttached is a Briefing Memorandum with Talking Points 

and several supporting Background Papers. 

Recommendation: 

That you sign the attached Briefing Memorandum. 

*> Ca «, L C. .4 ( u! i/ ^ « «N U «4 L.

.'i 

•'l 

.'/ash: ngtqn. 

Si’ptfii'bcr 1, 1973 

- r. . * Ur* a _ » -■> 

r J .y ... 

! y r u I' V ar.ce 

O C f. : 

11; e t: i r. g v: i t. h Argentine Prusirier.t Vi iel-i 

rou are scheduled to meet with Argentine 

5 . lent Vi del a September 4 in Home to discuss U.S.-Arcen- 

P. 0 12 X ations and ways to reverse a precipitous deteriorat 

i o: i n oar relations. The basic point you should make 

i s t n a t we seriously wish to improve relations as conditions 

pe a n d that a comprehcr.sive and thorough review of our 

to " ^ t a 1 r e latior.ship may be desirable. Assistant Secretary 

V a -

- JMu* 

r •? l y x .1t: o r. 

r. our roj‘.r:c*:vi vculr. no 

"i r e r. r. i n e c3vsrnj.nr.t: would t a k c: one or m. ore of 

- .. f 1 1 c v i:. g nt^'s ( A r. t -a n h rr. e r. t 4 ) : 

(’•.rrrecssr.; with the Inter-Amer; car. Human Rights 

"or.r.ijnior. ( IAHRC ) on a visit to Argentina; 

fry, release, or allow exile for the prisoners 


Establish a mechanist1, to inform families of the 

fate of the disappeared. 

While .v.r. Sewsor. was given a courteous and synpathctic 



Argentina to our pressure, on the other hand, h'As been 

severs. Contrary to our own view, many Argentines consider 


two years. The recent denial of an Ex-In letter of 

interest to Allis-Chaimers for the sale of hydroelectric 







conventional arms restraint, and Third World issues. 

Vide la's Aooroach 

V7e do not know exactly what Videla will say. He 

simply give the standard Argentine exposition — that 

human rights violations are an unfortunate, if unavoi 

and necessary, by-product of the effort to suppress a 

error 1st campaign, which threatens Argentina with an a 

n the other hand, there is also the possibility that 

might bring some new concrete points, explain steps t n e y 

are now prepared to take (particularly in regard to t he 

human Rights Commission), and suggestions on the futu re 

evolution c f L'. S . - A r c r* r. t i r. e relations. 

O rt 

may 

dablc 

vicious 

3" M 

Your Approacr. 

Your approach s h ou1d be s vr.pat h e t i c . You would w i s h 

to avoid commitments in respor. se to specif ic suggestions, 

if any, but would note that you v/ill carry Videla1s 

:‘w **r' 

3Z, 

Wil

3:i:s 

"art.r 

As a token of this, we have taken — and are taking — 

some modest steps, such as release of export 




on our Munitions Exncrt Control List. 

— While we understand the tragic history of Ar 

tina's domestic political conflict, we remai 















Secretary Vaky is willing to come to Buenos Aires, 


y iq 

-r ■> 

? 

Ul ■ J — 

n n 

L'l D Q

oo, :L/l_!\ ! ir,L 

; T T A C :£ K E N T S 

1 - HUMAN RIGHTS 

2 - KENNEDY-HUMPHREY AMENDMENT 

3 - HUMAN RIGHTS & U.S. RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES 

4 - UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM VISIT 

5 - NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION - ARGENTINA 

6 - CONSULTATIONS 

7 - ARGENTINA - GENERAL BACKGROUND 

8 - BIOGRAPHIC DATA 

President-Lt. Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla 

Foreign Minister - Vice Adm. Oscar A. Montes

"T’V» V r,.. w-:. * £ 

■The 19 75 human rig 

od by Pres i d e n t J c r ge 

har. i tl W S. S i r. m id-1976 

Lolat i onr still occur, 

h e si gnif i cancc , scope 

that Arger.tir.e officials 

" f un dame n t a 1 imp rovenent 

hts record of the military jur.t 

. Videla is ceirior. s t r a b ly better 

or even mid-1977. ■ Serious 

however, raising questions abou 

and effectiveness of measures 

insist be recognized as 

There is no evidence available to us that would 

indicate that strict observance of legal procedures in the 

treatment of political-security cases is in sight. 

On the positive side: 

— An apparent, although unverifiable, decline 

in the rate of disappearances has occurred since 

mid-1977. Both Embassy Euenos Aires and Argentine 

human rights activists believe that the rate has 

declined. If true, this is the most important 

development listed here. 

— Over 30C prisoners were released in a Christmas 

amnesty. Subsequently, the government undertook 

serial publication (nine lists to date) of the 

names of the some 3,600 executive (state-of-seige) 

prisoners acknowledged as detained. 

The "right of option" program has been implemented, 

enabling executive detainees to petition for exile 

in lieu of continued imprisonment. Less than 50 

prisoners have so far departed under this 

procedure, however. 

Responsive action has been taken on cases in 

which the U.S. has expressed special interest, 

e.g., Jacobo Timerman, Guillermo Vogler, and 

the 3 e u t c h s. 

Attempts reportedly have been made by some 

security authorities to regularize detention 

procedures, return counterterrorist troops to 

normal military activities, and demilitarize 

the police. 

GDS

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t n e r.etrat.:ve s::.e or 

. r. e leaccr 

£■ *■> cr Jr i o v 

c; v {' y y ir. s 

."uspneted 

v;c rke rs , 

doctors, 

sr.cfcE ccr.tir.uo, with o r. c of t h e several 

entities probably responsible in nearly 

iar.ee. Victims have included not only 

terrorists but also labor leaders and 

human rights advocates, scientists and 

members of radical political parties, 

ci r. cl others whose specific vulnerability remains 

unkr.own • 

-- Respite President Videla's professed desires, 

renegade security elements continue to operate 

with apparent impunity because they act with the 

toleration if not under orders of some military 

officials. At least in cases involving suspected 

terrorists, clandestine arrest, torture, and 

summary execution are standard practices. 

-- There are five reasonably documented cases 

(which occurred in February and March', in which 

political prisoners were released and almost 

immediately assassinated, presumably by security 

officials. There have been reports of other 

cases like these. 

A particularly shocking incident, which 

occurred last December, was the abduction 

by unidentified security personnel of 13 

members of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, 

a group that pressures the government for 

information on disappearance cases. According 

to reports, the bodies of seven of the group, 

including two French nuns, later washed ashore. 

— Official harrassment of selected religious groups 

continues. The Jehovah's Witnesses have born 

much of the brunt. 

Problem of_the__"disappeared. " Estimates vary widely 

but at least several thousand people have disappeared sine 

^ n a 

L. 14 C '.arch 1976 military coup. Security pernor« w rt 1 r. a v e 

been responsible in most cases, and it is during illegal 

detentions and subsequent interrogations that the most 

egregious violations tend to occur. In mid-1977 there was 

seme fear that the gradual reduction in the number of 

terrorist combatants would be followed by a sweeping and 

systematic effort to eliminate so-called "intellectual aut

of terrorism" and others who, for whatever reason, ran 

afoul of military hardliners. To our knowledge, no 

such sweeping attack was initiated, although, 

as indicated above, individuals not terrorists and 

representing a variety of sectors and interests have been 

abducted. Many are reported or presumed to be dead.

n r. r. ?■: v - H t m pr n y A m e n dir.e r. t 

Cr. October I, 

1373 the 

to the :’orcit:n Assistance Act 

lrchihit the sale of items on 

t o A r rr e n t i n a . 

Ke r.ne riv-Hump h r e y ame n dme r.t 

will enter into effect and 

the Munitions Control List 

The amendment was passed by Congress in August 

1977 because of the serious human rights problems in 

Argentina, but was drafted to allow approval of license 

requests before October 1, 1978 if the situation in 

Argentina merited. 

Based on this amendment, and more general legislation, 

the Department has held back most license requests for 

Argentina — over 230 are now pending. This has created 

a most adverse reaction among the Argentine military and 

triggered their turn to European arms suppliers. 

n c

T * • % • v» n, v — w 1 s v a s m e n e m e n : 

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57 fV 

r. a

i „• . r\.% 

RIGHTS 

Z Q S - J" 

ho "r.itei State? ha r. take :: the tollc.w in a 

■Live actions in re soon go to hue. an rights 

c::s i r. Argentina. 

- n e _ n t a atior.al Financial Institutions 

— 13RD - We have abstained on three loans 

valued at S265 million since June 1977. 

-- IFF - We have voted ro on three loans worth 

$123 million since October 1977. 

— 1FC - We have abstained on $33 million of loans 

since March 1978. 

The Export-Import Bank 

3y law, the Export-Import Bank must take human rights 

into consideration when considering new transactions. 

Because of this legislation, there are 11 loan requests 

for Argentina valued at $683 million held back by the 

3ank. One of these cases, a request by A1lis-Chalmers 

for $270 million for electrical generating equipment for 

a hydroelectric project, caused considerable negative 

reaction in Argentina. The Bank announced that it could not 

give A11is-Chalmers a letter of interest, which would have 

strengthened the company's hand in the international 

bidding for the contract because of the human rights 

situation in Argentina. The Argentines called in our 

Ambassador and presented a Note of Protest over what they 

considered this intervention in their domestic affairs. 

The Boeing Corporation, which has requested 

Export-Import Bank financing for the sale of $196 million 

in airplanes to Argentina, has had to turn to private 

banks in the face of the Export-Import position. The 

any may lose $100 million of the potential $196 million 

(D 

Military Sales 

— There are over 200 Munitions Control List cases 

valued at $145 million pending. Mainly spare parts, some 

cases have been held back eight months or more. 

— 1C1 requests worth seme $25 million for Foreign 

Military Sales letters cf authorization are pending action 

by the U.S. They will not be acted upon unless there is 

positive movement in the human rights area in Argentina.

j-t e 

k .'i o • o • i * r\ x w £? - a v r. :cr:s 

U r a £ t c 

9/1/19 

Clears 

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: AP.A/ECA : JSBanpulH j 

3 x 29166 

k/ 

ce : AEA/ECA : CW Rusuar

o 

Ur..i3 r. 5acrg 1 arv Newsom Visit 

'Jr.der Secretary Xewsos's late May visit to Argentina 

war. made with the hope of eliciting some positive movement 

i r. the human rights area. Newsom made clear to the Argentines 

that our basic concern was for the rights of the 

person and promised that the U.S. would respond if the 

Argentines moved in any one of the three following areas: 

— Reach mutual agreement with the Interamerican 

Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) of the OAS for a 

visit by the Commission to Argentina 

— Try, release, or allow exile for the 3500 prisoners 

held without charge. 

— Establish a mechanism to inform the families of the 

disappeared of the fate of these people. 

Specifically, Mr. Newsom promised that the U.S. would 

1) recommend approval of the Aliis-Chalmers and Boeing requests 

for Export-Import Bank financing and, 2) approve sale 

of military training if the Argentines would agree to a 

mutually acceptable IAHRC visit (President Videla had 

expressed to Mr. Newsom his government's intention to invite 

the IAHRC). 

The Argentines were elusive on the actions they would 

take, bur the conversations were generally positive in 

tone. 

X 

J 

J

UNDER- EL’ 

NEUSOK VISIT 

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->/■*■ /IS 73 x 2 915 6 

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Argentina has the most advanced and comprehensive 

unclear energy program, in Latin America. It seeks to 

become self-sufficient in nuclear energy, and to become 

the first exporter of nuclear technology in the hemisphere. 

It has based its power program on reactors fueled by natural 

(unenriched) uranium in order to avoid dependence upon 

suppliers of enriched fuel. Natural uranium reactors 

require heavy water to operate, and while Argentina car. 

produce small quantities of this material, it cannot 

produce heavy water in the amounts required to support 

its ambition of complete independence. Acquiring heavy 

water production technology is therefore of critical 

importance to Argentina, and adequate technology is available 

only from the U.S. ar.d Canada. However, technology 

of a lower order might be available elsewhere. 

Beyond self-sufficiency in its nuclear energy 

program option, the ultimate intentions of the Argentine 

leadership in the nuclear field are not clear. Argentina's 

decision to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco represents 

a limited but welcome step to accept greater restrictions 

on its freedom of action. At the same time, Argentina is 

continuing with its plan to construct a sizeable reprocessing 

plant, and maintains that it is not prepared to 

forego this program unless parallel action is taken by 

Brazil. This plant would give Argentina an ample source 

of safeguard-free plutonium to support a weapons program 

as early as 1981. There is no evidence of a decision by 

the government to carry out such a program, but the capability 

is there. 

Our most important lever in Argentina is the possibility 

of eventual transfer of heavy water production 

technology. We have made clear that the supply of heavy 

water production technology to Argentina is conditioned 

upon the acceptance of full-scope safeguards and the cancellation 

or deferral of the Argentina reprocessing 

project. The Argentines have repeatedly attempted to 

distort the L'.S. position to obtain this technology 

without foregoing reprocessing. They maintain that since 

they have now ratified Tlatelolco and have indicated 

their readiness to accept full sccpc safeguards, the "J.S. 

is obligated to supply this technology. But, we understand 

that in fact they have not deposited their instrument 

G3S

"f r t if c r. t. i o r. ir. ” c >: i c g City. a 

this :s i r. retaliation for U.S. r.ur.ar. 

jr s i :r.n 1 v bureaucratic laaoardnoss . 

e r t a i n whether 

s initiatives 

Both Governn er.ts have thus far m a nage d to kee p our 

nuclear dialogue 

this is becoming 

t c keep nuclear c 

deterioration in 

Argentina, we are 

October to discus s some next steps in 

alion in this area . 

apart from the human 

increasingly difficul 

ooperation from becomir.g linked to the 

other aspects of our 

sending a 

delegation 

rights issue, but 

t. Ir. an effort 

relationship with 

tc Buenos Aires 

expanding our coo 

in 

*3 c r — 

r v.

c r ti.cn - Arce a 

'Jriftci. : SES/XET : RDynir.s: deh 

3/1/78 

"Icarjncu : ?K:ALocke (substance) 

3/AS : r.Ke 1 ly (substance)

. i ! 

CC-KSL’T.TATIONS 

Wc have attempted to convey to the Argentines 

our interest in maintaining continued contact and 

cooperation in areas other than those directly related 

to human riohts. 

Joint OS -Argentine Economic consultations are 

scheduled for September 18-22 in Washington. The 

talks will touch most areas of economic concern, 

including discussion of the KTN, countervailing duties, 

investment and tourism. 

We are also scheduling an October visit to 

Argentina by a nuclear group which will discuss possible 

ways of expanding cooperation in this field. V7e hope 

that sandwiching the two meetings — nuclear and economic - 

around the October 1 military sales cutoff dates will make 

it clear to the Argentines that we are desirous of improved 

relations and that the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment is not 

a unilateral declaration of hostility by the rJ.S. 

/■*> r~ \ 

-I t-" 

= l i : 

i ; ! i i'

BACKGROUND 

Arii'ir/.ir.a is Latin America's nest Huron ear. state. 

Its highly litarate population of 26 million is Latin 

America's best trained. The first Latin American 

state to build a nuclear reactor (1958), it is the 

first "Third World" state to export a reactor to another 

country - to Peru in 1978. In agriculture, its 

potential remains vast. It is already the fourth 

largest wheat exporter in the world as we 11 as the 

fourth largest cattle producer. 

At the time of the military takeover in March 1976, 

the civilian government of Maria Isabel Peron had disintegrated. 

Fanatical groups of leftist and rightist terror 

ists fought pitched battles, the country was nearly 

bankrupt and inflation exceeded an annual rate of 600*.. 

Order has been imposed but at a heavy price in terms 

of human rights. 

The three man Junta which cane into power in 1976 

has managed to maintain stability for 2 1/2 years, and 

prospects arc for a continuation of relative internal 

peace for the foreseeable future. 

President Videla, recently elected in his retired-or 

civilian-status constituting the "fourth man" in the 

junta, projects a cautious image, suggesting a preference 

for acting by consensus within the army rather than risk 

dissension within the senior ranks. Civilian politicians 

and Church leaders perceive Videla as a moderate whose 

objective is to restore democratic rule. 

The ambitious Navy Commander, Admiral Massera, wants 

to circumscribe the Presidency's as yet unclearly defined 

powers. Massera himself will retire soon and has his 

lines out to civilian politicians and labor leaders in 

a clear bid for the Presidency at some future date. 

Massera, who distinguished himself as a tough counterterrorist, 

is now championing human rights. 

The political parties, whose activities were suspended 

when the Junta came to power, discreted themselves by 

their ineffectiveness before the 1975 coup and have

pno v:: ; 111 * c e 1' t 2 c t. resist* ice to tr.e 

have few attractive ca: Lioates 

offer t ;i e voters. The Peror.istas , 

eind 

wor. 

, n a 

:oa*:t:on of 

populist and minor labor elements wor. over o u -a o: 1" pi f» 

vote in the last election in 1973, but ard divided over 

: r v 

o r 

go v- 

i 3 G U C ; 

who should inherit Juan Peror.'s mantii The middle class 

Eadicaies are making some effort no revive their party 

and stimulate public support, but seem to be making 

little 

festive headway 

It the next few years, there appears little possibility 

of a return to civilian rule, provided the Junta 

is able to bring about improvements in the economic lot 

cf major sectors of the population. Although the Junta 

has been successful in rationalizing the economy and 

restoring business confidence from the chaotic pre-revolution 

conditions, serious problems remain. 

The government has built up foreign exchange holdings 

of over $5 billion, increased exports to over $5 billion 

annually and is attempting to balance the budget and 

has held unemployment to 4%. However, the government 

has not been able to control inflation, which is still 

running at over 100% per year. Expectation of runaway 

inflation is the main obstacle to private enterpriseoriented 

Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz's plans for 

economic recovery. Given credit for the economic progress 

made by the Junta, the Minister could lose his military 

backing if the situation does not improve soon. Most 

serious is the decrease in the salaried employee's living 

standards. Real wages have declined by as much as 30% 

in some sectors in the last two years and popular discontent 

is increasing. 

The United States has $1.4 billion in investments 

in Argentina and $3 billion in loans from U.S. commercial 

banks. U.S. companies and banks have continued to show 

interest in Argentina, but are awaiting assurances that 

the country is politically and economically stable before 

making new lone term investments. 

million, 

the First 

•S. has traditionally enjoyed trade surpluses 

tina. 1977 exports to Argentina were $353 

Tr.e Argentine trade deficit with the U.S. for 

Quarter of 1973 was $42 million.

Crgamzed terrorist movements have beer, largely 

brought under control. The once powerful o p. c o r. e r o 

revolutionaries and the Trotskyite People’s Revolutionary 

Amy (ERP) have been decimacec. Assassinations 

and bombings attributable to the left, however, do still 

occur occasionally. The American business community, 

which numbered approximately 1,200 in 1973, plunged to 

ftL*l 

0 business representatives in 1975 but has r.ow increase 

o somewhere over 100. 

The human rights situation remains bleak. While 

the government did acknowledge in February that it is 

holding some 3,400 prisoners without charges, there 

has been a reluctance to free or charge those detainees* 

Keanwhi le, disappearances and torture continue. V7e have 

made it clear to the Argentines that we do want better 

relations, but that there will have to be improvement 

in the human rights area before this is possible.


MEMORANDUM 


IT 

August 12, 1980 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


NORTH-SOUTH (Thor nton/Syi£i.o tea) 

Evening Report (U) * 

The day was mostly spent working on a letter to Mrs. Gandhi and preparing 

for the Zia visit. Also looked into the status of the Mugabe 

visit, following a phone call from Don McHenry. (C) 

At the North-South meeting we reviewed the outcome of the IDCA-State 

debate on concentration of AID efforts. So far so good, but we will 

have to keep this under continuing review. (C) 

Todman called from Madrid asking about the status of the Eguitorlal 

Guinea package. I told him to rest easy. (U) 

Charge Ruser in Argentina reports that while the Argentine military is 

solidly behixid the Bolivian coup, they are less than sure that Garcia 

Meza can last. He suggests that should Garcia Meza begin to falter, we 

suggest to the Argentines that they might ease him out in favor of a 

more acceptable candidate. (S) 

Press Contacts: 

None. (U) 

South Africa. CONGEN Capetown reports that rioting in the black townships 

broke out yesterday when SA police took action against the South 

African version of "gypsy-cab" drivers. The car services have proliferated 

as a result of increases in transit fares from township to city. 

The police chose the exact anniversary of the 1976 Capetown riots as 

the date to move. So far the violence has not spread to the mixed race 

townships. (C) 

Namibia. Internal USG debate, as well as that between the Contact Group 

members, on how to influence the SAG response to SecGen Waldheim's 6/20 

letter is focusing on the question of what degree of pressure/persuasion 

is appropriate and how it should be administered. McHenry tends toward 

the hard and fast approach while our ambassadors in the field, including 

Keeley in Salisbury, favor one that is less Intense. (C) 


Classified and extended by Claus Ruser 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority M L_C- - ?d- \Z V-^ ■ (f .7 

NARA—'fif- Dato_ ’ll _______ 

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INFO USMISSION GENEVA 1344 



USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1161 

"CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 7745 

EXDIS 

ROME FOR VATICAN OFFICE. 

DEPT PLS PASS USCINCSO FOR INTAFF 

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/19/86 (RUSER, CLAUS WO OR-M 

TAGS: SHUM PINT AR 

SUBJECT: THE TACTIC OF DISAPPEARANCE 


, 1. C - ENTIRE TEXT. 

,2. SUMMARY: DISAPPEARANCE IS STILL THE STANDARD TACTIC 

FOR THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES IN DEALING WITH CAPTURED 

TERRORISTS. THE MILITARY'S COMMITMENT TO THIS METHOD IS 

PROFOUNDLY ROOTED IN ELEMENTS THAT RANGE FROM EFFECTIVE 

NESS THROUGH EXPEDIENCY TO CULTURAL BIAS. WE DOUBT WHETHER 

INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS.AND OPPROBRIUM WILL, IN THEMSELVES, CAUSE 

THE GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE THE TACTIC AND GRANT CAPTURED TERROR 

ISTS DUE PROCESS. GETTING THE AUTHORITIES TO ABANDON THIS 

TACTIC WILL BE AN UPHILL. BATTLE. WE MUST TRY. 

THE VATICAN MAY BE THE HOST’EFFECTIVE ADVOCATE IN THIS 

EFFORT WHICH SHOULD TRY TO.CONVINCE THE LEADERSHIP THAT 

THERE ARE OTHER WATS TO DEAL .WITH THE PROBLEM—ESPECIALLY 

THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF'MILITARY COURT*. END SUMMARY. 

i 

3. THOUGH DRASTICALLY REDUCED IN NUMBERS’ FROM PREVIOUS 

LEVELS , DISAPPEARANCE CONTINUES TO BE TEE ST^lfBARD TACTIC 

FOR THE ARGENTINE'SECURITY FORCES IN DEALING:WXXK PEOPLE 

THEY BELIEVE TO BE MEMBERS OF TERRORIST ORGANlllTIONS. 

DISAPPEARANCE IS A EUPHEMISM FOR THE UNACKNOWLEDGED DETEN- 

*************** *WHSR COMMENT **************** 

1EOB:MOLAN 

HORN/RENT 

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**#****(^q_#—p~i d 7T t I A l**#****e COPT 

TION OF AN INDIVIDUAL BT SECURITY FORCES. BASED ON EVERY 

THING VE KNOW, VE BELIEVE THAT DETAINEES ARE USUALLY 

TORTURED AS PART OF INTERROGATION AND EVENTUALLY EXECUTED 

WITHOUT ANY SEMBLANCE OF DUE PROCESS. AS VE UNDERSTAND 

IT, THE CURRENT GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURITY FORCES ARE TO 

USE THIS PROCEDURE ONLY AGAINST ACTIVE MEMBERS OF TERROR 

IST ORGANIZATIONS. THE RESULT HAS BEEN THAT VIRTUALLY 

ALL OF THOSE WHO DISAPPEARED THIS YEAR HAVE PROBABLY 

BEEN MONTONEROS. ( 

4. THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES VON THE "DIRTY WAR" 

AGAINST THE TERRORISTS TWO YEARS AGO. SINCE THAT TIME THE 

MONTONEROS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CARRY OUT ONLY ISOLATED, IF 

OCCASIONALLY SPECTACULAR, ACTS FOR WHICH THE TERRORIST 

ACTORS HAVE OFTEN EVENTUALLY PAID WITH THEIR LIVES. 

THUS, EVEN IF ONE VERB TO CONCEDE THE CASE BEFORE, NECESSITY HARDLY 

CAN BE INVOKED BT THE MILITARY TO JUSTIFY THE USE OF DISAPPEAR 

ANCE AS A COUNTER-INSURGENCY TECHNIQUE. ON THE OTHER 

HAND, THE CONTINUED USE OF DISAPPEARANCE HAS A VERY HIGH 

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COST FOR THE -GOVERNMENT. IT IS 

ON THE DEFENSIVE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. RELATIONS 

WITH THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO BE STRAINED BY THE 

ISSUE. THE PROBABLE INVOLVEMENT OF ARGENTINE SECURITY 

FORCES IN THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THREE ARGENTINE„.MONTONEROS 

IN PERU FORCED PRESIDENT VIDELA TO CANCEL A TRIP TO LIMA 

THAT HE WISHED TO MAKE TO SYMBOLICALLY 

EXPRESS HIS GOVERNMENT'S DEMOCRATIC INTENTION. 

AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL IN THIS GOVERNMENT, OUR CONTACTS, 

EVEN AMONG THE MILITARY, RECOGNIZE THESE COSTS AND EXPRESS 

THE HOPE THAT EVENTUALLY DISAPPEARANCES WILL CEASE. 

5. BUT THEY DON'T THIS UNWILLINGNESS DOES N«OT REFLECT 

SIMPLE BLOODY-MINDEDNESS BT UNTHINKING MILITARY MEN. IF 

IT DID THE PROBLEM MIGHT BE MORE SOLUABLE. RATHER THE 

ARGENTINES HAVE RECORSE TO DISAPPEARANCE BECAUSE: 

—IT WORKED. MORAL AND LONG TERM POLITICAL COSTS APPEAR 

LESS IMPORTANT THAN SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS TO THE GOA. , . 

ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES DEFEATED ON# OF THE LARGEST 

TERRORIST ASSAULTS- ON A MODERN SOCIETY USING THIS 

TACTIC. THE EXPERIENCE OF VEST GERMANY AND THE-UNITED 

STATES IN USING THE LAV TO MEET- A TERRORIST THREAT' MAKES 

LITTLE IMPRESSION HERE SINCB'THI MILITARY ACCURATELY 

EVALUATE TIE THREAT THAT THEY, BESTED AS' BEING MUCH LARGER 

THAN THE ONE THE UNITED STATE#'AND THE I&G FACED. RATHER, 

ARGENTINES INVOKE ITALY'S CONTINUING TORMENT AS WHAT 

THEY MIGHT HAVE FACED IF THEY HAD STUCK TO THE LAW. 

—IT CONTINUES TO BE EFFECTIVE. DISAPPEARED PRISONERS YIELD 

UP INFORMATION UNDER TORTURE. DISAPPEARED PREISONERS CAN 

BE TURNED AGAINST THEIR FORMER COMRADES. DISAPPEARED 

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******»(^P-tr F ~1 i) 

COPT 

PRISIONERS ARE BELIEVED TO BE A FRIGHTENING EXAMPLE THAT 

INHIBITS THE MONTONEHOS * ABILITY TO HECHDIT NEW PERSONNEL. 

BT 

t 

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EM AMEMBASST BUENOS AIRES 


INEO USMISSION GENEVA 1345 



USMISSION USUN NEW TORK 1162 

A-0 N T-T D E-N T I A L-SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 7745 

EZDIS 


DIPT PLS PASS USCINCSO FOR INTAFF 

—THE MILITART ARE UNWILLING TO USE CIVILIAN COURTS TO 

PUNISH ACTIVE TERRORISTS. THET ARGUE THAT THE COURTS 

•WOULD SIMPLT LET THE TERRORISTS GO. IN VIEW OFKTHE 

STIFF SENTENCES HANDED OUT RECENTLY TO TERRORISTS 

'CAPTURED IN EARLIER TEARS, THIS ARGUMENT IS NOT CONVINCING. 

WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROBLEM IS FOUNDED FIRST IN THE 

INABILITY OF THE MILITART TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE FOR USE 

IN THE COURTS AGAINST MEN AND WOMEN-FANATICALLY DEDICATED 

TO THEIR CAUSE—OTHER THAN THAT EXTRACTED FROM THE 

DETAINEES UNDER TORTURE. SECONDLY, THE SECURITY SERVICES 

ARE UNWILLING TO SURRENDER THEIR COMPLETE CONTROL OVER 

THE DETAINEES. 

—THE MILITART DOES NOT HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTUREt 

THEORETICALLY A SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE WOULD 

HANDLE THE TERRORISTS, METING OUT CAPITAL SENTENCES IF 

THAT WERE TO ITS TASTES. HOWEVER, FOR SUCH A SYSTEM 

TO WORE, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE OFFICERS OF RECORD WHO 

IN THE FUTURE COULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR 

ACTIONS. AS ONE MAN, HIMSELF A MEMBER OF ONE OF THE MAJOR 

SECURITY FORCES, TOLD US, THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO 

ARGENTINE OFFICER WHO WANTS TO HAVE HIS NAME ON RECORD 

AS ORDERING THE EXECUTION OF A TERRORIST. UNDER THE 

CURRENT SYSTEM, THE MILITART ARE RESPONSIBLE AS AN 

INSTITUTION BUT THE INDIVIDUAL IS FREE FROM ACCOUNTABILITY. 

, —AT BEST, THE RULE OF LAW IS A WEAK.;AND FRAGILE" CONCEPT IN 

ARGENTINA. THE MILITARY DOES.NOT OPERATE INfA VACUUM AND ITS 

ft. 

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t 

nMTTBTHTTI 

COPT 

DISREGARD TOR THE PRINCIPLES OP DUE PROCESS REELECT 

WIDESPREAD ATTITUDES IN THIS SOCIETT. ARGENTINES WHO 

GENUINELY BELIEVE IN THE RULE OP LAW, SOME.IN THE GOVERN 

MENT AND OTHERS OPPOSING IT, REMAIN A MINORITY. 

—FORCING THE SECURITY FORCES TO ABNADON THE TACTIC WOULD 

INVOLVE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE POLITICAL LEVEL OP 

THE GOVERNMENT AND VERY POWERFUL ELEMENTSIN THE'SECURITY 

PORCES. THE POTENTIAL COSTS OP SUCH A CONFRONTATION MAKE 

IT A VERY UNATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO A GOVERNMENT WHICH 

MUST COUNT ON A MILITARY INSTITUTION THAT IS MORE OR 

LESS UNIFIED. 

—INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AND OPINION ARE GIVEN LESS 

WEIGHT BY THE MILITARY THAN THE NEED TO CLEAN UP THE 

REMANANTS OP THE ANTI-TERRORIST WAR. THEY WILL NOT 

EASILY CHANCE THEIR TACTICS TO MOLLIFY CRITICISM. 

' 6. THE USE OP DISAPPEARANCE IS NOW RESTRICTED,'WE BELIEVE, 

,TO ACTIVE TERRORISTS. THUS, THE EXTENT TO W&ICH DISAPPEAR 

ANCES OCCUR DEPSNDS SOLELY ON THE NUMBER OF MONTONEROS WHO 

ARE ACTIVE AND GET CAUGHT. AS THE NUMBER OP ACTIVE 

MONTONEROS HAS DECLINED, SO HAVE THE NUMBER OP DISAPPEARANCES. 

THIS TREND WILL CONTINUE. IP THE NUMBER OP ACTIVE MONTONEROS 

CONTINUES TO DROP, BUT DISAPPEARANCE AS AN ACCEPTABLE TACTIC 

WILL NOT END SOON. 

7. AS THE WAR BETWEEN THE TERRORISTS AND THE SECURITY PORCES 

GOES ONi HUMANITARIAN VALUES AND US RELATIONS WITH THIS 

COUNTRY ARE CAUST IN A CROSSFIRE. WE OBVIOUSLY CAN DO 

LITTLE TO APTECT THE TERRORISTS' CHOICE OP WHITHER OR NOT 

TO CONTINUE THEIR STRUGGLE. OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE 

GOVERNMENT'S DECISION ON TACTICS IT WILL USE IN. THIS WAR 

IS NOT MUCH GREATER. IT WILL- REMAIN DIFFICULT FOR US TO ARGUE 

AGAINST ARGENTINE "SUCCESS*!IN ITS UNDELCARED VAR AGAINST 

TERRORISM AND PARA-MILITART -GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. BUT WE 

BELIEVE THAT DESPITE THE OBSTACLES WE MUST MAKE THE EFFORT. 

WE SHOULD: 

—MAKE IT CLEAR TO GOA OPINION -MAKERS THAT WHILE WE HAVE 

NO SYMPATHY FOR THE TERRORISTS WE CANNOT CONDONE EXTRA- 

' LEGAL ACTIONS GAINST THEM. :5Q LONG AS THE.*GOt.IRNMENT 

CONTINUES TO EMPLOY SUCH TACTICS THERE VlLlr BEMN 

1 IMPORTANT’ IMPEDIMENT TONORMAL RELATIONS;. , 

—ENCOURAGE THE GOVERNMENT TO PGNDIR-SEBIOTSLT. ROW THIS 

POLICY IMPEDES ITS EFFORTS TO MAKS'ARGENTINA' A RESPECTED 

MEMBER OP THE WESTERN FAMILY OP NATIONS. 

—STIMULATE THE GOVERNMENT TO THINK ABOUT ALTERNATIVES■TO 

THE'TACTIC OP DISAPPEARANCE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ESTABLISH 

MENT OP AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OP MILITARY JUSTICE MAY BE 

THE BEST ANSWER. IP THE MILITARY COULD BE SHAKEN OUT OF . 

THEIR BELIEF THAT DEATH IS THE ONLY REASONABLE PUNISHMENT 

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'FOR TERRORISTS, THE ARMED FORCES MIGHT SEE ADVANTAGES 

IN USING THE MILITARY COURTS. THE BRAZILIANS RELIED ON 

'THEM DURING THEIR SUCCESSFUL BOUT VITH TERRORISTS. THIS 

EXAMPLE MIGHT HELP CONVINCE THE ARGENTINES THAT THEY 

SHOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THIS ALTERNATIVE. 

—ENCOURAGE THE VATICAN AND POSSIBLY THE ARGENTINE CHURCH 

TO INTERVENE VITH THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES. THE 

PAPAL NUNCIO HERE UNDERSTANDS THE ISSUES AND IS ALREADY 

INVOLVED IN TRYING TO GET THE GOA TO EXAMINE THE MORALITY 

AND VISDOM OF THE TACTIC OF DISAPPEARANCE (SEPTEL). THE 

CHURCH AND THE POPE HAVE FAR MORE INFLUENCE HERE THAN 

THE USG AND CAN BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE ADVOCATES OF A.. 

FULL RETURN TO THE RULE OF LAV. VE VILL OF COURSE 

CONTINUE TO FOSTER RETHINKING OF THE POLICY OF DISAPPEAR 

ANCES VITHIN THE MILITARY AND THE GOVERNMENT. ■ 

RUSER 

BT 

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-SECRET-— 

ARGENTINA 

1980/1981 PLAN OF ACTION AND OTHER ISSUES 

I. INTRODUCTION 

On May 29 the Interagency Group for Latin America 

developed a strategy, subsequently approved by the 

President, to achieve better balance in our relations 

with Argentina. Before the strategy could be fully 

implemented, Argentina became heavily involved in 

supporting the new Bolivian regime. Imminent GOA 

recognition of the Bolivian regime and continuing 

reports of Argentine involvement led to the postponement 

of Assistant Secretary Bowdler's visit. The visit 

was to have been the major vehicle for implementing 

most of the initiatives to improve U.S.-Argentine 

relations in 1980. 

Argentina continues to be heavily involved in 

supporting financially and militarily the Bolivian 

regime. There is some indication that because of 

the Btrong USG reaction and the effect on our bilateral 

relations, Argentine leaders are willing to counsel 

moderation to the Bolivians, but there is no clear 

indication as yet the GOA is in fact exerting needed 

pressure to end the more repressive and corrupt practices 

of the Garcia Mesa regime. Over the longer term, 

we would hope that Argentina would encourage a return 

to civilian rule and avoid a polarization in Bolivian 

society. 

Argentina is unlikely to cooperate further in 

the West's partial grains embargo on the Soviet union. 

Although we had been told earlier that cooperation 

was possible and depended on the Bize of the 1980/1981 

harvests, our Embassy was informed last week that 

Argentina would sell as much grain to the USSR as 

is available. 

The U.S. continues to have a significant stake 

in maintaining and furthering improved bilateral relations. 

We continue to seek Argentine support on East-West 

and Hemispheric issues, in international fora and 

on non-proliferation. We also seek to influence Argentine 

internal developments on human rights and on an eventual 

return to democracy, as well as to limit the potential 

increase of Soviet influence there. Other strategic 

interests include its size, geographic location, natural 

resources, and relatively advanced economic, scientific, 

■CECRET ■ 

GDS 11/1(5/80 

t 

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and cultural development. Argentina has the most 

advanced nuclear program in Latin America and potentially 

one of the world's richest oil-bearing areas in itB 

vast continental shelf. Argentina's port facilities 

and coastline could play an important role in the 

protection of critical sea lanes. 

The U.S. also has major commercial interests 

in Argentina. U.S. exports to Argentina more than 

doubled in 1979 over 1978 (from $704 million to $1.5 

billion). In the first nine months of 1980 exports 

increased 59.3% over the same period in 1979 to $1.8 

billion. Of particular interest to U.S. industry 

are the potentially large exports related to the huge 

hydroelectric projects being undertaken by the GOA 

with Paraguay, potential sales in one project alone 

could total up to $350 million. The U.S. Government 

has been actively supporting the tfids of U.S. firms 

in these projects. 

The U.S. faces a potentially serious confrontation 

with Argentina at the OASGA beginning November 19 

on the issue of the IAHRC's human rights report. 

Failure to reach agreement could affect our other 

national interests. In addition, we need to consider 

the U.S. approach to President Viola during his planned 

visit to Washington, particularly with regard to the 

GOA's interest in resuming arms purchases and the 

Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment barring such saleB. 

II. STATUS OF 1980 ACTION PLAN 

A. Continuing or Early-Action Initiatives! 

— Meeting of the U.S./Argentine Mixed Economic 

Commission. The meeting has been scheduled for April 

1981 (the earliest mutually convenient time frame). 

The agenda will include discussion of* bilateral trade 

issues and seek to expand commerciyal relations. 

— Bilateral Income Tax Treaty. Conclusion of 

the Treaty is in the final stages. 

— Consular Convention. Both parties are reviewing 

a proposed text. 

— Human Rights. We have continued the dialogue, 

most recently tnrougn high level bilateral discussions 

at the UNGA. We are continuing discussions at the 

OASGA. 

ngpuwii ^ 

-2- 

SECRET- 

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rnnTiffii 

wSvlUil 

-3- 

— Nuclear Relations. We are continuing negotiations 

aimed at resolving the remaining safeguards issues 

to permit the delivery of highly and moderately enriched 

uranium for Argentina's nuclear research program as 

well as components for its power program. We hope 

negotiations will be completed this year. We continue 

to urge the Argentines to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 

most recently during bilateral talks at the UNGA. 

B. Initiatives where the Timing is Undecided: 

— Visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter- 

American Affairs to Buenos 'Aires. Assistant Secretary ./ 

Bowdler's visit to Argentina was postponed following I*® 

Argentina's support of the Bolivia coup and recognition 

of the new Bolivian regime. 

— The first round of periodic security consultations 

focusing on security of the South Atlantic, m’hese 

talks will highlight the critical strategic implications 

of the South Atlantic and create interest in cooperation 

for its defense. 


issues. We would exchange views on global issues 

and explore ways to promote mutually beneficial policies. 

The agenda would include an-exchange of views on human 

rightB policies and Argentina's evolution toward democracy, 

East-West and Hemispheric cooperation, and international 

issues such as law of the sea and the transfer of 

arms and technology. 

T 

" S19nln9 the Agricultural Coopetatlo|| Agreement. 

We have withheld signing the agreement until &OA participation 

in the partial grains embargo on the Soviet anion 

is resolved. —* 

— An Invitation to an Argentine guest instructor 

to the q.S. Army School of the Americas. H reports 

that consultations with the Congress are completed 

and have been favorable. HA disagrees as to the scope 

of the consultations. 

— A high-level military visit. We told the 

President we will keep under review tlie desirability 

of an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader, 


SECRET 

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DstSKAl 

-4- 

A final decision, including timing, would take into 

account continued improvements in the observance of 

human rights and developments in U.S.-Argentine relations. 

C. Issues To Be Discussed: 

1. in view of the GOA's continuing involvement 

in Bolivia and its policy of non-cooperation on grains 

restriction, which initiatives should be rescheduled 

and which should be deferred for later decision? 

III. ARGENTINA AT THE OASGA 


One of the most controversial issues at the OASGA 

will be how to handle the lAHRC's human rights report 

on Argentina. If Argentina perceives it is unjustly 

or harshly treated by the OAS in general or the U.S. 

in particular, it may make good on its threat to walk 

out of the OAS. GOA officials have also implied that 

the U.S. position at the OAS will (be taken into account 

in considering the award of contracts for hydroelectric 

projects such as Yacyreta. 

Following USG representations, Argentina allowed 

the visit of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission 

(IAHRC) in September 1979. The Commission's special 

report was severely critical of Argentina, calling 

on the GOA to inter alia account for the disappeared 

and bring to trial ana punish those responsible, lift 

the state of siege, release or grant the right of 

option to depart Argentina to those persons held under 

Executive detention, investigate and punish those 

responsible for torture, and restore due process guarantees. 

Consideration of the lAHRC's report on Argentina 

may be the most divisive issue in this year's OASGA. 

Many human rights groups and representatives from 

the Argentine exile community plan to visit Washington 

during the meeting and will push for Assembly condemnation. 

Argentine Nobel laureate Perez Esquivel also plans 

to be in Washington during the meeting. While these 

activities will heighten publicity over Argentina's 

case in the U.S., they will serve even more to focus 

public attention on the Commission's activities in 

Argentina. The Argentine Government believes harsh 

uwf.on by the OAS will establish precedent for similar 

treatment in other interim*...,*—1 fora, and it is seeking 

-SECRET---- - 

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^JSBGRHE—- 

- * 

an omnibus resolution which would not name specific 

countries. Mexico, Venezuela and Peru are strong 

supporters of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission 

(IAHRC) and, in varying degrees, favor an activist 

stance by the OAS in the human rights field. 

U.S.-Argentine bilateral discussions could be 

crucial to achieving a satisfactory outcome. We are 

working informally with Argentina and other interested 

countries to develop an OAS resolution which, while 

not calling for condemnation off Argentina, will recognize 

the work of the Commission, take note of the human 

rights situation at the time of the report, note the 

improvements since, and call on the GOA to take into 

account the report's recommendations for improved 

human rights observance. 

B. issues To Be Discussed; 

1. Should the U.S. back offyon its position 

calling for a country-specific resolution and accept 

an an omnibus resolution which would make some specific 

mention of Argentina, if that is the consensus of 

the other OAS members? 

2. should we accept an omnibus resolution not 

mentioning Argentina? 

V. U.S. MILITARY SALES TO ARGENTINA 


At the May 14 Policy Review Committee meeting 

on Argentina, it was decided that it would be premature 

to consider rescission or modification of legislative 

restrictions on military supply to Argentina this 

year. In 1981, legislative modifications to permit 

training and perhaps other actions concerning military 

supply might be considered if the human rights situation 

in Argentina continued favorably. The current human 

rights situation is described in £he attached summary. 

IMET Training Programs, the Bale of training 

under FMS and military supplies to the GOA (FMS and 

Munitions List items) are prohibited by the Humphrey- 

Kennedy Amendment. In addition, under current policy, 

the U.S. Executive limits sales of non-Munitions List 

items to the Argentine military and the police through 

the Commerce export control licensing system. In 

•SECRET--- * 

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■SECHEE 

-6- 

order to permit the sale of these items, either: 

— the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment would have 

to be rescinded or modified; 

t 

— a presidential determination that a proposed 

sale was in the U.S. national interest would have 

to be evoked (At present, the President has no such 

leeway for Humphrey-Kennedy; however, legislation 

is pending in this year's FAA which would give the 

President this authority); or 

— the Congress would need to pass specific legislation 

permitting a particular sale. 

DOD has identified strategic and economic interests 

which support the sale of military aircraft in the 

near term: 

— There is a strategic need for the sale of 

ocean surveillance P-3 aircraft to the GOA to counter 

the Soviet buildup in the South Atlantic. 

— Argentina plans to embark next year on a $3 

billion modernisation program for its' Air Force. 

The GOA has told us that it prefers U.S. equipment 

and that it is committed to making a decision by June 

1981. If the U.S. is unable to respond by that date, 

Argentina will turn toward European suppliers. 

The U.S. proscription of military sales toward 

Argentina, while not affecting the availability of 

military equipment to the GOA (European suppliers 

have been more that willing to fill the gap), have 

considerable political significance as a tangible 

expression of disapproval of Argentine human rights 

violations. Modification of our posture must take 

into account the implications for our stance toward 

other countries with human rights violations, as well 

as the message this would send to human rights groups 

in Argentina and internationally who have joined us 

in criticizing human rights violations in Argentina. 

U.S. arms sales policies toward Argentina must 

also take into account the strategic balance in the 

Southern Cone. Chile already sees our improving relationship 

with Argentina as threatening in the bontext of the 

Beagle Channel - dispute. Major U.St. arms sales to 

Argentina while we maintain our present cool and distant 

relationship with Chile would further tip the balance 

SECRET 

Nn Dhifintinn Tn Denlassifinatinn in Mill 2013/02/04 : Nl C-24-91-3-12-8


SECRET— 

-7- 

o£ power in favor of Argentina; this plus the political 

signal renewed arms sales would convey to both parties 

could encourage Argentina to seek a military solution 

to the Beagle Channel dispute, if the current mediation 

fails. 


1. Has there been sufficient improvement in 

the human rights situation to change our position 

on military sales? 

2. What specific human rights improvements would 

be required for us to change our position? 

3. Are there strategic or economic consideration 

which would cause us to seek approval of specific 

sales? 

4. What are the ramifications of a resumption 

of sales to Argentina on the military balance in the 

Southern Cone? On our stance toward other countries 

with human rights violations? 

IV. PRESIDENT-DESIGNATE VIOLA'S VISIT TO THE U.S. 


Argentine President-designate Roberto Viola tentatively 

plana to travel to New York December 5 to address 

the Council on Foreign Relations aAd U.S.-Argentine 

Chamber of Commerce. According to the Argentine Embassy 

here, he may also visit Washington December 6-7. 

Viola is a moderate within the Argentine military 

hierarchy, friendly to the United states, and sympathetic 

to U.S. views. His visit would provide an opportunity 

to influence future Argentine policies on Bolivia, 

grains, human rights, and Tlatelolco. On the other 

hand, coming to Washington in the middle of a Presidential 

transition is awkward. The Carter administration 

will not be in a position to discuss policy beyond 

January 20. Whether the President-elect or his advisors 

would want to see him to review U.S.-Argentine relations 

is problematical. 


1. Whether Viola should be encouraged to come 

to Washington. 

SECRET-- * 

( 

Nn nhifir.tinn Tn nenlassifinatinn in Full 2013/02/04 : Nl 0-24-91-3-12-8


2. In the event of an affirmative anawerr who 

should see him? 

Attachment: 

Status of Human Rights in Argentina. 

Drafted:ARA/SC:Gjwhitman:mas r 

11/10/80 

t 

t 

Nn Ohipntinn Tn DfinlaRsifir^tion in Full 2013/02/04 : NL.C-24-91-3-12-8


-SECRET" 

STATUS OF HOMAN RIGHTS 3N ARGENTINA 

The human rights situation in Argentina has improved 

over previous years, but remains serious. Host seriously, 

fundamental, internationally recognized rights of 

the integrity of the person have been violated through 

the application by the security forces of the tactic 

of disappearance. The number of confirmed disappearances 

registered in Argentina this year total 11, but there 

are unconfirmed reports of 22 or more. This total 

is in contrast to the many thousands who disappeared 

in 1976 and 1977, more than 600 in 1978 and 44 in 

1979. There continue to be reliable indications that 

individuals detained as suspected terrorists or subversives 

are subject to torture. There has been no accounting 

for past disappearances. 

The number of detainees on other than common criminal 

charges has been reduced, although the numbers remaining 

are still significant, since 1974, 8200 people accused 

of terrorism or subversion have been detained under 

the special executive powers of the president. By 

September 1980, prisoners accused of other than common 

crimes totaled 1,700 to 1,800. Of these about 750 

were being held without trial, Borne for many years 

or after having served their sentences. About 600 

had been tried and convicted in military or civilian 

courts and another 400 were in trial status. The 

right of option program, which allows qualified prisoners 

to choose self-exile in lieu of detention, has been 

greatly restricted by Argentine Government regulations. 

As a result, of the 277 prisoners who have qualified 

for the U.S. Hemispheric Parole program, only 82 persons 

have been able to travel to the United StateB. 

Prison conditions have improved, although there 

is still concern over psychological conditions which 

may have been a factor in a number of suicides. Earlier 

complaints regarding overcrowding, lack of medical 

treatment, improper food, and restrictions on visits 

have been largely resolved. 

The opportunities for the exercise of political 

freedoms remain circumscribed by the prohibition on 

political activities and de facto limits on the freedom 

of expression. Within uncertain limits, politicians 

and the press increasingly voiced criticism of the 

Government's actions and plans. Occasionally politicians 

were detained on the grounds that they had overstepped 

the limits of the law. The military designated the 

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no UDjection 10 ueciassmcation in hull 2U13/U2/U4 : NLU-^-yi-ii-ii'-tJ 

-10- 

President for the period 1981-1984, while reiterating 

its ultimate commitment to return the country to civilian 

rule. However, no date has been fixed for that devolution. 

t 

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Cleared:ARA/SC:REService 

ARAsJABushnell . 

ARA/RPP:GJone s .. 

ARA:WGBowdler 

■SECRET". 

-11- / 

t 

t 

SB&OSr--- " 

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•No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-12-8j£ I 5X1 

•“» 

beat) 

* 

THE SECRETARY OF (STATE 

WASHINGTON 



From: 

Subject: 

THE PRESIDENT 

Edmund S. Muskie 





during 1980. 





and support, staged a coup in Boliyia. Assistant 

Secretary Bowdler's visit to Buenos Aires was postponed 

as a result. 







General Assembly. Under Secretary Cooper in a subsequent 




of the 1980/81 harvests. We plan to continue our 
















Do iri 

i 

4 

3^ 

- rtf 

3 » a 

fl 

o


2 

I. Continuing or Early Action Initiatives; 

— We will pursue our significant commercial 

and economic interests in preparation for the meeting 

of the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic Commission 

to be held in Buenos Aires, prob.ably in March or 






— We will move forward on negotiations to 







convention. 

II. Initiatives Postponed Until Next Year: 




issues. * 



decision to limit grains to the Soviet nnion. 


to the U.S. Army School of the Americas until consultations 

with the Congress are completed and we are 


— A high-level D.S. military visit, although 




Nn Ohiectinn Tn Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 • Nl C-24-91-3-12-B

' —■ No Objection To Declassification in full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-12-8'. 

/ 'If J f~~ 

”HE WHITE HOUSE J. 

WASHINGTON 

March 21, 1979 

Li 


t 

SUBJECT: 




1 situation in Argentina, and I agree that it‘ is a sobering 

document. The human rights situation inf Argentina may just 





to encourage them to respect human rights? (S) 

(2) What approach will permit us to sustain in' the U.S. 


Argentina, which are interpreted as punitive, we not only 








’t 


i impact on Argentine government decisions, hut it's never 

as direct or as much as we want. This ifs the case in our 

• human rights policy. (S) 











-SECRET—* 

Review on March 20, 1985 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13S2B 

Authority-H) ^ 

NARA __££--------Deto ----------


SSCRET- -2- 
















toward democratization. I believe that we should continue 



situation. They will continue to try to lure high-level 

visitors but we should resist that until progress is evident. (S) 


punitive, would be to invite criticisii from moderate and 







that this may mean six months to one year, but I think the 

wait is justified. (S) ~ 





move to negative votes in the IFI's or to cut back Export- 



and then adjust our policy appropriately. (S) 

9LJ>>& Wm 

JSE&BETr 

Z3IGN1 

EZINSKI

-secret 


' ? r 

MEMORANDUM 


March 20, 1979 

MEMdRANDUM FOR: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


ROBERT PASTOR 


At your request I have taken the main points in my memorandum 

to you and included them in a memorandum from you to Secretary 

of State Vance. Still, I recommend that you use the memorandum 

as talking points with the Secretary rather than send it. 

I am gun-shy — not to say paranoid — about sending memos 

from here to other agencies. (S) 


tONS) 

Therefore, I recommend that you not send the memorandum at 

Tab I, but rather phone Secretary Vance. 

Approve 

Disapprove 

cc: 

Jessica Mathews 

•eccRET" • 

'Review on March 20, 1979 

DECLASSIFIED

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-12-8 | 

i 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNQU, 

JOlTTIinTTIMr March 10, 979 

NOTE TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


M433^WS^Lk/S“ 

JESSICA TDCHMAN 

Argentina and Human Rights Policy 

Bob's recommendation ifS that we delay a change 

in policy until after fh«.-TAWpr mnA.Ttmt.rt. 

and indicates that the delay wllLl be a few 

months. In fact it will probably be much longer. 

It took 13 months after the visit to El Salvador 

to get out the final report. It will take at least 

as long to do the controversial Argentine report. 

So we are talking about a probable delay until 

June 1980 at least. 

cc: Bob Pastor 

coariPDinaq:— 

Review on March 9, 1985 

declassified 

E.Q.13S2B 

^

, No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91 -3-12-8 

• MEMORANDUM 

-rt - ^ 

w 



FROM: 

t 

March 5, 1979 

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSÎ^ 

,Z INSKI 

>${ 

ROBERT PASTOR 

&' .-*■ 

J 

M f 

SUBJECT: 





should adopt a tougher approach to Argentina. From 

October - December 1977, we voted "no" on loans to Argentina 

in the IFI's. We changed our position to abstention in 


would induce some improvement in the huntan rights situation. 


now believe that we should vote "no" on I'dAhs m the XJs’IiPs, 

""IOUby UELLI dduhtri.es to roilow our exaritpie; and assess 

'VJftgEKdf further action in X-M and Oîc should oe't&k&ft. '"(S) 

Assessment 

The report was prepared by INR—not HA— and it is a sobering 


worst in the hemisphere, and despite repeated promises 

III iy7B' ny the Argentine government, it has not improved. 


»* 

— There are 2900 acknowledged political prisoners; 


held by the military; and a smaller group is being "rehabili-? 

tated." There is no effort underway to substantially reduce 


"Physical and psychological torture apparently 

remain standard treatment." The Red Cross estimated that 

90% of the political prisoners are tqrtured, and some are 

executed. (S) 

— Disappearances — probably by security units — 


(Argentina's Interior Ministry claimed 4D per month; while 

CRET 

tgisal CL 3Y__Ri_Eastfl£------------- 

DECL 52 E27V Cl'Tjlpirrh 51 193-5- 

CT ETjJL 

t > cry 

6 HZLS3 5S. 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.1352B - 

Authority, ~ 3^ — 

NARA__5LS----- Date—------------

No Objection To Declassification in full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-12-8 




than with terrorists. Both international NGO's and 



, — Illegal invasion of the home — including theft 




using the Argentine government's statistics. Argentina's 



Videla has admitted that the war is over. INR concludes 

that the explanation for continued official terrorism, is _ 

army politics.(S) 

Policy 






law requires that we vote "no" on non-basic human needs 


law only requires that we "oppose" such loans, and "opposition" 





•- 



(2) What approach will permit us tb sustain in the U.S. 

our overall human rights policy? Whrfn we take punitive steps 





should move carefully and explain our position to a wide-range 

audience before taking any stepB, least we jeopardize our 

overall human rights policy. (S). 




SECRET—

-.SECRET- ' 




The Argentine government wants a wanner relationship with us 

for three reasons: (1) our historical, reasonably close 

relationship; (2) the U.S. under Carter has the prestige and 

the morality which could contribute to the idea that the 

Argentine military government is legitimate; and (3) Buch 








area at home. I think our cool and correct posture has been as 

effective as any policy could be. 1 think negative steps as 



In short, I would recommend that we maintain a cool and oorrect 


opportunity both directly and ' 4 * rage 

them to clean up their act. 


evident. (S) 

But even if you believe as Vance and Christopher do, that we 


delay. (S) 



a bit longer: (1) The Argentine1'government has been paralyzed by 

the Beagle Channel conflict for the past eight monthB; now that 


Argentina's most hard-line GeneralB have been transferred, and 





Commission is going there in May. We should wait and gear any 

new policy shifts to their report. That may mean & delay of six 


RECOMMENDATIONi * 


recommend you call him and ask him to re-consider. if be 



Approve 

Disapprove

SEG&&S- 


4 

cc: Jessica Mathews Views: 

Bob is right that our primary concern should be vhat will work with 





that in the near term nothing will work until and unless Videla gets 

However, there 1b one important consideration missing here, namely the 

relationship of Argentina to the rest of our human rights policy. As 



terrorist threat if not in absolute numbers). While it is Impossible 

to compare events in say Argentina and Indonesia, we do have to struggle 

to make the policy consistent insofar as we can, and by these standards 

there is a general consensus that we should be taking a firmer stand 


If neither posture is likely to be much more successful vis-a-vis the 

GOA, we should pick the one that is more consistent with the human rights 

policy -- returning to the tougher "no" vote position. 

Lu ocjf. uu 

■SSeRBT

| No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-12-8 

MEMORANDUM 

X AT IO X A L S E C U RIT Y, C O U N CIL 


-MaUUft'J.'- 

INFORMATION 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


THOMAS 

M-B-B Lunch — Argentina and Chile (U) 


As you will remember, there was an exchange of memos between 

Muskie and Brown — the former wanting to leave our relations 

with Argentina essentially on ice, the'latter wanting to proceed 

with some military cooperation*gestures (see attached 

package). An IG was held last week to confirm the State 

position, with the understanding that Brown could appeal if 

he wants to. He apparently does. (C) 

The issue is whether we should show willingness to move ahead 

with various minor military cooperation matters (e.g. joint 

talks, inviting an Argentine instructor to our school in Panama) 

despite the Argentine position on grain and their actions in 

Bolivia. Nobody sees the possibility of taking any major steps 

(e.g. the repeal of Kennedy-Humphrey) even if we wanted to. (S) 

RECOMMENDATION: Support State's position that there should be 

no further moves made towards Argentina by this Administration, 

on the following grounds: 

— They have behaved very poorly towards us. 

— There is no time urgency to any of the issues at stake. 

— The Argentines are unlikely even to.respond to feelers 

from this Administration, preferring to wait for the 

Republicans. * 

— To the extent that we have cards to play, let's leave them 

for the next administration, who might get something in return 

for them. The Carter Administration certainly won't. 

(S) 

-SECRET-" 

Review on Nov. 18, 1986 

declassified 

Nn Ohifictinn Tn Denlassifinatinn in Full 2013/02/04 • Nl D-24-91-3-12-8


SEeKET"' 2 

Chile 

A year has passed since the Letelier sanctions were imposed 

and we had agreed among ourselves tp review policy towards 

Chile about now.' State had, in fact, begun to do so, when 

Christopher put a stop to it. I asked to have this item put 

on the agenda so that we could get a determination whether 

or not we want to go through with the policy review or simply 

leave matters for the next administration to deal with. It 

is a fairly close call: 

Con 

— There are no pressing issues at stake for the next several 

months. 

— The Chilean Government remains fairly odious and has recently 

perpetrated a mockery of the democratic process, 

perpetuating the rule of Pinochet. It may also be retrogressing 


— By leaving changes to the next administration, we give 

them some cards to play. 

— The Letelier sanctions have had no effect, were never intended 

to be kept on permanently, and are now counterproductive 

to our own interests (e.g. the UNITAS issue). 

— Despite some recent setbacks, Chilean human rights performance 

with regard to violation of the person has improved 

greatly and in the course of events this should 

have been recognized. The Letelier sanctions have overlaid 

this, however, with the result that we are much 

tougher on Chile than on Argentina where Basket I 

violations are much worse. This is anomalous and 

discredits our human rights policy. It also leaves 

us badly out of balance as between these two Beagle 

Channel contestants. 

— Since we said that we would review our policy, let's do 

it. We are still the Government. (S) 


on two grounds: 

I think we should go ahead with the review 

— Let's leave a credible policy behind, and 

■SECRET---- - 

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SECRET-1 3 

— If we don't sort things out better, we will be inviting 

the next administration to throw the baby out with the 

bathwater, for we should continue considerable restraint 

in our relationships. (S) 

I am not disturbed by the idea that there may be no specific 

actions that this Administration will be taking towards Chile; 

what I am concerned about is leaving behind appropriate guidelines 

(e.g. reaffirming the President's decision on 1981 UNITAS 

participation; how to vote on IFI loans to Chile). (S) 

t 

i 

t 

■SECRET 

i 

t 

Nn nhiertinn Tn Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : Nl G-24-91-3-12-8

MEMORANDUM 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-12-& ,/ > 

•---- v- 'ft 


WASHINGTON 

DECLASSIFIED 

Authority 

NARA 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

MRS. CARTER 


Your Meeting with Argentine Nobel Peace 

Prize Winner (C) 

I understand that you will be meeting with Argentine Peace Prize 

winner Adolfo Perez Esquivel. In 1973, Perez Esquivel, a 

sculptor and Professor of Architecture, established the Ecumenical 

Movement of Peace and Justice, an organization of Catholics, 

Protestants and others opposed to violence by both right-wing and 

left-wing political forces in Argentina. In 1974, he became 

Secretary General of the Peace and Justice Service, a Buenos Airesbased 

network of human rights activists throughout Latin America. (C) 

Be has been very complimentary of the President's human rights 

policy, and of our former Ambassador tp Argentina, Raul Castro, but 

as the attached UPI report indicates, he said that he was "gravely 

concerned" about the human rights movement because of Reagan's 

election. The Argentine government iB unhappy that he received the 

Nobel Peace Prize, and the government has suggested indirectly that 

he may have contributed to terrorism. Our Embassy is aware of no 

information that would substantiate the charge. Indeed, he is a 

strong advocate of Gandhian non-violence. (C) 

Perez Esquivel has also criticized military aid to the Junta in 

El Salvador, and there is some question about whether he cares as 

much about condemning left-wing terrorism as he does about government 

repression and right-wing terrorism. The President alluded 

indirectly to the point in his speech to the QAS on Wednesday, 

where he said:' (C) 

"The cause of human rights will be all the stronger if it 

remains at the service of humanity rather than at the 

service of ideological or partisan ends — and if it 

condemns both terrorism and repression." (U) 

I suggest you make the following points: ' 

— The President and I both wanted to personally congratulate 

you for being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. 

— As you know, the President has placed great emphasis on 

the importance of human rights for the U.S. and the world. Your 

award is symbolic of the importance which the entire world attaches 

to human rights today. (U) 


■pfmmm 

Nn nhip.rtinn Tn nfinlasRifinatinn in Full 2013/02/04 ' Nl 0-24-91-3-12-8


-z- 

— We believe very deeply that for the human rights movement: 

to remain strong it must be credible and to do it- has to be perceived 

as separate from ideological or partisan political groups. 

We must support a free and just political process but not a 

political group. We must seek balance in our compliments and in 

our criticism; we should condemn the terrorism of the left as 

strongly as the repression of the right. ^ If we fail to maintain 

that balance, we will fall victim to one "side or the other. And 

the cause of human rights will suffer! (U) 

— I have heard that you may visit El Salvador. As the President 

said, we have supported the Junta in its effort to implement 

fundamental reforms and to resist efforts by the right to restore 

an old tyranny and of the left to create a new one. We have tried 

to use our aid — both economic and non-lethal military aid — to 

encourage the Junta to curb human rights abuses. Bob Pastor is 

prepared to discuss the situation there at greater length if you 

so desire. (U) 

l 

1 

-msmm- 

Nn Ohipntinn Tn npnlassifinstinn in Full 2013/02/04 : Nl G-24-91-3-12-R


pos REVIEWED~29-Jutv20^0rbECLASSIFIED FOR~ RE LEASE IN FULL' 

41 ? 

un n u i n f | i 

copi 

PRIORITY 

STD666 

DE RUESBA #0892 0301955 

P 301936Z JAN 80 

7M 1MEMBASST BUENOS AIRIS 

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 

C- Q--N- f I D E N T X A- -MUENOS 1IRE8 0892 

NOBIS 

E.O. 12065( XDS-1 1/29/10 (CHAPLIN, MAXWELL) OR-M 

TAOS 2 PEPR AR U8 

SUBJECT* (U) FOREIGN MINISTRI OFFICIAL REVIEWS GOODPASTER MISSION 

"""""rmm~m, 


2. POLCOUNS (HALLMAN) TALKED WITH OFFICER ON TBS STAFF 

OT DEPUTY POREION MINISTER CAVANDOLI (BSAOGE) ON 

JANUARY 29 ABOUT RESULTS 07 GOODPASTIR VISIT. BOfH 

WIRE NOTETAKERS DURING COODPASTER-PASTOR-MARfINEZ DE BOZ 

CdNTSlSATIONS. 

3. B1AUGE WAS PLEASED THAT BniNOS AIRE* PRESS COVERAGE 

07 THE VISIT HAD BEER SYMPATHETIC — "NO PROBLEMS HERR 

7QR TIE GOVERNMENT, ;. HE. SAID. 

4. EE WAS LESS SANGtifYNl ABOUT BEHIND-THE-SCENES FALLOUT 

— NOT, BE SAID, BECAUSE ANYTHINO HAD CONE tfROHG, BUT 

BECAUSE El SENSES THAT EXPECTATIONS WERE BUILT WITH HIS 

BOSSES HE PEARS WILL NOT BE SATIS7IED. THESE DEAL WITH: 

A. THE DEPARTMENT'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT TO THE 

CONCUSS. THIS. BIAUGE SAUCES! SAID. IS SOtfETWINC" 

JABTPR AND CAVANDOLI BELIE HE TRE ADMINISTRA 

TION BETINITELT CAN CONTROL. THEY WILL IE____ 

ITTTl^^TfNgiyrr-Tir'wii 

"\jpve t 

HkfiLQI CONSTITUENCIES WITIIN OUR ADMINISTRA 

TION AND BUREAUCRACY SIMPLT FALLS ON DBA7 EARS, 

BEAUOE SAID. (BSAUCE LIVED SEVERAL TEARS IN 

WASHINGTON AND UNDERSTANDS THE WORKINGS 07 

OUR GOVERNMENT.) ANOTHER PROBLEM IS THAT WHAT 

THE U.S. BELIEVES IS SCRUPULOUSLY PAIR MAT BE 

INFURIATING HERE. 

t 

B,< ACTION BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS 

*************** *V8SR COmment #*.#*** * * * 

DEN ODOM 

TOBsPASTOR,THORN 

E.0.13526 

Authority ^~ ‘ ^ ~ 

NAHAJ6£:____Peto l\^\\Vl------------ 

PSN:055934 P*&* 01 TOR:030/22:l9Z DT&S301936Z JAN 80 

♦»»**»»C-0 NFIDENTIA !,»»»»*»»£ COPY 


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rx&BNTIi 

COPf 

COMMISSION. beauge SAID cayandolx had given too 

MUCH VEIN HE SAID THAT GOA COULD ACCEPT 

KEEPING ITEM 12 B UNDER REVIEW. ON 

RRTIIOTION, THAT COURSE WOULD KEEP OPEN 

THE “ARGENTINA CASH," AN INDIVIDUALIZATION GOA 

DQES NOT WANT. GOA WILL TAKE THE ’ 

POSITION THAT REJECTION IS THE ONLY PRACTICABLE 

GOURDE IN ORDER ROT TO MIX TIE MATTER WITH THE 

INVESTIGATION OP THE INTIR■•AMERICAN COMMISSION 

ON HUMAN RIGHTS “WHICH, APTO ALL, WILL CONTINUE 

UNTIL THE COMMISSION'S REPORT IS ACTED UPON AT 

THE NEXT OAS MINISTERS MINTING. GOA WANTS O.S.G. 

HELP IN THIS POSITION. WtlMLKALLMAN ASKED WHETHER 

THIS WAS AN OTPIGIAL CLAfclfXCATION OP 

CATANDOLl'S PRESENTATION BjfcAff8S~ SATO" THAT------------- 

TIS IT WAS. 

C. TIE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION'S REPORT. 

BEAUGE SAID Hi AND HIS BOSSES KNOW THAT ANT 

SUGGESTION THAT THE U.S.G.TRT TO SWAT PARER 

PROM HIS STERN VIEWS ON ARSENTINA IS A 

NON-STARTER. HE ADMITTED HOWEVER THAT A 

STRATEGY OP TRYING TO PBRSUID* 046 MEMBERS 

TO VOTE MODIPXCATIONS TO THE REPORT MAT 

EMERGE — ESPECIALLY COUNTRIES HAYING 

CITIZENS WIO PARTICIPATE IN TIE COMMISSION. 

ZKXCALL THAT PASTOR SAID, BEAUGE REMINDED, 

THAT IT SEEMS POINTLESS POR A GOVERNMENT TO. 

CHOOSE BAD RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA JUST t 

BECAUSE OP TIE VIEWS OP A CITIZEN OP THAT 

COUNTRY. MEANWHILE, BEAUGE SAID, THE 

“OPPlfclAL GROUP" NAMED TO WRITE ARGENTINA'S 

REPLY TO THE COMMISSION'S RRPOXT LABORS 

MANPUUY WITH LEGAL ARGUMENTSr" " ‘ ... 

5. ASKED HOW HE V ORES RES ARflNJBYN* WILL APPROACH 

UNDERTAKINGS ON GlflNS EIP OUTS'MADE DURING GQQDRASTER'S 

VISIT, BEAUGE AT PIRST POUND IT PUZZLING SOMEONE SHOULD 

BELIEVE TH1RE WILL BE A PRECISE SUM DETERMINED TOR 

ARGENTINA'S COARSE GRAINS SALES TO THE' SOVIET UNION. 

CONCEDING AT LAST TEAT MARTINEZ Dfc HOZ'S AGREEMENT 

TO PUT A LIMIT ON SALES TO SOVIET GRAIN TRADING 

COMPANIES INDICATES THAT AN AMOUNT ACTUALLY.BE 

PIXEL, BEAUGE WENT ON TO SAY EE DOUBTED THAWmaNY 

BEYOND THE ECONOMY MINISTER HIMSELP WOULD EVER 

LEARN WHAT WAS THE DETERMINED SUM. BEAUGE WAS, UNCERTAIN 

ABOUT MODALITIES OP ARGENTINA'S PRESENTING INFORMA 

TION ABOUT GRAINS EXPORTS:TO THE MONITORING GROUP, 

BUT SAID THIS WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT HIS MINISTRY. 

8^ ONE OTHER SUBJECT CAME:UP: ARGENTINA'S P4R*ICI- 

PSN:055934 PAGE 02 TOR:030/2a»15Z DTGt30l936Z JAN 80 

»»»«»»»r h.e-_n t t a £***#***£ C0Pt 



»»»»*♦».£ q N T I- D E V * I ■*-!,*»»»**»* copr 

PATION IN TFT OLYMPIC GAMES. ATTER ARCEMTINA rS 

STRENUOBS OTPPTS TO "DI-POUTICI"* THE TORTS CUP 

GAMES HELD HER* IN 1978 AND * HE WORLD CAMCYR 

ENCE HELD TU TOT, Low lug TEAR XT WOULD RE ET-’EMELY 

DITTICU1T TO BACK A«AT TR0M THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS. 

BEAUffE KNEW 01 NO CURRENT DISCUSSION OT "HE POSSI 

BILITY THAT REGENTINA BOYQOW THE GAMES, BUT ALSO 

SAID THAT A RECENT STATEMENT BY THE ARGENTINE 

OLYMPICS COMMITTEE PRESIDENT THAT ARGENTINA DEFINITELY 

WOULD PARTICIPATE HAD NOT )IEN CLEARED WITH HIGHEST 

GOA AUTHORITIES. 

CASTRO < 

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OP IMHID 

STU361 

DP RUESBA #0859/1 8301659 

0 301625Z JAN 80 

?M AMIMBASSI BUENOS AIRIS 

TO SECBTATX WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4044 

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 0T 3 (BUENOS A U 1^0 869 

NOBIS 

E.O. 12065: IDS-1 1/26/10 (CASTRO, RAUL H.) OR-M 

TAOS I PIPR AR 

SUBJECTI (C) DRAFT MEMORANDUM 01 CONVERSATION: GENERAL GOODPASTEH'S 

VISIT TO AROENTIHIT ftl'BlfU TgAUI/GHAl W 1UP1631 JANUART 2S---- 

1, (C - INTIHE TEXT.) 

2^ MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION 

' 

3. SUBJECTl GENERAL GOOBFASTIR'S VISIT TO ARGENTINAl 

LIMITING ARGENTINA'S GRAINS SHIPMENTS TO THE SOVIET UNION 

4. PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS: BRIGADIER (RET) CARLOS PASTOR, 


DR. JOSE ALFREDO MARTINEZ DE HOZ. MINISTER OF ECONOMY 

COMODORO CARLOS CAYANDOLI, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER 

MR. VICTOR BEAUGS, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAI1S (NWITAKER) 

GENERAL ANDREW J. &00DPASTER, PRESIDENTIAL EMlSSAtt 

RAUL H. CASTRO, U.8. AMBASSADOR IN ARGENTINA 

CLAUS V. RUSES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE (ARA/ECA) 

WILLIAM H. HALLMAN, t*B. EMBASSY BUENOS AIRIS (NOTXTAKXR) 

5. TIME AND PLACE: JANUARY 23 AND 24, I960! THE ' 

MINI8TRT OF FOREIGN-AFFAIRS, BUENOS AIRES 

/*• 

6. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY, GENERAL GOODFASTER 

MIT ON TWO CONSECUTIVE DAYS AT TEX MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 

AFFAIRS. THE MINISTER. OF ECONOMY LED ARGENTINA'S " 

PART OF DISCUSSIONS SEALING WITH SHIPMENTS OF GRAINS 

FROM ARGENTINA TO TIE SOVIET UNION AND OUB EFFORTS 

TO GST ARGENTINA TO SlMIT THJL&X -.SHIPMENTS, THE » 

MINISTER FOUND MANY-REASONS FOX ARGENTINA'S NOT 

ATTEMPTING LIMITATIONS, TEX. GREATEST BEING HID 

*************** *ygsi COMMENT * • '*. ************ 

DECLASSIFIED 

J HR 

E.0.13S26 

T.OB IDEAL,THORN, OKS ,1RMAR,KIM,BRIM,HUNT1 Authnrih/ MUL - 3 A- Q\ - 

NARA—Ss-Sc:__ Date "\\o>.\\V| 

PSN1065800 PAGE 01 

TOR:030/20:362 DT»:301525Z JAN 38 

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No Objection To Declassification in -ull 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91 -3-2-9 

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* No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91 -3-2-9 

* 

f I P-E-N-T-4-S- 

tW 

11. limitations or grains shipments are signjticant, 

EVEN If TH1 RISULTB 0? TH1BI AHE PRINCIPALLY TO PROCLAIM INTEN 

TIONS. OUR BEGINNING, WE ADMIT, WAS CLUMSY IN TSAT 

WE TAILED TO CONSULT FULLY, BUT NilTHEA SECRETARY 

TANGE NOR TIE NATIONAL SX&9*m GOBNOH'HlECTOS 

INTINES TO ABUSE TRlINDSm. WE LOOK TOWARD-TO 

EXTENSIVE, TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS WITS ARGENTINA 

REGAlDING SUPPLY, STORAGE.• SIXPMSNT AND-POSSIBLE 

DIVERSIONS 01 GRAINS, ........ 

12, GENERAL GOODPASTER WENT ON TO REMIND THAT TIE 

U.S. IAD NOT GALLED TOR A-BOYCOTT AND WOULD TDLTILL 

COMMITMENTS MADE BACK IN 1*T5 TO BEIP TIE USSR 

B'MILLION TONS OT GRAIN, ECONOMY MINISTER MllTINlZ 

DI SOZ ASCII TOR A LEGAL IXPLANATION OT COMMITMENT* 

AND HOW VI JUXTAPOSED TgX| WITH AUTHORIZATIONS 

ALSO T0H8SIN IN TIE 1075U9RfelMlNr. HR, 1USIR ------ 

KXPLAINXI TIAT STATI IIPAIPMINT LAWYERS HAD STUDIED 

TIE QUESTION AND MAD1 A MlTI NOTION BETWEEN VRAT 

WAS P10MISSS AND VIAT HAS HEN MADE CONDITIONAL ON 

TU1TI1I AGIIEMENT. 

BT 

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»*»**»*,C-Q N ? I D"B- N T I A 

COPT 

OP IMMED 

UTS 59? 

DE RURS1A #0869/2 0301720 

0 301525Z JAN 80 

PM AMXMBASSY BUENOS AIRES: 

TO SEOSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4045 

jc-V-n-t nni ri~L Motion z or 3 boinos aires 0869 

NOBIS 

13. PASfGl ASKED WHETHER it WAS NOT TSUI THAT THE 

SOVIET UNION HAS STOCKS PMEAPS XTEN AMOUNT I NO TO 

TWO 01 rvo AND ONE BALE TEARS OT CONSUMPTION, AND 

IP TXIS USEE TSUI 10V U,S4 LIMITATIONS COULD BE 

MADE lPfJCTIVR, SENX1AL CHI0B9ASTER REPLIED TEAT 

Vlltl SI USEE NOT CERTAIN[ABOUT THE QUANTITY OP 

SOVIET SEAXNS OAHTOVER W.ESTIMATE A SOVIET 

PRODUCT!ON-HOLDINS CAPAOItt QP TVO HUNDRED MILLION 

TONS, ASAINST A SOVIET VISE TO DISPOSE OP PORR 

IUNBEEB MILLION. AT VERT LEAST OUR ACTION PLU6 

LAST TEARS SHORT SOVIET PfeOBtCTION WOULD LEAD TO 

HEAVT PtSSSUlX AND DlAWD0tN,|? ANT IZISTINS STOCKS. 

14, LIMITATIONS ON EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION.v 

GENERAL 0OOBPASTER CONTINUED, WOULD RAVE EPPECT ON 

ACTIVITIES ON IKK MARGINS OP OXAINS TRADE1 PODSTlt 

AND PORK PRODUCTION WILL SAVE TO BE REDUCED. THR, 

CtSATES DOMESTIC PIOBLEMS MR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, 

DrsifSECTION, V , 

15, TORSION MINISTER PASMX.iSIED WS1TEER DKNIU'Of, 

CRAINS TO TEE SOVIET UNION AftRAYED PRESIDENT CiRfSfc'S 

PROMISE NOT TO USE POOD AS A *9APON, TO WHICH MR* HOTHR 

I1PLXEB TEAT BASIC SUM AN CONSUMPTION WILL NOT BE AfPSCTED. 

A TEN PBICENT CUT, fOH HAMPER. IN GRAINS WOULD* |ATHER, 

ATPICT SOVIET IPPOITS TO DIVEStSlPI CONSUMER P^gfRRNS. 

16, PASTOR WENT ON TO OBJECT^THAT BASICALLY XT HAS 

WEST11N WEAKNESS DEMONSTRATED IS THE PAST TBAT BAD 

ALLOWED INROADS INTO APGHANlSfAN — JUST AS IT 'HAD, 

HE ASSERTED, INTO CENTRAL AMERICA. WOULD IT NQ*?H1 

MORI 1PPHCTITE TO USE MILITARY. MEASURES TO COUNTER 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.Q. 13526 

Authority N -r ; 

wAPfl date ----------- 

PSN1055802 

I 

PAGE 01 

TOR J033/2AI38Z 

»*»»***C 0--N- m » H-JI I^LP* 

Dtf»30l525Z JAN 80 

ili 

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* • No Objection To Declassification in ûll 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91-3-2-9 

n t n l»»»*»*»e copi 

MILITARY THRUSTS? PASTOR ADDED THAT HI WAS SQUALL! 

DUBIOUS ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OP AN OLYMPICS BOYCOTT. 

17 * MARTINEZ DE HOZ TOOK TRI PLOOR TO DEVELOP THESE 

TH1MSS. El DISAPPROVES, IN PRINCIPLEv OP USING 

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN MILITARY-POLITICAL COWRONTATIONS 

B1CAUS1 THE ONLY REALLY CERTAIN 1PPSCT IS TOT DESTROY 

AN ECONOMIC ORDER. IP ANYTHING* EX SAID. LX£1C0N0MIC 

SANCTIONS BR USED AGAINST ECONOMIC CHALLENGE. 

IS. FURTHER, Til MINISTER DOUBTXD NX HAD TAKEN INTO 

ACCOUNT THAT ONLY THE U.S. AND ARGENTINA All SIGNIFICANT 

PHD GRAINS IXPOITXRS. HI YI1VXD AS HOLLOW THE WILLINGNESS 

OP AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND VIE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TQ ABIDE 

BY GIAINS EXPORT LIMITATIONS, SINCE THE EXPORTABLE 

SUIPL9I OP THOU AREAS VOILE IN ANY EVENT BE DESTINED 

?Q OTHER KINDS OP MARKETS. * 

19. PIEP1CTION Of A LIMITATIONS POLICI BILL BE D1PPICULT 

01 IHPOfBIBLE, T«I MINISTER SAID. HE PREDICTED THAT 

LEAKAGE just PIOM U.S. SUPPLIES COULD AMOUNT *0 TEREX 

01 POUl MILLION TONS. AND IP THIS WEES TRUE OPTHE 

U.S,. IT WOULD BE EtlN LIKELIEl IN THE CASE OP ARGENTINA 

AND OTHER EXPORTHlS. HI DOOMED TUT THE SOVIET UNION 

COULE IS IU1T TO THE POINT OP CHANGING ITS POLICY POR 

A P1V MILLION TONS OP GRAIN* 

El. HAITINil Dl HOZ VINT ON TO EXPLAIN THE WORKINGS OP 

THE AEGINTINE GXAINS T1A9X. THIS GOYERNMENT DELIBERATELY 

SOUGIT TO DISMANTLE THE GRAINS MONOPOLY INHERITED PROM 

SAIL! 11 OOVXIIIMSNTS. TIE POLICY IS FUNDAMENTAL, AND 

IT IAS LED TO T1B11 OONBE6DI1TE 1UMPX1 CROPS. SUPPORT 

PRICES All USED TO THE SMALLEST STENT POSSIBLE AND. 

GENERALLY SPEAKING. TRUE AXE NONE OUTSIDE IRE WHEAT 

TRADE. UNLIKE IN 80MX COUNTRIES (til MINISTER CITED 

CANADA) THE GIAINS BOARD JOES NOT BUY UP CROPS BUT 

MERELY RIOZSTIES INTENDED: SPORTS WITHOUT HOARD TO 

D1STINATION. EXPORTEBS BUt DIRECTLY PROM PRODUCERS. 

USUALLY ON F.0«B. (BUENOS1 USES 01 ROSARIO) TERMS. 

IT IS TIE LARGS INTERNATIONAL TRADING COMPANIES. THAT 

USUALLY PURCHASE ON C.I.P* TERMS-AND DOING THIS 

ACQUIRE RESPONSIBILITY POE PINAL D1STINATIONS. THE 

SOVIET GIAINS TXADING ENTITY BUYS IN ARGENTINA LIKE 

ANY BIG INTERNATIONAL DEALER. 

21 • A SUGGESTION TUT THIS PATTERN BE ALTERED IS 

VERT 81RI0US BUSINESS. SAD YOU ASKED US VI COULD 

HAVE EXPLAINED ALL THIS, MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAID. AT 

AN XARLIXR POINT PERHAPS VE COULD HAVE TAKEN INTO 

PSN(055802 PAGE 02 TORl03i/2G*3BZ Dfi*30l525Z JAN 80 

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I! N m X»»*****E COPT 

ACCOUNT THIS* PRACTICAL DIPTICULTIISf BUT AT «EIS 

POINT IT 19 DXJPimT TO kfiQff MEASURES tTIAT COST 

US X1TXSX0N Of Til 1ASXC PMHISES OP OUl SYSTEM. 

MARTINI* SI IOI VINT ON TOMCAT THAT NIV CIRCUMSTANCES 

SP1AKIN6 AGAINIT WIS TOREBSOSUHE KERB BIPHCULT TO 

IMAGINE — GIVEN lBPICIAUrllZS CERTAI NTT TEAT TIER I 

VIII 11 DIVERSION*, ANS TEA*1 WATEVER ARGENTINA MIGHT 

DO VX0U19 LITTXJ tfJlCf VEA$ PRIVATE TUB I IS DO IN 

IT AIT, SPAIN, OUMANT OR SEtfEERIAND. 

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PSN1055802 PA01 03 $P 03 TOE 1030/201382 DTGl301525Z JAN 80 

0 N f—1 H H T I COPT 


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h. No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91 -3-2-9 

357 

; Him I I COPT 

OP IMM1B 

STU467 

SI 1U1BJA #0069/3 0301735 

0 301525Z JAN 80 

PM AMXM1A00T 101 NOS AIRIS 

TO SIOIfAfl NASH SC XMM1DIATX 4048 * < 

I * 

COW y-HHMFM-i L SXCTION 3 0? 3 101 NO8 AIRIS 0869 

NOSX8 

22. Til MXNXSTII POXNTIB TO 0TIER PRACTICAL BXPPICULTIIS. 

KI Alinno TUT ON TRI SAT op six contirsamon there 

VAS A TIX1TT S01JJL1 3PIXA9 WTWIXN IM»ARG0»r AND Pill” 

0XAIIIS• THIS Oiuns 81YW£ TRADE AND MANA0ftM$|lT PR01IIMB, AND 

If ALSO CXIATII Til QOSITf$8 WKXTIIR liftINTINX FARMERS 

MIflIT NOT 1001 TIXS PIXOl.ABTANTAM — NOT TO AN 

XPP10TXTX P01101 OP UMXMXJONS XDT RATIXR TO PRIVATE 

TIASnS IN Otin C00NTI1M. 

23. MAITINIX »| KOZ COHWAlWB THAT COIRXNT MARXXT 

DXITOIfXON8 OliATXD XT U.I. POIXOT A1XIAST IAS COST 

AUmiNA MAlKIfl. 10LITIA, EX SAXB, HAS CANCELLED 

01AXN0 CONTRAQTI VITX ARGENTINA VSIN 0PPX1XB lAROOUT 

D.l. Oil I NS ON OONCXSSIOHiX, TIMS. THIS TOOK fUCX, 

SI SAID, APT1X AROINT INARAS C0MP1AIN1D TO TX* 9.8. 

DOIINO XILAT1IA1 CONSUlTAtXONS. CONTX1SATIONS PITH 

MilICO RAD STOPPED WIN USXICO FOUND XT COULD^RIT 

D.S. WHAT POf MDD1NLT Of1 ¥11 HAUXt. ARBINT&NA'B 

TRADITIONAL S0R6I9H HARM: WITH JAPAN SLUMflft : 

WIIN 9.8. lOliiiM PlICW.fRLL. 

4 * : 

24. OOOSnim BRPRNSRSt WX RAB NOT SAID THAT ORAINS 

LIMITATIONS WOULD PUll TH SOVIET 9NI0N OOT Op AP0K1N- 

ISTAN. 1UT 1PH0TZTX IlfSlCTION — RESTRICTIONS, 

THAT Z0, NOT OFFSET PlOMj&tllR SOW CIS — SIND A CLRAR 

8ZONAL OP BOIXBAIXTT TO #S BOTlRf 00T1RNMIIC. XT XS 

SOLIDARITY, Af Til All, I IS TRAINS TEX 80T«T UNION 

PROM U8XN0 FORCE f* OAXN f¥8 XNBf XN 1010PI. g{HF ILSI 

SHOULD SOIIIT ATflNTION COMMANBBBT VXTI RWARB TO 

IRUENTXNA'B LOST 8A1XS It WAS CIRAILT NOT TIlvIttlNTION 

OP Til 9.0. TO ABOPT A ljRftAR-T«9-FIX0HB0R POX.ISJT. 

Til MINISTER'S PRESENTATION AL1UDT MAXIS ItiWTlNl'S CONCERNS 

f 

PSN 1055807 

I 

DECLASSIFIED 

;E.0.13526 

AuthorityC "a 'A" 

nara_J&£—0810—— 

FACS 01 TOR1030/20J40Z BT0I301525Z JAN 80 

4I ' 

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V»* * No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91 -3-2-9 

MTI J 1 N T I i 

COPT 

A SERIOUS CONCERN TO TBS U.8. CL08S, CONTINUING CON 

SULTATIONS HOST FOLLOW. VIAT WE SISK BASICALLY IS- 

MEANS 07 MAINTAINING AlGlNTlNA'S SALKS AT HIBT01IC 

mm — ALR1ADY TBK ANNOUNCED POLICY 07 TH1 ARGENTINE 

GOTHNM1NT. 

25. HAITINIZ 91 10Z REPLIED TEAT Til5 POLICY IMPLIED 

NOT BIKING TO CKNGI Til HAltlT AND THAT T1I5 

INCLUBXD A R1BOLVTION NOT TO INTIITINI. HI Off Si ID 

HOVIT1X THAT INFORMAL MEANS, SKOlf 07 INTERVENTION 

MINIMS 700N9. A101NTINA COULD, TOR KIAMPU-iGO 

TO Til SOTIIT GRAIN TUBING 1NTITT AND ASt mi IT 

LIMIT mclAIlt tO *X-$UANTITY." THIS WOULD ROT. 

HOiriVIl, SOLTI TU 7101LW 07 VIST DLTIMAT1LT' R1P7XNS 

TO A1G1NTIN1 GRAIN BOLD 7.0.1. TO A LAlit ITALIAN 

71RM.. 

26. G1NI1AL GOOPAGT11 7101KD HAITINIZ DS IOZ'8 ' 

ADMISSION TUT SOMS 71 IT ATX VOID COULD 11 GUM #0 

Til SOTIST T1ADISG COMPANY. *OITlN THAT AROlNtlM 

B1LI1T1S TKS RUSTICAL 7101LIM8 07 D18TINATlOfe, CONTROL 

All 10 G11AT TfAT TOS All UNFUA7UD TO TIT, DO TOO 

IN TACT AGIST TO SOLD U.1.8.1. fUlCHASES TO 'XmOlIC 

litiliV 

i ‘ . 

27. HAITINK SI IOZ R17LX1B TUT THIS COOLD OOLY 11 

DCfNI IN 810S10T 1SCAU81. 11 SAID, 80 MUCH HAD 

GON1 AV1T ALISAS*I PUBLIC OPINION VAS 077INDSD 

AT TU U.8. D1L1S1XAT1LI HIBimiSf NTINC ABGSNTINX 

TIWB A10UT AN UXLI11 AGllUfSHT. til DAY'S 

"CLAIXN" N1V87A711 CONTAIN ID A SHILL STAZINMT IT 

AGlICULTUll UNSS1 81CK1TA1Y UtUWAY A100T MZASU11S 

AGAINST AIGMTXNA X7 Til COUNTRT 7AIL1D TO JOIN IN 

ON ITU S TATIS FUNS. HUNNBXLI. A1GXNTINA HAD CLOS1D 

01A IIS BOA ID 1SOIST1ATZON8 AS 07 JANUARY A NO THIN RIFT THE BOARS 

CLOSSD IN ANTtCIfATION 07 Til SOODFASTK VIS XT. IXTWSION 07 THE 

CLOSNtl WOULD DIST01T Til LOCAL »MA1X1T 7URT111. 

28. G1N11AL G00D7ASTS1 TU1N1D T1R CONTERSATION TO 

FOSStlXIZTm VITSIN Til 1XXSTING ABSENT INI STSflM 701 

ATOItZNG DX711S IONS, HAITI NIZ DE HOZ C WHICH* 

THAT TII C0NTX1SATI0N IIOULD NOT TURN ON DITOflNG 

COUNTlIXly 1UT 1AT1XH ON "DXmtlNG COMFiNlK" 

OPMATING IN SITUATIONS 07 GRUT FLUIDM*. A1G1NTIN1 

BILLS 07 LADING DO SKOV DESTINATIONS RUT, MlfilHEZ 

DI 101 SAID, NOT. FINAL OKI. THUS AN INOHMODS COMMIHC!' 

APP1A18 HEADED 701 10TTISDAM BUT ONLY 1ECA9SE THAT 

INTflMXDZATX POINT IS IUR0?1*S LARGEST ENTREPOT. 

I 

20. GENERAL GOOSFASTIR ASLED WHETHER ARGENTINA COULD 

PSN:055807 PAGE 02 T011030/iiHSZ DTGl301525Z JAN 83 

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- « ft No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91 -3-2-9 

I 

.■> * 

**»»*»*C o H T mi T I | 

COPT 

C0M1 TO 80MI MIlfMIKT WITH 0TIXP COUNTRlM HL01IDING 

DIYltlJONS OP AROINTINI OR A Jill. MA1TINM »R SOZ 

RlPlIID TIAT Til ONITID SIAWM COULD, AS III 

INlTIATIt*. TAXI Of Til HATTV1 VITI 0TH1R IjrtNTRIlS. 

Gill 8IQQLB ll fAKlN TIOU0R ROT TO TAKl ACtXpN VBIGH 

WOULD HURT Alimill TAtMIR*, AND ANT |QCI; CONSUL TA- 

TI0N8 II0UL9 Till PLAC1 VXflKN AOlllMIRfS REIS III MO 

JUST llTVllN ftl 9.8. AND TS081 OTII1 COUKTKXS. 

MRANVIILS, HAITIRIS DR KOI SAID, VI WILL 1$ OUlllLTlS 

PULL iniNIB OR TIT TO NARUHLAT1 HAMITS < 

31. (COHHINTt til COlTUlilitOR 1ND1D AT H1& TO IX 

TAtlN OF AOAXR ON TU mstVXNO DAT.) J 

CASTRO • 1 * 

IT 

t 

. \ 

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PSN1093807 PAM 03 OTIS TO!I030/101401- 1 Dfl1301525Z JAN 80 

> 

• ruin i copr 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-91 -3-2-9;.'

,1. . 

,,W WMJWUUWI l I w UUMIUUUIIIWUUWII C.WUWI I 11 W "T 

jowrippgiviw 

HUMAN RIGHTS: 

ARGENTINA 

Political terrorism of the left and tin- right hus 

wracked Argentina since the late sixties anil war 

partially responsible for the economic end politico] 

breakdown precipitating the March 197G coup. The 

Junta's efforts to eliminate leftist terroricra led to 

a i:.anive counter-terrorist campaign, undertaken hy * 

the security forces. 

Although the Government has publicly stated that 

terrorism has largely been defeated, the anti-tcirorist 

campaign of the last few years has continued and has 

resulted in severe violations of human rights. 

Recently, however, instructions hove been issued by the 

Minister of Interior to the palire, and reportedly to 

the military, to curb excesses in counter-terrori-it 

operations. 

At present, the Government of Argentina acknowledges 

approximately 3,400 state of siege prisoners 

detained under executive power (PEN). The state of 

siege powers, invoked in 1974, have been used to hold a 

wide variety of persons for long periods without 

formal charges.The USG reports an additional 500 prisoner: 

in military camps_. 

Arrests continue but have decreased considerably 

from the level o£ the past twoyears. Proa January to 

August 1978, 347 were added to PEN and 446 released. 


routinely during the interrogation procesB. 

In addition, thousands (estimates rongo between 

1,000 and 20,000) have been abducted by security forces. 

These cases, known as the disappeared, includp a broad 

range of people, such as labor loaders, workers, clergymen. 

human rights advocates, scientists, doctors*and 

political party leaders. A movement is growing,'led by 

human rights organizstions and the Mothers of the 

Disappeared, with .the support of some elemonts of the 

Church, to trace .tho missing people. The Government, 

however, has not accounted far the vast majority of 

the disappeared, many of whom hire presumed to be dead* 

At present, disappearances and summary executions ere •• 

reported to continue on a reduced scale of 16-45 permonth. 

w w 

/ 

COWPTDL'NTIAT. 

State Dept, review completed 

NLC Review 

Completed. 

'OSD review complete 

Authority 

NAHA__ 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 q 

23 -^1 -3'1— 

psto__ n Wu*— 


inu lyujcuuui i i vj i~/ci>iaaaiiii>auuM iuuui i i/u*t . i'iLO-tu-u- i-o-a 

-COJiriDCWTTAtr 2 

The GOA in late 1977 reinstituted a limited "right of 

option" for political prit-.oiiurt:, held uinlr-r uxi-cul i vc 

detention, to request exile. However, from January to August, 

only 5fi. were allowed to leave under this program. 

The GOA for the first time in February 197B published 

lists of those detained under the state of siege. 

Once again permission has been granted for the ICRC tot 

visit non-military prisons. 

Responsive action has been token on a few case.? in 

which the U. s. has expressed special interest. Newspaper 

editor and Jewish leader Jacobo Timerman was transferred from 

PEN detention to house arrest, Alfredo Bravof Co-chairman ot 

the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, was paroled, 

Guillermo Vogler was released to the l). S. under tho right 

of option, and four of the five Deutsch family members were 

released. Also plnced on parole was Terex Esquivel, leader 

of Pa2 y Justicia and Nobel Peace Prize nominee. 

f+*‘ W 

Official harassment of selected religious groups 

continues. The Jehovah's witnesses have borne much of the 

brunt. Reports of anti-semitic incidents targeted at members 

of the Jewish community and Jewish prisoners have decroasod. 

Severe restrictions remain on civil and political 

freedoms, among these trade union rights, fair judicial processes, 

and the activities of political parties. Press freedom 

continues to be curtailed although some restrictions were 

recently lifted. There appears to be little concerted or 

effective effort to date to check fundamental abuses or 

revitalize the legal and institutional barriers that would 

prevent human rights violations in the future. 

Me had hoped that the Argentine Government would have 

been able to accept a visit by the OAS Inter-American 

Commission on Human Rights (ZAIIRC). However, the conditioned 

invitation issued by the GOA was not acceptable to the 

Commission. Negotiations are continuing. 

ACTION TAKEN ON HUMAN RIGHTS 

— On October 27, 1977, the U, S. voted no on a gas pipeline 

loan in the IDB. -We followed this up with "no" v.otes onv« 

cellulose plant on December 1 and a petrochemical complex on 

December 8. On November 3 we did, however, support fin IDB 

loan for potable water on the grounds that it meats basic 

human needs. 

anrrTpgNTTriTr 


r

INU UUJtSUUUII I U Ut!Ud&blllL,eIllUII iUUO/ I l/U*+ . INLV^-Ô-tJ- l-O-a ^ 

tEOHl'lPUUTXKE t 3 

— Early in 1978, we abstained on an industrial credit and 

a grain storage loan,, both in the World Rank. We abstained 

rather than vote no to signal to the Argentine Government 

that we had noted limited improvements in r.omc ,-iri.-..E, and to 

encourage further positive developments. We followed this 

by an extension of a $60 million agricultural credit loan in 

April and abstained on three IFC lonnc. 

— C::imbanh is currently holding biioV on ovor TCOO million 

in transactions for Argentina because- of human rights 

considerations. 

-- Argentina rejected FMS credits for FY 47B. The 

Administration declined to sign the FY ’77 FMS agreement and 

is not requesting FMS credits for Argentina for FY '79. A11 

arms transfers (FMS sales and commercial sales of items on 

the munitions list) ore being reviewed on a casc-by-casc 

basis; only very few selected new items with no apparent 

relationship to human rights have been approved. 

— On various occasions, we have discussed our human rights 

concerns with the GOA at the highest levels, including trips 

by two Assistant Secretaries, an Under Secretary ond the 

Secretary of State. When Under Secretary Newsom visited 

Argentina in late May, he made clear to the Argentines that 

we want better relations with that country, but that thafe 

would have to be improvements in the human rights arey. He 

specifically asked for movement on: an invitationto the IAHRC; 

establishment of a mechanism to inform the families of disappeared 

persons of their whereabouts; and trial, release or 

exile for the 3,400 PEN prisoners held without charge. 

-- The Department has submitted over 1,000 names of 

individuals who are either detained orhave disappeared to the 

Argentine Government and have requested that they furnish 

inforraationDn these individuals. 

INU UUJBU.IUII I U UBUdbblllOdUUII ZUUO/ I l/UH . IXLO-Ô-O- |-0-» 

■ain.nr.1 

MEMORANDUM ON TORTURE AND DISAPPEARANCES IK 

&R6SWtINA 

The Government of Argentina acknowledges approximately 

3, *00 state of siege prisoners detained under executive 

power (PEN). Arrests and disappearances currently con-' 

tinue although not on the massive scale of the past 

two years. * 

In May 1978, the US Embassy reported that "physical 

torture continues to be used regularly during the 

interrogation of suspected terrorists and so-called 

'criminal subversives' who do not fully cooperate." It 

reports that if there has been a net reduction in reports 

of torture, this is not because torture has been foresworn 

but "derives from fewer operations" because the 

number of terrorists and subversives has diminished. 

Torture used to intimidate and extract information 

is described by the Embassy to include "electric shock, 

the submarine (prolonged submersion under water), sodium 

pentothal, severe beatings, including 'El Telefono' in 

which a simultaneous blow is delivered to both ears with 

cupped hands.” A 197B Amnesty International report 

in addition describes "cigarette burns...sexual abuse,rape 

...removing teeth, fingernails, and eyes...burning with 

boiling water, oil and acid: and even castration." 

The Embassy reports firsthand accounts of physical 

torture at La Perla Interrogation Center, outside 

Cordoba, in September 1977. It further reports reliable 

information about a case in late December 1977, and in 

the past few weeks credible information about another 

case. Most incidents reported to the Embassy took place 

in 1976 and 1977. 

One well-known case of physical abuse was Jac^bo 

Timerman. Another well-publicised case by Amnesty International 

was that of Elizabeth Kasemann, a 29 year old 

West German citizen who died three months after her 

arrest by security forces in May 1977. Amnesty and our 

Embassy have numerous documented examples. 

The International Committee of the Red Crass reports 

"guard brutality" in the jails, hnd "beatings and assaults" 

during "transfers from jail to jail." The Embassy reports 

that "clandestine seizure, hostile interrogation, and 

summary adjudication remain basic operating procedures 

for Argentine security forces." These procedures are 

BECRET 

t 


V 

i\o uDjection i o ueciassmcauon ûuo/ i i/u

. I>10 UDJecuon i o ueciassmcauon ûuo/1 um imlu-ô-o- i-j m 

abchef 

' ---- t 

Internationally, human rights organizations are 

also supporting this campaign. Amnesty international,for 

example, on Hay 18 launched a major drive against political 

imprisonments, torture, disappearances and executions in 


Both the internal and external pressure building seek 

to generate an impact on the GOA to render a public accounting. 

I 

BBonpr 

f 


|\|U LJUIBL.UUI I IU UBL.ldaaillL.OUUI I Z.UUU/ I 1/ II . IN LU“ / I-U- IU-U 

*** y# 

itori 

#5^3 

TH E S ECR ETARY 0 F STATE 

WASHINGTON 

March 22, 1979 

J 

7 


FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 

Cyrus Vance c .>/< 

I 

f 

Taiwan Legislation. A bill reflecting the 

Conference Committee’s decisions is being put in final 

form and will be reported early next-week. The end 

product is an amalgam of provisions from the House and 

Senate versions. In some instances the Conference 

Committee made helpful additions or changes; in other 

instances it included less desirable provisions, but 

nothing in the Committee's action is contrary to the 

concepts underlying normalization. There is no impairment 

of the central purpose of enabling us to maintain 

a satisfactory entity for conducting unofficial relations 

with the people on Taiwan. Indeed, new language 

was added in Conference recognizing that "governmental" 

relations between the United States and Taiwan have 

been terminated. Thus it appears this legislation 

will reach you in satisfactory shape. 

Claims/AsBets Agreement. The Chinese have not yet 

responded to our offer to sign the claims/assets agreement 

which was initialed by Secretary Blumenthal March 2 

in Beijing. The ostensible reason is procedural — the 

need for State Council approval of the agreement before 

it can be signed. The possibility exists that they 

intend to defer signing until after the Administration 

has acted on the Taiwan legislation. 

Security in Wake of Peace Treaty Signing. Violent 

reactions against Americans in the wake of the Peace 

Treaty signing are possible, particularly in some Arab 

countries. We have alerted our missions abroad that 

the signing will probably take place March 26. We have 

instructed some of them to consult with host governments 

about increased protection and report to us on measures 

taken and their assessment of the threat. 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13S26 

RDS-2/3, 


completed 

I 



I

I\u uujbv

no uojeciion i o ueciassmcation zuuo/11/1 1 . in lawi-a- iu-r» 

r 

-3- 

PMS for Panama was cut from $5 million to $2.5 million. 

This cut was initiated by Republicans as a slap at the 

Canal treaties, but they were supported by new Democratic 

members of the Committee who were.' lodging human rights 

protests. 

r 

Middle East Consultations. Dick Stone told us today 

that the U.S. proposed draft Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 

was excellent, and that we should accept no further 

tightening of the language which would require approval 

by the Senate as a treaty. Javits agreed that the 

agreement as drafted was generally acceptable and would 

not require Senate approval. Hamilton felt that the 

whole concept of the MOA was hard to swallow. Although 

he accepted the need for some security assistance to 

Israel, he felt that the paragraphs dealing with U.S. 

policy should be omitted. 

Stone and Javits seemed prepared to accept a 

$1.5 billion FMS program for Egypt. Both felt that 

they could, under certain circumstances, accept an 

P-4 sale to Egypt. Stone said he would find the 

whole package acceptable, unless there were some 

particularly threatening type of hardware included. 

Mexico, While awaiting a formal response from 

the Mexican'government on our proposal for reorganizing 

the Consultative Mechanism, we are moving ahead 

to establish the new working groups and to set up 

meetings with the Mexicans in April. The energy 

group will meet following preliminary meetings on 

natural gas and electricity exchanges in Mexico 

City the first week in April. On trade, we are 

pressing the Mexicans to conclude negotiations 

with us before we conclude our MTN tariff negotiations 

in Geneva April 6. For the other six working 

groups, we are proposing or already have agreed 

with the Mexicans on April meeting dates. 

Israeli Settlements. With the U.S. abstaining, 

the UN Security Council today passed the Jordanian 

Resolution establishing a three-nation Commission 

"to examine the situation concerning the establishment 

of settlements in the occupied territories." 

The vote was 12-0 with three abBtentibns (U.S., 

UK, Norway). We abstained on the (Resolution after 

it was moderated at our Insistence. A tacit 


ino uojecuon i o ueciassmcauon zuuo/1 1/1 1 . inll.-/-* i-o- iu-o 

-4- 

-SECRET 

call for sanctions against Israel was deleted and 

the Commission's mandate was narrowed considerably 

from the original Arab proposal. Israel announced 

that the Commission would not be allowed to enter 

the occupied territories. 

Castro. Yesterday we received the following 

message from Fidel Castro, through one of his 

aides: Cuba is not now interested in official 

conversations and needB a gesture from the U.S. 

before the dialogue can usefully be resumed. While 

Cuba foresees no immediate hope for progress in our 

relations, it does not want any backsliding either, 

and will do nothing to provoke hostile relations 

with us. Cuba remains interested in pursuing links 

with the Cuban-American community, keeping up contacts 

with the U.S. on the prisoner release programs, holding 

talks with the U.S. Coast Guard later this spring, 

and continuing its cooperation with the FBI on 

security matters affecting the Pan-American Games 

that will be held in Puerto Rico. 

t 

-SECRET- 

No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/11 :*NLC-7-2^1-5-10-5

^ Y .No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/17 : NLC-24-35-7-9-0 

?44 *******g -0 N ? I D I f! P I A 1,*******^:= COPY 

r * 

CP I MM. ED 

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DOS REVIEW E D~1

.No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/17 : NLC-24-35-7-9-0 

*******Sc-e-ffr 

I~T~ T~I A j,#******# COPT 

OvFARTME NT WOULDN'T ACCEFT VERACITY OF ARTICLES'"lN TOTO”, 


lw CLEAR TC VIOLA AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS ARE INDEPENDENT 

AND ATTRI3UTION SHOULD NOT EE TO EMBASSY OR DEPARTMENT. 

•'T ACKNOWLEDGED TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF NEWS MEDIA AND 

STATED NO LINKAGE OR ATTRIBUTION SHOULD BE MADE TO USG. 

Viola's concern was that due tc importance of n£w tori 

TIMES AND WASHINGTON POST, DEPARTMENT MIGHT CATE IN 

Assume an arbitrary and capricious posture towards goa. 

I ALLAYED VIOLA'S FEARS BY TELLING HIM DEPARTMENT AND 

T1SG TOOK AN OBJECTIVE AND JUDICIOUS VIEW ON ARGENTINA. 

I REMINDED VIOLA THE STRAIN IN RELATIONS IS DUE TO HUMAN 


EMPHASIZED "BALL NOW IN THEIR COURT-ND IMPROVED 

RELATIONS WERE CONTIGENT ON MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS. 

HE ACCEPTED THIS AS A FACT. 

5. IAHRC VISIT: VIOLA REMINDED ME IAHRC WOULD BE VISIT 

ING ARGENTINA jTT7\Rl|lTMfr 

«■ H*1 STATED THIS 

DATE WAS CHOSEN BY IAHRC AND NOT BY GOA, WHO HAVE 


STATED PRISON CONDITIONS HAVE IMPROVED TREMENDOUSLY 

AND RELEASES WILL OCCUR IN LARGE NUMBERS. HE SAID ALL 


VIRTUALLY NO DISAPPEARANCES, NO TCRTURI AND NO IRREGULAR 

AHRFSTS. I REMINDED HIM OF SIX DISAPPEARED STUDENTS 

AS OF A FEW WEEKS AGO. HE AGREED THIS WAS A SLACK 

MARK IN THEIR RECORD, BUT DESPITE ALL INVESTIGATORY 

EFFORTS NO INFORMATION EXISTED ON THIS BIZARRE OPERATION. 

t 

*. DESAPARECIDOS: VIOLA STATED IN 1978 THERE WAS AN 

.AVERAGE OF ABOUT FIFTY "DESAPARECIDOS”. AT THIS POINT 

FE LOCKED AT HE WITH DIABOLICAL GRIN — FROM EAR TO EAR 

— JOINING HIS GRZY MUSTACHE WITH HIS SIDEBURSNS, AS IF 

THOUGH HE BAD ONE ON ME AND SAID: -I TAî YOUR FIGURES 


YEAR. IT'S ONLY SEVENTEEN DISAPPEARED IN SIX MONTHS." 

I INTERRUPTED HIM STATING OUR FIGURES INDICATED TWENTY- 

TWO DISAPPEARANCES. HF SAID EVEN SO, YOU MUST ADMIT 

THERE IS A MAJOR IMPROVEMENT." I ACKNOWLEGBD THE 


FPOM USG UNTIL THE FIGURE WAS ZERO. HIS REPLY WAS 

THAT THEY WERE GETTING THERE AND WAS CONFIDENT BY 

TIME IAHRC ARRIVED GOA WOULD REACH THE ZFRO STATUS. 

VIOLA MADE IT CLEAR TO ME THE DESPARECIDOS" WOULD NOT 

RFTURN. I INQUIRED ABOUT HIS STATEMENT. HF RaFEATED 



RE FLY WAS TEAT GOA LACKED INFORMATION ON THE DISAPPEARED 

t>SN: 004421 

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i-p-E K T I A-L»******E COPT 

MT IN VIJV OF THE EXTENDED PERIODS OF DISAPPEARANCE 

HF. DOUBTED ANY OF THESE PEOPLE WERE ALIVE. HE SAID THERE 

WIGHT PE A FEW CASES SURFACING - THOSE UNQCCCUNTED 

FOR IN PRISON DUE TO ERROR — BUT THIS £ WERE RARE EXCEPTIONS. 

VIOLA STATED GOA WOULD PROBABLY HAVE SOME STATEMENT! ON 

DISAPPEARED WHEN IAHRC ARRIVED. HE SAIL IT WOULD'BE A 

STATEMENT WITHOUT SPECIFICS, BUT. HOPEFULLY WOULD BE 

PALATABLF TO SOCIETY. 

RIGHT OF OPTION: I TOLD VIOLA THE RIGHT 0? OPTION 

PROGRAM RAD BEEN A FIASCO UP TO NOW. HE WAS REMINDED 

£OA — THROUGH ITS APPROPRIATE AGENCIES — EAD NOT GIVEN 

EMBASSY REASONABLE COOPERATION, BUT TO CONTRARY HAD 

RAISED ALL KINDS OF BARRIERS. AMAZINGLY ENOUGH, HE AGREED 

WITH MY STATEMENT, BUT RETORTED RIGHT OF OPTION CASES 

WOULD 0E MOVING FAST FROM NOW ON. HE SAID THESE CASES 

VERF HIGH ON THE AGENDA. 

ET 

f 

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. No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/01/17 : NLC-24-35-7-9-0 

249 ******££__£—jg F I D" V" N'T4 I A l#******E COPY 

CP IMMED 

UTS434 

I.T RUESBA ^5172/2 1772115 

C 262017Z JUN 79 

"M AMEMRASSY ^'JFNCS AIRES 

TO SHOSTAT' VASFJDC IMMEDIATE 1252 

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 0? 2 BUENOS AIAES 5172 

= . TIMERMAN CAS*: RECENTLY "CONVICCION", NA'U ORIENTED 

NEWSPAPER, AND THE 3UEN0S AIRES HERALD, ENGLISH-AMERICAN 

NEWSPAPER, FRONT-PAGED THURMAN'S IMMINENT RELEASE.I 

TOLD VIOLA USG HOPED THESE PREDICTIONS 'VE3E ACCURATE. 

HE DENIED ANY TRUTV TO THE REPORTS. HE SilD TIMERMAN 

WAS NO CLOSER NOW THAN HE WAS SIX MONTHS AGO TO BEING 

RELEASED. VIOLA AGAIN EXCULPATED HIMSELE I-Y STATING 

IF IT WERE LEFT UP TO HIM TIMERMAN WOULD HAVE BEEN 

RELEASED A LONG TIME AGO. IN A JESTING FASHION,‘I SUGGESTED 

*0 VIOLA TEAT AS ARMY COMMANDER AND PRESIDENT OF THE 

JUNTA BE WAS IN A UNIQUE POSITION OF AUTHORITY TO LEAD 

THE WAY. El SMILED AND REPLIED HIS O'jSIACLES WERE 

W*LL KNOWN TO ME. IT WAS TEEN I INQUIRED IF IT WOULD BB 

PROPER TO DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASE *iI IH GENERAL SUAREZ 

MASON, CPITF OE STAFF AND TIMERMAN'S NEMESIS. I 

rXFECTED A MINOR EXPLOSION CN THIS SUGGESTION FOR A5 

LONG AS I HAYE DEALT WITH VIOLA Hi HAS NEVER ADMITTED 

SUAREZ MASON TO BE ONI OF HIS PROBLEMS. MUCH TO THE 

CONTRARY, VIOLA LOWERED HIS VOICE AND TOLD ME HE STRONGLY 

RECOMMENDED I DISCUSS THE TIMERMAN CASS ITH SUAREZ MASON. 

I TCLD VICLA TEAT RECENTLY SUAREZ MASON HAD INVITED 

PIMSFII TO MY RESIDENCE FOR AN "ASADO" - "GAUCHO 


BARBECUE I DISCUSS THE TIM.EF.MAN CASE. VIOLA INDICATED 

'TEN THOUGH TIMERMAN'S RELEASE IS NOT IMMINENT, THERE 

IS STIIL SOME HOPE. 

9. SARAGOVI CASE: I REMINDED VIOLA OE RENEWED AND 

CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST ON TKi PORACIO SARAGOVI 

CASE. HE APPEARED NOT TO BE FAMILIAR WITH THE CASE. 

I TOLD HIM THE CASE WAS DI-iECTLY IN BIS LAP AS IT WAS A 

MILITARY TRIBUNAL CASE. THE CASE WAS UP ?0R REVIEW BY 

7IM. HE TOOK NOTES AND PROMISED TO LOOT INTO THE. MATTER. 


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N T I A L#*#****E COP* 

FLAYED AGAINST A TEAM, COMPRISED OP OUTSTANDING PLAYERS 

FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD. ARGENTINA LOST 2 TO 1 WITH A 

FUIL STADIUM OF OVER 75,002 PEOPLE. I ATTENDED THE GAME. 

I WAS PREPARED TO SIT WITH THE REST OP THE "COMMON HERD" 

PUT AS I VJLYFD INTO TEE STADIUM AN UNKNOWN GENTLEMAN 

SPOTTED ME AND TOLD ME I WAS TO SIT IN THE "PALCO DP 

ÔNOR" (VIP BOX ^ . I TOLD THIS PERSON MI TICKETS WERE NOT 

TRY VIP AND I WAS PERFECTLY CONTENT TO SIT AT MY 

DESIGNATED PLACi. THIS GENTELMAN WAS ^CITE STERN IN TELLING 

ME I BELONGED IN THE PRESIDENT'S EOX. I WAS THE ONLY 

AMBASSADOR IN THAT SPECIFIC AREA. THERE WFP.F SEVERAL 

AMBASSADORS IN ATTENDANCE, BUT I WAS T330NLY ONE PERMITTED 

TO SIT NEAR TEE PRESIDENT AND THE JUNTA. I THOUGHT THIS 

VAS AN UNUSUAL TWIST CONSIDERING SOMEWHAT STRAINED 

RELATIONS DUE TO NEGATIVE NEWSPAPER STORIES FROM USA. 

I 

11. COMMENT: THROUGHOUT THE MEETING VIOLA '!EP TELLING 

«E HIS PURPOSE IN WANTING TO SEE ME WAS TO DISCUSS 


ONLY AN EXCUSE TO DISCUSS MULTIPLE OTH*? MATTERS. HE 

SAID GOA WAS FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH USG ON NICARAGUAN 


NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO LA COUNTRIES. HIS REASONING 

WAS MOST OF LA COUNTRIES HAVE INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND EACH 

COUNTRY IEARED A PRECEDENT WOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN SENDING 

MILITARY UNITS TO SETTLE BASIC DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. 

VIOLA SAID THE NICARAGUAN PROBLEM WAS NOV? 2FYOND DIALOGUE 

AND NECESSITATED CURTAILING THE INFILTRATION OP MATERIAL 

AND TRCOPS THROUGH PANAMA AND COSTA RICA. VIOLA 


PEACF FORCE, BUT THE ARGENTINE PUBLIC -iOULU NEVER BUY IT. 

IT APPEARED TO ME HE WAS GRCPING OR HOMING FOR ME'TO GIVE 

PIM SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR SENDING A PEACE FORCE TO 

NICARAGUA, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ARGENTIfA. 

\2.. ADMIRAL MASSERA: STRANGELY ENOUGH AS I WAS LEAVING 

VIOLA' OFPICE I RAN INTO ADMIRAL MASSERA, .vRO -’AS 


MASSERA WAS COMPLETELY SURPRISED TO SEE ME AS I WAS TO 

SEE HIM. THE ONLY ONE NOT SURPRISED WAS VIOLA AND I FELT 

HE HAD PLANNED IT THAT MASSERA AND I WOULD MEET. IT 

APPEARED VIOLA WANTED MASSERA TO SNOW I HAD WITH HIM. 

IT'S JUST THE CASE OP TEE OID ARGENTINE INTRIGUE" JUST 

AS SUAREZ MASON WANTED VIOLA TO PNO.v T t AT I WAS HAVING 

PK "ASADO" WITH HIM. 

CASTRC 

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. »•.. »■ . •« »« , . . j ■ .• • ik. « 

Nn nhiprtinn Tn nanlassifiratinn in Full 7013/01/17 : Nl C-74-35-7-9-0

ui 81 •„ aUENOS Biiit 

ACT 'OH ARA-14 

ino uojection i o ueciassmcauon in i-uii iz/ \ti i i : imlu-d-'i-djurvjjui 

mienl uj oiaie~ TELEGRAM 

01 OF 03 21ZZZ6Z 0703 ‘l BUENOS Hill 01 OF S3 7127ZGZ 

INFO 'OCT-Bl ■so-aa ha-sj TRSE-OI CIAE-OB OCDE-IO PH-RS 

H-ll m>-ll l-01 KSAE-BB NSC-IS PA-01 SP-IZ 

SS-lb ICA-U AID-00 /07I V 

A Z12110Z JUl 71 

FIT AHEPBASSY BUENOS AIRES 

10 SECSTA1E VASKDC 66ZS 


AMEHBASSY HOHTEVIDEO 

AliEnSASSY SANT IASO 

USCINCSO QUARRY NTS 

.................................... 021372 220027Z /SO 

■* i R f i a e Armt~section i of 3 buends aires osos 

E.O. lltOZ: EDS 

TAOS: SNUB, AR 

SUBJECT: NUHAN RIGHTS ROUNDUP 


PART I - NEV EVENTS AND INDICATORS 

(TNE FOUOUINC IS ROT A COMPLETE REPORT OF All NEV 

EVENTS SINCE OUR LAST REPORT OF JUNE IS, 1S7I. A FOLIOV-UP 

SEPTEl Will RE SUBMITTED NEXT WEEK.) 

DECISION REPORTED IMMINENT ON PERSONS HELD UNDER 

INSTITUTIONAL ACT. 

SENIOR MILITARY CONTACTS CONTINUE TO REPORT THAT A 

GOVERNMENTAL DECISION SHOULD RE ANNOUNCED 

BEFORE AUGUST I REGARDING THE IS PLUS PERSONS PRESENTLY 

BEING HELD UNDER THE ACTA INSTITUCIONAL. THE JUNTA 

EVIDENTLY IS UNDOUBTEDLY UNEASY ABOUT 

THE ACTA WHICH INTER ALIA DETAINS INDEFINITELY A NUMBER 

OF SENIOR PERONIST LEADERS WITHOUT SPECIFIC CHARGES OR 

TRIAL. ACCORDING TO MILITARY SOURCES, THE JUNTA NAB 

DECIDED IN PRIIICIPIE THAT BEFORE AUGUST 1 ALL PERSONS 

BEING NELO UNDER THE ACTA SHOULD RECEIVE SPECIFIC 

SENTENCES AS ACTS OF ‘REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE' OR BE TURNED 

OVER TO THE JUDICIAL SYSTEH FOR CRIMINAL PRDSECTUION OR 

SET FREE. ONE NAVY CONTACT IN EARLY JULY ADMITTED THAT 

THE DECISION-HARING PROCESS IN EACH CASE WAS PROVING TO 

BE VERT DIFFICULT, BUT HE WAS OPTIMIST THE DETERMINATIONS 

WOULD BE MADE AND APPROVED BY THE JUNTA. 

NAVE REPORTED TO THE EMBASSY THAT IN HTD-JUNE A FEMALE 

PSYCHC.UGIST WAS ABDUCTED BY SECURITY FORCES AND HELD FOR 

IS HOURS. DURING HER DETENTION, THE PSYCHOLOGIST, A 

POLIO VICTIM CONFINED TO A WHEEL CHAIR, WAS REPORTEDLY 

INTERROGATED WITH ELECTRIC PICANA REGARDING TNE WHEREABOUTS 

AND ACTIVITIES OF ONE OF HER PATIENTS. 

LOCAL LAWYER WHO ACCEPTS HUNAN RIGHTS CASES REPORTED 

TO EMBASSY ON JULY IS THAT THE MOTHER OF ONE OF HIS CLIENTS, 

DANIEL ALBERTO EGEA, WHO HAS BEEN UNDER EXECUTIVE DETENTION 

SINCE EARLY 1976, WAS ADDUCTED FOR FIVE DAYS IN EARLY JULY 

BY HEK CLAIM.NG TO BE FROM TNE SECURITY FORCES. ^ MRS. EGEA 

WAS BEATEN AND THREATENED DURING HER INTERROGATION WHICH 

FOCUSED ON HER SON'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AHD FORMER 

FRIENDS. DURING THE LAST .TWO DAYS OF /HER CAPTIVITY 

SHE SAIL SHE WAS TREATED KINDLY AND RELEASED WITH APOLOGIES, 

BUT VITr AN ACCOMPANYING THREAT TO REMAIN OUIET. IVE ARE 

CHECKING FURTHER AS TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REPORTED 

INTERROGATION OF ALLEGED ‘POLITICAL ACTIVITIES'.) 

NEW DRUG REPORTED INTRODUCED 

A HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCE CONTACT IN THE MEDICAL 

PROFESSION WHOSE REPORTING HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST 

INFORMED THE EMBASSY IN LATE JUNE THAT TERRORISTS AND 

SUBVERSIVES SELECTED FOR ELIMINATION WERE NOV BEINO 

ADMINISTERED INJECTIONS OF 'KETAlAR*, WHICH SOURCE 

DESCRIBED AS A POWERFUL ANESTHETIC, INSTEAD OF CURACE. 

ACCORDING TO SOURCE, KETALAR IS ADMINISTERED IN AN INTRA 

MUSCULAR INJECTION TO THE PRISONER AS A PREVENTIVE HEALTH 

MEASURE, THE SUBJECT RAPIDLY LOSES CONSCIOUSNESS AND 

VITAL FUNCTIONS CEASE. SOURCE ALLEGES THAT SUBJECTS ARE 

THEN DISPOSED OF IN RIVERS OR THE OCEAN. 

jjQS REVIEWED 15-AUB-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 

MISTREATMENT OF PRISONERS BEPORTED 

A NUMBER OF THE EMBASSY'S HUMAN RIGHTS CONTACTS HAVE 

REPORTED THAT RECENTLY CATHOLIC PAROLED PEACE ACTIVIST 

ADOLFO MARIA PEREZ EDQUIVEl WAS SEVERELY BEATEN BY PRISON 

GUARDS IN LA PLATA PRISON SEVERAL WEEKS PRIOR TD HIS 

RELEASE. A NUMBER OF HIS RIBS WERE BROKEN. SAME SOURCES 

REPORT THAT ANOTHER PERMANENT ASSEMBLY LEADER (SEPARATE 

ME (ICON) WAS SEVERELY TORTURED DURING HIS INITIAL INTER 

ROGATION. (WARNING: XGDS-4. LEAKAGE OF THESE REPORTS 

IN WASHINGTON HAT PUT THESE HEN IN GRAVE DANGER.) 

EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED REPORTS IN THE LAST SEVERAL 

HOKTHS THAT SOME PJNPRISONERSJRI OR TO THEIR RELEASE 

FROM LA PLATA PR ISO)/ VJivC'hEe'n BRUTALLY BEATEN BY 

PRISON GUARDS. BED CROSS AUTHORITIES (PROTECT) NAVE 

EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN TO EMBASSY REGARDING THE 

PHYSICAL ABUSE OF PRISONERS IN LA PLATA PRISON. 

I 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O. 13526 , 

Authority N ^ ~ 

NARA_£kJE___ Dato------— 

MATERIAL WITNESSES REPORTED TORTUEO 

PERMANENT ASSFHRLY AND HUNCIATURA SOURCES (PROTECT) . I •

No uojection i o ueciassmcanon in i-uii zu\a \ \ 

^JISfZJJU.1 L/flC/EC. %JJ UCU« 

ixLO-o-^f-tj-1/:-1. 

i uuluiimil 

PAGE I) * BUENOS BSBSB 11 OF 13 2122S4Z 3717 

ACT;BN ARA-14 

INFO OCT-11 ISO-II HA-13 TRSE-OI C1AE-IB 00DE-I1 PH-15 

H-ll INR-ll L-13 NSAE-BB NSC-BS PA-11 SP-ll 

SS-1S ICA-11 AID-13 /(7I W 

R 1121142 JUL 71 

FM AltEnBASST BUENOS BINES 


INFO AHEMBASIY ASUNCION 

AncpiASsr noNTiviDEO 

AMENIASSY SANTIAGO 


—............................... B? 194B 27BB1IZ /B4 

IONPIQ-ENYIAL SECTION 2 OF 3 BUENOS AIRES 3631 

II - JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES PROILEflS CONTINUE 

JEHOVAH'S VITNESSES' LEADER INFOBHEO EMBASSY ON 

JUNE 21.THAT GOVERNMENT ACTION HAS RESULTED IN THE VIRTUAL 

EXPULSION OF EVERY JEHOVAH'S UITHESSES CHILD FROM THE 

ARGENTINE SCHOOL SYSTEM. THE WITNESSES ABEIIEVE THAT MORE 

THAN A THOUSAND CHILDREN HAVE RECENTLY BEEN EXPELLED. 

ACCORDING TO THE WITNESSES' SHORESMAN, MANY SCHOOL SYSTEMS 

USED THE WITNESSES REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELABORATE 

JUNE 21 FLAG DAY EXERCISES AS THE PRETEXT FOR THE EXPULSIONS. 

TO THE VITNESSES PARTICIPATION IN FLAG PAY 

CEREMONIES IS A FORM OF DELIRIOUS WORSHIP AND IS FORBIDDEN. 

THE ARGENTINE VITNESSES HAVE SUBMITTED A DETAILED 

ARTICLE ON THE REPRESSION OF THE LOCAL CHURCH FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER JEHOVAH'S VITNESSES MAGAZINE, 

AVAXE. THE ARTICLE IS EXPECTED TO BE PRINTED IN ALL THE 

WORLD'S MAJOR LANGUAGES. ACCORDING TO THE WITNESSES' 

SPOXESNAN, THE ARGENTINE LEADERSHIP PLANS TO DISTRIBUTE 

COPIES OF THE ARTICLE TO ALL SENIOR EXECUTIVE ANO JUDICIAL 

OFFICIALS IN ARGENTINA, AS WELL AS TO EACH ARGENTINE 

AMBASSADOR ABROAD. 

THE VITNESSES' SPOKESMAN COMMENTED THRT THE MINISTRY 

OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AMD VORXSHIP HAS STILL NOT ISSUED THE 

FORMS FOR THE REGISTRATION OF RELIGIONS IN ARGENTINA UNDER 

LAV 21,743. HE ADDED TNAT THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF 

THE VITNESSES REGISTRATION BEING APPROVED, GIVEN THE 

CURRENT DECREE BANNING THE WITNESSES FROM PUBLICLY PRACTICING 

THEIR FAITH. HE NOTED THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT 

IS NOV HEFERRING TO THE JEHOVAH'S VITNESSES AS AN 

‘.ORGANIZATION WITH RELIGIOUS COLORATIONS' (TINTE RELIGIOSA1. 

ON JUNE B, THE LOCAL PRESS REPORTED TNAT THE PROVINCE 

OF SANTIAGO DEL ESTERO KAO ISSUED A DECREE PROHIBITING 

ANY TYPE OF ACTIVITY BY THE WITNESSES. THE DECREE ORDERS 

THE SEIZURE OF ALL WITNESSES MATERIALS AND THE CLOSING OF 

All WITNESSES' FACILITIES WHERE 'PUBLIC OR PRIVATE* 

MEETINGS ARE HELD. 

RED CROSS ACTIVITIES: 

TORTURE REPORT 

• 

SIX RED CROSS SWISS NATIONAL DELEGATES ANO TWO SWISS 

DOCTORS ARE CONTINUING TO VISIT ARGENTINE NON-CRIMINAL 

PRISONERS THROUGHOUT ARGENTINA. THE RED CROSS PLANS TO 

VISIT ALL THE MAJOR PENAL FACILITIES IN ARGENTINA THREE 

TIMES DURIHG 1171 AND THE SMALLER INSTITUTIONS TWICE. 

ICRC SOURCE (PROTECT) STATED THAT AT PRESENT SIERRA CHICR 

WHICH HOLDS S3D PEN PRISONERS AND TINY LA RIOJA PRISON 

APPEAR TO RE THE COUNTRY'S WORST. IN GENERAL, THROUGHOUT 

ARGENTINA PEN PRISONERS ARE UNDERFED, HAVE LITTLE OR HO 

MEDICAL ATTENTION ANO NO HEAT IN THE WINTER. 

BUENOS BSISS B2 OF B1 112234Z 

INTERVIEWED ALMOST EVERY PEN PRISONER IN ARGENTINA. 

HE NOTED THAT ABOUT IB PERCENT HAD BEEN TORTUREO. SOME 

HAD MERELY BEEN BEATEN UP BUT THE LANGE MAJORITY HAD 

BEEN SUBJECTED TO ELECTRIC SKOCA OR THE SUBMARINE. THE 

ICRC REP WAS NOT*.OPTIMISTIC THAT THE RED CROSS WOULD BE 

ABLE TO INFLUENCE ANT CHANGE IN THE WIDESPREAD PRACTICE 

OF TORTUS? IN ARGENTINA. THE REP STATED THAT NO GOVERNMENT 

IN THE WORLD ADMITS TNAT TORTURE TAXES PLACE AND A GOVERNMENT 

CANNOT CONNECT A PROBLEM WHICH IT DOES NOT RECOGNIZE. 

THE DELEGATE RECOGNIZED THAT PHYSICAL MISTREATMENT DF 

PEN PRISONERS IS INFREOUENT AFTER THEY HAVE PASSED 

THROUGH THE INTERROGATION PHASE, I.E., AFTER THEY HAVE 

PASSED OFFICIALLY TO THE PEN. HOWEVER, VARIOUS FORMS 

OF PSYCXOl OGICAL TORTURE PERSIST IN THE PRISONS. 

ESTIMATED PRISON POPULATION AS OF JULY 1, 1S7S: 

PRISON PENA DAHt 

LA PLATA PRISON HSR 2B TO SB (MULTISOUBCED) 

DEVOTO PRISON 

75B 

SIERRA CHICA 5SB UNCONFIRMED REPORT OF OVER IBB 

COROHDA 

43B 

RESISTENCIA 33D IN (ICRC) 

RAWSON 23S B (ICRC) 

CORDOBA 13R SB PLUS/HINUS II CRM 

CASEROS MUNICIPAL 

4B ■ 

MENDOZA 22 

HICRC ESTIMATES (PROTECT) 

B UNRECOGNIZED PRISONERS HELD AT THE 

DISPOSITION OF 4)11 ITARY AUTHORITIES. 

(ACCORDING TO SECURITY FORCES THERE HAY RE UP TO 3BB 

AROUND t£e COUNTRY AT ANY GIVEN POINT IN TIME.) 

VILLA DEVDTO FIRE UPDATE 

ICRC SOURCE (PROTECT) INFORMED EMBASSY RECENTLY 

THAT FOUR PRISONERS HELD UNDER PER WERE INVOLVED IH THE 

MARCH 14, 1B7S VILLA DEVOTO RIOT AND FIRE. 

ACCORDING TO SOURCE, ALL FOUR WERE BEING HELD ON DRUG 

CHARGES BUT SIMULTANEOUSLY UNDER PEN AS WELL, AS THEY HAD 

FALSE ARGENTINE PASSPORTS WHEN ARRESTED, WHICH PUT THEM UNDER 

SUSPICION OF BEING POSSIBLE SUBVERSIVES AS WELL. THREE 

OF THE DKUG TRAFFICKERS DIED IN THE FIRE. THE BAOLY BURNT 

SURVIVOR TOLD THE ICRC THAT HE AND THE OTHER PEN PRISONERS 

HAD HO CONNECTION WITH SUBVERSION RUT WERE DRUG ADDICTS 

AND TRAFFICKERS UNO HAD OBTAINED FALSE PASSPORTS TO USE 

IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES. 

WITH .REFERENCE TO A HAY 4, 1S7I LETTER TO THE 

SECRETARY IN WHICH COHA DIRECTOR LAURENCE R. BIRNS ARGUES 

AGAINST EXPORT LICENSES FOR TNI SALE OF THREE TROOP* 

CARRYING BOEING,CK-47 HELICOPTERS ALLEGING THAT 

'HELICOPTERS SIMILAR TO THE ONES BEING SUPPLIED' WERE USED 

IN PUTTING DOWN THE VILLA DEVOTO PRISON RIOT AND CRUSHING 

LABOR STRIKES, WE NOTE THE FOUOVIRC BASED ON DISCREET 

INQUIRIES OF SECURITY SOURCES: 

f 

THE RED CROSS DELEGATE STATED THAT ICRC REPS HAD 

—CMflHIittSt

no UDjecrion i o ueciassincauon iri run i^/ \a \ i . inlu-o-h-o- \c- i 

PACE II ' BUENOS n»| U or 13 212315Z 1771 

aci fox ara-m 

INFO QCT-BI ISO-II HA-15 THSE-II CIAE-II DDDE-GG PH-NS 

R-ll IHR-1H L-13 NSAE-BB HSC-li PA-91 SP-12 

19-15 1CA-11 AID-15 /HIS W 

.. ...... nun »iim /e« 

I 11211(1 JUl 71 

in amemeassy buenos aires 

TO SECS1ATE VASHDC 9531 

INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 

AMEMBASSY HOHTEVIDEO 

AIUMASSY SANTIAGO 

USCINCSD OUAIRY HTS 

C 0 H F I- B C N T I A rSECTIMC 3 OF } BUENOS AIRES 5GS5 

WE HAVE NO INFORMATION THAT WOULD SUPPORT THE ASSERTION 

THAT US MIL MARY TYPE HELICOPTERS WERE USED IN HANDLING 

THE RIOT SITUATION AT VILLA DEVOTO. ADDITIONALLY, WE HAVE 

WHAT WE BELIEVE TO IE RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT IT WAS HOT A 

PRISON UPRISING AS SUCH. THERE WERE NO POLITICAL DETAINEES 

IN THE CELL BLOCK CONCERNED [WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF 

THE SO-CALLED 'SUBVERSIVE ANGL E * TO THE DRUG TRAFFICKERS 

MENTIONED IN THE PARAGRAPH ABOVE,) AND ALMOST ALL —IF NOT 

ALL-OF THE DEATHS RESULTED FROM SMOKE AND NEAT CAUSED 

BY THE FIRE THE INMATES HAD STARTED. ADDITIONALLY, 

THE SECURITY FORCES STATED THEY DO NOT USE HELICOPTERS TO RUSH . 

STRIKES OR TARE OVEH STRIKE-SOUND FACTORES BECAUSE IT IS 

JUST ROT OPERATIONALLY SOUND AND WOULD BE WASTEFUL OF 

RESOURCES. (WE BELIEVE THAT SMALLER HELICOPTERS WERE USED 

FOR SPOTTING POSSIBLE SABOTAGE ATTEMPTS ALONG THE RAILROAD 

LINES DURING THE RAIL STRIKE LAST NOVEMER, HOWEVER. 

SEVERAL BOMBS WERE SET OFF ON THE TRACKS DURING THE STRIKE.) 

THE FEDERAL JUDGE IN CHARGE OF THE VILLA DEVOTO 

INQUIRY HAS WITHDRAWN FROM THE INVESTIGATION FOR 

J UR I SO I CAT I OHAL REASONS. IKE CASE IS NOW 8EING TURNED 

OVER TO CRIMINAL COURT JUDGE WHO WAS CHOSEN BY LOT FROM 

THE CRIMINAL BENCH. 

DETENTION FACILITIES REPORTEO CLOSED 

A LA PLATA HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCE INFORMED THE EMBASSY 

IN EARLY JULY THAT THE ARANA DETENTION FACILITY OUTSIDE 

OF LA PLATA NAS BEEN ABANDONED AND ITS PRISONERS 

TRANSFERRED. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED SEVERAL SIMILAR 

REPORTS REGARDING TNE NAVY MECHANICAL SCHOOL IN BUENOS 

AIRES. TNE NAVY MECHANCIAL SCHOOL'S DETENTION FACILITY 

VAS DESCRIBED IR GREAT DETAIL IN THE SO-CALLED "HAGGIO 

LETTER' WHICH WAS CIRCULATED TO FOREIGN NEWS AGENCIES 

AND FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS. THE 

EMBASSY NAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM THE DEACTIVATION 

REPORTS OF EITHER OF THESE WELL-KNOWN DETENTION FACILITIES. 

RELEASE OF DETAINED UNION LEADERS STILL PENDING 

A MEMBER OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE WORKING gROUP ON 

HUMAN RIGHTS IFOWO) INFORMED EHBDFF IN-EARLY JULY THAT 

THE RELEASE OF 14 UNION LEADERS ANNOUNCED JUNE IS BY THE 

PERONIST-LEANING BISHOP OF LA PLATA WAS STILL UNDER 

ACTIVE CONSIDERATION IN THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. THE 

FOWG OFFICIAL SAID THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO ANNOUNCE 

THE NAMES DF THE LABOR LEADERS UNDER CONSIDERATION, BUT 

NOTED THAT HE VAS PERSONALLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THEIR RELEASE 

WOULD BE ANkOLHCED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. 

THE TI MERMAN CASE 

ACCORDING TO TIMERMAN'S FAMILY, THE GOVERNMENT 

ATTORNEY FOR TNE COUNCIL ON PATRIMONIAL RESPONSIBILITY 

W ueparimem oj siaw ituuitHitf 

BUENOS BS6SS B! OF S3 2121111 

(COHREPAl PRIVATELY INFORMED TIMESHAN'S LAWYER ON 

JUNE It THAT TNE COHAEPA INVESTIGATION HAD TURNED UP 

HOTHINS HEGATIVE AGAINST TI MERMAN, ACCORDING TO THE 

FAMILY, THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY CONFIDED THAT 'THIS CASE 

IS SOMETH IHG POLITICAL.* THE SAME SOURCE TOLD THE FXH11Y 

THAT CONHEPA HAS PROVIDED A CONFIDENTIAL RESUME OF THE 

TIHERIUN CASE TO THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL VIOLA 

IN LATE JUNE. 

TI MERMAN AND HIS FAMILY ARE CAUTIOUSLY HOPEFUL THAT THE 

REPEATED PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY ADMIRAL HASSERA THAT THE 

STATUS OF PERSONS BEING HELD UNDER THE ACTA INSTITUCIOHAL 

WILL BE RESOLVED BY THIS GOVERNMENT SEFORE AUGUST FIRST WILL 

RESULT IH TIMEr'MAN'S BEING ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY FOR 

ISRREL. f 

REQUESTS BY TIMERMAN'S ATTORNEY THAT HE RE PERMITTED 

TO SEE HIS CLIENT AND THAT HIS CLIENT ALSO BE PERMITTED 

VISITS BY HIS DOCTOR AND DENTIST HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY 

REPLY FROM THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF OR THE MINISTRY OF 

INTERIOR. ITIMERMAH IS NOT AMONG THOSE HELD UNDER 

THE INSTITUTIONAL ACT WHOSE PROPERTY IS EXPAOOPRIATED 

IN A RECENT COHREPA DECISION, ACCORDING TO JULY 21 PRESS 

ACCOUNTS. WE ARE CHECKING FURTHER, BUT THIS TENDS TO 

CONFIRM THE INFORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY 

REPORTED ABOVE. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS ACCOUNTS, 

CONREPA EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES BELONGING TO EX-CGJ 

HEAD CASILDO HERRERAS, EX-SOCIAL WELFARE MINISTER 

JOSE LOPEZ SEGA, EX-DEFENSE MINISTER ADOLFO MARIO SAVINO, 

JORGE ROTEHBERG (AH ASSOCIATE OF TIHERHAN AND DAVID 

BRAIVER IN THE LA OPINION ENTERPRISE) AND GRAVIER'S 

MOTHER) )1. 

CASTRD 

JLMH At-- 

V

• ,'inu wujeouuii iu ucoiaaomoauun m i un tuio/uû*t . i'iLo-tt-u/-‘t-o-u 



S/S 

TO: 

E>OS REVIEWED 07-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL) 

The Secretary —" 

FROM: 


t 


I. Objectives 








President Videla offers the best hope on the nuclear 







In this context, our objectives fare to: 





— obtain Videla's agreement to ratify Tlatelolco, 



issue; 

. — encourage Videla to follow through on his promise 



due process, and (b) ending "disappearances" and torturey/^ 

DECLASSIFIED . SjjlP 

E.0.13526 

GDS 

Authority. Kll£.'-34-Lh-^r°|-S___ I 

■mm. C-P- Drto ---- 


mnu wujcuuuii i u L-;cuiaoomoaiiui i in i usi c-\j ioiuuvs^t . nn-o-^-n-u/ -‘i-cj-u 

oalaa; 

“-2=' 









II. Setting 




significant achievements. At the time ofv the military 








the economy. 

Organized terrorist movements are acre largely under 










including personal vendettas, political Radicalisms 

of all kinds, and even cynical maneu\*erings to weaken 


be designed to embarrass videla himself. 










■flECRET—- ’ 


• /inu vjujeuuui i iu ucuaoomv/auui! m i un tuN/ut/u*T . I'lLu-tn-urro-u 

~-=3=~ 




serious distortions in relative price's have been corrected 


On the negative Bide, the government has not been able 









including more than $700 million from the DS. Interestingly, 







have led to considerable new interest* and some new 



















* 

The Junta has not committed itsejf.f to restoring 




SECRET 


( 

- inu WUJBL.UUH iu utjudaamocuiuii mi i un duuiut.tun . HLo-£>t-oc*t-o-o 

oatAfii 

—r?rt 

powerful labor unions are largely under tbe control 


Argentina's international■actiyity has been 
















Argentines are fully aware of our nuqjlear preoccupations 









nationalist sentiments in- Argentina, already resentful 


The Argentine Navy has increased its patrolB in 


more inclined toward negotiation. The Wavy 




relations. 

( 

Ill. Key Issues 

1. Human Rights # 

* 

U. S. Objective; To convince the Argentines that 




SACHET- 


• iîu wujeoituii tu Ljcwaaomucuiui i iti i un twiu/uc/vn , ini‘-r-cf-u 

niarmnw 

AflCnU i"* 

-S- 

Argentine Objective; To convince the US that the 

human rights'violations which have taken place, were 









have limited arms sales and voted against Argentine 1FI 



which triggered•them. 


civilians have been killed by leftist! terrorists. The 









the disappeared are often ignored by tne government. 















prisoners. 





—TifinEltn 

UliCAu 1 "• 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8.

•imu uujcouuii iu Lveoiassmocuiuii 111 i ljii e.\J u/uuut . ini_o-£*+-u/-H-a-o 

SECRET- 

-6-~ 



in the Deutsch family. (These cases ate covered in 




has just given us an unverified1 list containing the 








— President Carter was heartened by President Vldela's 




decided. 


the "right of option." We hope that &ts provisions will 










instances. 








brutal, but torture of prisoners is nAt acceptable 



SECRET 


. * INU WUJtSUllUI I IU UtiUldbiJlIIOcUIUII III TIJII 4UIJ/U/UU*t . INI_Vj-£*+-Uf "H-O-O 

-=7T— 

2. 

Terror ism 

P. S. Objective: To remind the Argentines that we, too, 



Argentine Objective: To focus U. S. thinking on 




I 














in May. 

i 



three businessmen were killed, 'and the office of the Labor 



» 

Points to be Made * 









i 

• t 

■ U. S. Objectives; To have Argentina ratify the Treaty 



explosions. 

•HeRET—- 


t

■inu uujecuun iu ueuassmcauuii m run ûio/u^/uh . inlu-^m-o^-h-s-o 

Argentine Objectives: To complete its nuclear fuel cycle 




Essential Factors; Argentina is now proceeding apace 




which is by far Latin America’s leading nuclear state, 


and international Btatus. It was the first to have 





accept fullscope safeguards and foregfe nuclear explosions, 





of nuclear weapons in our own hemisphere. The .President 


both Argentina and Brazil which is outlined in the background 




» 


— The United StateB is determined to do all it can to 


weapons. 




— It is not our policy to dissi/ade Argentina or any 


if Bteps can be taken to ensure the safe uses of such 




involve your deferral of reprocessing plans while an urqent 


manner. 

-fifieRET 


i

■ iNu uujeuuun iu ueuassmuauun m run ûig/u^/uh . inlv^-£h-o/-^-s-o 

—g— 















4. 0. S.-Argentine.Military Relations 

D. S. Objectives: To assure the Argentines that we 



performance. 

• 

Argentine Objective: To inform us that it values 

its military ties 'to the 0. s., but that without a 

clarification of U.S. armB policies, particularly on 



Essential Factors; 0. S.-Argentine military relations 

have deteriorated sharply'as a result of U. S. actions taken 

to disassociate the U. S. from the GOA's human rights 









I 




dropped out of UNITAS fleet exercises* this year. Until 





- SECRET- — 


•no UDjecnon i o ueciassincauon in run i j/u&\jh : i\Lo-^»-of-£f-w-o 

-IIP" 


— The United States values its gnilitary relations 















5. .Argentina and the International Financial 

Institutions ... 

U.S. Objectives: To explain togthe Argentines that 




Argentine Objective: To persuade the-U.S. to vote 

"yes" or abstain on Argentine loan requests in the IFIs. 

Essential Factors; Tn June we abstained instead of 

voting Hnort on one loan and told the Argentines that 









.voted "yes" on a potable Water loan in the IDB that 









-Sfl€ftET-------- 

* 


-no UDjection i o ueciassmcanon in i-uii 

SECRET 


-INO UUjfcJUUUri IU UeCIUSSIIICdllUM IM Mill £UIO/U£/UH . INLV^-^H-D/ 

-ia- 


has strongly criticized bur "basic human needs strategy" 

as a no growth ploy designed to divide the LDCs. 

Points to be Madei 


moderate position Argentina has taken aa many economic 


to use these fora to speaik opt constructively on issues 

of importance to the world community âs a whole. 




to North/South issues. 


the Argentines in the HTN* negotiations, and would 







obviously essential to meet basic human meeds 



I 

U. S, Objective: To be receptive tp Argentine requests 


* 



Essential Factors; A U.S-Argentine Mixed Economic 

Commission was established in 1966, but aa moribund. The 







e.g., Deputy Assistant Secretary, to avoad the appearance 

of too close a relationship to Argentina st this time. 

t 

-SECRET 

* * 


'no UDjection 10 ueciassmcanon in i-un û'u/uz/iw: 

OCIK.ACIX 

~=T5= 













PointB to be Hade: 







— The Treasury Department appreciates the cooperation 





. U. S. Objective: To consider Argentine proposals 















—SfieRET 


i

i\u uujecuun iu utJUidbbiiiudLiui1111 run cu i jiu^/uh . ini_v-»-£H"U/-*+-a-o 

-14- 


0. S. Objectives; To encourage greater technology 

development m LDCs, but to restrain discrimination 

N against U. S. suppliers of technology. To insure that 

IFI and USAID money is used to finance the best technolog; 

available, regardless of origin. 

Argentine Objective! To foster greater utilisation of 


agreements. 

Essential Factors; A United Nations Conference on 







— We will attend the Buenps AireB Conference with 

the goal of cooperating with LDC's ‘to enhance use of technology 




We would not favor a Conference attempt to justify 




U. S. Objective: To urge negotiations aimed at 


while staying out of the middle of’this Argentine- 

U. K. question. it 

Argentine Objective; To solicit U. S. support for the 

return of the U. Kl held Malvinas Islands to Argentina. 








P P 

«BOtnuj. 


*INU vjujecuun iu ueuabbiiiuauuii in run £uio/u£/u*+ . inlv^-^h-u/-h-s-o 

-15- 

unwilllngnesa to be ruled by Argentina and the possibility 


He have consistently urged both parties to seek 




in early November that an "incident" waB possible 



to Argentina. The British have aBked that we urge 


approach. 


I 






— Argentina should show restraint: any "incident" would 


i 

■StrCHET 


I

MEMORANDUM 

ino UDjecuori iu ueuassmuatiuii in run ûio/um . inlo-^h-» i-£+-o-/ 




FROM: 

SUBJECT: 


LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (Pastor. 


Caribbean. Met with Caribbean Country Director to go over 

policy papers on Jamaica, Grenada, and Guyana. I encouraged 

him to be much more precise in identifying what it is that 

concerns us in each of these countries that our actions 

can be effectively targeted. Met with Owen and others to 

discuss aid to the area. (C) * 

Cuba.’ -1 encouraged State to work on a message to our posts 

IrTthe Caribbean, explaining why our October 1st actions are 

responses to Soviet/Cuban actions rather than as efforts by 

the U.S. to bring the Cold War to the Caribbean. Andy Young 

criticized our Caribbean policy for viewing it as a "Cold 

War playground." He said we "would like to see them (Jamaicans) 

lay down and be good colored folks and accept the crumbs from 

the Master's table. That will never work in the Caribbean, and 

no amount of military maneuvers that you put on down there is 

going to intimidate anybody and make them love us any more." • (C) 

The Cuban UN Mission has asked for U.S. views regarding an 

invitation by the University of Puerto Rico to Cuban Vice Foreign 

Minister Alarcon to participate in a debate and seminar on Puerto - 

Rico's status. The Cubans said they do not want the visit to be 

a further irritant in our relationship. If the U.S. views his 

trip unfavorably, that "certainly would be taken into consideration 

in deciding whether to apply for a visa. I think we should let 

this happen: the Puerto Rican statehooders would destroy Alarcon. ( 

l 

UN Security Council Seat. After eleVen ballots4, Cuba has slowly 

enlarged its majority. The last vote is 80-65. A blocking third 

remains, but don't know how much longer. USUN may try to ask the 

Colombians to withdraw in favorthe Peruvians, who might do 

better as a NAM member.,(C) 

\. 

Human Rights. Spoke to Ed Sanders and recommended that the Preside: 

not meet with Timmerman since that would be rubbing the nose of the 

moderate Argentines in the dirt. They risked a coup to release 

Timmerman; the least we can do is not draw anymore attention to the 

issue. Also worked on Letelier. (C) 

Press Contacts. None (U) 

~~5CWPjLQENTIAL 

Review 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O.13526 

Authority 

WflRa g-fr n«tn 11 .till._____ 

Kiuc.

I NVJ UUJCbLIUI 

vj LÛVsICIOOII IUCUIUI I III t UII C.W I U/UC.I W“T . 1 St_W t-~T %J I “T %J I 

MEMORANDUM' 

-CONFIDENTIAL 


WASHINGTON 

490 


INFORMATION 


FROM 

SUBJECT: 

THE PRESIDENT 


Letter from President Videla (U) 

Attached at Tab A is the translation of a letter from Argentine 

President Videla dated January 18, responding to your January 11 

letter on Afghanistan. President Videla joins in condemnation of 

the invasion of Afghanistan, but complains of "measures adopted 

unilaterally and without consultation." Because a Presidential 

Emissary has since visited Argentina, I believe that no reply is 

necessary. (C) 

DECLASSIFIED 

-CONFIPENTISC 


Mn Hhiortinn Tn flpnlpticifiratinp in i ill 9013/03/(14 ■ Nl r*.-94-Q1 -4-3-7

i\o uojecuon i u ueuiassmuaiiun in run io/u^/uh . iNLo-^H-a 

MEMORANDUM 

coNTiDBurnar 


WASHINGTON 

INFORMATION 


FROM 

SUBJECT: 

THE PRESIDENT 


Letters from Videla and Ziaur Rahman (U) 

Attached are advance copieB of two letter s that we have 

received from Heads of State, Videla of Argentina and Ziaur 

Rahman of Bangladesh. (U) 

The letter from Videla is pro format and probably does not 

warrant any reply at this time. (U) 

The letter from Zia is more interesting. It seeks to deflect 

our unhappiness with Bangladesh1 b performance on Iran by 

pointing to the much more helpful role that they have been 

playing regarding Afghanistan. Zia, incidentally, is hopeful 

of paying a call on you sometime this year. We haven't 

encouraged him. (C) 

-COUFTBEN T 1AL~" ~ 


DECLASSIFIED 

E.O. J3S2B . 

Nn nhinrtinn Tn npHaccifiratinn in Full 9ni3/n9/fM • Nil H-94-Q1-4-S-7

INU uujecuun l u uuudbbiiiodiiun in run tu u/ui/u-+ . iNi_o-£*t-» 

234 »»»»»**fi_Q_4t_ji j D-g-N-fHE-t L#******E COPY iHP 

nP IMMED 

STUR07 

5jJuwjdi 

T_l£99i0 APR 

H’^TAMEM] 

1060946 

.CCA 


0...0 K74-U N-T-Y— XCl>A cT)210B 

EXDIS 

F.O. 12065: RDS-1 4/15/90 (SCHNEIDER, DAVID T.) OR-M 

TAGS: PIPR, PINS, BG, IR, US 

SUBJECT* LETTER TO. 

RAHMAN ON 


RESIDENT CARTER EROM PRESIDENT ZIAUR 

m cHms1 -------------- — 

2. BDG FOREIGN SECRETARY KIBRIA ON APRIL 15 HANDED AMBASSADOR 

A LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM PRESIDENT ZIAUR RAHMAN. 

KIBRIA ASKED AMBASSADOR TO SEND LETTER TO WASHINGTON AND NOTED . 

TEAT LETTER WOULD ALSO BE HANDED OVER BY BDG EMBASSY IN 

WASHINGTON. 

3. TEXT OF LETTER IS AS FOLLOWS* 

14 APRIL 1980 

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, 

AS WE CELEBRATE OUR NEW YEAR'S DAY OUR FRIENDS ABROAD 

ARE NATURALLY IN OUR THOUGHTS. ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE-OF 

BANGLADESH AND ON MY OWN BEHALF IT GIVES ME GREAT PLEASURE - 

TO SEND YOU OUR WARM GREETINGS ON THIS HAPP OCCASION AND 

WISH THE FRIENDLY PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

CONTINUED PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY. 

IT IS, INDEED, A MATTER OF SATISFACTION TO US THAT 

OUR TWO COUNTRIES AR BOUND BY CLOSE TIES OF FRIENDSHIP - 

BASED ON MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, SHARED DEMOCRATICE AND HUMAN 

VALUES AND SIMILARITY OF VIEWS ON MANY OF THE INTERNATIONAL 

ISSUES. WE SINCERELY HOPE THAT THESE TIES WILL GROW STILL- 

STRONGER DURING THE YEAR AHEAD. 

MR. PRESIDENT, AS TOUR, OF COURSE, KNOW, WE IN BANGLADESH 

ATTACH GREAT IMPORTA CE TO PEACE AND STABILITY BEGAUSE PEACE 

AND STABILITY ARE A PRE-REQUISITE FOR PROGREEE IN ACHIEVING 

OUR OBJECTIVES OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND RAISING 

THT QUALITY OF LIFE OF OUR PEOPLE. WE, THEREFORE, VIEW WITH 

*' ************** *VHSR COMMENT ,* * * ************ 

ZB AA DENED VP 

EOB:BLOOM,DEAL,THORN,SULL,KIM,HUNT,SICK 

PSN1046382 PAGE 01 TOR:106/14:06Z DTG:150945Z APR 80 

*** O-N" FIDrNTIA l**»»»»»E COPY 

Mn Hhiortinn Tn flpHaacifiratinn in Pull 7013/09/04 ■ Nil f!-94-Q1-4-3-7

INU WUjCUUUI I I U Lvcoiaaoilioaiiui I ll I UN

imu uujcuuui i iu ucuaootiioauui i Ull C-\J I \Jf UCJ UT . I I —T "U“l 

MEMORANDUM 


\ 

INU WUJtSULIUI I I U L/coiaasiiluauui i 111 Ull > oiuuu-r . I 

i —r vj- i 

MEMORANDUM 


WASHINGTON 

■GGNFIDENflflr 

ACTION 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

THE PRESIDENT 


Letter to Argentine Nobel Peace 

Prize Winner (U) 

Attached for your signature is a letter that we asked State 

to draft, congratulating Argentine Nobel Peace Prize winner, 

Adolpho Perez Esquivel. 

There is some down*side to sending this letter. The Argentine 

Government is furious about the award; our knowledge of Perez 

Esquivel is very limited; and he may be going soon to El 

Salvador, where he will probably take positions that we do 

not welcome. Indeed, he has already bben publicly critical 

of our support for the junta in El tSalvador. We will instruct 

the Embassy to tell Perez, when they deliver your 

message, that we would like to talk with him before he goes. 

(C) 

Clearly,however, you should sign the letter. Argentine human 

rights has been a major concern of your Administration and it 

is important that you stress your continuing identification 

with that issue. The problem in El Salvador (and its playback 

here) could be difficult, but it is manageable. The attitude 

of the Argentine Government results only from their own continued 

shortcoming in the human rights area. (C) 


That you sign the attached letter. (U) 

Approve _______ Disapprove _______ 

DECLASSIFIED 

-G0NR0ENM, 

E.0.13526 

,Authority N tC - 

jy|fiRA tfr Date 

Declassify on Oct. 17, 19 

Nn nhiprtinn Tn npHaQQifinatirtn in Puli 9013/09/04 • Nil H-94-Q1-4-3-7

MEMORANDUM 

-CONFIDENTIAL 

INU WUJtJUUUII IU LJCUiasailllsCmui I III ■ uil luiuiuuui |,i_u 

Luni luuiiiHL. 


t.*T \J\J w I W 

DOS REVIEWED 01-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL 

....... NoV&ffiBflr X4, 1980 

MEMORANDUM-FOR:- —ZBIGNIEW'BRZEZINSKI 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN (pasjtf) 

Evening Report CU) 

Jamaica. Seaga'a Finance Ministry has identified a $157 million 

balance of payments financing gap for November and December. GOJ 

has already negotiated a $100 million credit with a consortium of 

U.S. and Canadian commercial banks. The six month bridging loan is 

tied to negotiations with the IMF. GOJ expects $48 million from the 

Venezuelan oil facility. The rest will hopefully come from bilateral 

donors. Meanwhile, a GOJ team will arrive on November 17 for 

simultaneous negotiations with the IMF and World Bank — first time 

ever. Agreement on an extended fund facility and program loan may be 

completed as early as mid-December. The IMF staff sees a need for a 

USG contribution of $50-60 million in fast disbursing aid. That will 

not be easy to find, but we should find it. (C) 

% 

FRG does not plan to increase bilateral, aid beyond the DM 42 million 

already granted. The problem here is that the Foreign Ministry sees 

things our way but doesn't have any new money and the Friedrich Ebert 

Siftung has some money/ but doesn't see it our way. (The Foundation 

gave Manley's PNP $300,000 for the election campaign.) (C) 

Human Rights. Mrs. Carter's staff called and asked for an immediate 

recommendation on whether she should meet with Perez Esquivel, the 

Argentine Nobel Prize winner. I said that I thought she should meet 

with him, but that I expect it would be difficult to get a recommendation 

from the State Department, as they would have many views on that. 

I checked with Thornton, and he agreed on both points. Her staff thinks 

that she might want to keep a low profile, however. (C) 

Barbados. In response to harsh statements made about him by the 

Grenadian Prime Minister, Barbados Prime Minister Adams has recalled 

his country's Prime Minister to Grenada, furthering its isolation. 

Press Contacts. None. (U) 

f 

CONPIDDNTIAL 


declassified 

n. f-Vff- SS-?-3Vg 

J N L-Wf-M 1 I - 

PflMFinPMTMh- 

Nn Ohientinn To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-2-31-8

mu WUJCOIIUI i i u i~/Gistaoaiiii>ai.iui i in i an tw it/ it/ it . nu/- inti -vj-u-o 


COUNTRY AND REGIONAL PAPERS 

ARA 

Latin American Region 

Ethiopia 

Kenya 

Sudan 

Zaire 

EA 

China, Republic of 

Indonesia 

Korea 

Philippines 

Thailand 

EUR 

Greece 

Portugal 

Turkey 

Yugoslavia 

NEA 

Middle East 

Egypt 

Iran 

Israel 

Jordan 

Kuwait 

Lebanon 

Lower Persian Gulf and Oman 

Saudi Arabia 

Syria and Iraq 

Yemen 

North Africa 

Morocco 

Tunisia 

DECLASSIFIED 

The Subcontinent. . 

Regional Paper 

Authority 

NARA__ 


i mu wujeuuui i i u L/ooiaaoiiiociLUji in i r an e.\j it/ it/ it . ,ki_v^- i / - i t i-vi-o-o 


LATIN AMERICA 

Current State of Issue 

Armaments purchases by Latin American countries have 

been historically a smaller part of total national expenditures 

than any other world region except Africa. It 

follows that Latin America has absorbed only a Bmall portion 

of worldwide U.S. military sales. 

* 

In recent years, however, many I-atin American countries 

have begun to place increased emphasi's on acquiring more 

modern equipment of all types, including supersonic combat 

aircraft. We have attempted to assist in meeting what we 

believe are the legitimate defense needs of individual 

countries while resisting purchase requests which we believe 

would contribute to arms competition in the area. Several 

have turned to France, England, Israel, Italy and, in one 

case, the Soviet Union for advanced arms which we have been 

unwilling to sell or unable to supply at the time requested. 

The primary issue we now face is how to deal with sales by 

European, Soviet and Israeli suppliers of increasingly 

sophisticated and destructive types of weaponry, often on 

liberal credit terms, without relaxing our own restrictions. 

(For a discussion of prospective arms sales requests by 

individual Latin American countries, see APPENDIX A). 

Current U.S. Policy 

We do not wish to become a party to arms escalation and 

arms races in the Hemisphere which could lead to destabilization 

and increase the likelihood of armed conflict; we 

wish to encourage the use of scarce economic resources for 

economic and social development. Within these limitations, 

we have continued to try to respond to legitimate requests 

for equipment to modernize existing armed forces and to 

replace obsolete or worn out equipment. 

We do not approve Latin American requests for jet aircraft 

whose performance exceeds that of the F-5 or A-4, or for 

aircraft carriers, TV-guided air-tc-ground munitions, incendiary 

munitions, (including napalm and white phosphorus), 

attack helicopters and minicuns. Cuantities of convention::’, 

arms which are approved fcr sale in Latin America are also 

closely controlled in order to avoid contributing to a reci 

arms imbalance. 

No Objection To Declassification in PArt 2012/12/12 : NLC-17-121 -3-3-3

i mU vjuj >WU Ui ■ UO«J Ul 

l i k 

Department op State transition . 

briefing paper 

Brief History of Policy 

For over ‘a decade it has been our policy to limit 

Bales to weapons and equipment which are primarily designed 

for defensive purposes, unlikely to give the recipient 

Country a significant advantage over its neighbors and of a - 

design and in numbers which will not stimulate regional arms 

competition. Our decision in the mid-1960s to make the A-4 

and F-5 aircraft eligible, for Bale to a number of countries 

In Latin America (actual sales to be decided on an individual 

basis) came only after evidence accumulated' that several 

fcountries in the Hemisphere would turn, to Western European 

suppliers and those suppliers would be prepared to respond 

with sales of high performance jet aircraft if we continued 

to try to limit our deliveries to Korean War-era or older 

aircraft. 

t 

i 

Congressional Perspective 

i 

Although Congress has acted to limit or interrupt 

arms Bales in several countries, as noted below, it has not 

taken any actions which affect policy toward the region in 

general. It has supported the policy of limiting both the 

quantities and capabilities of arms which we.have made 

available to the area. 

Human Rights Aspects 

- Countries which have been the objects of recent Congressional 

interest on human rights grounds include: 

Chile - Section 406 of the International. Security 

Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 prohibits 

military grant assistance, security supporting assistance, 

military sales credits and the guarantee of any military 

loan to Chile. It also prohibits cash s'ales and the issuance 

of export licenses under the Arms Export Control Act. 

Uruguay - The Koch Amendment to* the Foreign Assistance 

and Related Programs Appropriation Act, 1977, Section 505, 

forbade, on the ground that human rights have been systematically 

violated by the Uruguayan Government, the extension 

during FY 1977 of FMS financing, grant training or grant 

materiel assistance to Uruguay. It did not prohibit FMS or 

commercial sales for cash and did not forbid the use of 

prior year, credits for arms■purchases. 

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2012/12/12 : NLC-17-121 -3-3-3

w i-r«n I ivic.ni I ur a I A I 


j.iuuiuj.j,xuii 

Argentina - Congressman Fraser'

PACE b: 

ACTION AIK-14 

fhFC 

BuENOS 8*937 ll OF V2 2721151 

OC’-BL ISO-38 ClAI-BB 30DE-BJ PM-HS M-ll IRR-1S 

L-B3 NSAE-BB NSC-B? PA-B1 SP-R2 SS-15 ICA-11 

> HA-R5 HCT-B1 TRSE-II 413-15 II-BB /B37 U 

................................... BS7531 mini /73 

P 272B12Z JUN 78 

NMEMBISST BUENOS AIRES 

TO SECSTATE WASNOC PR I ORITT 6ZJ3 

Jniinai IT I 4* SECTION 1 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4937 

'-.0. 11652: BOS 

'AGS: OVIP 

SUBJECT: 

HENRY KISSINGER VISIT TO ARGENTINA 

SUMMARY: FROM ARRIVAL TO DEPARTURE HENRY KISSINGER AND HIS 

FAMILY HERE WELL RECEIVED BY ARGENTINE POPULACE. THE GOA 

LAIC CUT RE3 CARPET, PULLING OUT STOPS. OR. KISSINGER SPOKE 

TO DIVERSIFIED GROUPS—FROM BANKERS TO 6AUCH0S. IN MOST 

'NSTAKCES, HE COMPLIMENTED GOA FOR DEFEATING TERORISTS BUT 

HE WARNED THAT TACTICS USED AGAINST THEN THEN ARE HOT 

JSTIFIARIE NOW. GENERALLY, DR. KISSINGER PUBLICLY AFFIRMED 

HIS SUPPORT FDR PRESIDENT CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH A 


1. 3R. KISSINGER, HIS WIFE AND SON ARRIVED IN BA EARLY 

inu wujeuuuu iu ueîdbiinucjiiuii in run 4.ui

I ’MJ WkJJCUUUI I I U k>OUtUJOIhViAUiiWl I III • Ull *—W 1^1 , ,—J i . I uw w r W I I 

umpartment of State W TELEGRAM 

PAGE i: 

ACT ICN fiBA-'.J 

BUENOS BAS37 «2 OF B2 272123Z 1278 BUENOS 0*937 02 OF 02 272123Z 

( 

'N70 

.so-sa ciae-bb oode-bb pm-bs H-01 iNR-n 

'--03 SSAE-00 HSC-li PA-01 SP-02 SS-1S ICA-11 

HA-09 P.CT-01 TASE-00 AID-09 EB-01 /0S7 W 

P 2720122 JUS 71 

FN AHEH8ASSY BUENOS AIRES 

70 SECS7ATE WA5MDC PRIORITY S2S4 

...................................097972 2722072 /73 

■f nil UlliT I A t—3C9TI0W 2 of 2 BUENOS AIRES 4037 

3. EARLY 7HURS0AY MORNING OR. KISSINGER NET WITH DR. JORGE 

LUIS BORGES, NOTED ARGENTINE POET AND WRITER. THIS PROMPTED 

MUCK NEWS COVEPAGE. LATER IN DAY KISSINGER AND FAMILY 

DEPARTE3 WITH II NISTER OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ 3E HSZ TO OVER 

NIGHT AT AN ESTAHCIA (FARID . THIS VAS MOSTLY A SOCIAL EVENT. 

HE'SAID HE WOULD WAIT ABOUT TWO WEENS AFTER H'S RETURN TO 

US BEFORE SPEARING OUT. KISSINGER WORKED CLOSELY WlfiT 

EMBASSY personnel.they were good guests ah: "ADE every 

EFFORT TO GIVE APPEARANCE THEY WERE NOT EMISSARIES OF 

OPPOSITION TO CURRENT US ADMINISTRATION. 

NY ONLY CONCERN IS THAT X'SSINGER’S REPEATED HIGH PRAISE 

FOR ARGENT.NA'S/CTION >N WIPING OUT TERRORISM AND HIS 

STRESS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ARGENTINA NAY HAVE GONE TO SOKE 

CONSIDERABLE EX’EST TO HlS HOSTS' HEADS. DESPITE HIS 

DISCLAIMERS THAT THE KLTnODS USED IN FIGHTING TERRORISM MUST 

NOT BE PERPET.A’EO, THERE IS SOME DANGER THAT ARGENTINES 

MAY USE KISSINGER'S LAUDATORY STATEMENTS AS JUSTIFICATION 

FOR riARDEH.KG THE1R HUMAN RIGHTS STANCE. 

CASTRO 

9. CN M IS RE'URII FROM THE FARM, KISSINGER SPOKE TO EMBASSY 

PERSONNEL. HE GAVE A »EP TALKS TO AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE 

PERSONNEL AS WELL AS LOCALS. HE NARRATED SOME CF HIS 


WAS VEiL DECEIVED RT ALL. 

IB. Oil FRIDAY EVENING A RECEPTION WAS OlVEN AT EMBASSY 

RESIDENCE itONOrlliG KISSINGER AND FAMILY. APPNOXiHATELY TWO 

HUNDRED PERSONS ATTENDED. GOA TOP OFFICIALS WERE WELL 

REPRESENTED. 

11. AFTER THE RECEPTION, KISSINGER ATTENDED A DINNER GIVEN 

BY MIN’STER OF ECONOMY NANTINEZ OE HOZ. THIS GROUP VAS 

COMPOSED OF lAl'KERS, ECONOMISTS AND INDUSTRIALISTS. THE MAIN 

DISCUSSION CONCERNED MEANS TO ATTRACT FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL AND 

OTHER INVESTMENT TO ARGENTINA. THE LONG TERM LACK OF POLITICAL 

S’ARILITY AND INFLATION SEEMED TO RE THE MAIN CONCERN OF 


( 

12. Oh JUNE 24 KISSINGER PARTICIPATED III AN OFF THE RECOHO 

PRESS CONFERENCE AMD WAS MADE AN HONORARl MEMBER 3F ARGENTINE 

COUNCIL ON INTERNAT.OHAL RELATIONS. THiS OROUP IS COMPRISED 

OF FORMER FOREIGN MINISTERS, WHO HOLO THEMSELVES UP TO THE 

PUBLIC AS THE "ELITE GROUP" ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. DR. KISSINGER 

GAVE Ah OFF THE CUFF TALK. HE STRESSEO THAT THERE WAS NO 

CUESTiCV BUT THAT AMERICANS LACREO KNOWLEDGE ABOUT 

ARGENTINA* S H.STORY. ESPECIALLY, 

I RCKEO FAMILIARITY 

WI-TH-ARGENTINfS FXPtBTtNCl IfjfMTIM Tfo.npim.—RE-EXPLAINED 

nS HIS OP I SI 01. GOA HAD DONE AN OUTSTANDING JOB IN WIPING 

CUT TE»BCRIST FORKS: SIT ALSO CIHT IUHEIRmAT METHODS Uotfl 

T?.TrGH*~Ni~TP0BVTSI,~miSt-MOY BE"PERPETUATED. "hE EXPLAINED 

a MOVEMENT TOWaToTTBRMALC»-MI1ST-ttWf-fWCE IF DEMOCRATIC 

.SEALS ARE "0 PREVAIL. 

13. OR. KISS'USER ALSO APPEARED 'N A QUESTION A'ID ANSWER 

PER 03 WITH G'.’E OF ARGENTIHA'SPOPULAR NEWS COHKEIITERS. 

DURING the INTERVIEW 

CTITtMfllIIHIII*T!! «»F MF 

OF THE GREATE5T VIOLATORS OF “»"«■ Air.qTA-—Hf SAID IT VAS 

UNFORTUNATE THAI IN 80ft IRSIARUb HUMAN RIGHTS WAS 

BEING USED AS A WEAPON AGAINST ITS FBI ENOS. ‘ 

COMMENT: 

THE H'SSIHGIR FAMILYAfTEKDED A FOOTBALL GAME IN 

ROSARIO. WHERE HE WAS INTRODUCED TO THE PUBLIC. INDICATIONS 

ARE HE WAS vELl RECEIVED BY THE AUDIENCE. HE ALSO ATTENDED 

TWO OTHER GAMES 'N BUENOS AIRES AS'A GUEST OF PRESIDENT 

VI DEL A. the argentine MEDIA GAVE FAVORABLE AND HEAVY 


0ECLASSIF1ED 

Authority -------- 

NABA-iS--- DrtE- 

UP. 

CDMMEMT: DR. K1SSIUGER TOLD THE AMRASSAOOR HE WOULD NOT 

I :RiTIC.2E ’HE CARTER AOMIN:STRATI OS SO LOSS AS HE WAS OVER 

SEAS. HE SPOKE HIGHLY OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S FDRE'GII POLICY 

TO THE AMBASSADOR, B-T FElT hE WOULD 5PE AH .OUT. ASAUSI-IHE 

w#mEtrmr 

iNr^hiRCtinr^Rêdassificatinn in Full 2012/12/11 : NLC-6-4-6-11-21

" I \VJ UUjCJOllUi I I U l/OîUOOii IOUkiwi i ■ ■ ■ I ujI £.VJ I u/ \J „/ w • . i ^ L.( -y-U 

uepartmeni oj aiaie • itLtliKAl/i 

"ROE 01 BUENOS 14337 02 OF 07 2771731 0271 BJE'IOS 0(937 02 OF 02 2721232 

«!» C‘< ARA-14 «■ 

■ o c:t-oi 

ciae-bb c:c7-00 pm-bg n-oi ii.u- iff 

.-22 HS:-.-?a 'HS-rS PA-01 s**-Be SS-1S ICA-ll 

"«-B5 N:r-ei trse-bh uio-sa tu-cs /as; ■- 

. . . . . . . . . . . 037372 2722071 /73 

p 27:0171 iU\ 70 

fi arti-BAsa* si';,:: vres 

'0 SECCTATE hA3>a: PRIORITY 6214 

r n o ' i a r-r- 7 i r i rrrnnv i or l buenos aires ish 

4 EA*l* THUR'JAV MSR’IIMG GR. XISSIKCER MET VITR OR. JCR6E 

ljis e;roe: 

argentine poef s-id writer. this prc-pte; 

-JCH NEWS COtEPAGE. LATER IN OA' KISSINGER AND F All 11Y 

depute; with :iit:ister of economy martinet ce hoi to overnight 

a: AH ESTAIICiA iFARH). THIS WAS MOSTLY A SOCIAL EVENT. 

CONCEPT OF ATTEMPTING TO IMPLEMENT H'JNAH RIGHTS i’i .A. 

PE SAIO HE WO’.'LB WAIT A03UT TWO WEEKS AFTER HiG RETURN TO 

.. 'JS BEFORE SPEK;!IG SJ’ KISSINGER .;7>'D C.OSE > W ’. 

EMB13S' PERSDV'*. THEY WERE GCDC GlESTS AND MACE E.'ERY 

EFFORT TO GiVE APPEARANCE THE/ vE»E NOT ENI3SAC1E5 SR 

OPPOSITION TO CURRENT US AON IN I STRATI ON. 

HI ONLY CONCERN IS THAI KISSINGER’S REPEATED H'SH PRAISE 

FOR ARGENTINA'S ACT 'ON IN WIPING OUT TERRORIST! AND HIS 

STRESS ON THE 'HPCRTAI.CE OF ARGENT IIIA NAY HAVE GONE TO SOLE 

CSHS'DERAE'.E l«TE”T T8 NIS HOSTS’ hEASS. DESPITE HIS 

BISCLAINERS THAT the METHODS USED III FIGHT :«5 TERRORISM MUST 

NOT BE PESPETUTID, ’-ERE '3 SOME CANCER THAT ARCENT NES 

NAY USE HISSIIiGFR'S LAUDATORY STATEMENTS AS JUSTIFICATION 

FSR HARDENING TpE'R HLKAII RIGHTS STANCE. 

CASTRO 

9 CN HIS RETURN FRCN THE FIRM, RISS.KGER SPOKE TO EMBASSY 

PERSONNEL. HE CAVE A PEP TAiKS TO SMtRlC.'l FOREIGN SERVICE 

PERSONNEL AS NELL AS LOCALS. HE NARRATF3 SOME OF HIS 


WAS Will RECEIVEO BY AlL. 

DOS REVIEWED 03-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE!N FULL 

10. ON FRIDAY EVENING A RECEPTION WAS GIVEN AT EHBASSY 

ALC'CLI.CE HCNCF'CS v.SSII.SER AND FATLY. APPROXIMATELY TVS 

HUSORFC PERSONS ATTENDED. GOA TOP OFFICIALS WIRE WEll 

REPRESENTED. 

I ‘ 

II. AFTER THE RECEPT'ON, KISSINGER ATTENDED A SINNER GiVEK 

BY NIH'STEH OF ECONOMY MARTINE2 DE NOZ. THIS GROUP WAS 

CoSpoSED CF BATHERS, ECONCK.STS ANC .NSUS'R■AL■STS. THE MAIN 

DISCUSSION CONCERNED MEANS TO ATTRACT FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL ANO 

3THLR INVESTMENT TO ARGENT I HA. THE LONG TERM LACK OF POLITICAL 

STABILITY Alio INFLATION SEEMEO TO BE THE NADI CONCERN OF 

7hc grgjp. little else developed from the dinner. 

t 

12. Cl uUKE 24 MSS'NucR PARTICIPATED ill AN OFF THE RECORD 

PHF5S C8I.FERENCF AND UAS MADE AN POIIORARf MEMBER OF ARGENTINE 

COUNCIL CN INTER.NATICNA. RELATIONS. THIS GROUP IS COMPRISED 

OF FQR'IER FOREIGN MINISTERS, WHO POLO THEMSELVES UP TO THE 

PUBLIC AS THE 'ELITE GROUP' ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. OR. KISSINGER 

GAVE AN OFF THE CUFF TALK. HE STRESSED TiJT THERE WAS NO 

C-ES'iO'l 0UT Tni: AMERICANS LACKED KNOWLEDGE A8CJY 

ar-jEM"’:A’S h’STCR' ESPECIh-LY, iMiAiGACS.UCPiJ. FAMI'.IAR'TT 

WTH •.AGENT!1.;’ 3 F«Frj|0Ê”7, FIGHTING .tUSLUUSM- ME EXPLAINED 

■is »■: BPIN-O'I G5a h-D OCNE «’l WS’A'ID'.SG JOB ''i WPi'.G 

OJT 7FRPCRIST FORCES. BUT ALSB GA'JTICIIED THAT METHODS JStD 

’■! T sL'iiVg'7«3'SC7'3'< must NO’ BE »EVPE’,..’Ea. -E EXPLAINED 

a MOVEMENT TCJASDS NORMALCY MUST TAKE PLACE IF DEMOCRATIC 

deal: are 73 pre.a.l 

17. ;r. KISS'liGtR ALIO APPEARED 4 OLECT'ON AND ANCUER 

PERIOD VITH C'.'E OF ARGENTINA-SPOPULAR NEWS COMMEHTERS. 

O'.'RiNS ’he n’rRviij_»i«imi ’-Tiy-i TFRARRIXTS WMF One 

CF THE GREATEST VIOLATORS OF HUMAN RI SHIS.- HE SAID IT WAS 

VNFCB’jKA’E TkvT SCrtC TT^BTiLt'i HUHAH RIGHTS was 

BlflNG USED AS A VLAPOli"AGAiHST ITS FRlEliOjT^’ 

lyiV' THE H'SSiXjER family AYTEkdf: A football GA"E 'V 

FDjAR C. where «E has IHIRC3UCE0 TO ’HE pjIlIC .HOISAT'ONS 

;pf HE HAS VEL. RECEIVED by the A'JD E'ICE PE ALSO ATTENDED 

•■-0 CHER GAMES 'h BJESOS AI RE 3 ASA EJECT OF PRESIDED’ 

DEL A THE ARSENY.'IE MED A GAVE FA.ORABlE AHD HEAVY 


COMMENT OR. K ESI USER TOLD TPE 1M.BAS3A5SR HE WOULD NOT 

:»:’i: :e the car’er :cm;n,st*a’i:,i so io’.g as he was oversea; 

he 5PC»E hIGHU OF PRESIDENT CARTERS FOREIGN POLICY 

’C >E .’•SAOSAOPR, BUT FF.’ »E hCV.C speak PUT ASRINST ’HE 

Authority 

NARA__ 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13S26 t . . 

NIL.C- - 

flats --------- 

No Objection I o ueciassiTicanon in Kill 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-56-1-6-6

MU UjCUllUl I I U UCUiCluJ • lUOllui i li i I Ul. cU i o/ \J / i • i «i v


MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZXNSXI 


Subject; Request for Appointment with Vice President 


A rge nt i na . 





Earlier on September 15, his last day as the Navy 

member of the Argentine Military Junta, Admiral MaBsera 


Argentina and the U.S., and requested a meeting with 

the President. Our recommendation on the latter is 

attached. 



Vice President as well. Our Ambassador specifically 






Secretary Vaky. 

Snnf 

Peter Tarnoff 

Executive* Secretary 

Atta chne nt; 

Tarnoff/Brzezinski Memorandum of October 2, 1978. 

TIAL 

Auth crity 

NARA 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O. 13526 

Dr*n ~\\^\vU 

~2_

• 



7818470y// 

Washington. D C 1db7l 

COPIES TO: 

P 

ARA 

TMC 

RF (jhw) 

CONFIDENTIAL 

October 2^ 19/8 

"r: j~?.t -■ ' 43 



SUBJECT: Letter to President Carter from Admiral Emilio 


On September 15, his last day as the Navy member of 





is trying to build a political base in Argentina. A -talented 

opportunist, Massera will soon travel to Europe and the 

United States in an attempt to gain international recognition 

to further his domestic ends. Massera i.s viewed with 


is the dominant partner in the Junta. Our Ambassador in 




recommended against such a meeting, suggesting instead that 

Massera speak with a lower ranking U.S. official. The 

Department agrees with this view; we do not want to 

antagonize the Army by arranging a meeting between Massera 




Massera to meet with Robert Pastor of the NSC staff and 


Attachment: 

Suggested Draft Reply 

tfraf t«

No Objection To Declassification in -till 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2 

Admiral Emilio MiSlera, 

Military Junta, 

Argentina, Buenos Aires 

□ear Admiral Massera: 

I have been asked to respond to your September 

15 letter to President Carter concerning relations 

between our two countries. * 

As you suggest, there is a need for continuing 

dialogue between Argentina and the United States 

so that the problems which exist can be discussed 

and resolved. 

We are hopeful that the conversations held 

between President Videla and Vice President Mondale 

will lead to actions which will make it possible 

to bring about closer cooperation and better understanding 

between our two countries* 

Like you, we believe that it is essential for 

all countries to work toward a worlds in which the 

dignity of all is acknowledged and observed. 

President Carter's schedule is very filled in 

the next few months but I would be pleased to have 

an opportunity to talk with you when you visit 

Washington. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 

American Affairs Viron Vaky has also expressed a 

desire to meet with you during your stay here. 

With my best regards. 

Sines rely 

I 

Rnhprt Pust-nr


SSmmmnJoHU mi 

^ BîwA 

BUENOS AIRES, 15 de setiembre de 1978. 

Excelentlslmo sefior Presldente de los Estados Unldos de Am6r1ca 

Dn. JAMES EARL CARTER 

WASHINGTON - ESTADOS UNIDOS 0E AMERICA 

Sefior Presldente: 

A1 cesar en mis funciones conn mlembro de la Junta 

MWtar de la RepflbUca Argentina, he cretdo convenlente d1r1g1rme a usted para 

hacerle parttcipe de algunas reflexlones sobre la sltuadfin de mi pals. 

( 

As! como los argentinos tenemos dificultades para 

comprender en plenitud las acciones de la politics nortearnericana, de la misma 

manera debemos admltir que por parte de su gobierno deben existir si mi lares in^ 

convenlentes para visuallzar los reales problemas que nos aquejan a los argentj_ 

nos. 

Elio, como es lfigico, produce diferentes enfoques 

de un pais con respecto a otro. Pero es deber de los gobernantes visuallzar cual 

es la verdadera intencidn con que se llevan a la prSetlea esas interpretaciones 

diferentes, con el objeto de adecuar el acdonar proplo a los mejores Intereses 

nacionales. 

En tal sent!do, me siento obligado a manifestar que, 

aGn cuando personalmente he llegado a disentir con algunos aspectos de la pollti, 

ca exterior de su gobierno con respecto al mlo, jamSs abrlguS la menor duda de 

que sus pesos estaban Inspirados por un noble cuan genuino interfis por el bienes 

tar de la RepGblics Argentine, en el contexto global de las naclones que tradicTo 

nalmente han sentldo y actuado como integrantes del mundo occidental. 

En mis frecuentes vlsitas a todos los palses sud americanos, 

he hecho especial h1ncap16 en la necesidad de emprender la reconquista 

del esplrltu de Occldente por parte de todos los palses amerlcanos, como Gnico 

camino para salvaguardar nuestra identldad continental. Es as! que he enfatlzado 

hasta el cansando que a Occldente no hay que buscarlo en el mapa, porque es hoy 

una actitud del alma que no estS atada a ninguna geograffa, Occldente es el hombre 

protagonlzando la dlgnldad esencial de la vida. Occldente es la Ubertad de 

pensar y de hacer. Occldente es el respeto al honor, al trabajo, al talento. Pero 

Occldente es tamblfin el amor, es la esperanza, y es la misericord 1a. 

Esta insistencla en sacar a la luz ese esplrltu dorml^ 

do de nuestros pueblos, ha s1do acogldo siempre con beneplSdto. Resulta extrafio 

entonces comprobar que, paradojicamente, el tema central de las presentes divergencies 

argentino-norteamericanas sea el mlsmo que nos ofrece la mayor posibiUdad 

de una comprenslfin total entre no*otros. 

Comprendo que exlsten dificultades para promover una 

generosa campafia de promodfin de los derechos humanos en el mundo, que no race en 

algunos aspectos la senslbllldad de los proplos amigos. Pretender que esto no ocu^ 

rra serla casi utdplco y falto de realismo politico. Yo mismo he sentldo la Incojn 

prenslfin de los esfuerzos por promover dentro de ml proplo pals un camblo de 

outlook. 

Ill • « • 

t


• ( 

.X ‘ft for « f^rftfct/e- 

'sumanclante rn Jr/t Jt &d\tnatla 

t 

Es por tal razdn que interpreto debidamente -y en 

tal convenclmiento se la agradezco- la generosa mencifln que usted hizo el 27 de 

enero, ante un grupo de periodistas de la Nueva Inglaterra reunldos en la Casa 

Blanca, sobre nuestro rol en la cuestifin de los derechos humanos. 

Esa actitud nuestra que mereciera tal mencifin suya, 

es firme y decldida. Puede usted tener la certeza de que no habrfi desviacifin de 

ese propfisito bajo la Comandancia de mi sucesor, el Almlrante Armando Lambruschlni. 

Sefior Presldente: al despedirme de usted como miembro 

del maximo firgano de poder de la RepGblica Argentina, lo hago persuadido de 

que debo seguir bregando -desde el llano-.por lakconsecus1fln de los objetivos que 

se propusieron las Fuerzas Armadas al hacerse cargo del poder. Como he manifestado 

recientemente ante la IX Conferencia Nava! Interamericana, las ideas no pasan a 

retiro. Yo puedo asegurarle que las mias no lo har&n y que por tal razfin seguirS 

bregando para restablecer a breve plazo la estructura Institucional de mi pats, 

M1s recientes conversaciones en Caracas con el Presji^ 

dente Carlos AndrSs Pfirez y con los ex-Presidentes Betancourt, Caldera, Sanabria y 

LarrazSbal, han robustecido mi convencimiento sobre las posibilidades del aflanzamiento 

democrfitico en la Amfirica Latina. 

Espero que en los prfiximos meses, oportunidad en que 

tengo planeado "a brief sentimental return to Washington" en donde vlvl por dos 

afios en la dScada del 60, pueda tener la ocasifln de conversar personalmente con usted 

sobre la evoluc16n de la situacifln argentina, 

Slnceramente,



DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES 

(TRANSLATION) 

LSNO. 69089 

WD/BP 

Spanish 

Military Junta 

Chief of Naval Operations 

Buenos Aires, September 15, 1978 

His Excellency 

James Earl Carter, 

President of the United States of America, 

Washington, 0.C. 

Mr. President: 

% 

Now that I have ceased to be a member of the Military 

Junta of the Argentine Republic, I should like to share with 

you some thoughts about the situation in my country. 

Just as we Argentines have difficulty in fully understanding 

United States policy actions, your Government must, of course, 

have similar trouble in visualizing the real problems that 

confront Argentina. The natural result is that differences in 

points of view develop between the two countries. But it is 

the duty of those in power to seek to understand the true 

intentions with which those differing interpretations are put 

into practice, in order that they may make their own actions 

consistent with their countries' best interests. 

t 

In that connection I feel impelled to state that, even though 

I have personally disagreed with some aspects of your Government's 

foreign policy with respect to mine, I never harbored the slightest


2 

doubt that your course was inspired by a noble and genuine 

interest in the well-being of the Argentine Republic as one 

of the nations that have traditionally felt and acted as members 

of the Western world. * 

On my frequent visits to all the South American countries, 

1 have laid special emphasis on the need for all the American 

countries to recapture the Western spirit as the only way to 

safeguard our continental identity. I have thus repeatedly 

stressed that the West is not to be sought on the map, because 

today it is a spiritual attitude independent of geography. 

The West is mankind acting out the essential dignity of life. 

The West is freedom of thought and action. The West is respect 

for honor, work, talent. But the West is also love, hope, and 

compassion. 

This insistence on bringing to iight that sleeping spirit 

of our peoples has always been favorably received. It is therefore 

strange to note that, paradoxically, the central theme 

of current U.S.-Argentine differences is the very one that 

offers us the greatest potential for complete mutual understanding. 

I realize that it is difficult to conduct a generous human 

rights campaign in the world without occasionally bruising the 

sensibilities of one's own friends. To pretend otherwise would 

be almost Utopian and politically unrealistic. I myself have 

felt the lack of understanding for efforts to promote a change 

in outlook within my own country. 

i


3 

it is in that light that I interpret—and appreciate— 

your generous reference, on January 27 to a group of New England 

journalists gathered at the White House, to our role in the 

matter of human rights. 

We remain firm and determined in the attitude that inspired 

your comment. You may rest assured that there will be no departure 

from it under my successor, Admiral Armando Lambruschini. 

I take my leave of you, Mr. President, as a member of the 

supreme governing body of the Argentine Republic, convinced 

that I must continue to strive—from afar—for the attainment 

of the objectives undertaken by the Armed Forces when they took 

power. As I recently stated before the Ninth Inter-American 

Naval Conference, ideas do not retire. I can assure you that 

mine shall not and that I will therefore continue to strive 

for the early reestablishment of my country's institutional 

structure. ‘ 

t 

My recent conversations in Caracas with President Carlos 

Andres Perez and with former Presidents Betancourt, Caldera, 

Sanabria, and Larrazabal strengthened my conviction regarding 

the possibility of assuring democracy in Latin America. 

I hope that in a few months' time, when I am planning "a 

brief sentimental return to Washington," where I lived for two 

years in the 1960's, I may have the opportunity for a personal


i 

4 

conversation with you on the development of the Argentine 

situation. ---------------- —........... 

Sincerely, 

[Signature]

........No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2 

7818470 


COPIES TO: 

RF:WEB 

Washington, O.C. 30520 

! 


irector, S/SÎ 

ition Management Section 


ext. .23836


^Rmary translation 

Letter from Admiral Emilio Massera, Member of the Military 

Junta of Argentina to President Carter. 

Admiral Massera notes that he is writing this letter on 

the date of his retirement from the Junta. He states that 

he believes there may have been misunderstandings between 

t 

our two countries because of a mutual misinterpretation of 

the policies that have been implemented. He does not, 

however, doubt the sincerity of the U.S. in adopting these 

policies. He believes there is a community of interest 

between Argentina and the U.S., both of which are dedicated 

to the dignity of human life. He states that his successor 

as Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Navy also believes 

in these values. He hopes to speak with you personally 

in the next few months when he visits Washington. 

7818470

intern 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2 ^ 

t HUbSJfc. UUL.UAU.INi / 


ACTION: 

INFO TO: 

URGENT 

Date 

9/a ih? 

X , 

D/LOS 

A 

________ ACDA 

M/DG 

CA 

________ AID 

M/CT 

cu 

( E 

T 

M/MO 

T/D 

f 

EB v 

H 

M 

UNA 

HA 

S/S 

C 

INR 

S/S-0 

S/MS 

10 

S/S-S 

S/CPR 

_______ AF 

L 

Team A 

S/NM 

ARA 

OES 

Team B 

S/P 

_______ EA 

PA 

.Team C 

S/PRS 

________EUR 

PA/FOI 

Team D 

________NEA 

PM 

1 Action Requested: 

Reiharks: 

' ______ Memorandum for the President 

Memorandum for the White House: 

\J Lt/ytcfes~ /tist/yLbi 

Bureau Handling 

Other 

&d- 

3 

« 

Due Date in S/S: 

I

uNo Objection To Declassification-in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-1^33-57-8^10-2 

MBMOftAND 

QFFIC.E OF THE VICE PftESi DENT 

WAIHIN6TON 

ACTION (ARA) 

ACTION 

Memo No. 916-78 

-COWgigaaiKAL 

?aptember 2fr» IVtfc 

COPIES 

S 

D 

P 

S/P 

INR 

KF (rs) 

TO: 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

Denis Clift 

Proposed Meeting with Hsnbar of 

Argentine Junta, Admiral Maaeera 

it has been recommended to the Vitae President by a private 

individual ttfat the Vice President agree to meet with. 

Admiral Mcnraera when the latter is in the U.S. October 9-11. 

Given the current state of play of US-Argentine relations t 

1 have questions about this reccsnendation. I would greatly 

appreciate a stata-i^^reooaiMad»tis»--sft’

No Objectiorô Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133 

57-8-10-2 

’ i i 1 • • ’ 

StP 

MESSAGE NO. /*/ 

CLASSIFICATION fcdtil 

FROM 

(JJ0A+ .________ 

(Name) 1 

_mx 

(Extension) 

(Rocbn number) 

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION 

TO(Agency) DELIVER TO: Extonston Room No. 

P

No Objection To Declassification in hull 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2 

^ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNcV 

REFERRAL 

Date: 9/27/7B 


DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: 

STATE SECRETARIAT 

\ 

» 

To: 

From: 

Christ-itui Dodson 

Den±A.- CAAf t 

Date: September 26, 1978 

Subject: Proposed Mtg w/ Mertber of Argentine Junta, Admiral 

Massera 

ACTION REQUESTED: 

Draft reply- for: 

______ Direct reply 

_____ Dispatch 

xxxxx Recommendations 

Other 

______ President1* Signature 

■ yfbitm Kouse Staff 

____ i Otbez— 

Furnish info copy 

Translation 

AppropriateHandllo 

Information 

DUE DATE: **** October 3, 1978 

COMMENTS: 

w*"' for CSLI3"IÊ D0DS0.N 

“""■STiFr SEC25TA3.Y

Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-133-57-8-10-2 

m*monancNo Objection To Declassification in 

OFFICE of THE ViCE PRESS DEWT 

WASHINGTON 

ACTION 

Memo No. 916-78 

cont iDEarriAL—“• 

Saptsrtfiif 2&» 1576^ 


FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

Denis Clift 

Proposed Meeting Vfith Member of 

Argentine Junta* Admiral Master* - 

it has been recommended to the vice President by a private 

individual tKat the Vice President agree to meet with. 

Admiral Mcnraera when fne fatter is in the U.fi. October 9-11. 

Given the current state of play of OS-Argentine relations* 

I have questions about this recnwendntion. I would greatly 

appreciate a state-NfiT-reccwaaendstlon -sn -this- proposal; 

t 

■CONFIDENTIAL

i No Objecliun lu UeClabbilli nlii.m in Qill 2012/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-1 -5 

t 

iaosREViEv^bT6-Jan-2oi ^"declassified for release in full] 

THE DYNAMICS OF ARGENTINE DECISION-MAKING 

Conclusions 

Our analysis of the Argentine decision-meflcing mechanism 

indicates that: 

—emphasis is always upon the tri-service nature of 

the government with the Navy and the Air Force 

over-represented in an effort to maintain the degree 

of military cohesion necessary for effective rule; 

—nonetheless, the Array is the predominant service, 

capable of forcing implementation of its preferred 

policies if compromise is impossible; 

—each service formulates its own policy positions 

based on service consensus, and differences are 

ironed out at the top; 

—compromise in the interest of unity is always Bought 

and usually achieved; 

—while often slow and cumbersome, the process has 

worked, and Videla is comfortable with it; 

—the Army's potential power and the tri-service 

arrangement will continue to be the significant 

factors under the new junta-president formula; and 

—outsiders seeking to influence the decision-making 

process must seek access at the top through, in the 

US case, the Videla-Viola channel. 

* * y * 

Army predominance is the crucial element in the present as 

in past Argentine military governments. The post-March 1976 

government has been a tri-service affair in structure and 

operation. The Army, Navy and Air Force have shared office- 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13528 

CONTI PENT IAL/EXDI0 NARA_E=£-------Date ---------- 



- 2 - 

holding responsibilities as equitably as the manpower of the 

two junior services permits, and all three" services have 

participated fully in the decision-maki*ng process. All 

participants, however, conduct themselves with the knowledge 

that a unified Army is the "most equal" of the services, 

capable of forcing implementation of its preferred policies 

if compromise with Air Force and Navy views cinnot be reached. 

Army willingness to accept a tri-service governing format 

in which the other two services are, in fact, over-represented ' 

rests on the belief that armed forces unity is critical to the 

viability of military government. Past experience (especially 

the 1966-73 Ongania, Levingston, and Lanusse governments) has 

demonstrated that military governments dominated by one man or 

one service run a high risk of alienating significant elements 

within the armed forces and thereby, forfeiting the chance for 

prolonging effective rule. Establishing the Air Force and 

Navy as equal parties in the governing process ensures that 

they will have a stake in its success and presumably act 

accordingly. 

Within the tri-service format, the decision-making process 

basically involves each service developing its own policy 

positions, with differences of opinion being compromised through 

discussion in one of several formal and* ad hoc forums. When 

a tri-service consensus cannot be reached, the matter is 

decided by majority vote in the junta (a president's selection 

or removal requires an unanimous vote.) At each step in the 

decision-making process, votes are cast in representation of the 

officer's particular armed force. 

Within each service, the task of canvassing opinion and 

drafting policies usually falls to the office of the Chief of 

Staff or the Secretary General, insofar as that process is 

formalized. On political matters, the service secretaries 

general (Army-Brigadier General Reynaldo Bignone; Navy-Rear 

Admiral Eduardo Fracassi; Air Force-Brigadier General Basilio 

Lami Dozo) have shouldered much of the burden not only for formulating 

policy but also for conducting inter-service bargaining 

to compromise differences. For example, recent negotiations 

to delineate the power relationship between the junta and the 

president after Videla retirement as army commander were 

handled by the secretaries general. In essence, the general 

secretariat in each service has become a cabinet for the 

service commander. The secretary general is a trusted subordinate 

of the commander, and the secretariat is staffed by carefully 

selected officers, often at the colonel\level. 

•eONriOEN«ftL/B3g>£fi- 



- 3 - 

When disagreements are not resolved prior to junta consideration 

of the issue at hand, it is extremely important 

for all three junta members to enter discussions with the solid 

backing of their subordinates. Thus, important junta meetings 

are often preceded by intra-service gathering chaired by the 

relevant commander and attended by all senior.officers of the 

service. These are closed meetings involving frank, extended, 

and often heated discussions. Nothing beyond possibly the 

topics discussed is disclosed to the public. Service discipline 

is usually strong enough to ensure almost unanimous 

support for whatever service position emerges from senior 

officer conclaves. 

With the emphasis always upon compromising differences, 

ad hoc decision-making instrumentalities are employed without 

Hesitation when the circumstances demand. In late April, for 

instance, during the deliberations over the choice of a 

president, the key meeting may well have been that of the "big 

junta" on March 28-30. Senior officers from the services (9 

Army Major Generals; 3 Vice Admirals; 6 Air Force Brigadiers) 

met in ad hoc fashion, settled on Videla, and left the details 

on the president-junta relationship to be ironed out by the 

secretaries general. At that meeting, Army Major General and 

Interior Minister Ablano Harguindeguy bluntly informed his 

Air Force and Navy colleagues that the Army represented 70% 

of the armed forces' power and therefore, like it or not, 

Videla would be president. It was one of the few occasions of 

which we are aware, that the Army has so bluntly wielded its 

recognized power advantage. 

» 

Decision-making centers outside the junta are also 

characterized by the tri-service arrangement. The Legislative 

Advisory Commission (CAL) advises the presidency concerning 

armed forces' opinion on proposed legislation. The nine CAL 

members (3 senior officers from each service) seek and reflect 

the views of their own services, and votes are cast by service 

with the majority deciding. Should the presidency disagree 

with the CAL, the matter is decided by majority vote in the 

junta. 

The cabinet ministries are divided among the services (3 

Army, 2 Navy, 2 Air Force, 2 civilian) and tend to become the 

preserve of the presiding service. Navy control of the Foreign 

Ministry, for instance, has led Videla at times to conduct 

foreign policy outside Foreign Ministry channels. Even here, 

however, the tri-service rule is evident in form if not in substance. 

Each service is entitled to place what are called 

Junta Delegates in each of the ministries and presidential 

secretariats, and in the government of the City of Buenos 

Aires. 

t 

CQMFI DENTT-ftL-/fiXPIS_-_ 



- 4 - 

The apparent anomaly in this governing system lies in the 

ability of the junior services to outvote the more powerful 

Army two-to-one at almost every turn. That this has not 

happened often, and never on a major issue on which the Army is 

unified, can be attributed to: 

—the wide area of inter-service and intra-service 

agreement on the general parameters of the National 

Reorganization Process, a crucial factor which lends 

cohesion to the entire process; 

—tacit recognition of the Army's strength in any 

1 forced showdown; and 

—the knowledge that schisms would be the harbinger of 

a near-term end to military rule. 

Generally, the Navy has been more prone to challenge the 

Army on a variety of issues, often because of the personal 

interests and ambitions of Commander Massera. Air Force 

Commander Agosti has supported the Navy insofar as challenge 

has been useful to maintain the independence and influence of 

the junior services. But the Air Force has generally been 

inclined to side with the Army when a confrontation looms. 

Agosti has no desire to test the Army's power, nor does he want 

to appear to be endangering the military's reconstruction process 

by backing a navy boss whose motivation is suspect in most 

military quarters outside the Navy. 

It is a cumbersome decision-making process, often slow to 

function, and almost bound to give the appearance of indecisiveness 

and, at times, of officials working at cross purposes, 

i The problem is complicated by the difficulty that the Army 

often experiences in developing positiqns acceptable to senior 

1 officers with varying political and policy preferences. 

Moderates like Videla and new Army Commander Viola must work 

carefully to ensure the continued support of hardline generals 

like Suarez Mason (Corps I, Buenos Aires); Menendez (Corps III); 

and Laidlaw (Planning Ministry.) Without a coherent Army 

position on key issues, the whole tri-service pattern begins 

to disintegrate. 

However slow and seemingly inefficient the process may be, 

it has worked. Tri-service support for the government remains 

solid, and there is little indication of grumbling in the ranks 

because officers or groups of officers feel their opinions are 

not being at least heard. The system has the added virtue of 

fitting neatly with Videla's personal style and temperament. 

Cautious and reticent about acting without careful preparation, 

Videla has not been uncomfortable with the tri-service arrange- 

CQNEXgENTT AL/EXDIS-- 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2Q12/04/16 : NLC-133-22-30-1-5 

t


- 5 - 

mcnt. Argentines as well as Argentine-watchers have questioned 

the viability of his low-key style in a country that has always 

demanded and usually received strong presidential leadership. 

Nonetheless, his success to date in preserving armed forces 

cohesion argues the wisdom of his tactics. 

Massera's machinations have often added a discordant note 

to the governing process since the March 1976 coup. Politically 

astute and ambitious, the admiral has been building a political 

base that he hopes to parlay into the presidency, perhaps within 

two or three years. Seen in this light, Massera's criticisms 

of Videla's and the Army's handling of affairs emerge as an 

attempt to compile the basis for a subsequent Massera challenge 

to military government. He apparently fplans to present himself 

as a former junta member who dissented from unpopular policies 

(e.g., human rights violations and labor repression.) 

There is little doubt that Massera has complicated the 

junta's governing task, but his experience reflects the two key 

characteristics of this military government, army predominance 

and tri-service participation. 

—Massera has never pushed Videla to the point of an 

open confrontation that would force one or the other 

from power. Massera knows he would lose. He cannot 

obtain sufficient Army support to oust Videla in his 

favor. 

—Massera has been effective because he has maintained 

the support of his own service. 

Impact of the Fourth Man Scheme 

Videla's August 1 assumption of'the presidency as a retired 

officer has necessitated changes in ther decision-making process. 

Some new guidelines have been established to regulate the 

president-junta relationship, but little is clear beyond the 

fact that: 

—the junta will remain the supreme governing body, 


actions to ensure that they remain within those 

guidelines; and 

—the president will be responsible for daily government 

operations, enjoying considerable powers of 

appointment (often with junta consent.) 

CONPI-SENGaAL/KXDIS _ 


i


- 6 - 

Videla's latitude to set as well as execute policy will 

probably be decided in an ad hoc manner over the coming months. 

Critical to Videla's success will be the degree to which he 

retains Army support through Army Commander Viola. The two 

share moderate policy outlooks and have a close working 

relationship. Viola, however, will have to work assiduously 

to placate hardline Army elements and maintain their support. 

If he can do so, the Videla-Viola alliejnce can be expected to 

reflect, and wield when necessary, the Army's power edge. The - 

Air Force and Navy, on the other hand, will be seeking to 

guarantee continuation of the tri-service governing arrangement 

by ensuring that the Videla-Viola connection is not translated 

into a de facto government by the Army. 

Pressure Points. The only feasible tactic for outsiders 

interested in influencing the Argentine decision-making process 

is to attempt to gain access at the top. Since the US cannot 

directly influence the number of officers in any service 

necessary to create a consensus behind our preferred policies, 

the alternative is to work through moderate leaders in the hope 

that they will be able to sustain the support of their subordinates 

. 

At present, the selection process is complicated by: 

—the blurring of lines of authority that has accompanied 

installation of the junta-president formula; and 

—the imminence of the annual military promotion/retirement 

cycle; it could alter the political complexion of the 

armed forces, especially the Army. 

Nonetheless, the most promising alternatives remain Videla, 

Viola, and moderate army officers close to those two, particularly 

Army Secretary General Bignone and Brigadier General Jose 

Villarreal, Secretary General of the Presidency. 

A possible pressure point may emerge in the figure of Vice 

Admiral Armando Lambruschini who is expected to replace Massera 

as Navy commander on September 15. A Navy chief disposed to 

cooperate with Videla would simplify and expedite the governing 

process. Most importantly from the US perspective, it might 

obviate the Army's felt need to circumvent the navy-controlled 

Foreign Ministry and thereby prevent the lack of communication 

within the Argentine government that has complicated, among 

other things, the Argentine-IAHRC negotiations. 

Lambruschini will not indulge in the kind of political 

machinations characteristic of Massera. However, his political 

views are not well-known, nor is the extent to which he will be 

oAMTirnnutmT n T /rsVnT O 


t 

%


- 7 - 

susceptible to manipulation by a retired Massera. Likewise, 

we cannot judge the degree to which the brutal murder of 

Lambruschini's daughter will be reflected in the new commander's 

attitudes and actions. 

IAHRC Visit. We have no information on the Argentine-1AHRC 

negotiations not contained in Embassy reporting (see appended 

copy of Buenos Aires 6425 of August 18 for the most recent 

account of Argentine attitudes.) 

Timing is a crucial element. The nationalistic response 

to recent US actions (or at least how US aptions were perceived) 

provides a pretext for rejecting an IAHRC visit that can be 

convincingly used by hardline official^ who would not accept a 

visit under any terms. The current Argentine atmosphere makes 

it extremely difficult for Videla to issue an invitation without 

provoking charges of "vende patria" from disgruntled military 

and aroused citizens. 

The chances of a visit will increase if the IAHRC can 

justify something leas than a totally unconditioned presence in 

Argentina. We understand that a precedent for a visit under 

previously agreed guidelines may exist in the form of the 

Commission's 1974 visit to Chile. The Commission may also be 

inclined to compromise because of the area-wide implications 

of an on-site visit to any Southern Cone country. By accepting 

half-a-loaf, the IAHRC might fatally undermine the reported 

mid-1977 agreement among Southern Cone governments to bam IAHRC 

visits to the area. 

i 

I 

( 

Drafted: 

INR/RAR:JEBuchananrblap 

8/25/78' 

^ 

Approved: INR/RAR/OD:Hunter L. Estep 

COMF1DENTIAL/EXDfS- 


T----------- --- ----- -------------------------- ----------------------- 

»

A 


atl i«rr 

DOS REVIEWED 07-Feb-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] : ;; 

MffMOJlANDOM TO* 

TME ACTING IICUTA2Y OT STATE 

ahmM IwoIA to » —pf *tf yw Twin Hjiw ftw Mb 

IfTTp At nuUM'i NMMta. 

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DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13S28 

Authority N Lg" 

NAHA_££------Date------1 «iIik I 

t 

ll\lr> Dhifir.Hnn To Dedassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-4-18-1



WASHINGTON 

June 23, 1977 

•SECRET 


FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 


Guinea. I met with the Guinean Prime Minister 

and several members of his Cabinet today. At the end 

of a long session, he said that he was authorized by 

President Toure to tell us that the Soviet intelligence 

flights out of Guinea would be stopped, as of 

today. Although not necessarily tied to the termination 

of the flights, he tabled a request for Coast Guard 

cutters to patrol Guinea's shores. I told him that we 

doubted that Guinea's security was threatened, but 

would earnestly consider the request. 

Although our information is that human rights 

conditions are very bad in Guinea, the Prime Minister 

strongly endorsed our human rights initiatives. He 

said that Guinea is prepared to allow an international 

group to conduct an examination of Its human rights 

situation. Because Guinea repoxttedly holds large 

numbers of political prisoners, I indicated it would 

be a significant step if Guinea would identify its 

political prisoners, indicate the reasons for their 

incarceration, and the length of their sentences. 

I told the Prime Minister that if Guinea followed 

through on the statements made today, it could lead to . 

a great improvement in our relations. He seems desirous 

of doing so, to open the way to more aid and investment 

and to offset close ties with the Soviets. The 

Prime Minister delivered a letter to you from President 

Toure, which wo forwarded immediately with a rough 

translation. 

SECRET 

V GDS 

Mn Ohiortinn Tn nprlaQQifiratinn in Full 7D12/1P/12 ‘ Nl fi-7-1 fl-4-18-1

No Objection To Declassification in Full £012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-4-18-1 

SECRET 

- 2 - 

Belgrade. The wire aervices are reporting a tough 

statement bySoviet Delegation chief Vorontsov to the 

effect that if the Soviet Union does not get its way 

in the current debate over the agenda for the main 

meeting there could be "great unpleasantness (and) the 

failure of our mission." This is characterized by the 

press as a Soviet threat to walk out if they cannot 

achieve a satisfactory agenda. 

Our Delegation believes that the Soviet statement 

iB a tactical ploy to pressure the West to be more 

receptive to the Eastern position on the agenda, rather 

than a threat to walk out. Despite dramatic press 

reports, there is no atmosphere of confrontation or 

crisis in Belgrade. Generally sneaking, the preparatory 

meeting in Belgrade is proceeding along anticipated 

lines, and we should be prepared for a substantial 

period of pulling-and-hauling. 

OAS. Before the OAS meeting in Grenada ended 

late yesterday, the U.S. Delegation, assisted by 

Venezuela and Costa Rica, pushed through a strong 

resolution on human rights. It waB supported by 

every country visited by Mrs. Carter except Brazil. 

The resolution affirms the rule of law and asserts 

that no circumstances justify torture or prolonged 

detention without trial. It commends the OAS Human 

Rights Commission (composed of seven experts elected 

as individuals rather than aB representatives of their 

countries), and asks member states to cooperate with the 

Commission and not to retaliate against individuals who 

cooperate with it. 

The resolution also asks the Commission to organize 

a program of consultations with governments, institutions, 

and organizations to fulfill, its function of 

protecting human rights in the hemisphere. This last 

point is a step short of the program of Commission 

visits to member countries for which we had originally 

hoped, but it is a step forward. 

In contrast to previous General Assemblies, 

economic issues were not given priority attention. 

The Latin Americans appeared to be more interested 

SECRET 

iMn nhiontinn Tn floHaccifiratinn in Full 9H19/19/1? • Nl fl-7-1 fl-4-18-ll


■SB6SET-" 

- 3 - 

in cooperation with the United States than in confrontation. 

We had to abstain on several resolutions 

(e.g., OPEC exclusion, Panama Canal tolls) but we were 

able to support a general resolution on trade cooperation 

and consultation. 

Portugal. Our efforts to secure international 

financial support for Portugal hkve been successful. 

Meeting yesterday in Paris, eleven countries — Germany, 

France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 

Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and 

Venezuela — made formal commitments to provide $750 

million in balance of payments loans over the next 

eighteen months. Austria, Ireland and Canada have 

participation under active and sympathetic consideration. 

For its part, Portugal announced its intention 

to take further economic stabilization steps in cooperation 

with the IMF and to negotiate a second credit 

agreement with the IMF by the end of the year. 

Although some follow-up with foreign governments 

will be necessary to complete arrangements, our major 

effort now will be to secure Congressional approval of 

the $300 million loan the U.S. has pledged as our contribution. 

The House and Senate have approved legislation 

authorizing the loan. The House is expected to appropriate 

the $300 million later tonight or tomorrow, but 

the Senate is not expected to act until late July. 

Yugoslav M-47 Tanks to Ethippia. We have instructed 

our Ambassador to raise the issue of the tanks with the 

Yugoslav government. 

Canadian GaB Prices. The Government of Canada 

announced today that the price of natural gas exported 

to the U.S. will increase from $1.94 to $2.16 per 

thousand cubic feet. The Canadians had proposed a 

price of $2.25 but agreed to reduce it after discussions 

with us. The nine cent price reduction will save consumers 

approximately $90 million. The new price will 

remain in effect for at least six months, but will then 

be subject to review. Further price increases can be 

expected as Canada continues its policy of pricing 

natural gas at the equivalent of world oil prices. 

J&B&tET----- 

T

No Option To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-4-18-1 

SfieKETp t 

% 

- 4 - 

Cuba. We learned late Monday that an anti-Castro 

terrorist group was planning a raid on Cuba. We passed 

this information to the Cuban Government the same day. 

Cy inquired whether the FBI could caution the exile 

terrorists against making the raid, but we were informed 

that this cannot be done without jeopardizing the lives 

of informants. However, our law enforcement authorities 

plan to make arrests if evidence is developed, and to 

interdict the raid if it proceeds. 

> 

u 

A.V 

On Tuesday, at the request of U.S. Customs, we 

alerted Cuba that four unmarked U.S. Customs Bhips are 

observing the terrorist group. Yesterday, we received 

a Cuban reply thanking us for the information we passed 

and advising that its naval units are aware of the 

presence of our ships. 

* 

Foreign Affairs Appropriations. The House is 

wrapping up two days of fairly intense debate on the 

appropriations bill tonight. Among the major developments, 

Congressman Miller prevailed late today with an 

across-the-board five percent cut (212-178). Funds can 

come from one program or all. Earlier in the day, we 

staved off an effort to make a substantial cut in fundB 

for the International Development Association of the 

World Bank. The leadership worked hard against both 

these amendments. All other fund-cut amendments were 

defeated. 

, Today Mozambique, Angola, and Cuba were added to 

the list of countries to which "indirect" assistance is 

prohibited by the Young amendment, passed yesterday. 

On the other hand, after eliminating all remaining 

military aid to Argentina yesterday, the House today 

restored approximately $3 million for aid to Nicaragua 

(225-187) . Finally, Harkin's amendment to reduce the 

FMS program for Korea was defeated this evening on a 

voice vote. Majority Leader Wright, Republican Ed 

Derwinski, HIRC Chairman Zablocki and Sam Stratton 

led the debate against the amendment. 

t 

•-SECRET--- 

iNo Obiertinn To Declassification in Full 2012/12/15^NUT^^^^|


w -stunt I w 


NLC-6-4-6-2-2 

rnuumiriG 

TELEGRAM 

If- 

DOS REVIEWED 15-Aug-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULLj 

PACE »: GUAÊM B3H6 II OF 12 1119:32 

AC'. C.’i JRA-BS 

■NFO OC'-ll SS-:a SO-ll SP-12 DHA-12 H-ll I NR-15 

NSC-15 YSCE-II ClAE-fl 5SC-I2 NNE-II /I55 * 

................................... I12IA9Z 125533 /SA 5 

0 IliiilZ JUS 77 

FM AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 

TC S:C5rATE ftiS-SC IMUEOlATE (232 

TREJ5 DEPT IMMEDIATE 

LINGlS 

SECT 101 1 OF 2 GUATEMALA 3*46 

TREASjR' FOR PETE' BR DCFS 

E.O. 11(52 GOS 

TAGS: 9C0K, EF III SfcjU C’ 

S'JBJ: SECRETARY 3LJHESTHA'-1 S BMTERAL UEETIH6 WITH ARCERTIRA 

REFi GUATEMALA 3MS, BRIOGES-GITTNER TELECOM 

AS PFR RESUEST BY III. PETER II:DGES THERE FOLLOW MEUGOR OF 

SECRETART BLU'MENTHAL'S BILATERAL MEETING HITH ARGENTINE MINISTER 

OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOZs 


PARTICIPANTS: 

ARGEN’iNA: JOSE ALFREDO MARTINEZ DE HOZ. MINISTER OF ECONOMY 

ALDOLFC CEXAR DlZ, PRESIDENT OF THE CENTRAL BANR 

3ANTE SillONE. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, IMF 

J. S. 

MICHAEL BLUMENTHAL. SECRETARY CF TREASURY 

C. FRET RERGSTEN. ASS.S'AN' SECRETARY OF TREASURY 

ARNOLD '■ACHMANOFF. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF TREASURY 

RICHARD ARELLANO. DEPUTT ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 

EDUARD B’TTNER. OFFICE OF DEVELOPING NATIONS FINANCE, TREASURY 

TiME AND PLACE: MAY 31. 1372 - U.S. CHANCERY, GUATEMALA 

SUBJ: BILATERAL MEETING WITH ARGENTINA 

MARTINEZ DE HOZ SAI9 HE NAS GRATEFUL FOR OPPORTUNl'Y TO EXPLAIN 

PERSONALLY TO SECRETARY BlUMENTHAL THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS THAT 

ARGENTINA HAS UAOE SINCE THE ADMINISTRATION OF VlDELA. HE BEGAN 

1122 

by S un; a ce’ai.ed oescriP'ion cf the political machinations 

LEADING „P TO THE MILITARY TAREOVER IN MAR 197B. EMPHASIZING 

THAT THE MILITARY RELUCTANTLY ASSUMED POWER WHEN PERON'S RIFE HAO 

LCS' CONTROL OF T»E POLITICAL SITUATION AND THE ECONOM* HID REACHED 

-p;:> BCCU . HE SA D "E AGREED '0 BE SI■ F«ISTtP OF ECCNCL’Y ONLY 

IF *L HAC THE COMPLETE POilTICAL BACHING OF ThE MILITARY AND IF 

HE WOULD HAVE CONTROL OVER ALL MINISTRIES INVOLVING THE ECONOMY. 

THE MILITARY INHERITED A LEGACY 0* TERROR ST ORGANIZATIONS WHICH 

PE'ON HAO (ACRED iN ORDER TG OPPOSE THE PREVIOLS GOVERNMENTS. 

BUT WHICH ULTiUATELY GOT OUT Cr CONTROL. 

6UATEU 13US fl OF IZ BUS 131 

DE HOZ IF HE SMI A WAT TO MOVE FROM EXTRA LEGAL METHODS CF CON 

TROL TO THE NORMAL LEGAL PROCESS IN HANDLING TERRORISTS, 

t 

MART.NEZ OE HC2 SAID THAT NHILE ARGERTlNA ADMIRES U.S. TRADIT CSS 

ANO LAWS AND CITED THE COMMON HISTORY. ThE PRESENT S>TUATlON 

IS HIGHLY ABNORMAL STEMMING IN PART BY INHIBITION OF THE JUDICIARY 

TO SEN’EHCE TERROR'STS BECAUSE OF FEAR OF RETIIBUT ON AGAINS' 

THEMSELVES ANO THEIR FAMILIES. THE POLICE BECAME DISCOURSE! WHEN 

TERRORISTS BROUGHT TO TRIAL WERE ALWAYS SET FREE. THUS. A POLiCY 

OF TAXIRG NO PRISONERS WAS ADOPTED. LIKEWISE, TOUNG MIL TART 

OFFICERS T00K MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANGS. MARTINEZ GE HOZ 

SAID PRESIDENT VlDELA IS COMMITTED TO RESTORING HUMAN RIGHTS. 

CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN WIPING OUT THE TWO MAIN 

TERRORIST GROUPS AND HE ANT IC1 PATES GlAOUAL IIPROYEMENT IN 

RESTORIN': human RIGHTS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. 

(OSTER 

MAR’iF.EZ :E “01 RE YERfATED 'HE ECONOMIC PROCESS W** ■ Ch -IS 

BEEN MADE UNGE' H 3 .EACERSH!". DIRECTING CJR ATTENTICN TD BOOK 

W.'H CHAR'S SHOWING INTER ALIA DECREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT. 

DECREASE N MONETARY EXPANSION. INCPEASE IN AGRICULTURAL PRO- 

DLC Gil. ENE»5v PROO.GTION ANO EXFORT SHIPMENTS, REDUCTION N 

GCVF'NWN' OEF:Ci’. OECL:NE IN RATE OF INFLATION. AND IMPROVE 

MENT IN EXTERNAL SECTOR. HE SA'C HE WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE THE 

PCP-LA’lCN ABC.-' 'HE NECESS.'* OF A DECEASE: GROWTH IN REAL WAGES 

AS 'H PR Ci ;0R AC* EVi-.G S'AB L Tf. 

Sl'.V'K'HA. SA 0 HE AOMPEO THE PROGRESS IN THS ECONOMY WHICH 

ha: been UCE J'.C UNOE’S'i'.OS '-E FOlI' C*. 3 ’LA'.ON S'EVL'lNC 

FROM ’HE TERFC SU N-ER 'EC '"Oil FFEv O'jj 3CEP,.,'ET.TS. -E C TEC 

THE FACT THAT 'HE BENOiX CORPCRAT'CN W'tH KHiEh HE PREiC.'SiT HAC 

5:L'l as.r: A'EC .CS' 'HFEE EI,sl:*fs 'C TERFC? STS. ’-EyEP- 

'ir FSi. VE .. S. S .'ER* CC'iCE'NEC A»E.t ;«E P'OIESS CF .A» 

II,: T»i GE’.E'A. FRC'ECTICN of HlUAN R'C-TS. he AsFEC "S'T.'.EZ 

Authority 

declassified 

E.0.13S2F 

.S'__ Oslo. 

NASAiNn 

Ohientinn To Declassification in Full 2012/12/11 : NLC-6-4-6-2-21


' -W&Kirt- * 


1 : NLC-6-4-6-2-2 

INCUMING 

TELEGRAM 

NEE II EE1TEI lilil l£ OF 12 IIUEEE Ell! SUETEH EEE4E EE OF n IIIEE11 

ACT I Oh ARA-BS 

info ocT-ii ss-u iso-n sp-»2 oha-iz h-b: inr-bs 

NSC-BS NSCE-II ClAE-ll 110-11 INRE-SB /US W 

....................................B12B4SZ B2BZS4 /u s 

S 0111412 J UK 11 

FM AUEHBASS* GUATEMALA 

TO SECSTATE WASHOC 'JUEOIATE 6233 

TPEAS CtPT IV1XC.ATE 

CONGRESS'S POSITION FIRMLY TO MARTINEZ OE HOZ SUBSEQUENT 

TO THE LATTER'S BILATERAL WITH SECRETARY SLUMENTHAL. U.S. 

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR RALPH DURBAN MADE THE SAME CASE ON A 

DIFFERENT OCCASION TO MARTINEZ OE HOZ. 

BOSTER 

1 

scour T"SrCTIC4 2 CF 2 GUATEMALA 344s 

LIHOIS 

' TREASURY FOR PETER BRIDGES 

I 

SLUMENTHAL SAIO THAT WILE WE ARE UNDERSTAND INC OF ARGENTINA'S 

PROBLEM AMD WE DON'T WISH TO INTERFERE INTERNALLY. THE CARTER 

ADMINISTRATION MUST BE CONSISTENT IN THE PURSUIT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. 

THE HARK IN AMENDMENT REQUIRES US TO VOTE AGAINST LOANS BY THE I OB 

FOR COUNTRIES WITH GROSS VIOLATIONS EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF THE 

NEEDY. THE BADILLO AMENDMENT, WHICh ALREADY HAS PASSED THE HOUSE 

WOULD EXTEND THIS LAW TO OTHER IFI'S. WHILE HUMPHREY 

AMENDMENT WOULD PRCVIOF UORF FLEXIBILITY, THE ADMINISTRATION IS AS 

A MATTER OF ITS OWN POLiCY AND CONV:CTIOh, COMMITTED TO THE 

ADVANCEMENT OF UMAR RIGHTS. HE SUGGESTED, THEREFORE, THAT IT 

MIGHT BE ACVISEABLE FOR ARGENTINA TO POSTPONE APPLICATIONS FOR 

LOANS UNT'L IT COJLD SHOW SOME DEFINITE IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS. 

MARTINEZ DE H02 SAID THAT PRESIDENT VlDELA IS COMMITTED TO 

RESTORIHG HUMAN RIGHTS AS SCON AS POSSIBLE. ARGENTINA HAS TWO 

LOANS 'N THE PIPELINE FOR IDB CONSIDERATION WHICH COULD BE HELD 

UP. BUT HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT A Sill MILLION LOAN FOR THE NATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT BANK WHICH IS BEING CONSIDERED BY THE IBRD. HE 

EXPRESSED CONCERN THAI ARGENTINA WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO UTILIZE ITS 

S3II MILLION QUOTA WITH THE IBRD IF THE LOAN WERE DELAYEO TO THE 

NEXT FISCAL YEAR. HE SAIO HE HOPED THAT THIS LOAN MIGHT GET 

THROUGH THE "NEEDY" LOOPHOLE ON THE GROUNDS OF EMPLOYMENT GENERATION. 

SLUMENTHAL RESPONDED BY INDICATING THAT THE IBRD LOAN IS VERY 

L'(ElY TO PRESENT PROBLEMS FOR US. 

MARTINEZ DE HOZ BECAME SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE AND ASHED WHO 

I WORRIES ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE VICTIMS OF THE TERRORISTS. 

ARELLANO SA'D THERE IS N0 WAV OF RAT.OhAL!Z■KG HUMAN RIGHTS 

1 VIOLATIONS. 

IN RESPONSE TD BlUMENTHAL'S QUESTION ABOUT ASSERTIONS OF 

ANTI-SEMITISM IN ARGENTINA. MARTINEZ CLAIMED THERE WAS NO SUBSTANCE 

TO THE CHARGES. 

SLUMENTHAL SAIO HE BELIEVES THAT THE U.S. POSITION IS CLEAR. 

WE HOPE TO SEE IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS MADE OUICXLY AND WOULD 

LIKE T0 BE INFORMED CONCERNING PROGRESSMADE. 

SIJVEThAl RE TERATED U.S. OPPOSITION TC ANY INCREASE IN 

SA.ARY FOR IGB EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND ASKED FDR ARGENT NA'S 

Support. 

VAR'.NEZ CE HOZ AGFEED '0 OISCjSS SALARY ISS.E *,TK ORT Z MENA 

» 'H "hi OBJECT *E 0‘ WAV - NS IT PJ' AS'C;. HE ’"Eh BROUGHT l'P TPE 

pass b l 1 ty ;f iital eeing elim^na'e:. or transformed, i■ Pice 

.HTAi is *hE CNl* IN'LRNAT ORAL CRCAN./A"'ON LOCATED IN ARGENT,HA 

MARTINET CL hcz IS ANXIOUS THAT .r REMAIN there '.N some form. 

BERGSTEN SAID THAT AS 'HE SECBE'ARV NOlCATED IN HIS IDB 

MEETING SbEECH. THE L.S. WISHES TO STUDY THE FUTURE CF INTAL. 

MARTIlif2 OE "OZ THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR BEING ABLE TO SPEAK 

FRANtl' ABCb* TPE Sl'UA'-ON IN ARGENTi.NA. 

AS REPORTED PE'TE. CONGRESSMAN BAO'lLC EXPLAINED 

Sftftff— '

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-1-3 16 

CQNgjPEN' DENTIAL 

DOS REVIEWED 21 Aug-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 






taken to promote human rights. This latter category 


financial institutions, a subject which the 

Argentine Minister of Economy surely will raise with 

you. 


- Human Rights: Wanton violations of human rightB 

are taking place in the name of^counterterrorism. We 


processes. 







- Petroleum: The U.S. Geological Service has estimated 










and agricultural fields.) 

t 


Antarctic research program and an eventual, claim to polar 

resources. 


wholly literate, generally self-sufficient industrial 


CONFIDENTIAL 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13520 , . _ 

Authority >4 ~ --------- - 

NARA_£^L__ Dato___------------------ 

iNo Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-1-3|


_-COKFIBS«TlSr 

Political Violence and Human Rights 

The Argentine military inherited an almost inpossible 


Isabel Peron in March 1976. Terror and. inflation were 






the contrary, they are polarizing society. The government 






government, anti-Semitism is also a problem. However, 


and Marxists, continue to murder military personnel, 





attempt. laBt month. 








influence.) 








to internal security are now defied routinely. Other 







CONFIDENTIAL-


- 3 - 






the World Bank before voting foi* a $105 million highway 

project. 


of how to vote on $265 million in five loans Boon to 


Bank and the World Bank. ThiB issue was raised by 











waB particularly difficult for us (because it may be 



Martinez de Hoz may well mike a plea for greater 

understanding of Argentina1s difficult problems and 



— Compliment the Minister for his achievements to 

date in restoring Argentine economic stability (notably 



— Inquire about the health of the former Foreign 


attempt. 

— Ask why it has not been possible for the government 



guerrillas. 





-GQNFfBENTIAL—« 

* 

iNo Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-1-3


gPMgiujM'ngi; 

- 4 - 

— Refer to Secretary Blumenthal's suggestion 

that it would be helpful if Argentina deferred loan 



t 

f 

—SeNFIDENTIKE-- 

|No Objection To Declassification in full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-6-1-3

■ ,*No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8 

. ' • -IT 



S/5 


TO: The Secretary ^ 

FROM: 



I. Objectives 

U.S.-Argentine relations are increasingly strained. 







President Videla offers the best hope on the nuclear 







In this context, our objectives are to: 





obtain Videla's agreement to ratify Tlatelolco, 


to set the stage for possible movement op the reprocessing 

issue; 




due process, and (b) ending "disappearances" and torture./^ 

declassified 

E.0.13526_ -H-V? 

Authority 

N ARA -----DstQ —^ 

°nW1 

BBCRBT 

“dDS 



"'-S'- 









II. Setting 



economic nationalism have long impaired jits otherwise 







is the Army member, came to power with two- primary 


the economy. 












of all kinds, and even cynical maneuverings to weaken 

contending government factions, and may as occasion 

be designed to embarrass Videla himself. 










■SECRET-- ' ■ 


■ .-No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8 

OCiV*£V£«4. 


Foreign currency reserves now exceed *$3 billion, inflation 


serious distortions in relative prices have been corrected 


On the negative side, the government has not been able 
















have led to considerable new interest and Borne new 


















Videla and boost his own chances for the'Presidency. 

t 





■BSCRET - 



5»r.v-nriJ. 

' -1- 

powerful labor unions are largely under the control 


Argentina's international actiyity has been 




Argentina does have an exceptionally (able diplomatic 








makinq basic decisions to reduce their ties to us. 




Argentines are fully aware of our nuclear preoccupations 






There is, however, no great tension now.' An April 



nationalist sentiments in-Argentina, already resentful 




more inclined toward negotiation. The Navy 




relations. 

III. Key Issues 


U. S. Objective; To convince the Argentines that 




-SECRET 

t 



egCRBT- 

Argentine Objective; To convince the US that the 

human rights violatloni"which have taken place were 


were an unfortunate but necessary part of tiie fight 









violations and underestimate the terrbrist actions 

which triggered■them. 










Supreme Court writs of habeaB corpus concerning 

the disappeared are often ignored by tne government. 






I 










prisoners. 





— SECRET' 


t


tsGRBT— 

-6-~ ’ 







has just given us an unverified' list containing the 












decided. 


the "right of option." We hope that its provisions will 










instances. 





^ 







8BCRBT 



-7- 

2. 

Terrorism 

P. S. Objective; To remind the Argentines that we, too, 



Argentine Objective; To focus U. S. thinking on 











in Foreign Minister Montes' speech to the PNGA in 






in May. 



three businessmen were killed, ’and the office of the Labor 






to express our sympathy to these men and.their families. 






■ U. S. Objectives: To have Argentina ratify the Treaty 



explosions. 

.j&eeRE*—. 


i



in order to have greater- energy independence, to become a 










a research reactor (195B), the first (and so far only 




accept fullscope safeguards and forego nuclear explosions, 







both Argentina and Brazil which is 'outlined in the background 
















involve your deferral of reprocessing plans while an urgent 


manner. 

i 

No Objection To Declassification in FAN 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8

•No Objection To Declassification in Fflll 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8 











I 





4. P. S.-Argentine, Military Relations 

P. S. Objectives: To assure the Argentines that we 



performance. 1 

Argentine Objective: To inform us that it values 

its military ties to the g. S., but that without a 

clarification of g.S. arms policies, particularly on 



I 

Essential Factors: U. S.-Argentine military relations 

have deteriorated sharply'as a result of g. S. actions taken 

to disassociate the g. S. from the GOA's human rights 


has refused all military Bales financing for fiscal 






military requests. * 

While our policy haB little real military significance 



dropped out of ONITAS fleet exercises this year. Ontil 





^SECRET 



~=ITF~ 

Points to be Hade 
















5. .Argentina and the International Financial 

institutions 

I 

U.S. Objectives; To explain to the' Argentines that 

we cannot support their loan requeBtd, except those which 



* 

Argentine Objective; To persuade the' U.S. to vote 

"yes" or abstain on Argentine loan requests in the IPIs. 


voting "no" on one loan and told the Argentines that 






•’no", and informed the Argentines that without human 



voted "yes" on a potable Water loan in the IDB that 





have been delayed until after your v.isit.) 




SECBES— 



after significant improvements in human rights have 

taken place, vote "no". 







t 




in the World Bank and IDB when future loans come up. 






U.S. Objectives: To encourage Argentina to use its 

influence within the G-77 on issues where our 


Argentine Objective; To encourage the U. S. to 



* 

Essential Factors! Although outtwardly supportive 










exporter of any of the 18 core commodities. ' Last September, 







JiECRET—■ 

t 



-l2- 


has strongly criticized our "basic human needs strategy" 

as a no growth ploy designed to divide the LOCs. 



moderate position Argentina has taken on many economic 







to North/South issues. ' ( 


the Argentines in the MTN- negotiations, and would 







obviously essential to meet basic human needs 



U. S, Objective: To be receptive to Argentine requests 


I 



% 

Essential Factors: A U.S-Argentine Mixed Economic 

Commission was established in 1966, out as moribund. The 

Argentines proposed its reactivation whem Assistant Secretary 







of too close a relationship to Argentina at this time. 


I

■ .'No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8 

The Argentines may wish to use a* reactivated 












PointB to be Made; 

The U. S. views the Economic Commission as a useful 






»■ 






, U. S. Objective: To consider Argentine proposals 











■ M ——i « ■■ ^ 

V 





-fteeREt----- 



.SECRET t 

~n- 


U. S. Objectives; To encourage greater technology < 

development in LDCs, but to restrain discrimination .7 

against U. S. suppliers of technology. To insure that ll 

IFI and USAID money is used to finance the best technology// 

available, regardless of origin. // 

Argentine Objective; To foBter greater utilization of 


agreements. 

Essential Factors: A United Nations Conference on 







t 


the goal of cooperating with LDCs 'to enhance use of technology 





use of LDC technology for its own Bake at the expense of 







Argentine Objective: To solicit U. S. support for the 

return of the U. held Malvinas Islandb to Argentina. 

(The Argentines would prefer you use fthe name Malvinas.) 


the U~ KT since 1833. Argentine-UK conversations 





JSfiCRET 


. 'No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-9-8 

-15- 












approach. 







— Argentina should show restraint: any "incident" would 


t 

JJEGfffiT-' 


No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55 -7-4/3k it 

t 

DOS^REVIEWED 28-Vlay-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 

A SUMMARY OF THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE INTER-AGENCY COMMITTEE 

ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE 

MAY - OCTOBER 1977 

t 

declassified 

E.O.J^ g.3 

Authority—3^ r-i----- -------- * 

NARA__Ds®3-----1' ------- — 



No Objection To DeUcibbifiudliun in full 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-7-4-3, ?#■ 

Afghanistan 

t 

May 19, 1977 

IDA Agricultural Bank - $12 million 

The Committee recommended that a demarche be made to the GOA Unking 

our support for their loans in the International financial Institutions 

to human rights considerations. 


May 19, 1977 

IBRD - $100 million 

IFC - $ 7 million 

IDB Gas Pipeline - $35 million 

IDB Petro-chemlcal Program - $83 

% 

IDB Urban and Rural Potable Water - $40 million 

The Committee agreed that Secretary Blumenthal should ask Econorny 

Minister Martinez de Hoz, when he sees him on June 1 at the Annual 

IDB meeting in Guatemala to postpone an upcoming $100 million Industrial 

credit loan 1n the IBRD. He will also Inform the Minister that, because 

of human rights considerations, we may have problems with other loans 

1n both the IDB and the IBRD and that we would like to avoid a 

confrontation on them by having them delayed until a more propitious 

time. It was also agreed that the U.S. Executive Directors 1n the IDB 

and IBRD would indicate to their colleagues that the U.S. was seeking 

a delay on consideration of these loans. 

June 9, 1977 

The Committee was appraised that despite U.S. urging, the Argentines had 

refused to withdraw the $100 million loan In the World Bank. Another 

small $7 million loan was scheduled to come up for consideration at the 

same time. The Committee agreed that the U.S. should abstain on these 

two World Bank loans and make a statement at the Bank Board meeting 

explaining our action. The rationale for not deciding to vote no was 

that a graduated approach was considered to be more likely to obtain 

positive results from the Argentines. It was agreed that the U.S. Bank 

Director could let other Bank Directors know a few days 1n advance that 

we would not be supporting this loan. 

eONriDLNTIAL 



XQNriDCNTIAb 

- 2 - 

i 

' 

August 11, 1977 

■ Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 

$36 million loan 

IDB petro-chemlcal program $80 million loan 

IDB/FSO potable water $32 million ordinary 

capital loan 

$51 million Fund for Special Operations 

(FSO) local currency 

IDB cellulose $50 million loan 

IDB global Industrial* credit $30 million loan 

There was a consensus 1n the Committee that the human rights situation 

had not changed sufficiently to warrant altering our previous position 

of opposing pending IFI loans because of human rights considerations. 

Thr Group, however, determined that it would be preferable not to take 

action on any of these loans until after It had considered the country 

evaluation paper for Argentina and directed that the paper be prepared 

by August 20. 

September 28, 1977 IDB gas pipeline $36 million loan 

IDB petro-chemlcal program $80 million loan 

IDB/FSO potable water $32 million ordinary 

capital loan, $51 million local currency 

IDB cellulose $50 million loan 

IDB global industrial credit $30 million loan 

The Committee determined that the U.S. woul*d support the IDB potable 

water loan on the basis that it provides for basic human needs, and 

vote no on the other four IFI loans considered at this meeting. 

XflttFTPEWHAt— 


I


Benin 

Hay 19, 1977 

- 3 - 

IDA Feeder Roads - $5.5m 

IDA Technical Assistance - $2 m 

The Committee recommended that the United States abstain on these two 

loans, and directed that U.S. Executive Director to make a statement 

1n the Board explaining that our abstention is a reflection of our concern 

for human rights conditions in Benin. 

f 

June 24, 1977 

ADF Rural Health Services - $5,5m 

The Committee agreed that the United States should vote favorably on 

this loan and make private representations in the Capital of Benin and 

among Fund Board members explaining that we are supporting this loan 

because it clearly will directly benefit the needy. 

Bolivia 

August 11, 1977 IBRD urban development $17 million loan 

IDB agricultural credit $6.4 million loan . 

AID agricultural sector II $8 million loan 

AID small farm production $600,000 grant 

AID rural enterprises and agri-business $8.3 

million loan 

f 

AID product credit guarantee program $2.5 million 

guarantee 

The Group agreed to accept the staff recommendation for support of the 

IFI and AID programs but directed that the Bolivian government be 

specifically informed by diplomatic demarche of our human rights 

concerns and our consideration of human rights situations in future 

evaluation of both bilateral and multilateral assistance. The demarche 

should include specific reference to the flaws 1n due process present 

in the judicial system, limitations on the free operation of labor unions, 

detention of labor leaders, arbitrary arrest and detention and denial of 

due process. The demarche can also express hope for an early return to 

democratic processes, noting the government's recent statement that 

elections will be early In 1980. 

. qONEISEffffAtr 


t


- 4 - 

October 14, 1977 IDB, Vocational Education Loan, $20 million 

October 

IDB, Agriculture Credit Loan, $12 million 

October 

t 

The Committee recommended that the U.S. support both of the upcoming 

loans to Bolivia 1n the IDB but to link their Implementation to a 

demarche to the GOB expressing continued U.S. concern with the human 

rights situation in that country. 

Brazil 

June 24, 1977 IDB Petro-chemical Technology - $20m 

IDB Copper Smelter - $60m 

IDB Hydroelectric Facilities - $60m 

The Committee recommended to the Secretary that, in a response to the 

Brazilian Foreign Minister's letter, he cite concern over the Brazilian 

pressure on Paraguay, note both recent positive actions with regard to 

rights of the person but continuing human rights concerns in Brazil, 

and mention that the U.S. takes the internal human rights situation in a 

country Into account In connection with our consideration of loans 1n 

the IFIs. 

t 

September 14, 1977 IBRD Ceara rural development loan, $17 million, 

ordinary capital 

The Committee agreed to postpone a decision on a formal demarche to 

Brazil 1n relation to a recent vote in favor of a $17 million loan 

(rural development) from the IBRD, until the Country Evaluation Plan on 

human rights 1n Brazil could be reviewed. 

_£ONTWENTIAL---t 



■OTTTrTVUli rflWFTTIFNTTAl Alii* 

Central African Empire 

- 5 - 

< 

August 11, 1977 AFDF health $5.5 mil Hon loan 

AID Ouham Province rural health $435,000 grant 

The Committee noted the difficult human rights situation in the country 

and the recent arrests of foreign journalists and a U.S. Peace Corps 

volunteer, and suggested deferring both pending loans until the country 

evaluation plan could be considered. 

September 21, 1977 ADF health loan, $5 million 

AID Ouham Province rural health grant, $435,000 

In response to a request made at the last meeting, a_ paper was prepared 

on the situation 1n the CAE, outlining U.S. government's actions 1n 

response to 1t. The report calls for cancellation of new fiscal year 

1 78 and 1 79 AID programs, a determination to defer a decision on 

sending a USIA officer (PAO) and to not send an AID program officer to 

Bangui, and a recommendation that the U.S. would not send a special 

emmisary from the President to the Emperlor's coronation ceremony. The 

report also calls for continuation of the peace corps program In the CAE. 

It also calls for a fiscal year 1 78 AID apprfpriatlon of some $435,000 

to finance the second phase of an ongoing rural health project. The 

Committee agreed that this strategy Is an appropriate one. In addition, 

1t was recommended that the U.S. abstain on an upcoming loan 1n the AFDF 

to the Central African Empire, accompaning this abstention with a 

statement by our alternative executive director at -the AFDF to the 

C.A.E.'s representative. This course of action would be consistent with 

actions undertaken by us with regard to loans to Benin and Ethiopia. 

t 

-CONFfBENTfAt— 


Chile 

June 24, 1977 


- 6 - 

AID Small Farmer Irrigation - $7 million 

AID Small Farmer Marketing - $2.6 million 

Export-Import Bank - Crfedit Request - Amount Unknown 

The Committee agreed to recommend postponing implementation of the AID 

loans and reviewing them again later In the fiscal year. It also 

recommended that Ex-Im delay raising its current lending limitations 

for Chile. (Note: In a diplomatic note received on June 27, following 

the publication of the Comnittee's decision to delay implementation of 

two AID projects, the Embassy of Chile notified the Department of State 

of GOC desire to "decline the economic assistance" provided to them in 

the FY 77 Foreign Assistance Act. This amounts to $27.5 million: 

$15 million in PL 480 Title I and $12.5 million in development loans 

and grants). 

September 14, 1977 IDB industrial credit relending loan, $20 million 

CCC wheat purchase credit for rural miller's 

association, $10 million 

The Committee agreed that the U.S. should vote against the proposed IDB 

loan of $20 million (industrial credit relending) if the Chileans press 

their application to a vote. It was noted that the Harkln Amendment 

requires a negative vote since Chile is a grosi violator and the loan 

does not.go to the needy. It was further felt that it would be 

desirable to have the supporting votes of the other western democracies 

in the IDB and efforts to make those countries aware of our position 

should be begun. 

Discussion of a private Chilean group's application.for a $10 million 

CCC credit (wheat) was inconclusive. It was decided, therefore, to 

postpone a decision on the Chilean application pending study of a 

paper on these aspects of CCC arrangements. 

-GQNFEBENTiAt:— 


I


- 7 - 

El Salvador 

May 6, 1977 

IDS - Hydroelectric Power - $90 million 

There was a general consensus within the Group that the U.S. which has 

veto power over a portion of this loan should approach the IDB management 

with an attempt to obtain an indefinite postponement of this loan 

for at least a few months until we could observe some change in the 

human rights'situation 1n El Salvador. There was also a consensus that 

we should advise the GOES that our decision is based on both human 

rights concerns and concerns with the economic rationale of the 

project. 

I 

June 6, 1977 

IBRD sites and services - $12.7 million 

The Committee was told that at the urging of the U.S. the Government of 

El Salvador-recently withdrew-**$9Q m44lion *1 can-in-the IDB-. .--This move-- - 

had a dramatic impact. In light of this, the Committee decided that we 

should vote 1n favor of this loan, clearly earmarked for the needy, 

which is coming up..1n the World Bank.. At the same time It was agreed 

that the Salvadoran Ambassador to Washington and the other Bank 

Directors would be told that we are waiting to see results of our 

recent action on the IDB loan and that in the meantime wished to 

indicate our willingness to be helpful, especially with regard to 

loans to the needy. The rationale is that this approach 1s more 

likely to succeed with the Government of El Salvador at this time. 

The Ambassador would also be told what specific improvements we would 

like to see so that we can continue to be supportive in the future. 

! 



- 8 - 

El Salvador 

August 11, 1977 

AID fundamental education and skills training 

$3 million loan, $300,000 grant. 

The Committee accepted the Working Group recommendation to go forward with 

an AID loan and grant in conjunction with a demarche. The representation 

would specify that our action on these bilateral and multilateral assistance 

programs would be based in part on our evaluation of the human 

rights situation and whether the projects directly benefit the needy. 

We appreciate the government's assurances concerning consular access 

but we are not satisfied with the report on the Richardson case. We 

are pleased that the threats against the Jesuits have not been carried 

out; the government can presumably take some credit for this. However, 

we are still concerned over continuing human rights problems, particularly 

the continued detention of political prisoners, the lack of adequate 

control to prevent excesses by the national guard and continuing harrassment 

of priests. U.S. policy and law dictate that we continue to review 

this "Situation; We hope that *progress”1n the human rights-field -wITl-- 

enable us to reconsider our action on the pending IDB loan at some 

future date. 

September 21, 1977 IDB hydroelectric loan $90 million 

Prior to the assumption 1n July of a new Administration 1n El Salvador, 

the government of that country, at the request of the U.S., withdrew a 

$90 million hydroelectric power loan from consideration In the IDB. The 

Committee considered whether developments since July would warrant going 

back to the government of El Salvador at this tW and telling it that 

we would have no objection to its placing that loan back on the calendar 

of the IDB. The Group decided that Deputy Assistant Secretary Devine 

should consult interested Congressmen to determine whether they would 

oppose such an action. If Mr. Devine encountered strong opposition on 

the Hill, he would report back to the Group so that further consideration 

can be given to the advisability of such an approach at this time. The 

Group decided that 1n the absence of strong opposition on the H111 we 

would support this loan in the IDB. 

-CQNFIBENTTAfc— 

t 


Ethiopia 

May 19, 1977 


- 9 - 

IBRD Grain Storage - $24 million 

The Committee recommended that the United States abstain on this loan 

to Ethiopia, giving the U.S. Executive Director the option to make a 

statement to the Board, explaining that this action reflects our 

concern for human rights conditions in Ethiopia. 

August 11, 1977 

AID rural roads $8 million grant 

AID southern Cema Cofu area rehabilitation 

$196,000 grant 

f 

AID Upper Didessa development $4.1 million grant 

The Committee reached a consensus that, given the previous abstention by 

the United States on an IFI loan, that we should delay consideration of 

the AID projects until the next Interagency meeting.' This would permit 

a more detailed review as to whether there has been a sufficient change 

in the human rights situation and to determine whether the projects will 

unquestionably directly benefit the needy. 

September 14, 1977 AFDF rural road loan, $5 million 

AID rural roads, $8 million grant 

AID southern Cema Cofa area rehabilitation 

$196,000 grant 

AID Upper Didessa development $4.1 million grant 

At the last meeting it was thought that AID could defer proceeding on the 

three grants to Ethiopia until September 30. Subsequent to the meeting 

it was learned that AID would require an immediate decision on these 

projects in order to have time to process them before the end of the 

fiscal year. Accordingly, various members of the'Group conferred by 

telephone In the time available, and it was cbncluded that in view of 

the nature of the grants and the-character of our current relations 

with Ethiopia, the grants should be approved. It was also agreed that 

approval of the grants should be accompanied by a demarche linking our 

support to our desire to aid the needy and expressing our continuing 

concern over human rights violations in Ethiopia. Such a demarche has 

been made. 

It was also decided to approve and support the pending AFDF loan for 

Ethiopia on grounds it fulfilled the criteria of aiding the "neediest 

and poorest", but that the U.S. would make a verbal demarche to the 

Ethiopian director of the AFDR on our continuing human rights concerns. 

DOMHBENTlAb— 


r

Guatemala 

August 11, 1977 


- 10 - 

AID rural electrification $10 million loan 

AID small farmer marketing $3.4 million loan 

The Committee recommended approval of the two AID loans coupled with a 

demarche to the GOG. The demarche should inform the GOG of our 

continuing consideration of human rights factors in reaching decisions 

on bilateral assistance and U.S. positions on multilateral loans. The 

demarche could also note our concern with regard to recent Increases in 

violence and our hope that the government would continue to take actions 

to discourage violence from extra-legal para-m11itary groups both on the 

left and the right. The U.S. will also follow closely the government's 

actions in carrying out its commitment to permit a free political process 

leading up to an open democratic election early next year. 

t 

Guinea 

October 14, 1977 PL 480 Title I, $7 million - FY 1978 

The Committee determined that as a result of human rights problems in 

Guinea, the proposed PL 480 agreement would be reduced from $7 million 

to $5 million. 

Hai ti 

August 11, 1977 

AID health services, $7.1 million grant 

AID administrative Improvement and training 

$300,000 grant 

AID disaster preparedness $60,000 grant - 

The Committee concurred in the staff recommendation to support three 

pending AID loans and carry out a demarche on human rights Informing 

the Haitian government of our continuing evaluation of human rights 

factors in determining the character and level of .bilateral assistance 

programs and the U.S. position on multilateral loans. The demarche 

would be presented by Ambassador Young and Deputy Coordinator for Human 

Rights, Hark L. Schneider, accompanied by Ambassador Jones, during their 

meeting with President Duvaller In Haiti August 15. The demarche would 

include a follow-up to the Secretary's suggestion that a visit to Haiti 

by the Inter-American Human Rights Committee would be viewed favorably 

by many observers. 

—eONFTfiENTIAL 



- 11 - 

Indonesia 

June 9, 1977 

The Committee recommended that a demarche shoi/ld be made to the GOI 

linking our future support in the IFIs to human rights considerations. 


PL 480 Title I - CCC - $99.2 million 

(total FY 78 program) 

The Committee recommended that the U.S. go forward with the proposed 

Title I allocation to Indonesia, (which is less than last year's level) 

and suggested that our Embassy in Jakarta couple the implementation of 

the Title I agreement with a demarche to the Indonesian government, 

expressing concern over the human rights situation in that country. 

Korea 

May 19, 1977 

IBRD Heavy Machinery - $15 million 

IBRD DKFC IV - $70 million 

IBRD Vocational Training - $30 million 

IFC K1sco - $10 million 

ADB Mineral Resources Exploration - $15 million 

The Coumittee recommended to Mr. Habib, that in the context of his upcoming 

visit to Korea, he indicate to the GOK that we are examining their IFI 

loans on human rights grounds. Final recommendation of these loans would 

be deferred pending his return. 

June 9, 1977 

The Cormiittee concluded that the process of troop withdrawal, coupled with 

President Park's political isolation and stubbornness indicated that a 

cautious approach would maximize the possibility of achieving positive 

results in the human rights area. It was agreed that the U.S. would 

vote yes on loans to Korea for the time being but that we would instruct 

our Embassy in Seoul to tell the Koreans that International Financial 

Institution (IFI) loans are being related in some countries to human 

rights. It was further agreed that, we should let other Bank Board 

directors know that we are concerned with the human rights situation 

in Korea and have made our views known to the Korean government. 

t 

—GQNFtmrm: 



- 12 - 

Malawi 

May 6, 1977 

IDA Blantyre Water Supply - $7 million 

» 

The Committee recommended that the United States support this loan. The 

Committee suggested however, that the U.S. should inform privately both 

the Malawian IBRD Director and the Malawi Government that (a) we voted 

for the loan because it will benefit the poorest segment of the population; 

(b) our action was taken despite our continued concern over human 

rights in Malawi; and (c) we hope to see improvements in this regard. 

I 

Nepal 

June 9, 1977 

The Committee recommended that a demarche should be made by the new U.S. 

Ambassador-to the GON -upon his arrival, explaining that our continued — 

support for their loans in the IFIs will be linked to human rights 

considerations. 

Nicaragua 

August 11, 1977 - IDB electric power-feasibility, study 

$550,000 grant 

AID rural education development $10 million loan, 

$980,000 grant 

AID nutrition improvement $3 million loan 

AID rural municipal development $3 million loan 

The Committee reviewed the human rights situation and noted continuing 

Congressional concern over human rights practices in Nicaragua. It 

recommended that the pending IDB grant be deferred and the pending AID 

loans and grant also be delayed until the country evaluation plan for 

Nicaragua can be considered. It directed that the paper be made 

available by August 25. 

SONriDCNTIftt 

No Objection To Declassification in Fifill 2013/02/04 : NLC-24-55-7-4-3


- 13 - 

Nicaragua 

September 21, 1977 IDB technical cooperation grant, Canadian funds 

$455,000 


$980,000 grant 

AID nutrition Improvement $3 million loan 

AID rural municipal development $3 million 

The Committee noted that on September 20, the Government of Nicaragua 

had issued a decree lifting the state of seige. They discussed whether 

it should go ahead with the loans to Nicaragua 1n the light of this 

development. It was determined that, despite early Indications that 

this is indeed a real Improvement, the Group.should wait until its 

meeting next week to determine what-reaction’we should take with 

regard to the loans. 

The Group appeared to be 1n agreement that If this is indeed a real, and 

not a cosmetic, move on the part of the Government of Nicaragua; then 1t 

Is something of very great significance and we should recognize it as 

such. It was pointed out that a proposal is being considered currently 

as to whether we should sign the FMS agreement with Nicaragua for 1977 

1n the light of this development. -It was pointed out that any action 

with regard to FMS would, of course, be relevant to the decision of 

this group on loans. 

September 28, 1977 IDB technical cooperation grant, Canadian funds 

.$455,000 


$980,000 grant 

AID nutrition Improvement $3 million loan 

AID health grant $20,(100 

AID health grant $55,000 

AID education grant $20,000 

The Committee decided to support the three AID grants to voluntary 

agencies, to take no action for the time being with regard to other AID 

loans, and to try to seek a delay 1n the consideration of the IDB loan 

so that the group could consider it at a subsequent meeting after more 

time had elapsed so that it could better access the effects of the 

lifting of the state of siege in Nicaragua. 

^CONffPENTIAT 



Paraguay 

Hay 6, 1977 

t 

IBRD Development Finance Corporation - $10 million 

IBRD Rural Development - $22 million 

The Committee agreed that the U.S. should vote in favor of these two loans 

on the basis of encouraging signs of support among the Paraguayan 

officials for improved human rights practices. The Committee agreed that 

we should reinforce Departmental communications by making an Immediate 

high-level demarche to the GOP urging the Government to accept the request 

of the Inter-American Human Rights Conurission (IAHRC) to visit Paraguay 

and indicating that the GOP decision will affect our consideration of 

future bilateral and multilateral development loans. Prior to acting, 

the GOP, aware of pur concern, took the Initiative to Inform both our 

Embassy and the Department that an Invitation to the IAHRC would be 

forthcoming. . 

June 24, 1977 

IDB(SF) Pre-Investment - $.9 million 

IDB(SF) Agricultural Marketing II - $7.3 million 

The Committee agreed that the Ambassador should ask the President of 

Paraguay to allow the IAHRC visit, inform him that the U.S. would have 

to vote against the two upcoming IDB loans if this was not done and suggest 

that the Government of Paraguay might wish to withdraw the loans if it 

could not let in the IAHRC at this time 

August 11, 1977 IDB/FSO agricultural marketing - $7.6 million 

loan, $165,000 grant 

IDB/FSO Industrial preinvestment $900,000 loan, 

$200,000 grant, and $190,000 Canadian project 

preparation fund grant 

IDB/FSO technical assistance $47 million loan 

AID rural roads $5 million loan 

AID market town development $5 million loan 

In response to a recommendation made by this Committee at Its June 24 meeting, 

the Government of Paraguay was asked, and subsequently agreed, to withdraw 

the first two IDB loans listed. Later, on it*s own initiative, 1t also 

withdrew the third IDB loan. 

■CONFIDENTIAL--- 



_£ODlEXOENT4Atr' 

- 15 - 

The Coimrittee concurred in the staff recommendation that the absence 

of an invitation to the IAHRC which previously Paraguay had promised 

to issue, required our continued opposition to pendlngr JOB loans;- - - 

Paraguay should be Informed that if there isfa forthcoming Invitation 

for an IAHRC inspection visit without restraints we will be able to 

support these loans, otherwise, we will not. Si nee'we -an se&kibg-io— 

delay the IDB loans at this time, the Connrittee decided to delay the 

fina.l decision on pending AID loans. -- 

September 14, 1977 AID grant to the Paraguayan National Council 

of Philanthropic Organizations, $50,000 

AID grant to the Salesian Society, $96,000 

AID grant to a national wofnen's voluntarygroup 

for community services to women and 

disadvantaged people, $120,000 

The three pending AID grants to private non-profit organizations for 

Paraguay were approved by the Committee, but 1t was also agreed that 

the U.S. should monitor the negotiations between the GOP and the IAHRC 

to insure that a certain date is reached for the Investigative visit by 

the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC). It was agreed that 

such a Paraguayan agreement would be useful (a) as a test of the GOP's 

good .faith; and (b) along with an assessment!of the current human rights 

situation in determining our position on future Paraguayan loan 

applications to the IDB and several AID loans directly Involving the GOP. 

September 21, 1977 IDB/FSO agricultural marketing $7.6 million loan, 

$165,000 grant 

IDB/FSO industrial preinvestment $900,000 loan, 

$200,000 grant and $190,000 Canadian project 

preparation fund grant - - - :— - 

IDB/FSO technical assistance $47 million loan 

IDB/FSO Potable water $498,000 grant 

AID rural roads $5 million loan 

AID market town development $5 million loan 

AID housing investment guarantee $4 million 

t 

-GQNFfDENTIAt. 



CWFiPENTlAtr 

- 16 - 

The Committee was Informed that we have received assurances from 

President Stroessner and the Foreign Minister of Paraguay that the 

Inter-American Human Rights Corrniisslon will be allowed to visit that 

country as soon after the February 1978 elections as the IAHRC can 

arrange, the Committee discussed whether the U.S. should support 

upcoming loans and grants to Paraguay 1n the light of this assurance. 

It was determined, that we would support the AID loans and the 1DB 

potable water loan. All of those loans would appear to meet the needy 

criteria. The Committee decided however t{pat it would await further 

developments In Paraguay before deciding to support other upcoming loans 

to that country. 

t 


____ t 

t

Regional Programs, 

Central American Regional 


- I/ - 

September 14, 1977 IDB Electrical Interconnection Study (countries: 

Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Cl Salvador, Guatemala, 

Honduras and Panama) $579,000, FS0 

Southern Cone Regional 

September 14, 1977 IDB Agricultural Research (countries: Argentina, 

Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) 

$3.5 million, FS0 

The Committee decided to support the proposed SDB loan of $579,000 for an 

Electrical Interconnection Study for six Central American countries, since 

the loan was directed to a regional entity and that entity was Independent 

of the countries involved. 

However, it was decided to postpone a decision on the Southern Cone loan 

for agricultural research pending-further.analysis of the application. 

There was general agreement (AID and State legal divisions) that the 

Harkln amendment does not apply to loans to regional organizations which 

have an established supranational identity and function and where such 

an Intermediary does not appear to be a subterfuge to avoid the statute. 

But it was also determine that the Harkln amendment must be applied in 

instances where the regional organization served as a direct conduit 

for assistance to the constituent member state or where it was -not 

independent of the countries themselves. 

September 28, 1977 IDB/FS0 agricultural research $3.5 million 

(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, 

and Uruguay) 

IDB agricultural research $360,000 

(Bolivia, Chile, Peru) 

It was noted that both of these regional loans go for Agricultural 

research and the legislative history of the Harkin Amendment would seem 

to indicate that we could support this type of loan. In the absence of 

a State Department legal brief to the contrary, in the next few days, 

the Committee decided that the U.S. should support these regional loans. 

ftfmctnriJTTfll______ 

^TTTr 1 C/tiTrTHL 

■ 



- 18 - 

September 28, 1977 IDB, Economic and Social Research (ECIEL) 

$1 million, headquartered in Brazil 

IDB, Central American Intermediate Technology 

(ICAITI), $650,000 

t 

IDB, Artisan Industry Development in Guatemala, 

Bolivia, and Ecuador, $900,000 

IDB, Urban Development Problems (FIPE), 

Headquartered in Brazil, $860,000 

IDB, Development Banking (ALIDE), Headquartered 

in Peru, $81,400 

IDB, Regional Wheat and Corn Institute (CIMYT), 

Regional Tropical Products Institute (CIAP), 

Potato Institute (CIP), $6.2 million, 

Headquartered in Mexico, Colombia, and Peru, 

respectively 

The Cormrittee agreed to support each of the pending regional loans. 

Philippines 

May 6, 1977 

IBRD - Rural Development - $15 million 

The Committee was informed that the Embassy makes periodical demarches 

to the GOP expressing our concern about human rights. The Committee 

agreed that the U.S. should vote in favor of this loan, which 1s directed 

at the rural poor, with the understanding that U.S. Embassy officials 

will continue informally to encourage positive action of the GOP which 

leads to improved human rights practices. The Committee agreed that we 

would include in our approach to the GOP reference to the fact that we 

take human rights considerations into account in examining IFI loan 

proposals. 

t 

i 

t 

rnwrTnriUTTJM 



- 19 - 

Romania 

May 16, 1977 

IBRD Brason Bearings - $38 million 

IBRD Bucharest Glass Fiber - $18.3 million 

IBRD Polyester - $50 million 

The Committee recommended that the United States support these three 

loans, however that a demarche should be made to‘the GOR linking our 

future support in the IFIs to human rights considerations. 

Thailand 

June 9, 1977- 

The Committee agreed that a demarche should be made to the GOT Unking 

our support in the IFIs to human rights considerations. 

logo 

August 11, 1977 

IDA cotton $14 million credit 

AID family health training $300,000 grant 

The Committee concurred with the staff recommendation supporting the two 

pending AID programs, coupled with a demarche to the government on our 

human rights policy. The demarche should acknowledge the steps already 

taken by the Togo government to improve the human rights situation, and 

express our hope for continued progress. We Should also recall In a 

positive vein President Eydema's previous statement to us that he will 

invite Amnesty International to visit Togo. 

pnucTnriiTTAi 


t


- 20 - 

Uruguay 

August 11, 1977 

IDB/FSO technical assistance to the Bank of the 

Republic $200,000 

I0B Paso Sever1no water supply $24 million loan 

AID cooperative development $100,000 grant 

AID credit union development $200,000 grant 

The Committee determined on the basis of the human rights conditions in 

Uruguay that the Harkin Amendment would apply 1f the U.S. were to vote 

now on loans for that country. Therefore, tha Committee recomnended that 

Uruguay be requested to delay both pending IDB loans. The Committee also 

concurred with the 0PIC statement that a recommendation will be made to 

the 0PIC Board not to move forward with a pending proposal to initiate 

an 0PIC program In Uruguay. Finally, the Committee determined to postpone 

a decision on two AIO grants-until more-information is available 

on the beneficiaries, their ties to the government, and whether the 

program will benefit the needy. 

rnMF.IflEN.TIAi---- 

Stephen Collins 

AID - AA/IIA 



MEMORANDUM 

"CONFIDENTIAL 

POS REVIEWED 28-Vlay-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL, 


July 1, 198Q 



FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

ROBERT PASTOR 


Cuban Refugees. The San Jose II Conference began (reasonably well yesterday, with 

19 countries and 7 International organizations represented. It was clear Costa Rica's 

enthusiasm had waned, but Carazo did agree to open the Conference, and repeated his 

"Insist, Insist, Insist" formula for dealing with Cuban Government. Australia stated its 

willingness to take up to 200 refugees, and Italy, 50 to 100. Several speakers proposed 

taking the issue to the UN or the 0AS. At today's meeting, the U.S. delegation will 

seek to enlist support for a communique. (C) 

Congress. Sat In on the President's meeting with Charlie Wilson and Henry Hyde who said 

they were about to bolt from their long-standing support for foreign aid because of 

State's Ideological tilt to the left. The President soothed their right-wing anger and 

expressed his Interest In being less negative In the future to Chile and Argentina. I 

passed this on to Christopher and will prepare a more detailed memo for you. By COB, 

Harkln called to accuse State of being soft on the right-wingers like Major D'Aublsson 

of El Salvador. Where Is the silent majority In the middle? (C) 

Grenada. Canadian officials have passed along reports they received from the Grenadian 

charge in Ottawa concerning forthcoming Soviet and Bloc assistance to the island. 

According to these reports, the Soviets will donate three million dollars of equipment 

(trucks, Jeeps, pumps) to Grenada within the next nine months. Ten year, low Interest 

Soviet credits will also be available. Bulgaria will provide canning and Ice plants, 

and the CzechB are undertaking feasibility studies on "the establishment of light industry 

and agro-lndustrlal processing facilities. These (reports appear to corroborate other 

information Indicating Increased Bloc cooperation and diplomatic contacts with Grenada. (C) 

Jamaica. On the evening of June 29 government-owned TV carried a long segment of a 

speech by Jamaican Communist (Workers Party) President Trevor Munroe accusing the U.S. 

Embassy and the Defense Attache of Involvement In the recent alleged coup plot. Munroe 

claimed he had evidence to support his charges and called for the DATT's removal. Our 

Embassy has prepared strongly-worded contingency guidance denying any such connection and 

stressing our support for the democratic process. State watered-down the recommended 

guidance, and then approved it. (.C) 

El Salvador. JRG Member Colonel Gutierrez told Ambassador White in confidence that 

younger officers in the Guatemalan army are planning a coup. The model would be 

El Salvador's October 15 Revolution, and the objectives would be far-reaching political, 

economic and social change. Gutierrez gave the Impression that he believed support for 

the coup was building rapidly and that it could be expected soon. (C) 

Press Contacts. None. (U) 

'confidential 

ReviewZJtK*£/l/86 

declassified 

E.0 

Authority 

MARA.. t— Rato 

t 

Nn OhiRntinn Tn nfidassifiratinn in Full ?ni3/fl?/n4 ■ Nl r.-94-fiR-1-4D-P

■, # No Objection To Dedfmifirntinn in Full 2012/12/11 : NLC-17-111-2-3-5 

- *' *- ------ '/%■ 

UOiTREVIEWED 15-Mar-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 

ISSUES AND OPTIONS PAPER; URGENT LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES 

I- Summary Overview 

The Problem: 

America as a region. 

whether to have a policy for Latin 

The overriding issue in our relations with Latin 

America is deceptively rhetorical. It is wrapped up in the 

phrase "special relationship". The phrase has meanings that 

are not only different but contradictory. Some are useful 

— like the core security functions of the OAS. Some are 

unavoidable — like the dependence of Latin America on our 

markets and capital. Some may lead us down blind alleys 

— like the suggestion that we can solve global economic 

t problems in this hemisphere alone. Some Are pernicious, like 

the tradition of unilateral US intervention in neighboring 

■ states. 

But the issue wrapped up in the words "special 

relationship" is real, not a straw man. 

All other major issues are affected by decisions on 

the first,, "special relationship" issue. This paper also 

considers fiv&’-other specific issues: 1 

— the economic relationship; 

— special measurep for the near neighborhood; 

— arms and local conflicts; 

— human rights; and 

— Cuba; 

II. Background, Current Situation andtCurrent Policy 

The American public and Congress have limited interest 

in, or knowledge of, Latin America. Cuba aside, they are 

agreed that US security is not likely to be threatened from 

the hemisphere. Nonetheless, they have vague but deeply 

rooted feelings of community ‘with Latin America; together 

^T&eRJST 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13S20 

Authority ^ " 3 

MAH A Date. 'iVAvuE - 



SECBE'jT 

-2- 

we are "the New World". These express themselves in the 

irrepressible phrase "special relationship". As a consequence, 

Americans are uncomfortable when we neglect Latin 

America, but have not been prepared to pay the economic 

costs of giving substantial content to a "special 

relationship". 

This ill-defined sense of community and shared values 

leads Americans to set higher standards for Latin America 

than for other regions (viz. the astringency of the selfdescribed 

"human rights lobby"). 

The Latins' perspective on the special relationship 

is almost a mirror image. They see our standards as 

paternalistic and interventionist. They increasingly reject 

a definition which implies hegemony -- or even community* 

since they aspire to their own identity. But the Latins 

do expect special attention and special benefits: from the 

United States, for they believe our power and wealth impose’ 

special obligations on us. To this extent, a degree of 

paternalism is expected. When Latins — and North Americans — 

talk about "neglect", the underlying assumption is that the 

US must at least demonstrate a personal and rhetorical 

concern. When we do, we create expectations of tangible 

concessions to real Latin interests. 

The US, thus, is motivated by low-grade guilt which 

is not sufficiently acute to move us to the logic, of our 

conclusions. The problem is complicated by the fact that — 

absent real security interests or knowledgeable empathy — 

Congressional interest is fitful, particularistic, and 

expressed in terms of essentially domestic concerns like 

coffee, sugar, illegal immigrants, US prisoners, Mexican 

heroin and thie projection of American values. Even our guilt 

has domestic roots in increasing awareness of the low economic 

and social status of the large, growing, increasingly 

articulate and organized Hispanic-American community — 

18 million strong in.1976. 

The "special relationship" in fact means many 

different things. To some it signifies the. traditional US 

hegemony or paternalism. To the left it signifies economic 

dependence or US interference. To most it means special 

obligations on the US. ! 

Exactly how much of the "special relationship" should 

be retained, and how much discarded, is the key policy 

question. 

SEC 



SECjgfT 

-3- 

The Latins are united primarily by the desire to 

limit and regulate US power in the hemisphere — and to 

evoke special benefits. The nature of desired benefits varies 

and tends to divide them: some (like the small Central 

American countries) want aid even if it does imply paternalism; 

most prefer bilateral trade/financial advantages. 

To stop talking about ending the "special relationship" 

would be easy and very possibly desirable. To end Latin 

claims for special treatment on a hemispheric basis would 

not be easy. It has been tried before and been called 

"neglect". 

Operationally, we face an annual series of inter- 

American meetings (the OAS system) that by their very 

existence attach a special nature to the relationship. Yet 

the Latins — and many potent North Americans — would see 

withdrawal from the OAS-as worse than "neglect", as an effort 

to divide Latin America and deal with the weaker constituent 

parts rather than the stronger whole. 

Against this backdrop.•real US interests in Latin 

America include: 

— the absence of (a) strategic intervention by a 

hostile extra-hemispheric power or (b) intraregional. 

conflict that might invite eijctrahemispheric 

intervention. This interest is . 

particularly important in tne near neighborhood 

(Mexico, the Caribbean, Central America and 

Panama); 

— 15% of our global exports, 25% of our oil imports, 

$19 billion in investment, and $60 billion in 

private bank exposure; 

— reversal, at least over the long term, of the 

dry rot attacking democratic forms in the 

hemisphere; 

— a hemispheric environment which both leaves us the 

time and energy to deal with the rest of the world 

and provides us a secure redoubt should we need it. 

Latin interests are diverse and can be divisive as 

between countries and sub-regions: 

— all want increased access to the US — and other 

OECD -- markets as essential to their development; 

t 


No Objeclion To Declassification in Full 2012/12/11 : NLC-17-111 -2-3-5 

-4*- 

— the major countries want us to take them seriously 

as international actors; the weaker nations, with 

some exceptions, are still inclined to follow our 

lead and to welcome US involvement in regional 

and sub-regional affairs; 

— all want a role in the international decisions that 

affect them economically and, most especially, in 

the decisions taken by the United States Government; 

but the smaller ones calculate that they 

have a better chance to pin us down in the QAS 

and other multilateral bodies, while Brazil and 

Mexico, and perhaps Venezuela,* have enough weight 

to try quiet bilateral dea^s. 

A. Current Situation. The trend over the past decade has 

been an odd mixture of growing independence and increasingly 

neuralgic interdependence. 

Vietnam, Watergate, detente and disillusionment with 

the effectiveness of foreign aid have distracted the United* 

States — and depressed the Latins. The Latins have been 

striking out politically on their own in CIEC and the UN, 

diversifying their trade, buying arms elsewhere, putting 

together increasingly competent cadres of technocrats. 

Our interdependence thus now reflects their middlerange 

economic status and consequent dependence on our 

markets, capital resources, technology and managerial competence 

more than.any traditional "assistance" relationship. ' 

Yet these new relationships and resource needs are much harder 

to control than aid funds. 

For the US, interdependence means $4.00 coffee, 

3-8 million illegal immigrants fleeing poverty, $4 billion 

in Mexican brown heroin on our streets^, fishing rights and . 

investment disputes, the effect on our banks of a Mexican or 

Jamaican or Peruvian default. Interdependence also still means 

our trade surpluses, our access to oil and other important 

resources, and substantial political/security support in the 

OAS and elsewhere. 

There are two particularly serious problem areas. 

The Near Neighborhood. Mexico, some parts of the 

Commonwealth Caribbean and — to a lesser extent — Central 

America confront dangerous economic and social problems which 

impact directly on us. When they export poverty, we import . 

RfcT 


I 

f


-5- 

T 

illegal immigrants. Unemployment is running as high as 50% 

in some Caribbean islands, and at least 40% of the Caribbean 

people are under 15 years of ago. On another front, Jamaican 

"price leadership" has increased the cost of bauxite to 

American companies six-fold since 1974. As many as five 

economically unviable mini-states are emerging in the 

Caribbean. Cuba is fishing deftly in troubled waters. 

« 

Apart from short-term financieyl assistance in Mexico 

this past fall, the US has taken no serious initiatives in its 

near neighborhood — where the only remaining democracies are 

located. 

Democratic Forms and Human Rights are under severe 

stress throughout the hemisphere. Only Colombia, Costa Rica, 

Venezuela and the Commonwealth Caribbean have managed to 

resist the authoritarian tide. In many countries, democracy 

was never more than skin deep; in others, economic and social 

reverses, plus terrorism, have discredited politicians, brought 

the military to power, and led to a -frequently ■' heavy-handed 

emphasis on order and "security". At the same time Watergate 

was leading us in the opposite directions to a renewed 

appreciation of democratic values. We are caught between . 

our real need to be true to ourselves and the fact that in 

projecting our values into the hemisphere we risk' renewed forms 

of interventionism —■ a risk enhanced by our sense of "hew 

world" community and the absence of inhibiting security 

interests. 

B. Current Policy. Current policy is to give modest 

rhetorical status to the "special relationship" — without 

giving it much effective expression in trade, aid or deliberate 

transfers of technology/managerial assistance. The effort is to 

deal pragmatically with bilateral problems and to treat most 

economic issues as a function of broader' North-South considerations. 

GSP affects only $1 billion of the■$17 billion 

in Latin exports to the US. Bilateral aid is down to $200 

million annually; we have invested only $42 million in the 

Caribbean Development Bank and are $300 million in arrears in 

our contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank. 

The US has taken advantage of — and perhaps contributed 

modestly- to — the decline in traditional anti-gringo solidarity 

by seeking deeper bilateral relationships with the most important 

Latin countries, Brazil most notably. Mexico is the ■ 

current candidate, given our common problems. By the same 

token, the US has interposed no obstacle to diversification of 

Latin American relations with extra hemispheric interests. 


t

' 


SEC^Bg* 

-6- 

* 

t 

The warming trend in US-Cuban relations was interrupted only 

by Anqol.a and by Castro's position on the Puerto Rico issue. 

On the other hand, the US has as yet been unable to 

devise a comprehensive policy with respect to our increasing 

interdependence with Mexico and the Caribbean. 

Ill. Major Issues and Options 

We have defined the first, strategic issue as the 

package of fallacies, ambiguities, and virtues known as the 

"special relationship", but which need separate consideration. 

Discussion of issues and options proceeds from five 

key assumptions; 

(1) there will be some progress ’in the broader North- 

South dialogue? 

(2) publicized study groups, high-level missions and 

patronizing slogans are undesirable; 

! 

(3) a return to activist US hegemony or massive bilateral 

transfer of appropriated aid funds is 

domestically unsustainable; 

(4) demonstrated movement toward a new Panama Canal 

treaty coupled with a Presidential statement of 

intention to eschew covert or military intervention 

would, as suggested by the Linowitz Report, constitute 

an adequate short-term regional policy (and would be 

consistent with either of the options under the first issue) 

(5) immediate progress on Cuba is not central to any 

hemispheric strategy, but if it comes, it' would need 

to be accompanied by reassurances to Latins worried 

by Fidel's intentions. 

1. Issue: To have a Hemispheric Policy or Not 

The centraL issue is whether the Administration wishes 

to treat the hemisphere as a conceptual aijd policy whole, and 

hence to give effective content to the special relationship. 

Or whether it wishes to focus its attention more narrowly on 

constituent elements of the hemisphere which are directly 

relevant to important US interests. The broad option below 

obviously subsumes the narrower option, but first steps and 

first words by the new Administration — whichever option it 

SEgftE’f"'* 


■ No Objection To Declassification in Fyll 2012/12/11 : NLC-17-111 -2-3-5 

-7- 

in fact chooses — will take on a life and logic of their own. 

Thus, to chose Option II but then to have public reference 

to a "special relationship" will imply that the choice was, in 

fact, the broader option, to raise expectations at home and 

abroad and to lead to correspondingly shrill recriminations. 

Option I: Hemispheric policy implying major forward 

steps designed to serve both Latin and US .interests on the 

broadest possible front. 

Option II: Differentiated policy less responsive to 

specific Latin expectations than to demonstrable US interests. 

The costs and benefits of the two options are virtually 

self-evident. The risk in Option I is the difficulty of 

delivering, for example, Congressional votes on necessary 

implementing legislation. The principal benefit is that it 

will come closer to assuring a congenial hemisphere. The 

risk in Option II is that it will necessarily be focused more 

narrowly on policies and programs in the near neighborhood, 

the democracies (and, perhaps, Brazil) ; it therefore risks 

disillusion and reaction in South America. The benefit is 

that it is more sustainable domestically in practical political 

terms because Option .1 necessarily involves challenges to 

domestic economic interests. 

Implementing actions 

Option I: 

— visible Presidential involvement including an early 

speech (perhaps at the April OASGA) foreshadowing a 

major effort on trade and development problems; 

— intense, early effort to secure Congressional repeal 

of offending legislative amendments (e.g. Hickenlooper, 

Pelly, Gonzalez, etc.); 

* 

— establishing a Cabinet committfee to identify and propose 

measures on trade and bilateral assistance which 

would demonstrate the special commitment to Latin 

America; 

— push positively on human rights but measure sanctions 

carefully; 

— initiate and sustain serious correspondence on serious 

global/hemisphcric subjects with major Latin leaders; 

SBgftET 



— plus appropriate implementing steps listed under 

Option II below. . 

Option II: 

— Presidential involvement in the problems of the near 

neighborhood; general rhetoric would be restrained 

and eschew references to specialty; 

— survey mission through Caribbean by Under Secretary 

for Political Affairs preparatory to development of 

a- well-funded policy; 

— special attention to democracies (and, in a rhetorically 

restrained fashion, to Brazil); 

— downplay US involvement in the OAS and other inter- 

American organizations. • . 

2. Issue: How "Special" the Economic Relationship? 

Trade and private capital flows are now ;key elements 

of the US-Latin American economic relationship. : Trade (a) 

supplies the bulk of Latin American financial resources and 

goods Latin American needs for development, and ; (b) is affected 

or potentially affected by US Government actions. The Latin 

Americans see those actions as unpredictable and/or 

unsatisfactory. 

More than any other factor, trade is the touchstone 

by which the Latin Americans will decide whether there is a 

"special relationship" that is meaningful in economic development 

terms. 

Option I: Provide hemispheric preferences through 

legislation to give Latin. America substantial benefits-in 

the trade field which are not available to other developing 

countries. 

Option II: 

hemisphere. 

Give no special consideration to the 

Option III: Focus special attention on Latin America 

within a non-discriminatory global framework. 

Option I would provide the clearest expression of US. 

interest in Latin America. Politically, we would balance 

t.he EEC/Associated States arrangements; economically, it 



SE 

-9- 

would dwarf Lome. Option I would maximize trade opportunities 

for the semi-industrialized countries of this hemisphere 

that are in the best position to use them. Regional import 

liberalization might be more palatable to Congress than a 

global alternative. 

On the other hand,, there is little practical scope 

for substantial broadening or deepening of the US preference 

system, even regionally. Regional preferences would risk 

almost certain damage to our global edonomic relations, contrasting 

sharply with the traditional US goal of a single 

world economic system. They might slow the development of 

Latin American trade relations with Europe and Japan. The 

larger Latin American countries, with the exception of 

Colombia, strongly oppose regional preferences; the smaller, 

poorer countries would favor them. 

Option II is consistent with global US objectives and 

would avoid GATT problems. But Option II ignores the cultural, 

historical, and institutional links between the US and Latin 

America. It could be seen as lacking an economic content 

parallel to the Rio Treaty and the. OAS.- It could bring 

charges of "neglect" in that aspect of the hemisphere 

relationship that is most important to the Latin Americans. 

Option III seeks the best of both worlds — and, of 

course, falls short. It is roughly current policy. It would 

be but a partial commitment to Latin American economic 

development. It would lean heavily on special mechanisms 

that are technically non-discriminatory. k We would make 

the most of the fact that, of all the developing areas, Latin 

America — with its higher degree of industrialization, 

education, and economic infrastructure — is best able to take 

advantage of world markets for goods (improved through the 

Geneva negotiations), funds, and technology. Like Option I, 

it would require a high degree of political will' in the US 

to avoid the mockery that domestic protectionism — or 

failure to follow through concretely — could make of it- But 

Option III would preserve the hemispheric option should the 

global approach break down. 

Implementing Actions 

Option I: 

■— introduce legislation to extend and improve GSP 

for the benefit of Latin America; add more products 


t

No Objection To Declassification in Ffill 2012/12/11 : NLC-17-111-2-3-5 

SEQjiflT 

— 

-10- 

by deleting mandatory exclusions; liberalize 

the limiting elements (competitive need); 

— seek legislation to permit more relaxed application 

toward Latin America of current US countervailing 

duty, antidumping, and safeguard guidelines; 

— apply for a GATT waiver to permit a regional preferential 

arrangement; the quid pro quo would at 

least be explicit acceptance in the GATT of the Lome 

arrangement. 

Option II 

— do nothing except pursue world trade policies on a 

reasonably liberal basis and yith special concern for 

the needs of developing countries. 

Option III 

— undertake intensified and broadened consultations 

in the OAS on trade and other economic matters, 

analogous to OECD consultations; 

— demonstrate willingness to give special consideration 

to Latin American needs in the implementation of US 

trade legislation, and to broaden GSP to products of 

particular interest to. Latin America; 

— seek, in the MTN, special and differentiated treatment 

for developing countries; given its state of development, 

this would be especially beneficial to Latin America; 

— consider financial mechanisms to support Latin 

American trade, particularly among themselves, and to 

provide further balance-of-payments support; 

— fashion new arrangements to fc(cilitate the flow and 

development of technology in Latin America; 

— expand bilateral and multilateral aid for Latin 

American including, as a priority matter, fulfillment 

of our commitment to the IADB. 

3. Issue; The Near Neighborhood — To what Degree do 

we take Special Measures? 

Our near neighbors - - Mexico, the independent Caribbean, 

sometimes Central America — have been the historical subjects 

SE£R«1T 



-11- 

% 

of our concern and our interventions.. Not till World War II 

did we really become concerned about Latin America as a whole. 

Even since then, our most serious concerns have been in the 

near neighborhood. (Obvious examples are the Cuban problems 

and the Dominican intervention of 1965.) But ironically our 

major efforts in economic assistance have not been in our 

neighborhood, where most of the remaining democracies are to • 

be found. 

We are not well positioned to meet the challenges. The 

issues of the ex-British Caribbean are new. In Mexico, the 

new thing is the geometric growth of.old problems, although 

we go on coping with the intense "border" problems — migrants, 

heroin, and so on — in a particularistic, low-level way. 

We have no focal point for sorting out the trade-offs which 

will be required. 

Option I: Continue on present course of not putting 

special emphasis on the problems of the near neighborhood. 

Option II; Bring special (perhaps Presidential) focus' 

to US-Mexican relations, including continuing high-level 

attention to mutual problems and availability of substantial 

resources where needed. 

Option III: Focus on near-neighborhood problems as a 

conceptual whole (even though program;: do not run across the 

board) by developing parallel and special programs for Mexico 

and the Caribbean, including special, assistance to the latter. 

Option I is the traditional, bureaucratically acceptable 

approach. It has worked reasonably well, and it involves the 

least cost in time and resources. It defederalizes problems, 

keeping responsibility in local jurisdictions. Option II would 

focus high-level national attention on problems which are in 

fact symbiotic. . It could increase US-Mexican ability to make 

necessary trade-offs by. looking at "the problem" as a whole. 

Option III would add the rest of the near-neighborhood, but 

primarily the Black Caribbean, to Option II. Option III thus 

suggests that, conceptually and in domestic political terms, the 

problems of the near-neighbors should be treated as a whole — 

even though the implementing programs might be quite different. 

Caribbean problems are perhaps less susceptible to US actions, 

but trouble in the Caribbean (see separate transition paper) 

seems even more certain than in Mexictf. 

SECJt^T 



-12- 

i 

Jmplomenting Actions 

Option 1 

— None, by definition. 

Option IX 

— Establish a cabinet-level committee on Mexico, supported 

by intor-agency working groups. One of the first 

agenda items would be coordination of the actions of 

the many USG agencies involved in Mexico; 

— public announcement of Mexican^ inter-agency group, 

with plea for support from Chicano community; 

— vigorous push for a law to achieve control of illegal 

immigration by making it illegal for employers to hire 

them, accompanied by special economic measures to 

enhance employment prospects in Mexico; 

— accompany the previous step by some form of amnesty to 

allow migrants already here to remain in their jobs, 

at least temporarily. (Current estimates are that 

from three to eight million are present in the US) . 

Option III 

— All of Option II, plus addition of Caribbean to concerns 

of inter-agency group; 

— Mission to the Caribbean by the Under Secretary for 

Political Affairs. (This would not be a publicity 

spectacular but a chance to discuss new possibilities 

with the Caribbean chiefs of state.); 

t 

• — discussions with the British, Canadians, and possible 

Venezuelans on their role in the ex-British Caribbean; 

— substantial bilateral assistance programs to the 

Commonwealth Caribbean. 

4. issue: Arms and Local Conflicts 

One of the most durable issues in the hemisphere is 

that of arms transfers. While the US was traditionally the 

major supplier, we now provide only 25% of.arms being purchased 

and have imposed severe restrictions on the technological 

quality of what we sell. The most sophisticated weapons come 

from out.side the hemisphere. Several countries — Argentina 


i


t 

and Brazil — now manufacture (and increasingly export) their 

own basic equipment. 

In brief, we are no longer considered a reliable.source 

of supply. The considerable influence we once enjoyed in this 

area is correspondingly diminished. 

While Latin arms purchases do not represent more than 

an average of 2% of GNP, certain specific kinds of purchases 

(and relationships) are worrisome. The purchase of Soviet 

SU-22 fighter-bombers and T-55 tanks by Peru has introduced 

potentially dangerous instabilities into the west coast of 

South America which, combined with the Chile-Peru-Bolivia 

territorial dispute, could pose real difficulties for the US: 

the possibility (not now imminent) of a Peruvian attack on one 

or more of its neighbors. Similarly., Israqli aircraft sales 

to Honduras (in violation of Israel's arms transfer agreements 

with us) risk setting off an arms race .tn one of the poorest 

areas of the hemisphere. 

Option I: 

Seek producer/consumer restraint agreements ■ 

— a very difficult task. As in the nuclear suppliers club, 

our goal should be qualitative restrictions; 

Option XI: Liberalize US sales policies modestly to 

improve our leverage; 

Option III: Move toward ending the US role as arms 

supplier to"Latin America. 

At best, the options promise only marginal gains, but 

even they may be useful. Option I carries political risks 

in Latin America, although some governments might (at least 

tacitly) welcome another multilateral effort to restrain arms 

purchases — provided our hand was not too heavy. The costs 

and benefits of Option II are difficult to weigh and are 

complicated by the human rights question; in addition, our 

storehouse of secondhand equipment is not what it was. Option III 

is Congressionally palatable but,1 by the same token, promises 

least benefits in the hemisphere; it cohid, of course be 

combined with Option I. 


Option I 

— seek European/Israeli sales restraint. We have 

modestly more leverage than we have yet employed; 

SEECK^T 



u iU\rf iuj A 

-14- 

— introduce disruptive Soviet arms sales explicitly 

into our pursuit of detente; 

— consult with certain Latin governments preparatory 

to surfacing (via the Latins or multilaterally) renewed 

arms control proposals. 

Option II 

— selectively increase FMS levels andk liberalize policy 

with respect to sales of sophisticated weaponry 

(especially aircraft), but with*clearjunderstanding of 

inhibitions imposed by human rights violations. 

Option III 

— phase out FMS by FY 1979; 

—. eliminate all MLGRPS within three years, maintaining 

three-man Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC's) in 

only a handful of countries until the pipeline is 

dry. 

5. Issue: Human Rights 

How can the United States most effectively bring about 

greater respect for human rights in this hemisphere? 

The new US Administration comes into office at a time of 

expectation in the US, in Congress, and most particularly among 

the peoples of Latin America.' There is hope that a Democratic 

President can bring about improvement in the economic and 

political conditions in which most of the p'eople in the 

hemisphere live. The echoes of FDR, JFft and even LBJ reverberate 

. 

Most of the governing elites of this hemisphere are also 

expectant. They are ambivalent and uneasy about renewed US 

political activism. Some even see the US "human rights" concerns 

as a reflection of detente and communist propaganda; others 

as a new phase of US interventionists. Some note the declining 

US commitment to assistance/resource transfers and question 

whether political restrictions on resource flows to developing 

nations Is not hypocritical. Interested Americans and 

Members of Congress moreover may have unrealistic expectations 

about the extent of US leverage in the proud and increasingly 

self-reliant nations of this hemisphere. 

i 


t


-15- 

Any strategy to improve human rights in this hemisphere 

is closely entwined with the rhetoric and psychological baggage 

of the "special relationship". 

The types of questions that will have to be asked are: 

*— Can the Executive and Congress develop a collaborative 

strategy to create pressures and/or incentives 

(Jackson-Vanick may or may not be a model)? 

— Should the Executive take’a strong stand on 

democratic values with clear policy implications for 

assistance programs and hilateral relations in order 

to encourage eventual chang^, realizing that the 

short-term results could be deteriorating official 

relations with over half of the nations of the 

hemisphere? 

— Should we concentrate on the diminution of torture, 

violation of due process, and prison conditions or 

press equally hard for all the right's in the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights (including the rights to 

economic well-being which it also contains)? 

— Can we devise country-specific strategies to improve 

"human rights" conditions or should we seek to 

establish consistent global or hemispheric policies? 

Although there is a variety of possible policies — and 

permutations among them — we have outlined two basic strategies 

that illuminate the issue most starkly: 

Option I: A bold new policy placing human rights at the 

center of US' bilateral relations and participation in 

international organizations. 

Option 11: A pragmatic approach articulated so as to 

leave ambiguous US policies and program options for specific 

countries. 

i 

Option T. would revitalize US public and Congressional 

interest in foreign affairs, give clear direction to foreign 

policy agencies, and permit a zero-based budgeting approach to 

US bilateral and US-supported multilateral assistance proqrams. 

It would offer all nations including our own, an opportunitv to 

begin anew and he measured from January 197 7. It would lay 

down clear guidelines for our concerns in bilateral relations 

and establish a basin for US actions in defense of human 


No Objection To Declassificatiop iiTicatiop in Full 2012/12/11 : NLC-17-111-2-3-5 

SEC ECggT 

-16- 

rights. ■ But would US corporations and banks fall in line? 

How would international institutions respond? At least half 

of the governments of the hemisphere would have a strongly 

negative reaction. Although the impact would eventually be 

positive in a few countries, retrogression would result in 

others. Moreover, if Option I were not backed up by significant 

resource transfers and a positive "caring" approach 

to North-South issues, the US could be charged with hypocrisy. 

And wereye to disengage from resource transfer to large numbers 

of countries on human rights grounds wo would hinder economic 

development — an important factor in improving the conditions 

of 'man. 

Option II, even if stated forcefully could well be. 

seen as insufficient by Congress and sections of the US public. 

The strongest opponents of repressive regimes seek US pressure, 

and then disengagement, where change in human rights practices 

does not take place. Option II would hold us open to charges 

of double standards, of realpolitik, and of caring about 

people only when our national security is not on the line. 

In either option there is apt to be a wide gap between our 

rhetoric and our ability to perform. ^ 


Option I 

— announce a policy that would place respect for the 

rights of man, political and economic,, as a major 

objective of US foreign policy; 

— press for Senate ratification of all outstanding 

treaties and covenants dealing with these issues; 

— propose special assistance programs and commitments to 

those nations which demonstrate respect or improvement 

of.respect for human rights; 

— develop particularly forthcoming political and 

economic, programs for democracies; 

— announce that human rights performance will be measured 

from January 20, 1977 — a fresh gtart for all nations,- 

— state that all bilateral assistance programs are to be 

reappraised — bilateral military and economic 

assistance will go only to nations that do not show 

a consistent pattern of gross violations of human right 



SECJK^T 

-17- 

— announce a similar policy for|US voting in all 

international lending agencies!; and 

— develop with Congress a close working relationship in 

monitoring performance. 

Option II 

— announce a policy that places respect for human rights 

as a major objective of US foreign policy but recognizes 

political diversity, economic development and national 

security as major competing concerns of nation states; 

— stress US desire to devote our efforts primarily to 

ending torture, improving prison conditions, and 

raising respect for due process worldwide; 

— give special emphasis in our assistance programs to 

democracies of the developing world; 

— devise strategies for US policies and programs toward 

individual countries based on the- leverage available, US 

interests, and type of change fthat can be expected; 

— develop private contacts with leaders of particularly 

repressive regimes such as in Argentina, Chile, 

and Uruguay to convey US interest in supporting their 

efforts to achieve economic stability if important 

steps are taken in the human rights area; and 

— work with Congress to develop country specific approaches 

and seek modification of across-the-board legislation 

such as the Harkin Amendment. 

6. Issue: Cuba 

Cuba? 

How and at what pace should the US renew relations with 

The new Administration may wish to test Cuban desires 

to improve relations. Cuban officials have indicated they are 

interested in reinstituting the 1973 Hijacking Agreement, 

which Cuba denounced following the terrorist destruction of a 

Cubana Airlines plane last October. Castto has shown intermittent 


No Objection To Declassificati 

SECRET 

-18- t 

in Full 2012/12/11 : NLC-17-111-2-3-5 

interest in restoring relations with the US. He wants access 

to US markets/ technology and credits, US recognition of his 

revolution, and possibly to move beyond initial exchanges on 

hijacking. 

"Normalization" of relations is a word loosely used 

in the US-Cuban context. To some it connotes resolution of 

all outstanding issues between the two countries, including 

compensation for nationalized properties, military questions 

and human rights. To others it means resumption of diplomatic 

relations. Castro and the Cuban leadership are ambivalent 

about restoration of extensive ties with the US which full 

"normalization" implies. In past years the Cubans have said 

diplomatic relations could only come at the end of the 

negotiating process. But recent American visitors to Havana 

have been told that such relations could come early on. 

Option I: Minimal Change. Preserve; the hijacking . 

agreement but make clear we are making no basic dhanges in qur 

policy until Cuba withdraws more troops from Angola. 

Option II: Prove Cuban intentions. Make sufficient gestures 

to test Cuban .interest in negotiating the entire range 

of bilateral problems. Diplomatic relations would follow 

progress on substantive differences. 

Option III; Seek Diplomatic Relations followed by negotiations 

on the major substantive issues. 

Option I would avoid antagonizing conservative Congressmen 

and segments of the US public at a time when Panama Canal 

Treaty negotiations are a top priority. The period between 

moving from Option I to one of the other options (after the 

Panama issue is clear) could be used to increase pressure on 

the Cubans to disengage from Southern Africa. But the Cubans 

would probably take Option I as an afront. Option II would 

permit businesslike openings to Cuba. While conservatives and 

certain Cuban exiles might be alarmed we could move slowly and 

demonstrate our intention not to give anything away. ■ Extended 

low-key discussions would permit Latin and US domestic opinion 

to adjust to a US-Cuba rapprochement. t But by negotiating 

first we could give Fidel the advantage. The talks could 

break-down prior to establishing a US presence in Havana which 

is more in our interests than his. Option III is most consistent 

with recent US practices (PRC and GDR) and would 

likely get us into more open talks and a presence in Havana 

soonest. But Option III carried out now would likely result 

• SECRET 

/ 


No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/11 NLC-17-111-2-3-5 

SEC 

-19- 

fusion of the anti-Castro and ant.i-Qanal Treaty Consmen, 

increasing the problems in achieving Senate support. 


Option I 

— work thru the Swiss to renew the Hijacking Agreement 

following appropriate steps here regarding US intentions 

to prosecute and restrict Cuban exiles; 

— convey to the Cubans informally US interest in moving 

to negotiations and normalization if Cuba makes 

some appropriate gesture such as significant 

withdrawals of troops from Angola; 

— make publicly clear that we are ready to normalize if 

Cuba demonstrates it is not interested in supporting 

expanded conflict in Africa. 

Option II 

— announce lifting of travel restrictions to Cuba and seek 

thru the Swiss to begin direct private talks with 

the Cubans in New York on Hijacking Agreement; 

— if Cubans respond favorably to initial meetings, 

announce jointly that US and Cuba have agreed to 

undertake discussions in New York an Hijacking Agreement 

and entire range of bilateral issues; 

— agree to establish diplomatic relations and lift 

embargo when good faith in negotiating process established. 

Option III 

— seek confidential contacts with Cubans to determine 

their interest in moving quickly toward diplomatic 

relations; 

— the US would lift travel restrictions and the embargo 

on food and medicines. We would announce measures 

to restrict Cuban exile activity against Cuba; 

— Cuba would release American prisoners and agree to 


« r 


SECRg^ 

-20- 

ncgotiate in good faith all outstanding issues; 

following reestablishment of diplomatic relations 

fcrmal negotiations would begin. 

t 

Dr a f t ed: ARl^: mm s 

l)*15/77 ext. 2921Q 

Clearance: ARA: WHLuei^^ 

SECRET 


No Objection To D 


DOS.REVIEWED 1B-Feb-2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL! 

TELEGRAM 

PAGE P! CbATEH mu II CF 12 II IS 132 111 I 

ACTIGA ARA-ls 

INFO OCT-11 SS-it ISO-II SP-II SHA-12 K-1I I NR-15 

NSC-13 NSCE-AB ClAE-13 SS0-2I iNRf-Di /D36 * 

.....................1111*32 126533 til i 

0 II1241Z JUA V 

FH AUEVBASSl C.ATIMALA 

TO SECSTATE it-SxOC. IMMlDiATE 6232 

TRIAS DEPT IMMEDIATE 

it t-C *4 T-SfC?iO'. 1 OF 2 GUATEMALA 3**6 

1 IU0IS 

TREASURE FOP. PETER BRUGES 

. E.O. 11652 COS 

TAGS: CCOH, Ei IN SHUN. CT 

SUBJ: SECRETARY BlUMENTHAl ‘ S BILATERAL litE11HC WITH ARGENTINA 

«■■■■ M H l ■ I ' 'I ■ I II ‘ 

REF: 

GUATEMALA 3116, BRIDCES-B■TTKER TELECON 

GUATEM (Silt II OF 12 I11SI32 

DE HOZ IF Ht SAW A WAT TO MOVE FROM EXTRA LEGAL METHODS OF CDH- 

TIOL TO THE NORMAL legal PROCESS IN NAhClINC TERRORISTS. 

MARTINEZ DE HOZ SA'D THRT MILE ARGENTINA ACUiRES If. S. TRADITIONS 

AND LAWS AND CITED THE COMMON HISTCRl. IRE PRESENT SlTUiTiCH 

IS HIGHLY ABNORMAL STEVUINC IN PARE IY INHISIUON OF THE jL3lC:APY 

TO SENTENCE TERRORISTS BECAUSE OF FEAR 0* KETRiEL.FI3F> *i*:.'.S; 

THEMSELVES ASO T-tlR FAMILIES. THE POLICE BECAME DISCOURAGED HnEN 

TERRORISTS BROUGHT TQ TRIAL WERE AlKAYS SET FREE. THUS. A PSilCT 

OF TARING NO PRISONERS MS ADOPTED. LIKEWISE. TOUNG WiLITIRr 

OFFICERS TOGA MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS. MARTINEZ DE NC2 

SAID PEES ID! fiT Y-CELA IS CCWIITTEO TO RESTORING HUMAN PiCnTS. 

CCNSIOEPABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE III ft-.PING OUT THE T*0 MAIN 

TERRORIST CROUFS AND HE ANTICIPATES (RACIAL IMFIOPEMENT IN 

RESTORING HUMAN RIGHTS OYER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. 

IOSTER 

! 

AS PER BE QUEST BY L'S. PETER BRIDGES THERE FOLLOWS MEUSO-T CF 

SECRETARY Dll'MfNIHAl'S (ILATERA.. MEETING KITH ARGENTINE MINISTER 

OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOI: 


PARTICIPANTS: 

ARGENTINA; JOSE ALFREDO MARTINEZ DE HOZ. MINISTER OF ECONOMY 

JLLOOLFO CEXAI DIZ, PRESIDENT OF THE CENTRAL 1ANR 

DANTE SIMONE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, IMF 

U. S. 

MICHAEL fllUKEKTRAl, SECRETARY OF TREASURY 

C. FRED BERGITEV ASSISTANT SECPETAPf OF TREASURY 

AKHOlC NACHUANCFF, CEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC’ETART OF TREASURY 

RICHARD ARELLANO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 

EDWARD BITTNER, CFlCE CF DEVELOPThS NATIONS FINANCE. TREASURY 

TI ML AND PLACE: MAY SI, 117) - U.S. CHANCERY, GUATEMALA 

SUBJ; BILATERAL MEETING WITH ARGENTINA 

MARTINEZ DE nO) SAIO HE WAS GRATETUL FOR OPPORTUNITY TO ERPLAIN 

PLRSONALL) TO SECRETARY RLUMENTHAl THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS THAT 

ARCENIINA HAS UADi SINCE THE ADMINISTRATION OF YIDELR. HE BEGAN 

BY CUING A DEIAILIO DESCRIPTION OF THE POLITICAL MACHINATIONS 

LEADING UP TO THE MILITART TAXED.ER IN MAR 15)6, EMPHASIZING 

THAT THE Mil I TART RELUCTANTLY ASSUMED PC»£R *HER PERON'S RIFE HAO 

I OS T CONTROL OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND THE ECONOMY pPO REACHED 

-ROC* BOTIOU'. HE SAID HE AGREED TO BE MINISTER OF ECOWY ClilY 

| IF HE HAD THE COLD IE TE POLITICAL BACK i.NC OF THE MIL ITAFT AND IF 

HE WOULD HAVE COhTROL OVER ALL MINISTRIES INVOLVING THE ECONOMY. 

THE AH LI TAR f ifiCCRlTEO A LEGACY OF TERRORIST CRCA'il/ATlMS *MCH 

• PERCH HAD 8AC*fD IA ORDER TO OPPOSE ThE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS, 

HUT WHICH ULTUUIELY GOT OUT OF CONTROL. 

MARTIN£1 DE HOZ RE ITEPEATEO THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS WHICH HAS 

PETN MADE USCER HIS LEADERSHIP. ClTECTir.C OUR ITTENTiON T5 EOOK 

WITH CHAR'S SHOWING INTER ALIA OECiEASf IN UNEMPlOTUf.NT. 

DECREASE IN USVEIA'Y EXPANSlCH. iNCPEASE IN AGR |C‘jl TJ=AL PRO 

DUCT I O'l, ENIRC' PRODUCTION AH3 EXPORT SHiH'EATS. REDUCTION IK 

CCVSRNVENT DEFICIT DECLINE IN RATE OF INFLATION. AND IMPROVE 

MENT III EXTERNAL SECTOR. HE JAIC HE APS AELC TO CONVINCE THE 

POPUl AT I O'l ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF A CECREASEO GROWTH lli RIAL WAGES 

AS TkL PRICE FO* ACHIEVING STABuiTf. 

RUUi.H'HA: EA.O PE ACUIP'5 THE PPOC»TSS IH '«£ ECONOMY IHICI 

HAO EEEA M*3' A*.6 unOEPS'AHSS THE PO.i'ICAL SITUATION S':'"i:l.G 

r»OM THE TEXFCFiSM iIiHfRirr; t*5V ffEvIf-uS CCVEP'iMENTS. U CITED 

ThE FACT THAT THE CE'fCIX CORPCPA'IGN WI'H W«iCH HE PPEviVjSLT HAO 

BEEN :SS*C'1TE5. ICS' Yuorf EL"'?S '0 THE T:»*CFISTS. NEVER- 

TP!LESS. :».[ J.S. >S VERY CCTiCt-'.E.TT ASCI.’ CUE PFCCESS 0: lA* 

AND ThE C fE * A L F»CTE:tiON CF HL-UP-: RlG-'S. HE ASVEO UPPTINEZ 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O.13526 

Au?hnrihr N LC, -1 S - 3, - \ -\ 

. Dr»to -l\q\u# 

Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/06/18 : NLC-15R-3-1-1-1’^w^* 

i

No Objeotion To Declassification in Full 2012/06/18 : NLC-15R-3-1-1-1 

tlLUIlLI 

i 11 u w in i n vi 


TELEGRAM 

PACE 11 GiiATEU 8344S BZ OF n 1111322 11(1 

AC1I0N ARA-S6 

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............. ...SI214SZ 12(2(4 /(4 S 

0 111(412 JIM 27 

FV AMLL>i

v 1 


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■ -w r>rrnrT 

©fcvmfci 

DOS REVIEWED 28-Jan 2011: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL] 


, WASHINGTON 

June 23, 1977 


FROM; 

THE PRESIDENT 

Warren Christopher, 

Acting 

i 

Guinea. I met with the Guinean Prime Minister 

and several members of his Cabinet today. At the end 

of a long session, he said that he was authorized by 

President Toure to tell us that the Soviet intelligence 

flights out of Guinea would be stopped, as of 

today. Although not necessarily tied to the termination 

of the flights, he tabled a request for Coast Guard 

cutters to patrol Guinea1 s shores. I I told him that we 

doubted that Guinea's security was threatened, but 

would earnestly consider the request. 

Although our information is that human rights 

conditions are very bad in Guinea, the Prime Minister 

strongly endorsed our human rights initiatives. He 

said that Guinea is prepared to allow an international 

group to conduct an examination of its human rights 

situation. Because Guinea reportedly holds large 

numbers of political prisoners, I indicated it would 

be a significant step if Guinea would identify its 

political prisoners, indicate the reasons for their 

incarceration, and the length of their sentences. 

i 

I told the Prime Minister that if Guinea followed 

through on the statements made today, it could lead to 

a great improvement in our relations. He seeus desirous 

of doing so, to open the way to more aid and investment 

and to offset close ties with the Soviets. The 

Prime Minister delivered a letter to you from President 

Toure, which we forwarded immediately vfrith a rough 

translation. t DECLASSIFIED 

■SECRET 

GDS 

E.O.13526 

Authority!)'


mCTUTi 

- 2 - 

Belgrade. The wire services are reporting a tough 

statement bySoviet Delegation chief Vorontsov to the 

effect that if the Soviet Union does not get its way 

in the current debate over the agenda for the main 

meeting there could be "great unpleasantness (and) the 

failure of our mission." This is characterized by the 

press as a Soviet threat to walk out if they cannot 

achieve a satisfactory agenda. 

t 

Our-Delegation believes that the Soviet statement 

is a tactical ploy to pressure the West to be more 

receptive to the Eastern position on the agenda, rather 

than a threat to walk out. Despite dramatic press 

reports, there is no atmosphere of confrontation or 

crisis in Belgrade. Generally speaking, the preparatory 

meeting in Belgrade is proceeding along anticipated 

lines, and we should be prepared for a substantial 

period of pulling-and-hauling. 

OAS. Before the OAS meeting in Grenada ended 

late yesterday, the U.S. Delegation, assisted by 

Venezuela and Costa Rica, pushed through a strong 

resolution on human rights. It was supported by 

every country visited by Mrs. Carter except Brazil. 

The resolution affirms the rule of law and asserts 

that no circumstances justify torture or prolonged 

detention without trial. It commends the OAS Human 

Rights Commission (composed of seven experts elected 

as individuals rather than as representatives of their 

countries}, and asks member states to'cooperate with the 

Commission and not to retaliate ag.fcinst individuals who 

cooperate with it. 

The resolution also asks the Commission to organize 

a progrsun of consultations with governments, institutions, 

and organizations to fulfill its function of 

protecting human rights in the hemisphere. This last 

point is a step short of the program of Commission 

visits to member countries for which we had originally 

hoped, but it is a step forward. 

In contrast to previous General Assemblies, 

economic issues were not given priority attention. 

The Latin Americans appeared to be more interested 

—SECRET- 

No Objection To Declassification in Fnill 2012/11/26 : NLC-133-5-7-33-5

No Objection To Declassification in Ffill 2012/11/26 : NLC-133-5-7-33-5 

fiDCRET—' 

- 3 - 

in cooperation with the United States than in confrontation. 

We had to abstain on several resolutions 

(e.g., OPEC exclusion, Panama Canal tolls) but we were 

able to support a general resolution on trade cooperation 

and consultation. 

Portugal. Our efforts to secure international 

financial support for Portugal have been successful. 

Meeting yesterday in Paris, eleven countries — Germany, 

France, Italy, J&pan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 

Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and 

Venezuela — made formal commitments to provide $750 

million in balance of payments loans over the next 

eighteen months. Austria, Ireland! and Canada have 

participation under active and sympathetic consideration. 

For its part, Portugal announced its intention 

to take further economic stabilization steps in cooperation 

with the IMF and to negotiate a second credit 

agreement with the IMF by the end of the year. 

Although some follow-up with foreign governments 

will be necessary to complete arrangements, our major 

effort now will be to secure Congressional approval of 

the $300 million loan the U.S. has pledged as our contribution. 

The House and Senate have approved legislation 

authorizing the loan. The House is expected to appropriate 

the $300 million later tonight or tomorrow, but 

the Senate is not expected to act until late July. 

Yugoslav M-47 Tanks to Ethiopia. We have instructed 

our Ambassador'to raise the issue of the tanks with the 

Yugoslav government. 

Canadian Gas Prices. The Government of Canada 

announced today that the price of natutal gas exported 

to the U.S. will increase from $1.94 to $2.16 per 

thousand cubic feet. The Canadians had proposed a 

price of $2.25 but agreed to reduce it after discussions 

with us. The nine cent price reduction will save consumers 

approximately $90 million. The new price will 

remain in effect for at least six months, but will then 

be subject to review. Further price increases can be 

expected as Canada continues its policy of pricing 

natural gas at the equivalent of world oil prices. 

SECRET 

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/26 NLC-133-5-7-33-5


W jaeRETT1 W 

- 4 - 

t 

Cuba. We learned late Monday that an anti-Castro 

terrorist group was planning a raid on Cuba. We passed 

this information to the Cuban Government the same day. 

Cy inquired whether the FBI could caution the exile 

terrorists against making the raid, but we were informed 

that this- cannot be done without jeopardizing the lives 

of informants. However, our law enforcement authorities 

plan to make arrests if evidence is developed, and to 

interdict the raid if it proceeds. 

On Tuesday, at the request of U.S. Customs, we 

alerted Cuba that four unmarked U.S. Customs ships are 

observing the terrorist group. Yesterday, we received 

a Cuban reply thanking us for the information we passed 

and advising that its naval units are aware of the 

presence of our ships. 

Foreign Affairs Appropriations. The House is 

wrapping up two days of fairly intense debate on the 

appropriations bill tonight. Among the major develop-' 

ments. Congressman Miller prevailed late today with an 

across-the-board five percent cut *[212-178) . Funds can 

come from one program or all. Earlier in the day, we 

staved off an effort to make a substantial cut in funds 

for the International Development Association of the 

World Bank. The leadership worked hard against both 

these amendments. All other fund-cut amendments were 

defeated. 

Today Mozambique, Angola, and Cuba were added to 

the list of countries to which "indirect" assistance is 

prohibited by the Young amendment, passed yesterday. 

On the other hand, after eliminating all remaining 

military aid to Argentina yesterday, the House today 

restored approximately $3 million for aid to Nicaragua 

(225-187}. Finally, Harkin's amendment to reduce the 

FMS program for Korea was defeated this evening on a 

voice vote. Majority Leader Wright, Republican Ed 

Derwinski, H±RC Chairman Zablocki and Sam Stratton 

led the debate against the amendment. 

i 

t 

—SECRET—' 


No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-1-2 

m * 

Uftrcb 5V 1977 

UtUOtAMBQIi FOB 

THE SBCBSTABY OB STATE 

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No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-1-2-1« 

w —OtUKtll » >4 


WASHINGTON 

March 4, 1977 


FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 

Cyrus Vance 

t 

1. Bongo Comments on PLOt After you left the 

meeting with President Bongo yesterday, I asked him 

whether, in his opinion, there is any willingness on 

the part of the PLO to recognize the right of Israel 

to exist. Bongo replied that two PLO representatives 

(whose names escaped him) called on him recently in 

Gabon and gave him the impression that their position 

had changed somewhat. They appeared to agree to 

recognize the existence of Israel as an independent 

and sovereign state, no longer make their claims for 

complete repossession of Jerusalem, accepted a small 

part of the West Bank for their own state, and are 

agreeable to some kind of a federation with Jordan. 

The Palestinians told Bongo that they would have to 

accept the link with Jordan if only because they are 

without resources and could not survive alone. The 

Palestinians also told Bongo that they wanted to be 

able to attend the Geneva Conference at which a third 

country like the US would make a set of proposals 

along the lines mentioned above. According to Bongo's 

PLO visitor, Arafat is prepared to accept such an 

overall plan. 

It is, of course, hard for me to assess the PLO 

reactions that Bongo reported. We do not know the 

identity of his visitors or their relationship to 

Arafat. We will, of course, be very attentive to any 

indication that the PLO position may be evolving along 

the lines described by Bongo. TheiPLO is holding a 

congress on March 12 and we may conceivably see some 

small sign of change or flexibility then. 

2. Habib Before Diggs Subcommittee: Yesterday 

afternoon, Phil Habib testified on our southern Africa 

policy before Charlie Diggs' subcommittee on African 

GDS 

Nn Ohier.tinn Tn Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-1-2-1


-2- 

ret' 

a. 

& 

Gf i 

Affairs. As you know, Diggs and the other members of 

the subcommittee are very attentive to the need to have 

our African policy made consistent with our commitment 

to social justice. Phil described your administration's 

current review of southern Africa policy as an effort 

aimed at strengthening the U.S. commitment to Rhodesia, 

Namibia, and South Africa. The committee reacted very 

positively to our approach. Several members suggested 

policy tacks that Phil agreed we would take into serious 

consideration. Charlie Diggs made clear that the 

subcommittee would be taking a hard look to see how well 

our actions in southern Africa square with our announced 

intentions. Nevertheless, I belipve that we have gotten 

off to a good start with a committee whose cooperation 

and support will be vital as we attempt to establish a 

consensus on southern Africa policy. 

3. Argentina Spurns Foreign Military Sales Credits! 

The Argentine government has now formally notified us that 

it will not use its foreign military sales credit for 

FY '78. In a call on Warren Christopher, the Argentine 

Ambassador rejected the charge that Argentina was violating 

human rights. He also complained that his government had 

first heard of our aid cutoff from press reports of my 

testimony before the Inouye Committee. Warren replied 

that we were aware of Argentina's security problems, but 

he emphasized again the importance we attach to the rule 

of law and protection of human rights. Warren then reminded 

the Ambassador that we had warned Argentina previously that 

in our opinion it had become necessary to exercise Borne 

restraint in its anti-terrorist campaign. 

4. Soviet American Maritime Accord: In late January 

we passed on to the Soviets a diplomaticnote indicating 

that as of March 1 we intend to enforce a fishing jurisdiction 

that will follow the line set forth in the 1867 

U.S.-Russian Convention that ceded Alaska to the U.S. 

This unilateral decision on our part was designed to 

discourage any attempt to renegotiate a key maritime 

boundary line in the Bering Sea. Several days ago the 

Soviets told us that they could accept our position. As 

a result we have avoided a potentially difficult boundary 

dispute and gained undisputed control over significant 

fisheries resources. Here is an instance of Soviet 

moderation which demonstrates that it is still possible 

to reach understandings with the Soviets on key issues 

despite disagreements on strategic or human rights 

questions. 

■GBeRET"" 

■W^nhienHnnT^npHa«ifiratinrnrîil^n^/12/1^^NLC-7-18^^-ll


SECRETLi 

-3- 

5. Conversation with the Jamaican Foreign Minister: 

Warren Christopher and I met with Jamaican Foreign Minister 

Patterson yesterday to discuss bilateral relations and 

prospects for increased U.S. economic assistance. The 

Jamaicans do not hide their interest in trying to improve 

relations with us and proposed that a group of technical 

experts meet to study aid and trade questions. I said 

we would try to find a mutually convenient time for a short 

meeting between you and Prime Minister Manley. 

On economic questions, the Jamaicans told me of their 

intention to resume discussions with the IMF in April in 

an effort to win further support for the ailing Jamaican 

economy. When I stressed the desirability of a negotiated 

settlement of the Revere bauxite dispute, Patterson 

responded that there was still disagreement between his 

government and the company over the va^lue of Revere1 s 

facilities. However, the case had been taken to the 

Jamaican courts and the government ^would abide by the 

decision of the courts. 

Patterson said that the Jamaicans feel they can 

benefit from Cuba's experience, especially in the construction 

of housing, schools and microdams, and they hope 

that the United States and Cuba will improve relations. 

Patterson also expressed hope for a new Panama Canal 

treaty. 

6. Namibia: We called in South African Ambassador 

Botha this morning to ask for an update on his government1s 

thinking on Namibia. Botha said that his government had 

not ruled out trying for an internationally acceptable 

settlement and that he personally believes that many of 

the seven points negotiated last September in Pretoria 

with Henry Kissinger still offer a basis for a negotiated 

settlement. However, the South African government also 

wants to keep the Namibian constitutional conference 

(which excludes SWAPO as an organization) alive and to 

include its participants in the negotiations for a final 

settlement. When we reiterated to Botha that time was 

of the essence in getting the Namibian peace process 

moving again, he promised to report our views to his 

government and be back to us next week. 

SFCRRT'

Nu Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7- ; 7-18-3-14 6^F"1" 

Wlavnui 


WASHINGTON 

May 19, 1977 

\ 

POS REVIEWED 08-Feb 2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FUlID 


FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT' 

f 


Arms Transfer Policy. The text of your statement 

on conventional arms transfer policy, was sent to all 

diplomatic posts this afternoon. Embassies in countries 

where we have supply relationships were instructed to 

inform their host governments promptly of the nature 

of the new policy. We provided key Embassies with 

guidance on matters of special interest to their 

respective host governments. 

Nixon Letter. We told the Vietnamese today in 

Paris that the Nixon letter to Lester Wolff was not 

related to the normalization negotiations, and we 

downplayed the story in today's press briefing. The 

timing and content of Mr. Nixon's letter to Wolff 

seems to be part of his effort to regain a measure 

of public acceptance. 

Todman Trip to Latin America*. Assistant Secretary 

Todman returned this week fropj a quick swing through 

Latin America. In Colombia, President Lopez Michelsen 

pressed for the helicopters which we promised him in 

1975 under our narcotics assistance program, but which 

we are hesitant to deliver because of reported 

narcotics-related corruption in the Colombian Government. 

Lopez generally supports our human rights policy but 

warned that we should not try to be the "world's moral 

policeman." He urges that we internationalize the 

GDS 

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flB0RET~L' 

- 2 - 

effort (which of course we arc trying to do). 

Colombian officials pressed their view that we should 

give special preferences to Latin American goods to 

offset the preferences the European Community extends 

to former European colonies. 

In Venezuela, President Perez, looking forward 

to his forthcoming state visit, is anxious to cooperate 

with us in all areas and to take a strong stand on 

human rights. The Venezuelans stressed that the 

single most important issue in our bilateral relations 

is the removal of Venezuela (and Ecuador) from the 

list of OPEC countries excluded from our system of 

generalized trade preferences. 

% 

Todman talked with President Videla of Argentina 

who was also visiting Venezuela. Videla said that he 

understood our human rights position and did not argue 

with its importance, but that Argentina just could not 

meet the highest standards until it wins the war against 

terrorism. Videla asked for our understanding of 

Argentina's difficulties. 

Foreign Minister Silveira stressed that Brazil 

attaches great importance to the Memorandum of 

Understanding signed with the United States in 1976. 

He was obviously concerned that ambiguity on its 

future would not only hinder bilateral problem-solving, 

but could lead to a further deterioration in U.S.-Brazil 

relations. Cy will be meeting with Silveira next week 

during the CIEC meeting and will try to put his doubts 

to rest on this score. Although not discussed 

extensively with Todman, the nuclear issue remains of 

primary concern to the Brazilians. 

Bolivian President Banzcr and other Government 

officials promised to speed up adjudication of the 

cases of Americans held on narcotics charges. Based 

on our pledge of assistance, the Bolivian Government 

is now fully committed to a program of crop substitution 

for the cocaine-source coca now produced there. 

■S.'F.rRFT


SECRET 

- 3 - 

Japanese Aid Policy. Embassy Tokyo reports that 

Japan will increase its foreigh assistance budget to 

almost $2 billion in fiscal 1977, up 21.7 percent 

over last year. The bulk of the increase will go to 

multilateral agencies. Actual disbursements lag 

increasingly behind budget levels, however, causing 

Japan to look for ways to accelerate use of its aid 

as well. 

Japan's wealth, North-South pressures, and 

prodding from trading partners are gradually loosening 

Japan's traditionally tight purse strings. Pukuda 

reportedly even considered announcing a doubling of 

aid over five years at the Summit. If Pukuda and the 

Foreign Ministry continue to win out over the Finance 

Ministry and its allies, marked improvements in Japan's 

aid budget and disbursement levels over the next few 

years will result. 

Panama Canal. In discussions yesterday and today, 

the Panamanian negotiators indicated acceptance, in 

principle, of a treaty provision jinder which both 

Panama and the United States would jointly maintain 

the neutrality of the Canal irl accordance with 

established rules. The negotiators also indicated 

an awareness of the U.S. understanding that neutrality 

provisions would apply to threats to the Canal 

originating from within Panama as well as from third 

countries. The talks will continue tomorrow. 

■SSCKEOL—f

V 


14, IfTT 

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No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-4-12-7N fij^ 


WASHINGTON 

STgrRBT 

June 15, 1977 

MEMORANDUM FOR! 

FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 


CSCE Preparatory Meeting. Today's opening session 

of the Belgrade preparatory meeting was purely ceremonial. 

At the first working session tomorrow, the United Kingdom 

delegation will table a "draft decision sheet" with proposed 

language for the decisions on timing, duration, 

agenda and modalities which are to be taken at the 

preparatory gathering. This paper was worked out by 

the NATO Allies in Brussels and represents a common 

NATO position. Our delegation will join the British 

in co-sponsoring the draft. 

In a conversation yesterday with the head of our 

working delegation (Ambassador Sherer), the head of the 

Soviet delegation indicated that he hopes to move 

expeditiously through the preparatory meeting without 

discussion of political issues. However, he also noted 

the Soviet desire to have the fall meeting focus mainly 

on new proposals rather than on a review of implementation 

of the Helsinki agreement., The Soviets believe 

the review should be limited to plenary sessions, which 

would limit our ability to discuss specific problems of 

implementation. We will insist on a full and complete 

review which we do not regard as incompatible with 

consideration of meritorious new proposals. We will 

gain a better idea of the Soviet position as the meeting 

proceeds to discuss specific points of organization and 

timing. 

Bulgaria. I met today with Madame Zhivkova, 

Chairman of the Bulgarian Cultural Committee and the 

daughter of Bulgarian Chief of State, Todo Zhivkov. 

She is here to sign our firBt bilateral cultural and 

scientific exchange agreement, and her visit signals 

SECRET 

GDS 

Inh Dhiprtinn Tn Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-4-12-7l

No Objection To Declassification ir^'ull 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-4-12-7 

SECRET 

- 2 - 

a desire to improve our relations. I expressed appreciation 

for her Government's cooperation in the Marev 

case and urged that they keep up the momentum in 

resolving our family reunification cases. 

Argentine World Bank Loans. Despite a last-minute 

effort by Argentina to persuade us that recent actions, 

including prisoner releases, signify improvement in 

their human rights performance, our Executive Director 

will abstain on two World Bank loans to Argentina that 

come to a vote tomorrow. One major loan provides $100 

million in industrial credits; the dther extends a 

$7 million credit for a soybean project. Given the 

grave violations in Argentina and the fact that past 

promises of change have come to little, we felt that 

we would have to see more evidence of progress in order 

to approve the two loans. However, we will accompany 

our abstention with a statement recognizing that there 

are Bigns that the situation in Argentina may be 

improving. 

Toth CaBe. Although Robert Toth continues to be 

questioned by Soviet security officials, there is no 

indication that the Soviets plan to try him. We believe, 

however, that the "protocols" he has been required to 

sign may be used as testimony against Soviet Jewish 

activists and dissidents at some point. Toth was 

questioned closely about his connections with Anatoliy 

Shcharanskiy, who provided information last November 

which Toth used in an article on Soviet Jews who had 

been refused emigration on grounds of having dealt with 

classified information. The information was relatively 

innocuous, but we speculate that the Soviets may allege 

that Shcharanskiy passed "state secrets." In bo doing, 

they would avoid directly challenging your statement 

that Shcharanskiy had no connection with the CIA. 

Legislation. As you know, the Senate is spending 

the week on foreign policy legislation. In the debate 

on International Financial Institutions (IFIs) yesterday, 

the Humphrey human rights provision survived by a vote 

of 50 to 43, but a Dole amendment prohibiting IFI loans 

■SSGRBT 

iNn Dhipr.tinn Tn Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-4-12-71


.gBGRET 

- 3 - 

to Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos was adopted 56 to 32. 

Dole had virtually solid Republican support, and a 

reasonably broad spectrum of Democrats including the 

Majority Leader. We forestalled a similar amendment 

on the bilateral aid authorization today by offering a 

less-damaging substitute which extends the existing 

prohibition on direct aid but permits indirect 

assistance. 

% 

The Dole amendment language ,does not occur in the 

House-passed version of the IFI authorization. There 

is some chance, therefore, that we can strike it in 

conference. This will be next to impossible, however, 

if the House adopts a similar amendment on the Foreign 

Operations Appropriations bill which will be debated at 

the beginning of next week. 

Korean withdrawal is the next major trouble spot 

in the Senate. The State Department Authorization, 

which will be debated tomorrow, contains a McGovern 

amendment supporting the withdrawal policy. Howard 

Baker intends to introduce an amendment to Btrike the 

McGovern language which will prompt a debate over Korea 

withdrawal policy. Our tactic will be to broaden the 

McGovern amendment to insure adequate assessments at 

each stage of the withdrawal plus regular Congressional 

consultation. We have passed the word to Senator Byrd 

that Baker's amendment represents a direct challenge to 

Administration policy and asked him to tell us what he 

will support if he cannot support the broadened McGovern 

language. Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee has scheduled Stan Turner to testify next 

Monday on the assessments behind *our withdrawal decision. 

Phil Habib and General Brown will then return to the 

Committee to support our policy.


DOS REVIEWED 30 viar-2ril2: DECLASSIF1ED FQR RELEASE IN FULL 

MiwkSO. 1977 

MFMOftAMOtXM FOX 

tick nrvuTY naiTAiv or rati 

a capy ol yaav of MAM 19. 1977, 

Zbigniew Braaalaakl 

Nln Dhipr.tinn Tn Derlassifinatinn in Full 7012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-1 -19-31

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-1-19-3^/7 ^/l 

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE 

WASHINGTON 

-SECRET 

March 29, 1977 


FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 

Warren Christopher 

Position of New Indian Governpient on Non-Proliferation. 

Our Embassy m New Delhi has supplied a 

cautious reading of Prime Minister Desai's presB 

statement that: 

r 

'ft* 

"We do not believe in nuclear weapons 

at all. That policy stands. I do 

not know whether it is necessary to 

have a nuclear explosion for peaceful 

purposes, but if it is not necessary 

it should never be done." 

fa 

Following a meeting with Foreign Secretary Mehta, 

our Embassy cabled that they doubt there will be a 

basic change in Indian nuclear policy. We need to 

test this judgement and to influence the new government 

in the right direction. I will attempt to do so 

when I see the Indian Ambassador in the next few days, 

just before he returns to Delhi for consultations. 

Ambassadorial Appointments. We have cabled host 

governments today requesting their agreement on an 

urgent basis to the following Ambassadorial appointments 

(an asterisk after the name connoces a career officer): 

Algeria 

Australia 

Belgium 

Cameroon 

Great Britain 

India 

Iran 

Israel 

Japan 

Kenya 

NATO 

Pakistan 

Turkey 

Ulric Haynes 

Philip Alston 

Anne Cox Chambers 

Mabel Smythe 

Kingman Brewster 

Robert F. Goheen 

William Sullivan* 

Samuel W. Lewis* 

Mike Mansfield 

Wilbert LeMelle 

W. Tapley Bennett* 

George S. Vest* 

Ronald Spiers* 

SECRET 

iNn Ohientinn To Declassification in.cull 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-1 -19-3l

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/ 

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it**, 

H "J, 

V' 

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We can increase the number of Career appointments 

to be announced with this package if you wish. 

Security Assistance and Human Rights. As you 

may know, five Latin governments "rejected" American 

military assistance based on the submission to Congress 

of the required human rights reports. It is interesting 

to note that four of the five seem to be having 

second thoughts about turning their backs on American 

military aid. 

— Although the Argentines turned down our FY 78 

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit program of $15 

million, they still want to receive $700,000 in grant 

training. They also want to sign contracts for over 

$30 million in unobligated FY 77 funds, but we have 

refused thus far to honor their requests because of 

human rights conditions in that country. 

— We have begun to receive indications that Brazil 

didn't realize that its rejection*of the $50 million 

credits for FY 78 meant that they would be unable to 

participate in the Foreign Military Sales cash sales 

program. They may ask permission to buy spare parts 

for American F-5E fighters and naval equipment, drawing 

on unobligated FY 77 money. 

__ 

El Salvador and Guatemala are now hedging on 

■/•_// r their initial refusals to participate in rather small 

f credit .................... and training programs .......... for ........... FY 78 and unobligated 

--....... 

FY 77 money. 

r 

A"* 

We have told the Congress that we are not now asking 

that the FY 78 budget request for these countries be 

withdrawn. We prefer to let the situation settle down 

and assess our security relationships at a later date. 

However, the atmosphere in the House Appropriations 

Committee is such that some of these FY 78 programs may 

be eliminated, although we doubt that the Congress would 

eliminate the FY 77 funds still in the pipelines. 

Follow Up to Fukuda Visit. With*Jim Schlesinger's 

concurrence, we are initiating consultations with the 

Japanese at the technical level on the reprocessing 

.^facility at Tokai. These consultations will try to lay 

the groundwork for an eventual meeting between Jim and 

the Japanese Minister of Science. 

SECSEf 

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*: :-F 

WASHINGTON 

SDCRET- May 26, 1977 


FROM: 

Cyrus Vanctf««f 

1. Powell Memo: In reference to Jody’s memorandum to you, 

we have sent a cable to Seoul telling General Brown and Phil Habib 

that if there was deliberate Korean Government encouragement of 

criticism by the US military of your withdrawal plan or by the government-controlled 

press on your handling of the Singlaub affair, they 

should take up the matter with the Korean Government. 

2. Representation at International Conferences: I have 

notified Interested departments and agencies and issued the 

directive here and to our posts abroad chat we must reduce the size 

of our delegations to International conferences by 15 - 25 percent. 

I have also emphasized chat as many women and members of minority 

groups as possible should be included in our representation. 

We will take part in about 1000 international conferences 

this year. Such a large number of meetings involves considerable 

expense. I hope that by cutting baric on the number of the people 

involved in these conferences, an appreciable savings can be made. 

The number of women members and minority groups in 

these meetings is far from adequate, and I have given instructions 

that a special effort be made to correct this. 

3. CIEC: I leave Saturday evening for Paris and believe that 

the position which we have developed for CIEC is generally sound 

but I have some worries as we have discussed before. Dick Cooper 

and Solomon from Treasury are meeting today and tomorrow with 

other senior CIEC participants. They find the cone which LDC 

representatives are taking to be moderate. It is too early, however, 

to assess the outcome. 

ST 

GDS 

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JSEgRgr 

- 2 - 

4. Latin Presidents Plan Meeting on US Policies; Presidents 

of Latin America's Souchern Cone nations (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 

Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay), disturbed by US policies, particularly on 

human rights, are apparently attempting to organize a summit 

meeting, perhaps as early as June 3, to coordinate their response. 

To our knowledge, no such summit has been held since 1967, Brazil 

is key to the meeting. Given Brazil's international status and their 

recent problems with us. President Geisel's attendance would make 

the meeting significant and potentially difficult for us. Presidents 

Videla of-Argentina a-nd-Stroe&sner-of Pfcraguay^wanfttrforestall a 

blatantly anti-US gambit by broadening participation to include 

Venezuela, Colombia and Peru, but these countries almost certainly 

will refuse invitations. It is unlikely that Videla and StroeBsner 

would refuse to participate if their neighbors, especially Brazil, 

agree to meet. (We will follow this closely and keep you informed.) 

5. The Nangolo Execution: The South African Government 

has confirmed to our Ambassador its intention to execute Fllemon 

Nangolo, the Namibian convicted in South African courts of murder 

and attempted robbery. SWAPO has contested the execution. If the 

South Africans proceed, which is quite possible, the execution will 

complicate the Namibian negotiations. We have backed up our strong 

demarche in Cape Town with a parallel approach to the South African 

Ambassador here stating that the execution could undermine current 

negotiation efforts. We have also asked the other members of the 

Western Contact Group to urge their governments to make Bimllar 

representations in Cape Town. 

6. Meeting with Roel: We held our meeting with the Mexicans 

today and have agreed to establish three working groups. 

t 

-- Political: on-going discussions between myself 

and Foreign Secretary Roel. 

— Economic: overall working group which will have 

subgroups in trade, finance and energy. 

-- Social: This will include migration, border crime 

and environment and possibly drug matters. 

SECRET 

-SECRET 

iNn Dhifintinn Tn Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-3-19-11

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atuittr 

in Full 2012/12/12 

•• 

: NLC-7-18-3-19-1 

SECRET 

- 3 

We held preliminary meetings of the working groups 

today. We will prepare a report for you within three months, 

In my conversations with Roel we discussed ways in 

which Mexico might be helpful with Manley and the Belize problem. 

Roel also is interested In supporting our efforts on human rights 

and has some ideas on how we might work together to strengthen the 

Inter-American Human Rights Commission. He will also give me 

his thoughts on how to revitalize the OAS so that we can concert 

our actions at Grenada next month. 

The signing of the treaty was a step of major importance 

and I believe will help in moving the remaining non-signatories to 

join In. 

7, Tackson Committee Hearing: *'1 have just returned from 

Capitol Hill and will report to you tomorrow on my testimony before 

Scoop's Subcommittee. 

SECRET 

SECRET 

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No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-3-19-1^ _ 

~ ~twRET 


WASHINGTON 

SECRET May 26, 1977 


FROM: Cyrus Vance e* 

1. Powell Memo: In reference to Jody's memorandum to you, 

we have sent a cable to Seoul telling General Brown and Phil Habib 

that if there was deliberate Korean Government encouragement of 

criticism by the US military of your withdrawal plan or by the government-controlled 

press on your handling of the Singlaub affair, they 

should take up the matter with the Korean Government. 

2. Representation at International Conferences: I have 

notified interested departments and agencies and issued the 

directive here and to our posts abroad that we must reduce the size 

of our delegations to international conferences by 15 - 25 percent. 

T have also emphasized that as many women and members of minority 

groups as possible should be included in our representation. 

We will take part in about 1000 international conferences 

this year. Such a Large number of meetings involves considerable 

expense. I hope that by cutting back on the number of the people 

involved in these conferences, an appreciable savings can be made. 

The number of women members and minority groups in 

these meetings is far from adequate, and I have given instructions 

that a special effort be made to correct this. 

3. CIEC: I leave Saturday evening for Paris and believe that 

the position which we have developed for CIEC is generally sound 

but I have some worries as we have discussed before. Dick Cooper 

and Solomon from Treasury are meeting today and tomorrow with 

other senior CIEC participants. They find the tone which LDC 

representatives are taking to be moderate. It is too early, however, 

to assess the outcome.


4. Latin Presidents Flan Meeting on US Policies: Presidents 

of Latin America's Southern Cone nations (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 

Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay), disturbed by US policies, particularly on 

human rights, are apparently attempting to organize a summit 

meeting, perhaps as early as June 3, to coordinate their response. 

To our knowledge, no such summit has been held since 1967. Brazil 

is key to the meeting. Given Brazil's international status and their 

recent problems with us, President Geisel's attendance would make 

the meeting significant and potentially difficult for us. Presidents 

Videla of Argentina and Stroessner of Paraguay want to forestall a 

blatantly anti-US gambit by broadening participation to include 

Venezuela, Colombia and Peru, but these countries almost certainly 

will refuse invitations. It is unlikely that Videla and Stroessner 

would refuse to participate if their neighbors, especially Brazil, 

agree to meet. (We will follow this closely and keep you informed.) 

* 

5. The Nangolo Execution: TP.e South African Government 

has confirmed to our Ambassador its intention to execute Filemon 

Nangolo, the Namibian convicted in South African courts of murder 

and attempted robbery. SWAPO has contested the execution. If the 

South Africans proceed, which is quite possible, the execution will 

complicate the Namibian negotiations. We have backed up our strong 

demarche in Cape Town with a parallel approach to the South African 

Ambassador here stating that the execution could undermine current 

negotiation efforts. We have also asked the other members of the 

Western Contact Group to urge their governments to make similar 

representations in Cape Town. 

6. Meeting with Roel: We held our meeting with the Mexicans 

today and have agreed to establish three working groups. 

-- Political: on-going discussions between myself 

and Foreign Secretary Roel. 

-- Economic: overall working group which will have 

subgroups in trade, finance and energy. 

-- Social: This will include migration, border crime 

and environment and possibly drug matters. 

SECRET 

[Nr^hiectinn To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-3-19-1

No Objection, To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-3-19-1 

We held preliminary meetings of the working groups 

today. We will prepare a report for you within three months. 

! 

In my conversations with Roel we discussed ways in 

which Mexico might be helpful with Manley and the Belize problem. 

Roel also is interested in supporting our efforts on human rights 

and has some ideas on how we might work together to strengthen the 

Inter-American Human Rights Commission. He will also give me 

his thoughts on how to revitalize the OAS so that we can concert 

our actions at Grenada next month. 

The signing of the treaty was a step of major importance 

and I believe will help in moving the remaining non-signatories to 

join in. 

7. Jackson Committee Hearing: I have just returned from 

Capitol Hill and will report to you tomorrow on my testimony before 

Scoop's Subcommittee. 

t 

i 

iNo Ohiection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-3-19-1


bOS REVIEWED 09-Apr-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL 


WASHINGTON 

August 23, 1977 

J 

-SECRET 


FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 

Warren Christopher, Acting iStL 

Lagos Conference. The South African nuclear 

issue came up frequently during the plenary session 

today. Shawn McBride, Ireland's maverick delegate, 

made a speech this morning in which he asserted that 

the South African Government had already exploded a 

nuclear explosive device. Speeches by African delegates 

referred to Western cooperation with South 

Africa in the nuclear field. 

The Soviet representative will address the conference 

tomorrow. Originally scheduled to speak today, 

Andy asked for a delay until Thursday to be able to 

comment on and respond to the speeches of other delegates 

. 

Law of the Sea. Elliot Richardson has informed 

us that he would be willing to Continue to serve as 

principal U.S. representative at the next session of 

the Law of the Sea Conference scheduled for February 

1978 and to handle advance preparations — if you wish 

to have him do so. Cy and I think it is important to 

have Richardson continue in these difficult and complex 

talks, at least through the next session which may last 

two months. If it is agreeable with you, we will tell 

him that you share our desire that he continue through 

the next session of the Conference. No resubmission 

to the Senate would be required. 

-9bc» 

Authority 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 . 

NARAJcS--------Date—------- 

|No Objection To Declassification in full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-18-6-16-1


Korean Military Compensation Package. We and 

Defense have been looking carefully intohow to handle 

the Korean military compensation package with the 

Congress. We believe that we should request special 

legislation authorizing the no cost transfer to South 

Korea of equipment from the U.S. ground forces which 

are to be withdrawn. We plan to consult with key 

legislative staff next week on the prospects for such 

a bill. We do not plan to ask the Congress to approve 

additional FMS sales credits outside the regular budget 

cycle. 

Repatriation of U.S. Citizens from Cuba. It now 

appears that the first plane load of U.S. citizen 

repatriates and their families will not be ready to 

leave Cuba before next week. We had hoped to bring 

back the first plane load this Thursday, but the Swiss 

Embassy reports that many of the citizens interviewed 

so far may decide to remain in Cuba'. Others are 

difficult to reach, do not have ^proper documentation, 

or are taking extra time to settle their personal affairs. 

Todman Trip. Terry Todman's trip to Argentina, 

Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay had a significant impact 

in all four countries. Much of the interest centered 

on human rights, and his meetings with government leaders 

were taken as a sign that our policies are serious and 

non-discriminatory. He met freely with opposition 

groups who viewed the visit as a manifestation of concern 

and a cause for hope. 

Although we should not attempt to take public credit 

for concessions, our concern for human rights has stirred 

domestic forces and created internal pressures for change 

in Latin America. Abuses continue and the administration 

of justice remains quite weak everywhere, but the direction 

of change is now generally positive throughout the 

Southern cone. Our challenge in the months ahead will 

be to demonstrate our support for human rights in ways 

that will encourage further positive evolution. 

SE

No Objection To Declassification in Part 2012/11/20 : NLC-7-20-5-22-3" 

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"SECRET 

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE 

WASHINGTON t -T* > : 

July 28, 1978 


FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 

Warren Christopher 

Rhodesia. In New York Cy had separate 

discussions on Rhodesia with Pik Botha and 

Mark Chona. Both agreed that the situation 

is critical and time is fast running out. 

Botha said Ian Smith is inclined toward an 

all-parties conference but his black colleagues 

in the Salisbury Group, especially Muzorewa, are 

not yet convinced. 

Cy also raised the idea of an interim 

meeting between the principals. David Owen, 

who along with Brand Fourie, Botha's deputy, 

was present at the meeting with Botha, will sound 

out Nkomo on this question Thursday. Fourie 

said he would go to Salisbury this Sunday and 

provide us with word of Smith's reaction. 

This morning Chona told Cy that Kaunda is 

gravely concerned about the deteriorating Rhodesian 

situation. The more time passes the less attractive 

the all-parties meeting will be to the Patriotic 

Front. Every effort must be made to convene the 

interim meeting. Chona talked to Mugabe in Khartoum 

and says he is willing to attend an interim meeting; 

so too, he maintained, is Nkomo (we have other 

information that Nkomo is still reluctant). Chona 

believes that if Smith can be convinced to go along, 

the other parties to the internal agreement will 

fall into line. He said the Front Line would do 

all it could and suggested Malawi's President Banda 

might be most effective in convincing Sithole and 

perhaps Muzorewa to agree to attend. Cy agreed 

that we had to move as quickly as possible. 

No Objection To Declassification in Pari 2012/11/20 : NLC-7-20-5-22-3


Indonesia. Recent Indonesian military 

activities directed against a band of West Now 

Guinea guerrillas forced us to raise the subject 

with the Indonesian Government. The Indonesians 

strafed villages in West New Guifnea, using two 

U.S.-supplied light aircraft. At least one Indonesian 

incursion into Papua New Guinea territory 

was Involved. The Indonesians now report! 

I 

Ithat they understand 

the serious implications of continuing a military 

effort against the guerrillas near the border. 

The Indonesians have ordered troops to stay clear 

of the border area and are making an effort to 

restore good relations with Papua New Guinea. 

Visa Policy. This week Senator Baker 

succeeded in passing an amendment to eliminate 

last year's McGovern Amendment, which liberalized 

our visa procedures and made it possible for 

members of "proscribed organizations," including 

Communist party members,to visit the United States. 

Our 42-50 loss in the Senate can be attributed 

largely to the AFL-CIO lobbying. We are taking 

steps in the House to try to assure that Baker's 

amendment is not adopted in conference. Dante 

Fascell is helping. 

Haitian Emigration. 102 Haitian nationals, 

being held at Guantanamo after attempting to enter 

the United States illegally, were returned to Haiti 

yesterday. A review of their asylum requests by 

representatives from State, INS, and the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees determined that they were 

not bona fide refugees. A State Department officer 

accompanied the flights to Port-au-Prince to observe 

the reception and treatment given the returnees. 

Portugal. Eanes has begun consultations with 

the political parties to find a formula for a new 

government that can win parliamentary support. None 

of the three democratic parties has foreclosed participation 

in a new government, but the concessions 

each will demand mean that a quick solution is unlikely. 

Should an impasse result, Eanes may take 

segrEt 



-3 

advantage of the ambiguous Portuguese Constitution 

and attempt to promote a caretaker government to 

serve for four months until required elections 

are held. Our ambassador reports that whatever 

the outcome, formation of the government will 

unquestionably proceed within the established 

democratic framework. 

Uganda. By a 73-1 vote, the Senate today 

approved a Weicker-Hatfield amendment to the IMF 

Authorization Act imposing a trade embargo against 

Uganda. The amendment covers both imports and 

exports, but exempts food sales. The embargo 

could be lifted only if you determined that Uganda 

is no longer engaged in a consistent pattern of 

gross violations of human rights. An attempt by 

Senator Church to substitute a non-binding resolution 

of condemnation was defeated, 46-30. In advance 

of the vote, we warned a number of Senators that 

a trade embargo could provoke Amin to retaliate 

against Americans in Uganda. Notwithstanding the 

fact that we have been advising Americans to leave 

Uganda for Borne time, action against our citizens 

would create heavy pressures on us for rescue or 

other countermeasures. 

Argentina. In late June we approved the 

export of certain safety-related munitions list 

equipment to Argentina, because there appeared to 

be modest improvement in the human rights situation 

there. However, because the overall human rights 

situation was poor, we deferred approval of military 

training as well as other exports to the Argentine 

military. In addition, in carrying out our statutory 

obligation to advise the Ex-Im Bank on human rights 

conditions, we recently recommended that Ex-Im 

defer action on about $600 million in credits and 

guarantees for exports to Argentina. 

Since we took these actions, there has been no 

significant improvement in the human rights situation 

in Argentina: there are continuing reports of 

disappearances and torture and a large number of 

No Objection 

i Fart 2012/11/20 NLC-7-20-5-22-3


4 

political prisoners. Moreover, although Argentina 

is in discussions with the I AC HR, it has still not 

agreed to acceptable conditions for a visit. We 

are therefore continuing to withhold approval of 

Ex-Im credits and guarantees at this time. 

There is mounting pressure on us from business 

and some Members of Congress to modify our advice to 

Ex-Im, since it may well result in the loss of 

considerable business for American firms. On the 

other hand, since the Argentine Government attaches 

considerable symbolic importance to Ex-Im financing, 

it may well make the human rights improvements 

necessary to enable us to be more positive. In the 

absence of such improvements, we plan to continue 

our present policy. 



DOS REVIEWED 08 Fob 2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE l\ FULL< 

H -tip 


WASHINGTON 

J 

—secret September 29, 1977 


From: 

THE PRESIDENT 


ft 

Tongsun Park. When Cy met this morning with 

the Korean Foreign Minister, they agreed that the 

Koreans would soon receive Justice Department officials 

to discuss with Korean Justice officials the 

terms and conditions under which we could interrogate 

Tongsun Park. This is a limited but significant step 

forward. The Koreans wanted us to agree to drop both 

the indictment and our request that Park return to 

the U.S., but Cy made clear that this was not possible. 

The Korean Foreign Minister was also told that we 

would be submitting the compensatory package to Congress 

at the appropriate time, after close consultations 

with the leadership. We expect Justice and the Koreans 

will separately announce the trip to Seoul tomorrow. 

* 

Hungary. In keeping witjfi the terms of your 

decision regarding the return'of the Crown of St. 

Stephen, Cy plans to discuss the matter with Foreign 

Minister Puja on Saturday. Puja will be asked to 

confirm the assurances already given to Ambassador 

Kaiser and Billy Graham that the Crown will be maintained 

on continuing.public display, that it will be 

received with honor in a public ceremony, and that 

the Cardinal will be an active participant in the 

ceremony. Once these assurances are confirmed by 

Puja, we will begin discussions with the Hungarians 

on the details of the return. 

"DEL RET 

GDS 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526

No Objeclion To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-19-1 -22-8 

China. Cy hosted a dinner for Chinese Foreign 

Minister Huang Hua last night. Huang expressed 

regret that a prior commitment to visit Canada would 

prevent his meeting with you fin New York. The dinner 

conversation, especially Huang's response to Cy's 

comment that we are studying his normalization proposals 

carefully but are not yet ready to reply, 

suggested that the Chinese understand our present 

situation and are not upset with the prospect of a 

limited delay in movement. Huang delivered a message 

from Chairman Hua to you, which stressed that normalization 

was not a diplomatic issue so much as a political 

issue. Cy told him that we would be back in touch 

with him through Leonard Woodcock on normalization. 

In their discussion of global issues, Cy felt 

that Huang was somewhat more forthcoming on Chinese 

activity than he had been in Peking in August—especially 

in regard to East Africa, where he outlined a few things 

that the PRC was doing. He also seemed less critical 

of our Middle East policy than he had been a month ago. 

Indian Ocean Talks■ It seems clear the Soviets 

have accepted the General Declaration framework for 

Indian Ocean arms control that ygu approved and we 

proposed Monday. They appear satisfied with our suggestion 

that we commit oursel*ves in the Declaration to 

prompt negotiations on reductions in a second stage. 

On stabilization, they are trying to broaden the definition 

of the area, seeking to commit us to greater 

restrictions on our activities, probing our intentions 

with respect to Diego Garcia, and trying to find ways 

to get us to take our allies and bases in adjacent 

areas into account. But they have done this in a 

non-combative manner, leaving the door open for concessions 

by them. They have questioned us closely 

on our indirect assurances on strategic systems, and 

Ambassador Mendelevich said today they "appreciate" 

our effort to meet them on this point and will report 

fully when they return to Moscow.' This round of the 

talks will end Saturday morning. 

Law of the Sea. Elliot Richardson and I met with 

Norwegian Minister Evensen to discuss prospects for


SEC 

-7' 

-3- 

getting back to a negotiating- base that holds promise 

for concluding a comprehensive treaty. I made clear 

our strong dissatisfaction with the outcome of the 

last LOS negotiating session and our unwillingness 

to proceed unless an acceptable basis for dealing 

with the deep seabed mining issue -can be found. 

Evensen, who has been a friend and a constructive 

force in the negotiations, is seeking new formulas 

and wishes to explore them in an informal small 

meeting in November, with the results to be reported 

directly to the President of the Conference. We have 

agreed to participate in that meeting. 

SALT Unilateral Statement. Attached is the text 

of the proposed concurrent resolution worked out 

between Senators Church, Cranston and Jackson, as 

referred to in last night's report. As indicated, 

Cy told Church that we would have no objection. 

Human Rights. The Interagency Group on Human 

Rights and Foreign Assistance yesterday considered 

five large Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) loans 

to Argentina. It was the concensus of the Group that 

in view of the Argentine Government's very poor human 

rights record, we would recommend voting against four 

of the five loans. (Since we do not have veto power 

over these particular loans, and since other nations 

are not likely to join us in opposing the loans, they 

will probably be approved.) However, because the 

Group considers it important to send some signal of 

support for General Videla, we agreed to recommend 

approval of an $83 million loan for a potable water 

project which will benefit the needy. 

The Group also considered a proposed IDB loan and 

several proposed AID projects for Nicaragua. There 

has been a significant development in the human rights 

picture in Nicaragua with the lifting of the state of 

seige on September 19. Some positive changes—such as 

a return of vigorous press criticism of the regime— 

have already occurred. On the other hand, disturbing 

reports of serious human rights violations in Nicaragua 

continue to reach us. In view of this mixed picture, 

it was the consensus of the Group that we should approve 

three small AID grants that wpuld benefit the needy, 

|No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-19-1 -22-1


SECI 

-4- 

but defer consideration of two large AID loans and 

seek to postpone consideration of the IDB loan until 

we have a clearer picture of the trend. 

Finally, the Group considered two IDB regional 

loans—one to a group consisting of Argentina, Bolivia, 

Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Urugilay; the other, to a 

group consisting of Bolivia, #;hile and Peru. While 

each group contains countries with poor human rights 

records, the loans in question (both for agricultural 

research) would help meet basic human needs. For this 

reason, it was the consensus of the Group that we 

should recommend approval of the loans. 

Rhodesia. The UK resolution authorizing the 

Security Council to appoint a representative to join 

in military talks with Smith's military and the parties 

passed the Council with the Soviets abstaining and the 

Chinese not participating. There was only one amendment, 

by Libya, calling on the Secretary General to 

consult the Council in appointing his representative. 

The Soviets, Chinese, and Libyans expressed their 

reservations about the UN plan and the proposal for 

talks, and we expect the Soviets in particular to 

continue to make trouble behind the scenes. 

Attachment. 

iNÔêctior^^êclassificationinFiill 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-19-1-22-


RESOLUTION WITH RESPECT TO PRESIDENTIAL ACTION AFFECTING THE 

LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS 

WHEREAS the Interim Agreement Between the United States 

of America and the USSR on Certain Measures with 

Respect to the Limitations of Strategic Offensive 

Arms will expire on October 3, 1977; and 

WHEREAS a temporary observance of the limitations of the 

Interim Agreement will provide time for further 

negotiation, consistent with P.L. 92-448 toward 

a treaty limiting strategic offensive arms; and 

WHEREAS the Congress desires that the United States 

negotiate a treaty supportive of United States 

national security without the burden and pressure 

of imminent deadlines; and 

WHEREAS the Arms Control and Disarmament Act contemplates 

close cooperation and consultation between the 

Executive and Legislative Branches on matters of 

important substance; and 

WHEREAS the interests of the United States are best served 

by a mutual recognition, in a spirit of comity, by 

the Congress and the Executive, of the importance 

of close consultation, cooperation and adherence 

to the constitutional and statutory sharing of 

responsibility in the conduct of foreign affairs; 

and 

WHEREAS the Administration has stated its unilateral intent 

that while the SALT II negotiations are being 

completed, the United States intends not to take 

any action inconsistent with the Interim agreement, 

provided that the Soviet Union exercises similar 

restraint; and 

WHEREAS the Administration has expressly represented to 

Congress that the aforesaid declaration of intent 

is non-binding and non-obligatory upon the United 

States, now, therefore, be !Lt 

RESOLVED, that the President isîuthorizecT^to proceed in 

accordance with the declaration or intent of the 

Secretary of State of September 23, 1977 and the 

Senate of the United States and the House of 

Representatives concur. 

Ino Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-7-19-1-22-?


t 


DOS REVIEWED 20 Jan 2010: 

NO OBJECTION TOD ECLASSi FI CAT ION.' 

REFER TO CIA 



Atteehoi herewith I* • copy of yeer Evening Report of November 3, 

1977, with the PresMent'e eemmeete* 

t 

Zbigniew Brneetaeki 

Attachment 

'CIA RE VIEW EDQ9~M ay^201~2? SANlfiZED FORRELEAS~eTn PART] 

siaawrrqer 

Au'hnr'i ty 

PW.RA_ 

T 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

^lc-iTV3-\-Q 

nia A»CW 


No Objection To Declassification in Part 2012/11/20 : NLC-7-19-3-1 -0 , 

- r' 


WASHINGTON 

JJovember 5, 1977 


FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 


Argentina: I met yesterday with Deputy Foreign 

Minister of Argentina Allara, and underscored our hope 

that President Videla would be able to carry through on 

the human rights initiatives he outlined during your 

talk with him in September. Allara stressed the recurring 

terrorism problem, but his explanations were not 

defiant or petulant. 

On non-proliferation, I was encouraged, given the 

advanced stage of Argentina's nuclear .reprocessing 

facility, by Allara's statement that he could "see 

virtually no impediment to Argenti/ia's ratifying the 

Treaty of Tlatelolco." Such a decision would require 

considerable courage on Videla's part in view of the 

pressure against ratification from important military 

elements. Allara said he hoped this matter could be 

resolved during Cy's visit to Argentina on November 21. 

Romania: When he called on me this week, Romanian 

Deputy Prime Minister Patan made a strong pitch in favor 

of extending MFN to Romania on a multi-year basis. Patan 

argued that the annual renewal procedure under the Trade 

Act creates business uncertainty and provides a field day 

for critics of Romania. Patan had found a sympathetic 

ear in Senators Stevenson and Williams, and Congressmen 

Vanik and Bingham, among others. I told Patan that we 

GDS 

No Objection To Declassification in Pari 2012/11/20 : NLC-7-19-3-1-0


sec^t* 

-2- 

tJ**r - 

understand the difficulty and the irritation caused by 

the annual review, that we arc prepared to consider 

favorably a Longer review period, but that this will 

require study within the administration, including 

careful attention to the question of emigration from 

Romania to Israel. Patan was also planning to see 

Senator Jackson, and I emphasized that his reaction 

would be important. 

South African Pass Laws: As you noted, the South 

African Government announced thaL it intends to propose 

measures to do away with the present system of issuing 

pass books to regulate the movement of blacks into 

urban areas. However, it appears that movement of blacks 

will continue to be controlled by requiring them to carry 

documents issued by the homelands which will be the 

functional equivalent of pass books. The Government's 

proposal is evidently intended to reinforce "separate 

development" by emphasizing homeland citizenship in lieu 

of South African citizenship. 

Reportedly, the Government will also allow black 

workers who now have housing in white areas to be joined 

by their families. On the face of it, this seems to be 

a positive step but we will need to have more information 

to evaluate it. It is unlikely that many blacks will 

benefit from the change because there is little housing 

available to blacks in white areas. The change will not 

apply at all, for example, to the large group of migrant 

mine laborers who are required to live in bachelor hostels. 

Human Rights: The Interagency Group on Human Rights 

and Foreign Assistance has recently considered upcoming IFI 

loans to several countries: 

Indonesia: It was the consensus of the Group that 

we should recommend a yes vote on four Asian Development 

Bank (ADB) loans to Indonesia, while indicating to the 

Indonesians that we are doing so on the assumption that 

they will keep their commitment to release some 10,000 

political prisoners in December. 

Bangladesh: The Group also agreed to recommend 

approval of three ADB and two World Bank loans to Bangladesh. 

» 


No Objection To Declassification in Purt 2012/11/20 : NLC-7-19-3-1-0 

» 

Throe of the loans would clearly serve basic human needs; 

the other two would serve important developmental purposes 

in this very poor country. We have previously 

expressed to the Bangladeshis our concern about possible 

human rights violations flowing from the reaction to the 

October 2 coup attempt. 

Korea: Pursuant to the Group's recommendation, 

we abstained on one Asian Development Bank loan to Korea 

and voted in favor of another, larger loan which would 

tend to serve basic human needs in certain respects. We 

have explained to the Koreans that the abstention reflects 

our serious concern about the lack of progress in improving 

human rights conditions in Korea. 

Chile: The Group recommended voting against 

four upcoming Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) loans 

to Chile in view of its extremely poor human rights record. 

Bolivia: The Group agreed to recommend approval 

of an IDB loan to Bolivia where there have been some 

encouraging signs of progress on human rights issues, 

including some movement in Bolivia's position concerning 

Americans imprisoned on drug charges. 

Uruguay: The Group agreed to recommend that we 

oppose an upcoming IDB highway project loan to Uruguay 

because of its very poor human rights record. 

Rhodesia: Lord Carver and General Chand met on 

November 2 with Rhodesian military commanders and on 

November 3 with civilian officials. The military expressed 

predictably strong opposition to basing the new army on 

the liberation forces, but conceded that since only the 

Patriotic Front can deliver a ceasefire, there is no 

alternative to dealing with it. Interestingly, despite 

their earlier scorn for the UN Force concept, the military 

pressed for assurance that the UN would be authorized to 

use force in support of the civil power. The civilian 

officials voiced concern about the "dictatorial powers" 

the Resident Commissioner would exercise and brought up 

the possibility of a modified internaL settlement involving 

an alliance of Muzorewa, Sithole and "even Nkomo" 

backed by Kaunda and Machel. 

SEC iJJGST 



-4- 

Although the meetings produced no real progress, 

the Rhodesians have kept the door open to further 

negotiations, Smith's ill-humored comments to the press 

notwithstanding. Carver and Chand leave Salisbury 

today to continue consultations in Botswana, Mozambique 

and Nigeria. 




WASHINGTON 


DOS REVIEWED’oB Feb 2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE l\ FULL, 


FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 

Cyrus 

* 

1. Cyprus - Foreign Minister Rolandis met with Warren 

and Matt Nimetz yesterday to describe his discussion 

Thursday with Kurt Waldheim on how to get the Cyprus intercommunal 

negotiations started early in 1979. Rolandis 

said the Greek Cypriots had problems with some of our framework 

proposals but knew that if they sought changes in 

their favor Turkish Cypriots would want to do the same. 

He had suggested to Waldheim several approaches to the 

Greek Cypriot domestic political problem, which he said 

would still enable the US ideas to be taken up as a "working 

paper" at the resumed negotiations. Rolandis stressed 

that, while they could not say so publicly, the Greek 

Cypriots did want the US to remain closely involved behind 

the scenes once the talks begin. 

Warren talked with Waldheim this morning and urged 

that he seize the present opportunity by scheduling an 

early Greek-Turkish Cypriot meeting, Kurt promised to 

press ahead, shooting for a February 1 reconvening of the 

talks 

2. Inter-African Forces in Shaba - Our representative 

to the Paris five-power meeting this week assured our allies 

(France, Belgium, UK, FRG) that we share their general concern 

for maintenance of security in Shaba, and we agree 

it would be far preferable for the Moroccan and Senegalese 

troops to remain another six months. He made clear, however, 

Authority 1^ 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

RDS — 2/3 12/16/98 (Vance, Cyrus)


secret 

2 

t 

that we believe our original airlift contribution was 

significant and we have severe budgetary constraints 

that inhibit our providing ftirther support. For this 

reason, we look to our European colleagues who have more 

direct interests in Shaba to shoulder the burden in this 

case. The French have nevertheless urged us to join them 

in a joint demarche in Rabat and Dakar to request that 

the forces remain. We replied today that we must reluctantly 

decline to participate in this approach since we 

would not be in a position to furnish the financing the 

Moroccans and Senegalese will require. The French Ambassador 

has pressed us again on this question. We were 

told in Paris that President Giscard intended to raise 

the matter with you at Guadaloupe, and he may now decide 

to approach you right away. 

3. Iran - Members of the Bahai faith have stressed 

the very difficult situation of ‘the Bahais in Iran. 

Bahais in Shiraz and nearby towns have recently been attacked 

by toughs and their houses, automobiles, and businesses 

fire-bombed. These attacks have occurred as pro-Shah 

demonstrators are spreading violence in the same cities, 

but we have no indication that there is a direct connection 

between the pro-Shah and anti-Bahai violence. There 

is very little that the US can do to assist these people 

in view of the turmoil and the hostile attitude of the 

Moslem population and government policy towards the Bahais. 

Any public statement by us is apt to make matters worse 

for the Bahais. We will be alert to opportunities to 

express our concern privately on behalf of the Bahais and 

other minorities in Iran. 

4. Nicaragua - The Congress passed the Amnesty Law 

yesterday and Somoza signed it at 5:30 p.m., thus fulfilling 

the last of the FAO’s preconditions for discussions 

with Somoza1s party (PLN) on the plebiscite. The negotiating 

team convoked a meeting of the FAO, the PLN, the church 

and COSEP (private sector representatives) for today. 

On Monday, the OAS Permanent Council will consider 

the report of the Ad Hoc Commission which investigated 

the border incident in which Costa Rican Civil Guardsmen 

were killed. The report came to no decision on blame, 

but recommends an observer force. A working group will 


in Full 2012/11/23 : NLC-7-21-2-9-9 

No Objection To Declassification in^Full 

3 

staff out the recommendation. Also on Monday, the OAS 

Meeting of Foreign Ministers (attended mostly by representatives) 

will formally receive the 1AHRC human rights 

report on Nicaragua. 

5. Beagle Channel - Presidents Videla and Pinochet 

both expressed appreciation for your messages. In his 

reply to you, Pinochet reaffirmed that Chile would not 

initiate military action. His Foreign Minister asked that 

we send military attaches as observers, which we have 

declined. Videla said he was exploring with his military 

commanders passible ways of resuming confidential talks 

with Chile. The Argentine fleet is now in position near 

the disputed islands. Videla is being pressed by his 

hard-liners to authorize military action. 

6. Comprehensive Test Ban Status - The CTB talks 

recessed on December 14, with resumption planned for 

January 29. At the last meeting, the Soviets gave preliminary 

approval to our proposed locations for the ten 

national seismic stations (NSS) in the USSR. We in turn 

agreed preliminarily with the ten locations the Soviets 

proposed for the US. Both sides kept open the possibility 

of adjusting some of the specific locations. (There are 

problems regarding sites proposed by the Soviets for NSS 

in British dependent territories.) 

7. Conclusion of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities 

Discussions with Soviets - Enactment of the new Diplomatic 

Relations Act of 1978 set in motion US-Soviet discussions 

on diplomatic privileges and immunities. These were 

concluded yesterday with an exchange of notes providing 

for expansion of such privileges and immunities to members 

of the administrative/technical and service staffs of our 

Embassy in Moscow and the Soviet Embassy in Washington 

in line with the Vienna Convention of 1961. The exchange 

of notes continues the traditional US-Soviet practice of 

according non-diplomatic personnel in Washington and Moscow 

all of the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomats. 

The exchange of notes will facilitate our bilateral relations 

with the Soviets by eliminating a potential source of friction.

No Objection Tr> Declassification 2008/11/11 : NLC-7-21-5-10-5 


WASHINGTON 

March 22, 1979 

J 


FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 

Cyrus Vance c .'>/• 

Taiwan Legislation. A bill reflecting the 

Conference Committee's decisions is being put in final 

form and will be reported early npxt week. The end 

product is an amalgam of provisions from the House and 

Senate versions. In some instances the Conference 

Committee made helpful additions or changes; in other 

instances it included less desirable provisions, but 

nothing in the Committee's action is contrary to the 

concepts underlying normalization. There is no impairment 

of the central purpose of enabling us to maintain 

a satisfactory entity for conducting unofficial relations 

with the people on Taiwan. Indeed, new language 

was added in Conference recognizing that "governmental" 

relations between the United States and Taiwan have 

been terminated. Thus it appears this legislation 

will reach you in satisfactory shape. 

Claims/Assets Agreement. The Chinese have not yet 

responded to our offer to sign the claims/assets agreement 

which was initialed by Secretary Blumenthal March 2 

in Beijing. The ostensible reason is procedural — the 

need for State Council approval of the agreement before 

it can be signed. The possibility exists that they 

intend to defer signing until after the Administration 

has acted on the Taiwan legislation. 

Security in Wake of Peace Treaty Signing. Violent 

reactions against Americans in the wake of the Peace 

Treaty signing are possible, particularly in some Arab 

countries. We have alerted our missions abroad that 

the signing will probably take place March 26. We have 

instructed some of them to consult with host governments 

about increased protection and report to us on measures 

taken and their assessment of the threat. 

DECLASSIFIED 

RDS-2/3, 3/22/99 


completed 



i

No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/11 : NLC-7-? 1-5-10-5 

-2- SEpRET 

Grenada. We announced at noon today that we 

will continue friendly and cooperative relations 

with Grenada, and that our Ambassador at Bridgetown 

will travel to Grenada to meet with the Governor 

General and the new Prime Minister. Jamaica, 

Barbados and Guyana have formally recognized the 

new government, as has the UK. Our public announcement 

explicitly noted that our decision was based 

on the new government's stated commitment to free 

elections and constitutional government. We have 

reiterated this same point to the GrenadanB, other 

interested Caribbean states and the UK. 

Common Fund. The framework agreement reached 

in Geneva on the Common Fund iB a significant step 

forward in the North^South dialogue and effectively 

removes the Fund as a contentious political issue 

for UNCTAD V at Manila in May, An Interim Committee 

will meet later this year on remaining operational 

issues. We have said we cannot accept the current 

voting arrangement giving 47 percent df the votes 

to the developing countries and onf.y 42 percent to 

OECD countries, and this will be further negotiated. 

P-3 Flights. Djibouti has approved our request 

for increasing our monthly P-3 flight to two flights 

per week over the next two weeks. When we can judge 

better the Arab reaction to the Egypt-Israel Treaty, 

we will consider the prospects for Oman’s approval 

of P-3 access on a longer-term basis. 

Security Assistance. The House Foreign Affairs 

Committee completed mark-up of the security assistance 

authorization today. The FMS and MAP programs were 

approved,for the most part, as requested by the 

Administration. Zablocki hopes the security assistance 

bill will go to the floor March 29. 

Human rights advocates eliminated IMET for 

Guatemala and derailed a proposal by Gus Yatron to 

permit Chile, Argentina and Brazil to participate 

in regional IMET programs. $10 million in FMS for 

Zaire was rejected partially on human Tights grounds. 



-3- 

f 

FMS for Panama was cut from $5 million to $2.5 million. 

This cut was initiated by Republicans as a slap at the 

Canal treaties, but they were supported by new Democratic 

members of the Committee who were lodging human rights 

protests. 

Middle East Consultations, Dick stone told us today 

that the U.S. proposed draft Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 

was excellent, and that we should accept no further 

/ tightening of the language which would require approval 

fit** m by the Senate as a treaty. Javits agreed that the 

* //'•' agreement as drafted was generally acceptable and would 

yt* not require Senate approval. Hamilton felt that the 

whole concept of the MOA was hard to swallow. Although 

he accepted the need for some security assistance to 

Israel, he felt that the paragraphs dealing with U.S. 

policy should be omitted. 

* 

Stone and Javits seemed prepared to accept a 

$1.5 billion FMS program for Egypt. Both felt that 

they could, under certain circumstances, accept an 

F-4 sale to Egypt. Stone said he would find the 

whole package acceptable, unless there were some 

particularly threatening type of hardware included. 

Mexico. While awaiting a formal response from 

the Mexican"government on our proposal for reorganizing 

the Consultative Mechanism, we are moving ahead 

to establish the new working groups and to set up 

meetings with the Mexicans in April. The energy 

group will meet following preliminary meetings on 

natural gas and electricity exchanges in Mexico 

City the first week in April. On trade, we are 

pressing the Mexicans to conclude negotiations 

with us before we conclude our MTN tariff negotiations 

in Geneva April 6. For the other Bix working 

groups, we are proposing or already have agreed 

with the Mexicans on April meeting dates. 

Israeli Settlements. With the UiS. abstaining, 

the UN Security Council today passed the Jordanian 

Resolution establishing a three-nation Commission 

"to examine the situation concerning the establishment 

of settlements in the occupied territories." 

The vote was 12-0 with three abstentions (U.S., 

UK, Norway). We abstained on the Resolution after 

it was moderated at our insistence. A tacit 

SECRET 

No Objection To Declassi^dation 2008/11/11 : NLC-7-21-5-10-5

No Objection To Declassification 2008/11/11 : NLC-7-21-5-10-f 

-4- 

call for sanctions against Israel was deleted and 

the Commission's mandate was narrowed considerably 

from the original Arab proposal. Israel announced 

that the Commission would not be allqwed to enter 

the occupied territories. 

Castro. Yesterday we received the following 

message from Fidel Castro, through one of his 

aides: Cuba is not now interested in official 

conversations and needs a gesture from the U.S. 

before the dialogue can usefully be resumed. While 

Cuba foresees no immediate hope for progress in our 

relations, it does not want any backsliding either, 

and will do nothing to provoke hostile relations 

with us. Cuba remains interested in pursuing links 

with the Cuban-American community, keeping up contacts 

with the U.S. on the prisoner release programs, holding 

talks with the U.S. Coast Guard later this spring, 

and continuing its cooperation with the FBI on 

security matters affecting the Pan-American Games 

that will be held in Puerto Rico. 



March 28, 1979 

MZHOKAXDW FOR 


Attached is a copy of your Evening Rapott 

of March 27, with ooeenenta by the Pmaldent. 

Sbigniew Braaainaki 

PGS REVIEWED 11 APR 2012 DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULlj 

-SECRET 

kW&Smn 

i 

DECLASSIRED 

E.0.13526 

Authority 7 ^ "V 

NAHA ?Jc Dsto__ ---------- 

iNn Dhiprtinn Tn Dfinlassificatinn in Full 2012/11/21 : NLC-7-21-5-13-1

No Objection To Declassification in Full ?ni3/ii/9i_^\n r_7-7i.fi.ia.il 


WASHINGTON 

i 

March 27, 1979 

#2-.DA 


FROM: 

( N 

Cyrus Vance1' 

1. Meeting with the Cranston Group: I had lunch today 

with Alan Cranston and a group of 15 senators interested in SALT II. 

I first brought them generally up to date and then outlined the foreign 

policy consequences of a failure of the Senate to ratify. John Glenn 

read a long list of items which he said we would not be able to 

verify as a result of the closing of the Iraq installations. I assured 

the group that we would not sign a treaty that was not adequately 

verifiable and described in general terms the intelligence community's 

proposals for dealing with the Iran loss. John Culver 

expressed concern that members of the Senate Armed Services 

Committee were planning to push us to decide prematurely on a 

basing mode for the MX. Ted Kennedy asked whether we were 

contemplating other agreements with the Soviets that would create 

a more positive atmosphere for the consideration of SALT and suggested 

the possibility of an improvement in the human rights 

climate in the Soviet Union, e. g., the release of some of the 

dissidents. 

2. PRC: Warren met with Ambassador Chai today and 

they discussed the Taiwan legislation for mare than an hour. They 

went over the Chinese objections point-by-point, and Warren also 

handed over a paper responding to the Chinese points. Warren 

thinks he may have made some progress, especially In pointing 

out that some of the PRC's objections pertain to provisions which 

did not survive the Conference Committee. Warren also told 

Chai that we might wish to have a US Navy ship visit a Chinese 

port and that, while not ready to make? definite plans, we would 

like a reaction as to whether such a visit would be welcomed. 

Chai promised an early answer. Chai was also told that we are 

prepared to exchange military attaches. 

RDS - 2/3 3/27/99 (Vance, Cyrus) 

REGRET— 

iNn OhiectinnToDedassificationiriFull2012/^/2^^^^^T^3^1


m m 

2 

3. Shah's Travel: Preparations for the Shah's onward 

travel concentrated today on the Bahamas. Dave Newsom has 

worked closely with David Rockefeller's office and Robert Armao, 

a New York public relations consultant who will meet with Bahamian 

Foreign Minister Adder ley Wednesday. We have helped to arrange 

this meeting, and our Charge in Nassau was scheduled to see 

Adderley late this afternoon. He will inform him of the Shah's 

wish to arrive this Friday. In two recent soundings by our 

Embassy, Adderley did not close the door to the Shah, but his 

government has still not reached a final decision. Assuming 

the answer is positive, the Shah and his party would stay on the 

secluded island of Eleuthera. We understand that the Shah regards 

the Bahamas as a temporary stop. His principal interest remains 

Mexico, although his representatives have decided not to approach 

the Mexicans until after arrangements to move to Eleuthera are 

complete. 

4. Uganda: Nyerere has told us that over the weekend 

Quadafi sent him an ultimatum giving Tanzania 24 hours to withdraw 

from Uganda. Nyerere ignored! this threat and is continuing 

to pursue his military campaign against Amin, but he has expressed 

his concern to us and other Western representatives and has asked 

us for our assessment of Libyan involvement in Uganda. We will 

give him our intelligence on Libya's military capability. Our 

Initial estimate is that the Libyan threat contains a large element 

of bluff. 

Ugandan exile leaders meeting in Tanzania have elected 

an 11-member council as a provisional government. The council, 

which is representative of the regional and ethnic groups of Uganda, 

plans to establish itself in southern Uganda. 

1 • Nu Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/21 : NLC-7-21-5-13-1 

w-------------------9 

3 

1 

1 

barrels per day (compared with about 6 mmbd under the Shah). 

He asked other OPEC members to stop supplying incremental 

output to the market as they have done since October to help 

offset the Iranian shortfall. 

t 

Results of the meeting are disquieting. The price 

increase alone will add about $12 billion to world oil import 

bills, with the surcharges adding more. Uncertainty about the 

amount of oil to be provided by producers with surplus capacity 

will aggravate the current tight market conditions. The meeting 

results illustrate that Saudi Arabia cannot, in present circumstances, 

exercise its traditional overwhelming influence on OPEC prices. 

Even with the Saudis producing oil at near-maximum levels, the 

reduction in Iranian exports leaves supply and demand essentially 

unbalanced, keeping pressure on prices and preventing the 

seasonal stock build-up needed to cover next winter. 

6. Peru: Chris met today with the new Peruvian Ambassador, 

Alfonso Arias Schreiber. Chris told him of our concern about the 

Cuban candidacy for a seat on the Security Council and said the 

4»US would back Peru if it gained the support of the Latin American 

r caucus. Arias will report this to his government, and may have 

something to say to you on the subject when he presents his 

credentials Friday. , 

Following up on the discussion Fritz had on this topic 

last week with Brazilian Foreign Minister Guerreiro, I plan to 

send a personal letter to Guerreiro asking for more active 

Brazilian support of a Peruvian candidacy. 

7. Argentina: I have been increasingly concerned about 

the absence of substantial human rights progress in Argentina. 

During 1978 Argentine security units continued to abduct and 

torture (and in many cases summarily execute) an average of 

more than 50 persons per month. Last month we informed the 

Argentines that, in the absence of substantial Improvements, 

we would not be able to maintain our position of abstention on 

loans to Argentina in the multilateral development banks, and 

instead would have to vote against the loans. L.ate last week 

i 

-SECRETiNr^hifintinr^êdassification 

in Full 2012/11/21 : NLC-7-21-5-13-1

'» ■ No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/11/21 

vcunLi • 

NLC-7-21-5-13-1 

che Argentine Ambassador responded with a number of potentially 

significant representations, including that the moderates have 

strengthened their position within the junta, that abductions by 

security units have been stopped, and that any reports of abductions 

will be immediately investigated. Although we have learned 

to be skeptical of Argentine promises, reports of abductions 

have greatly diminished in February and March. On the basis 

of their representations, Warren told the Argentines that we 

are adhering to our abstention position on a World Bank loan 

today and would continue to watch the situation closely. 

* 

t 

iNr^hiRctior^TDeclassification in Full 2012/11/21 : NLC-7-21-5-13-1

» ^ • 

#[ 


MB 

State Dept review completed 

SEC-REF 

SECRET- 


WASHINGTON 

April 18, 1979 


FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 

Warren Christopher, Acting. 

i 

Panama Canal. I met with ifack Murphy today to 


implementing legislation. Murphy said the crucial 

vote would probably occur on a motion by Ceorge Hansen 



troaties. 

Wq had a good talk, and (I hope) established a 


stages. Murphy urged us to undertake a major educa- • 

tional campaign to convince House members, particularly 

Republicans, that the treaties cannot ba overturned 

and that the. Hanson approach would jeopardize efficient 


on the Op Ed page of the POST today, entitled “Panama: 

from No to Ves," should be helpful with Republicans. 



implemonting legislation. I gave Bill-our appraisal 



to the Panamanians. ; 

RDS 2/3 

SECRET 

4/18/99 (Christopher, Warren) 

-SECRET 


DECLASSIFIED 

E .0 .13526

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/17 : NLC-^1-5-21-3 

- 2 

'SfCftET 


deployed to southern Lebanon tod#y. Haddad's artillery 



was killed and another wounded in today's shelling. 

An American officer serving as a UN observer waa 

briefly held by Haddad's forces and released only 



report, to the Security Council on the implementation 

of UN resolutions on Lebanon. Wo understand Begin'a 





The Shah, a campaign remains in progress to 


to the u.S. John MCCloy, following up conversations 

with Cy and zbig and a long letter to me, 




efforts of Ardcshir Zahedi. . 

The Shah has turned down Panama. We are awaiting 

a renponsc to an inquiry _ _ to 

President Lopez Portillo on behalf of the Shah. 

> Our belief that we must encourage the Shah to go 

elsewhere. at least for the time being, is further 


influence and Lhe withdrawal of two-thirds of the 

Iranian, guard Corcu from our Embassy compound. A new 

evaluation ha3 just come in from Tehran confirming 



comes hero. 

Argentina. I saw Ambassador Castro today to 

discuss the recant significant improvements in the 



the abductions hy official security units which had 


.. -RFfiBFT— 

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/17 : NLC-7-21 -5-21-3


3 

SECRET 

SECRET 

■They appear to be investigating the few reports of 



more active role In pressing the regime for information 






month). 

Ij. 5.-Mexico Consultative Mechanism. u.S. participants 

i.n six of the eight working groups have 




SECRET 

' NcTbbjection to Declassification in Part 2012/04717 : NLC-7-21-5-21-3



WASHINGTON 

April 18, 1979 


FROM: 

THE PRESIDENT 

Warren Christopher, Acting Ux. 

< 

« 

rl 

DECLASSIFIED 

E .0 .13526 

Authority M U L - V S - 3 3 - 

N A R A __£=E___ Deto l \ q \ l l * 

Panama Canal. I met with Jack Murphy today to 


implementing legislation. Murphyfsaid the crucial 

vote would probably occur on a morion by George Hansen 



treaties. 

We had a good talk, and (I hope) established a 


stages. Murphy urged us to undertake a major educational 

campaign to convince House members, particularly 

Republicans, that the treaties cannot be overturned 

and that the Hansen approach would jeopardize efficient 


on the Op Ed page of the POST today, entitled "Panama: 

from No to Yes," should be helpful with Republicans. 



implementing legislation. I gave Bill our appraisal 



to the Panamanians. 

THIS DOCUMENT MAY CONTAIN CONGRESSIONAL 

MATERIAL 

RDS 2/3 

4/18/99 (Christopher, Warren) 

State Dept review completed 


No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : NLC-7-21-5-22-2 / 

- 2 - 

SECRET 


deployed to southern Lebanon today. Haddad's artillery 



was killed and another wounded in?today's shelling. 

An American officer serving as a UN observer was 

briefly held by Haddad's forces and released only 



report to the Security Council on the implementation 

of UN resolutions on Lebanon. We understand Begin's 





The Shah. A campaign remains in progress to 


to the U.S. John McCloy, following up conversations 

with Cy and Zbig and a long letter to me, 




efforts of Ardeshir Zahedi. 

% 

The Shah has turned down Panama. We .are .awaiting 

a response to an inquiry 

to 

President Lopez Portillo on behalf of the 'Shah'. 

25X1 

Our belief that we must encourage the Shah to go 

elsewhere, at least for the time being, is further 


influence and the withdrawal of two-thirds of the 

Iranian guard force from our Embassy compound. A new 

evaluation has just come in from Tehran confirming 



comes here. 

Argentina. I saw Ambassador Castro today to 

discuss the recent significant improvements in the 



the abductions by official security units which had 




- 3 - 

They appear to be investigating the few reports of 



more active role in pressing the regime for information 






month). 

t 

U.S.-Mexico Consultative Mechanism. U.S. parti 

cipemts-!!!-iIx-of_~tHe~eIgHt-worklng—groups have 




I! 

SECRET 

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/24 : Nl^C-7-21-5-22-2 

»

No Objection To Declassification in J-uli 1^/12/12 : NLC-6-4-7-2-lNb 

ueparimem oj state" ihLtliKAM 

1/ J 

PACE 11 TEL IV 22121 11 OF 12 21I414Z 4321 

ACTION NEA-U 

INFO OCT-11 AAA-11 ADS-11 HA-IS PM-16 KSC-85 SP-12 

IS-1S CIAE-II DODE-ll INR-10 1SAE-II PA-11 /HI V 

1 2S1110Z OCT 71 

FM AHEHRASSY TEL AVIV 



ANEHBASSY BUENOS AIAES 

................................... 161431 2I1423Z /23 

L U N F I D l H II A L SECTION II OF 12 TEL AVIV 22121 

STATE FOR NEA/ARA VARY; HA FOR DERI AN 

USICA FDR AR 

TEL AV 22121 II OF 12 2SI4I41 

NOT TO HEAT I ON COX IN ANY A1TISLES. 

6. TIHERMAN ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE BELIEVES THE HIGHT- 

VINC AND VERY ANTI-SEMITIC NEWSPAPER CABILOO IS FINANCED 

1Y DIANA DE MASSOT, PUBLISHER OF NUEVA PIOVINCIA IN 

BAH IA BLANCA. (NS: MRS. MASSOT WAS WELL-KNOWN TO THE 

EMBASSY, AND IF MEHORY SERVES, RECEIVED A MARIA MOORS 

GA10T OR IAPA AWARD IN 1173 OR 1174.) 

7. AS TO THE FUTURE OF ARDENT INE POLITICS, TI HERMAN 

SAYS HE SEES A SITUATION IN WHICH MODERATE AND RUNT WINC 

ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY WILL COMPETE FOX PERONIST 

SUPPORT, WHICH HAY CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH ISABEL PERON 

WILL IE IN A POSITION TO DECIDE WHO RUNS ARGENTINA. 

E.O. 1216): RDS 11/25/59 QIETERICH, W.i.) OR-O 

TAGS: PEPR, PINR, PINT, IS, AR 

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH ARGENTINE EXILE tilt J/pifl timfRnah 

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT) 

2. IN CONVERSATION WITH PRESS ATTACHE DIETEHICH, WHO 

KNEW HIM IN ARGENTINA DURING A 1172-74 TOUR THERE, 

TIHERHAN DISCUSSED INTER ALIA HIS INTERROGATION BY 

POLICE AUTHORITIES IN ARGENTINA, ANTI-SEMITISM ON THE 


WHETHER TO WRITE ABOUT HIS EXPERIENCES, AND THE 

FUTURE OF ARGENTINE POLITICS. TIHERHAN WILi IE IN THE 

UNITED STATES TO RECEIVE AN AWARD FROM THE AMERICAN 

JEWISH COMMITTEE ON SATURDAY, OCT. 27. AFTER THAT HE 

PLANS TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK WHERE HE EXPECTS TO SEE 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERI AN. THEN HE WILL GD TO WASH- 

INGTON FOR VARIOUS MEETINGS ON THE HILL, AT THE*TftPARTHEHT. 

ANO AT THE WHITE HOUSE. 

- ----------------- ' 

3. TIHERHAN SAID THAT THE MAIN FOCUS OF QUESTIONING 

DURING HIS IMPRISONMENT WAS HIS ROLE AS TNE ARGENTINE 

’LEADER' OF AN ALLEGED WORLD ZIONIST CONSPIRACY, AND 

THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE EMPHASIS ON ANY LEFTIST OR 

TERRORIST CONNECTIONS. HE WAS ONCE TORTURED IN LA 

PLATA IN A ROOM WITH AH ORGANIZATION CHART WHICH SHOWED 

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI AS THE LEADER OF THE CONSPIRACY. ON 

ANOTHER OCCASION HE WAS TOLD THAT HE WAS BEING BEATEN 

BECAUSE HE HAD DARED TO USE THE TERM LEFTIST-FASCISTS 

IN A CONVERSATION WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIAN, THE 

OBJECTION APPARENTLY BEING THAT HE HAD SLANDERED FASCISM. 


BETWEEN HEI.ACHEN BEGIN AND THE MONTG'lERO GUERILLAS 

OURING A BEGIN VISIT TO ARGENTINA IN 1S76. TIHERHAN 

BELIEVED THESE CUESTIONS STEMMED FROM THE FACT THAT 

BEGIN'S BOOK ’WAR IN THE HOLY LAND’ HAD BEEN FOUND AMONG 

MATERIALS USED BY THE MONTOnEROS. TIHERHAN WAS BROUGHT 

FROM PRISON TO AN INTERVIEW WITH GEN. HARGUINDEGUY IN 

THE CASA ROSADA PRIOR TO A DERIAN VISIT. THE GENERAL 

INFORMED HIM THAT THE ARGENTINA GOVERNMENT WAS AWARE 

THAT PATT DERIAN WAS INTERESTED IN HIS CASE BECAUSE SHE 

WhS HIS COUSIN. 

I. IN CONVERSATION WITH TI MERMAN ONE IS LEFT WITH A 

CHILLING IMPRESSION THAT HE IS SIMPLY REPORTING 

WHAT RE HAS EXPERIENCED AND BELIEVES. HE CHARACTER I EES 

THE ARGENTINE HIUTARY RIGHT AS CLASSICALLY TOTALITARIAN 

AND ANTI-SEMITIC. 

S. TIHERHAN IS NOW EMPLOYED BY THE IMPORTANT TEL AVIV 

DAILY MAARl) AND SEEMS COMFORTABLE WITH THAT FACT, 

ALTHOUGH HE SAID HE MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN SPENDING SOME 

TIME AT AN ACADEMIC INSTITUTION IN THE US. HE SPECIFICALLY 

MEITIONED COLUMBIA. THUS FAR HE HAS WRITTEN ONLY ON 

LATIN AMERICAN HATTERS, BUT IT IS TO BE EXPECTED THAT HE 

WILL BRANCH INTO BROADER DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL 

POLITICAL MATTERS. HE SAID THAT THE THEME OF A SPEECH 



REVIEWED 15-Aug-2012: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL J 

DECLASSIFIED 

‘ E.O. 13526 

* Authority L.C. - Ifl ~M ~~) -3." I 

NARA__ 6-P- Datn 1 \a\ Uj 

4. TI MERMAN ALSO REPORTS THAT HE BELIEVES LANUSSE'S EX 

PRESS SECRETARY EDGARDO SAJON DIED OF A HEART ATTACK 

DURING TORTURE BY ELECTRIC SHOCK. SINCE HE WAS A 

RELATIVE! Y Y0UN3 MAN, THE MILITARY DID NOT SUSPECT THAT 

HE HAD A HEART CONDITION. 

5. TIHERHAN IS HOW RELUCTANT TH UBITF HHnilT HIR FBPFR- 

IENCLS IH ARGENTINA BECAUSE HE FEARS REPRISALS BY THE 

miliTxix-AdAIKST FRIEkBil still Th Argentina, as an 

EXAMPLE of THIS HE MENTIONED THAT ROBERT COX, EDITOR OF 

THE BUENOS AIRES HERALD, HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO HIM 

THROUGH THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES ASHING HIM 

CONFIDENTIAL

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2012/12/12 : NLC-6-4-7-2-1HNI1 

wuepartment oj dtatm itLtliRAM 

PAGE 01 TEL AV 22920 02 OF 02 28D404Z 4324 

ACT I ON NEA-11 

f 

INFO OCT-01 ARA-11 ADS-00 PM-06 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 

CIAE-00 DODE-00 I NR-10 NSAE-00 PA-01 HA- 05 /06 7 W 

................. 06 04 4 1 2 8 0 4 242 /23 

R 251510Z OCT 79 





< 0-N- F I D [■ N T I A Hr-SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 229 20 

WILL BE REAPING THE BENEFITS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY ' 




RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN ARGENTINA. HE^ If ANXIOUS TO EXPRESS 


THE WFfjTF_ H mis F I F W1 S ------ 

i 

-CONFIDENTIAL

• . No Objection To Declassification in Full 2Q13/02/04 : NLC-24-67-4-10-6 

CONFIDENTIAL 

Human Rights Cases 

There has been widespread civil violence in Argentina 

since 1970. The unique quality of the present situation 

is the very large number of people detained and "disappeared" ■ 

since the military came to power in 1976. A worldwide storm 

of criticism has resulted. Some of the cases of greatest 

interest are: 

Detained bos REVIEWED QB-Jun-2010: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULLj 

Deutsch Family; Jewish groups, human rights organizations 

and some 25 Congressmen have asked our assistance 

for the family. President Carter raised the case of the 

Deutsches with President Videla during their bilateral. 

The father, mother and three daughters were arrested 

in September. A aon and his family fled and are now in 

the U.S. The Deutsch home was looted by the troops that 

arrested the family and there are reports that the family 

was tortured during the first weeks c^f confinement. In 

October, the mother and two daughters were released, but 

the youngest daughter and the father are still held. 

President Videla wrote to President Carter in October to 

say that the detained daughter was a member of a terrorist 

organization hnd that the fa.ther had known this yet 

had covered up for her. They would both be tried by 

military courts, the President said. 

i 

Jacobo Timerman: Editor and publisher of one of 

Argentina's largest newspapers, Timerman has become a 

cause celebre for Jewish groups and newspaper editors 

worldwide. Five Senators—Javlts, Case, Sarbanes, Stone 

and Church—wrote you asking for your intercession on 

Timerman*s behalf while you are in Argentina. He was 

arrested in April and there are reports that he was mistreated. 

No charges have been placed against him, and 

his arrest is more surprising in that his paper generally 

took a pro-military line. Last week, Timerman's civil 

rights and control over his property were cancelled by 

the government. The U.S. Jewish community sees Timerman's 

case as a specific example of the anti-semitism which 

they believe is rampant in Argentina.fThe government 

forcefully denies it is anti-semitic and has passed a 

law prohibiting the incitation of racial violence. 

Alfredo Bravos Vice President of a major Argentine 

human rights group and President of the Argentine 

Teachers Union, Bravo was arreBted in September. Because 

CONFIDENTIAL 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Authority L-fi. - 5t/7 -*4~l O “ 

NARA__________ Data l\q\\L* 



-COWglDENTI^fr -- 

-2- 

he had met a few days before his arrest with a visiting 

AFL-CIO delegation, the U.S. labor movement is very 

interested in his case. 

» 

Adolfo Perez Esquivel; A deeply religious and nonviolent 

man, Perez Esquivel was the Coordinator of the 

ecumenical movement "Peace and Justice." He was arrested 

in April and has been imprisoned without charges since 

then. The Catholic Church and human rights groups have 

pressed strongly for his release. 

Vogler Family; Liliana Vogler was arrested in June 

1975 and her frather was arrested later that year, 

reportedly because he was making inquiries on her behalf. 

Liliana was tried on charges of subversion, but not 

allowed to renounce a confession which had been obtained 

under torture. The sentence should be given in the next 

few months. Guillermo Vogler haB been granted permission 

to leave the country, (he will come to the D.S.) but 

has not actually been released. The Foreign Ministry has 

promised to try to speed up his release. There has been 

White House and Congressional interest in the case. 


Mauricio Lopez: Another ecumenical leader, Lopez 

was rector of San Luis University when he disappeared 

in January. Church groups in the D.S. and Europe have 

shown great interest in his case. 

Eduardo Sajon: The former press secretary to 

Argentine President Lanusse, Sajon disappeared.in April. 

Dagmar Bagelins A dual national Swedish-Argentine 

student. Hag el In cTisappeared in January. The Swedish 

Prime Minister wrote to videla about her, but was told 

the Argentines had no information. The Swedish government 

has now appealed to us for assistance. 

Procedures for Reporting Human Rights Cases 

The Argentine Foreign Office Working Group on 

Human Rights, to which we have made known our interest 

in specific cases, has been generally unresponsive to our 

requests for information. This week, however, they did 

reply to a backlog of our requests, but provided little 

new information. Their failure to provide information 

may be a reflection of the GCA's indecision as to 

how to handle the cases of the "disappeared." 

—r"Tnr 


T r\ 

r\ ■ ' n 

vU^C tos « > \ Q_

-fr&ttFTtrOnTAL 

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 

v 

PAGE 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES B7B7 

DTG:1 1 1649Z DEC B3 PSN:075B50 

SIT052 AN007551 TOR: 345/1800Z 

DISTRIBUTION: V£ /002 

OP IMMED 

STU5804 

DE RUEHBU *8787 •'Ol 34S1B55 

O 111649Z DEC B 3 ZFF4 


TO SECSTATE WASHOC NIACT IMMEDIATE 

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 

9708 

OF 04 BUENOS AIRES 0B787 

SECSTATE FOR WHITE HOUSE ONLY 

WHITE HOUSE PASS TO ADMIRAL MURPHY 

ABOARD VICE PRESIDENT1 S ^ 

AIRCRAFT 

E. O. 1235B: DE CL: OADR 

TAGS: PREL, US, AR 

SUBJECT: BUSH-ALFONSIN BILATERAL DRAFT MEMCON 

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 

2. THERE FOLLOWS A DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION 

OF THE BUSH/ALFONSIN BILATERAL. PLEASE ADVISE EMBASSY 

OF CONCURRENCE OR REVISIONS SO WE CAN SUBMIT AS FINAL. 

WE RECOMMEND DISTRIBUTION TO VARIOUS WASHINGTON AGENCIES, 

PARTICULARLY DEFENSE AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION. 

3. PARTICIPANTS: VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH, 

AMBASSADOR FRANK ORTIZ, ASSISTANT SECRETARY ANTHONY 

MOTLEY, ADMIRAL DANIEL MURPHY, PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSIN, 

FOREIGN MINISTER DANTE CAPUTO, UNDER SECRETARY FOR 

FOREIGN AFFAIRS HUGO GOBBI, SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDENCY 

GERMAN LOPEZ. 

5. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE IN LOS OLIVOS, THE PRESIDENTIA 

RESIDENCE, FROM 2030 UNTIL 2120 HOURS ON DECEMBER 10, 

1983. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, THE VICE 

PRESIDENT INTRODUCED DEPUTY SECRETARY MCNAMAR AND GENERAL 

GORMAN, AND THEIR ADVISORS, WHO HAD PARTICIPATED IN 

SIMULTANEOUS SIDE MEETINGS WITH MINISTER OF ECONOMY 

BERNARDO GRINSPUN AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE RAUL BORRAS. 

B. THE VICE PRESIDENT OPENED BY SAYING HE SPENT AN 

UNBELIEVABLE DAY AS A PARTICIPANT AND SPECTATOR IN THE 

PUBLIC JUBILATION OVER ARGENTINA1 S RETURN TO DEMOCRACY. 

HE SAID NOW THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA COULD BECOME 

EQUAL PARTNERS IN THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE AND 

PROSPERITY. HE BELIEVED THERE IS A GREAT POTENTIAL FOR 

COOPERATIVE ACTIONS BY TWO GREAT NATIONS. PRESIDENT 

ALFONSIN REPLIED HE WAS VERY PLEASED TO HEAR THIS. 

ARGENTINA WANTS TO HAVE INCREASINGLY GOOD RELATIONS 

WITH THE UNITED STATES. SUCH RELATIONS WOULD BE BETWEEN 

MATURE PARTNERS. THE TWO NATIONS HAVE MANY COMMON 

INTERESTS. THEY NOW SHARED A COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY 

AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN. THERE WERE ALSO DIFFERING AND 

CONTRADICTORY INTERESTS WHICH HE DID NOT SPECIFY. HE 

SAID WE SHOULD STRIVE TO MAKE THE DIFFERING POINTS OF 

VIEW BECOME COMMON INTERESTS AND’ THE CONTRADICTORY POINTS 

OF VIEW SIMPLY BECOME DIFFERING POINTS OF VIEW. HE 

SAID BILATERAL RELATIONS SUFFERED BECAUSE OF THE MALVINAS 

WAR, BUT THIS SAME PROBLEM COULD BECOME A POSSIBLE 

AVENUE TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONSHIP. THE DEMOCRACIES OF 

THE WORLD MUST BE UNIFIED. THE MALVINAS ISSUE DIVIDES 

THEM. IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEGIN TO IMPLEMENT THE UN 

RESOLUTION ON THE MALVINAS. CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE 

U. K. AND ARGENTINA SHOULD BEGIN, EVEN IF WITH DIFFERING 

'lush UN? 

vK.ieopy

jMF+tmnTAT 


PAGE 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 87B7 OTG: 1 1 1649Z DEC B3 PSN: 075851 

AGENDAS, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO START TALKS. THERE MUST 

BE AN END TO THE EXCLUSION ZONE AND AT ALL COSTS THE 

CONVERSION OF THE I5LANDS INTO A MILITARY FORTRESS MU5T 

BE STOPPED BEFORE THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IS TURNED TO THE 

NORTH ATLANTIC. THERE IS A RISK THAT THE SOUTH ATLANTIC 

WOULD, LIKE THE INDIAN OCEAN, BECOME AN AREA OF CONTEST 

BETWEEN WORLD POWERS. ARGENTINA IS DECISIVELY OPPOSED 

TO SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. ARGENTINA HOPES THE UNITED 

STATES WILL COOPERATE WITH THE ARGENTINE NATION TO AVOID 

SUCH A SITUATION. 

7. THE VICE PRESIDENT REPLIED HE BELIEVES THE U. K. WANTS 

TO MOVE FORWARD IN REBUILDING ITS RELATIONS WITH 

ARGENTINA. THE UNITED STATES DECISION TO CERFITY TO 

THE CONGRESS ARGENTINA' S IMPROVEMENTS IN THE OBSERVANCE 

OF HUMAN RIGHTS WAS NOT EASY FOR THE BRITISH TO ACCEPT. 

THE UNITED STATES HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS SUPPORT FOR 

ARGENTINA. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES IT CAN HELP IN 

BETTERING RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO FRIENDS. IF THE UNITED 

STATES SEES THERE IS NO WAY IT CAN BE HELPFUL, WE SHALL 

TELL ARGENTINA SO FRANKLY AND TELL THEM WHY. THE UNITED 

STATES DESIRES A FRANK RELATIONSHIP WITH ARGENTINA. 

J PRESIDENT ALFONSIN SAID HE WAS VERY DELIGHTED TO HEAR 

THE VICE PRESIDENT SPEAK IN THIS MANNER. HE SAID HE ALSO 

WANTED THAT THERE BE A FRANK DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO 

COUNTRIES. 

a. WHEN THE VICE PRESIDENT ALLUDED TO SOME DEMONSTRA 

TIONS OF HOSTILITY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AMONG 

THOSE IN THE GREAT CROWDS IN THE CENTER OF THE CITY, 

THE PRESIDENT SAID AMERICANS SHOULD NOT BE NAIVE. WHILE 

IT IS TRUE THERE IS ADVERSE SENTIMENT IN ARGENTINA SINCE 

THE MALVINAS WAR, THAT WAS NOT THE REASON FOR WHATEVER 

ISOLATED INSTANCES OF HOSTILITY THE VICE PRESIDENT MAY 

HAVE OBSERVED. THERE ARE GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA WHO 

RAISE BANNERS THAT ARE NOT NATIONAL BANNERS BUT ARE 

THOSE OF THE EAST/WEST CONFLICT. LATIN AMERICA IS A 

BT 

iliSlT'1 .t.’!"' , «DGOpy

■GfflfttfliT I Atr" 


PAGE 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 8787 

SIT0S1 

AN0075S0 

□ TG: 1 1 1 6 4 9 Z DEC 83 

TOR: 345/1802Z 

PSN:075B54 

DISTRIBUTION: VP /002 

OP IMMED 

STU5B06 

□E RUEHBU • B 7 8 7/02 3451656 

O 1 1 1B49Z DEC 83 ZFF 4 

FM AMEMBASSY BUEN05 AIRES 

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9709 



WHITE HOUSE PASS TO ADMIRAL MURPHY ABOARD VICE PRESIDENT' S 

AIRCRAFT 

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR 



BATTLEFIELD FOR IDEOLOGICAL PROPAGANDA. IT WAS EAST/WEST 

NOT NORTH/SOUTH MANIFESTATIONS THE VICE PRESIDENT SAW. 

IN NO WAY DO THOSE WHO SO DEMONSTRATED REPRESENT THE 

GREAT MAJORITY OF ARGENTINES. THEY ARE ONLY’ A SMALL 

GROUP WHICH IN ARGENTINA ARE CALLED "ULTRAS". THEY HAVE 

THEIR OWN AGENDA, WHICH IS NOT ARGENTINA' S AGENDA. 

9. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID, GIVEN THE NEW RELATIONSHIP 

THAT IS BEING DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, HE 

WOULD SUGGEST THAT THERE BE PARLIAMENTARY EXCHANGES. 

ALFONSIN IMMEDIATELY AGREED. THE VICE PRESIDENT ALSO 

EXTENDED AN INVITATION TO THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE A 

WORKING VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES SOME TIME LATE IN 

1984. HE PREDICTED THAT PRESIDENT ALFONSIN WOULD VERY 

MUCH LIKE PRESIDENT REAGAN. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN SAID 

IT WOULD GIVE HI^ THE GREATEST PLEASURE TO MEET PRESIDENT 

REAGAN AND TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES. THE DETAILS COULD 

BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE AMBASSADORS. 

;10. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THERE ARE SPECIFIC AREAS 

IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES HOPED IT COULD BE COOPERATIVE 

AND SUPPORTIVE. HE NOTED THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY OF 

TREASURY MCNAMAR WAS A MEMBER OF HIS DELEGATION AND WAS 

THEN MEETING WITH THE NEW ARGENTINE ECONOMIC TEAM. THE 

UNITED STATES WOULD TRY TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE 

IN ASSISTING ARGENTINA TO MEET ITS GREAT FINANCIAL 

PROBLEMS. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN SAID A LESSENING OF THE 

MAGNITUDE OF THE DEBT PROBLEM IS ABSOLUTELY VITAL TO HIM. 

HE SAID THERE IS A DANGER THAT HIS ADMINISTRATION COULD 

NOT FULFILL THE EXPECTATIONS IT AWAKENED. HE SAID IT 

WAS ESSENTIAL TO END THE LIMITATIONS ON ARGENTINA'S 

DEVELOPMENT IMPOSED BY THE HUGE DEBT SERVICE REQUIRE 

MENTS. HE SAID ARGENTINA ALWAYS PAYS ITS DEBTS. THE 

WAY FOR ARGENTINA TO PAY OFF ITS DEBT IS TO EXPORT. IT 

WAS VITAL TO FIND MARKETS FOR ARGENTINA' S EXPORTS AND 

TO ARRANGE AN EQUITABLE REFINANCING OF THE DEBT, BUT 

THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION THAT ARGENTINA WILL PAY. 

THE VICE PRESIDENT REPEATED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD 

TRY TO HELP. HE POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN VERY 

STRONGLY RESISTED THE SIREN-CALL OF PROTECTIONISM RAISED 

BY AFFECTED AMERICAN PRODUCERS. THE UNITED STATES WAS 

DOING IT NOT OUT OF GENEROSITY BUT BECAUSE IT WAS GOOD 

FOR THE UNITED STATES. THE UNITED STATES MARKET SHOULD 

BE OPEN TO EVERYONE. THE UNITED STATES SHALL CONTINUE 

TO RESIST RAISING BARRIERS TO TRADE. HE ASSURED 

PRESIDENT ALFONSIN THAT WOULD BE THE CASE AND THAT THE 

UNITED STATES WOULD BE A GOOD TRADING PARTNER. ALFONSIN 

SAID THAT THIS WAS A BASIC COMMON INTEREST AND THANKED 

> ift!''.'-' ~i''!rTl!OCOO\

--GWHMffAT'' 


PAGE 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 8787 DTG: 111649Z DEC 83 PSN: 075854 

THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR HIS ASSURANCES. HE NOTED THAT 

EVEN ARGENTINA HAD TO EXTEND HELP TO COUNTRIES IN 

DISTRESS. HE SAID ARGENTINA WOULD HAVE TO PAY BOLIVIA 

8 2 7 0 MILLION VERY SOON, A SUM THAT ARGENTINA COULD 

SCARCELY AFFORD. 

11. THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN 

THE UNITED STATES AND ITS PROBABLE AFFECT ON THE 

ECONOMIES OF OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY IF THE EUROPEAN 

ECONOMIES ALSO WOULD IMPROVE. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN 5AIO 

THE TOP PRIORITY MUST BE TO EXPAND THE ECONOMY AND TO 

HAVE GREATER PRODUCTION. HE BELIEVED IT WAS VERY 

IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE A REDUCTION IN INTEREST RATES. 

12. THE VICE PRESIDENT RAISED THE MATTER OF ARGENTINA’ 5 

NUCLEAR PROGRAM. HE SAID THE UNITED STATES LISTENED 

WITH GREAT SENSITIVITY TO THE ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION’ S 

STATEMENTS ON THE MATTER. HE -NOTED THAT PURELY AS A 

BILATERAL UNITED STATES/ARGENTINE QUESTION, THE UNITED 

STATES COULD BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN ASSURING THERE BE 

A STEADY FLOW OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION 

IF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION WERE LESS 

CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE PROLIFERATION OF 

NUCLEAR DEVICES. HE SAID TO THE DEGREE ALFONSON COULD 

FIND IT POSSIBLE TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR 

SAFEGUARDS IT WOULD MAKE ALL AREAS OF BILATERAL 

COOPERATION MUCH EASIER. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THIS 

ISSUE WAS ARGENTINA’ S BUSINESS, BUT PRESIDENT ALFONSIN’ S 

DECISIONS WOULD HAVE A CONSIDERABLE EFFECT ON THE DEGREE 

OF COOPERATION POSSIBLE BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. THE VICE 

PRESIDENT SAID HE COULD NOT BE LESS THAN FRANK ON AN 

ISSUE OF SUCH IMPORTANCE. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN SAID THE 

NUCLEAR I5SUE WAS THE CONVERSE TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. 

ON THE NUCLEAR QUESTION, THE BIG POWERS WORRY ABOUT THE 

BT 

aushuK-t^. '“'-"JttAAjpy



5IT053 

AN007S52 

□ TG: 1 1 1 649Z DEC B3 PSN: 075859 

TOR: 345/1804Z 


OP IMME D 

STU580S 

□E RUEHBU *8787/03 3451857 

O 111B49Z DEC 83 ZFF4 

FM AMEMBA5SY BUENOS AIRES 

TO SECSTATE WA5HDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9710 



WHITE HOUSE PASS TO ADMIRAL MURPHY ABOARD VICE PRESIDENT' S 

AIRCRAFT 

E. O. 1235B: DECL: OADR 



ACTIONS OF THE LITTLE POWERS. HE SAID HE WANTED THE 

VICE PRESIDENT TO KNOW OF HIS IRREVOCABLE AND ABSOLUTE 

DECISION THAT ARGENTINA WILL NOT BUILD AN ATOMIC BOMB. 

HE SAID ARGENTINA WOULD MAKE AGREEMENTS WITH ITS 

NEIGHBORS WHICH WILL TRANOUILIZE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. 

13. THE VICE PRESIDENT, IN A FORCEFUL MANNER, CONVEYED 

TO PRESIDENT ALFONSIN THE COMMITMENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN 

TO A MAJOR REDUCTION IN ARMS NOT SOLELY LIMITATION, BUT 

A REDUCTION IN ARMAMENTS. HE NOTED THAT A PRESIDENT 

WITH THE CREDENTIALS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN CAN MAKE 

EFFECTIVE AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND OBTAIN 

RATIFICATION FOR SUCH AGREEMENTS IN THE SENATE. IT IS 

NECESSARY TO ENGAGE THE SOVIET UNION IN DISCUSSIONS 

LEADING TO SUCH ENDS. PRESIDENT REAGAN FEELS VERY 

STRONGLY ABOUT THIS ISSUE. THE UNITED STATES ABSOLUTELY 

WANTS TO REDUCE ARMS, HOWEVER, IT TAKES TWO TO TANGO. 

THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE BELIEVED THERE WAS GROWING 

SUPPORT IN EASTERN EUROPE FOR ARMS REDUCTION. HE KNEW 

THAT IN THE UNITED STATES THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN IS 

STRONG ENOUGH TO ACHIEVE IT. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN SAID 

THAT THIS TRULY WAS A MESSAGE OF HOPE. HE WISHED 

PRESIDENT REAGAN EVERY SUCCESS. 

14. THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED FOR PRESIDENT ALFONSIN’ S 

ADVICE ON CENTRAL AMERICA. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT IN 

CENTRAL AMERICA THERE IS AN AUTHENTIC STRUGGLE BY THE 

PEOPLE AGAINST A FEUDAL SYSTEM THAT ENSLAVES AND EXPLOITS 

THEM. IN THIS SITUATION THERE IS INTERFERENCE BY BOTH 

SUPER POWERS, WHICH COMPLICATES THE ATTAINMENT OF LOCAL 

SOLUTIONS. HE ADVISED THAT THE UNITED STATES HONESTLY 

ACCEPT DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA, CONSIST 

ING OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, AGARIAN REFORM, AND 

THE NATIONALIZATION OF SUCH ENTERPRISES AS BANKS. 

HISTORICALLY, THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT BEEN WILLING TO 

DO SO. SUCH A DECISION BY THE UNITED STATES IN THIS 

REGARD WOULD TRANOUILIZE THESE COUNTRIES. THE VICE 

PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT THE KEY WORD WAS "DEMOCRATIC". IF 

BY FREE EXERCISE. OF THE POPULAR WILL SUCH COURSES AS 

THOSE CITED WERE DECIDED UPON, THE UNITED STATES WOULD 

HAVE NO PROBLEM. HE NOTED THE UNITED STATES WAS THE MOST 

SIGNIFICANT SUPPORTER OF THE SANDINISTA REVOLUTIONARY 

GOVERNMENT IN A MATERIAL, POLITICAL AND EFFECTIVE SENSE 

THAN ANY OTHER NATION. HOWEVER, THE SANDINISTAS PROMPTLY 

REMOVED THE "DEMOCRATIC" FROM THEIR SYSTEM AND EVEN THE 

"SOCIALIST" ATTRIBUTES DISAPPEARED. THEIR COUNTRY WAS 

CONVERTED INTO A MARXIST/LENINIST TOTALITARIAN STATE. 

THE UNITED STATES HAS NO INTEREST IN CREATING MIRROR 

3ush 

3i?otoocpv

-OWF+MNT-HHr—’ 


PAGE 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 87B7 DTG:111649Z DEC 83 P5N:075B59 

IMAGES IN CENTRAL AMERICA. WHAT THE UNITED STATES IS 

TOTALLY COMMITTED TO IS TO DEMOCRACY, TO FREE ELECTIONS, 

A FREE PRESS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND FREE INSTITUTIONS. 

THAT IS WHAT WE INSIST UPON, AND THAT IS WHAT WE HOPE 

TO ACHIEVE IN THAT AREA. IF CENTRAL AMERICA BECOMES 

A SERIES OF DEMOCRATIC STATES WE SHOULD BE VERY 

COMFORTABLE WITH WHATEVER THEY DECIDE TO DO. HE REFERRED 

TO THE HARSH STATEMENTS BY ORTEGA UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN 

BUENOS AIRES AND SAID UNFORTUNATELY ORTEGA MADE IT A 

HABIT TO SAY THINGS THAT ARE NOT TRUE. THE UNITED STATES 

HAS HAD MANY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SANDINISTAS AND WILL 

CONTINUE TO DO SO. WE LISTEN CAREFULLY TO NICARAGUAN 

OVERTURES AND WILL BE RESPONSIVE TO SINCERE OVERTURES. 

THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE CONTADORA INITIATIVE. 

15. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN SAID HE WAS VERY PLEASED TO HEAR 

THIS. HE WONDERED IF IT WAS A GENERAL UNITED STATES 

GOVERNMENT POSITION WHICH WAS APPLICABLE TO THE PENTAGON 

AS WELL AS TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THE VICE PRESIDENT 

REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION IN THE UNITED STATES 

OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 

HE NOTED PRESIDENT ALFONSIN WAS STRIVING TO ESTABLISH 

SUCH CIVILIAN CONTROL IN ARGENTINA. THE POSITION HE OUT 

LINED IS A POSITION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

AND CONSEQUENTLY IS THE POSITION OF THE ENTIRE UNITED 

STATES GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE SLOW-MOVING BUREAUCRACY. 

PRESIDENT ALFONSIN SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT WHAT THE 

VICE PRESIDENT TOLD HIM WAS TRUE. 

IB. THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN DELIVERED A PERSONAL LETTER 

FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THANKED PRESIDENT ALFONSIN FOR 

HIS TIME, NOTING THAT HE MUST BE EXHAUSTED AFTER HIS 

INTENSIVE DAY. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN WAS VERY EFFUSIVE 

IN HIS FAREWELL REMARKS, FOREIGN MINISTER CAPUTO OBSERVED 

BT 

jusft 

“"•oTonopy

JLWIRWNf+fttr-' 


PAGE 01 

SIT054 

BUEN05 AIRES 87B7 

AN007553 

□ TG: 1 1 1649Z DEC 83 PSN: 075860 

TOR: 345/1804Z 


OP IMMED 

UTS1796 

DE RUEHBU •>8787/04 3451ES8 

O 111649Z DEC 83 ZFF4 


TO SECSTATE WA5HDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9711 



WHITE HOUSE PASS TO ADMIRAL MURPHY ABOARD VICE PRESIDENT* S 

AIRCRAFT 

E. O. 12356: DE CL: OADR 



WITH FEELING THAT HE CONSIDERED IT TO HAVE BEEN A 

"BEAUTIFUL" MEETING. ORTIZ 

BT 

r photocopy

-ewmririm 


PAGE 91 OF 92 

SIT096 

BUENOS AIRES 8723 

AN996659 

DTG: 97 2249Z DEC 83 PSN: 96 9 4 18 

TOR: 3 42/995 2Z 

DISTRIBUTION: MCF JP IP. SIT EOB /BB8 

Y/HSR COMMENT: --CHECKLIST-- 

OP IMMED 

STU7658 

DE RUEHBU * 8.7 23 3 4 122 49 

0 972249Z DEC 83 


declassified 

E.0.13526 


CONFIDENTIAL BUENOS AIRES 98723 

NOD I S 

E. 0. 123 5 6: DECL: OADR 

TAGS: PARM, UK, AR 

SUBJECT: (0 ARGENTINE- CERTIFICATION -- DELIVERY OF 

PRESIDENTIAL LETTER AND PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT 

REF: STATE 346197 

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. 

2. AT 1699 HOURS WASHINGTON TIME DECEMBER 7 I GAVE 

PRESIDENT BIGNONE THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER CONCERNING 

CERTIFICATION TO THE CONGRESS. PRESIDENT BIGNONE WAS 

GRATIFIED PARTICULARLY BY THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THE 

PRESIDENT'S LETTER CONGRATULATING HIM ON HIS ACCOMPLISH 

MENT IN RETURNING ARGENTINA TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. 

3. PRESIDENT BIGNONE ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD MAINTAIN 

OUR DECISION IN CONFIDENCE. HE SAID THIS POSITIVE STEP 

BY THE UNITED STATES REMOVED AN IRRITATING OBSTACLE TO 

COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA 

.- °'rv 'Tocopy


PAGE 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 8 7 23 DTG:07 2 240Z DEC 83 PSN:0694 18 

" IN MANY IMPORTANT FIELDS". ORTIZ 

BT 

3usrr L-i'»• 1 ^

UNCLASSIFIED 

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM . 

L VP TRIP TO 

PAGE 01 OF 02 

SIT703 

DISTRIBUTION: NONE /001 

BUENOS AIRES B441 

AN004391 

OP IMMED 

STU30BS 

DE RUEHBU *8441/01 3322251 

O 2B2221Z NOV B3 


TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 9523 

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 BUENOS AIRES 08441 

TOR: 

, DISTRIBUTION. ACTION I NFC 

DON GREGG 

• 

J. BUSH 

ADVANCE OPC 

r. GREET- 

MRS BUSH'S or 

Secret servic 3 

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« 

E. O. 1235B: N/A 

TAGS: OVIP, ODIP, PGOV, MNUC, MASS, EFIN, ETRD, EAGR, 

PBTS, SHUM, .PREL, AR, US 

SUBJ: U. S. DELEGATION TO ARGENTINE PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURA 

TION: SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES LIKELY TO ARISE IN PRESS 

ENCOUNTERS 

REF: STATE 334418 

1. HEREIN IS A PRECIS OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH THE 

VICE PRESIDENT IS LIKELY TO ENCOUNTER IN HIS DEALINGS WITH 

THE PRESS. THE FIRST SECTION COVERS BILATERAL ISSUES WITH 

LIKELY QUESTIONS AND RECOMMENDED ANSWERS. THE SECOND 

SECTION DEALS WITH ISSUES OUTSIDE THE BILATERAL FRAMEWORK 

INDICATING THE ISSUE AS PERCEIVED BY THE ARGENTINES. 

2. FALKLANDS/MALVINAS 

ISSUE: THE INCOMING ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND, PARTI 

CULARLY, THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE, EXPECT THE U. S. GOVERNMENT 

TO URGE THE UNITED KINGDOM TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON 

SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS. HMG HA5 REJECTED 

NEGOTIATIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY. 

QUESTION: NOW THAT ARGENTINA HAS A DEMOCRATICALLYr 

ELECTED GOVERNMENT, WILL THE U.S. PRESS THE GOVERNMENT OF 

GREAT BRITAIN TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON SOVEREIGNTY OF THE 

MALVINAS? 

ANSWER: THE POSITION OF MY GOVERNMENT IS CLEAR. WE 

ARE IN FAVOR OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO 

RESOLVE THIS DISPUTE, AND WE HAVE REPEATEDLY DEMONStRATED 

OUR SUPPORT FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. MOST RECENTLY BY 

SUPPORTING THE ARGENTINE RESOLUTIONS ON THE MALVINAS AT 

THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE GENERAL 

ASSEMBLY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. 

3. THE U. S. COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA 

ISSUE: MOST ARGENTINES ARE EUPHORIC ABOUT THE 

RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY. THEY ARE AWARE THAT ARGENTINA' S 

DEMOCRACY, DESPITE ALFONSIN' S MANDATE. 15 STILL FRAGILE 

AND WOULD APPRECIATE REASSURANCE THAT THE U. S. IS SOLIDLY 

BEHIND THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM HERE. THERE ARE SOME 

CHARGES THE U. S. , AT LEAST THE MILITARY, SOMETIMES 

ENCOURAGES COUPS. 

QUESTION: HOW DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INTEND 

TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IT SUPPORTS THE CONSOLIDATION OF A 

STABLE AND LASTING DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA? 

ANSWER: I CAN EMPHATICALLY ASSURE YOU, AND THE RECORD 

CLEARLY SHOWS THIS. THAT MY GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO 

SUPPORTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS, AND DEMOCRATIZING 

PROCESSES IN COUNTRIES WHICH LACK DEMOCRATIC RULE. NOT 

ONLY IN ARGENTINA BUT THROUGHOUT THE AMERICAS. PRESIDENT 

REAGAN HAS ASKED ME TO MAKE CLEAR TO PRESIDENT ALFONSIN 

AND TO ALL ARGENTINES OUR READINESS TO DO WHAT 15 WITHIN 

OUR POWER TO HELP ENSURE THAT DEMOCRACY, CONSTITUTIONAL 

RULE AND RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES ARE RE5TORED 

FOREVER IN THIS GREAT NATION. ALL SECTORS OF THE AMERICAN 

i_rr.irv,' ;i ms, iw.xjouy

UNCLASSIFIED 


PAGE 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 8441 DTG:282221Z NOV 83 PSN: 052427 

PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENT STRONGLY SUPPORT DEMOCRACY IN 

ARGENTINA. 

4. ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA 

ISSUE: THE KENNEDY-HUMPHREY AMENDMENT TO THE 

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION PROHIBITS MILITARY 

ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING CASH SALES, TO ARGENTINA UNLESS 

THE PRESIDENT CERTIFIES TO CONGRESS THAT THE HUMAN 

RIGHTS SITUATION HAS IMPROVED AND SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD 

BE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST. CONSIDERATIONS DEALING WITH 

THE MILITARY TENSIONS IN THE AREA COULD AFFECT MAJOR 

SALES EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH LEGISLATION. 

QUESTION: WlLL THE UNITED STATES SELL ARMS TO 

ARGENTINA NOW THAT THERE IS A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT? 

ANSWER: THE OBVIOUS IMPROVEMENT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS 

SITUATION IN ARGENTINA STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE HUMAN 

RIGHTS RELATED CERTIFICATION THAT WOULD PERMIT ARMS 

SALES. THE TIMING OF SUCH A CERTIFICATION IS UNDER 

INTENSIVE REVIEW. AFTER SUCH CERTIFICATION ANY SALES 

WHICH MIGHT BE REQUESTED WILL BE EXAMINED ON A CASE-BY 

CASE BASIS AS IS THE PROCEDURE FOR OTHER COUNTRIES. MY 

UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN THAT MAJOR ARMS'PURCHASES ARE 

NOT A HIGH PRIORITY FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT, AND IT 

CERTAINLY IS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE U. S. TO URGE ARMS 

PURCHASES ON ARGENTINA. 

BT 

Phutooopy

UNCLASSIFIED 



DTG:282221Z NOV 83 PSNs052428 

SIT704 AN004392 TOR: 332/2306Z 


OP IMMED 

UTS3432 

DE RUEHBU «8441/02 3322252 

O 282221Z NOV 83 




E. O. 12356: N/A 


PBTS, SHUM, PREL, AR, US 

SUBJ: U. S. DELEGATION TO ARGENTINE PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURA- 

5. BEAGLE CHANNEL 

ISSUE: THE POPE HAS PROPOSED A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLV 

ING THE LONG-STANDING TERRITORIAL WATERS DISPUTE BETWEEN 

ARGENTINA AND CHILE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, THE SO-CALLED 

BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE. 

QUESTION: DOES THE U. S. INTEND TO PRESS ARGENTINA AND 

CHILE TO RESOLVE THE BEAGLE DISPUTE? 

ANSWER: IT IS CERTAINLY OUR HOPE THAT THESE TWO SISTER 

REPUBLICS WILL FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION-TO THIS LONG- 

PENDING DISPUTE. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THE MEDIATION OF 

THE DISPUTE IS IN THE MOST CABLE HANDS POSSIBLE. WE 

WISH THE POPE AND THE TWO PARTIES EVERY SUCCESS. 

5. ARGENTINE NON-ALIGNMENT 

ISSUE: ALFONSIN WILL CONTINUE THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT' S 

NON-ALIGNED POLICY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. OCCASIONALLY THE 

PRESS CLAIMS THAT THIS WILL PREJUDICE* ARGENTINA' S RELA 

TIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. 

QUESTION: HOW WILL YOUR GOVERNMENT REACT TO ARGENTINA' S 

ASSUMING A STRONG NON-ALIGNED POSTURE? 

ANSWER: THE U. S-. GOVERNMENT RESPECTS THE NON-ALIGNED 

MOVEMENT AND HAS-' EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH MANY OF ITS 

MEMBERS. WE HAVfe NO TROUBLE WITH GENUINE -NON-ALIGNED 

POSITIONS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. WE THINK THAT AT 

TIMES THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT DIVERGES WIDELY FROM A 

TRULY NON-ALIGNED COURSE AND ACCORDINGLY WE HAVE MADE 

OUR VIEWS -KNOWN .TO THE NAM LEADERSHIP AND ITS MEMBERS. 

7. THE FORETGN DEBT 

ISSUE: ARGENTINA'S FOREIGN DEBT IS OVER U. S. 40 BILLION 

DOLLARS. SOME ARGENTINES BELIEVE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS 

MAY PROVIDE A NEWLY DEMOCRATIC ARGENTINA ASSISTANCE TO 

PROVIDE BREATHING SPACE TO MOVE THE COUNTRY TOWARD 

RECbVERY WITHOUT ADOPTING SEVERE AUSTERITY MEASURES. THE : 

ARGENTINES BELIEVE THEY HAVE A GREATER ABILITY TO 

SERVICE THE DEBT THAN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN DEBTORS; 

THEREFORE ARGENTINA IS LESS OF A RISK AND SHOULD RECEIVE 

BETTER TERMS. 

QUESTION: WHAT ASSISTANCE CAN THE UNITED STATES GOVERN 

MENT GIVE US IN MANAGING THE FOREIGN DEBT INCURRED BY 

THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT? 

ANSWER: I AM PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO TELL YOU THAT THE U. S. *" 

CONGRESS HAS APPROVED THE INCREASE IN THE U. S. CONTRIBU 

TION TO THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. THUS ARGENTINA, 

WHICH IS ALSO AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE FUND, MAY WELL BE 

ABLE TO ACQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL FINANCING FROM 

THAT SOURCE IN THE CONTEXT OF A CAREFULLY DEVELOPED PLAN 

TO OVERCOME CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. MOREOVER, THE 

RAPID U. S. ECONOMIC EXPANSION WHICH HAS NOW BEEN GOING 

3USft iJtM'Kv: HTtlftQCOpy

UNCLASSIFIED 


PAGE 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES B441 

DTG:2B2221Z NOV B3 PSN:05242B 

ON FOR SEVERAL MONTHS IS ALREADY CONTRIBUTING TO 

INCREASING DEMAND FOR EXPORTS FROM AROUND THE WORLD 

INCLUDING FROM ARGENTINA. WE ARE COMMITTED BOTH TO KEEP 

ING OUR RECOVERY MOVING FORWARD AND TO KEEPING OUR DOORS 

OPEN FOR COMPETITIVE EXPORTS FROM ARGENTINA AND OTHER 

COUNTRIES. IN TERMS OF THE DETAIL OF THE DEBT AND 

ARRANGEMENTS FOR MORE FAVORABLE REPAYMENT CONDITIONS, I 

MUST POINT OUT THAT MOST OF THE ARGENTINE DEBT IS WITH 

PRIVATE BANKS NOT WITH THE U. S. OR OTHER GOVERNMENTS. 

HOWEVER, I KNOW THAT U. S. BANKERS, AS WELL AS ALL OTHER 

SECTORS OF THE U. S. , WELCOMED THE RETURN OF STABLE 

DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA AND THEY WILL CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE 

TERMS FOR THE DEBT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ECONOMIC PRO 

GRAM YOUR NEW GOVERNMENT WORKS OUT WITH THE IMF. 

B. BEEF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS 

ISSUE: THE U. S. DOES NOT PERMIT THE IMPORT OF FRESH 

OR CHILLED BEEF FROM ARGENTINA BECAUSE HOOF AND MOUTH 

DISEASE IS STILL PRESENT IN ARGENTINA. CHILE HAS 

RECENTLY BEEN DECLARED FREE OF HOOF AND MOUTH AND CAN 

NOW EXPORT FRESH BEEF TO THE U. S. ARGENTINA EXPORTS 

COOKED AND PROCESSED BEEF TO THE U. S. 

QUESTION: WILL THE U. S. PERMIT THE EXPORT OF FRESH BEEF 

TO THE U. S. NOW THAT THERE IS A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT? 

BT 

3ush Mhi'w

UNCLASSIFIED , 


PAGE 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES B441 DTG:2B2221Z NOV B3 PSN: 052430 

5IT705 AN004393 TOR: 332/2311Z 


OP IMMED 

STU3071 

DE RUEHBU *B441/03 3322252 

O 2B2221Z NOV 83 


TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 9525 


E. O. 12356: N/A 



SUBJ: U. S. DELEGATION TO ARGENTINE PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURA- 

ANSWER: I WISH IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR THE U. S. TO OPEN OUR 

MEAT MARKET FULLY TO ARGENTINA. I WOULD PERSONALLY LIKE 

TO EAT MORE OF YOUR EXCELLENT BEEF. HOWEVER, THE 

PROBLEM IS THE PRESENCE OF HOOF AND MOUTH DISEASE IN 

ARGENTINA WHICH MIGHT BE TRANSMITTED TO THE U. S. IN 

TIMES PASSED THE ELIMINATION OF THIS DISEASE HAS REQUIRED 

EXPENDITURES-OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN THE U. S. THUS WE 

MUST MAINTAIN OUR STRICT SANITARY RESTRICTIONS. IF 

ARGENTINA CAN ELIMINATE THE DISEASE, WE WOULD BE DELIGHTED 

TO PLACE A GREAT DEAL OF YOUR EXCELLENT -MEAT ON OUR TABLE. 

ISSUE: THE U. S. HAS CHANGED ITS BEEF IMPORT INSPECTION 

REQUIREMENTS WHICH REQUIRE ADDITIONAL TESTING SYSTEMS 

BE OPERATIONAL IN EXPORTING COUNTRIES BY JANUARY 1, 

1984. 

QUESTION: WILL ARGENTINE BEEF EXPORTS TO THE UNITED 

STATES BE RESTRICTED NEXT YEAR? 

ANSWER: ALL FOREIGN SUPPLIERS OF MEAT AND POULTRY TO 

THE U. S. MARKET MUST COMPLY WITH CERTAIN INSPECTION 

PROCEDURES THAT ARE REQUIRED BY U. S. LAW. THESE 

REQUIREMENTS WILL BE THE SAME FOR U. S. DOMESTIC AS WELL 

AS FOREIGN SUPPLIERS. I UNDERSTAND THAT ARGENTINA IS 

ADVANCED IN MEETING THESE REQUIREMENTS, AND I WOULD 

CERTAINLY HOPE THAT NECESSARY STEPS BE TAKEN DURING 

THIS PERIOD OF GOVERNMENT TRANSITION SO THAT PROCESSED 

MEAT EXPORTS TO THE U. S. ARE NOT INTERRUPTED. 

9. - U. S. GRAIN EXPORT CREDITS 

ISSUE: MANY ARGENTINES BELIEVE THAT, THROUGH THE 

BLENDED CREDIT PROGRAM, THE U. S. IS DISPLACING 

ARGENTINE GRAIN EXPORTS. 

QUESTION: WILL THE U. S. CONTINUE TO USE CREDIT TO 

DISPLACE ARGENTINE GRAIN EXPORTS TO LATIN AMERICAN 

COUNTRIES? 

ANSWER: THE U. S. GOES TO GREAT PAINS NOT TO DISPLACE 

NORMAL ARGENTINE COMMERCIAL GRAIN EXPORTS. HOWEVER, 

SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE TO CURTAIL 

SEVERELY THEIR GRAIN IMPORTS WITHOUT THE AVAILABILITY 

OF CREDIT. THEIR LARGER USE OF GRAIN CAUSES MORE GRAIN 

TO BE REMOVED FROM THE WORLD MARKET AND PRICES ARE 

THUS STRENGTHENED. I MIGHT ALSO ADD THAT WE HAVE PAID 

U. S. FARMERS A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY TO TAKE LAND OUT OF 

PRODUCTION IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN WORLD GRAIN PRICES 

AND ARGENTINA IS BENEFITING FROM THESE HIGHER PRICES 

FOR MOST GRAINS. 

10. COMMERCE DEPARTMENT INVESTIGATIONS INTO IMPORTS 

OF STEEL PRODUCT5 

ISSUE: IN EARLY NOVEMBER U. S. STEEL CORPORATION 

PETITIONED THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE TO REVIEW 

"iiiQU 

i_.fi' >»' •.ît.vfocupy

UNCLASSIFIED 


PAGE 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 8441 DTG:282221Z NOV 83 PSN: 052430 

IMPORTS OF STEEL PRODUCTS FROM ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND 

MEXICO. U. S. STEEL ARGUES THAT THESE IMPORTS BENEFIT 

FROM GOVERNMENT EXPORT SUBSIDIES AND ASKS THE COMMERCE 

DEPARTMENT TO PROVIDE RELIEF THROUGH THE IMPOSITION OF 

COUNTERVAILING DUTIES. 

QUESTION: WHY IS THE U. S. GOVERNMENT REVIEWING ARGENTINE 

STEEL IMPORTS AND WHAT ACTION WILL BE TAKEN AGAINST 

THESE IMPORTS? 

ANSWER: THE U. S. COMMERCE DEPARTMENT IS INITIATING 

A REVIEW OF STEEL IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND 

MEXICO AT THE REQUEST OF A PRIVATE U. S. STEEL 

MANUFACTURER UNDER PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED BY U. S. 

LEGISLATION. ' AS THIS REVIEW IS JUST NOW BEGINNING, 

IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO TALK ABOUT ITS RESULTS, 

AT ANY RATE THIS PROCESS IS A QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEDURE 

IN THE U. S. IN WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION HAS LITTLE 

DISCRETION. 

■11. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 

IS5UE: THE ANNOUNCEMENT NOVEMBER IB THAT ARGENTINA 

HAD ACQUIRED ON ITS OWN URANIUM ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGY 

UNDER A SECRET PROGRAM UNDERWAY SINCE 1S78 HAS PROMPTED 

STRONG PUBLIC REACTION WITHIN THE COUNTRY BOTH IN FAVOR 

AND IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEVELOPMENT. SOME ARGENTINE 

OFFICIALS HAVE PREDICTED A STRONG HOSTILE REACTION BY 

THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS, AND THERE WILL BE CONSIDERABLE 

BT 

t 

3USf> , -'^tfocopy

UNCLASSIFIED 


PAGE 01 OF 02 

SIT70B 

BUENOS AIRE5 B441 

AN0043 94 

□ TG: 2B2221Z NOV 83 PSN: 052433 

TOR: 332/23 1 3Z 


OP IMMED 

UTS3435 

DE RUEHBU *8441/04 33222S3 

O 282221Z NOV BS 

FM AMEMBAS5Y BUENOS AIRES 

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9B2B 


E. O. 1235B: N/A 



SUBJi U. S. DELEGATION TO ARGENTINE PRESIDE1MTIAL INAUGURA- 

PRESS INTEREST IN THE U. S. RESPONSE. 

QUESTION: WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO ARGENTINA' S 

ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IT HAS ACQUIRED URANIUM ENRICHMENT 

TECHNOLOGY? 

ANSWER: THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE MUST BE VERY PROUD THAT 

ITS NUCLEAR TEAM HAS BEEN ABLE TO DEVELOP THIS ADVANCED 

TECHNOLOGY THAT FEW COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD POSSESS. 

AT THE SAME TIME, AS WITH ALL TECHNOLOGIES THAT CAN 

BE USED FOR PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES, WE WOULD 

HOPE ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS WOULD BE DEVELOPED TO ENSURE 

THE TECHNOLOGY IS NOT MISUSED. I IMAGINE THAT ALL 

ASPECTS OF THE NUCLEAR - ISSUE WILL BE HIGH ON THE LIST 

OF PRIORITIES FOR THE NEW ARGENTINE ADMINISTRATION 

AND CONGRESS. 

QUESTION: DOES THE UNITED STATES BELIEVE THAT ARGENTINA 

MAY BE DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS? 

ANSWER: NO. EVEN THOUGH URANIUM ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGY.' 

OBVIOUSLY HAS THAT POTENTIAL, I THINK MOST COUNTRIES 

IN THE WORLD WERE VERY MUCH REASSURED BY PRESIDENT 

ALFONSIN' S STATEMENT THAT HE WOULD ENSURE THAT ARGENTINA' S 

NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY WOULD ONLY BE USED FOR PEACEFUL | 

PURPOSES AND THAT INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS WOULD BE 

ESTABLISHED TO GUARANTEE THAT OBJECTIVE. 

QUESTION: ARE YOU GOING TO URGE PRESIDENT ALFONSIN TO ■ 

RATIFY THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCQ? 

ANSWER: I UNDERSTAND THAT ARGENTINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL 

ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY HAVE BEEN WORKING FOR SOME TIME ON: 

ACHIEVING A SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD PAVE THE WAY 

FOR ARGENTINA TO RATIFY THE TREATY OF TLATELTH-CO. ■ ‘AS ■ 

MR. HANS BLIX, DIRECTOR OF THE IAEA POINTED OUT DURING 

HIS RECENT VISIT HERE, A SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT ON ALL OF 

ARGENTINA' S NUCLEAR FACILITIES WOULD CREATE A CLIMATE OF 

CONFIDENCE WITH THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD THAT NUCLEAR 

TECHNOLOGY WAS BEING USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR PEACEFUL 

PURPOSES. 

12. HUMAN RIGHTS 

ISSUE: HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERS WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THE 

NEW GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA TO SEEK AN ACCOUNTING FOR 

THE DISAPPEARED, INCLUDING PUNISHMENT FOR THOSE RES 

PONSIBLE. THEY ALSO WANT REPEALED AN AMNESTY LAW PRO 

MULGATED BY THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, AND THE DISMANTLING 

OF THE SO-CALLED REPRESSIVE APPARATUS. 

QUESTION: DID YOU RAISE WITH THE NEW ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT 

THE ISSUES OF THE AMNESTY LAW AND AN ACCOUNTING FOR THE 

DISAPPEARED? 

ANSWER: THE RETURN TO A DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL 

FORM OF GOVERNMENT IS THE BEST GUARANTEE AGAIN5T 

VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT ALSO 

PROVIDES LEGAL MECHANISMS TO DEAL WITH IMPORTANT ISSUES

UNCLASSIFIED 


PAGE 02 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 8441 DTG!2B2221Z NOV 83 PSN; 052433 

SUCH AS THE TWO YOU MENTIONED. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN IS 

KNOWN WORLDWIDE AS A DEFENDER OF HUMAN RIGHTS. IT 

WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO REVEAL THE CONTENTS 

OF OUR DISCUSSION, BUT I CAN TELL YOU THAT MY GOVERNMENT 

FULLY SUPPORTS PRESIDENT ALFONSIN' S COMMITMENT TO THE 

DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM AND FULL RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN 

ARGENTINA. 

13. THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS CONTAINS ISSUES WHICH GO 

BEYOND THE BILATERAL FRAMEWORK. WE LEAVE TO THE 

DEPARTMENT TO PROVIDE RECOMMENDED ANSWERS. 

14. GRENADA 

ISSUE: OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTILATERAL PEACE 

KEEPING EFFORT IN GRENADA 5PARKED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST 

IN ARGENTINA AND SUBSTANTIAL CRITICISM FOR INTERVENTION 

IN A SOVEREIGN COUNTRY. PRESIDENT-ELECT ALFONSIN 

HIMSELF CRITICIZED THE INITIATIVE AT A PUBLIC RALLY 

DURING THE CAMPAIGN. DUE TO SLANTED AND SELECTIVE 

MEDIA COVERAGE HERE OF GRENADIAN EVENTS, THE REASONS 

WHY THE U. S. UNDERTOOK THIS RESPONSIBILITY WERE NEVER 

CLARIFIED TO THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE. 

QUESTION: DOES THE U. S. BELIEVE IT CAN USE ITS TROOPS 

BT 

■*usr< ;i»»'»■ : VfOGUOy

UNCLASSIFIED 


PAGE 01 

SIT707 


AN004395 

□ TG: 2B2221Z NOV 83 PSN: 0S2406 

TOR: 332/2322Z 


OP IMMED 

STU3074 

□E RUEHBU *8441/05 3322Z54 

O 2B2221Z NOV B3 

FM AMEMBAS5Y BUENOS AIRES 



E. O. 12356: N/A 



SUBJ: U.-S. DELEGATION TO ARGENTINE PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURA- 

IN LATIN AMERICA WHENEVER IT WANTS TO AS IT HAS IN THE 

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, HONDURAS, AND GRENADA? 

15. CENTRAL AMERICA 

ISSUE: SOME ARGENTINES, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE 

INCOMING GOVERNMENT, ARE CONCERNED THAT GRENADA 

MAY BE A PRELUDE TO A U. S. , OR U. S. -SPONSORED, 

INVASION OF NICARAGUA. ALFONSIN AND THE OPPOSITION 

PERONISTS HAVE PUBLICLY EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE 

CONTADORA EFFORT. 

QUESTION: IS THE U. S. GOING TO INVADE NICARAGUA OR 

WOULD THE U. S. SUPPORT AN EFFORT BY OTHER CENTRAL 

AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO INVADE NICARAGUA? 

QUESTION: IN RECENT WEEKS NICARAGUA HAS ASKED LARGE 

NUMBERS OF CUBANS TO LEAVE AND HAS ALLOWED THE 

OPPOSITION PRESS ACCESS TO NEWSPRINT. WILL YOUR 

GOVERNMENT BE MORE TOLERANT OF THE GRN- IN LIGHT OF 

THESE FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS? WILL WASHINGTON STOP 

ITS AID TO THE "CONTRAS"?. 

16. FELIPE GONZALEZ INITIATIVE ON CHILE 

ISSUE: •GONZALEZ AND OTHER EUROPEAN LEADERS WHO WILL 

ATTEND ALFONSIN' S INAUGURATION MAY BE THINKING ABOUT 

A STATEMENT WHILE HERE EXPRESSING HOPE THAT "OTHER" 

COUNTRIES MAY FOLLOW ARGENTINA'S DEMOCRATIC 

EXAMPLE. 

QUESTION: WILL THE U. S. SUPPORT EFFORTS BY EUROPEAN 

COUNTRIES TO PR.&SS FOR AN EARLY RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC 

RULE IN CHILE AND URUGUAY? 

17. NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES 

ISSUE: ARGENTINA HAS ASSERTED IN INTERNATIONAL FORA THAT 

THE UNITED KINGDOM' S USE OF A NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINE 

TO SINK THE ARGENTINE CRUISER BELGRANO IN THE 1982 SOUTH 

ATLANTIC WAR WAS A NON-PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 

PROHIBITED BY THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO. IN RESPONSE., 

ARGENTINA ANNOUNCED IT WAS UNDERTAKING A FEASIBILITY STUDY 

TO CONSTRUCT ITS OWN NUCLEAR SUB. 

QUESTION: WHY DOESN’ T THE UNITED STATES CONSIDER THE 

SINKING OF THE BELGRANO BY A BRITISH NUCLEAR SUBMARINE TO 

BE A NON-PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY PROHIBITED BY THE 

TLATELOLCO TREATY? 

QUESTION: WOULD THE U. S. HAVE ANY OBJECTION IF ARGENTINA 

WERE TO CONSTRUCT A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE? 

ORTIZ 

BT

JGmnmmr- 


OUTGOING 

PAGE 01 OF 04 AIR FORCE TWO 9366 DTG:120420Z DEC 83 PSN:076421 

SIT111 AN007608 TOR: 346/0502Z 

DISTRIBUTION: MCF JP VP SIT EOB /008 

dHCCKUST 

OP IMMED 

DE RUEADWW »9 3 6 6 3 4 6 05 02 

0 120420Z DEC 83 

FM AIR FORCE TWO 

TO ZEN/THE WHITE HOUSE 

INFO SECSTATE BUENOS AIRES 

CONFIDENTIAL NODIS WH09366 SECTION 1 OF 3 

SUBJECT: BUSH-ALFONSIN BILATERAL MEETING 

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT - -NODIS 

2. THERE FOLLOWS A SUMMARY OF CONVERSATION 

OF THE BUSH/ALFONSIN BILATERAL. SECSTATE PASS TO 

DEFENSE AND AEC. 

3. PARTICIPANTS: VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH, 

AMBASSADOR FRANK ORTIZ, ASSISTANT SECRETARY ANTHONY 

MOTLEY, ADMIRAL DANIEL MURPHY, PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSIN, 

FOREIGN MINISTER DANTE CAPUTO, UNDER SECRETARY FOR 

FOREIGN AFFAIRS HUGO GOBBI, SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDENCY 

GERMAN LOPEZ. 

5. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE IN LOS OLIYOS, THE PRESIDENTS 

RESIDENCE, FROM 2030 UNTIL 2120 HOURS ON DECEMBER 10, 

1983. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, THE VICE 

PRESIDENT INTRODUCED DEPUTY SECRETARY MCNAMAR AND GENERAL 

GORMAN, AND THEIR ADVISORS, WHO HAD PARTICIPATED IN 

DECLASSIFIED jusr . h;- ■?"• ''OCOOV 

E.0.13526 

Authority,^------------ 

naba 

Date "'1Y3£\\l>


OUTGOING 

PAGE QT 2 OF 04 AIR FORCE TWO 9 3 6 6 DTG: 12 U420Z DEC 83 P S N: 07 6 42 1 

SIMULTANEOUS SIDE MEETINGS WITH MINISTER OF ECONOMY 

BERNARDO GRINSPUN AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE RAUL BORRAS. 

6. THE VICE PRESIDENT OPENED BY SAYING HE SPENT AN 

UNBELIEVABLE DAY AS A PARTICIPANT AND SPECTATOR IN THE 

PUBLIC JUBILATION OVER ARGENTINA'S RETURN TO DEMOCRACY. 

HE SAID NOW THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA COULD BECOME 

EQUAL PARTNERS IN THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE AND 

PROSPERITY. HE BELIEVED THERE IS A GREAT POTENTIAL FOR 

COOPERATIVE ACTIONS BY TWO GREAT NATIONS. PRESIDENT 

ALFONSIN REPLIED HE WAS VERY PLEASED TO HEAR THIS. 

ARGENTINA WANTS TO HAVE INCREASINGLY GOOD RELATIONS 

WITH THE UNITED STATES. SUCH RELATIONS WOULD BE BETWEEN 

MATURE PARTNERS. THE-TWO NATIONS HAVE MANY COMMON 

INTERESTS. THEY NOW SHARED A COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY 

AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN. THERE WERE ALSO DIFFERING AND 

CONTRADICTORY INTERESTS WHICH HE DID NOT SPECIFY. HE 

SAID WE SHOULD STRIVE TO MAKE THE DIFFERING POINTS OF 

VIEW BECOME COMMON INTERESTS AND THE CONTRADICTORY POINTS 

OF VIEW SIMPLY BECOME DIFFERING POINTS OF VIEW. HE 

SAID BILATERAL RELATIONS SUFFERED BECAUSE OF THE MALVINAS 

WAR, BUT THIS SAME PROBLEM COULD BECOME A POSSIBLE 

AVENUE TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONSHIP. THE DEMOCRACIES OF 

THE WORLD MUST BE UNIFIED. THE MALVINAS ISSUE DIVIDES 

THEM. IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEGIN TO IMPLEMENT THE UN 

RESOLUTION ON THE MALVINAS. CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE 

U.K. AND ARGENTINA SHOULD BEGIN, EVEN IF WITH DIFFERING 

AGENDAS, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO START TALKS. THERE MUST 

BE AN END TO THE EXCLUSION ZONE AND AT ALL COSTS THE 

CONVERSION OF THE ISLANDS INTO A MILITARY FORTRESS MUST 

BE STOPPED BEFORE THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IS TURNED TO THE 

NORTH ATLANTIC. THERE IS A RISK THAT THE -SOUTH ATLANTIC 

WOULD, LIKE THE INDIAN OCEAN, BECOME AN AREA OF CONTEST 

BETWEEN WORLD POWERS. ARGENTINA IS DECISIVELY OPPOSED 

TO SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. ARGENTINA HOPES THE UNITED 

STATES WILL COOPERATE WITH THE ARGENTINE NATION TO AVOID 

■rJusr* 

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SUCH A SITUATION. 

7. THE VICE PRESIDENT REPLIED HE BELIEVES THE U. K. WANTS 

TO MOVE FORWARD IN REBUILDING ITS RELATIONS WITH 

ARGENTINA. THE UNITED STATES DECISION TO CERFITY TO 

THE CONGRESS ARGENTINA’S IMPROVEMENTS IN THE OBSERVANCE 

OF HUMAN RIGHTS WAS NOT EASY FOR THE BRITISH TO ACCEPT. 

THE UNITED STATES HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS SUPPORT FOR 

ARGENTINA. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES IT CAN HELP IN 

BETTERING RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO FRIENDS. IF THE UNITED 

STATES SEES THERE IS NO WAY IT CAN BE HELPFUL, WE SHALL 

TELL ARGENTINA SO FRANKLY AND TELL THEM WHY. THE UNITED 

STATES DESIRES A FRANK RELATIONSHIP WITH ARGENTINA. 

J PRESIDENT ALFONSIN SAID HE WAS VERY DELIGHTED TO HEAR 

THE VICE PRESIDENT. SPEAK IN THIS MANNER. HE SAID HE ALSO 

WANTED THAT THERE BE A FRANK DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO 

COUNTRIES. 

8. WHEN THE VICE PRESIDENT ALLUDED TO SOME DEMONSTRA 

TIONS OF HOSTILITY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AMONG 

THOSE IN THE GREAT CROWDS IN THE CENTER OF THE CITY, 

THE PRESIDENT SAID AMERICANS SHOULD NOT BE NAIVE. WHILE 

IT IS TRUE THERE IS ADVERSE SENTIMENT IN ARGENTINA SINCE 

THE MALVINAS WAR, THAT WAS NOT THE REASON FOR WHATEVER 

ISOLATED INSTANCES OF HOSTILITY THE VICE PRESIDENT MAY 

HAVE OBSERVED. THERE ARE GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA WHO 

RAISE BANNERS THAT ARE NOT NATIONAL BANNERS BUT ARE 

THOSE OF THE EAST/WEST CONFLICT. LATIN AMERICA IS A 

BATTLEFIELD FOR IDEOLOGICAL PROPAGANDA. IT WAS EAST/WEST 

NOT NORTH/SOUTH MANIFESTATIONS THE VICE PRESIDENT SAW. 

IN NO WAY DO THOSE WHO SO DEMONSTRATED REPRESENT THE 

GREAT MAJORITY OF ARGENTINES. THEY ARE ONLY A SMALL 

GROUP WHICH IN ARGENTINA ARE CALLED "ULTRAS". THEY HAVE 

THEIR OWN AGENDA, WHICH IS NOT ARGENTINA'S AGENDA. 

9. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID, GIVEN THE NEW RELATIONSHIP 

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THAT IS BEING DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, HE 

WOULD SUGGEST THAT THERE BE PARLIAMENTARY EXCHANGES. 

ALFONSIN IMMEDIATELY AGREED. THE VICE PRESIDENT ALSO 

EXTENDED AN INVITATION TO THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE A 

WORKING VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES SOME TIME LATE IN 

1984. HE PREDICTED THAT PRESIDENT ALFONSIN WOULD VERY 

MUCH LIKE PRESIDENT REAGAN. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN SAID 

IT WOULD GIVE HIM THE GREATEST PLEASURE TO MEET PRESIDENT 

REAGAN AND TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES. THE DETAILS COULD 

BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE AMBASSADORS. 

10. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THERE ARE SPECIFIC AREAS 

IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES HOPED IT COULD BE COOPERATIVE 

AND SUPPORTIVE. HE NOTED THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY OF 

TREASURY MCNAMAR WAS A MEMBER OF HIS DELEGATION AND WAS 

THEN MEETING WITH THE NEW ARGENTINE ECONOMIC TEAM. THE 

UNITED STATES WOULD TRY TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE 

IN ASSISTING ARGENTINA TO MEET ITS GREAT FINANCIAL 

PROBLEMS. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN SAID A LESSENING OF THE 

MAGNITUDE OF THE DEBT PROBLEM IS ABSOLUTELY VITAL TO HIM. 

HE SAID THERE IS A DANGER THAT HIS ADMINISTRATION COULD 

NOT FULFILL THE EXPECTATIONS' IT AWAKENED. HE SAID IT 

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WAS ESSENTIAL TO END THE LIMITATIONS ON ARGENTINA'S 

"DEVELOPMENT IMPOSED BY THE HUGE DEBT SERVICE REQUIRE 

MENTS. HE SAID ARGENTINA ALWAYS PAYS ITS DEBTS. THE 

WAY FOR ARGENTINA TO PAY OFF ITS DEBT IS TO EXPORT. IT 

WAS VITAL TO FIND MARKETS FOR ARGENTINA'S EXPORTS AND 

TO ARRANGE AN EQUITABLE REFINANCING OF THE DEBT, BUT 

THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION THAT ARGENTINA WILL PAY. 

THE VICE PRES I DfJIIT REPEATED THAT THE UNITED .STATES WOULD :■ 

TRY TO HELP. HE POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN VERY 

STRONGLY RESISTED THE SIREN-CALL OF PROTECTIONISM RAISED 

BY AFFECTED AMERICAN PRODUCERS. THE UNITED STATES WAS 

DOING IT NOT OUT OF GENEROSITY BUT BECAUSE IT WAS GOOD 

FOR THE UNITED STATES. THE UNITED STATES MARKET SHOULD . 

BE OPEN TO EVER.YONE. THE UNITED STATES SHALL CONTINUE 

TO RESIST RAISING BARRIERS TO TRADE. HE ASSURED 

PRESIDENT ALFONSIN THAT WOULD BE THE CASE AND THAT THE 

UNITED STATES WOULD BE A GOO.D • TRAD ING PARTNER. ALFONSIN. 

SAID THAT THIS WAS A BASIC COMMON INTEREST AND THANKED 

THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR HIS ASSURANCES. HE NOTED THAT 

EVEN ARGENTINA HAD TO EXTEND HELP TO COUNTRIES IN 

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DISTRESS. HE SAID ARGENTINA WOULD HAVE TO PAY BOLIVIA 

S270 MILLION VERY SOON, A SUM THAT ARGENTINA COULD 

SCARCELY AFFORD. 

11. THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN 

THE UNITED STATES AND ITS PROBABLE AFFECT ON THE 

ECONOMIES OF OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY IF THE EUROPEAN 

ECONOMIES ALSO WOULD IMPROVE. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN SAID 

THE TOP PRIORITY MUST BE TO EXPAND THE ECONOMY AND TO 

HAVE GREATER PRODUCTION. HE. BELIEVED IT WAS VERY 

IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE A REDUCTION IN INTEREST RATES. 

A 

12. THE VICE PRESIDENT RAISED THE MATTER OF ARGENTINA’S 

NUCLEAR PROGRAM. HE SAID THE UNITED STATES LISTENED 

WITH GREAT SENSITIVITY TO THE ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION'S 

STATEMENTS- ON- THE'- MATTER.1 HE NOTED THAT PURELY AS A - 

BILATERAL UNITED STATES/ARGENT INE.QUEST I ON, THE UNITED 

STATES COULD BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN ASSURING THERE BE 

A STEADY. FLOW OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION 

IF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION WERE LESS 

CONCERNED ABOUT THE P0SSIBILITY OF THE PROLIFERATION OF 

NUCLEAR DEVICES. Hf SAID TO THE DEGREE ALFONSON COULD 

FIND IT POSSIBLE TO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR 

SAFEGUARDS IT WOULD MAKE ALL AREAS OF BILATERAL - 

COOPERATION MUCH EASIER. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THIS 

ISSUE WAS ARGENTINA’S BUSINESS, BUT PRESIDENT ALFONSIN'S 

DECISIONS WOULD HAVE A CONSIDERABLE EFFECT ON THE DEGREE 

OF COOPERATION POSSIBLE BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. THE VICE 

PRESIDENT SAID HE COULD NOT .BE LESS THAN FRANK ON AN 

ISSUE OF SUCH IMPORTANCE. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN SAID THE 

NUCLEAR ISSUE WAS THE CONVERSE TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. 

ON THE NUCLEAR QUESTION, THE BIG POWERS WORRY ABOUT THE 

ACTIONS OF THE LITTLE POWERS. HE SAID HE WANTED THE 

VICE PRESIDENT TO KNOW OF HIS IRREVOCABLE AND ABSOLUTE 

DECISION THAT ARGENTINA WILL NOT BUILD AN ATOMIC BOMB. 

HE SAID ARGENTINA WOULD MAKE AGREEMENTS WITH ITS 

ftiooranur-

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PAGE 03 OF 04 AIR FORCE TWO 9367 DTG: 120420Z DEC 83 RSN: 07 642! 

NEIGHBORS WHICH WILL TRANQUILIZE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. 

13. THE VICE PRESIDENT, IN A FORCEFUL MANNER, CONVEYED 

TO PRESIDENT ALFONSIN THE COMMITMENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN 

TO A MAJOR REDUCTION IN ARMS NOT SOLELY L I -MI T AT I ON, BUT 

A REDUCTION IN ARMAMENTS. HE NOTED THAT A PRESIDENT 

WITH THE CREDENTIALS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN CAN MAKE 

EFFECTIVE AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND OBTAIN 

RATIFICATION FOR SUC.H AGREEMENTS IN THE SENATE. IT IS 

NECESSARY TO ENGAGE THE SOVIET UNION IN DISCUSSIONS 

LEADING TO SUCH ENDS. PRESIDENT REAGAN FEELS VERY 

STRONGLY ABOUT THIS ISSUE. THE UNITED STATES ABSOLUTELY 

WANTS TO REDUCE ARMS, HOWEVER, IT TAKES TWO TO TANGO. - 

THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE BELIEVED THERE WAS GROWING 

SUPPORT IN EASTERN EUROPE FOR ARMS REDUCTION. HE KNEW 

THAT IN THE UNITED STATES THAT PRES I DENT REAGAN IS 

STRONG ENOUGH TO ACHIEVE IT. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN SAID 

THAT THIS TRULY WAS A MESSAGE OF HOPE. HE WISHED 

PRESIDENT REAGAN EVERY SUCCESS. 

14. THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED FOR PRESIDENT ALFONSIN’S 

ADVICE ON CENTRAL AMERICA. THE ;PRESIDENT SAID THAT IN 

CENTRAL AMERICA THERE IS AN AUTHENTIC STRUGGLE BY THE 

PEOPLE AGAINST A FEUDAL SYSTEM THAT ENSLAVES AND EXPLOITS 

THEM. IN THIS SITUATION THERE IS INTERFERENCE BY BOTH ? 

SUPER POWERS, WHICH COMPLICATES THE ATTAINMENT OF LOCAL 

SOLUTIONS. HE ADVISED THAT THE UNITED STATES HONESTLY 

ACCEPT DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA, CONSIST- ' 

ING OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, AGAR I AN REFORM, AND . 

THE NATIONALIZATION OF SUCH ENTERPRISES AS BANKS. 

HISTORICALLY, THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT BEEN WILLING TO 

DO SO. SUCH A DECISION BY THE UNITED STATES IN THIS 

REGARD WOULD TRANQU I L I ZE T.HESE COUNTRIES. THE VICE 

PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT THE KEY WORD WAS "DEMOCRATIC". IF 

BY FREE EXERCISE OF THE POPULAR WILL SUCH COURSES AS 

THOSE CITED WERE DECIDED UPON, THE UNITED STATES WOULD

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HAVE NO PROBLEM. HE NOTED THE UNITED STATES- WAS THE MOST- 

SIGNIFICANT SUPPORTER OF THE SAND INI STA REVOLUTIONARY 

GOVERNMENT IN A MATERIAL, POLITICAL AND EFFECTIVE SENSE 

THAN ANY OTHER NATION. HOWEVER, THE SAND INI ST AS PROMPTLY 

REMOVED THE "DEMOCRATIC" FROM THEIR SYSTEM AND EVEN THE 

"SOCIALIST" ATTRIBUTES DISAPPEARED. THEIR COUNTRY WAS 

CONVERTED INTO A MARXIST/LENINIST TOTALITARIAN STATE. 

THE UNITED STATES HAS NO INTEREST IN CREATING MIRROR v 

IMAGES IN CENTRAL AMERICA. WHAT THE UNITED STATES IS 

TOTALLY COMMITTED TO IS TO DEMOCRACY, -TO FREE ELECTIONS, 

A FREE. PRESS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND FREE INSTITUTIONS. 

THAT IS WHAT WE INSIST UPON, AND- THAT -IS WHAT WE HOPE 

TO ACHIEVE IN THAT AREA; IF CENTRAL AMERICA BECOMES- 

A SERIES OF DEMOCRATIC STATES WE SHOULD BE VERY 

COMFORTABLE WITH WHATEVER THEY DECIDE TO DO. HE REFERRED 

TO THE'HARSH “STATEMENTS BY - ORTEGA UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN - 

BUENOS AIRES AND SAID UNFORTUNATELY ORTEGA MADE IT A 

HABIT TO SAY THINGS THAT.- ARE NOT TRUE. THE UNITED STATES 

HAS HAD MANY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SAND INI ST AS AND WILL 

CONTINUE TO DO SO. WE L I STEN*CAREFULLY TO.NICARAGUAN 

OVERTURES AND WILL BE RESPONSIVE TO SINCERE OVERTURES. 

BT 

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THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE CONTADORA INITIATIVE. 

15. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN SAID HE WAS VERY PLEASED TO HEAR ' 

THIS.; HE WONDERED If IT WAS A GENERAL UNITED STATES 

GOVERNMENT POSITION WHICH WAS APPLICABLE TO THE PENTAGON 

AS WELL AS TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THE VICE PRESIDENT 

REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION IN THE UNITED STATES 

OF CIVILIAN CONTROL AYER THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 

HE NOTED PRESIDENT ALFONSIN WAS STRIVING TO ESTABLISH 

SUCH CIVILIAN CONTROL IN ARGENTINA. THE POSITION HE OUT 

LINED IS A POSITION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

AND CONSEQUENTLY IS THE POSITION OF THE ENTIRE UNITED 

STATES GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE SLOW-MOVING BUREAUCRACY. 

PRESIDENT ALFONSIN SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT WHAT THE 

VICE PRESIDENT TOLD HIM WAS TRUE. 

16. THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN DELIVERED A PERSONAL LETTER 

FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THANKED PRESIDENT ALFONSIN FOR 

HIS TIME, NOTING THAT HE MUST BE EXHAUSTED AFTER HIS 

INTENSIVE DAY. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN WAS VERY EFFUSIVE 

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IN HIS FAREWELL REMARKS, FOREIGN MINISTER CAPUTO OBSERVED 

WITH FEELING THAT HE CONS'IDERED IT TO HAVE BEEN A 

"BEAUTIFUL” MEETING. ORTIZ 

DECL. OADR 

2 3 08 

BT 

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/ “)hOtOCOpv

MEMORANDUM 

8530 

vr° 

SECRET 

ACTION 


WASHINGTON 


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

ROBERT C. McFARLANE 

Argentine Certification 

Issue 

Whether to certify to Congress that Argentina has made 

significant improvements in human rights. 

Facts 

With the recent elections, Argentina's human rights situation has 

improved dramatically and certification will signal our strong 

support for the return of democracy. Certification would be 

effective upon installation of the Alfonsin government on 

December 10. The U.K. and Chile will be especially concerned 

about the Argentine certification. A memo from George Shultz 

(Tab A) provides a recommended certification scenario. The first 

step would be a letter (Tab B) from you to Mrs. Thatcher. Cap 

Weinberger opposes certification (Tab C) . 

Discussion 

Cap Weinberger's concerns focus on the reaction in the U.K. On 

balance, the strategy outlined by George Shultz, in my view, 

adequately addresses Cap's concerns. Moreover, the question is 

not whether but when we will certify Argentina. The game plan 

includes, inter alia, Congressional consultation in advance, and 

dispatching Dick Walters to explain our position to President 

Pinochet. I recommend approval, and OMB concurs. 

Recommendation 

OK 

___ 

No 

___ That you approve the strategy for 

Argentine certification (Tab A) and 

sign the proposed letter to Mrs. Thatcher 

(Tab B). 

Attachments 

Tab A Secretary Shultz memo 

Tab B Proposed letter to Mrs. Thatcher 

Tab C Secretary Weinberger's letter 

SECRET 

0ADR 

E.0.13526 

Authority 

NARA_i£____Date AÂ\C--------- 

Prepared by: 

Robert H. Lilac 

cc: The Vice President

MEMORANDUM 

SECKEf 


WASHINGTON 


MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT 

THROUGH: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

Admiral Murphy 

Don Gregg 

Certification for Argentina 

Attached is an advance copy of the certification 

package prepared at State for the President. If this 

package works out as intended, U.K. fears should be 

assuaged. 

At the NSC meeting this morning, I learned that DoD 

opposes certification for Argentina. Weinberger will be 

sending a memorandum forward today stating his views on this 

matter. 

Per your instructions, the letter to Margaret Thatcher 

will be held until the details pertaining to certification 

have been worked out. 

Attachment 

DECLASS'*?® 

SECRET 

DECIfW: OADR

★ 

★ 

★ 

★ 


WASHINGTON 


The Right Honorable Margaret Thatcher 

Prime Minister 

London, England 

Dear Madame Prime Minister: 

Before leaving for Argentina, 1 want to send a few 

thoughts to you. Oliver Wright came in to see me on 

Tuesday, just before his departure for London. We had a 

very good talk about the overall relationship and 1 made 

clear to Oliver my desire to help in any way to deal with 

matters of mutual concern. 

Since that meeting, I have read your most forthcoming 

response to President Reagan's letter about our 

certification of Argentina. I am also aware that you have 

sent a message to President-elect Alfonsin congratulating 

him and the people of Argentina on the restoration of 

democracy in that country. 1 will do all I can to help the 

Argentines understand your interest in restoring relations 

between Buenos Aires and London without having such 

restoration be dependent upon discussion of the Falkland 

Islands sovereignty issue. 

I am concerned about recent events and am determined to 

do all I can to be hepful. Upon my return from Argentina, 

we will make certain that Sir Oliver is fully briefed on 

pertinent developments that took place during that trip. 

I wish we could sit down and chat because I have been 

troubled by recent tensions and I know it hasn't been easy 

for you either. 

Respectfully 

George Bush 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

Utw/y ôiucopy

TALKING POINTS FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING 

WITH PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSIN OF ARGENTINA 

COURTESY 

DEMOCRACY 

BILATERAL 

— Extend President's congratulations both for 

Argentina's successful transition to democracy and, 

more personally, Alfonsin's election as President. 

— Promotion of democratic institutions major 

objective of Reagan administration. Argentina's 

successful transition to democracy sets important 

example for rest of hemisphere. 

— Note bright prospects for improved relations. 

Offer regular policy consultations. Suggest 

exploring Interparliamentary exchange. 

— Invite Alfonsin to US next year for official visit. 

NUCLEAR 

— Announcement of unsafeguarded gaseous diffusion 

enrichment plant will be seen by many as step to 

nuclear weapon. Perceptions important. Argentina's 

insistence that their nuclear program is strictly 

peaceful is best demonstrated by safeguarding all 

facilities. 

— Safeguards will in no way impede nuclear 

development. Argentina can play leadership role by 

accepting safeguards on all its nuclear activities. 

— Argentine nuclear policy is an issue which could 

impede development of improved bilateral relations. 

CENTRAL 

AMERICA 

— Progress is being made in effort to defeat 

Soviet/Cuban/Nicaraguan-sponsored insurgencies. US 

and others providing aid to cope with economic 

problems that make these countries vulnerable. 

— Offer team for briefing on Central America. 

REGIONAL 

ISSUES 

ECONOMIC 

— We support peaceful negotiations on Malvinas 

dispute, and papal mediation on Beagle dispute. Ask 

Alfonsin how he sees these issues developing. 

— Acknowledge current Argentine difficulties, 

importance of reaching an accord with IMF. Note US 

willingness to support Argentine recovery efforts. 

toi-'.crii;/ 

MARA_— 

nr 

" E .O. 'i 3526 

L32tO — 

CONFIDENTIAL 

DECL: OADR 

Bush Library Photocopy

Department op State 

briefing paper 

ARGENTINA 

SETTING AND OBJECTIVES 

Your trip to Argentina comes at a historic moment and provides 

an excellent opportunity to set a very positive tone for our 

relations with the new government and to advance several other 

important objectives. 

Alfonsin's election victory marks a sharp break with the past. 

His 52% of the popular vote represents a repudiation of seven years 

of military rule and of the traditionally dominant Peronist Party. 

Most Argentines are excited about the restoration of democracy and 

optimistic about the future of their country in the wake of the 

elections. While we perceive no immediate threat to democracy from 

either the discredited military or the extreme left, and while 

Alfonsin won a convincing mandate, democracy in Argentina is still 

fragile. Your presence at the inauguration emphasizes that the U.S. 

is solidly behind the democratization process, constitutional rule 

and human rights not only in Argentina but throughout the hemisphere. 

With the advent of a democratically-elected government, human 

rights has ceased to be an issue of conflict between our two 

countries. On the contrary, it has become a common value and 

interest. On problems of concern to Argentina such as the Beagle 

Channel and Falklands/Malvinas disputes and negotiations with 

commercial banks and the IMF on the external debt we may be able to 

play a constructive and supportive role. In any case, these issues 

do not present serious constraints on improved relations. 

There is a potential for conflict in at least two areas of our 

bilateral relations which also may be turned to common interest. 

Argentina's foreign policy under Alfonsin will likely continue along 

an independent nonaligned stance. While critical of our actions in 

Grenada and Central America, Alfonsin's Radical Party views this as 

a defense of the principle of nonintervention and not a bilateral 

issue. Argentina can be a moderating influence in the Third World, 

however, and Argentina's independent foreign policy can play a 

positive role despite an inclination to engage in occasional 

rhetorical excesses. 

The other problem area is in the nuclear area. On November 18 

the GOA announced the development of a gaseous diffusion enrichment 

facility. Technology of this kind can be used to produce weapons 

grade highly enriched uranium. We were unaware that Argentina was 

pursuing this technology. The Argentines are proud of their 

technical capabilities in the nuclear field, and are the most 

advanced in Latin America. While they have consistently stated they 

have no planB to develop nuclear weapons, they have refused to 

Authority 

MflBfl 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.1352B 

Date__kiiÂ\3 

7-^tS 

GQNFxDENxIAIr" 

DECL: OADR 

iliSh Ubns'v fftxjupy

eeNFIDENTIMr 

- 2 - 

adhere to the NPT or to bring into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco 

(although Argentina has signed it). They argue that these accords 

discriminate against countries such as Argentina which are 

attempting to develop their own independent nuclear technology 

base. In the last year we have resumed a dialogue with Argentina on 

nuclear energy and non-proliferation matters. While this effort had 

positive results, there is strong Congressional sentiment for the 

prohibition of any cooperation with countries that do not have 

safeguards on all their facilities. 

The inauguration of Alfonsin offers an opportunity to take up 

this issue before the policies of the new government are fixed. 

Argentine adherence to full-scope safeguards, be it under Tlatelolco 

or a separate agreement with the IAEA, would convert an issue of 

potential conflict into an area for further cooperation. It would 

set an example for other nations in the hemisphere as well. 

Moreover, putting at least the gaseous diffusion enrichment facility 

under safeguards would demonstrate Argentina's peaceful intentions. 

Your specific objectives with Alfonsin should be to: 

1. Extend the President's congratulations both for Argentina's 

successful transition to democracy and to Alfonsin for his election 

victory. 

2. Indicate our desire to have close relations with Alfonsin's 

administration by inviting him to the U.S. next year for an official 

visit and by suggesting that regular policy consultations be held 

between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Department. 

3. Indicate our desire to see a safeguards agreement with the IAEA 

worked out that would cover all of Argentina's nuclear activities, 

and urge that the enrichment facility be placed under safeguards in 

order to demonstrate the peaceful intentions of the Argentine 

nuclear program and to avoid jeopardizing our nuclear dialogue. 

4. Note our hope that peaceful negotiations through the papal 

mediation process to resolve the dispute on the Beagle Channel will 

lead to a successful outcome. 

5. Reiterate our desire to see the Falklands/Malvinas conflict 

settled through peaceful negotiations. 

6. Indicate our hope that Argentina will be successful in its 

negotiations with the IMF and commercial banks, noting our 

willingness, where possible, to be helpful. 

6896S 

CONFIDENTIAL 

bush Lflarerj? ^.Jttxjqpv

TAP343 t**t**fr n »--F t n r i t i copy _ ■ - : v ". in ; 

OP IMMEO r -;.v 

DE- RUEHC #89X0 0862245 ’ .v.-■ 

f-r- 

0 272239Z MAR 81 ZFF4 ■ • - , 

FM. SECSTATE WASMDC ■' 

TO AMEH8ASSY 8USN0S AIRES ' NlACT IMMEDIATE 1383 ; - 

C .0 N F I D E N T I A l V 

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE. STATE 078910 

r.G," I2065S N/A ' : 

'TAGS* PDEV/ P DI P> PPOG/ AR 

r 

• 

SUBJECTi VICE PRESIDENTJS MESSAGE TC INCOMING ARGENTINE 

PRESIDENT VIOLA . . . , 

.1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING TO INCOMING'PRESIDENT'VIOLA 

At APPROPRIATE TIME "‘ON "OR BEFORE MARCH 29," QUOTE, .' 

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT? PLEASE ACCEPT MY WARMEST PERSONAL 

CONGRATULATIONS AS YOU’ASSUME fHE'OFFICE OF PRESIDENT 

OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA. I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING 

WITH YOU AGAIN AS WE MOVE m'-EXPAND"THE. SCOPE .Of 

CONSULTATIONS ON THE ISSUES THAT CONFRONT ‘THE NATIONS . 

OF THE WEST * 'SINCERELY/ GEORGE'BUSH. END QUOTE. 

2, VICE PRESIDENTS OFFICE DOES NOT PLAN RELEASE BUT 

has no objection to release by Goa.' naIg' 

bt : v 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

, Authority __VAJPoA-y-*^ ~2>o\TSl 

NARA__^£_ Date -------- 

sir; vp 

EdBii ARA . 

■ .•■■■., 

VH$R COMMENTS;- ' ;-V ‘. :4'‘ 

PAGE 01 OF Cl SECSTATE WASHDC 8910. 

0TG;272239Z MAR 81 PSNtOOOJTS 

'TORI -086/2249Z 

»♦»♦*♦*&■ 0 ■ M p j 0 g n t | ;rv******4$ COPY 

Bush Library Photocopy

MEMORANDUM 


WASHINGTON 

Memo No. 641-81 June 4, 1981 

MEMORANDUM 

THROUGH: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT 

Admiral Murphy 

Nancy Bearg Dyke1 

Your Question on the Timmerman Affair 

You asked the other morning "how much of what Timmerman says 

is true". The answer in a nutshell is: 

— His descriptions of what happened to him are probably 

fairly accurate, although he has tended to skate around the real 

reasons for which he was arrested and detained. 

— His description of the Jewish situation in Argentina — 

both past and present — leaves something to be desired, although 

there has no doubt been discrimination there — perhaps more so 

than in some other countries with a sizeable Jewish population. 

There is no comparison, however, with Nazi Germany or even with a 

so-called systematic government policy of anti-semitism separate 

from other events. 

Attached at Tab A is a short State paper on anti-semitism in 

Argentina. Tab B is a rather helpful article which you may have 

seen by Irving Kristol in the Wall Street Journal. 

Bush Library ^hrrtncooy

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INFO AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 0916 

CONFIDENTIAL BUENOS AIRES 0B947 

EXOIS 

SUGGEST THIS BE PASSED TO USCINC SOUTHCOM QUARRY HEIGHTS PN 

E. O. 12356: DECL: OAOR 

TAGS: AR, PINRS, PGOV, PINS 

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ALFON5IN COMMENTS ON THE CURRENT 

SITUATION 

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT 

2. CUTTING SHORT A VISIT TO TIERRA DEL FUEGO FROM WHICH 

JOINT U. S. -ARGENTINE-CHILEAN SCIENTIFIC OPERATIONS IN 

ANTARCTICA ARE ABOUT TO BEGIN, I RETURNED TO BUENOS AIRES 

TO SEE PRESIDENT ALFONSIN ON OCTOBER 27 TO DISCUSS THE 

CURRENT SITUATION WHICH LED HIM TO INVOKE A STATE OF 

SEIGE. 

3. THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED ME LOOKING TIRED AND 

PREOCCUPIED. I TOLD HIM I WANTED TO OPEN AND CLOSE OUR 

CONVERSATION BY REITERATING TO HIM THE STEADFAST SUPPORT 

OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE FOR ARGENTINA' S 

ATTEMPT TO INSTITUTIONALIZE ITS DEMOCRACY. THE PRESIDENT 

SAID U. 5. SUPPORT IS A CONSTANT SOURCE OF STRENGTH AND THE 

ARGENTINE PEOPLE ARE FULLY AWARE OF THIS. THE PRESIDENT 

SAID THE CURRENT SITUATION IS A DIFFICULT ONE BUT HE DOES 

NOT FEEL DEMOCRACY 15 IN DANGER. THE UNHAPPINESS IN THE 

MILITARY SERVICES PROVOKED BY THE REDUCTION IN THE BUDGET 

AND THE TRIALS OF MILITARY LEADERS ADDED TO THE HARD 

ELECTIONEERING AND CONTINUING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, MADE 

FOR DIFFICULT TIMES. HE SAID HE WAS SURPRISED THAT 

THESE PROBLEMS HAD NOT BEGUN SOONER. IN ANY CASE, HE 

AND HIS GOVERNMENT WERE CONFRONTING THEM AND EXPECTED 

THE SITUATION TO BE MUCH CALMER VERY SOON. HOWEVER, HE 

TOLD ME CONFIDENTIALLY HE WAS POSTPONING HIS STATE VISIT 

TO JAPAN AND SAUDI ARABIA ON WHICH HE WOULD HAVE LEFT IN A 

COUPLE OF WEEKS. 

4. THE PRESIDENT SEVERELY CRITICIZED THE JUDGES WHO, 

DECLARING HIS DECREES AND ACTIONS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, HAD 

AGAIN RELEASED SEVERAL OF THOSE ARRESTED FOR ALLEGEDLY 

ORGANIZING ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND OTHER DESTABILIZING 

ACTIVITIES. HE WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS TO DESCRIBE HOW 

THE MILITARY "INFILTRATED" THE COURTS AND HOW JUDGES 

WERE "OWNED" BY HIS GOVERNMENT'S ENEMIES. TO MY 

SURPRISE HE ADMITTED THE GOVERNMENT HAD NO PROOF OF THE 

ACTIVITIES FOR WHICH THE ARRESTS WERE MADE BUT WOULD 

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OTG:2717S5Z OCT 85 PSN:05BB 

SOON HAVE IT. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT HIS CURRENT PROBLEMS 

WITH THE COURTS WOULD MOST PROBABLY NOT BE HIS LAST; 

IN A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT EACH OF THE THREE POWERS ACTED 

AS A CHECK AND BALANCE AGAINST THE OTHER. THE PRESIDENT 

OUICKLY AGREED SAYING THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BOW TO THE 

JUDGES RELEASE OF MANY OF THE PRISONERS BUT WOULD APPEAL 

THEIR FINDINGS. 

5. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT I WANTED HIM TO LEARN DIRECTLY 

FROM ME THAT AFTER CHECKING I COULD FIND NO ELEMENT 

OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT THAT HAD PROVIDED ANY INFORMATION 

TO THE GOA ON ANY OF THE TWELVE INDIVIDUALS ARRESTED. 

THE PRESIDENT READILY AGREED THAT WAS SO. I SAID, 

THEREFORE, WE WERE SURPRISED AND UNCOMFORTABLE IN THE 

EMBASSY TO READ IN THE PRESS THAT GOVERNMENT SOURCES WERE 

ATTRIBUTING THE U. S. AS BEING A SOURCE OF INFORMATION 

UPON WHICH THE ARRESTS WERE MADE. THE PRESIDENT SAID 

THIS COULD NOT BE, BUT I CITED TO HIM SPECIFIC ARTICLES. 

THE PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD TAKE STEPS TO STOP SUCH 

NONSENSE WHICH WAS BAD FOR THE TWO OF US. 

6. I ALSO TOLD THE PRESIDENT OF OUR CONCERN OVER THE 

SITUATION IN THE ARMY WHICH WE UNDERSTOOD WAS REACHING 

THE POINT WHERE OFFICERS WERE OPENLY DISRESPECTFUL OF 

THEIR SENIORS. THE PRESIDENT SAID THE SITUATION IS INDEED 

BAD; HE SAID THERE IS OBVIOUSLY A CAMPAIGN TO BRING 

DOWN ARMY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF RIOS ERENU WHO WAS A LOYAL 

OFFICER OF STRONG DEMOCRATIC CONVICTION. 

7. THE PRESIDENT SAID WE SHOULD REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH. 

HE WILL ADVISE US OF IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS AND HOPED 

WE WOULD ALSO GIVE HIM INFORMATION HE SHOULD HAVE. I 

SAID HE COULD COUNT ON US. 

8. THE PRESIDENT AGAIN EXPRESSED HIS THANKS FOR U. S. 

SUPPORT. HE SAID OUR OFFICIAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE 

ESPECIALLY HELPFUL BECAUSE HE WANTS TO ASSURE THAT 

ARGENTINA DOES NOT LOSE ITS GOOD IMAGE IN THE WORLD. 

ORTIZ 

BT 

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BECAUSE ORDINARY COURT PROCEDURES WOULD IE 

FOLLOWED.1 .THE BRIEF FURTHER HELD THAT THE 

ARRESTS WERE WITHIN THE AUTHORITY OF 'DISCRETIONAL 

POVERS WHICH THE CONSTITUTION GRANTS THE PRESIDENT 

OF THE REPUBLIC TO DEFEND THE NATION IH CASE OF UNREST 

OR ATTACK.' IN RULING FOR THE GOVERNMENT, THE 

APPEALS COURT CRITICIZED THE EARLIER DECISION'S 

ALLEGEDLY SELF-CONTRADICTORY ARGUHENTS WHICH 

‘EFFECTIVELY NEGATE ARTICLE 23 (WHICH AUTHORIZES 

STATE OF SIEGE DECLARATIONS) OF THE CONSTITUTION.' 

IT NOW APPEARS CERTAIN THAT THE CASE WILL 

EVENTUALLY BE DECIDED BY THE SUPREHE COURT. 

OP IHHED 

STU7SE3 

DE RUEIBU #3371/11 3112031 

0 232031Z OET 35 

FH AHENBASSY BUENOS AIRES 

TO SECSTATE UASIDC IHHED I ATE 3311 

INFO USCINCSD OUAJtJIY HEIGHTS PN 

USCINCLAHT NORFOLK VA 

USAFSO HOWARD AFB PN//DDI/LAI// 

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 31 OF B2 BUENOS AIRES 0337B 

TERREP 

E.O. 113SB: DECL: OADR 

TAGS: PGOV, PHUH, HARR, PTER, AR 

SUBJ: STATE OF SIEGE: DETENTIONS OVERTURNED, 

RECOUP IRHED 

REFS: BUENOS AIRES SS40 


3. (U) POLITICAL REACTION TO THE STATE OF SIEGE 

DECREE IS GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE. SOME PRESSURE IS 

BUILDING TO CONVENE CONGRESS IN A SPECIAL SESSION 

WHICH WOULD PRESUMABLY CONFIRM THE DECREE. RADICAL 

BLOC LEADER IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES CESAR 

JAROSLAVSKY REPORTEDLY SAID THE GOVERNMENT WAS 

CONSIDERING SUCH A HOVE. PROMINENT PERONISTS 

SUCH AS ITALO LUDER LAMENTED THE LACK OF CONGRESSIONAL 

PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION TO IMPLEMENT THE 

STATE OF SIEGE. ON THE LEFT, DEPUTY AUSUSTO CONTE 

AND INTRANSIGENTS LEADER OSCAR ALENDE BLAMED THE 

LEGAL DECISIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT ON THE GOA'S 

FAILURE TO REHOVE FROM THE BENCH MANY JUDGES WHO 

SERVED DURING THE YEARS OF THE JUNTA GOVERKHENtS. 

THE UCD RESPONDED MILDLY, EXPRESSING THE HOPE 

THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD GOOD REASON FOR ITS 

ACTION AND THAT PROOF AGAINST THOSE DETAINED WILL 

BE HADE PUBLIC BEFORE THE NOVEMBER 3 ELECTIONS. 

CRITICISM CAME FROM THE PERONIST EXTREMES OF 

VICEHTE SAADI AND HERHINIO IBLESIAS AND ARTURO 

FROND IZI*S HID-WHICH CHARGED THE STATE OF SIEGE 

SERVED ELECTORAL PURPOSES. 

1. (C) SUMMARY: AN APPEALS COURT UPHOLDS STATE OF 

SIEGE DETENTIONS AFTER A LOWER COURT ORDERS THE 

RELEASE OF THOSE HELD. POLITICAL REACTION TO THE 

STATE OF SIEGE IS GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE ALTHOUGH 

PRESSURE HAY BE BUILDING TO BAIL CONGRESS INTO 

SPECIAL SESSION TO CONFIRM THE DECREE. EDUCATION 

AND JUSTICE MINISTER CARLOS ALCONADA AAAHBURU, 

WHO APPARENTLY MASTERMINDED THE DETENTION DECREE 

EARLY LAST WEEK, IS INCREASINGLY CRITICIZED FOR 

THAT ERROR-FILLED ORDER. MEANWHILE, IN THE 

MILITARY, RESENTMENT OVER THE DETENTIONS REMAINS 

HIGH, BUT MODERATES ARE INCREASINGLY COUNSELING 

A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE. AS THE COUNTRY BEGINS 

THE FINAL WEEK OF CAMPAIGNING IN PREPARATION FOR 

THE NOVEMBER 3 ELECTIONS, NEW INCIDENTS ARE 

POSSIBLE. END SUMMARY. 

4. (C) MEANWHILE, MUCH OF THE BLAME FOR THE 

ARREST DECREE WHICH TRIGGERED THE TENSE DEVELOP 

MENTS OF THE LAST FOUR DAYS IS LANDING ON JUSTICE 

MINISTER ALCONADA ARAMBURU. THAT DECREE (BA 1804) 

IS NOW SEEN AS A DISASTER WHICH INEVITABLY 

BROUGHT ON THE STATE OF SIEGE IT INTENDED TO 

AVOID. IN ADDITION TO CARRYING TWO WRONG KANES— 

THE GOA ACTUALLY WANTED TO DETAIN PATRICIO CAMPS, 

APPARENTLY PICKED UP ON FRIDAY OR SATURDAY, MID 

RAUL RIVAHERA CARLES, STILL AT LARGE, RATHER THAN 

BT 

2. 01) A NATIONAL CRIMINAL APPEALS COURT OCTOBER 

17 REVERSED A LOWER COURT DECISION FREEING THE 

EIGHT PERSONS DETAINED UNDER THE STATE OF SIEGE 

DECREE SIGHED OCTOBER 23. (FOUR OF THOSE NAMED 

REHAIH AT LARGE.) THE LOWER COURT JUDGES RULED 

OCTOBER 2D THAT WHILE THE STATE OF SIEGE DECREE 

WAS CONSTITUTIONAL, THE DETENTIONS ORDERED BY AN 

ACCOMPANYING DECREE WERE NOT, AS THERE WAS NO 

EVIDENCE TO HOLD THE SUSPECTS. THE GOVERNMENT 

IMMEDIATELY APPEALED THAT DECISION. IN TAKING ITS 

CASE TO THE APPEALS COURT, THE GOVERNMENT 

STATED THAT A JUDGE CANNOT OEHAHD PROOF FDR THOSE 

HELD BECAUSE *IF THAT EVIDENCE EXISTED, ARREST 

UNDER STATE OF SIEGE POWERS WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY 


nniir i nriiT i r. 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O. 13526 

Authority 

NAHA SJC- Date__UVisAxl# 

t

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INFO USCINCSO OUARRY HEIGHTS PN 

USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA 

USAFSO HOWARD AFB PN//DOIAAI// 

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION R OF R BUEHOS AIRES RB7B 

TERREP 

E.O. 12356: OECL: OADR 

TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, HARR, PTER, AR 

SUHJ: STATE OF SIEGE: DETENTIONS OVERTURNED, 

GOVERNMENTS* POLITICAL POSITION SOHEMAT, RUT 

SOHE DAMAGE HAS ALREADY BEEN DOHE TO ITS 

IMAGE AND REPUTATION. 

G. K) FROM ALL REPORTS MILITARY ATTITUDES REHAIN 

DIVIDED. MANY OFFICERS BOTH ABOVE AND BELOW THE 

COLONEL LEVEL ARE COUNSELING MODERATION AND A 

WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE WHILE STRONG GOVERNMENT 

CRITICS — PARTICULARLY AT THE COLONEL LEVEL — 

CONTINUE TO PRESSURE FOR THE REMOVAL OF ARMY CHIEF 

RIOS ERENU, RALLY AROUND THEIR ACCUSED 

COLLEAGUES AND THREATEN TO TAKE DRASTIC ACTION SHOULD 

THE GOA ORDER A HEW WAVE OF MILITARY ARRESTS. FOR 

NOW, HOWEVER, THE WAIT-AND-SEE RODE SEEMS TO BE 

CARRYING TRE DAY. AT A HINIIUN THE DETENTION HAS 

FURTHER COMPLICATED THE GOA'S RELATIONS WITH A 

RESEHTFUl AND SENSITIVE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. 

AS THE COUNTRY BEGINS THE FINAL WEEK OF ELECTION 

CAMPAIGNING, THERE IE A THREAT THAT NEW INCIDENTS 

OF VIOLENCE OR SOHE OTHER DRAMATIC CHARGES OR 

REVELATIONS COULD OCCUR TO STIR UP THE POT. 

7. tC) APART FROM REACTIONS IN THE MILITARY, A 

BIG UNANSWERED QUESTION IS MAT EVIDENCE OR INFORMATION 

DOES THE GOVERNMENT POSSESS THAT PRECIPITATED ITS 

DECISION TO DETAIN THESE TWELVE PERSONS. PRESS STOltlES 

CONTINUE TO ALLEGE UNHELPFULLY THAT THE US AND 

OTHER GOVERNMENTS (BRAZIL, ISRAEL, AND URUGUAY) 

PROVIDED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO THE GOA THAT 

CONTRIBUTED TO ITS DECISION TO ACT BUT SO FAR THIS 

HAS FORTUNATELY NOT BECOME A MAJOR PUBLIC ISSUE. 

THEIR BROTHERS-THE DECREE CALLED FUGITIVE SUAREZ 

MASON A GENERAL EVEN THOUGH HE WAS STRIPPED OF 

HIS RANK AND CASHIERED IN 1814. IN ITS ARGUMENTATION 

IT ALSO CITED THE CONSTITUTION INCORRECTLY. 

FUNDAMENTALLY, HOWEVER, THE DECREE IS AN EMBARRASS 

MENT TO THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE IT FAILED THE TEST 

OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. ROW HIGH A POLITICAL PRICE 

ALCONADA ARAMBURU PAYS FOR NOT RECOGNIZING THE 

ORDER'S CONSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESS IS STILL UNCERTAIN. 

EVEN BEFORETAST WEEK’S EVENTS, HOWEVER, THERE WAS 

B. (C) AFTER THREE DAYS WITHOUT A BOMB - ALTHOUGH 

THERE WERE MANY FALSE THREATS ESPECIALLY IR SCHOOLS 

CAUSING THE EVACUATION OF A REPORTED ISS.BSI STUDENTS 

ANOTHER BOMB REPORTEDLY EXPLODED AT 2:3f AM ON 

OCTOBER ZB, CAUSING PROPERTY DAMAGE BUT NO INJURIES. 

ORTIZ 

BT 

SPECULATION THAT HE MIGHT RE REPLACED IN A POST- 

ELECTION CABINET SHUFFLE. 

3. (C) COMMENT: ALTHOUGH BUENOS AIRES REMAINED 

OUTWARDLY UNMOVED OVER THE WEEKEND AS CROWDS 

THRONGED TO THE PARKS AND POLITICAL PARTIES CONTINUED 

TNEIR INTENSIVE CAMPAIGNING, THE SITUATION IS 

DELICATE AND TENSE. FORTUNATELY FOR THE RADICAL 

GOVERNMENT, HOST POLITICAL FIGURES CONTINUED TO 

GIVE THE GOVERNMENT THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT IN 

CALLING THE STATE OF SIEGE. REGARDLESS OF THEIR 

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY ADO OPPOSITION TO VIOLENCE, 

PRESS AND PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE GOA'S INCOMPETENCE 

IN FORMULATING THE FIRST DECREE INCREASED AHIO 

GROWING CONFUSION OVER TRE LEGALITY OF ITS CONDUCT. THIS 

LEFT LITTLE CHOICE EXCEPT TO TAKE THE NEXT STEP 

AND DECLARE A FORMAL STATE OF SIEGE. THE IMAGE 

OF GOVERHHENT DISARRAY AND DISORDER, HOWEVER, IS 

BEGINNING TO OBSCURE THE MORE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE 

OF WHETHER THERE WAS/IS CREDIBLE THREAT TO THE 

PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE COUNTRY REQUIRING A 

STRONG GOA POLITICAL RESPONSE. THE LATEST DECISION 

OF THE APPEALS COURT TO UPHOLD BOTH THE COHST1TUT I DUAL ITY 

OF THE STATE OF SIEGE ORDER AND THE DETENT I OH OF 

THE 12 ALLEGED CONSPIRATORS SHOULD HELP THE 

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USAFSO HOWARD AFR PN//DOI//LAI// 

3. IU1 III A SEPARATE IH'ERVIEU, AN OFFIC Al 

IDENTIFIED ONLY AS A iUSh R-NmNG DEFENSE 

Hill 3TRf LOURCE REPORTED..( :OLD THE PRESS Tn-T 

THE SITUATION CAUSED RY COIUIENT REGARDING 

POSSIBLE NEW ARRESTS OF ARHED FORCES OFFICIALS 

IS UNDER CONTROL. THE U1HAMED SOURCE RULED DUT 

FOR THE MOMENT ANY MORE ARRESTS. 

REFERRING TO THE ALLEGED ROLE OF EX-GEUERAl 

CARLOS GUILLERMO SUAREZ NASON IN PLOTTING AND 

GOA EFFORTS TD LOCATE AND ARREST HIM, THE SOURCE 

EMPHATICALLY DENIED THAT THE GOA RAD RECEIVED 

'INFORMATION FROM U. S. INTELLIGENCE SERVICES* 

CONCERNING SUAREZ MASON'S ACTIVITIES. THE 

SAME RUMOR WAS ALSO REPORTEDLY DENIED BY RADICAL 

SENATOR FERNANDO DE LA RUA, CAMPAIGNING IN ENTRE 

RIOS PROVINCE, IBID ALSOQAID—ACCORDING TO THE 

RADICAL DAILY LA RAZDN—THAT STORIES THAT THE 

UNITED STATES WAS THE SOURCE OF INFORMATION 

REGARDING ACTIVITIES RY GROUPS WIICK SEEK TO 

DESTABILIZE THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT OF 

ARGENTINA ARE ‘TOTALLY FALSE.’ 

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION SI OF B3 BUENOS AIRES BSS7Z, 

CIHCSO ALSO FOR INTAFF 

CINCLANT ALSO FOR INTAFF 

j 

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 


SURJ: STATE OF SIESE: GOA/ARNED FORCES TENSIONS 

EASE AS ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN ENTERS FINAL 

PHASE 

REF: 

BUEjlOS SB22 AND PREVIOUS 

1. (Cl SUMMARY: GOA/ARHED FORCES TENSIONS 

DECREASED OCTOBER 2S. PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND 

PRIVATE COMMENTS SUGGEST THE GOA BELIEVES ANY 

'MILITARY UNREST IS HOW UNDER CONTROL. IT 

APPEARS THE GDA BACKS ARMY CHIEF RIOS EREHU 

AND IS WORKING TO PORTRAY HIM AS INVOLVED IN 

DECISIONS AFFECTING THE ARMY HE COMMANDS. 

JUDICIAL ACTION ON THE STATE OF SIEGE DETENTIONS 

MOVES TOWARD THE SUPREME COURT. AFTER TWO 

BOMBLESS DAYS, THERE WAS AN EARLY OCTOBER 30 

A.N. EXPLOSION IN AN APARTMENT BUILDING. PUBLIC 

ATTENTION TURNS TO THE FINAL PHASE OF THE 

ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN. END SUHHARY. 

4. 01) COMMENTING ON POSSIBLE MILITARY CHANGES OR 

'. RETIREMENTS, THE DEFENSE MINISTRY SOURCE Al DENIED 

THERE WOULD BE CHANGES IN EITHER THE THREE SERVICE 

CHIEFS OR THE HEAO OF THE JOINT STAFF, AND B) SAID 

SPECULATION THAT 7 TO IB GENERALS MIGHT BE RETIRED 

BEFORE THE END DF THE YEAR IS ’EXCESSIVE.’ HE 

DISMISSED STORIES THAT GENERAL MEDRANO CARO, 

OPERATIONS CHIEF OF THE ARHED FORCES JOINT STAFF, 

IS A POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR TO ARMY CHIEF RIOS ERENU. 

ONE PRESS REPORT SUGGESTED THAT ONE PURPOSE DF 

THE OLIVOS MEETING WAS TO UNDERSCORE THE PRESIDENT'S 

CONFIDENCE IN RIOS ERENU AND TO SHOW THAT HE WAS 

A PARTICIPANT IN DECISIONS AFFECTING THE INSTITUTION 

HE COMMANDS. RIOS ERENU ALSO REPORTEDLY RAD A 

PRIVATE MEETING WITH CARRANZA OCTOBER ZS IN WHICH 

HE DESCRIBED TO THE MINISTER TBE ARMY'S CONCERN 

7~'~~ 

k. (C) OH THE LEGAL FRONT, HOST DF THE HABEAS 

/CORPUS REQUESTS ON BENALF OF THOSE NAMED FOR 

\J DETENTION HAVE BEEH REJECTED. LEGAL CONFUSION 

V CONTINUES, HOWEVER, AS A JUDGE ORDERED THAT ONE 

DETAINEE REMAIN FREE UNTIL THE CRIMINIAL COURT 

BT 

2. (C) TENSIONS (ABED PERCEPTIBLY FOLLOWING THE 

OCTOBER 2B MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT ALFOHSIN AND 

ARMED FORCES/MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CHIEFS. WHILE 

ATTENDING A PUBLIC CEREHONY ON COAST GUARD DAY, 

DEFEHSE MINISTER CARRANZA ACKNOULEGED THAT 

PUBLICATION OF PATRICIO KELLY'S LIST DF WOULD-BE 

PLOTTERS HAD CAUSED SOME UNHAPPINESS IN THE ARMED 

FORCES. CARRANZA ADDED THAT CONTRARY TD SOME 

RUMORS, THE MONDAY MEETING AT OLIVOS WAS ‘VERY 

TRANQUIL’ AND THAT THERE ARE NO DECISIONS REGARDING 

FUTURE ARRESTS. IN ANOTHER POSITIVE ROTE NAVY 

CHIEF RAMON AROSA TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE OLIVOS 

MEETING WAS A VERY POSITIVE WORKING SESSION AND 

THAT THE NAVY HAS CONFIDENCE THAT THE POLITICAL 

SYSTEM WILL FIND A FAIR SOLUTION. 

3 % 


DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13526 

authorityVOtUv**" MapVS" 

NARA.. ___ Dato_U\2T\yS«___

. I! D 8 i; fi H E B li a H L 

' ’ l "I 

t: tl a i b u 

: ll i n l E C D l E E I B = i uill I i 

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SECRE i Aril AT 

PA>E II BUENOS AIRES 9372 DTS: 3f:0E6Z OCT BE PSK OB43-3 

E01314 4HS0741S TOI: 30--2II5Z CSS. HCE9I9 

DISTRIBUTION: MILL-01 RAY-SI NOHT-Gl BURG-11 TIIL-OI HUGH-01 

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DE RUEHBU M072/92 3B321S1 

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TO SECSTATE UASHDC I MEDIATE 3408 

INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PR 

USCIHCLRNT NORFOLK VA 

USAFSD 10UARD AFR PN//DOI//LAI// 

C01FIIERTIAL SECTION B2 OF R3 RUEHOS AIRES B1B72 

CINCSO ALSO FOR INTAFF 

CIHCLANT ALSO FOR INTAFF 

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 


SUBJ: STATE OF SIEGE: GOA/ARHED FORCES TENSIONS 

RULES OH TIE LEGALITY OF THE DETAINHENT DECREE. 

ACCORDIHG TO THE DEFENDANT'S LAWYERS REPORTED 

REACTION, THIS DECISION EFFECTIVELY STAYS ACTION 

UNTIL THE SUPREME COURT RULES. THE SUPREME COURT 

WILL APPARENTLY BE ASKED TO RULE HOT OK THE 

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATE OF SIEGE OR THE 

Act of arrest itself, but on whether sufficient 

CAUSE EXISTS TO JUSTIFY DETAINHENT. AT LEAST 

ONE ELEMENT OF THIS GENERALIZED CONFUSION CAN RE 

CLARIFIED—PATRICIO CAMPS, REPORTED DETAINED 

YESTERDAY, IS STILL IN HIDING. 

B. 01) AFTER TWO BOMB-FREE DAYS, AN EXPLOSION 

DAMAGED AH APARTHEHT BUILDING, REPORTEDLY OCCUPIED 

BY A NUMBER OF RETIRED MILITARY, AT APPROXIMATELY 

B2BB LOCAL TIME OCTOBER 30. OX THE FINANCIAL 

FRONT, THE DOLLAR DECLINED AGAINST THE AUSTRAL 

MONDAY AND TUESDAY, A FURTHER SUGGESTION THAT 

TENSIONS ARE EBBING. 

THIS EVENING, ’DGETHER WITH PillEVEC PLBLiC F9C.S 

ON THE CAMPAIGN AND MORE OEFT GOA LANOLIIIG OS 

ARMED FORCES 5EHSITIUlTlEE REGARDING TIE 

DETENTIONS, CHOULO HELP FURTHER DIFUSE RECENT 

TENSIONS. FORTUNATELY, THERE WERE NO INCIDENTS 

AT THE HUGE RADICAL PARTY RALLY AT BOCA STADIUM, 

ALTHOUGH THE UCD AND PEROHISTS MUST STILL WIND 

UP THEIR CAMPAIGNS WITH LARGE PUBLIC GATHERINGS 

THAT OFFER A POTENTIAL TARGET FOR TROUBLEMAKERS. 

ALTHOUGH AH UNLIKELY PROSPECT, ANY MAJOR TERRORIST 

ATTACH BETWEEN HOW AHD SUNDAY WOULD NATURALLY HAVE 

UNPREDICTABLE HUT SERIOUS CONSEOUEkCES. 

S. (Cl IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO DPAW ANY DEFINITIVE 

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEU WEEKS. 

THE GOVERNMENT'S VIGOROUS-SOME WOULD SAY POORLY 

COHCEIVED AND EXECUTED-OVERRESPONSE TO THE 

CAMPAIGN OF BOMBINGS AND THREATS HAY STRENGTHEN, 

AND AT WORST, HOT HURT, ITS ELECTORAL PROSPECTS. 

NEVERTHELESS, ITS UNCERTAIN HANDLING OF THE 

DETENTIOMS AHD SUBSEOUENT STATE OF SEINE DECREE 

DAMAGED ITS IMAGE WITH SOPHISTICATED AHD MORE 

CONSERVATIVELY ORIENTED ARGENTINES. OF GREATER 

LASTING IMPORTANCE IS THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF 

THESE EVENTS OH THE GOA RELATIONS VITH THE ARMED 

FORCES. PRESIDENT ALFOHSIN'S DECISION TO SEIZE 

THE POLITICAL INITIATIVE AND PUT REAL OR SUSPECTED 

WOULD-BE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PLOTTERS ON. THE 

DEFENSIVE BY MOVING AGAINST THE TWELVE ACCUSEO 

HAY BE GOOD SHORT TERM POLITICS, BUT IN SOME NON 

RADICAL CIRCLES IT RAISED DOUBTS BOTH ABOUT HIS 

POLITICAL TACTICS AND THE GOA'S ABILITY TO MANAGE 

PRUDENTLY THE ALWAYS SENSITIVE AND UNEASY RELATION 

SHIP WITH THE ARMED FORCES, ESPECIALLY TIE ARMY. 

IN ANOTHER NEGATIVE NOTE, THIS VEER’S EVENTS HAY 

POSSIBLY INDICATE THAT, CONTRARY TO THE CASE IN 

COUPS AGAINST PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS, 

ELEMENTS IN THE ARMY WOULD CONTEMPLATE AH EXTRA- 

CONSTITUTIONAL ACT I OH EVEN IF PUBLIC SUPPORT WERE 

LACKING. THERE ARE ALSO POSSIBLE PLUSSES. MONDAY 

NIGHT'S OLIVOS MEETING HAY ULTIMATELY BE SEEN AS 

AN ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE, 

I.E., THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF MEETING WITH HIS 

SERVICE CHIEFS FOR AH EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON 

A CRITICAL ISSUE AFFECTING THE ARMED FORCES. 

LIKEWISE, THE APPARENT WILLINGNESS OF FORCES' 

BT 

I 

7. All PUBLIC ATTENTION IS FINALLY RETURNING TO 

THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN WITH POLLS LESS THAN FOUR 

DAYS DISTANT. THE RADICALS CLOSED THEIR RUEHOS 

AIRES CAMPAIGN WITH A TRADITIONAL SOCCER STADIUM 

RALLY ATTENDED HY AN ESTIMATED RB.BSB LAST NIGHT. 

TONIGHT THE UCD CLIMAXES ITS CAMPAIGN, ROPING TO 

AT LEAST HALF-FILL THE CITY AND COUNTRY'S LARGEST 

STADIUM. THE PARTY DRAWS SOME STIFF COMPETITION- 

PRESIDENT ALFONSIN WILL ADDRESS THE HATI ON OH THE 

SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE 19R3 ELECTIONS RETURNING 

ARGENTINA TO DEMOCRACY. 

B. (C) COMMENT: FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S 

MEETING WITH THE TOP MILITARY COHHAHO, HIS SPEECH j| 


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SECRETARIAT 

P.-ki£ 01 

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AN9 0 7 4 15 

□ TG: 3B2056Z OCT B5 

TOR: 323.-2116Z 

P5N: 254342 

CSN: HCEE20 

DISTRIBUTION: 

MILL-01 RAY-01 NORT-01 BURG-01 TILL-01 HUGH-01 

/00B A4 

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STU5532 

DE RUEHBU *9072/03 3032102 

O 3 0205 BZ OCT BS 





USAFSO HOWARD AFB PN//DOI//LAI// 



CINCLANT ALSO FOR INTAFF 

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR 

TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, MARR, PTER, AR 

SUBJ: STATE OF SIEGE: GOA/ARMED FORCES TENSIONS 

CHIEFS TO ARTICULATE THEIR RESPECTIVE SERVICE’ S 

CONCERNS, COMBINED WITH THE' MORE JUNIOR OFFICERS 

WORKING THEIR COMPLAINTS THROUGH THEIR SUPERIORS. 

MAY CONTRIBUTE TO RE-ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE 

AND RESPONSIVE CHAIN OF COMMAND IN THE ARMED 

FORCES. ORTIZ 

BT 


nmiP i uriiT i ■ i

l Li i: t h L. b m u t 1.1- r„ u U L U C L u ti li li U fti il L i. .. l . i. i; ti L u b H >i >. » h 

K r .’V - 

>B Att> __ / BUHNERS 

“REF; '.HullOS AIRES SS14 AND PREVIOUS 

la’ive mo >--::ii.::al e e:ti;ii$ tf-n--eijds 

NUMBER-CRUNCHIRG Oil SEAT DISTRIEUT Oil AII3 VOTING 

PERCENTAGES (REFTELI. THESE FOILS. THE FIRST 

RON-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HELD UCDER A DEMOCRACY 

IN MORE THAN TUO DECADES, ARE SEEN BY ALL OUR 

CONTACTS HERE AS TNE HEAT STEP IN THE COUNTRY'S 

CDHTINUIIIG EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE LHD STABILIZE 

ITS DEMOCRACY. SOME OF THIS VERBAL DEMOCRATIC 

COliHITHENT IS UNDOUBTEDLY LIP SERVICE, BUT HE 

TAKE THE GREAT MAJORITY OF IT AS STRAIGHTFONWARD. 

ARGENTINES ARE PROUD TO HAVE REACHED TUO YEARS 

UNDER DEMOCRACY AND BELIEVE THESE ELECTIONS 

DEMONSTRATE THAT TNE COUNTRY IS SERIOUS ABOUT 

MAINTAINING CONST ITUT I ORAL STABILITY. 

4. MUCH OF THE CAMPAIGN LABORED UNDER TNE SHADOV 

OF VIOLENT INCIDENTS. ARGUMENTS"fYER THE 

DWG I NS OF THE VIOLENCE CONTINUE, VITN THE 

GOVERNMENT BLAMING SHALL MINORITIES UK I CM SEEK 

f /TO OVERTHROW ARGENTINA'S CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOC- 

V/ RACY. SOME GOVERNMENT OPPONENTS ARGUE THAT TIE 

RADICALS, HAVING FAILED TO CONVINCE THE POPULATION 

THAT THE VIOLENT INCIDENTS REPRESENT A SERIOUS 

THREAT TO DEMOCRACY, THEMSELVES ARE BEHIND SOME 

OF THE VIOLENCE AND THREATS AS THEY THY TO PROVORE 

f f —■*—:» OR

i 

L i) R UU b B fa Li t) U 6 a 1; U C t li H n 

TnroTTK ar! iolo by uhl Contact. goes eveTTqueb 

IN PRIVATE. OOUH TO 45 PERCENT. IN HORMAL ) 

POLITICAL CIRCUHSTAHCES A OROP IN RULING PARTY 

SUPPORT WOULD BE LOGICAL EXPECTATION AFTER TWO 

YEARS. BUT IN THIS WAY, AS IN SO MANY OTHERS, 

ARGENTINA IS HOT NORMAL: IT HAS AN ENORMODSLY 

POPULAR PRESIDENT PRESIDING OVER A LESS POPULAR 

GOVERNMENT AGAINST A DIVIDED OPPOSITION WHICH 

SPENT MUCH OF THE LAST TWO YEARS COVERING ITSELF 

WITH EGG RATHER THAN GLORY. IN THIS CONTEXT, 

IMF lira wm pmuiBijf ie seen as a loser if jr 

jjflFS NOT EQUAL THE 7l PERCENT IT RECEIVED l» * 

••jmSRESSIOHAL VOTING IH 11R3^ IT WILL Ull A 

'politically significant vote of confidence if it 

EXCEEDS ALFONSIN’S PERSONAL TOTAL OF 52 PERCENT 

THAT Year; ANYTHING ELSE, AND PROBABLY THE MOST 

LIKELY RESULT WITH LESS THAN SEVENTY-TUO HONRS 

REMAINING BEFORE BALLOTING BEGINS, IS LIKELY 

TO IE READ AS A POLITICAL UASH. 

POSSIBLE POLITICAL EFFECTS 

RESULTS OF THE NOVEMBER 3 VOTING MAY AFFECT 

SIGNIFICANTLY A NUMBER OF POLICY AND POLITICAL 

ISSUES. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, ALFONSIN'S 

CONTROL OVER THE RADICAL PARTY COULD BE AFFECTED. 

A MIXED OR UNSATISFACTORY OUTCOME FOR THE UCR 

COULD TEND TO GALVANIZE THOSE ELEMENTS WHICH 

RESENT BOTH THE PRESIDENT'S APPARENT EFFORTS 

TO BREAK WITH THE PARTY11_ST AT I IT jAgt-AB-lU 

WILLINGNESS TO STAFF SOHE*OF THE HUHEST POSTS 

IN HIS ADMINISTRATION WITH INDIVIDUALS LACKING 

STRONG RADICAL CREDENTIALS AND TRADITIONAL PARTY 

CONVICTIONS. CONVERSELY, IF THE RADICALS 

SCORE UELL, THE SO FAR RELATIVELY IDLE TALK OF A, 

THIRD- HISTORICAL MOVEMENT CAN BE EXPECTED TO 

INTENSIFY, PARTICULARLY IF THE ELECTION RESULTS 

SUGGEST THAT THE OPPOSITION'S FRAGMENTATION IS 

IRREPARABLE IN THE SHORT TERM. AT THIS POINT 

WE ARE UNCERTAIN HOW ALFONSIN WOULD RESPOND TO 

PRESSURES SEEKING TO HAKE HIM, LIKE PERON AND 

YRIGOYEN EARLIER IN THIS CEH’KlRY, MORE IMPORTANT 

IT 

f ~ jiesp.;ite7t{ie violence and alleged apathy, Sunday 

'. •- . .ij ijcosAht because it is viewed, at least 

PARTiALllj AS A PLEBISCITE ON THE TWO YEARS OF THE 

ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION AND THE AUSTRAL ECONOMIC 

PLAN. VOTER PARTICIPATION WILL PROBABLY NOT 

REACH THE 16 PERCENT OF 11B3‘S PRESIDENTIAL POLL. ' 

SINCE THE FRANCHISE IS OBLIGATORY IN ARGENTINA, 

HOWEVER, TURNOUT SHOULD SIGNIFICANTLY EXCEED 

THE 71 PERCENT IN THE NON-OIL IGATORY BEABLE^C. 

REFERENDUM LAST YEAR. A TURNOUT HEABInQs ^--------------- 

PERCENT WILL LIKELY BE SEEN AS A RINGING 

REPUDIATION OF VIOLENCE AND AN AFFIRMATION THAT 

ARGENTINES ARE NOT LOSING THEIR INFATUATION WITH - 

DEMOCRACY. IN OUR VIEW, SUCH AH INTERPRETATION 

WOULD BE LEGITIMATE. 

7. MEASURING SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND 

THE AUSTRAL PLAN IS TRICKIER BECAUSE THE RADICALS 

THEMSELVES VARY SO WIDELY IH THEIR ASSESSMENT. 

•Photocopy Reagan Library 

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SECRETARIAT 

PAGE 01 

EC!(OS 

BJEIiDS AIRES Silt 

"1003337 

DTG:I1121SZ UOV tS P:il:BG7t7S 

TOR: 305/1258Z CSH:HCE61S 

QISTRIBUTION: M1LL-B1 RAY-SI HORT-01 IURG-B1 TILl-ll HUGH-11 

/BBS A2 

UMTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION: 

SIT: 

EOB: 

OP IMHED 

UTS74S3 

DE HUEHBU BS12B/B3 3051131 

0 01121BZ NOV S5 

FH AHEHBMSY BUENOS AIRES 

TO SECSTATE UASHDC I IVIED I ATE S43S 

INFO USCINCSO OUARRY HEIGHTS PN 

USCI NCIANT NORFOLK VA 

USAFSO HOWARD AFB PH//00I/lAI// 

CONFIDENT CAL SECTION B3 OF B5 BUENOS AIRES SB12S 

CINCSO ALSO FOR IHTAFF 

CINCLAMT )ILSO FOR INTAFF 

"o.; 1235s: oecl:oaor 

climjAv, AR 

i, . SUBJT EMOTIONS 'B5, REPORT S: HEARINGS BEHIND THE 

^■^îTAN'THETlEIIOCRATIc'sYSTEn HE HU SO ARDENTLY 

"i-r-TFtEFENDEDÔR TRE LAST TWO TEUS. IT IS CLEAR, 

£ 4r :HoyEVESV:jhat the radicals—whatever their 

= ■“-rirOEtlRES&AoULD NOT UNILATERALLY BE ABLE TO ' 

CONSTITUTIONAL AHEHDHENT AUTHORIZING 

^-;a-_.i«EÊCEcN OF THE PRESIDENT. IN ARGENTINA, " 

1 - -P"-AMENDING CONSTITUTION REOUIRES A CONSTITUTIONAL 

^ - "tWVfeNTIl I WHICH CAN ONLY BE AUTHORIZED BY A TUOr! 

'i '- thIhDS Vi E OF CONGRESS. SUNDAY'S ELECTION 

RESULTS I LL NOT BRING THE RADICALS ANYWHERE NEAR 

P ■; fthat"Toil.. 

si "t 

L-.--rj;. 

I NO I CAT 

ER 3 HAY ALSO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT 

FOR THE FUTURE OF PERONISN. ALL 

«E RESIGNED TO LOSINS VOTES, WITH 

r IsOIIE^POLLp SHOWING THEN AS LOU U MOUND 20 PER- ■ 

'------ CENT -NATIONALLY. TRENDS ME HOSE IMPORTANT THAN*- 

RAU NUMBERS, HOWEVER, MO THE KEY ISSUE FOR THE 

PJ IS HOW WELL REFORMERS SUCH M -CMLOSCiROSSP J ^ 

IN CAPITAL FEDERAL MD, PMTICULARLY7 THE MTOHIO 

CAFIERO-LED TICKET IN BUENOS AIRES PROVIHCE PJR 

FORM. SHOULD CAFIERO DEFEAT THE HERHINIO 

IGLESIAS FREJULI LIST IN BUENOS AIRES, REFORMIST 

ARGUMENTS THAT THE CURRENT PEROHIST LEADERSHIP 

IS UNREPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEROHIST ELECTORATE 

WILL CMRY INCREASED WEIGHT. REFORM PERONISTS 

PAINT A SCENMIO IN WHICH A CAFIERO VICTORY, 

PARTICULMLY IF COMBINED WITH A RADICAL WIN IN 

VICENTE SAADI'S CATAHARCA HOME GROUND, WILL 

RESULT IN INTERNAL PRESSURE FORCING THE CURRENT 

PJ LEMEHSHIP TO RESIGN TO PERMIT NEW PARTY - 

ELECTIONS. REFORMIST VICTORIES SUNDAY WILL- ' 

CERTAINLY HARE THE MODERNIZATION MD RECONSTRUCTION 

OF PERONISN SOMEWHAT EASIER. NONETHELESS, THE 


EFFORT WOULD STILL BE ARDUOUS GIVEH REFORM 

PEROHISH'S HETEROGENEOUS COLLECTION OF WOULD BE 

LEADERS (CAFIERO, GROSSO, ITALO LUOEH, SANTA FE 

GOVERNOR VERNET, AND LA RIOJA GOVERHOR MENEM AMONG 

0THERS1 AND THE INEVITMLE FACT THAT WIN OR LOSE 

HERHINIO IGLESIM WILL REHAIN A FACTOR OF SOME 

POWER IN BUENOS AIRES. FOR OUR PMT, ALTHOUGH 

MOST POLLS SHOW CAFIERO'S GROUP COMFORTABLY AHEAD 

OF HERHINIO, WE RESPECT IGLESIM' MACH I HE AND ARE 

- v 

NOT WILLING TO COUNT HIM OUT. IF HE DEFEATS X / 

CAFIERO, WE SEE LITTLE CHANCE FOR PERONISN TO 

BRAKE THE OECLINE MD FRAGMENTATION IT SUFFERED 

THE LAST TWO YEMS. 

IB. THE PMT I DO IHTRMSIGENTE (PI) AND THE 

CENTER-RIGHT, PMTICULARLY TKE UNION CENTRO - 

DEMOCRAT I CO UCD) OF ALVMO ALSDGMAY, WILL BE 

SEEKING WITH THESE ELECTIONS TO ESTABLISH THEM 

SELVES M VIMLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE UCR FOR THE 

SCHEDULED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN 1SBS. NEITHER 

GROUP HAY SUCCEED, BUT AT THIS TIHE THE PI LOOKS 

TO HAVE THE BETTER CHANCE. IT COULD DRAW MORE OREM 

THAN IS PEHCEHT OF THE POPULM VOTE, MORE THAR HAH/ 

OF,' • 

TRIPLING ITS 1BS3 PERFORMANCE. A MAJOR AIM 

THE PI WILL BE TO EXTEHD ITS APPEAL BEYOND THE 

‘ X 

BUENOS AIRES AREA MO SHOW GAINS IN OTHER 

POPULOUS PROVINCES SUCR M CORDOBA MD SMTA , FE.l/ - 

PRESIDENT ALFONSIN'S RIGHT TURN TO A TOUGH 

AUSTERITY PROGRAM IS PROBABLY ADDING TO THE ?\lV 

APPEAL. AT THE SAME TIHE, THE AUSTRAL PLM 

WORKS AGAINST THE UCD WHICH, EVEN THOUGH SOME OF 

THE BLOOM IS OFF THE PLM, IS WIDELY SEEN AS 

LOSING ITS ONE BIG ISSUE TO THE GOVERNMENT. 

THE UCD ALSO HANDICAPS ITSELF BY ITS PERSISTEHT 

.V 

IDENTIFICATION WITH THE HOST PUBLICLY DISCREDITED 

SECTORS OF ARGENTINE SOCIETY. THE PRESS REPORTED 

OCTOBER 31 THAT ONE OF THE BIGGEST OVATIONS AT 

THE PARTY'S IMPRESSIVELY ATTENDED CLOSING RALLY 

WENT TO ONE OF THE MORE DUBIOUS DEMOCRATS OF THE 

LMT THREE DECADES, ADMIRAL ISAAC ROJAS. CON 

SERVATIVE PMT IES ME LIKELY TO FARE BETTER II f 

PROVINCES SUCH AS MENDOZA, SMTA FE MD CORK IENTES, V 

BUT GIVEN PERSONAL RIVALRIES, THE CENTER- 

RIGHT'S DIFFICULTIES IN COALESCING AT TKE 

NATIONAL LEVEL AROUNO A SINGLE LEADER HAY HOT 

BT 

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BUENOS AIRES >126 

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SIT: 

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DE RUEHBU BB126/BS 3SS123Z 

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Fit AMEHRASSY BUENOS AIRES 

TO SECRTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9437 



USAFSO HOWARD AFB PN//DOI/LAI// 

DTG: 0112)8Z NOV IS PSH:047S3B 

TOP: CS,,-1,'EE!S • ’tstEIIT l'*riA’IOII ID DCTCDER), THE APPARENT 

'.ACT V DECISIOII ON NEXT STEPS PLUS THE UN 

POPULAR FORCED SAVINGS LAV PROMPTS INCREASING 

:0:XERU III THE PRIVATE SECTOR THAT THE GOVERUHENT 

WILL HOT STAY THE COURSE OUTLINED LAST JUNE. 

OUR SEHSE IS THAT NO ORAIUTIC ECONOMIC POLICY 

CHANGES UILL OCCUR I MEDIATELY AFTER THE ELECTION, 

NO HATTER UHAT THE OUTCOHE SUNDAY. LABOR UNREST 

OVER REAL OK PERCEIVED DECLINES IN REAL VASES AND 

UNEHPLOYHENT HAY RISE, HOWEVER. RADICAL PARTY 

PRESSURES Oil THE SOURROUILLE PROGRAM ALSO APPEAR 

TO BE INCREASING. IT IS THEREFORE CONCEIVABLE 

THAT OVER THE NEXT WEEKS OR MONTHS ALFDNSIN HAY 

FEEL CONFLICTING PRESSURES FROM THE PRIVATE 

SECTOR, LABOR AND HIS OWN PARTY TO AOJUST HIS 

ECONOMIC POLICY. THE PRESIDENT HAS CONSISTENTLY 

REITERATED HIS INTENTION TO STAY WITH HIS OWN 

ECONOMIC GAME PLAN, HOWEVER, AND STRONG POPULAR 

SUPPORT NOVEMBER 3 COULD STRENGTHEN THAT DETERMINATION, 

ORTIZ 

RT 

C 0 HJ I D E N T I A L SECTION BS OF OS HUENOS AIRES BB12I 


CINCLANT JU.SO FOR INTAFF 

f . 5UBJ: ‘ EJECTIONS 'BS, REPORT S: MEANINGS BEHIND THE 

i ' LIKELY BS IMPROVED. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT ALFDNSIN 

RiGHT, AS IN 1SR4, OPT TO CONFRONT THE UNIONS---------- - 

-j‘I..:, jf’jHE’ ilU WINS IMPRESSIVELY. IN THIS CASE, THE UCR 

r : l.- ilA^ 1/feLLINTENSIFY EFFORTS TD DIVIDE THE PERONISTS 

j “■ 2! MW BimijjsOME PRO-RADICAL LABOR SUPPORT. CON- 

tVi'.'T-JiiSENTLjnALFDNSIN IS LIKELY TO BARGAIH AND 

COMPROMISE WITH UNIONS AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR 

* ' &LTHE Atj}ll HI STRATI ON CONTINUES ITS ECONOMIC 

'v—^r'JpRiiSNAH MID, PARTICULARLY, AS IT HOVES TO EHO— 

PROBABLY GRADUALLY--THE WAGE AND PRICE FREEZE. 

ONE PROMINENTLY DISCUSSED SCENARIO HAS THE FREEZE 

EVOLVING INTO A NEXT STAGE OF AGREED UPON WAGE AND 

PRICE GUIDELINES. ALFONSIN'S WILLINGNESS TO 

ACCOHHOOATE LABOR'S DEMANDS IS LIKELY TO BE 

GREATER IF HE READS THE ELECTION RESULTS AS MIXED 

OR NEGATIVE AND TILTS RACK TOWARD EXPANSION AND 

HIBR EMPLOYMENT AS MORE IMPORTANT TO HIS ECONOMIC 

PROGRAM THAN CONTROL OF INFLATION AND OF THE 

PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICIT. 

IS. THE CLOSELY RELATED ISSUE OF ALFOIISIN'S 

POST-ELECT I OX ECONOMIC POLICY IS POTENTIALLY ' 

THE MOST IMPORTANT TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. 

ALTHOUGH THE AUSTRAL PLAN CONTINUES TO HE SUCCESSFUL 

IN CONTROLLING INFLATION (EARLY ESTIMATES ARE FOR 

I 


ErillBBIICRGDBBGCGDECC-GDEOCOGBLljDfaliUllBRIililjBI 

. ^ No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/10 : NLR-313-1-20-13-6 

* '. . . . —SllHHUtWI IflL 

State Dept. revtawcom {Noted! 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL \/ 

SECRETARIAT 

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PREC: PRIORITY'CLAS: CONFIDENTIAL■0SRI> RUEIRU'DTA- 3430307 DFC Rb 

FR AHEMBAS3Y 01005 AIRES 

TR RUEHC/SECSTAIE HASHDC PRIORITY 5133 

IRFO RUEHHN/MEnASSY MONTEVIDEO ]7li 

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RUCRSAA/USCIRClART RORF0LR YA 

RUEOSRA/liSAFSO ROUARO AFR PR//DOI/LAI// 

SUBJECT: 

CO0ERESS PASSES 'PURTD FINAL* RILL 

LOBPIBEMTIAI) RS0TIOR 01 OF 02 RUEROR RISER 

CIRCSO AND CIRCLANT ALSO FGR IRTAFF 

E.O. 12156: DECL: OAOR 

TASR: PGOV, MRS, SK1IH, AR 

SUBJECT: CORCRISS PASSER ’PUNTO FIRAL* RILL 

REF: RUENOS AIRES 121SS OMTAL) 

>REGIR SUMMARY* 

1. 1C) SUMMARY: ARGENTINA'S ROUSE OF DEPUTIES 

APPROVED THE SO-CALLEO ’PUNTO FINAL* BILL -- IWDSING 

A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UPON MILITARY PROSECUTIONS FOR 

PAST ABUSES --HA VOTE OF 126-16-1 OR DECEISER 11. 

THE GOVERRINC RADICAL PUTT VOTED ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY 

FOR THE RILL. MOST PERONISIS IOTCOTTED TIE SESSIOR. 

TRE HOUSE TEXT IS IBEHTICAL TO THAT PASSED BY THE 

SENATE DECEMBER 22. THE SILL IECOHES LAV VHEN SIEREO 

BY THE PRESIDENT AW PUOLISREO IN OFFICIAL GAZETTE. 

CONGRESS IDHAL PASSABE OF TRE BILL REPRESENTS A POLITICAL 

VICTORY FOR ALFRNSI0. IT PROBABLY PROVIDES PERONISTS 

WITH A 1917 ELECTION ISSUE, HOVE HER, MB VILL ALMOST 

CERTAINLY HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR PERONISTS' RELATION 

SHIPS VITH THE MILITARY, END SUMMARY. 

>ENB SUMMARY: 

2. Hi' SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON DTCEMER 23-24, 

AROINTIHA'S HOUSE OF DEPUTIES APrRO'.lO TNI ‘PUNTO 

FIRAL* RILL. TIE IUTE FOE LOVED HOURS OF IMPASSIONED 

DEBATE AND SEVERAL DISTHIANCES IOTA IN TRE PURL 1C 

GALLERIES INSIDE AND THE STREETS OUTSIDE THE 

CAPITOL. THE FIRM VOTE HRS 11S IN FAVOR, IS 

OPPOSED, AND SHE ASST ENT I OR. Ill DEPUTIES Of TRE 154 

MEMBER ROOT HERE N0T PRESENT. 

1. 01) THE GOVERNING RADI CAL RJCRJ PASH HAS ALMOST 

UNANIMOUS IN ITS SITPORT FOR THE SILL. THREE 

RADICALS VOTER AGAINST TRE RILL (APPARENTLY HITROUT 

AUTHORIZATION) MO ONI ABSTAINED, REPORTEBLV UITN 

APPROVAL OF T*£ PARTY LEADERSHIP, BECAUSE HIS SON EAB 

DISAPPEARED BONING THE YEARS OF MILITARY RULE. THE 

RADICALS HERE JOINED RY SEVERAL PROVINCIAL ARB 

CENTRIST PARTIES. THE CENTRIST UCO VOTED AGAINST. 

PERONISTS HITS EXCEPTION OF BERM IR10 IGLESIAS-LEB 

FACTION BOTC0TTEB TIE SESSION. HOST LEFTIST DEPUTIES 

HERE NOT PRESENT FOR THE VOTE. 

4. 011 THE HOUSE PASSED THE SAME TEXT AS HAS 

APPROVED HT TRE SENATE DECEMBER 21. TRIM THE RILL 

BECOMES LAV OBCE SIBNED RY TIE PRESIDERT AND 

PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL GAZETTE MR ICR HEAT ON STRIAE 

FOR UNRELATED REA sms ON DECEMBER 231. FINAL TEXT OF 

TRE RILL FOLLOW. 

1. 01) BEGIN INFORMAL TRANSLATION: 

- ARTICLE l: TNERE HILL RE NO PENAL ACTION VITH 

REGARD TO ARY PERSON, DUE TO HIS ALLEGED 

PARTICIPATION AT ART LEVEL, IN THOSE CRIMES INCLUDED 

UNDER ARTICLE IS OF LAV NO. 31. 040, IF HE IS HOT A 

FUGITIVE, NOR IN DEFAULT, NOR SUMMONED TO HARE A 

STATES NT, RY AM APPROPRIATE COURT, UITHIN SB BAYS 

FROM DATE OF APPROVAL OF THE PRECEI.T LAH. 

UNDER THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES, TKFRE HILL RE NO PENAL 

ACTION AGAINST ANT PERSON HHO COMMITTED CRIMES OF 

POLITICAL VIOLENCE BEFORE DECEMBER 10, ISS3. 

- ARTICLE 1: HITHIR THE PERIOD DETERMINED BY THE 

ABOVE ARTICLE, THE APPROPRIATE FEDERAL COURTS VILL 

REVIEH TRE CASES AROOGHT SEFORE THE SUPREHE COUNCIL 

OF THE ARMED FORCES, AMO TAKE THEM OVER IF THEY DEEM 

IT APPROPRIATE. 

ACCUSATIONS HADE SEFORE THE SUPREHE COUNCIL OF THE 

ARMED FORCES HlTHIN THIS PERIOD MUST HE REPORTEO 

UITHIN 40 HOURS RY THE SUPREHE COUNCIL TO THE 

APPROPRIATE FEDERAL COURT, HR I CM MAY REVIEH THEM AND 

EXERCISE JURISDICTION. 

— ARTICLE 1: VKENEVER, UNDER THIS PROCCUURE, 

DETENTION OR PREVENTIVE ARREST IS ORDERED UITH REGUD 

TO ARMED FORCES, SECURITY, POLICE OR PRISON ACTIVE 

DUTY PERSONNEL, OF WHATEVER RANH, AS STATED IN 

ARTICLES 371 TlROUGH 37S OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL 

■RDCEDURI, OR IN ARTICLES 303 THROUGH 111 OF THE CODE 

OF MILITARY JUSTICE, SIICN MEASURES HILL RE CARRIED 

OUT UNDER ARTICLE 316, SECOND CLAUSE OF THE LATTER 

CONFIDERTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 RUENOS AIRES 12345 

CIHCSO AND CIRCLANT ALSO FOR INTAFF 

E.O. 12366: DECL; OADR 

TAGS: PGOV, HARR, SHUN, AR 

SUOJECT; CONGRESS PASSES 'PUNTO FINAL’ HILL 

CODE, AT THE REQUEST OF TRE CHIEF OF THE MILITARY 

ZONE IR WHICH THE PERSON SERVES, OR OF ARY OTHER 

SENIOR COMMANDING OFFICER. IN THIS CASE, THE SENIOR 

COHMARSIIIC OFFICER VILL BE RESPONSIPLt FOR THE 

IMMEDIATE APPEARANCE OF THE ACCUSED BEFORE THE COURT, 

VHENEVER HE IS REOUESTEO TO DO CO. 

-- ARTICLE 4: JURISDICTIONS CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE 

CUM.iE COUNCIL OF TRE ARMED FORCES /. D THE FEDERAL 

CD'.TTT, C>: CTWEEN INDIVIDUAL FEDERAL COURTS, AS ! 1'.L 

a:: rLi.ji;. appeals uxicn prevent deckions on the 

MERITS O' COMPETENT COURTS VILL SUtPEUD THE OEADUhE 

ESTATEIS..TO UNDER ARTICLE 1. LIREVISi, THE PERIOD 

RCrXCN RECEIPT OF NOTIFICATION DY A FEDERAL COURT OF 

A PENDING ACTION AND ACTUAL RECEIPT OF THE CASE HILL 

ROT BE TAXER INTO ACCOUNT (IN TRE RUNNING OF TRE IR 

OAT PERIOD). 

FOR THE PURPOSE OF ARTICLE 1, ART IKE 251 BIS OF THE 

CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, HILL NOT APPLY. 

-- ARTICLE S: THE PRESENT LAV DOES NOT SUSPEND CIVIL 

ACTIONS RASED UPON CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES. 

— ARTICLE I; THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DESCRIBED 

IN ARTICLE 1 DOES NOT APPLY TO ANY CIVIL ACTIONS. 

END OF TRANSLATION. 

f. K> COMMENT: FIRAL PARSASE OF TKE 'PUNTO FINAL* 

RILL REPRESENTS A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL VICTORY FOR 

ALFONSIN. THE RILL HAS RICHLY CONTROVERSIAL. IN THE 

DAYS I MEDIATELY FOLLOWING ITS PRESENTATION, THERE 

WERE SIGNS RF LARGE SCALE DESERTIORS AND HREAKDOUNS 

IN RADICAL PUTT DISCIPLINE. ALFORSIH MADE THE RILL 

A TEST OF RIS PERSONAL PRESTIRI AND PARTY LEADERSHIP. 

HE CRACKED THE WHIP OF PARTY DISCIPLINE, ANO DID SO 

TO GREAT EFFECT. IT IS UNCLEAR AT THIS POINT VHAT 

CORSEOUERCER FOR TNOSE NCR DEPUTIES UNO DEFIED PUTT 

DISCIPLINE VILL BE. PERONIST APPROACH IS ALSO LIKELY TO 

—nflfjr i nruT i ai- - 

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/10 : NLR-313-1-20-13-6

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/10: NLR-313-1-20-13-6 

-68Nf IDENTTAt—■ 


SECRETARIAT 

PME D DF R 

ANJD'jUO 

HAVE REPERCUSSIONS. NARY PERORICTS OHYIOUSLY 

PERCEIVED IIR7 ELECTORAL AOVANTARE IR HARDLIRR TRE 

NATTER AS TREY 010. RUT A CASUALTY Of TRE PERONIST 

APPROACH HAY VEIL RE TRE PARTY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH 

mu TAR Y ESTARl ISRHENT. THE HILIYARY NAY ROT RE 

SATISFIED VITK ALFOKSIR ADMINISTRATION' S HANOI IRC OF 

DILI TORY HUMAN RICXTS TRIAL ISSUES, RUT IT IS NOV 

PATENTLY CLEAR TRAT IT IS THE RADICALS AND HOT THE 

PERORISTS UNO ARE TARING THE POLITICAL RISKS IHHEREHT 

IN ATTEMPTING TO DIMINISH 5ERSE OF INSECURITY UITHIN 

ARMED FORCES WITH RESARD TO THIS ISSUE. AS NOTED 

REFTEL, THE RILL MUCH VAS PASSED IS ROT A PURTO 

FINAL. DERATE CONTINUES IN THE COUNTRY ON WHETHER 

THE LEGISLATION HILL RESOLVE TRE UNCERTAINTY RF 

FUTURE MILITARY PROSECUTIONS AMI STRENGTHEN CIVILIAN 

CONTROL OVER THE ARGENTINE MILITARY, ALFOKSIR HAS 

STILLED DERATE, HOWEVER, ON WHETHER HE STILL CONTROLS 

TRE RADICAL PARTY MIDWAY THROUGH RIS ADMINISTRATION. 

SILDRED 

SECTIBR: SI OF 02 22« E61224155JL2 MSGSODLST132712 

«SECT.SECTION: SI OF 07 Z1IS 1GI124HR253 HSGOSOT37112971 

-pnuc i nnrrnrr 

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/10: NLR-313-1-20-13-6

BI I I I I I I II I I E I i I I I I I I II I I I 

-&BNFIHENTIAL 


SECRETARIAT 

PAGE Cl BUENOS AIRES lilt Dili 1I1S13Z NOV 14 PSN:I713G! 

EOB647 ANBS7752 TOR: 3Z1/1B27Z CSN:HCE933 

DISTRIBUTION: RIT-ll N0RT-B1 BURG-B1 TILL-B1 /BD4 At 

UHTS ASSIGNEO DISTRIBUTION: 

SIT: 

EOE: 

OP IHHED 

STU7B3I 

DE RUEHBU BS13I/B1 3211915 

0 1B1913Z NOV 14 

FN AHEHBASSY BUENOS AIRES 

DEFENSE RAUL BORRAS' REFUSAL LAST VEER TO DEFEND THE 

COUHCIL FRON AN ALLEGED CAMPAIGN TO DISCREDIT THE 

INSTITUTION. THE COUNCIL ITSELF PRECIPITATED THE 

SERIES OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE ACTION WITH A!. 

OCTOBER 29* NOTE TO BORRAS DENNOUNCING THE ALLEGEt 

CAHPAIGN AND SEERING A PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF SUPPOR" 

FRDH HI71. (THE COUNCIL RECEIVED HARSR CRITICISM FROH 

HART INSIDE AND OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT WHEN IT ANNOUNCED 

IN SEPTEMBER THAT IT COULD NOT REACH A PROMPT VERDICT 

IN TRIALS OF TRE THREE JUNTA MEMBERS, BUT FOUND NOTHING 

LEGALLY WRONG VITH THE ORDERS LAUNCH IHG THE WAR AGAINST 

SUBVERSION. SEE BUENOS AIRES 771S). THE COUNCIL DID 

NOT HELP ITS CAUSE VITH BORRAS, A MINISTER WHO SHUNT 

HEADLINES AND SEERS TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES OUT OF THE 

PUBLIC EYE, WHEN IT RELEASED THE TEXT OF ITS NOTE TC 

THE PRESS. 


INFO AMEMASSY ASUNCION GRAB 

AHEHBASSY BRASILIA 6543 

AHEMASSY LA PAZ 5111 

AHEMASSY LONDON 234B 

AHEHBASSY MONTEVIDEO B134 

AHEMASSY ROME 2919 

AHEMASSY SANTIAGO 74S6 

USHISSIOH USUN NEU YORK 122B 

USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN 

USCIHCLANT NORFOLK VA 

USArSO HOVARD AFB PN//DOI-LAI// 

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES B913S 

CINCSO FOR INTAFF 

CINCLANT ALSO FOR POLAD 

ROHE ALSO FOR EMBASSY VATICAN 

E.O. 1235G; DECL:OADR 

TAGS: SHUN, PGOV, HARR, AR 

SUBJ: SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ARMED FORCES RESIGNS 


2. SUMMARY: ALL ELEVEN MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COUHCIL 

OF THE ARMED FORCES RESIGNED NOVEMBER 14. THE COUNCIL, 

RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING SOHE 70S CASES CHARGING 

HUNAN RIGHTS ABUSES DURING THE HILITARY REGIME, WILL 

CONTINUE ITS WORK UNTIL ITS RESIGNATIONS ARE ACCEPTED 

AND REPLACEMENTS NAMED. WHILE THE RESIGNATIONS DO NOT 

HEAR AH IMMEDIATE CRISIS FOR THE GOVERNHEHT, THEY DO 

CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT HILITARY CHALLENGE TO THE 

GOVERNMENT. THEY VILL ALSO FURTHER COMPLICATE ALFONSIN'S 

ALREADY FLAGGING STRATEGY FOR TRYING THOSE. RESPONSIBLE 

FOR PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. FINALLY, THEY REFLECT 

A WIDER ARMED FORCES VIEW THAT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IS 

NOT SUFFICIENTLY DEFENDING ITS ARMED FORCES FROH PUBLIC 

CRITICISM. END SUMMARY. 

3. THE ELEVEN MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE 

ARMED FORCES, NINE OF WHOM ARE INVESTIGATING CASES 

CHARGING HUHAN RIGHTS ABUSES DURING THE HILITARY REGIME, 

RESIGNED HDVEHBER 14. WHILE THE ELEVEH RETIRED HILITARY 

OFFICIALS CITED ’PERSONAL REASOHS’ FDR THEIR ACTIOH, 

THE COUHCIL WAS IN FACT RESPONDING TO MINISTER OF 

4. BORRAS MET WITH COUNCIL MEMBERS NOVEMBER S AND TOLD 

THEM THAT DISSENT, CRITICISM AND FREEDOM OF THE PRES: 

WERE ALL FUNDAMENTAL TO DEMOCRACY. IF THEY CONSIDERED 

ATTACKS SLANDEROUS OR LIBELOUS, THEY, LIKE ANY OTHEP 

CITIZEN, COULD BRING JUDICIAL ACTION. THE COUNCIL 

PONDERED THIS RESPONSE OVER THE WEEKEND. PRESS 

REPORTS EARLIER THIS WEEK ANNOUNCED THE RESIGNATIONS OF 

TWO MEMBERS BEFORE THE UNANIMOUS ACTION. 

5. THE HI HI STAY OF DEFENSE RESPONDED CALMLY TO THE 

RESIGNATIONS, SAYING THEY DO HOT CONSTITUTE A ’MILITARY 

CRISIS.* DEFENSE SECRETARY JAUNARENA ADDED THAT THE 

COUNCIL WILL CONTINUE ITS WORK UNTIL THE RESIGNATIONS 

ARE ACCEPTED AND REPLACEMENTS NAMED. HE NOTED THAT IT 

IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT BORRAS WILL REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE 

RESIGNATIONS. ACCORDING TO ONE EMBASSY RETIRED HILITARY 

SOURCE, COUNCIL REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT RESIGNATIONS 

NOT BECOME EFFECTIVE UNTIL CASES ALREADY UNDER CONSIDERA 

TION ARE CONCLUDED. IF TRUE, THIS WOULD MEAN THE CURRENT 

COUNCIL HAY BE WORKING FOR SOHE TIME, DEPENDING OH THE 

NUMBER OF CASES IT HAS ALREADY OPENED. 

B. COMMENT: WHILE THE RESIGNATIONS ARE NOT AN IMMEDIATE 

THREAT TO THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT, THEY CONSTITUTE A 

SIGNIFICANT HILITARY CHALLENGE TO THE ALFONSIN ADHIHISTRA 

TION. IF POORLY HANDLED, GDVERNNEHT RESPONSE TO THE 

RESIGNATIONS COULD CAUSE A SERIOUS AHD LONG-LASTING 

DETERIORATION IN CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS. TO 

PREVENT THIS, BORRAS WILL HEED TO ASSURE THAT THE 

BT 

declassified 

E.O. 13520 

lV\xoiS” 

>eUv>!±=- 

Authority-i*. i ■■ v Ju. 

nm?a_££—Mo-ssosiu*. 


J&NF1DENTIAL * 


SECRETARIAT 

PAGE o: BUENOS AIRES 313E DTE:161S13Z NOV S4 PSN:B71366 

EOBS61 AN8B7751 TOR: 121/1S2SZ CSN:HCESS4 

DISTRIBUTION: RAf-Ol NORT-B1 BURG-01 TILL-01 


SIT: 

EOE: 

OP I WED 

UTS6206 

DE RUEHIU 0S13B/B2 3211317 

0 1G1313Z NOV 04 

FH AHEHBASSY BUENOS AIRES 

TO SECSTATE UASRDC IHHEDIATE 4245 

/004 A4 

B. THE RESIGNATIONS WILL ALSO FURTHER COHPLICATE THE 

PRESIDENT'S STRATEGY- FON TRYING THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOF 

PAST HUNAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. THAT STRATEGY, 

DEVELOPED FROH THE BELIEF THAT THE MILITARY SHOULC 

JUDGE ITS DUN AND THAT—BY DEFINING LEVELS Or 

RESPONSIBILITY-TIE ARNED FORCES AS AN INSTITUTION 

SHOULD OE PROTECTED FROH PROSECUTIONS REACHING DEEP INTC 

THE OFFICER RANKS, IS ALREADY SOHEWHAT TATTEREC. 

TRIALS OF THE FIRST THREE JUNTAS PASSED INTO CIVILIAN 

COURTS WITHOUT ANY DECISION FROH THE SUPREME COUNCIL 

PRESS LEAKS NAHING ALLEGED HUNAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS AND 

THE HUNDREDS OF CASES ALREADY CLOGGING THE COUNCIL': 

AGENDA RAISE GREAT CONCERN AMONG HID- AND LOWER-RANKINC 

OFFICERS THAT THEY WILL BE PUNISHED FOR CARRYING DU~ 

ORDERS DURING THE WAR ON SUBVERSION. 

INFO AflENBASSY ASUNCION S6B7 

ANEHBASSY BRASILIA 6544 

AIK HIASSY LA PAZ 5112 

AHEHBASSY LONDON 2341 

ANEHBASSY HOHTEVIDEO 0135 

AHEHBASSY ROHE 2S1S 

ANEHBASSY SANTIAGO 7417 

USHISSIOH USUH NEW YDRR 1221 

USCIflCSO OUARRY HEIGHTS PH 


USAFSO HOWARD AFB PN//DOI-LAI// 

S. FINALLY, THE SUPREME COUNCIL ACTION REFLECTS A WIDEF 

ARHED FORCES VIEW THAT THE HOO IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY 

DEFENDING ITS ARHED FORCES FROH PUBLIC CRITICISM. IN Ah 

APPARENT ATTEMPT TO COUNTER THIS MILITARY VIEW, 

PRESIDENT ALFONSIH REPORTEDLY TOLD A MILITARY DINNER 

EARLIER THIS WEEK HE SOUGHT TO HAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR 

'OFFICIALS TO WALK DOWN THE STREET ARH-IN-ARH WITH 

THEIR WIVES, WEARING THEIR UNIFORMS WITH PRIDE, AS lli 

THE PAST.’ END COHMENT. ORTIZ 

BT 

EOliF IOEIIT IAL SECTION B2 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES BS13S 

Clk-CSO FOR INTAFF 

ClkCLAHT ALSO FOR POLAO 

ROHE ALSO FDR EHRASSY VATICAN 

E.O. 12356: OECL: OADR 

TAGS: SHUH, PBOV, HARR, AR 

SUBJ: SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ARHED FORCES RESIGNS 

SUPREME COUNCIL IS STAFFED WITH OFFICIALS RESPECTED 

WITHIN THE FORCES, THAT THE COUNCIL NAIHTAINS 

RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUDGING HUHAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 

ALLEGEDLY COWITTED BY THE MILITARY, AND THAT THE 

COUNCIL'S WORK TRULY DOES CONTINUE UHTIL THE RESIGNA 

TIONS BECOME EFFECTIVE. 

7. BORRAS WILL REPORTEDLY CONSULT WITH ALFONSIH OVER THE 

WEEKEND ON NEXT STEPS. THE HINISTRY OF DEFENSE IS 

REPORTEDLY IN CONTACT WITH RETIRED OFFICERS WHO MIGHT BE 

NAMED TO SUCCEED THE RESIGNED COUNCIL MEMBERS, BUT MAY 

FIND OTHERS RELUCTANT TO TAKE ON THE COUNCIL'S THANKLESS 

TASKS. IF SO, THE HOD COULD ORDER ACTIVE HI LITANY TO 

SERVE OH THE COUNCIL. SUCH A MOVE MIGHT HE COUNTER 

PRODUCTIVE SINCE IT SEEHS LIKELY THAT AH ACTIVE DUTY 

OFFICER COUNCIL WOULD PROVE EVEN MORE RELUCTANT TO JUDGE 

ITS COLLEAGUES THAN WAS THE LAME DUCK COUNCIL. NOVEMBER 

16 PRESS REPORTS SPECULATE THAT ONLY SOME RESIGNATIONS 

WILL BE ACCEPTED, WITH THE REST OF THE OFFICIALS 

CONTINUING TO SERVE THEIR SIX-YEAR TERM. TWO OTHER 

OPTIONS, BORRAS CAVING IN TO THE PRESSURE OF THE 

RESIGNATIONS BY GIVING THE COUNCIL THE PUBLIC SUPPORT 

HE REFUSED THEH LAST WEEK AND A DECISIOH TO MOVE ALL 

CASES TO CIVILIAN COURTS, APPEAR TO BE ONLY REHOTE 

POSSIBILITIES. 


GARRISONED HIMSELF AS OF EARLY APRIL 15 IN THE 14TH 

AIRBORNE REGIMENT IN CORDOBA. ONE RADIO REPORT AT 

0800 BUENOS AIRES TIME APRIL 16 SAID BARREIRO HAD 

ISSUED A STATEMENT THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO MAINTAIN 

HIS DEFIANCE AND THAT HE WAS SUPPORTED BY HIS ARMY 

COLLEAGUES. THE COMMANDER OF THE REGIMENT, LIEUTENANT 

COLONEL LUIS POLO, REPORTEDLY CONFIRMED THAT BARREIRO 

WAS IN THE REGIMENT, THAT THE SITUATION WAS "NORMAL" 

AND THAT AS COMMANDER HE WOULD "RESPOND TO THE 

NATURAL COMMANDERS." 

4. (C) ONE RADIO REPORT SAID CORDOBA POLICE FORCES 

ARE AT THE REGIMENT, BUT THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

COULD NOT CONFIRM THAT FOR US. ARMY COS HECTOR RIOS 

ERENU INFORMED ALL ARMY UNITS OF THE SITUATION. HIS 

MESSAGE REPORTEDLY URGED COMPLIANCE WITH JUDICIAL 

ORDERS AND RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM. 

5. (U) PRESIDENT ALFONSIN HAS CONVENED A CABINET 

MEETING FOR THIS MORNING AND A NUMBER OF POLITICAL 

FIGURES FROM THE RADICAL AND PERONIST PARTIES ARE 

REPORTEDLY IN THE CASA ROSADA TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR 

SOLIDARITY WITH CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY. RADIO 

COMMENTARIES BY POLITICAL FIGURES HAVE STRESSED THAT 

THIS IS A LAMENTABLE, BUT ISOLATED, INCIDENT AND ONE 

THAT SHOULD BE RESOLVED WITHIN THE ARMY CHAIN OF 

COMMAND. 

6. (C) COMMENT: THIS IS THE FIRST OVERT DEFIANCE 

OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY BY AN ACTIVE DUTY OFFICER 

AND A CHALLENGE TO BOTH CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES AND 

ARMY HIGH COMMAND. IT IS PRECISELY THE SCENARIO OF 

INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT THAT WE HAVE BEEN SIGNALLING 

AS A POSSIBILITY FOR SOME TIME. 

THE LONGER THE SITUATION OF DEFIANCE 

CONTINUES, THE MORE POSSIBLE IT BECOMES THAT OTHER 

JNITS MAY ALSO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEFIANCE OF AUTHOR 

ITY. CERTAINLY THERE IS SOME SYMPATHY FOR BARREIRO'S 

STANCE. THIS IS, IN SHORT, THE MOST IMPORTANT TEST 

3F WILLS THAT HAS THUS FAR OCCURRED IN THE CONTEXT OF 

THE MILITARY HUMAN RIGHTS TRIALS SITUATION AND ITS 

DUTCOME WILL LIKELY HAVE FAR REACHING EFFECTS. 


CINCSO AND CINCLANT ALSO FOR INTAFF 

3.O. 12356: DECL: OADR 

FAGS: PGOV, MARR 

SUBJECT: ARMY MAJOR DEFIES COURT SUMMONS AND TOUCHES 

1. (C) IT APPEARS THE GOVERNMENT WILL PROCEED FIRMLY 

JUT CAUTIOUSLY. ONE POSSIBLE GOA PLAN SUGGESTED TO 

JS INCLUDES DECLARING A STATE OF SIEGE, WHICH WOULD 

THEN be endorsed by congress in an effort at a 

JROADLY BASED COMMON FRONT IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERN- 

IENT AND REJECTING THE ACT OF DEFIANCE. 

IILDRED 

SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 3816 870416125709 MSG000166885028 

SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 3816 870416125733 MSG000166885052 


F0B?50 o n i n ii t copy IN 

0? XMMED 

DE SUE0C #6140 1780226 

0 060128Z MAY 81 

DECLASSIFIED 

St*, SIC5TATI FASHDC E.D.13WD E.0.13526 

\ 

Authority 

TO AMBMBA5SY BUENO? AIRIS IMMEDIATE 1716 nuuiumj . % 

CONFIDENTIAL 

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 116140 

E.O. 12655* N/A 

TAGS* SEUM, AR 

MApfl 

SUBJECT t JJUMPHRBY-SENNEDY AMENDMENT REPEAL 

eal 

; FOLLOWING IS TEXT OP NON-PAPER PREPARED BY 

ARA/SC FOR DISTRIBUTION TO CONGRESSMEN CONCERNED 

ABOUT PROBLEM OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN ARGENTINA. 

HFAC STAFFERS RATE EXPRESSED INTEREST IK BATING 

A CURRENT STATUS REPORT FROM EMBASST ON THIS 

SUBJECT, NX REALIZE THAT IDENTIFIABLE USG DOCUMENT 

RAISES PROBLEMS OF CONFIDENTIALITY. NEVERTHELESS, 

POS POSSIBLE USE AS NEEDED, EMBASSY IS REQUESTED 

TO PROTIDE ITS ASSESSMENT OR COMMENTS ON NON 

PAPER BY OPENING OP BUSINESS MAY 7. 

2. (BEGIN TEXT) ANTI-SEMITISM IN ARGENTINA 

ARGENTINA HAS THE LARGEST JEWISH POPULATION OF 

LATIN AMERICA. ARGENTINE JENS HATE WXU-OBGANI ZED 

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS, EXERCISE THEIR RELIGION 

WITHOUT RESTRAINTS, AND PARTICIPATE FULLY IN 

ARGENTINE ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL LIFE. YET OVER 

THE PAST 38 TSARS, ANTI-SEMITIC ATTITUDES IN 

SOME SECTORS OF THE POPULATION AND OCCASIONAL 

)Y2RT ACTS OF ANTI-SEMITISM HATE BSYN A RECURRING 

PROBLEM. 

DURING THE SECURITY FORCES VAR AGAINST TERRORISM 

PROM 1074—1076, MANY ARGENTINE JENS VERB TICTIMS. 

20VSYSR, MOST OBSERVERS, INCLUDING LEADERS OF 

Date__W)± 

»******-****#***********»**#«(>****•** 

SIT* 

?QB; FONTAINE 

msn COMMENTS* 

PAGE 01 SXCSTATF NASHDC 6140 DTG*0601262 MAY 81 PSH*051878 

TOR* 126/0230Z CSN(HCE075 

Photocopy Reagan UbrE^*****^ N f~ T"U ENT *****£ COPT

»»»♦»*it& o-n r I p E--N--T--f-A--fc**»*»**g COPY 

THE ARGENTINE JEWISH COMMUNITY, DENY THIS REFLECTED 

AN EFFORT TO SINGLE OUT JEWS, NOTING THAT INDIVIDUALS 

OF JEWISH ORIGIN WERE MEMBERS OF ID&CATXD/INTELLECTUAL 

GROUPS TARGETED Br THE SECURITY FORCES. AT THE 

SAME TIMS, THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF ANTI-SEMITIC 

PERSECUTION BY SOME ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITY 

FORCES FOLLOVINC THE DETENTION OF JEWISH PRISONERS. 

THERE ALSO HAVE BEEN INCIDENTS WHICH REINFORCE 

THE BELIEF BY SOME THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT 

TOLERATES A DEGREE OF ANTI-SEMITISM. A REPORTEDLY 

ANTI-SEMITIC INTERVIEW LAST OCTOBER ON A GOVERNMENT 

SPONSORED TELEVISION STATION, THE SALE OF ANTI- 

SEMITIC LITERATURE, AND GOVERNMENT REFUSAL TO 

PERMIT THE SHOWING OF THE HOLOCAUST HAVE BEEN 

CITED AS EXAMPLES, 

IN HIS APPEARANCE BEFORE THE BOUSE AND SENATE 

FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEES IN MARCH, 1961, 

PRESIDENT-DESIGNATE VIOLA SAID THAT THE ARGENTINE 

GOVERNMENT WAS AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF ANTI- 

SEMITIC INCIDENTS AND HAD ADOPTED ENERGETIC METHODS 

AGAINST ANTI-SEMITISM. HE REITERATED SIS CONVICTION 

THAT THE ARGENTINE JEWISH COMMUNITY ENGAGES IN 

ITS ACTIVITIES ON AN EQUAL LEVEL WITH OTHER ARGENTINE 

CITIZENS. 

the oas human rights commission reported after 

ITS VISIT IN 1979 THAT THERE IS NO OFFICIALLY- 

SPONSORED POLICY OF ANTI-SEMITISM. LEADERS OF 

THE ARGENTINE JEWISH COMMUNITY CONSISTENTLY HAVE 

MAINTAINED THE SAME POINT OF VIEW. THEY ALSO 

POINT OUT THAT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, UNLIKE 

TTS PREDECESSORS, TOOK STEPS TO MAKE IT LEGALLY 

POSSIBLE FOR MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY TO COLLECT 

IND REMIT MONEY TO ISRAEL. THE MANDATORY CIVICS 

BOURSE WRICH ALL CHILDREN MU8Y TAKE HAS BEEN 

MODIFIED TO REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY. 

’RESIDENT VIDELA'5 MESSAGE LAST YEAR TO THE JEWISH 

COMMUNITY ON THE OCCASION OF THE JEWISH HOLIDAYS 

TREATED THEM AS FULLY INTEGRATED MEMBERS OF THE 

ARGENTINE NATION. THUS, ACCORDING TO THE ARGENTINE 

rSWISH COMMUNITY, THOSE OUTSIDE ARGENTINA WHO 

STATE THAT ARGENTINE JEWS AND SOVIET JEWS ARE 

N THE SAME SITUATION DO A GRAVE DISSERVICE TO 

ARGENTINE JEWS. 

IELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. ISRAEL IS AN IMPORTANT 

SUPPLIER OF ARKS AND OTFER MILITARY EQUIPMENT 

) i 

‘AG E 02 K*CSTATE WASHDC 614-3 S?fGtWlP.61 MAT 61 

TOR: 12R/32?0Z 

PSNf051876 

S5N*HC2M?5 

Photocopy Reagan Lib

»*»»»**g iQ H P 

A t***#***2 COPY 

TO ARGENTINA. (2ND TEXT) CLARX 

BT 

AO2 03 0? 03 SSCSTATE EA8HDC 6140 DTG10BB12BZ HAT 81 

TORi 126/B230Z 

PSN1051B7B 

GSNIHC2073 

Photocopy Reagan UbW^ftfc^HLQ q-n y I -*r~E~ N T~I-COPY

T--n?2i5 o H-y-r-B-r-irr copy IN 

0? I HMD 

Si?: kUERC #3381 1330033 

0 1223242 NAT fll 

”N SECSTATE WASHDC 

TO ANBMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 0330 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.0.13525 Vv 

Authority 

H&oa tS-TF- Date -------- 

INFO AMEM3A3SY SANTIAGO IMMF.DI ATF (3000 

AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE 0000 

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 133281 

MONTEVIDEO FOR DAS BUSPNELL 

E.O. 12065: CDS 5/12/87 (SERVICE, R* E.) 

TAGS: BTRD, NASS, PMMC, OS, AR 

SUBJFCTx RUMPHRET-EENNSDT AMENDMENT 


2, HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (FFAC) ON MAY 12 APPROVED 

BY VOICE VOTE AMENDMENT WHICH IMPOSES RDMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS 

TO ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL TO LIFT SECTION 620 B OF 

FAA, TEXT OF AMENDMENT IS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE: 

(A) SECTION 620? OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, 

RELATING TO ARGENTINA IS REPEALED, 

1*__fK!_JF—I—3i—i; COPT 

TIONS OP THTt SWATS A DETAILED REPORT CERTIFYING THAT* 

—(1) THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT 

PROGRESS IN COMPETING WITH INTERNATIONALLY.RECOGNIZED 

PRINCIPLES OP HUMAN RIGHTS? AND 

-~(2) THE PROVISION 0? SUCH ASSISTANCE, CREDITS, I.OANS 

GUARANTEES, DEFENSE ARTICLES, DEFENSE SERVICES, OR 

EXPORT LICENSES IS IN THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE 

-JN!TED STATES. 

(C) IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE REQUIREMENT OF PARAGRAPH 

(1) OF SUBSECTION (B) HAS BEEN MET, PARTICULAR ATTENTION 

SPALL BE PAID TO WHETHER* 

— (1) THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA HAS MADE EVERY EFFORT 

TO ACCOUNT FOR THOSE CITIZENS IDENTIFIED AS ’’DISAPPEARED". 

— {5?) THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA HAS EITHER RELEASED 

OR BROUGHT TO JUSTICE THOSE PRISONERS HELD AT TEE DISPOSI 

TION OF TEE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE POWER (PEN). 

3. TEXT OF HOUSE AMENDMENT WAS DESCRIBED AS IDENTICAL 

TO AMENDMENT PASSED IN SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 

(SFRC) THE PREVIOUS DAY. (WJ! UNDERSTAND CERTAIN "TECHNICAL 

ADJUSTMENTS” TO SENATE VERSION WHICH CLOSED COMMERCIAL 

SALES LOOPHOLE WERE MADE FOLLOWING SFP.C ACTION). HOUSE 

HOWEVER DELETED ADDITIONAL SFCR LANGUAGE ATTACHED TO 

SECTION (C)(1) AFTER "DISAPPEARANCES"...." AND HAS PROVIDED 

A LISTING OF ALL ARGENTINE CITIZENS KNOWN TO THE GOVERNMENT 

BOTH TO HAVE DISAPPEARED AND HAVE DIED AFTER NOVEMBER 

6, 1974." 

4. ABA/SC SERVICE PRESENTED ADMINISTRATION POSITION 

AGAINST AMENDMENT, EMPP.ASIZrNG DOUBLF STANDARD, RISK 

THAT COUNTRY SPECIFIC LANGUAGE WOULD BE USED BY ELEMENTS 

WITHIN ARGENTINA LEAST INTERESTED IN IMPROVING HUMAN 

RIGHTS, AND THAT .AMENDMENT WOULD HARM OVERALL RELATIONSHIP 

AND JOINT EFFORTS BY NSW PRESIDENTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. 

SECRETARY HAIG'S LETTER TO BROOMFIELD (SIMILAR LETTER 

ALSO SENT TO ZABLOCKI) MAKING ARGUMENTS AGAINST AMENDMENT 

ALSO INSERTED INTO RECORD. 

5. ASIDE FROM STRONG DESIRE IN DOTH HOUSE AND SENATE 

«0T TO APPEAR TO PE ABANDONING EFFORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 

A NUMBER OF FACTORS APPEARED TO CONVERGE TO STRENGTHEN 

FAG?! 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 32*1 DTGil22324Z MAT *1 

TORi 133/PP31? 

»*»»»»».& Q-K-fu-i-«y s h T~fA L»******F COPY 

PSN :003266 

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CONSENSUS ON COUPLING REPEAL WITH CONTINUING HUMAN RIGHTS 

REQUIREMENTS, THEY WERE! 

— ISSUE'or ANTI-SEMITISM, BROUGHT TO PORE BY TIMERMAN 

ARTICLE {Pm PRESIDENT MARIO G0R5NSTEIN PRESENTED OPPOSING 

VIEWS IN PRIVATE TO SOME EFAG MEMBERS THE HOUR BEFORE 

THE LAST SESSION)? 

— DETERMINATION BY PELL AND OTHERS WHO MET WITH VIOLA 

FOR VIOLA TO MAKE GOOD ON BIS PLEDGE TO DO SOMETHING 

ABOUT CLARIFYING CASES OT DISAPPEARED! 

— ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC INCIDENTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS 

IN HIGH INTEREST PEN CAS£5 SINCE VIOLA TOGS OFFICE! 

AND 

— CONCERN TOR REGIONAL BALANCE IN 7ISW OF HEIGHTENED 

TENSIONS ON ARGENTINE-CHILEAN BORDER, 

IN NEEIS AHEAD, Wa! WILL BE EXAMINING HOW AND TO 

YEAT EXTENT WE MAY BE ABLE TO ELIMINATE OR MODIPT RESTRICTIVE 

LANGUAGE ON FLOORS OP BOTH HOUSES. WHILE OUR BEST PROSPECTS 

APPEAR TO LIE IN SSNATF, ELEVEN TO ONI VOTE IN SUPPORT 

OF RESTRICTION IN STRC MAKES 5UCCFSE PROBLEMATICAL. 

HAT?. 

BT 

PAG t 03 OF 33 SECSTATF WASH DC 3?l'l rTG :i?23?4.7 MAY ?1 

TOP.: 133/0331Z 

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COPY 

ARGENTINE MILITARY TRAINING IN TFF US. WHILE EQUIPMENT PURCHASES 

WOULD HAVE BEEN SMALL, AT LEAST INITIALLY, HE SAIT, THE MILITARY 

SERVICES HAD HOPED’TO RESUME THE TRAINING OF PROMISING YOUNGER ' 

OFFICERS IN THE TJS. (SIMILAR REACTIONS ARE BEGINNING TO COME IN 

TO THE ATTACHES FROM THEIR CONTACTS IN THE MILITARY SERVICES.). 

i. COMMENT. THE CONDITIONS POSED IN THE HOUSE-SENATE VERSION GO OF 

COURSE BEYOND ANYTHING EVEN WHAT MOST ARGENTINE POLITICIANS AND 

OTHERS CRITICAL OF THE GOA ARE PRESENTLY ADVISING IN TERMS OF AN 

ACCOUNTING FOR THE PAST. THESE POLITICAL LEADERS—AS- MOST POLITI 

CALLY INFORMED OPINION IN THIS COUNTRY—BELIEVE THATA SOLUTION 

TO TEE PROBLEM OF THE DISAPPEARANCES, A MORALLY BURNING ISSUE, 

CAN COME ONLY GRADUALLY AS PART OF A LARGER POLITICAL SOLUTION? 

EXCESSIVE PRESSURE ON THE ISSUE NOW, IN THEIR VIEW, IS IN FACT 

AN OBSTACLE OF LIBERALIZATION AND EVENTUAL NORMALIZATION. CON 

FIRMING THE WORST FEARS OF THOSE WHO ENOW THEMSELVES RESPONSIBLE, 

IT STRENGTHENS THE HAND OF HARD LINE ELEMENTS IN THE ARMED SER 

VICES WHO VIEW WITH MISGIVINGS THE RHETORIC—AND EXPECTATIONS— 

ABOUT A MORE OPEN POLITICAL DIALOGUE GENERATED BY THE VIOLA ADMIN 

ISTRATION DURING ITS FIRST SIX WEEKS IN OFFICE. 

5. VIOLA'S OWN STANDING—AND SUPPORT—COULD SUFFER IF THE PERCEP 

TION SHOULD GAIN GROUND IN SENIOR MILITARY RANKS THAT ALLEGED 

PROMISES BY VIOLA (DURING THE SENATE CODELS VISIT HERE AND VIOLA'S 

OWN VISIT TO WASHINGTON) HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THE SFRC'S ACTION. 

AS THE DEPARTMENT IS AWARE, VIOLA IN OUR VIEW DID NOT IN FACT 

GIVE SUCH A PLEDGE EITHER HERE OR IN WASHINGTON (A MISTRANSLA 

TION HERE APPARENTLY LED TO A MISUNDERSTANDING OF THIS POINT) AND 

VIOLA PUBLICLY DENIED SUCH A COMMITMENT OUITF EXPIICITEIY EVEN 

BEFORE LEAVING WASHINGTON. 

6. WE HAVE NOTED SOME FRAGMENTARY INDICATIONS THAT DESPITE THIS 

SOME IN THE VIOLA ADMINISTRATION WERE BEGINNING TO LOOK FOR A FEW 

VERY LIMITED PRAGMATIC STEPS TO SHOW SOME MOVEMENT IN THIS AREA 

(THIS WOULD MOT INCLUDE, EVEN IF IT CAME ABOUT, THE RELEASE OR 

TRIAL—IN THE NEAR FUTURE AT LFAST—0* WHAT THE REGIME CONSIDERS 

A HARD CORE GROUP OF KNOWN TERRORISTS OR TERRORIST COLLABORATORS 

AND INSTIGATORS HELD UNDER PEN? A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THEM 

ACTUALLY DETAINED BY TTTE PREVIOUS PERON ADMINISTRATION). BUT ANY 

GENERAL AND COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION REMAINS, IN THE OPINION OF 

VIRTUALLY ALL QUALIFIED OBSERVERS, AT PRESENT BEYOND THE REACH 

AND POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE SYSTEM. 

RUSFR 

RT 

PAGE 02 OF 02 RUENOS AIRES 350? 

DTG:131515Z MAY 81 ?SN:00ft52? 

TOR: 133/2121Z CSN:HCE59S 

n p i ; ]j H"T j & •[,*******£ COPY 

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I NED OCT-BO C0PT-B1 ADS-00 IIIR-IB EUR-00 SS-OB 

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PH-SS PA-01 IKT-D2 DHB-01 USIE-BB BP-B1 

PRS-B1 SLPD-01 /OS6 U 

R 0516B4Z JAN B4 

FH AHEHBASSY BUENOS AIRES 

TO SECSTATE UASHDC SS9I 

INFO AHEHBASSY ASUNCIOH 

AHEHBASSY BRASILIA 

AHEHBASSY LA PAZ 

AHEHBASSY LOIIOON 

AHEHBASSY HONTEVIDEO 


USCIHCSO CUARRY HEIGHTS PH 

USCIHCLAUT NORFOLK VA 

.................................... 013214 B70241Z /72 

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF B3 BUEHOS AIRES SOIOS 

CIHCSO FOR IHTAFF 

CINCLA1IT ALSO FOR POL AD 

E.O. 12356: DECL:OAOR 

TAGS: PGOV, AR 

SUBJECT: THE TRIALS OF THE HILITARY 

REF: 

BUENOS AIRES BS14 

1. SUIIHARf. ALL NINE MEMBERS OF THE EARLY JUNTAS 

(IS76-SZ), INCLUDING THREE FORKER PRESIDENTS OF THE 

REPUBLIC, WERE ARRAIGNED OVER THE HOLIDAYS. THE 

CHARGES—KIDNAPPING, TORTURE AND HDHICIOE—HERE 

BROUGHT BY THE HEW COMMANDER-IH-CHIEF OF THE ARMED 

FORCES, PRESIDENT ALFONSIN. FORMER PRESIDENT BIGHOHE 

AND TWO MEMBERS OF THE LAST JUNTA (1SB2-S3), WHICH 

TOOK OVER IN THE FALKLAHDS DISASTER, WERE EXEMPTED 

FROM ALFOHSIH’S IHDICTHENT. OUT THAT DID HOT 

PREVEHT THEM, TOO, FROH TUMBLING IHTO THE COILS OF 

THE LAW, ENHESHED III PRIVATE SUITS BROUGHT AGAINST 

THE HILITARY. THE PLAINTIFFS ARE TENACIOUS PEOPLE 

WHO HOW HAVE THE HELP OF A BLUE-RIBBON CITIZENS GROUP, 

COHHISSIOHED LAST MONTH BY ALFONSIN TO INVESTIGATE 

AND REPORT ON THE DIRTY WAR BY HID-YEAR. THIS 

TELEGRAM IS A REFERENCE POINT FOR THE LITI GAT I OH 

INITIATED SO FAR BY THE ALFONSIN GOVERNMENT AND BY 

PRIVATE PARTIES. ONLY AS THE JUDICIAL SYSTEH GETS 

INTO THE WORK WILL IT BE POSSIBLE TO INTERPRET THE 

SIGNIFICANCE. END SUMMARY. 

CIAE-OB 

L-B3 

SNP-B1 

V1DELA, VIOLA AND BALTIERI, WHO UERE BOTH PRESIDENTS 

AND ASHY COMMANDERS AT ONE TINE; LAHBRUSCHIHI AND 

ANAYA FROM THE NAVY, AHD THE THREE AIR FORCE LEADERS, 

A60STI, GRAFF IGHA AND LAHI DOZO. ONLY FORMER NAVY 

CHIEF HASSERA FAILED TO APPEAR; HE IS DEIHG HELD 

WITHOUT BAIL IN A CIVIL CASE BROUGHT EIGHT MONTHS 

AGO INVOLVING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF A BUSINESS 

ASSOCIATE.' 

4. MULTIPLYING DISCOVERIES OF UNIDENTIFIED BOQIES 

IN UNMARKED GRAVES WERE A GRISLY COUNTERPOINT TO 

THE SPREAD OF THE ARMED SERVICES' PROOLEHS. SCORES 

OF FINOS UERE REPORTED AND HIGHLY PUBLICIZED OVER THE 

HOLIDAYS IN CEHETERIES AHD OTHER BURIAL SITES III THE 

BUENOS AIRES AND LA PLATA AREAS. CIVILIAN JUDGES UERE 

LEADING THE LOCATION AHD EXHUHATIOII EFFORTS, AHD 

IT WAS GENERALLY ASSUMED THESE UERE THE HILITARY 

EXCESSES WHICH, UNTIL NOW, IT SECIED THE COUNTRY 

EITHER 010 HOT BELIEVE OR WANT TO KNOW ABOUT. 

PRESIOIIIT ALFONSIN HEANTIHE SIGNED LEGISLATION 

REPEALING THE SEPTEMBER AMNESTY WHICH THE LAST JUNTA 

HAD GRANTED TO ITS THREE PREDECESSORS. THE 

CONTROVERSIAL MEASURE WAS HOT ONLY DECLAREO 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL BUT 'NULL.' BY DECLARING THE 

AMNESTY A NULLITY, AUTHORS OF THE REPEAL HOPE TO 

DENY THE ACCUSED ANY RECOURSE TO IT AS THE ‘HOST 

BENIGN LAW.' 

5. ACTION IH THE CIVIL COURTS AGAINST HONTOUERO AND 

EBP TERRORISTS FOR THE SAME OFFEHSES DATING BACK TO 

1S73 BEGAN AS THE HEW ATTORNEY GENERAL, JUAN OCTAVIO 

SAUNA, BEGAN PREPARING THE STATE'S CASES. ONLY ONE 

INDIVIDUAL CITED IN ALFONSIN'S DECEMBER 13 

INDICTMENT, FORMER COROOBA GOVERNOR RICARDO OBREGOH 

2. TUESDAY THE 13TH FOR HISPANICS CAH BE EVERY BIT AS 

ILL-STARRED AS FRIDAY THE 13TH FOR SUPERSTITIOUS 

ANGLOS. ALFONSIN'S THUNDERBOLT ORDERING MILITARY 

COURT TRIALS FOR TNE FIRST THREE JUNTAS WAS THEREFORE A 

•HARTES TRECE* SURPRISE, CONING AS IT DIO OH TUESDAY, 

DECEMBER 13, HIS FOURTH DAY IN OFFICE REFTEL). IT 

WAS FOLLOWED DECEMBER 2B BY DEFENSE HIIIISTER RORRAS' 

ORDER TO THE ARMED FORCES SUPREME COUNCIL TO START 

PROCEEDINGS AGAIHST THE NINE, ALL AT DUE TIHE OR 

OTHER CINCS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE SERVICES, FOR RAVING 

USED -METHODS AND PROCEDURES* IH THE DIRTY WAR THAT 

WERE -MANIFESTLY ILLEGAL.- 

Authority 

mapa €~P 

declassified 

E.0.13520 

Date—tf _— 

3. THE SUPREME COUNCIL, HEADED BY AN AIR FORCE 

BRIGADIER GENERAL NAMED LUIS MARIA FACES, SCHEDULED 

APPEARANCES OF THE ACCUSED FOR THE 2STH AND 30TH OF 

DECEHBER TO HEAR THE CHARGES. ALL BUT ONE CAHE-- 


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R B516B4Z* JAN A4 

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INFO ANEHBASSY ASUNCION 

ANEHBASSY BRASILIA. 

ANEHBASSY LA PAZ 

ANEHBASSY LONDON 

ANEHBASSY NONTEVIDEO 

ANEHBASSY SANTIAGO 

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HSCE-'BS NSAE-BB HA-BI L-B3 

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---------- 813226 B7B241Z 772 

THE HUNAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT, ONE OF UHOSE PIONEER 

LEADERS WAS ALFONSIN HIMSELF, ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S 

TINIDITY. THE JUNTAS, IN THE CRITICS' VIEW, SHOULD 

BE TRIED BY CIVILIAN HAGISTRATES, NOT IN HILITARY 

COURTS; THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE COUNCIL'S FINAL 

DECISIONS CAN BE APPEALED IN CIVIL COURT (BY EITHER 

PARTY) IS HOT ENOUGH. THE CRITICS ALSO PICK AT 

ALFONSIN'S SELECTIONS FOR THE BLUE-RIBBON CITIZENS 

PANEL INVESTIGATING THE DIRTY VAR; THEY WOULD PREFER 

A JOINT SENATE-HOUSE INVESTIGATION OF THE DISAPPEARED. 

THEY CAUTIOUSLY APPLAUO ALFONSIN'S OUICK ACTION, 

BUT THEY ARE CONCERNED IT IS NOT SWEEPING ENOUGH. 

THEY POINT TO THE SELECTION OF GENERAL ARGUINDEGUY 

AS ARHY CHIEF OF STAFF AS.NOTHING HORE THAN RECONSTITU 

TION OF THE OLD SYSTEN WITH DIFFERENT PEOPLE; 

ARGUINDEGUY'S INDUCTION REMARKS, AND THE PRESENCE OF 

VIDELA AND VIOLA AT THE CEREMONY, ARE ALL PROOF 

THAT IS HEEDED FOR MANY IN THE MOVEMENT. 

UNITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION B2 OF B3 BUENOS AIRES SB1S9 



E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR 

TAGS: PGOV, AR 

SUBJECT: THE TRIALS OF THE HILITARY 

CANO, IS IN THE COUNTRY. HIS EXPERIENCE SINCE 

RETURNING LAST HDNTH SHOULD DETER OTHER TERROR I STS-1N- 

EXILE FROM TRYING TO CDME HOME LEGALLY. OBREGON CAHO 

WAS ARRESTEO OH AN OLD POLITICAL SLANDER CHARGE AS 

SOON AS HE ARRIVED AND IS BEING HELD UNTIL FULL 

PARTICULARS AGAINST HIM ARE DRAW UP. BUT EVEN IF 

THE CIVILIAN TERRORIST TRIALS EVER GET OFF THE 

GROUND, THEY COULD NEVER HATCH THE DRAMA OF THE 

TRIALS INVOLVING HIGH-RANKING OFFICERS NOW UNDERWAY. 

B. ALFONSIN AND HIS PEOPLE SEEH TO UNDERSTAND THAT 

WITH ALL HIS BOLD MOVES, THEY CAHHOT ALLOW THEMSELVES 

TO BE PUSHED TOO FAR, TO RESPOND, OR BE SEEN TO.BE 

RESPONDING,.TO THE SOMEWHAT INCHOATE CLAIM OF THE 

MILITANTS FOR A SPECIES OF "POPULAR JUSTICE." WHAT 

THE NEW ADMINISTRATION SEEHS TO BE DOING IS STICKING 

TO ITS CAMPAIGN PROMISE: THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR 

PLANNING AND EXECUTING THE DIRTY VAR, AND THOSE WHO 

COMMITTED EXCESSES, WILL BE HADE ACCOUNTABLE; 

THOSE WHO LEGITIMATELY FOLLOWED ORDERS WILL NOT. THE 

PROSCRIPTION IS VAGUE, BUT SO IS THE PROBLEM IT WAS- 

DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH-TKAT IS,-THE HILITARY 

LEADERSHIP'S ASSUMPTION OF COLLECTIVE RESPONDIRILITY 

FOR THE DIRTY WAR IN ITS ‘FINAL REPORT" OF LAST 

APRIL. NOW, PRESUMABLY COHES THE TEST OF INDIVIDUAL 

6. BESIDES THE SUPREME COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST 

LEADERS FROM THE 1S7G-B2 ERA, BIG NAMES FROM THE 

JUNTA WHICH JUST LEFT OFFICE ARE BEING CAUGHT UP IN 

INVESTIGATIONS OF SEVERAL CELEBRATED DISAPPEARANCES. . 

' FEDERAL JUDGES HAVE TAKEN TESTIMONY FROM GENERAL 

NICOLAIDES ANO AONIRAL FRANCO IN THE 1977 KIDNAPPING 

OF INES OLLERDS, A COMMUNIST ACTIVIST. FORHER 

PRESIDENT BI GNOME, WHO ALSO HAY BE CALLED TO TESTIFY 

IN THE OLLEROS CASE, FACES INVESTIGATION IN THE 

DISAPPEARANCE OF TWO YOUNG ARHY CONSCRIPTS, BOTH 

ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COMMUNISTS ASSIGNED TO THE HILITARY 

COLLEGE WHEN BI6N0NE COMMANDED IT; COMMUNIST PARTY 

YOUTH FORMALLY OENOUNCEO THE FORMER PRESIDENT'S 

RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CASE OH JANUARY 3. BIGNOHE 

ALSO UNDERWENT THE INDIGNITY OF BEING "IMPLICATED 

BUT-NOT INDICTED" IN THE XIDNAP-DISAPPEARANCE OF 

PHYSICIST ALBERTO GIORGI FROH THE NATIONAL TECHNOLOGICAL 

INSTITUTE FIVE YEARS AGO. BIGNOHE WAS THUS THROWN 

TOGETHER WITH SOME OF THE HORE NOTORIOUS HARDLINERS 

OF THE DIRTY WAR WHO, AS "IHPUTADOS" IN THE GIORGI ~ 

CASE, HAVE ALL BEEN BARRED FROH LEAVING THE COUNTRY. 

BIGNONE BEGGED OFF FROM WHAT WOULD BE HIS FIRST 

COURT APPEARANCE DECEMBER 2B BECAUSE OF A SICK WIFE. 

7. INVESTIGATIONS-ARE SPREADING LIKE INK STAINS IN 

OTHER WELL-KNOWN DISAPPEARANCE AND MURDER CASES AS 

COURTS ALL OVER THE COUNTRY ARE GETTING INVOLVED. 

HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS MEANTIME KEEP THE 

PRESSURE UP IN THOSE AREAS WHERE THEY SEE ALFONSIN 

TO BE A BIT SHY. MUCH COMPLAINING IS HEARD FROM 


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PRS-01 SLPO-01 /056 W 

---------------------------------------------------013227 07 0241Z /7 2 

R 051B04Z JAN 84 


TO SECSTATE WASHOC 9.993 

INFO AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 

AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 

AMEMBASSY LONDON . 

AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 

AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 

USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN 





E. O. 1235B: DECL: OADR 

TAGS: • PGOV, AR 

SUBJECT! THE TRIALS OF THE MILITARY 

CULPABILITY, OR EXPOSURE TO PUNISHMENT, AGAINST THAT 

GENERAL ASSERTION OF RESPONSIBILITY. 

9. ADMITTEDLY, ALL OF THIS COULD SINK INTO A SWAMP 

OF LEGALISMS AND MORAL JUDGMENTS. IT CAN ALSO CAUSE 

SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEMS UNLESS ALFONSIN MAKES A 

CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN HIS INDICTMENT OF THE TOP 

PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE AND HIS SUPPORT. FOR THE INSTITUTIONS 

OF THE ARMED FORCES THEMSELVES. ORTIZ 


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Department of. State 

INCOMING 

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PH-BS PA-01 HCT-B3 0HB-B1 US I E-BO SP-B2 SNP-B1 

PRS-01 /OSB w' 

-----------------------------1U061 260011Z m 

R 1S1223Z JAN 14 

FH AHENRASSY BUENOS AIRES 

TO SECSTATE WASNDC 0201'. 


ANENBASSY BRASILIA 

AHEHBASSY LONDON 

ANENBASSY MADRID 

AHEHBASSY HDUTEVIDEO 

ANENBASSY ROHE 


USHI5SI0N USUN NEW YORK 

USHISSIOH GENEVA 

USCINCSO OUARRY HEIGHTS PH 

USCII1CLAIIT NORFOLK VA 

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 11 OF 13 BUENOS AIRES 005S7 

CINCSO FOR INTAFF, CIHCLAHT ALSO FOR POLAD, ROHE ALSO FOR. 

VATICAN OFFICE 

E.O. 12356: DECLsOADR 

TAGS: SHUN, PGOV, AR 

SUBJ: HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS IN ARGENTINA 

REF: 

BUENOS AIRES OSIS 

1. (C) SUMMARY: ALFONSIN SAYS THEBE ARE OVER 10,000 

PEOPLE UNO DISAPPEARED. HE ORDERED THE ARREST OF ONE 

OF THE HOST FAMOUS FIGURES OF THE 'DIRTY UAR,‘ GEN. CAMPS. 

PRESIDENT BIGNOHE F.EMAIHS UNDER ARREST, AS RUING 

OVER THE PAST CONTINUES TO DON I HATE THE NEWS. 

DEVELOPMENTS OF THE PAST TEN DAYS HIGHLIGHT ALFDNSIN'S 

PROBLEM IN MAINTAINING A BALANCE BETUEER RIGHT AND 

LEFT, BETUEEN DEMANDS FOR RETRIBUTION AND FEUS THAT 

SUCH RETRIBUTION WOULD HAVE ON THE UHED FORCES 

MO THE DEMOCRATIC FUTURE. END SUHHUY. 

PROGRESS OF ONE OF THE*HOST IMPORTANT COUNTRIES ON 

EARTH TO CONE HERE ANO'hELP US TURN ARGENTINA. AS WELL, 

INTO ONE OF THE.HOST IHPORTANT COUNTRIES ON EARTH.' 

4. 011 CAMPS ARRESTED. 

A FORHER POLICE CHIEF OF BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE, ARHY 

GENERAL RET) RAHOH'CAMPS, WAS ARRESTED ON JAHUARY IS ON 

THE ORDERS OF PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSIN. THE PRESIDENT 

ORDERED CAMPS TO BE COURT-HARTIALED ON GROUNDS THAT 'IN 

PRESS STATEHEHTS, GENERAL CAMPS REPORTEDLY ACKNOWLEDGED 

HIS DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN THE ABDUCT I HI AND DEATHS OF 

THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE, IN THE KIDNAPPING OF MINORS AND THE 

CHANGE OF THEIR FAMILY STATUS, AND ALSO REPORTEDLY HE 

JUSTIFIED VARIOUS CRIMES, INCLUDING TORTURE.' LAST YEAR 

THE SPANISH HAGAZINE 'PUEBLO' OUOTED CAMPS AS HAVING 

SAID THAT 'WILE I VAS THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE 

CHIEF, SOME 3,ODD PEOPLE DISAPPEARED. SOME OF THEM IN ' 

BURIED IN NN 010 NAME) GRAVES.'' CAMPS LATER DENIED 

NAVIHG MADE THAT AND OTHER CONTROVERSIAL STATEMENTS. 

NEVERTHELESS, ALFONSIN SAID THAT ‘THE TRUTH OF THESE 

STATEHEHTS - WHICH SHOCKED PUBLIC OPINION HERE AND 

ABROAD - HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR 

THE CORRESPONDING PUBLICATIONS,* WITH THE ADDITIONAL 

EVIDENCE OF THE 'INNUMERABLE UNIDENTIFIED CORPSES' FOUND 

RECENTLY IN BUENOS AIRES AND THE 'MULTIPLE REPORTS OF 

ABDUCTIONS AND DISAPPEARANCES OF PERSONS.* 

3. DJ) ALFDNSIN'S DECREE, WHICH WAS SIGNED BY THE 

PRESIDENT UD HIS DEFENSE AM INTERIOR MINISTERS, 

ORDERED CUPS' TRIAL BY TNE UHED FORCES SUPREME 

COUNCIL FOR 'PRIIIA FACIE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PIMHING 

UD DIRECTING OF A SINISTER TERROR APPUATUS WHICH HAD 

1. 01) ALFONSIN ESTIMATES THE OISAPPEUED AT 'MORE THU 

10,000*. 

' IN STATEMENTS MADE DURING AN INTERVIEW WITH HEW YORK 

CITY'S TELEVISION CHUNEL 41, RELEASED HERE JUUANY 23, 

PRESIDENT ALFONSIN ESTIMATED THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE HISSINO 

AS.A RESULT OF THE FORHER MILITARY REG I HE* S SO-CALLED 

‘oiRTY WU‘ AGAINST SURVERSIOH AT ‘ALMOST CERTAINLY MORE 

THAN 10,000.* ONCE AGAIN, HE STATED HIS POSITION THAT IT 

WAS ‘FIGHTING EVIL WITH EVIL THAT TURNED ARGENTINA INTO 

A VERITABLE'HELL.* HE REJECTED, HOWEVER, UY COMPARISON 

BETWEEN WHAT HAPPENED IN UGENTIHA UD THE EVENTS IN NAZI 

GERMANY ‘WHERE TRERE WAS A TRUE GENOCIDE. THERE HAS BEEN 

NO BUSH RACIAL PERSECUTION HERE. IMAT TRERE HAS BEEN 

HERE IS THE USE OF TERRORISM TO FIGHT TERRORISM.* THUS, 

NOT ALL THE DISAPPEUUCES WERE TNE WORK OF THE UHED 

FORCES, NE SAID, HUING IT INCUMBENT OH THE GOVERNMENT 

' TO INVESTIGATE DIRTY WU CRIMES NOT IN THE SPIRIT OF 

REVENGE BUT USING TRUTH UD JUSTICE TO RECONCILE THE 

NATION. 

3. 01) IN THE SUE INTERVIEW, ALFONSIN ALSO UHOUNCED 

THAT HE WOULD CREATE A COMMISSION TO COORDINATE THE 

RETURHOF ARGENTINE SCIENTISTS, TECKHI Cl JUIS, AND 

SKILLED WORKERS WHO ARE CURRENTLY LIVING IN THE U.S. 

HE SAID THAT 'WE HEED THOSE WHO UE WORKING. . .FOR THE 

Photocopy Reagan Library . —CONFIDENTIAL — 

DECLASSIFIED 

E.O. 13526 

Authority__ ujQ-wiM**- \aotS" 

NArtA B’F Data M

■ 

mHmtmr 


TELEGRAM 

SAGE 01 

ACTION ARA-00 

INFO 

OCT-OB 

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PRS-fll 

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AHEHBASSY BRASILIA 

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USHISSIDN USUIl HEW YORK 

USHISSION GENEVA 

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EUR-OB SS-OB 0IC-B2 

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 006S7 

CI NCSO FOR INTAFF, CIHCLAIIT ALSO FOR POLAD, ROHE ALSO FOR 


E.O. 12356; DECL:OADR 

TABS) SHUH, PGOV, AR 

SUBJt HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPHEIITS IN ARGENTINA 

TNE ALLEGED PURPOSE OF FIGHTING THE EOUALLY SINISTER 

TERROR ISH OF THE OPPOSITE SIDE,' ALONG WITH THE NINE 

HEHBERS OF THE FIRST THREE MILITARY JUNTAS THAT RULED 

ARGENTINA FROM MARCH 1S7G TO HID-1SB2. THE NINE HAVE 

ALL APPEARED AT ARRAIGNMENTS OF THE HILITAIY COUNCIL, 

TO BE INFORHED OF THEIR COURTS-HARTIAL, BUT CAHPS WAS 

THE FIRST OFFICER TO BE ARRESTED ON DIRECT ORDERS OF 

THE CIVILIAN PRESIDENT. ONE PRESS REPORT CLAIMED 

ALFONSIH WAS ‘SURPRISED* SO FEW PRIVATE COURT CASES HAD 

BEEN BROUGHT AGAIHST SUCH OBVIOUS FIGURES AS CAHPS, AND 

DECREED CAHPS*ARREST IN PART TO HAKE UP FOR THE LACK OF 

ACTION IN THE CIVILIAN COURTS. 

SNP-B1 

S16S 

AMONG THOSE REPORTEDLY PROVIDING SOME OF THE EVIDENCE ' 

WAS THE UNDERSECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ALFREDO BRAVO, 

WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEH TORTURED FOUR TIMES BY CAHPS 

IN SEPTEMBER 1S77. OTHER ALLEGED VICTIMS ALSO 

REPORTEDLY SUBMITTED EVIDENCE. ONE IS JOURNALIST 

JACOBO TI HERMAN, WELL-KNOWN EDITOR WHO WAS STRIPPEO JDF 

RIS CITIZENSHIP BY THE FORIER MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND 

WHO RETURNED TO ARGENTINA THIS HONTN ANNOUNCING'HE WOULD 

HELP SEHD CAMPS TO JAIL. PRESS REPORTS STATED THAT 

THE SUPREME COUNCIL WOULD BEGIN OUESTIDHHIIIG CAHPS THIS 

WEEK. 

B. (U) BIGHONE TO BE TRIED BY THE HILITARYT 

FORMER PRESIDENT BIGHOHE'S DEFENSE ATTORHEY CHARGED OH 

JANUARY 12 THAT THE CIVILIAN TRIAL JUDGE WHO HAD 

ORDERED BIGHOHE'S DETENTION BECAUSE OF HIS SUSPECTED 

INVOLVEHEHT IH THE DISAPPEARANCE OF TWO ARHY CONSCRIPTS 

IS NOT COMPETENT TO HAHDLE THE CASE. THE DEFENSE 

ATTORHEY ALSO REOUESTED THAT THE COURT PROCEEDINGS BE 

TRANSFERRED TO MIL I TART JURISDICTION ON THE GROUNDS 

THAT THE INVESTIGATION INVOLVES WHAT WERE CLEARLY 'ACTS 

OF DUTY.' OH JANUARY IS THE PROSECUTOR IN TNE CASE 

ALSO RECOHHEHDED THE TRANSFER OF THE TRIAL TO MILITARY 

JURISDICTION, STATING THAT THE KIDHAPPIHG OF THE CON 

SCRIPTS ‘HAD THE INDISPUTABLE, TYPICAL CHARACTERISTICS 

OF A MILITARY INCIDENT,' AHD ‘THAT THE PROCEEDINGS HUST 

BE SUBMITTED TO HILITARY JURISDICTION.' 

S. (U) HENENDEZ LET OFF THE HOOK. 

THE CHAHBEH OF DEPUTIES* CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 

DECIDED ON JANUARY IS AGAIHST RECOMMENDING ANY PUNISHMENT 

G. tU) CAMPS' ARREST DREW MIXED REACTIONS. ARGENTINE 

WRITER AND CHAIRMAN OF ALFOIISIH'S NATIOHAL COMMISSION 

ON THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PERSONS, ERNESTO SABATO, 

DESCRIBED THE ARREST AS ‘AN IMPORTANT STEP' TAKEN BY 

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. A MEMBER OF THE MOTHERS OF THE 

PLAZA DE NAYO AGREED, BUT RODEO THAT *WE ASX FOR HIM TO 

HE TRIED BY CIVILIAN COURTS, AHD THAT HE BE GIVEN THE 

MAXIMUM SENTENCE, THAT IF, LIFE IMPRISOHMEHT, RATHER 

THAN THE DEATH PEHALTY IMPOSED BY THE MILITARY DICTATOR 

SHIP.' HOHEL PEACE PRIZE VINNER ADOLFO PEREZ ESOUIVEL 

SAID HE WAS SATISFIED THAT CAMPS WAS TO BE TRIED BUT 

ADDED THAT PRESIDENT ALFONSIH ‘TOOK LONGER THAN HE 

SHOULD HAVE’ IH TAKING CAHPS TO COURT. ONE NATIONAL 

CONGRESSMAN, RICAROO BALESTRA, OF THE LIBERAL 

AUTONOMIST PARTY OF CORRIEHTES, SOUNDED A THEME STILL 

HEARD IN CONSERVATIVE CIRCLES HERE. ‘THE VINNER OF A 

VAR IS NEVER TRIEO, AHD WHAT WE LIVED THROUGH WAS A 

VAR, DIRTY, BUT A WAR NEVERTHELESS,* HE SAID. 'AS LONG 

AS CAMPS DID NOT COHHIT ANY ECONOMIC CRIMES, IIOR ACTED 

FOR PERSOHAL REVENGE, NOR COMMITTED AHY CRIMES OUTSIDE' 

THE ALLEGED POL ITI CAL PURPOSE CF FIGHTING SUBVERSION, 

HE CANNOT DE GUILTY.* 

7. 01) PRESS REPORTS OF. JANUARY 21 STATED THAT EVIDENCE 

AGAIHST CAMPS WAS TURNED OVER TO THE ARHED FORCES 

SUPREHE COUNCIL BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ON JANUARY 20. 


CONFIDENTIAL - '

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INFO AHEFtlASSY ASUNCION 

AHEMHASSY BRASILIA 

AHEN1ASSY LONDON 

ANEHBASSY MADRID 

ANEHBASSY MONTEVIDEO 

AMEK1ASSY ROHE 

AHEKBASSY SANTIAGO 

USHISSION USUN NEW YORK 

USHISSION GENEVA 

USCINCSO OUARRY HEIGHTS PN 


—-------------------------- 111B7B 16BB11Z /71 

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION B3 OF B3 BUENOS AIRES B05S7 

-ee»ptwtrTtstr0 

Department oj state 

INCOMING 

TELEGRAM 

11. (Cl COIIHENT: ALFONS Ill'S STATEMENT THAT AT LEAST 

IB,BBS DISAPPEARED IN THE REPRESSION, CARRIED IN ALL 

THE HEADLINES OH JAHUARY 13, TAXES HIM INTO TERRAIN PRUDENT 

OBSERVERS HAVE AVOIDED III THE PAST: PUTTING A NUMBER ON 

THE TOLL OF HISSINS IN THE DIRTY UAR. (INTERIOR MINISTER 

TROCCOLI TOLD THE AMBASSADOR DECEHBER 16 THAT THE TOTAL IS 

AROUND 6,000, A NUMBER DEVELOPED ON THE BASIS OF CASE 

HISTORY DOCUMENTATION BY THE PERMANENT ASSEMBLY OF HUMAN 

RIGHTS AND UIOELY ACCEPTED AS AUTHORITATIVE.) WHETHER 

IT IS 6,BB8, IB,BOB OR 30.BBB, AS CLAIMED BY THE MOTHERS 

OF THE PLAZA DE HAYO, BECOMES IRRELEVANT AS EXRUHATIDH OF 

THE PAST CONTINUES TO SHOCK THE NATIONAL CONSCIENCE. THE 

WEEKEND DISCLOSURE THAT THREE Y0UN6 CHILDREN APPARENTLY 

WERE EXECUTED IN WRAT WAS LATER DRESSEO UP TO BE A MILI 

TARY SHOOT-OUT WITH TERRORISTS SEVEN YEARS ABO ONLY 

HEIGHTENS THE BROWING PUBLIC HORROR OF WHAT ACTUALLY 

HAPPENEO HERE. ALL THIS ONLY FUELS THE HIGH FEELING 

AGAINST MILITARY OFFICERS BEING HAULED BEFORE TRIBUNALS 

IN UNRULY STREET SCENES. THIS IN TURH ADOS TO THE DIS 

QUIET IN THE ARMED FORCES, AND DEMONSTRATES THE 

PRESIDENT'S PROBLEM WHEN HE CALLS FOR REASON ON ALL 

BIDES TO SECURE THE GREATER GOOD OF RULE OF LAW. 

ORTIZ 

CINCSO FOR INTAFF, CINCLANT ALSO FOR POLAD, ROHE ALSO FOR 


E.O. 11356: OECL:OADR 

TABS: SHUN, POOV, AR 

SURJ: HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS IN ARGENTINA 

FOR GENERAL (RET) LUCIANO BENJAMIN HENENOEZ AFTER 

ACCEPTINO HIS ASSURANCES THAT HIS RECENT STATEMENTS 

BRANDING ALL CRITICS OF EXCESSES DURIHO THE ANTI 

TERRORIST CAMPAIGN AS SUBVERSIVE WERE NOT DIRECTED AT 

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. HENENOEZ RAO REITERATED THOSE 

STATEMENTS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON JANUARY 17 BUT HAD ALSO 

DECLARED HIS LOYALTY TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT. 

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMAN AND LEADING KUHAN RIGHTS 

ACTIVIST AUGUSTO CONTE WAS ALONE IN PRESSING FOR A BO 

DAY PRISON TERM. 

1C OJ) LEGISLATION. 

A. PENAL COOE REFORH. 

PRESIDENT ALFDNSIN ON JANUARY 13 SIGNED A LAW PASSED BY 

CONGRESS THAT REFORMS THE CRIHINAL PENAL CODE BY ALLOWING 

FOR THE SUBMISSION OF WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS IN FAVOR OF 

CIVILIANS SENTENCED BY MILITARY COURTS, EVEN IF THE 

SENTENCES WERE CONFIRMED BY CIVILIAN COURTS. THIS NEW 

LAW WILL FACILITATE THE ANNULMENT OF MILITARY TRIBUNAL 

SENTENCES IMPOSED AGAINST CIVILIANS, WHO HAY BE 

ELIGIBLE FOR RELEASE FROM PRISON OR HAY HAVE THEIR 

CASES SENT TO CIVILIAN COURTS FOR REVIEW BY APPEALING 

THEIR SENTENCES WITH A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. 

B. MILITARY CODE REFORH. 

THE SENATE HAS FORMALLY ACCEPTEO FOR DEBATE LATER THE 

MILITARY CODE OF JUSTICE REFORH BILL PASSED EARLIER 

THIS MONTH BY THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. THE BILL IS 

CONTROVERSIAL. JUSTICIALIST PARTY LEADER IN THE SENATE 

VINCENTE SAADI HAS ALREADY CALLED IT "AH UNCOIIFESCEQ 

AMNESTY" OF THE MILITARY AND SECURITY PERSONNEL INVOLVED 

IN THE SO-CALLED DIRTY VAR -AGAIHST SUBVERSION. THE 

DEBATE WILL REVOLVE AROUND ALFONSIR'S PLAH FOR LIMITING 

THE HUMBER OF MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES PERSONNEL 

WHO WILL STAND TRIAL. 


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The Department has been aware of these cases for 

some time. We and our Embassy in Buenos Aires on numerous 

occasions have solicited from the Argentine Government 

information as to their whereabouts. While we have 

been told that the Argentine Government has no knowledge 

concerning welfare of these individuals, we will continue 

to use our influence privately to encourage Argentine 

officials to make information available to the families 

of these as well as other cases of missing persons. 

With warm regards, 

Sincerely, 

ZD 

Walter J. Stoessel 

Mr. Jan Kalicki, 

Office of Senator Kennedy, 

2241 Dirksen Senate Office Bldg 

Washington, D.C. 

» 

i 

Drafted: AHA/SC i GJWh 1 tman s mas 

3-30-81 X29166 81-134G 

(Disc #21) 81-09311 

Clearances:ARA/SC:REService 

ARA:MNudell 

H:JMcBride 

Photocopy Reagan Library'

EDW,ARD W. KENNEDY 

' MASSACHUSETTS 

WAR 2 3 1S:i 

'jtyCntieb J£)icx{e& ,-3ben£x£e 

WASHINGTON. O.C. ZSSID 

8l%a L:I 

March 20, 1981 

Pv • 

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3 

'.n 

The Honorable r 

Walter J. StoesEel. 

Under Secretary fjj r 

Political Affa:j 

Washington, D.cJ/20520 

Dear Walter: 

To follow up the letter to the 

Secretary from Senators Cranston and 

Kennedy, I am enclosing the list of 

children who "disappeared" in Argentina 

since 1976. The Senators would 

appreciate the Department's pursuing 

these cases with the Government of * 


With thanks and best wishes, 

o 

Sincerely, 

50 

Jan Kalicki 

Foreign Policy Adviser 


\ . 9 

Political Prisoners — Argentina, March, 1981 

—Jorge Albert TAIANA —OAS/IACHR case 2353 

Detained by Federal Police in .Buenos Aires April 5, 1976. 

* —Gustavo WESTERKAMP — OAS/IACHR case 2127 * 

Arrested October 21, 1975, held withour charges or trial. 

* . 

—Raul Hector CANO — OAS/IACHR case 34 82 

Detained at the disposition of the Executive since May 27, 

1976. 

—Norberto Ignacio LIWSKY — OAS/IACHR case 3905 

Held at the disposition df the Executive since April 25, 

19781 

03 —Monica Maria Candelaria MIGNONE '— OAS/IACHR case 2209 

C5 Abductefd front her parents1 .home May 14, 1976. 

O —Debora Esther BENSHOAM'' 

Since kidnap in August, 1977, no charges have been brought 

against her. 

O 

—Pablo KLIMOVSKY 

*.0 Abducted April 20, 1975. Now held at the disposition 

of the Executive. 

!*} 

. —Alberto Maximo SCHPREJER 

Abducted January-30, 1976, held without hearing at the 

q . disposition of the Executive. 

m —Horacio Rene MATOSO 

. Arrested October 8, 1976, held without charge or trial. 

‘—Duilio Bias APONTE 

Arrested November 18, .1974. Charged and acquited, now 

held at the disposition of the Executive. Right of option 

to emigrate rescinded. 

• « 

—Maria do las Esperanzas Beltramino de LOTO 

* • 

Arrested with her husband September 25, 1976 — he is a 

"disappeared" person, she has been held at the disposition 

of the Executive, her right of option to emigrate having 

been rescinded. 

i 

—Rodolfo Juan BEGNARDI 

..’Arrested November 9, 1.975, held without trial at the 

disposition of the Executive. 

« 

Photocopy Reagan Library :


V* 'ithinftiin, [) * *\r«7U 

Dear Senator Kennedy: 

Thank you for your letter of March 19 expressing 

your concern over the human rights situation in Argont.:.* 

and asking that Secretary Haiy raise these concxrn.1: 

with President-designate Viola and other Argentineofficials. 

o 

a 

a 

o 

3 

LO 

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3 

3 

This administration is committed to the r.-.-ot--.. tic:, 

and promotion worldwide of individual freedoms and 

legal rights. Through the use of quiet, private tip]oir.acs 

*We have and will continue to pursue this important 

interest within the context of our overall strategic, 

hemispheric and security interests. 

In Argentina, there have been significant imprcve.-.e-t 

in human rights. There have been no confirmed disappear*:.-, 

this year. The number of persons held by the Executive 

on other than common criminal charges has been reduced . 

from about 8,000 in 1977 to under 900 today. Greater 

press and judicial discretion exists. We expect this 

progress to continue. 

The issue of accounting for the disappeared is 

the most difficult human rights issue facing the Argentine 

Government today. To the extent that it raises concerns 

of the military over recriminations and reprisals 

by a future civilian government, it impedes progress 

in other important areas such as restoration of due 

process and return to democratic rule. Over the longer 

term, we expect the Argentines themselves will resolve 

this issue. In the interim, wo will continue to 

our influence privately and in international fera 

to encourage Argentine officials in their effort:, 

to make information available to tho families of Iv.-iny 

persons. 

We have decided to seek repeal of Section 62-V 

of the Foreign Assistance Act. By imposing b?. 

restrictions on the sale of military supplies ar.J 

The Honorable 

Edward M. Kennedy, 

United States Senate. 


training to Argentina, this legislation inhibits the 

accomplishment of our strategic objectives in the 

hemisphere while not permitting recognition of the 

considerable progress Argentina has made toward the 

restoration of due process and rule of law. As in 

countries without restrictive legislation, we intend 

to utilize existing legislation and control procedures 

to take into account the full range of U.S. interests. 

Yours sincerely, 

O 

o 

o 

o 

•_o 

* Richard Fairbanks 

Assistant Secretary 

for Congressional Relations 

Drafted:ARA/SC:GJWhitman:HA:RJorgenson 

Cleared: ARA/SC:REService 

ARA:SDEaton 

ARA:JABUshnell 

HA:RGraham 

HA:SPaimer 

o 

35 

• • « • ■ . 

\ 

Photocopy; Reagan Library '

ÎCnifcb Pieties ^benctlc 

c\L 

WASHINGTON. D.C. *0510 

March 19, 1981 

The Honorable 

Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

Secretary of State 

Washington 

Dear Al: 

O 

m 

io 

•\ i 

V v 

o 

3D 

Following your meetings.this week with President 

Viola, - we are writing to request that you intervene 

on behalf of political prisoners and those men, women 

and children who have "disappeared" in Argentina. Former 

Secretary of State Vance delivered an earlier list to 

the Government of Argentina, making clear that there 

could be no military relations until some accounting 

was made and prisoners released. 

As you know; Senator Hubert Humphrey joined us and 

other Senators in introducing legislation in 1977 to' 

end all military aid and support to Argentina because 

of the extremely serious violations of human rights in 

that country. Since the military coup in 1976, up to 

15,000 individuals .have been seized by security forces 

and then "disappeared". Periodically these disappearances 

continue:* just this past week, two more were abducted 

by Buenos Aires provincial police, held incommunicado, * 

and tortured before being released.' 

Amnesty International, the Inter-American Commission ■ 

on Human Rights, the U.N. Human Rights Commission and 

other international human rights groups have documented 

extensive use of torture and violations of fundamental % * 

human rights; and even today, there are several thousand 

political prisoners who have been denied due process 

as well as the right of option to depart their country 

guaranteed by the Argentine Constitution. We are 

enclosing a list of particularly pressing humanitarian 

cases. 

We believe there will be significant Congressional 

and public opposition to U.’S. military aid to Argentina 

until its military junta accounts for the "disappeared", 

releases political prisoners, and respects the rights, 

of its citizens. 'You may be aware that each Thursday, 


* fc • ** 

•• > 

* I 

-2- 

mothers of the "disappeared" hold a vigil -in Buenos 

Aires; last week they were arrested by security police. 

We haye met with, some of them in the- past and found 

their cases compelling reason for our country to continue 

to urge disclosure of the facts- about their children and 

their grandchildren. We are making available to your 

Department all of the cases raised by these mothers with 

usr same of which are included in the enclosed list. 

CM 

O 

o 

n 

' We hope that you will raise these concerns directly 

with President Viola and express your own support for 

these aims, as well as for the return to civilian rule 

and- free elections in that country. To do so will be 

in the best traditions of our nation, and Argentine 

respect for freedom and human rights will make an 

essential contribution to increased stability and 

security in our Hemisphere. 

CNT 

P 

** * 

30 

V 


• I 1 


ACTION MEMORANDUM 

APR 71981 

UNCLASSIFIED 

TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 

P - Mr. Walter J. Stoessel 

ARA - Toro Ender 

Reply to Jan Kalrcki on Disappeared Children 

in Argentina 

ro 

3 

3 

in 

Mr. Jan Kalicki, Foreign Policy Adviser to Senator 

Kennedy, has written you to provide a listing, promised 

in Senator Kennedy's letter to the Secretary of March 

19, of children alleged to have disappeared in Argentina. 

Our response to the Senator1s letter is attached at 

Tab 2. 

Recommendation: 

That you sign the reply attached at Tab 1. 

M 

3 Attachments: 

— 1. Letter to Mr. Kalicki. 

2. Our Response to Senator Kennedy. 

35 3. Letter from Mr. Kalicki. 

Drafted:ARA/SC:GJWhitman:ma s 

3-30-81 X29166 

Cle ar ed: H: JMcB r i 

AMB. STOESSEL HAS SEEN 

APR 8 1981 

UNCLASSIFIED

Argentina - Carter, Regan, and Bush VP

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