FUTURE ARMY

THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY
2. THE ARMY TODAY: 2016-2020
Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley has just
completed his first year in office and will likely serve
for three more years before stepping down in August
2019. The decisions he makes during his term will not
only guide the Army through the turbulent demands
of the current world, but will also set the foundation
for both the mid-term Army of the 2020s and the farterm
Army stretching out to 2040 and beyond. While
major changes take time, they must be started now to
achieve longer-term effects.
The Army must adapt in five major ways to both
meet current demands while preparing for the next
conflicts—many of which involve finding innovative
ways to get more capability out of a nearly millionsoldier
force. The Army must creatively adjust force
structure to better meet operational requirements;
fully integrate the Army’s Active and Reserve
Components; rebuild joint and combined arms
warfighting capabilities; transform Army headquarters
and slash non-essential processes; and reconstitute
capabilities for rapid expansion.
ADJUST FORCE STRUCTURE TO BETTER
MEET OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The Army needs to alter its current force structure and
mix of conventional and special operations forces to
provide more effective deterrence and crisis response
capabilities. Realigning active and reserve units,
slashing unnecessary headquarters, and restructuring
selected infantry BCTs (IBCTs) will help provide the
needed billets for these changes.
Increase Army Special Operations Forces
After fifteen years of irregular wars, the nation’s
demand for SOF is showing no signs of abating. The
continued menace of global terrorism, the ongoing
conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, and the
explosion of conflicts in the gray zone 38 demonstrate
that US special operations capabilities will continue to
be required across a range of missions and theaters.
Between 2001 and 2016, the number of US SOF more
than doubled, from 28,620 to 63,150. 39 Most of those
were Army special operators—especially Special
Forces (SF), Rangers, and special operations aviators.
38 Barno and Bensahel, “Fighting and Winning in the ‘Gray Zone,’”
op. cit.
39 International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance
2001 (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 25; International Institute
of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2016 (London:
Routledge, 2016), p. 48.
Yet, despite continued demand for their skills, recent
cutbacks have caused Army Special Forces to reduce
and reorganize one SF battalion in each SF Group,
and the Army Ranger Regiment had to inactivate
one company in each Ranger battalion. As discussed
earlier, demands for SOF will only continue to increase
in the future. Therefore, reducing SOF—particularly
the cutting-edge capabilities of these units—makes
no sense. The Army needs to reverse those recent
cutbacks and put US Army Special Operations
Command (USASOC) on a modest continual growth
trajectory once again.
Recreate Heavy Cavalry Units
The inactivation of the Army’s last heavy armored
cavalry regiment (ACR) in November 2011 eliminated
one of the most versatile and capable formations from
the Army’s force structure. 40 ACRs integrated aviation,
armor, and mechanized forces down to the company/
troop level and provided both reconnaissance and
security to protect larger formations. They conducted
flank and forward screening missions to support a
division or corps, and fought to gain vital battlefield
intelligence about the enemy. 41 They also provided
security around the edges of the battlefield, providing
important protection for other Army units. During
the same period, the Army also eliminated all of its
division cavalry squadrons.
These changes were made for two main reasons: the
standardization of combat brigade units into Armored,
Infantry, and Stryker 42 BCTs across the force, and a
perception that the new reconnaissance, surveillance,
and target acquisition (RSTA) squadrons in each
BCT could perform the heavy cavalry’s traditional
tactical missions. The unending demands for
counterinsurgency forces in Iraq and Afghanistan also
contributed to the decision to eliminate heavy cavalry
units. However, these decisions led to significant gaps
in providing reconnaissance and security that remain
40 The Third Armored Cavalry Regiment was converted to a
Stryker unit. Heather Graham-Ashley, “3rd ACR Transitions to
Strykers, Changes Name,” November 30, 2011, https://www.
army.mil/article/70060/3rd_ACR_transitions_to_Strykers__
changes_name.
41 Each Army division was assigned an Armored Cavalry
Squadron, roughly the size of a battalion, for this mission;
each Army corps was assigned an Armored Cavalry Regiment,
roughly the size of a brigade. Headquarters, Department of the
Army, FM 17-95: Cavalry, April 20, 1981, http://cgsc.contentdm.
oclc.org/cdm/pageflip/collection/p4013coll9/id/596/type/
compoundobject/show/590/cpdtype/monograph/pftype/pdf.
42 Strykers are eight-wheeled armored vehicles.
10 ATLANTIC COUNCIL