FUTURE ARMY

THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY
of citizens with some Army experience who could be
called upon in times of need.
Create an Army Civilian Volunteer Auxiliary Corps
Many Americans wish to serve their country in some
form, but an increasing number of them cannot meet
the military’s entrance requirements. In 2014, only 29
percent of men and women between the ages of 17
and 24 were eligible to serve in the military because
they lacked a high school degree or had issues related
to health, obesity, mental acuity, drug use, or criminal
records. 177 Some of the disqualifying characteristics
should rightfully preclude military service, such as
felony convictions. However, many individuals with
some of the other disqualifications might still be able
to provide valuable service to the Army in a different
role. The Army could establish, for example, an Army
Civilian Volunteer Auxiliary Corps,
modeled along the lines of the
Civil Air Patrol, 178 whose personnel
could assist the Army in various
enterprise functions, such as
information technology, library
services, or general administrative
support. More skilled (and
certified) volunteers could assist
with child care, health care, or
legal services. Volunteers would
provide valuable services and
would maintain a visible affiliation
with the Army. Such an effort
could widen the scope of those
citizens who are exposed to the
US military and could help shrink,
even slightly, the ever-growing
divide between the US military
and the population it serves. 179
EMBRACE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES
AND EXPERIMENTATION
The Army is and always will be about people. As former
Chief of Staff of the Army General Creighton Abrams
once said, “People aren’t in the Army. People are the
Army.” 180 While that is undoubtedly true, the Army’s
177 Miriam Jordan, “Recruits’ Ineligibility Tests the Military,” Wall
Street Journal, June 27, 2014.
178 Richard Mulanax, “Civil Air Patrol: 75 Years of Service,”
CAP National Historic Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, January-
March 2016, http://history.cap.gov/files/original/
f6a1bb617d7650f767d2043a7dc8f4b2.pdf.
179 David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “When the Yellow Ribbons
Fade: Reconnecting Our Soldiers and Citizens,” War on the
Rocks, July 14, 2015, http://warontherocks.com/2015/07/
when-the-yellow-ribbons-fade-reconnecting-our-soldiers-andcitizens/.
180 Quoted in Secretary of the Army Pete Geren, speech delivered
The Army must
therefore find new
ways of leveraging
and investing
in advanced
technologies—not
to replace its
people, but to
enable its people
to perform far
more effectively.
rightful focus on people often seems to generate
a parallel distrust of advanced technology. Army
senior leaders often rail against the siren song of high
technology replacing the verities of war, 181 and many
in the service feel that the emphasis in the late 1990s
on rapid decisive operations and Army Transformation
led the US military down the wrong track—as the
bloody close-fighting wars of Iraq and Afghanistan
subsequently proved. Nevertheless, rapidly changing
and evolving technology will permeate every aspect
of life in the twenty-first century. The Army must
therefore find new ways of leveraging and investing in
advanced technologies—not to replace its people, but
to enable its people to perform far more effectively.
Enable Greater Experimentation in Operational Units
In the 1980s, the Army designated the 9th Infantry
Division as the “High Technology
Test Bed” division. 182 It served as
both an operational division and
one that could undertake bold
and innovative experiments with
all manner of new technologies
and innovative tactics. Much
of this experimentation was
decentralized, enabling junior
officers and NCOs to explore,
experiment, and test new ideas.
The division’s commanders were
chosen for their reputation as
innovators and for an ability to
be forward thinking. Not all of the
experiments worked, of course, but
this was accepted as the inevitable
price of discovery and eventual
progress. This model produced
numerous new concepts based
on unorthodox tactics, equipment, and organizations
that generated extensive discussion and promoted
intellectual ferment throughout the force.
at the Army Management Staff College, January 29, 2009,
https://www.army.mil/article/16369/Remarks_by_Secretary_
Pete_Geren_to_Army_Management_Staff_College___
Jan__29__2009.
181 Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster has been particularly
outspoken on this point. See “The Pipe Dream of Easy War,”
New York Times, July 20, 2013; “Thinking Clearly About
War and the Future of Warfare–The US Army Operating
Concept,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military
Balance Blog, October 23, 2014, https://www.iiss.org/en/
militarybalanceblog/blogsections/2014-3bea/october-831b/
thinking-clearly-about-war-and-the-future-of-warfare-6183.
182 “Sixty Years of Reorganizing for Combat: A Historical Trend
Analysis,” CSI Report No. 14, Combat Studies Institute, US Army
Command and Staff College, December 1999, pp. 45-50, http://
usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/sixty.pdf.
42 ATLANTIC COUNCIL