The Threat of Small UAS
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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Threat</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Small</strong> <strong>UAS</strong><br />
NAMMO MP Symposium<br />
14 September 2016<br />
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Topics<br />
• <strong>UAS</strong> threat perception and evolution<br />
• NIAG’s role in feasibility studies into C-<strong>UAS</strong>/C-LSS<br />
– (NATO Industrial Advisory Group)<br />
• Focus on C-<strong>UAS</strong> in the military context (GBAD)<br />
• <strong>The</strong> challenges <strong>of</strong> the shorter range C-<strong>UAS</strong> solutions<br />
• <strong>The</strong> way ahead
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“US Army leadership in Europe, as well as many countries in the region,<br />
have warned there is a growing gap in short-range air defense.”<br />
“Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, the US Army Europe commander, told Defense<br />
News during an interview in Poland last week he has similar concerns. For<br />
him, the biggest worry is countering unmanned aerial vehicles. “That is my<br />
SHORAD concern, especially if there’s like a swarm,” he noted, adding<br />
there is a lot <strong>of</strong> work being done to develop the capability.”<br />
June 14, 2016<br />
• AI3<br />
• MHTK<br />
• AIM-9X<br />
• Tamir<br />
• IBCS<br />
• IFPC-2<br />
• MML
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«Protective edge (Gaza war) was not a short sprint, but a marathon»<br />
Brig.Gen. Shahar Shochat<br />
IAF (GBAD), August 2015<br />
«… we’ll need to have close-point defence capabilities in the near future to address<br />
the threat <strong>of</strong> precise, stand-<strong>of</strong>f munitions, whether from cruise missiles at the high<br />
end or a spectrum <strong>of</strong> UAV threats»<br />
«… the counter-UAV mission is only going to expand over time as unmanned threats<br />
become more varied. We’re looking at Mini-UAVs and even Mico-UAVs that will<br />
challenge us in the near future; and that’s why we’ll need the additional intercepting<br />
layer [below Iron Dome]».
Russia in East Ukraine – <strong>UAS</strong><br />
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«Orlan-10»<br />
«Korsar»<br />
July 2015<br />
«Searcher» Mk 2<br />
(Israeli origin)<br />
«Forpost»<br />
May 20, 2015<br />
«Granat-1» May 2015<br />
Zala 421 series
200 th STUDY – COUNTER LOW, SLOW AND SMALL THREAT EFFECTOR MIX<br />
Recent UAV Military <strong>Threat</strong> Appearance<br />
Zala 421-08M Micro UAV<br />
Yakovlev Pchela<br />
ISR UAV<br />
Time sensitive<br />
targeting for artillery<br />
Zala Micro UAV employed with forward<br />
observers by GRU Spetsnaz<br />
Long Range<br />
Artillery<br />
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Russia in East Ukraine – Lessons learnt<br />
(Dr Phillip A. Karber , Potomac Foundation, Johns Hopkins APL (ARCIC), 6 July 2015)<br />
Russia:<br />
• 14 different UAV designs employed since May 2014 (13 F/W and at least one R/W<br />
design)<br />
• 5 different UAV types observed<br />
– Very long range strategic surveillance HALE UAV flying the border and Ukrainian southern coast<br />
– Long range-higher altitude F/W drone flying over UKR positions beyond Brigade area<br />
– Medium range F/W drone used in target acquisition and real-time engagement with less than 15 min<br />
response time, associated with Urgan and Smersch MLRS<br />
– Short range F/W drone particularly working with BM-21 MLRS targeting<br />
– Very short range tactical R/W quad-copter used for scouting defence positions and post-strike BDA<br />
• Rapid evolution <strong>of</strong> capability<br />
• Well trained <strong>UAS</strong> force units – long planning cycles, not ultra-reactive<br />
• Survivability <strong>of</strong> Russian drones seems to be quite good (no effective UKR C-<strong>UAS</strong>)<br />
• Most efficient RUS C-<strong>UAS</strong> capability were self-propelled ECM-vehicles<br />
jamming Ukrainian and OSCE surveillance drone GPS<br />
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(Nano)<br />
UAV Classes and Characteristics<br />
Example platforms<br />
Micro<br />
Weight: < 2kg<br />
Op. Alt: 100 m<br />
Radius: 5 km<br />
Payload: < 0.5 kg<br />
Zala 412-8m<br />
Octocopter<br />
Class 1<br />
Legacy GBAD relative to LSS/UAV Battlespace<br />
High Speed/High Dive<br />
Depressed trajectory TBM (SS-26)<br />
SHORADS<br />
VSHORADS<br />
3-4 km<br />
Loitering SEAD/DEAD <strong>UAS</strong><br />
30km<br />
20km 10<br />
Defended assets area<br />
0 10 20<br />
30km<br />
--- Micro UAVs<br />
--- Mini UAVs<br />
NIAG Study Group 188<br />
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<strong>The</strong> role <strong>of</strong> NIAG<br />
• High level advice<br />
• Feasibility studies
‘STUDY TODAY – CAPABILITY TOMORROW’<br />
Sequence <strong>of</strong> NIAG Studies into C-<strong>UAS</strong><br />
200 th STUDY – COUNTER LOW, SLOW AND SMALL THREAT EFFECTOR MIX<br />
German Political Rally<br />
SG-170<br />
SG-188<br />
SG-200<br />
‘STUDY TODAY – CAPABILITY TOMORROW’<br />
Study on Low,<br />
2012 2014 2015<br />
2017<br />
Slow and <strong>Small</strong><br />
Effector Mix<br />
Study on<br />
Engagement <strong>of</strong><br />
Low, Slow and<br />
<strong>Small</strong> Targets by<br />
GBAD<br />
Serbia v Albania<br />
Soccer Match<br />
• Inventory <strong>of</strong> extant sensors and<br />
effectors and assessment <strong>of</strong><br />
effectiveness against LSS threats<br />
• No one sensor solution<br />
• Extant effectors not cost<br />
effective against LSS<br />
threats<br />
LSS <strong>Threat</strong>s<br />
Study on GBAD<br />
Sensor Mix<br />
Optimization for<br />
Emerging <strong>Threat</strong>s<br />
Islamic State use<br />
<strong>of</strong> UAV in Syria<br />
• Analysis <strong>of</strong> LSS threat platforms<br />
• Reaffirms no one sensor solution<br />
• Analysis <strong>of</strong> sensors against these<br />
threats and optimum sensor mix(s)<br />
– sensor cluster concept<br />
• Required changes to extant GBAD<br />
Force Construct<br />
French Nuclear Power Stations<br />
NATO INDUSTRIAL ADVISORY GROUP<br />
• Analysis <strong>of</strong> the effectors against<br />
the LSS threats and optimum<br />
sensor/effector mix(s)<br />
• Identify issues to consider for<br />
development <strong>of</strong> Counter LSS<br />
<strong>Threat</strong> CONOPS<br />
200 th STUDY – CO<br />
h German Political Rally<br />
STUDY – COUNTER LOW, SLOW AND SMALL THREAT EFFECTOR MIX<br />
SG-17<br />
Study o<br />
Engageme<br />
Low, Slow<br />
<strong>Small</strong> Targe<br />
GBAD<br />
• Inventory <strong>of</strong> extan<br />
effectors and as<br />
effectiveness agai<br />
• No one senso<br />
Serbia v Albania<br />
Islamic State use<br />
1<br />
• Extant effecto<br />
effectiv<br />
<strong>of</strong> UAV in Syria<br />
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Soccer Match<br />
2012
NIAG STUDY GROUP SG-200<br />
Study on Low, Slow and <strong>Small</strong> (LSS) <strong>Threat</strong>,<br />
Effectors<br />
Mid-Term Report to JCG GBAD<br />
April 19, 2016<br />
Mr Sveinung Alne<br />
Chairman SG-200<br />
sveinung.alne@kongsberg.com<br />
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NIAG SG-200 Participating Companies<br />
Airbus Group Innovations<br />
AirRobot<br />
AIT<br />
Altay Corporation<br />
Aselsan<br />
BAE Systems<br />
Boeing<br />
Diehl-BGT GmbH<br />
E&Q Engineering<br />
Engineering Ingegneria Infomatica S.p.A<br />
Ernst Kelter Business Consulting<br />
ESG<br />
IABG<br />
IDS Corporation<br />
Information Bridge (International) Consulting<br />
Intecs S.p.A<br />
Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace<br />
L-3 Communications<br />
Lockheed Martin<br />
Lockheed Martin UK<br />
MBDA France<br />
MBDA Germany<br />
MBDA Italy<br />
MBDA UK<br />
NIAG SG-200<br />
Micr<strong>of</strong>lown AVISA<br />
Nexter<br />
OpsServe International<br />
PIT-RADWAR<br />
Prostaf<br />
Retia<br />
Rheinmetall Air Defence Switzerland<br />
Rheinmetall Defence Electronics<br />
Rheinmetall Italia<br />
Rheinmetall Waffe Munitions<br />
RUAG Aviation<br />
S3Log<br />
SAAB<br />
Safran Herakles<br />
Selex ES<br />
Selex Italia<br />
SIMAV<br />
SRC Inc<br />
Synthesys<br />
TeamNet International<br />
Tekever<br />
Thales France<br />
Thales Group UK<br />
47 companies<br />
representing 16<br />
nations<br />
• Austria<br />
• Czech Republic<br />
• France<br />
• Germany<br />
• Italy<br />
• Netherlands<br />
• Norway<br />
• Poland<br />
• Portugal<br />
• Romania<br />
• Spain<br />
• Sweden<br />
• Switzerland<br />
• Turkey<br />
• United Kingdom<br />
• United States<br />
4
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C-LSS/<strong>UAS</strong> Capability Classes - Battlespace<br />
Outer Tier<br />
Inner Tier<br />
Middle Tier<br />
1 km<br />
Defended assets area<br />
500m<br />
500m<br />
5km<br />
NIAG SG-200<br />
2km<br />
0 2km<br />
5 km<br />
--- Micro UAVs (R=5km, Alt=100m, Payload
C-<strong>UAS</strong> - Typical threat scenarii<br />
• <strong>UAS</strong> performance classes (*Micro, *Mini, *<strong>Small</strong>)<br />
– <strong>Threat</strong> exposure ranges (0-500m, 500m-2km, 2-5km)<br />
– F/W, R/W<br />
– Remote control from ground operator replaced by threat platform autonomy<br />
• <strong>UAS</strong> missions<br />
– ISR – Pop-up, eksposure range given by sensor payload, short exposure time (8-12 sek), v~0-100 km/t<br />
– ISR combined with indirect long range fire<br />
– Direct attack with explosives or - (UCAV), v~200 km/t<br />
– Direct Mass/Swarm-attack<br />
*<strong>Small</strong><br />
R=100km<br />
H=1500m<br />
V=
Effector Types and Assessment<br />
• Guns & Ammunition<br />
• Lower cost missiles<br />
• DEW<br />
• MPL/HPL<br />
• MPM/HPM<br />
• Hunter-killer UAVs<br />
• Novel effectors<br />
NIAG Study Group 200<br />
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Effectors analysed in NIAG SG-170, 188, 200<br />
1. Contemporary missiles<br />
2. <strong>Small</strong> calibre, short range, low energy point defence missiles<br />
3. Low cost deep magazine missiles<br />
4. Low altitude missiles<br />
5. Mobile missile system<br />
6. Loitering UAV is the effector<br />
7. Loitering UAV carries the effector<br />
8. Contemporary guns in a layered defence<br />
9. Contemporary guns with low collateral ammunition<br />
10. Contemporary guns with guided ammunition<br />
11. Network enabled handheld gun<br />
12. Static deployed net barrier<br />
13. Single, high power laser effector<br />
14. Multiple, widely distributed and coordinated lasers<br />
15. Mobile laser effector<br />
16. Short range UAV carried RF DEW payload<br />
17. Highly directional RF DEW<br />
18. ECM against UAV<br />
19. ECM against UAV controller<br />
<strong>Small</strong> Low-cost<br />
missiles<br />
Hunter/Killer<br />
on NASAMS LCHR<br />
30 mm gun turret<br />
Munition ?<br />
(Air burst micro-pellet, FAE ?)<br />
Laser on gun turret
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C-<strong>UAS</strong>/LSS Challenges – <strong>The</strong> big picture<br />
• A realistic view <strong>of</strong> what the LSS threat can do to us<br />
• <strong>Threat</strong> appearance ranges<br />
• Offensive/defensive timelines<br />
• <strong>Threat</strong> ISR observation ranges<br />
• Low observability effects<br />
• Gaps in contemporary sensors and effectors<br />
• New effectors and sensors taxonomy<br />
• Overlap between contemporary and new effectors<br />
• <strong>The</strong> C-LSS integration space – complexity !<br />
• <strong>The</strong> need to see current and future C-LSS concepts with defined battlespace as<br />
instruments for navigating the complex solution space<br />
• C-LSS solutions should aim to be included in SHORADS class GBAD<br />
• Continuous threat “Horizon scanning” is key
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C-<strong>UAS</strong> Plug-ins<br />
for NASAMS III GBAD<br />
DroneDefender<br />
Examples<br />
Skywall 100<br />
NINOX<br />
DroneRanger Blighter DroneRanger<br />
HEU<br />
Link 11B<br />
Link 16<br />
JRE<br />
Rheinmetall<br />
NAP = Network<br />
Access Point<br />
NAP<br />
BOC<br />
BNDL-IP<br />
Real-time Network<br />
(J-Series structure)<br />
NAP<br />
FDC<br />
FDC<br />
NAP<br />
High Power Laser<br />
MCT-30 Turret<br />
30 mm gun turret<br />
Munition ?
kongsberg.com<br />
Questions ?
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