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Law Society Gazette | gazette.ie
EXTRADITION
Jan/Feb 2017 37
THE LAW
IT IS OPEN TO IRELAND AND BRITAIN TO ENTER
INTO THEIR OWN BESPOKE EXTRADITION
ARRANGEMENTS. THIS COULD TAKE THE FORM OF
A NEW BILATERAL EXTRADITION TREATY
PIC: GETTY IMAGES
A possible alternative that might
succeed in overcoming this concern would
be for Britain to enter into a collective
extradition agreement directly, following
the precedent established under Council
Decision 2006/697/EC of 27 June 2006.
That directive effectively extended the use of
EAWs to the third-party, non-EU states of
Iceland and Norway and is virtually identical
in its terms to the EAW Framework
Decision, with one crucial difference: namely,
that the principle of the supremacy of EU
law does not apply. The national courts are
not subordinate to the European Court
of Justice (ECJ). Under the terms of the
directive, any dispute can be referred
to a “meeting of representatives of the
governments … with a view to settlement
within six months”.
To promote uniformity in the
interpretation of law, Iceland and Norway
have agreed to keep their domestic case
law under constant review and, while not
accepting to be bound by ECJ judgments,
there is an acceptance of the persuasive value
of those judgments.
It should be borne in mind that both
Iceland and Norway’s systems of law, as
members of the European Free Trade
Association and the Schengen acquis (the
EU’s border-free zone), are compatible with
the EU member states. Contrast this position
with the stated aim of the Brexit campaign to
restore Britain’s ability to exert control over
the free movement of people.
The extradition agreement between
Iceland, Norway and the EU member states
took eight years to negotiate and, after a
further five years in waiting, the agreement
(the directive) is still not in force. Compare
this timeline with the maximum two-year
period that would be required to both
negotiate and to complete an extradition
agreement once Brexit is triggered.
If Britain and the EU do not enter into
such an agreement or there is a delay of
several years before a collective extradition
agreement is actually in force, what happens
in the interim period?
The ‘not viable’ option
A second, though unviable, option would be
that Ireland and Britain fall back upon any
pre-existing extradition arrangements.
Up to 1965, any arrest warrant issued
by a court in Britain, the Channel Islands,
the Isle of Man, or Ireland was immediately