HACKABLE SECURITY MODULES

More documents

Recommendations

Info

HOW DO WE DEFINE INSTRUCTION CLASSES? class TMS320C64xInstD1 : TMS320C64xInst { bits dst; bits src2; bits src1; bits op = opVal; } let Inst{27-23} = dst; let Inst{22-18} = src2; let Inst{17-13} = src1; let Inst{12-7} = op; let Inst{6-2} = 0b10000;
HOW DO WE DEFINE INSTRUCTION CLASSES? class TMS320C64xInstD2 : TMS320C64xInst { bits dst; bits src2; bits src1; bit crosspath; bits op = opVal; } let Inst{27-23} = dst; let Inst{22-18} = src2; let Inst{17-13} = src1; let Inst{12} = crosspath; let Inst{9-6} = op; let Inst{11-10} = 0b10; let Inst{5-2} = 0b1100;
Page 1 and 2:
HACKABLE SECURITY MODULES: REVERSIN
Page 3 and 4:
OUTLINE What is an HSM and HSM secu
Page 5 and 6:
USAGE Securely store cryptographic
Page 7 and 8:
BIG PLAYERS Gemalto Bought Safenet,
Page 9 and 10:
BIG PLAYERS Utimaco Primary target
Page 11 and 12:
WHERE ARE THEY USED?
Page 13 and 14:
DNSSEC Root Zone operators store ke
Page 15 and 16:
ONE DOES NOT SIMPLY Implement serio
Page 17 and 18:
GENERAL INFORMATION As HSMs are use
Page 19 and 20:
FIPS 140-2 Defines 4 different secu
Page 21 and 22:
FIPS 140-2 FIPS 140-2 validation ha
Page 23 and 24:
COMMON CRITERIA Interesting fact: I
Page 25 and 26:
VARIOUS MODELS OF THE CRYPTOSERVER
Page 27 and 28:
THE HARDWARE Network HSMs are Linux
Page 29 and 30:
DEVICE KEY A single key created whe
Page 31 and 32:
TOOLS csadm: Command line tool to m
Page 33 and 34:
USERS Every user has: An authentica
Page 35 and 36: COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL Custom commu
Page 37 and 38: FORMAT A single blob in a custom .m
Page 39 and 40: MTC FILES Individual firmware modul
Page 41 and 42: MTC FILES $ binwalk adm_3.0.18.1_c5
Page 43 and 44: MTC FILES $ hexdump -C adm_3.0.18.1
Page 45 and 46: MTC FILES $ strings csadm | grep CO
Page 47 and 48: MTC FILES Now what???
Page 49 and 50: MTC FILES We can now extract the CO
Page 51 and 52: MTC FILES
Page 53 and 54: MTC FILES (Insert multiple slides w
Page 55 and 56: THE TMS320C64X DSP Steps to write o
Page 57 and 58: BLOCK DIAGRAM
Page 59 and 60: PARALLEL EXECUTION 8 execution unit
Page 61 and 62: REGISTERS A0-A2,B0-B2 are also cond
Page 63 and 64: DELAY SLOTS Most instructions are e
Page 65 and 66: REVERSING TOOLS Still wondering why
Page 67 and 68: ABI - CALLING CONVENTIONS No stack
Page 69 and 70: ABI - REGISTERS 12 callee-saved reg
Page 71 and 72: IMPLEMENTING THE DISASSEMBLER We kn
Page 73 and 74: THE CAPSTONE DISASSEMBLY FRAMEWORK
Page 75 and 76: WHERE DO WE START? Clone the projec
Page 77 and 78: THE TABLEGEN FILE Let's first gener
Page 79 and 80: WHAT'S ACTUALLY NEEDED? In our case
Page 81 and 82: HOW DO WE DEFINE REGISTERS? Simple,
Page 83 and 84: HOW DO WE DEFINE OPERANDS? def memo
Page 85: HOW DO WE DEFINE INSTRUCTION CLASSE
Page 89 and 90: HOW DO WE DEFINE INSTRUCTIONS? defm
Page 91 and 92: LETS FINISH THIS THING!
Page 93 and 94: PROBLEMS FACED Instructions that us
Page 95 and 96: CONGRATULATIONS! We have a disassem
Page 97 and 98: REVERSING THE FIRMWARE Let's check
Page 99 and 100: REVERSING THE FIRMWARE We've got sy
Page 101 and 102: CAN WE PROFIT? These products are m
Page 103 and 104: EXTRACTION OF MBK DATABASE BACKUP S
Page 105 and 106: WHAT ABOUT OTHER BUGS? All the code
Page 107 and 108: DOWNLOADS Reversing tools: https://
show all

HACKABLE SECURITY MODULES

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?