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<strong>THE</strong> <strong>FIRST</strong> <strong>BIANNUAL</strong> <strong>STRATEGIC</strong> <strong>REPORT</strong><br />
DEC. 2016
CONTENTS<br />
»»<br />
Executive Summary.........................................................................8<br />
»»<br />
Internal Affairs.............................................................................. 11<br />
»»<br />
The Presidency of the Republic Institution...................................12<br />
»»<br />
The Presidential Institution and the Supreme<br />
Leader of Revolution.......................................................................12<br />
»»<br />
The Institution of the Presidency and<br />
the Legislative Authority..................................................................26<br />
»»<br />
The Presidential Institution and its Role<br />
in the Conflict between the Legislative and Judicial Authorities.... 28<br />
»»<br />
The Military Institution.................................................................32<br />
»»<br />
The Budgets of Revolutionary Guard and the Army..................... 32<br />
»»<br />
War Production............................................................................ 34<br />
»»<br />
Drones Development Program..................................................... 36<br />
»»<br />
Rockets Program...........................................................................37<br />
»»<br />
The Reality of Iranian Military Productions.................................. 37<br />
»»<br />
Maneuvers and Training Projects................................................. 38<br />
»»<br />
Iranian Navy Activities.................................................................. 39<br />
»»<br />
Trump Promises Iranian Navy a Harsh Response..........................41<br />
»»<br />
Iranian Ambitions in Building Naval Bases in Syria and Yemen.....42<br />
»»<br />
Military Cooperation with Foreign Countries............................... 43<br />
»»<br />
Iran and the Syrian War................................................................ 46<br />
»»<br />
Conclusions...................................................................................48<br />
»»<br />
The Security File............................................................................51<br />
»»<br />
Repression of non-Persians...........................................................51<br />
»»<br />
The Future of Mobilization in non-Persians Areas........................56<br />
»»<br />
Future Scenarios in the Iranian Regime's Dealings with the<br />
non-Persians....................................................................................57
»»<br />
The Human Rights Situation in Iran...............................................58<br />
»»<br />
Conclusions................................................................................... 68<br />
»»<br />
Economic part................................................................................70<br />
»»<br />
First Axis: Iranian economy indicators and future scenarios.........70<br />
»»<br />
Positive signs during the last six months and their economic<br />
repercussions....................................................................................71<br />
»»<br />
Two future scenarios..................................................................... 79<br />
»»<br />
The first scenario........................................................................... 79<br />
»»<br />
The second scenario......................................................................80<br />
»»<br />
Second Axis: The Iranian banking system exchange rate a year after<br />
the nuclear deal and the direction of future progress......................81<br />
»»<br />
First: The banking system...............................................................82<br />
»»<br />
Second: The Iranian currency's exchange rate against<br />
the US dollar.................................................................................... 83<br />
»»<br />
Third Axis: Iranian citizens’ standards<br />
of living -what comes next?.............................................................88<br />
»»<br />
First: Future economic conditions and their impact on citizens'<br />
living standards.................................................................................88<br />
»»<br />
Second: The new budget plan and its possible impact on a citizen<br />
in the future......................................................................................91<br />
»»<br />
Conclusion.....................................................................................92<br />
»»<br />
Arab Affairs..................................................................................101<br />
»»<br />
First Axis: The Future of GCC-Iranian Relations<br />
in a Troubled Region......................................................................101<br />
»»<br />
First: Determinants of Gulf-Iranian Relations...............................102<br />
»»<br />
1. The State Geo-Strategic Determinant......................................102<br />
»»<br />
2. The Oil-ECHO Determinant......................................................103<br />
»»<br />
3. Sectarian Links and Population Increases................................104<br />
»»<br />
4. The US Invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its Impact<br />
on the Regional Balance of Power .................................................104<br />
»»<br />
Second: Gulf-Iranian relations, heading where?.........................106.
»»<br />
First Phase: Before the Iranian Revolution of 1979......................106<br />
»»<br />
Second Phase: During and After the Iranian Revolution, 1979....107<br />
»»<br />
Third Phase: After the Fall of Saddam Hussein's<br />
Regime in 2003...............................................................................108<br />
»»<br />
Third: GCC-Iranian relations during the second half of 2016.......112<br />
»»<br />
1. Ongoing Saudi Arabia-Iran conflicts.........................................112<br />
»»<br />
2- The growing Iranian threats towards Bahrain..........................115<br />
»»<br />
3- The escalation in UAE-Iranian differences............................... 115<br />
»»<br />
Fourth: Conclusions of the biannual strategic report period.......116<br />
»»<br />
Fifth: The Future for Gulf-Iranian relations..................................118<br />
»»<br />
Second Axis: Iran's Role in the Neighboring Gulf Countries<br />
Iraq and Yemen..............................................................................119<br />
»»<br />
First: Iraq as a springboard for Iran’s expansionist strategy.........120<br />
»»<br />
1- Shift in Iran's strategy from integration to empowerment......122<br />
»»<br />
2- The Challenges of Iran’s role in Iraq.........................................126<br />
»»<br />
3- The future of Iran’s role in Iraq and the expected trends........127<br />
»»<br />
Second: The future of Iran’s role in the Yemeni crisis..................129<br />
»»<br />
1. Yemen’s geostrategic importance for Iran............................... 129<br />
»»<br />
2. Iran's strategy in Yemen...........................................................129<br />
»»<br />
3. Increasing Iranian support for the Houthis in Yemen.............. 131<br />
»»<br />
4. The results of Iranian support for the Houthis.........................134<br />
»»<br />
5. Developments in Yemen in favor of legitimacy........................136<br />
»»<br />
Third Axis: The future of Iran’s role in<br />
the Syrian crisis… A rise or fall?..................................................... 138<br />
»»<br />
First: The axes of Iran blocking for political settlement<br />
to the Syrian crisis..........................................................................139<br />
»»<br />
1. The Political Axis...................................................................... 139<br />
»»<br />
2. The Military Axis......................................................................140<br />
»»<br />
Second: The Inconsistency of Iranian-Russian interests in Syria..141
»»<br />
Third - The Iranian-Russian contentious issues on Syria..............143<br />
»»<br />
Fourth - Aspects of Russian-Iranian differences inSyria.............. 146<br />
»»<br />
Fifth - The Iranian escalation boundaries with Turkey on Syria... 147<br />
»»<br />
Sixth – Absence of US variables in the Syrian crisis..................... 148<br />
»»<br />
Seventh - The future scenarios of the Iranian role in Syria..........150<br />
»»<br />
International Affairs.....................................................................159<br />
»»<br />
The Future of American-Iranian Relations in a Changing World..159<br />
»»<br />
First: The American-Iranian relations during<br />
the Obama Presidency...................................................................160<br />
»»<br />
Second: The American-Iranian relations timeline<br />
during the second half of 2016......................................................161<br />
»»<br />
Third: The impact of Obama’s doctrine on both<br />
the American and Iranian roles in the Midle-East region...............163<br />
»»<br />
Fourth: Possible scenarios for future US-Iranian relations.......... 165<br />
»»<br />
EU-Iranian Relations....................................................................166<br />
»»<br />
European foreign policy between the European<br />
Union Council and the European Parliament.................................167<br />
»»<br />
Limitations of the European Foreign Policytoward Iran.............. 167<br />
»»<br />
The EU Boosting Trade Relations with Iran<br />
and its Strategy toward this Country ........................................... 170<br />
»»<br />
The EU’s Strategies toward Tehran.............................................. 170<br />
»»<br />
Opening an EU delegation in Tehran............................................171<br />
»»<br />
German-Iranian Relations.............................................................173<br />
»»<br />
Russia-Iranian Relations...............................................................176<br />
»»<br />
The Syrian Crisis...........................................................................176<br />
»»<br />
Military Cooperation....................................................................180<br />
»»<br />
The Future of the Military and Economic<br />
Cooperation Between Russia and Iran...........................................184<br />
»»<br />
Conclusions...................................................................................184<br />
»»<br />
Closure..........................................................................................185
Executive<br />
Summary<br />
T<br />
his is a biannual report that tracks the most important<br />
developments in Iran during the last six months of<br />
2016 to provide precise details about the Iranian case file on<br />
internal, Arab, and international levels.<br />
» Internal Affairs<br />
This section focuses on four central points:<br />
1. Institution of the Presidency<br />
a. The relationship with the Supreme Leader. This report focuses on the points<br />
of disagreement between both sides such as the nuclear deal, economic sector,<br />
governmental reshuffle, and the upcoming elections.<br />
b. The relationship with the legislative authority, which includes:<br />
1. The role of the Institution of the Presidency in the balance of power inside the Islamic<br />
Shurra Council.<br />
2. The establishment of a parliamentary bloc for the Turkish majority provinces’ MPs.<br />
3. Defection of the Moderate and Reform trend.<br />
c. The relationship with the judicial authority. This report focuses on the Institution of the<br />
Republic’s efforts to mediate between the legislative and judicial authorities.<br />
2. The Military Institute.<br />
a. This report presents a comparison between the Army and the Revolutionary Guard in<br />
terms of budgets and President Rouhani’s call for a reduction in the IRGC’s provisions in<br />
order to restore a balance with the traditional military institute.<br />
8 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
. The Iranian military industry and reasons<br />
behind Iran’s active efforts to update its<br />
military capabilities.<br />
c. Iran’s military exercises during the second<br />
half of 2016.<br />
d. The harassment of American warships by<br />
Iranian naval vessels.<br />
e. Iran’s increased presence in international<br />
waters within the framework of its expansionist<br />
ambitions.<br />
The future of Iranian-Chinese and Iranian-Pakistani military cooperation.<br />
f. Iran’s military involvement in the war in Syria and the criticism directed at Tehran<br />
because of its role in the Syrian crisis.<br />
3. The Security Issue.<br />
This report focuses on the following aspects:<br />
a. Segregation and oppression of non-Persian ethnic minorities in terms of:<br />
1. Current events in Kurdistan, Ahwaz, and Baluchistan.<br />
2. Future conflict between the Iranian regime and ethnic minorities in light of the regime’s<br />
constant use of violence and its rejection of their demands for freedom and equality.<br />
3. Possible scenarios for the regime’s relations with non-Persian ethnic groups.<br />
b. Human rights conditions, especially the executions of ethnic minority activists.<br />
c. ISIS’ plans for a series of attacks on several districts in Tehran and the contradictions by<br />
Iranian officials concerning this issue.<br />
d. Reasons behind the restrictions on multinationals.<br />
e. The fires that started in vital Iranian economic sites.<br />
4. The Economy<br />
a. This report discusses the most important economic indicators in Iran during the second<br />
half of 2016 and the possible scenarios for economic growth in Iran based on those<br />
indicators.<br />
b. Developments in the banking system a year after signing the nuclear deal, and changes<br />
in the exchange rates in Iran and their future expectations by the end of 2017.<br />
c. The Iranian people’s living conditions and the impact of the economic policies on their<br />
lives.<br />
» Arab Affairs<br />
This part of the report focuses on the following points:<br />
1. The future of the Gulf-Iran relations in a troubled region in terms of:<br />
a. The nature of these relations before and after the Revolution of 1979.<br />
b. Determiners of these relations.<br />
c. Gulf-Iran relations during the second half of 2016.<br />
d. Possible scenarios for future relations that fluctuate between cooperation and tension.<br />
2. Iran’s role in the neighboring Gulf countries, especially in Iraq and Yemen since the<br />
American invasion of Iraq in 2003 in terms of:<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
9
a. Iran’s expansionist strategy in Iraq and the change from a strategy of integration into<br />
control.<br />
b. The future of Iran’s role in Iraq.<br />
c. The future of Iran’s role in Yemen through analyzing Yemen’s geostrategic importance<br />
for Iran and Iranian support for the Houthi rebels. This report also studies the latest<br />
developments in favor of legitimacy and the future of the Yemeni crisis.<br />
d. The future of Iran’s role in Syria through analyzing Iran’s interference in the political<br />
solution and the conflict of interests between Iran and Russia about this country.<br />
» International Affairs<br />
This report covers the following key factors on an international level:<br />
1. American-Iranian relations under the title “The future of the American-Iranian relations<br />
in a changing world.” This report discusses the rapprochement between the two countries<br />
during the Obama administration in 2016 after signing the nuclear deal between Iran and<br />
the P5+1 group in July 2015 and its impact on Iran’s regional strategy. It also covers the<br />
latest developments and the future of these relations following Republican Donald Trump<br />
winning the presidency of the United States according to three possible scenarios:<br />
a. Continuation of the nuclear deal and a non-confrontational policy.<br />
b. Review of the nuclear deal.<br />
c. A new stage of confrontation and a resumption of sanctions, which is the most<br />
probable scenario.<br />
2. European-Iranian relations. This report focuses on the following points:<br />
a. The European Union<br />
This report discusses the foundations of EU foreign policy toward Iran and its approach<br />
to relations between both sides during the second half of 2016. It also covers the<br />
EU’s desire to open an EU delegation in Iran and the responses of the various Iranian<br />
political movements to this. As a model for EU-Iranian relations, this report deals with<br />
the improvement of German-Iranian relations and their impact on Iran’s internal and<br />
foreign policies.<br />
b. Russia<br />
This report analyzes the following points concerning the Russian- Iranian relations:<br />
1. Coordination between Iran and Russia on the Syrian crisis.<br />
2. The use of Nogah Airbase in Hamadan province by Russian jet fighters to attack Syrian<br />
targets.<br />
3. The contradictions in Iranian officials’ statements concerning this issue and the legal<br />
status of giving permission to Russian bombers to use this base.<br />
4. Russian-Iranian points of disagreement on Syria.<br />
5. The future of relations between the two countries.<br />
6. Continuation of military cooperation through the completion of the S300 missile<br />
deal, the Kalashnikov-103 machine gun deal, and other military deals signed by the two<br />
countries during the second half of 2016.<br />
7. Joint military exercises and visits by Russian naval vessels to the Iranian ports.<br />
8. The Russian-Iranian cooperation in the oil, energy, nuclear, and electricity sectors, in the<br />
banking sector, and in space.<br />
9.The future of Russian-Iranian relations in all economic and military sectors.<br />
10 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
INTERNAL<br />
AFFAIRS<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
Iran’s internal affairs are characterized<br />
as taking precedence over other Iranian<br />
political affairs. Their unique nature makes<br />
an analysis of events in Iran and their<br />
repercussions dependent on examining all<br />
aspects of Iranian internal affairs: social,<br />
economic, political, and, specifically, both<br />
security and related military issues. This<br />
means that an exploration of the future<br />
of Iran’s domestic affairs necessitates<br />
analyzing all these aspects and studying<br />
the connectivity between various events,<br />
basing one’s conclusions on the resulting<br />
findings.<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
11
»»<br />
The Presidency of the Republic Institution<br />
In this chapter of our bi-annual strategic report concerning the second half of 2016, we<br />
deal with the institution of the presidency of the Iranian Republic through its relationship<br />
with the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Republic, who is considered the supreme<br />
authority over the Iranian regime, including the representative legislative institution in<br />
the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the judicial authority. The period covered by this<br />
report runs from the second half of the beginning of 2016 following the signing of the<br />
nuclear agreement through the last half of the year and beginning of 2017, ending with<br />
the run-up to the upcoming presidential elections scheduled for May 2017. This was a<br />
turbulent period, ending the previous relatively calm phase lasting around two-an-ahalf<br />
years during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency, which witnessed only the usual conflict<br />
between the Conservatives and the Reformists during the nuclear program negotiations.<br />
»»<br />
The Presidential Institution and the Supreme Leader of Revolution<br />
The Presidential Institution occupies an intermediate position between the presidency<br />
and the prime ministry in the parliamentary republican regime of the Islamic Republic.<br />
In other words, the Iranian presidential leader is not considered the head of the State,<br />
as is usually the case in other presidential systems. The President in Iran enjoys greater<br />
authority than that of the executive, judicial, and legislative heads; thus, the dissolution<br />
of the prime minister’s position in 1998 was considered an uncontroversial decision. The<br />
reason for this concerns similar duties, which the President performs, and which are the<br />
same as those of any prime minister in any parliamentary system. In this context, the<br />
Supreme Leader appoints ambassadors and constitutes the government. However, only<br />
the designation of both Ministers of Defense and Intelligence must be approved by the<br />
Supreme Leader before the parliamentary approval. In other words, the Supreme Leader<br />
is the official head of the Iranian Republic. 1<br />
Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, the Iranian Supreme Leader since 1990, lived through four<br />
different presidencies, serving for 26 consecutive years, which were preceded by eight<br />
more, although these were not consecutive. Rafsanjani enjoyed privileges directly<br />
granted by the constitution and the authoritative institutions. He was entitled to exert<br />
full control over the regime and the direction of the political system in Iran. 2 In spite of<br />
all this authority, Rafsanjani was almost overthrown by Iranians’ protests during the<br />
2009 demonstrations, which broke out after the controversial re-election of Mahmud<br />
Ahmadinejad to the presidency. Reformist leaders were put under house arrest after<br />
Ahmadinejad played the role of the savior of Khamenei's policies by abolishing the<br />
reformist current along with its advocates and dismantling civil society institutions, which<br />
had been established during Mohammad Khatami's presidential term.<br />
»»<br />
Rouhani and the Problematic Issue of Political Affiliation<br />
Analysts disagree about the exact positioning of President Rouhani’s political affiliation,<br />
despite the passage of three-and-a-half years since his election, arguing over whether<br />
he should be ideologically placed among the moderate Conservatives or the Reformists.<br />
This disagreement is not only a concern among analysts but among Iranian politicians<br />
themselves.<br />
12 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
Despite his long history of service in highly sensitive positions only assigned to<br />
individuals close to Khamenei, Rouhani, who served as the leader of the air force and as<br />
national security advisor for 13 consecutive years, as well as being appointed to head the<br />
Iranian delegation at the nuclear talks between 2003- 2005, and as the Vice-President of<br />
the High Council of National Security, and serving as an MP from the 1980s until 2000,<br />
presented himself during the 2013 elections as a moderate who rejected the oppressive<br />
acts which took place in 2009. He also called for greater convergence with the West,<br />
releasing the Green movement prisoners, and reforming the domestic media.3 These<br />
policies attracted the remaining members of the Reformist movement, who aligned<br />
themselves alongside him. Those who believe that Khamenei did not welcome these<br />
positions and his subsequent rise, however, were mistaken. Indeed, by presenting<br />
himself in this way, Rouhani gained many benefits for the theocratic leadership.<br />
To start with, Rouhani’s position helped to quell the still widespread political anger<br />
after the regime’s repression of the 2009 protests and to find a way out of the deadlock<br />
that afflicted the Iranian political scene, which was still wracked by instability after the<br />
Conservatives took control over all of the authoritative institutions, from the presidency<br />
to the parliament, to the local organizations, as well as their own headquarters in the<br />
Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts, and the judicial authority.<br />
Rouhani’s policies also enabled Iran to escape from the economic crisis afflicting it,<br />
which had reached a very critical stage by the end of Ahmadinejad’s term in office,<br />
especially after the collapse of the national currency, which lost more than 80 percent of<br />
its value following Western sanctions.<br />
As President, Rouhani also managed to reach an agreement with the West concerning<br />
the Iranian nuclear program, an especially crucial achievement after the banning of<br />
Iranian oil exports, which also averted the threat of a military attack.<br />
As all this shows, Khamenei’s decision to give Rouhani the chance of a presidential role<br />
was motivated by political pragmatism and necessity, all of which led him to view this<br />
appointment as an essential yet manageable risk. This is not to question Rouhani’s loyalty<br />
to Khamenei, however, as much as to point out the leadership’s acceptance beforehand<br />
of a possibly inevitable clash between the President and Supreme Leader, more<br />
especially given the great level of relative personal independence in decision-making<br />
enjoyed by the President. Such differences in opinion had occurred with all the previous<br />
Iranian Presidents under the theocratic regime, except for Ahmadinejad during the early<br />
period of his presidency, and Mohammad Ali Rajai, who was assassinated 18 days after<br />
his election in August 1981.<br />
Therefore, for Khamenei, Rouhani was simply the man of the hour chosen to carry out<br />
specific missions, but not to become a popular leader, as was the case with Mohammad<br />
Khatami. Rouhani, himself, meanwhile, was very much aware of the nature of the<br />
political game in Iran through his extensive experience in prominent and sensitive senior<br />
positions within the regime. As a result, in forming his government, Rouhani depended<br />
on the moderate Conservative bloc under the leadership of Ali Larijani and did not<br />
appoint any minister from the reformists’ ranks. Rouhani was aware that this would not<br />
be viewed as a suitable time for the reformists to return to power. Bearing this in mind,<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
13
this decision led to political tensions between the two political blocs during the sixmonth<br />
period of writing this report. The nature of the disagreement concerned political<br />
competitiveness, however, rather than any dissent over the content or core of the<br />
political system itself.<br />
»»<br />
Changing relations between the President and the Supreme Leader<br />
The disagreement between the two institutional figures representing the Presidency<br />
and the Guidance Council, respectively, was concerned with various issues:<br />
»»<br />
Nuclear Agreement<br />
Once Khamenei was assured that the threat of Western military action had been<br />
averted and the earlier economic sanctions on Iran had been lifted, he began attacking<br />
the nuclear agreement, which Rouhani and his group were not to sign, unless Khamenei<br />
approved every word of it. At the beginning of March 2016, Khamenei announced his<br />
rejection of the agreement. He expressed this opposition after the US delayed its lifting<br />
of the banking sanctions on Iran, expressly stating that he had accepted the signing of<br />
the agreement only to prove that the US is Iran’s principal enemy and will not keep its<br />
promises. Khamenei continued issuing official statements, which were critical of Rouhani<br />
and his group's dealings with the US. 4<br />
Two objectives were behind Khamenei's attack on the nuclear agreement:<br />
Firstly, this provided a useful external target for the Iranian public’s anger, as the people<br />
had witnessed none of the promised improvements in the country’s economic situation<br />
despite the lifting of sanctions and the subsequent release of massive sums of money<br />
to the regime in funds previously frozen in Western banks, along with the regime’s<br />
collection of the significant accumulated oil funds from Indian importers, which Iran had<br />
previously been unable to collect due to the banking sanctions.<br />
Secondly, the attack enabled the Supreme Leader to distort Rouhani’s achievement in<br />
the nuclear agreement and to diminish his popularity as a leader with the public.<br />
Rouhani, meanwhile, rejected Khamenei’s criticisms, calling the nuclear deal “a winning<br />
agreement for both parties” and asserting that it had had a positive good influence<br />
on Iran’s economic situation. For the first time, Rouhani publicly opposed Khamenei's<br />
statements, provoking outrage among Conservatives, who subjected the President to<br />
a storm of severe censure and condemnation to the extent of demanding his trial on<br />
charges of treason to the Islamic Republic, deceptiveness, and attempting to move the<br />
leadership from the Jurist Leadership Regime.<br />
The Supreme Leader’s aggressive attack was accompanied by other criticisms aimed<br />
at the person of Rouhani, who was accused of adopting an unrealistically positive<br />
perspective on future Iranian-Western relations. Rouhani rejected these accusations,<br />
stating, “Being positive about the nuclear agreement does not mean being positive about<br />
the major world powers,” and assuring the leadership that his government does not place<br />
any trust in the US to implement the nuclear agreement’s articles, although he is positive<br />
about the agreement itself and about his role in solving the country’s problems.<br />
14 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
This failed to placate<br />
the Conservatives,<br />
who further escalated<br />
their attack on<br />
Rouhani over his<br />
disagreement<br />
with Khamenei<br />
regarding the nuclear<br />
agreement. This<br />
led to intervention<br />
by parliamentary<br />
head Ali Larijani, a<br />
Conservative ally of<br />
Rouhani, in an effort to<br />
re-establish national<br />
unity and ease the<br />
tensions between<br />
the Reformists and<br />
Khamenei: Supreme Leader<br />
Hassan Rouhani:the President of Iran<br />
Conservatives. At the same time, through mobilizing supportive Conservatives, Rouhani<br />
aimed to both strengthen them and to win backing for the agreement, believing it to be<br />
one of the first steps for the implementation of a program of intensive political reforms<br />
under the name ‘Bergam 2,’ an acronym whose Persian initials mean ‘Comprehensive<br />
Action Plan.’ Rouhani views the nuclear agreement as being the first step in this<br />
comprehensive action plan, to be followed by political reforms, although Khamenei does<br />
not accept any negotiations on this subject, as he believes the current political situation<br />
in Iran is ideal and considers any attempts to introduce amendments an act of treason<br />
and rebellion against the regime and his own authority.<br />
Khamenei's attacks on both Rouhani and the agreement continued throughout<br />
July 2016 until the arrival of State Week, which commemorates the assassination<br />
of Mohammed Ali Rajai, the Islamic Republic’s second elected President on August<br />
30th, 1981. On this occasion, the Iranian government presents reports publicly for the<br />
Supreme Leader, to be announced mostly on national television. By the end of the week,<br />
the Supreme Leader issues his directives to the government with an action plan that the<br />
government must abide by. 5 In the light of these continuous meetings and the inevitable<br />
proximity between the Supreme Leader and the President, Khamenei changed his<br />
discourse toward Rouhani and the agreement. He stated:<br />
“My criticism of the nuclear agreement is a criticism of the breaking of the covenant<br />
and the malice of the other [party – i.e. the U.S.], not of our own men, because the<br />
Iranian delegates worked, with extreme efforts, day and night and we do appreciate all of<br />
the troubles they put themselves to."<br />
At this point, Khamenei adopted a reconciliatory stand towards the nuclear agreement,<br />
which sounded more rational. He now criticized only some of the executive procedures of<br />
the agreement. That occasion, however, was considered a milestone in the relationship<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
15
etween Rouhani and Khamenei. No direct intense attack on Rouhani by Khamenei was<br />
as marked as during those months before State Week. Nevertheless, the Conservatives<br />
fiercely attacked Rouhani for a number of reasons:<br />
• High salaries paid to the heads of governmental organizations.<br />
• The interference of Hossein Fereydon, the brother of Rouhani, in state affairs and being<br />
accused of financial embezzlement.<br />
• The crisis of the convention against corruption (FATF).<br />
• Questioning governmental records of the economic development rate and<br />
employment rate in Iran.<br />
The pull and push strategies between the President and the Supreme Leader decreased<br />
the conflict level so as to preserve and therefore shield the image of the Supreme Leader,<br />
as he is not assumed to be a part of any political tensions between the regime’s fractions,<br />
nor deemed to be affected by any. From his side, Rouhani stopped engaging in personal<br />
criticism of Khamenei. However, at the same time, he responded to the Conservatives<br />
through encouraging the Reformists to pursue the pitfalls of the Conservatives. As a<br />
result, the Reformists heightened the case of Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf, the Mayor of<br />
Tehran, who was accused of distributing State land to his acquaintances and friends, and<br />
of financial corruption in the Legislative Authority, which also affected its President, Sadiq<br />
Larijani. Qalibaf is known to be an ally of the Conservatives.<br />
Driving the level of conflict away from the President and the Supreme Leader to the<br />
political currents allowed for coordination between the two, which substantiated itself<br />
through Rouhani’s address to the International Forums to compel the United States to<br />
comply with the commitments given in the nuclear agreement, reassuring chiefly that<br />
European banks and companies, which were abstinent from dealing and trading with<br />
Iran, were not going to be subject to US economic sanctions.<br />
While addressing his State speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations<br />
in New York, Rouhani demanded the implementation of the articles of the nuclear<br />
agreement and minimized his criticism. He demanded Group ‘5+ 1’ to meet its<br />
commitments, which were promised to Iran after the agreement. His speech was<br />
mainly addressing the US with the warning that “Neglecting the implementation of<br />
the agreement articles is a contravention of international laws.” He called on the US to<br />
amend its “strategic mistake” as outlined in its infringement of its commitment. Rouhani<br />
further asserted that among the agreed promises were the subject of the sale of US<br />
civilian aircraft to Iran, namely to lift the sanctions which had prevented Iran's from<br />
completing the aircraft deal with different companies. 6<br />
In his speech, Rouhani’s main concern was the implementation of the agreement’s<br />
articles that were multilateral and international, not only between Iran and the US. Any<br />
cancellation by one of the parties was not admissible since this would be a failure to<br />
adhere to the international commitment, which demanded a fair reaction from the other<br />
countries who had signed and ratified the agreement.<br />
16 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
After Rouhani’s New York speech, the debate continued between the proponents<br />
and opponents. Soon afterward, the US displayed some signs of resolving the civilian<br />
aircraft purchase issue; either the US Boeing or the European Airbus. Signs of the US<br />
Treasury uplifting the ban, which had been placed on Iranian banks, were subsequently<br />
followed by US approval. Nevertheless, we dismiss the idea that the diplomatic pressure<br />
exercised by Rouhani on the US was the main cause for this approval by the US. It is most<br />
likely that the Iranian-Russian convergence of interests and the increase in the level of<br />
cooperation between the two sides caused the US to ease the pressure on Iran so as not<br />
to further advance its cooperation with Russia. However, no one can deny that Rouhani’s<br />
speech had a great impact on the European countries who signed the agreement, and<br />
which from the beginning had hoped for all sides to cooperate with Iran. The European<br />
countries required that International stand to be able to encounter the US position<br />
represented by the US Congress with the support of both Obama and John Kerry to the<br />
nuclear agreement.<br />
Donald Trump's triumph in the US presidential elections caused a lot of anxiety in<br />
Iranian political circles because of his hostile rhetoric toward Iran during his presidential<br />
campaign and his threat to 'tear up' the nuclear agreement if he reached the White<br />
House. The leaders of the Iranian regime did not forget that Trump belongs to the<br />
Republican Party, whose leaders had vowed to break the agreement in Congress. Nothing<br />
was left for Tehran but to await Trump's decisions about the nuclear program.<br />
Official announcements and reactions regarding Trump's victory revealed fears<br />
concerning the fate of the nuclear agreement, which Tehran had achieved after marathon<br />
negotiations and years of international sanctions which had put substantial economic<br />
constraints on Iran.<br />
The Iranian President immediately reminded Trump that the nuclear agreement was<br />
international and therefore he could not cancel it from his side because a number of<br />
parties had participated in drafting and concluding it. He confirmed that his country<br />
would keep to all of its promises, and demanded that all the parties involved would keep<br />
theirs as well, in terms of what they had promised Iran. 7<br />
Rouhani’s fears arose because the agreement had accomplished a lot. This was<br />
apparent in the speech he delivered in front of the economic sector officials in Alborz<br />
province when he stated that the nuclear agreement with the six major powers had<br />
accomplished much for Iran that could not be annulled and that his country would not<br />
allow the US or Europe to cancel or change it. 8<br />
Moreover, some groups in Iran did not mind Trump's cancellation of the agreement and<br />
they noted that it was a great victory for Iran because they believed the agreement had<br />
not achieved any of its stated outcomes, especially regarding the lifting of sanctions. They<br />
believed that the grave economic situation would continue and that the US would still<br />
inflict sanctions on Iran. 9<br />
The third group of political analysts observed that Trump would not cancel the nuclear<br />
agreement, particularly after his councilors had undermined Trump's statements.<br />
Analysts thought that Trump would change his policies toward the agreement and Iran in<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
17
general, and that whatever Trump was working to achieve had to do with amending the<br />
agreement’s articles and probably imposing sanctions for reasons other than the nuclear<br />
program, such as the missile program, supporting participants in regional conflicts, or<br />
human rights violations.<br />
Iranian concerns concerning the cancellation of the agreement did not increase national<br />
solidarity against the probability of an external danger. On the contrary, this caused the<br />
Conservatives to gloat about the Moderates. The Conservatives saw that freezing the<br />
agreement, or even its cancellation would bring an end to Rouhani’s political movement.<br />
Calls started to be heard for the nomination of a Conservative to run for the next<br />
presidential elections to counterattack Trump's hidden policies toward Iran. Expectations<br />
were divided between Mohammed Baqer Qalifbaf, the Mayor of Tehran, who has an<br />
honorable military past and a strong connection with the Conservatives, and Saeed<br />
Jalili, a member of the Supreme Council of the Iranian National Security and a previous<br />
negotiator for and opponent to the nuclear agreement.<br />
There is no doubt that Trump gaining power in the US has weakened Hassan Rouhani’s<br />
position in spite of continuous European reassurances to Iran that the nuclear agreement<br />
would still continue in spite of Trump's claims. However, if the agreement is frozen,<br />
Rouhani will lose much of his popularity and the Conservatives’ power will increase as<br />
they are supported by the Supreme Leader. In this context, the agreement between these<br />
two players, the President and the Supreme Leader, has become very closely connected<br />
to Iran's external situation in spite of the fact that the conflict is internal. This is no longer<br />
a bilateral equation since Trump has now become the third part, as has the European<br />
Union. Rouhani is counting on the EU's support for Iran on the nuclear agreement, but<br />
in return, the EU has its own demands regarding human rights violations, minorities,<br />
and Iran's interference in Middle-Eastern conflicts. As a result, Iran’s foreign policy<br />
has become one of the defining links between the President and the Supreme Leader,<br />
whether Rouhani stays in power or leaves after the upcoming elections.<br />
»»<br />
Economic File in the President and the Supreme Leader Disputes<br />
After signing the nuclear agreement, the Iranians were hopeful that this would bring<br />
foreign investments to their country to alleviate the economic recession and open doors<br />
for imports to compensate for the shortage of commodities which the market suffers<br />
from, especially high-quality goods from the European and American markets.<br />
Rouhani and the Reformists support open economic policies with the West for a<br />
number of reasons:<br />
A. Generating new investments to increase the economic growth rate after it showed a<br />
decline during Ahmadinejad’s terms in office.<br />
B. Developing Iran’s industries, which would benefit from Western technologies.<br />
C. Improving the standards of living for Iranians and allowing them to enjoy luxury goods.<br />
D. Preventing shortages of strategic goods such as medicines.<br />
On his behalf, Khamenei called for what he named ‘Resistance Economy Policy,’ which<br />
ostensibly is close to austerity policies, but in substance is more closely connected to war<br />
18 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
economics. Khamenei's experience was relevant to the executive authority he gained<br />
throughout his presidency during the war with Iraq. He wanted to downsize foreign<br />
business trading and replace it with self-sustainment policies in different economic<br />
sectors while depending on whatever local technologies were available. In addition, he<br />
did not encourage giving business to foreign companies, instead of depending on local<br />
ones, especially in the oil and energy sectors. Iranian society was divided between these<br />
two economic approaches, as each has its logical economic objectives and justifications. 10<br />
This division, however, has other non-economic reasons. Resistance Economy Policy<br />
means the continuation of the power of the Revolutionary Guards in most of Iran’s<br />
economic sectors, which are mainly oil and energy. Converging with the West means a<br />
decline in that power and probably adjusting some internal policies and international<br />
stands to be in line with Western economic policies.<br />
These disputes opened up a new area of conflict about new contractual agreements to<br />
explore and develop oil fields. The new oil agreements ‘IPC: Iran Petroleum Contracts’<br />
became the most important issue for Iranian oil exports during July 2016. This paved<br />
the way for accusations of corruption and obstructing the national interest between Ali<br />
Khamenei on one side and Rouhani and his government on the other. This happened<br />
after the government formed a technical group of experts to develop the articles and<br />
framework for oil and energy agreements in Iran, based on a decision by the Finance<br />
Minister. This type of agreement allows foreign companies to be partners with national<br />
oil companies in explorations and progress, and to exploit oil and gas fields. However,<br />
this was something new; as it had not been implemented before in Iran and foreign<br />
companies had not been allowed to enjoy these rights. The agreement was designed<br />
to be implemented in high-risk investment areas, specifically the Iranian fields in the<br />
Arabian Gulf, the oil deposits in the South Pars gas field, and so on. 11<br />
In spite of the infamous history of the State-owned Iranian oil companies’ development<br />
of oil fields, Khamenei insisted on giving the new oil contracts to companies under<br />
Revolutionary Guard control. From his side, Rouhani resisted Khamenei’s orders for two<br />
months, although he eventually succumbed to the pressure and agreed to share the<br />
contracts between the Revolutionary Guard companies and the foreign companies. This<br />
issue was met by the severe disapproval of Rouhani and the Minister of Oil, which led<br />
them to transfer the oil file to be debated in Parliament.<br />
The Conservatives put pressure on the Rouhani administration by accusing the Minister<br />
of Oil of corruption. The Minister responded by saying that he would expose the Qatari<br />
Lobby which was operating inside Iran, and which was trying to block attempts to exploit<br />
the joint oil fields. He further threatened to expose the opponents of the new agreement<br />
by presenting facts that would result in their condemnation, but without giving any<br />
further details in this regard. This issue was used by opponents to make more allegations<br />
about the Minister by charging him with deliberately covering up a number of corrupt<br />
persons, and threatened to open an old file on corruption in the Ministry that was signed<br />
during his term in office; that an Iranian oil sector official had received a 15-milliondollar<br />
bribe to enforce an agreement signed by the Ministry and the Norwegian State Oil<br />
Company. In addition, according to the Iranian Kayhan newspaper, a signed agreement<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
19
with Crescent Petroleum ended up with Iran paying billions of dollars in penalties to this<br />
UAE company as a result of poor Iranian management that had adversely affected them;<br />
this was according to an international verdict which states that Iran has to export oil at a<br />
rate lower than the market price, In due course, Rouhani and his Finance Minister gave up<br />
and awarded the new oil agreements to the Revolutionary Guard companies.<br />
The second case in the economic file disputes was followed by inflicting a severe blow,<br />
particularly on the Revolutionary Guard. As per Rouhani’s governmental orders, the<br />
Millat Bank declined to open accounts or carry out financial transfers in the name of<br />
the Khatam Al-Anbiya' Military Base owned by the IRGC, which strictly monitors most<br />
of the economic activities for the IRGC, and massively funds the Al-Quds Force outside<br />
Iran, as well as other armed forces collaborating with Iran. The bank denied this under<br />
the agreement’s articles about combating money-laundering, which Iran signed during<br />
Ahmadinejad’s government. Nevertheless, the agreement was not implemented until<br />
August 2016. The reason for this postponement was the mounting conflict between the<br />
two political movements. On the other side, the Conservatives viewed the agreement<br />
as a violation of Iran’s sovereignty on the basis that it had subjected its institutions to<br />
foreign orders on Iranian soil. The case was further submitted to the High Council of<br />
National Security. In spite of the fact that the case has not been resolved to this day, it<br />
is undoubtedly considered one of the victorious moments of Rouhani’s government, as<br />
it marks the first time the government has opposed one of the Revolutionary Guard’s<br />
procedures. 12<br />
»»<br />
Ministerial Amendment<br />
Hassan Rouhani was put under intense political pressure to force him toward a<br />
cabinet reshuffle, whether from the Supreme Leader and his Conservative followers,<br />
or the Reformists, who were aspiring to again political advantage from their coalition<br />
with Rouhani and from the upcoming presidential elections in May 2017; besides,<br />
Rouhani needed the Reformists’ continued support to make sure there was no rival<br />
Conservative candidate who might take the votes which Rouhani would receive from<br />
these supporting voters.<br />
In October 2016, Rouhani made a limited ministerial amendment after a long period<br />
of waiting by various political factions. On October 9th forecasts about the amendment<br />
began by spreading the news of the dismissal of the Minister of Culture, Ali Jannati. Over<br />
a period of nine days, predictions continued about who was going to be included in the<br />
amendment until it was declared officially that it would be Mahmoud Goudarzi, the<br />
Minister of Youth Affairs and Sports, and Ali Asghar Fani, the Minister of Education, who<br />
continued to deny this news until the last moment. This ministerial amendment indicated<br />
that Rouhani was not being decisive about who he was going dismiss. Also, negotiations<br />
about who was going to be dismissed were probably not even held.<br />
The ministers who were part of the amendment and the direct reasons behind it<br />
suggest that it was a largely a response to direct pressure from Khamenei because the<br />
ministers who were dismissed were viewed as Modernists and close to the Reformists,<br />
especially the Minister of Culture Ali Jannati, whom the amendment started with. These<br />
20 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
three ministers had the most interaction with the youth sector, which is considered the<br />
base of the Reformist movement, and to which supporters give their votes. 13<br />
Nothing, however, was said by the Iranian government to explain the reasons behind<br />
the dismissals. On the contrary, they were presented as if the ministers had themselves<br />
resigned. Moreover, it was understood that each of these ministers had a significant<br />
disagreement with the Conservatives.<br />
The most significant crisis concerned Ali Jannati, the Minister of Culture and son of<br />
the religious fundamentalist Ahmad Jannati. After a lot of pressure from the religious<br />
authorities on the grounds of authorizing a classical concert in Mashhad, where the<br />
majority of clergymen, teachers, and Hawza students live; this classical concert was<br />
the subject of criticism from the Conservatives because it attracted a large number of<br />
young people and because nationalist musical pieces were performed that contributed<br />
to a certain extent to substituting the religious perspective in Iranian culture for<br />
a nationalist one.<br />
As part of his policy, Rouhani was forcing Jannati into an individual confrontation with<br />
the Conservatives with no real support from him, especially after he (Jannati) had been<br />
attacked by the legislative authority and Mashhad scholars.<br />
The Minister of Youth Affairs and Sports’ consecutive statements were in fact about<br />
criticizing the nuclear agreement, while the government’s criticism was about not<br />
submitting the budget assigned to youth and sports infrastructure, which was one of the<br />
reasons for his dismissal. 14 But we should never forget that the Iran-South Korea football<br />
match was held on the 9th Muharram, which was the day of mourning for the murder of<br />
Hussein bin Ali (May Allah be Pleased with Him). That was the reason the Conservatives<br />
criticized Ali Goudarzi. 15 Removing Ali Asghar Fani was an extremely dramatic gesture.<br />
Goudarzi was hounded by endless accusations of corruption and misappropriation of the<br />
Teachers Pension Funds. In spite of the fact that the hatred harbored against the minister<br />
was against him personally, the Conservatives’ criticism was also directed towards<br />
changes in the academic curricula on the basis that it contradicted the ideologies of the<br />
Revolution and was regarded as having been a distortion and misuse of the curricula from<br />
the time of the Construction and Reconstruction of the Government up to the time of the<br />
Reformists during Khatami's era. 16<br />
It is believed that the cabinet reshuffle only cemented Rouhani’s authority inside the<br />
government, and even if this was not the case, it would have been more appropriate for<br />
him to wait out the remaining months of his government. Besides, he did not actually<br />
need to rearrange his house from inside, and the ministerial changes were proof of<br />
Rouhani’s maneuvering to win a game. We believe that these changes improved the<br />
performance of these ministries for that short period. These actions were essentially<br />
trying to calm the situation between Rouhani and the Reformists, who were most<br />
affected by the ministerial changes. Another reason, which did not consider the point<br />
of view of setting right the relationship between Rouhani and the Reformists, had a<br />
practical basis which asserted that a calming process was occurring after Khamenei<br />
gave Ahmadinejad some public advice about not running in the upcoming mid-year<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
21
presidential elections and the relevantly quiet political situation which Rouhani was<br />
experiencing a month later, along with less criticism. There was also the response to a<br />
letter sent by the Hawza Association of Muslim Scholars, of which no details were given,<br />
except that the Qom scholars indicated they were not happy with the performance of the<br />
Minister of Culture Ali Jannati. In addition, there was an announcement about a contract<br />
for the largest Iranian oil deal after signing the nuclear agreement which was estimated<br />
to be worth three billion dollars for local companies mainly owned by the Revolutionary<br />
Guards for developing the South Pars gas field, especially in light of the fact that these<br />
same companies had failed to develop earlier phases of the same field. In this case, we<br />
can see a fully-fledged political deal between Rouhani and Khamenei, which includes the<br />
following articles:<br />
Removing Rouhani’s Conservative electoral opponents, mainly Ahmadinejad,<br />
who had expressed his determination to run for the upcoming second presidency,<br />
in return for Rouhani getting rid of the semi-reformist nature of the government by<br />
dismissing the three above-mentioned ministers. This would ensure no future requests<br />
to increase freedom and rights, which would please the Qom scholars. 17 If this is<br />
confirmed to be true, then we are looking at a long-term political deal that guarantees<br />
a second presidential term for Rouhani, who will have to curb the Reformists and give<br />
the Revolutionary Guard the rights to attain new oil agreements, whereby it would<br />
strengthen its grip on the IRGC and increase its military and economic role beyond Iran’s<br />
borders.<br />
»»<br />
The New Ministers<br />
Rouhani appointed and introduced the names of his new ministers in order to win<br />
Parliament’s confidence. These ministers were Reza Salehi, Minister of Culture and<br />
Islamic Guidance; Fakher Al-Deen Ahmadi Eshtiani, Minister of Education; and Masoud<br />
Soltanifar, Minister of Youth and Sports.<br />
Rouhani also nominated Ameri Wadansha Shishtani and Soltanifar for different<br />
ministerial positions after winning the presidential elections in 2013, except that they did<br />
not enjoy Parliament’s confidence at that time. However, winning the vote of confidence<br />
this time happened after Rouhani had stated, on his entry to the Parliamentary Hall<br />
during the session where the votes were officially declared, that the ministers’ names<br />
were appointed after consultation with Khamenei.<br />
The supervising officer of the Al-Shura Council, Ali Yousef Nejad, reassured that the<br />
council had initiated intensive consultations about the three ministers proposed by<br />
Rouhani. He also confirmed that the MP’s worked independently and that he had<br />
checked their experience and expertise; 18 the fact that this was referred to earlier shows<br />
that a mutual political deal had been struck between Rouhani and Khamenei.<br />
»»<br />
The Next Presidential Elections<br />
Over the six-month period covered by this report, the subject of Rouhani’s standing for a<br />
second presidential term was the subject of much debate in Iran. As well as being unable<br />
to win widespread popularity among the Iranian public, Rouhani has also come under<br />
heavy political criticism from Conservatives, with his independent streak in running<br />
22 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
his government his own way and his genuine desire<br />
to control the State’s political and economic course<br />
placing him in conflict with the Supreme Leader,<br />
Ali Khamenei. Moreover, the coalition which he<br />
formed, which helped him succeed in the previous<br />
elections, has not been as harmonious as it once<br />
was, since the primary point unifying its members<br />
was the aim of breaking the political deadlock<br />
which Iran suffered from during Ahmadinejad’s<br />
term in office. With Ahmadinejad gone, however, the<br />
discordance between the different factions came to<br />
the fore.<br />
Rouhani’s political performance, away from the success of the nuclear agreement and<br />
Iranian diplomacy, was somewhat unsuccessful during the second half of 2016, with<br />
the President committing a number of political blunders in July, which harmed and<br />
adversely affected his popularity. During a visit to Kermanshah in western Iran, he ignited<br />
public anger with a speech about the problem of unemployment, with members of the<br />
audience jeering him and disrupting his speech by yelling slogans and shouting abuse.<br />
Rouhani’s efforts to silence these outbursts came in for heavy criticism, both from the<br />
public and from the previously supportive reformist media in Iran, which condemned his<br />
failure to listen to the electorate. A similar incident took place during an international<br />
conference for mayors and city councilors in Tehran, when Rouhani said in his speech<br />
that he does not blame the senior city officials for their attempts to develop financial<br />
resources for their own cities, even while Tehran’s residents are up in arms about<br />
the local municipality selling off the city’s parks and green spaces to developers. The<br />
Reformists slammed this speech, saying that Rouhani is not in step with the times and<br />
that Iran should leave his era behind.<br />
While it is true that a number of Reformists changed their mind about this statement<br />
the next day, with some, led by Mohammed Reza Aref, declaring Rouhani to be the<br />
only option for the Reformists in the upcoming elections, disagreements remain within<br />
Reformist circles over the alliance between Rouhani and the country’s Reformist bloc,<br />
particularly following revelations that Rouhani remained popular amongst only 24<br />
percent of his supporters.<br />
With Rouhani’s popularity declining, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made an effort to<br />
return to the political spotlight, delivering campaign speeches in several Iranian towns,<br />
which were well received, most particularly in Malayer, where he received a rapturous<br />
welcome. While Ahmadinejad’s reemergence threw the Reformists into chaos, initially<br />
leading them to embrace Rouhani as their candidate, they subsequently decided to<br />
nominate another candidate of their own choice.<br />
In light of this shower of criticism to Rouhani’s government and the policy of tug-of-war<br />
between different political currents in Iran, Iranian newspapers started speculating about<br />
a number of different possible scenarios for Rouhani and making predictions about his<br />
political future. One of these scenarios is verifiable:<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
23
1. Spontaneous withdrawal: Rouhani may be forced to make this choice, especially after<br />
the attack on his brother, Hussein Fereydon, whose name was listed in a case involving<br />
embezzlement from the Mallet Bank.<br />
2. Narrowing down the supervisory bodies for political liquidation: This would mean<br />
ruling out Rouhani’s run for election by the Shura Maintenance Council. This scenario, in<br />
spite of the expense and political changes required, copies previous models, which makes<br />
it possible, if improbable.<br />
3. Weakening Rouhani's government through supporting a new contender: This would<br />
mean allowing Rouhani to stand for election before defeating him at the ballot box.<br />
4. Accepting Rouhani’s run for a second presidential period. This remains a choice, in<br />
spite of its being unfavorable for all political parties. However, it remains a choice with<br />
some positive features in comparison to the other options, especially since it attracts a<br />
large number from all political factions within the regime, including those who believe<br />
that Rouhani cannot be replaced in the next upcoming presidential period.<br />
The first two choices are highly improbable, with Rouhani showing no indications<br />
of any intention to withdraw from the political race, while there is no justification or<br />
excuse for the Shura Maintenance Council to exclude him. The possibility of the third<br />
option has been greatly reduced after the scandal over Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and<br />
declarations by some of the leading Conservative figures that they would not accept the<br />
nomination of Ahmadinejad. The last option to remain on the table is the acceptance of<br />
Rouhani to run for a second presidential period.<br />
According to Reformist theorist, Saeed Hajaryan, “Because Rouhani knows quite<br />
well that the Reformists have no choice except to support him in the next presidential<br />
election, Rouhani's attention was lately drawn towards the Conservatives to try and<br />
get close to them to win their votes.” 19 Because of this, Rouhani seemed to be closer to<br />
winning a second presidential term in May’s election, with his team apparently more<br />
solid and stronger than before and able to regain its popularity.<br />
Rouhani did not surrender to failure following his earlier public meetings in July.<br />
Instead, he amended his speech and went next to the town of Qazvin near Tehran, which<br />
enjoys a relatively high economic status, avoiding the heart of the Iranian countryside,<br />
where supporters are mainly Conservatives and where he has proven less popular. During<br />
his speech in Qazvin, Rouhani criticized the misconceptions among Ahmadinejad’s<br />
supporters about the system of economic management, which he followed during his<br />
presidential term, saying that between 2005 and 2013 Iran was run at massive expense,<br />
which encouraged corruption and poverty. This mismanagement he said created a huge<br />
crisis, which the current government was still recovering from. He further added that at<br />
that time under Ahmadinejad’s rule, while Iran was trying to earn very high oil revenue,<br />
the government was internally and externally borrowing heavily and issuing budget<br />
permission in order to balance the general budget. Despite these points, however, the<br />
newspapers criticized Rouhani for not implementing his electoral promises of meeting<br />
regularly with Iranian economists, demanding that he listen to their opinions in a friendly<br />
meeting and inviting him to strengthen his relationship with the economic experts and<br />
24 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
ecruit them to explain the worsening economic situation of Ahmadinejad’s rule and to<br />
express their opinions about the economic future of the country. 20<br />
Despite all of this, however, the Reformists have still been unable to consider breaking<br />
up the coalition with Rouhani as the 2017 election approaches, being unable to fight it<br />
individually or with a new coalition. Unhappy at this lack of options, they have already<br />
begun discussing their political future in the 2021 elections. One of the prominent<br />
members of the ‘Participation Front’ and the ‘Union of Islamic People Party,’ Hossein<br />
Kashefi, said that nobody expected the Reformists to choose a non-Reformist in the 2013<br />
elections (a reference to Rouhani himself), adding, “It was normal to support Mohammad<br />
Reza Aref, but on balance we chose the country’s interest in that period over any other<br />
interest and we voted for Hassan Rouhani.” Khashefi has called for working to choose a<br />
candidate who more closely represents the interests of the Reformist bloc in the 2021<br />
elections. 21<br />
It seems that this choice by the Reformists to nominate presidential candidates who<br />
do not belong to the same political bloc has provoked some of its other members too,<br />
with a number of the parties already making moves towards nominating someone with a<br />
Reformist identity in the 2021 elections.<br />
Despite the political blocs’ belief in the inevitability of Rouhani’s running for a second<br />
presidential term in the upcoming elections, some voices demanded that he give up his<br />
candidacy. A fundamentalist MP from the previous parliament, Javad Karimi Ghodoosi,<br />
asserted that Rouhani was not running for the 2017 elections for the purpose of rescuing<br />
the country and finding a solution to the dead-end state it had reached, adding that<br />
Rouhani's coming to power had not been good for his personal interests or for those of<br />
the country. 22 Nevertheless, these personal opinions of some Reformists who are not<br />
quite happy with Rouhani's performance do not represent the wider public opinion,<br />
either among the elite or among the supporters of the Reformist bloc in the public.<br />
Even the majority of Conservatives are convinced that Rouhani should run for a second<br />
presidential term, even if they are somewhat dissatisfied with him.<br />
Khamenei used Rouhani's pending reelection for a second term as leverage in political<br />
debates over the past six months, although he was not a part of the ongoing political<br />
debate. However, Khamenei’s advice to Ahmadinejad not to run for re-election effectively<br />
shut the political door in Ahmadinejad’s face and greatly changed the course of domestic<br />
politics in Iran. Many changed their opinions of the candidates aspiring to stand as<br />
rivals in the presidential race following Khamenei’s announcement, especially when he<br />
stated that a number of politicians are uninterested in running for election, such as the<br />
Head of the Parliament, Ali Larejani; the Secretary General of the Expediency Council,<br />
Mohsen Rezai; the Secretary General of the Islamic Union of Engineers, Mohammed-Reza<br />
Bahonar; and Khamenei's representative in the ‘Ettelaat Foundation,’ Mahmoud Da'aye,<br />
who swore by “the spirit of the Imam” that he had no intention of standing for election.<br />
As for the current Foreign Minister, Mohammed Javad Zarif, he rejected claims that he<br />
intended to announce his candidacy for the elections, making it very clear that he had no<br />
intention of doing so. Another rumored presidential candidate, the commander of the<br />
Al-Quds Force, General Qassem Suleimani, also rejected any suggestions that he would<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
25
stand for office, saying he is a soldier in the Jurist Leadership and the Islamic regime and<br />
will remain one for the rest of his life, adding that has no interest in the political arena. 23<br />
After Trump’s victory in the American presidential elections, there was fresh discussion<br />
in Iranian political circles of the possibility of more Conservative candidates, such as<br />
Saeed Jalili, running for the 2017 presidential elections in order to ensure the failing of<br />
the nuclear agreement and to assert that Rouhani is unfit to deal with the new American<br />
President in the light of the latter’s taking a hardline stance against Iran.<br />
»»<br />
The Institution of the Presidency and the Legislative Authority<br />
The Islamic Shura Council undertakes the duties of the legislative authority in the<br />
Iranian Islamic Regime; although the 12-member Shura Council is elected, its power<br />
is not absolute, with the approval of the Guardian Council of Constitution required to<br />
approve laws issued by the Shura Council. Six of the Council’s members are appointed<br />
directly by the Supreme Leader, while other Shura Council members nominate the<br />
other six, although these members also require the approval of the Supreme Leader<br />
before they can take office. In cases when the Guardian Council of Constitution rejects<br />
one of the laws issued by the Shura Council, the legislation is returned to the legislative<br />
authority to amend it. In case the Guardian Council of Constitution does not agree to it<br />
during a second reading, it is referred to the Expediency Council to adjudicate between<br />
the two councils.<br />
February 2016 saw Iranian parliamentary elections, with the Conservatives, the<br />
Moderate Alliance, and the Reformists claiming to have won; these claims stemmed from<br />
a lack of clarity in the political affiliations of a large number of the winning MPs, especially<br />
those entering the election under the name the ‘Omed Coalition’ (Al-Amal). Despite the<br />
competing claims, however, the Conservatives’ losses were obvious. Most of the new<br />
MPs’ political affiliation began with the election of the Head of the Parliament, which saw<br />
a confrontation between the Reformist Mohammad Aref and the moderate Conservative<br />
and Rouhani ally Ali Larijani. The parliamentary election results indicated that the<br />
Reformist candidates won 133 seats against 125 Conservatives. When electing the Head<br />
of the Parliament, Aref received only 102 votes. This showed that a number of the MPs<br />
who stood as Reformists were not loyal to their political bloc, as well as a tendency<br />
amongst independent MPs to side with the Conservatives. Many of the Reformists saw a<br />
need for Rouhani’s return favors to Mohammad Aref, who withdrew from the elections<br />
in 2013. Rouhani, from his part, did not take a supporting stand in the election of Aref as<br />
Head of Parliament. In spite of not having a supporting Parliament with the majority of<br />
voters, Rouhani got rid of the MPs who opposed the nuclear agreement. 60% of the MPs<br />
became new members of the Parliament.<br />
During the six-month period of preparing this report, the Iranian Parliament witnessed<br />
two events as equally important as the election of the Head of Parliament, Ali Larejani.<br />
One was the formation of a conglomerate of representatives of the Turkish-majority<br />
areas in the Iranian Parliament, which made a lot of noise inside and outside Iran. The<br />
supporters of this action saw that it would contribute largely to defending Turkish rights<br />
and recognizing them as a basic constituent of the Iranian population. Those who were<br />
against this saw that it might increase racial bigotry and divide national unity.<br />
26 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
170 university professors and Iranian historians<br />
expressed their rejection of the deputies’ coalition<br />
of Turkish areas, and they sent a letter to the Head of<br />
Parliament in order to stop dividing Parliament into<br />
national parties.<br />
This coalition included 100 persons forming most<br />
of the Turkish members of the Parliament. Masoud<br />
Baztchak Bour was chosen as head of the coalition and<br />
Zahra' Saye as an official speaker.<br />
In spite of the extreme rejections and warnings<br />
against forming this coalition, Rouhani’s government<br />
supported the idea. The spokesman, Mohammed Baqer Sadeq Larijani: head of the judicial system<br />
Nobakhat, confirmed the government’s stand that is<br />
supportive of forming national coalitions and questioned: “What is the wrong with<br />
forming coalitions in the Iranian Parliament for all minorities: Azeris, Kurds, Baluchis,<br />
Arabs and others?”<br />
Some linked Rouhani’s government’s support of the formation of a coalition inside<br />
Parliament with his need to win votes from the ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan,<br />
Kurdistan, Baluchistan, Al-Ahwaz, and the rest of the marginalized border areas.<br />
It is likely that forming a coalition for the minority in Parliament is linked to the<br />
upcoming presidential elections because in the 2013 elections Rouhani got most<br />
of the votes from the minority-populated areas. It is thought that the government<br />
supported this step to win the Turks’ support and win their votes for the next<br />
elections. 24<br />
The second event was the breakup of Kazem Jalali from the 'Velayat Movement' and<br />
forming a third coalition inside Parliament, which included 40 MPs. With this, those<br />
40 MPs were deducted from Rouhani’s coalition. Jalali stated that the number of<br />
members in the Parliamentary bloc would reach 80 within days.<br />
With these changes taking place in Rouhani’s relationship with the political blocs<br />
in Parliament, many MPs demanded that Rouhani deal firmly with his brother and<br />
personal assistant Hussein Fereydon and stop him from entering the Presidential<br />
Institution, referring to the fact that Freydon’s name was often mentioned in<br />
many media sources. These sources talked about his influential role in appointing<br />
managers and bank presidents, in addition to his illegal activities. In a letter sent to<br />
Rouhani, it was mentioned that reliable media sources referred to Rouhani’s personal<br />
assistant cancelling the travel plans of the Assistant President of Women’s and<br />
Children’s Affairs, Shahyndecht Mulorda, in order to achieve his personal objectives,<br />
as well as disposing of lands in Kish with the help of managers from the Presidency<br />
Institution in return for money. In response, Hussein Fereydon stated that these<br />
accusations were unfounded and anything being circulated by the media was aimed<br />
to take on Rouhani and those around him for political objectives and gains.<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
27
»»<br />
The Presidential Institution and its Role in the Conflict between the Legislative and<br />
Judicial Authorities<br />
In the absence of a clear division between the three executive, legislative, and judicial<br />
authorities in Iran, every now and then clashes occur. As the Expediency Council was<br />
founded to separate the legislative authority represented by the Shura Council and<br />
the Constitution Maintenance Council, which was formed by MPs and lawyers from<br />
the judicial authority and chosen by Khamenei, the judicial authority has clashed with<br />
Parliament in the past six months over two consecutive incidents:<br />
1- Banning the Reformist MP Ali Motaheri from giving a speech in Mashhad<br />
The decision of the Deputy General of the City of Mashhad to ban MP Ali Motaheri from<br />
giving a speech caused a huge political disagreement that is still going on today. Police<br />
forces broke into the headquarters of the religious ceremonies, which Motaheri was<br />
visiting, and separated the attendees at that occasion.<br />
The ban came days after Motaheri criticized the undermining of Rouhani’s authority and<br />
the decision-making centers in the country in light of the huge amount of power wielded<br />
by Supreme Leader Khamenei.<br />
This decision did not pass peacefully. Iranian sources reported clashes taking place<br />
between the police and the public who were refusing to leave the place.<br />
Motahari described the break-in as an ‘ISIS attitude’ and called for President Rouhani to<br />
implement the necessary procedures to save the province from the tyrannical behavior<br />
practiced by some officials in response to the decision not to allow an orchestral concert<br />
in Mashhad which had been arranged by the judicial authority, whereby the dismissed<br />
Minister of Culture had succumbed to Ali Jannati. He also demanded clarification as to<br />
whether the official in Mashhad was the Governor or the Deputy General, or the Imam<br />
at Friday prayers. He added, “Did the Deputy General think about the consequences<br />
of violating the laws and the negative effects on young people who came from remote<br />
places in order to participate?” 25<br />
One of the most prominent critics of the judicial authority during this incident was<br />
President Rouhani, who warned against reducing the country to two fighting factions<br />
over who had authority, just because some officials were not allowed to give their<br />
speeches. He also warned about the rise of extremism in Iranian society and wondered,<br />
in a letter to the Minister of the Interior and Justice, that if some officials were enjoying<br />
having powers in highly sensitive locations in Mashhad, “whether they think that<br />
in silencing voices, shutting halls, and preventing speeches, they can participate in<br />
achieving progress for the country?”<br />
Rouhani demanded the President of the judicial authority to confirm the duties of the<br />
police and security forces in securing ceremonies which are held legally and to guarantee<br />
the freedom of expression in the country. He considered their behavior shameful and<br />
demanded the Minister of the Interior to open a comprehensive investigation to disclose<br />
information about what happened during that incident. 26<br />
In his turn, the Minister of the Interior Abdolriza Rahmani Fazli issued a decree to form<br />
28 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
an investigation committee to examine the reasons behind<br />
the cancellation of the speech by the Vice President of the<br />
Shura Council Ali Motaheri, and to submit a report about the<br />
incident. Rahmani said that if there was a case of negligence<br />
or violation by the executive officials, they would be dealt<br />
with severely. He also said that the report would be sent<br />
to relevant parts since the necessary procedures were<br />
issued by the government and the Ministry of the Interior.<br />
Fazli gave assurance that Motaheri’s program in Mashhad<br />
had obtained all the official and legal documents from the<br />
correct sources. 27<br />
The Mayer of Khorasan described the ban of the Deputy<br />
General by Ali Motaheri as “inappropriate and ugly.” He gave Ali Motahari: Iranian politician<br />
details about the case and assured that when the Deputy<br />
General Office had reported to him about banning Ali Motaheri’s speech, it was on the<br />
orders of Revolutionary Guard Intelligence. 28<br />
In spite of these justifications, the Head of Parliament Ali Larejani confirmed that the<br />
Deputy General in Mashhad had issued the ban based on the orders of Revolutionary<br />
Guard Intelligence. These statements were considered to be solid evidence by the public<br />
of the involvement of the Revolutionary Guard in the ban decision.<br />
It was notable that the family relationship between the President of the judicial<br />
authority Sadiq Larijani and his brother the Parliamentary President Ali Larejani did not<br />
prevent them from clashing this month when many clashes occurred between the two<br />
authorities.<br />
The second of these clashes was between the legislative and judicial authorities, which<br />
started with an attack by Reformist MP Mahmoud Sadiqi on the Conservative President<br />
of the judicial authority Sadiq Larijani. It occurred when Sadiqi asked the Finance Minister<br />
a question about millions of dollars having been deposited in Sadiq Larijani’s bank<br />
account and his demand to show all of his bank accounts to an official representing one<br />
of the core members of the Conservative movement and one of the most prominent<br />
religious leaders in Iran.<br />
In spite of reassurances from judicial authority officials to the Parliamentary President<br />
Ali Larijani that they would not legally persecute Mahmoud Sadiqi, the police issued a<br />
legal warrant for his arrest on his return home. Sadiqi gave his assurance that he did not<br />
recognize the warrant because he believed it to be illegal.<br />
This incident had two following separate results and caused much discussion in the<br />
political arena and the media:<br />
• Secret Iranian Bank Accounts.<br />
• MP’s Parliamentary Immunity.<br />
Sadiqi's obtaining the bank account details of Larijani and knowing his bank balance<br />
brought into question the law of the confidentiality of bank accounts in Iran. Is it<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
29
necessary to exclude officials from these laws in the<br />
future to avoid any financial corruption, which is<br />
endemic in Iran? The second issue is how an MP could<br />
be arrested when enjoying parliamentary immunity.<br />
After the arrest warrant and the accompanying<br />
events, Sadiqi refused to comply with police orders.<br />
A number of police officials gathered in front of his<br />
house. The news spread to social media networks and<br />
large numbers of people rushed to his house. After<br />
Rouhani’s and the Head of the Parliament Ali Larejani's<br />
intervention, and after some intensive phone calls, the<br />
police withdrew from Sadiqi's house. 29<br />
2- The Presidency and the Intervention in the<br />
Conflict between the Legislative and Judicial<br />
Ali Larijani: chairman of the Parliament of Iran<br />
Authorities<br />
The President of the judicial authority did not wait for the Iranian President Hassan<br />
Rouhani to form an alliance with those who followed the executive authority and<br />
Parliament before attacking. They immediately launched an attack on Rouhani and his<br />
government, as they believed in the nature of the coalition between the Parliament and<br />
the executive authority.<br />
The Conservative movement was found to be present in a number of cases presented to<br />
the Presidential Institution and the media were given an opportunity to demonstrate the<br />
contradictions in Rouhani’s stand. They demanded that the same procedures be followed<br />
that were put in place against the Reformist newspapers; namely, banning newspapers<br />
such as the Qanoun Newspaper, banning journalists from working, or even imprisonment<br />
in some cases.<br />
In his 2013 campaign, Rouhani made promises to defend freedom of expression and to<br />
support the freedom of the press, although government institutions have so far lodged<br />
more than 102 complaints against 12 media organizations. It appears that Rouhani’s<br />
promises to give more freedom to the media and press were only electoral promises. 30<br />
The level of enmity between the media and the Presidency became extreme, especially<br />
when Rouhani's Assistant for Legal Affairs announced that “some of the media in Iran<br />
are imitating 'Mujahedin Khalq' at the beginning of the Revolution,” while others were<br />
imitating an anti-Revolution. He accused them of instigating a state of despair in society.<br />
In spite of this position against the media in Iran, Rouhani recently called for the media<br />
to enjoy more freedom of expression during the inauguration of the 22nd publication<br />
exhibition in Tehran. He stressed the importance of its security and called for the<br />
establishment of a Journalists Union. Rouhani also said that broken pens and silenced<br />
voices could not do anything; therefore, he gave his assurance that breaking pens and<br />
silencing voices would not be allowed.<br />
30 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
The absence of equality in Iran and the legal dealings with the Iranian media reflected<br />
the need for a general media and press law to regulate legislative dealings with criminal<br />
press publications, as double standards had been noticed in legal dealings with the press<br />
and media according to press affiliations and the persons being criticized; this is why<br />
there are those whose blood is easily shed by the press and those who are protected<br />
according to strict laws. This is in addition to illegal dealings by the Iranian State.<br />
Rouhani’s statements and invitation to give the media more freedom angered the<br />
President of the legislative authority Sadiq Larijani, who harshly criticized the former. He<br />
described his statements as contradictory and considered them a form of defamation of<br />
and insult to the authority itself. He questioned Rouhani’s motives when demanding the<br />
Supreme Leader Khamenei to stand up to the media. However, he changed his position<br />
when he met media reporters and press journalists. Rouhani defended them and offered<br />
them protection. 31 Iranian analysts see in Rouhani’s statements an indication that he<br />
wanted to win the press and media over to his side when the election is close, as he did in<br />
his previous presidential campaign.<br />
The legislative authority’s criticism of Rouhani and his government was not limited to<br />
the subject of freedom of the press; it also criticized the government because it had not<br />
yet submitted a report to the legislative authority regarding “astronomical salaries.” 32<br />
In the aftermath of the leak of the “astronomical salaries” story, many Government<br />
managers resigned. One of them was the Director of the General Organization of<br />
Insurance in Iran, while others were fired by the President. The Finance Minister Ali<br />
Tayyip Nia announced that Rouhani had ordered a change of managers at the following<br />
banks: ‘Millet,’ ‘Saderat,’ ‘Al-Rafah,’ ‘Qard Hassan,’ and ‘Mahr Iran.’<br />
After this discussion of the judicial authority crisis and the intervention by the<br />
Government, we can conclude that the judicial authority represents a stronghold in the<br />
Conservative movement and that the Iranian judicial body is involved in the political<br />
arena, which is not supposed to be the case for any judicial system. The political<br />
practices implemented by the President of the judicial authority or the prosecutors in<br />
Iranian provinces seem to be a normal pattern to the extent that the Iranian political<br />
environment does not criticize them.<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
31
The Military Institution<br />
Introduction<br />
The Iranian military institution consists of three main divisions: The Regular Army,<br />
the Revolutionary Guard, and the People's Defense Forces, which are known as the<br />
‘Basij’ with 545,000 members in its base. The General Leader of these forces is the<br />
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.<br />
The Iranian army consists of the Joint Chief of Staff and four main forces: Ground<br />
Troops, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Seal of the Prophet Air Force Defense<br />
Headquarters.<br />
The Revolutionary Guard was formed after the victory of the 1979 Revolution<br />
according to a decree from Khomeini that would create one body to join all the<br />
military forces. It was established at the time of the Revolution as support for the<br />
regime and to create a balance with the traditional army, which took a neutral<br />
position during the Revolution.<br />
Estimates by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London indicate that<br />
the Revolutionary Guard consists of 350,000 members, and it has its own special air,<br />
naval, and ground forces. They are not considered part of the military forces that the<br />
Iranian Jurist Leadership had. They are perceived as the main force and loyal guard<br />
of the Supreme Leader and the Iranian regime. However, the Institute of Strategic<br />
and International Studies in Washington estimates their numbers as not exceeding<br />
120,000.<br />
The Revolutionary Guard has four main branches: Ground forces, a navy, an air<br />
force, and air defenses. In addition, there is the Quds Legion, which has links with the<br />
Basij, which was founded in 1980 and consists of civil volunteers who are supported<br />
by the Revolutionary Guard. Its main objective is to enforce security inside Iran.<br />
Many years later, other duties were assigned such as the suppression of protests and<br />
supporting Iran’s allies during wars.<br />
The secretive nature of these forces and their presence in schools, universities, and<br />
governmental and private institutions makes it hard to calculate the exact numbers<br />
affiliated with it, although some reports claim that it consists of 2500 regiments, each<br />
with 300 members.<br />
The Al-Quds Legion was founded during the Iraq-Iran war. It represents the<br />
intelligence unit of the Revolutionary Guard and is in charge of any military action<br />
outside the country, in addition to offering military intelligence support for pro-Iran<br />
countries and militias.<br />
»»<br />
The Budgets of Revolutionary Guard and the Army<br />
The Revolutionary Guard forms a powerful internal body in Iran because of its<br />
loyalty to the Supreme Leader and not to the Iranian Government. One of its<br />
duties, as stipulated by the Constitution, is to protect the regime from any internal<br />
32 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
or external enemies. Since Mohammed Khatami’s presidency from 1997 to 2005,<br />
interventions by the Revolutionary Guard have increased in internal affairs and a number<br />
of threats have been made to exclude Khatami.<br />
The Revolutionary Guard is not only a military institution that practices its political role,<br />
and is active inside and outside Iran, it has become an economic giant which controls a<br />
number of huge institutions and has complete economic power over many economic<br />
sectors. One of the disputes typical of the relationship between President Rouhani<br />
and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is Rouhani’s attempts to limit the power of the<br />
Revolutionary Guard by cutting its budget.<br />
In July 2016 Rouhani’s Government proposed amending the budget allocated for the<br />
Iranian military forces (the Army and Revolutionary Guard), namely cutting the Guard’s<br />
budget and increasing that of the Army. This suggestion was criticized by Mojtaba Zolnur,<br />
a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee in Parliament, justifying<br />
it by the different threats surrounding Iran, especially the threats coming from American<br />
officials, as well as cases of terrorism and terrorist groups, both issues that require not<br />
reducing the budget.<br />
The defense budget submitted to Parliament by Rouhani in January 2016 included a<br />
re-distribution of the budget between the Army and the Guard, not only a reduction of<br />
the total amount. The Iranian defense budget typically increases every year at a rate of<br />
2%-5%, but Rouhani’s 2016 budget suggested an increase in the Army’s budget of 15%, or<br />
1.5-1,75 billion US dollars. He suggested decreasing the Revolutionary Guard’s budget by<br />
16%, or 4.1 billion US dollars, as well as increasing the budgets of the Basij troops and the<br />
General Staff of the Armed Forces by around 400 million US dollars each.<br />
Rouhani failed to pass this proposition through Parliament, as a result of either the<br />
political compromises taking place during 2016 or the threats he had received. He<br />
changed course, and in spite of his call to reduce the Revolutionary Guard’s budget in the<br />
2016 General Budget, Rouhani granted them a phenomenal budget in the budget list for<br />
2017, with a huge increase of 53% in comparison to the previous year, which amounted<br />
to 6.9 billion US dollars. 33<br />
This list is currently under review by the Iranian Parliament. Economic analysts have<br />
described it as having a military and security pattern. According to the list, the General<br />
Budget for next year is 371 thousand billion Tomans (99.7 billion US dollars) with a 39%<br />
increase in defense spending, which will be distributed as follows:<br />
The Ministry of Defense and its different institutions, such as the Social Security of the<br />
Armed Forces, the Information Security Organization, Research and Defense Studies, the<br />
Organization of Ideological and Political Affairs, the Malek Ashter Industrial and Defense<br />
University, and the Organization of Geographical Affairs, all received 2,299,909 billion<br />
tomans (5,075 billion US dollars).<br />
The Revolutionary Guard’s forces and its institutions such as the Khamenei<br />
Representative Office in IRGC and Basij, the Information Security Organization, the Emam<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
33
Al-Hussein University, and the National Guard University altogether received 240,545<br />
billion Tomans (6.9 billion US dollars). 34<br />
»»<br />
Signs of Increasing the Guard’s Budget in 2017<br />
There were a number of factors involved in changing Rouhani’s position of reducing the<br />
Revolutionary Guard’s budget, the most prominent of which are the following:<br />
Reducing allocations to the Revolutionary Guard in the 2016 budget, which was<br />
rejected and met with great condemnation by the National Security and Foreign Politics<br />
Committee, because most of its members are Revolutionary Guard Generals. This<br />
committee saw and still, sees, that Iran is exposed to many different threats, especially<br />
the crises happening throughout the region, as well as incidents of terrorism and terrorist<br />
groups.<br />
The Revolutionary Guard represents Iran abroad, and it enforces the regime’s policies of<br />
expansion in the region, something that demands more financial support.<br />
A couple of months separates Rouhani from the presidential elections; therefore, he<br />
would prefer to postpone his disagreements with the Revolutionary Guard and avoid any<br />
conflict with them in the meantime.<br />
»»<br />
War Production<br />
During the mid-1990s, Iran showed great interest in building up its war industry. Some<br />
reports indicate that Iran has so far exported its domestic made weapons to more<br />
than 57 countries. Most of these countries are in conflict zones and wars in Africa, the<br />
Middle East, and Latin America. In addition, Iran exports different types of weapons to<br />
organizations and armed groups in the Ivory Coast, the Congo, Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria,<br />
Southern Soudan, and Uganda. Furthermore, affiliated movements in the region such as<br />
Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Shiite Muslims in Iraq.<br />
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Iran exported<br />
weapons to a number of countries with an estimated value of no more than 200 million<br />
US dollars 2010-2014. 35<br />
Over the last few decades, Iran has sought to rebuild its exhausted military system. It<br />
has also shown an ongoing interest in increasing its rocket power to include different<br />
missiles and involves any potentially useful country for that objective.<br />
Observers of military manufacturing in Iran see that most of the war industry there<br />
reproduces Russian and Chinese weapons, or that the military technology of those<br />
two countries has to a certain extent an influence on the technical formation of the<br />
manufacture of weapons in the hands of Iranian experts.<br />
Iranian Motives in the Increase of War Production<br />
Iran’s motives to develop its local war production can be summed up as the following:<br />
1. The prohibition of exporting the imposed weaponry on Iran to different degrees since<br />
the 1980s outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian War, which formed a strong motive for Iran to<br />
develop its local abilities in maintaining and manufacturing weaponry.<br />
34 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
2. The comparatively old weaponry of aircraft and tanks, which Iran has in comparison<br />
to other armies in the region, especially the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council<br />
and Israel.<br />
3. Iranian armaments strategy depends on the manufacturing local missiles in large<br />
quantities, even if most of which had limited destructive power or low shooting accuracy.<br />
This is a strategy, which Iran gained during the Iraqi War by deeply hitting the enemy’s<br />
territories without causing human losses.<br />
4. Fear of foreign forces’ pursuit of reaching the heart of Iranian regime poses a strong<br />
motive to develop militarization programs. 36<br />
5. Regional competition and creating a state of balance among nuclear powers such as<br />
Pakistan and India, besides, Turkey and Russia’s influence over the Central Asian States.37<br />
6. Convincing the Iranian inside of the fundamental role that is carried out by the RG<br />
and the Military Institution generally in combating foreign dangers.<br />
7. During the past six months, Iran declared the manufacturing and developing large<br />
number of weapons in order to supply different military units (navy, ground, and air) with<br />
the newest and most developed weapons.<br />
8. In the following, we present a part of Iran’s recently announced military<br />
manufacturers of the past period, according to the military units, their specialties and<br />
uses:<br />
9. The Navy’s Militarization Programs<br />
In the city of Bushehr, the ground forces affiliated with the IRGC launched, Natheri<br />
Frigate, which is considered the first frigate made of aluminum; 55 meters long, 14<br />
meters and 10 meters long, and 13 meters height. The completion of this project took<br />
14 months. It also has the feature of sailing in rough seas and helicopters taking off and<br />
landing easily on it.38 It also enjoys many sophisticated capabilities, mainly sailing amid<br />
severe weather conditions, and sailing 10 thousand kilometers without the need of fuel<br />
and its ability to carry 100 persons.<br />
But the attached photo during the inauguration ceremony showed that it carries one<br />
civil helicopter, and nothing was noticed about its military capabilities.<br />
Iran states this frigate is provided with the most recent equipment and devices and was<br />
designed according to the most modern international standards with Iranian expertise<br />
without the help of any foreign experts.<br />
Recently Chief Commander of the Iranian Navy of the IRGC, the Commander, Ali Fadwi,<br />
stated that a new generation of Natheri frigates is being manufactured and that these will<br />
join the navy without announcing the dates. He said that these will form a turning point<br />
in the power of the navy of the IRGC. 39<br />
As for the Iranian army affiliated, the Marines, they also presented their latest<br />
achievements in the war production. Research and Jihadist Institution, one of the sectors<br />
affiliated with the forces, recently presented their latest achievements which include<br />
the automated testing for floats prototype project, and ‘Thamen project’ for controlling<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
35
system of exterior and air flames for battleships carrying rocket launchers, and the<br />
military ‘Radar LPI project’.<br />
Also during the ceremonies, Radar ‘Dira’ Al-Bahar’ (Shield of the Sea) was launched by<br />
the instructions of the Chief of General Staff of Armed Forces. This functions by a system<br />
that locates moving objects and is provided by different systems against the electronic<br />
war through which it can monitor Iranian and Foreign fighters. They also revealed the…<br />
for testing the ability to survive in sea storms, as well as controlling maritime ships crash<br />
project, the electromagnetic civil defense radar project in the ships, and detecting enemy<br />
radar system .40<br />
In the same ceremonies, the curtain was removed from 'Mirsad' project for machine<br />
stabilization which is about torpedo equipment model 46, 41 that was announced by<br />
the Iranian official channels and issued neutral reports discussing what Iran announced<br />
about its military achievements.<br />
As for the North fleet that is owned by the navy in the Iranian army, it was announced<br />
the joining of a bombing barge 'Subr' in the south waters and Oman sea, in addition to<br />
the joining of destroyer 'Sahand' to the forces. 42<br />
»»<br />
Drones Development Program<br />
Iran moved the curtain from a number of aircraft, such as jamming aircraft, which was<br />
displayed in a project for the latest ground forces equipment.<br />
In addition to this aircraft, other<br />
aircraft were displayed which were<br />
designed for image detecting, and<br />
other provided with laser destructive<br />
equipment that can jam on image<br />
operations which other crafts take. 43<br />
As for the air forces, it displayed<br />
what was said to be the latest aircraft<br />
operating under the name 'Saeqa',<br />
which is a drone combat aircraft from<br />
the 'Simorgh' model.<br />
Iranian Simorgh aircraft are considered<br />
the Iranian model of the American<br />
'RQ170' aircraft, which Iran was able to take over after taking it down in 2011 after<br />
entering the country.<br />
Iran says that it designed a model through using the reverse engineering technology to<br />
carry four smart missiles. It also announced that this strategic aircraft would be continued<br />
to be designed as Iran needs this type of aircraft. 44 In the same context, the Secretary of<br />
the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, during his visit to the production<br />
line and the drone aircraft exhibition affiliated with the IRGC, said that this kind of aircraft<br />
goes within the scope of rocket capacity, a very important sector among Iran's deterrence<br />
36 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
power. Therefore, Iran will not recognize any borders or limitations in order to develop<br />
this kind of aircraft, which participates in developing Iran's defense capabilities. 45<br />
From another side, the marine moved the curtain on the first drone aircraft that can<br />
operate suicidal operations. It was stated in the proclamation of the IRGC that this aircraft<br />
is capable of flying for 4 continuous hours, with 1000 scope. Among its features is that it<br />
can fly at different heights that vary between half a meter above sea level to 3000 feet.<br />
The speed of the new drone aircraft is around 200 kilometers/hour and it can land on<br />
water. 46 Moreover, it has been announced the launch of the first drone aircraft under the<br />
name 'Saher' which is designed by Iranian students.<br />
According to the disseminated information about this drone aircraft, it can reach a<br />
field range of 1900 kilometers and its highest speed reaches 180 k/hour and it can fly<br />
for 10 continuous hours. Its duties include photographic imaging, monitoring traffic and<br />
executing military operations. 47<br />
Within the past few months, Iran announced the launching of a group of radar systems<br />
that were locally manufactured. The most important of which is the launching of radar<br />
projects and air navigation devices in Shiraz city. These models include two radar<br />
systems: 'Miraj 4' and 'Matla' Al-Fajr 3', and 'DME' system, as well as radar sensor system<br />
from the navigation family system.<br />
'Miraj 4' is characterized by its controlling ability, launching initial warnings, long-range<br />
air surveillance, monitoring ground sites, and third detection. 'Matla Al-Fajr 3' is another<br />
system that was revealed. Air forces say that it is characterized by it high ability to detect,<br />
discover and identify targets ranging from 500 km. As for 'DME', it is one of the systems<br />
that aid the wireless navigation systems, which use civil airports and are manufactured<br />
for communication between the ground station and the control room in the aircraft. 48<br />
»»<br />
Rockets Program<br />
On another level, Iran also revealed information about a number of rockets; the most<br />
prominent is 'Zulfiqar' rocket which represents the latest of the locally manufactured<br />
rockets which reach a range of 750 kilometers; that was revealed in the military<br />
performance of the Iranian air forces in Bandar Abbas city, south-west of Iran, in<br />
concurrence with other military performances in Tehran and other cities.<br />
According to 'Tasnim' Iranian agency, 'Zulfiqar' rocket is considered one of the most<br />
accurate of the locally manufactured rockets. This has joined the long-range Iranian<br />
ballistic missiles because it contains fission igniter warhead that can hit different targets<br />
on ground and airport tarmac. 49<br />
»»<br />
The Reality of Iranian Military Productions<br />
In spite of the huge publicity about Iran's military achievements in the last few months,<br />
it is hard to trust all the information published about the experiments, industries and war<br />
discoveries. A lot of uncertainty and mystery still enclose a lot of these industries. Some<br />
reports and information indicate that some of these industries are not even accurate. In<br />
the following, we present the most highlighted uncertainties about these achievements:<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
37
1. Iran does not have advanced technologies, which are needed for manufacturing large<br />
numbers of weapons it talks about every now and them.<br />
2. Not having sufficient information about the efficiency of most of these industries.<br />
3. The inability of these military industries to compete with advanced weaponry<br />
systems which are owned by other countries in the region.<br />
»»<br />
Future of Iranian Military Industries<br />
A number of reasons will lead Iran to continue spending on armaments and announcing<br />
more about its local industries, we mention the following:<br />
1 Backsliding of the security conditions in a number of border areas and the continuing<br />
confrontations between the IRGC forces and the security forces against arms smuggling<br />
and drugs gangs.<br />
2 Continuing National Liberation Movements in its confrontation with the Iranian<br />
security forces.<br />
3 Iran's need to renew its military arsenal with new and advanced weapons.<br />
4 The polarization state which the country witnesses and Iran's growing ambition to<br />
play a more effective role in crises which are taking place in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq.<br />
5 Refuse to sell advanced weaponry to Iran by weapon manufacturing countries, such<br />
as the United States.<br />
6 Iran's interest in reaching the level of arms exporting countries<br />
»»<br />
Maneuvers and Training Projects<br />
It has become clear to the observers of the Iranian internal affair that a very important<br />
part of the many military maneuvers conducted by Iran focuses on the psychological and<br />
political aspects affecting those of whom Iran considers its adversary, whether inside<br />
or outside Iran. For the past six months, different Iranian military forces conducted a<br />
number of maneuvers, including the following:<br />
In the surrounding airspace area of Esfahan city, south of Iran, the Air Force ran a<br />
maneuver called 'Sixth Velayat Sky Commandos' in which different fighters, bombers,<br />
heavy and semi-heavy cargo aircraft, communication aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft,<br />
aerial refueling, and other drone aircraft, participated in. The air forces also conducted<br />
ground penetrating radar operations to the hypothetical enemy at this phase.<br />
The F14 and the Meg 29 fighters carried out training operations on air combat in the<br />
field combat situation during real war times. On the last day of the maneuvers, 6 'Meg 29'<br />
aircraft were able to carry out aerial tracing operations to locate the position of 'Krar', the<br />
drone aircraft in order to destroy a target with an air-to-air guided missile. 50 It also used<br />
the advanced and locally manufactured bomb fighters 'Qased' in destroying specified<br />
targets. These fighters were able to destroy specific targets through the launch of 'Naser'<br />
missile, and laser directed bomb that weighs 200 pounds. 51<br />
The most important results of the locally manufactured bombs, missiles, and weapons…<br />
it was officially announced that the testing of these was successful by all means. 52<br />
38 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
The second maneuver was the radioactive leakage. This maneuver was conducted<br />
by the Iranian army in Khashan Natanz and Aran in the midlands: i,e. areas where<br />
the nuclear reactors concentrate in Natanz, Arak, and Vrdo. In this regard, the official<br />
spokesperson, Ahmad Jawzi, said that these maneuvers aim at increasing the readiness<br />
of the forces to combat any possible attacks and to protect the nuclear reactors and<br />
abilities; besides coordinating the efforts between the police, security and the regime<br />
forces to ward off any dangers in the nuclear field. 53 The Chief Commander of the<br />
Headquarters of Radioactive Defense in Kashan, Hamid Reza Ma'manyan, said that these<br />
maneuvers were conducted according to the standards of the Iranian Atomic Energy<br />
Organization and under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency and<br />
the number of participants reached up to1300 persons who were supported by 200<br />
more. 54<br />
The third maneuver is the 'Basij' which was conducted by the Mobilization Forces in<br />
Rebar, Karman province south-east Iran, with the aim of training on security ambuscades<br />
in border areas. 55<br />
The fourth maneuver which was called 'to Jerusalem' was also conducted by the Basij<br />
forces in 13 Iranian provinces in the participation of 84 regiments. Those who conducted<br />
the maneuver focused on doing operations that stop the enemy from entering inside<br />
cities, besides preventing the parachuting of soldiers; in addition to training on modern<br />
techniques to confront new threats and how to combat attacks done by ISIS. 56<br />
The fifth maneuver is the 'Great Maneuver of Rasoul Allah'. This was run by the navy<br />
forces in Iranian army in south-east the country. It covered around 200 square kilometers.<br />
The objective of this maneuver, according to the Commander of Nave Forces, the Admiral<br />
Haidari, is to evaluate the readiness of the forces and test their ability levels. 23 troops<br />
of the ground forces participated and the focus was on armor and artillery weapons,<br />
the guerrillas, and fast response forces. The utilization of locally manufactured armors<br />
shaped a very important side to the maneuvers program. 57<br />
In these maneuvers, some of the new industries were displayed, such as 'Feryad', a new<br />
drone aircraft that is manually launched and reaches a range of 20 kilometers and flies for<br />
45 continuous minutes.<br />
The ground forces displayed 'Jamr' a device that is designed to combat hostile drone<br />
aircraft. Ground forces say that this device can fight drone aircraft within 3 kilometers<br />
and is able to take out any aircraft out of control before taking it down to the ground. 58<br />
On the third day of the maneuvers, the ground forces tested the suicide drone aircraft<br />
'Raed 85', besides two other aircraft which carry the names of 'Shahin' and 'Eqab'; the<br />
first is used for fighting operations and has surface-to-air missiles. The second one is<br />
specialized in spying operations. The ground forces claim that this aircraft can fly up to 24<br />
continuous hours. 59<br />
»»<br />
Iranian Navy Activities<br />
1- Iranian patrol boats harassing US ships<br />
The marine force that is affiliated with the Iranian IRGC follows harassment policy with<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
39
the American warships and obstructing its route. The forces question the American<br />
military activities near Iranian borders. This constant harassment was described by the<br />
United States as irresponsible and provocative and threatened to drown these boats in<br />
case of other reoccurrences.<br />
In July 2016, five Iranian war vessels affiliated with the IRGC approached one of the US<br />
warships that carried one of the prominent Generals in US army who is in a one day visit<br />
across the Strait of Hormuz. The vessels are supplied with 'Tao' missiles and drew near<br />
the ship of around 560 meters.<br />
The General Commander of the United States Army Central, who is supervising the<br />
war against ISIS, General Joseph Votel, addressed the news reporters on the board of<br />
the 'American USS New Orleans' saying that: 'the chance of having wrong calculations<br />
is big'. He also added that about 10% of the cases are described as unsafe, abnormal or<br />
unprofessional.<br />
In August 2016, Iranian patrol boats in the Arab Gulf continued its fixed policy of<br />
obstructing the vessels, which cross over the international navigational lines in the Gulf,<br />
especially American Vessels.<br />
A US defense official announced that four boats affiliated with the Iranian IRGC<br />
obstructed the way of an American destroyer in the Strait of Hormuz area. He said that<br />
two Iranian boats drew near almost 300 kilometers from the destroyer 'NETZ' in a very<br />
unsafe and unprofessional behavior. He added, 'the high speed and the closeness of the<br />
Iranian boats were annoying. This is when the commander of the destroyer changed its<br />
path.'<br />
In September 2016, Iran continued its escalation of its navigational activities in the Arab<br />
Gulf Region through sending speedy patrol boats and middle-sized vessels constantly,<br />
with a wide increase of surveillance operations and obstructing American ships.<br />
American vessels did not respond to these moves.<br />
The most prominent incident of obstructing US ships route is noted through what 7<br />
Iranian vessels did when they obstructed the route of the 'USS Fire-point Destroyer' in<br />
the Arab Gulf waters, at the time it was 91 meters away from one of the Iranian boats,<br />
which forced it to change its course to avoid any clash.<br />
The Pentagon said that the American boats warned the Iranian side many times over a<br />
wireless connection, but to no avail, stating that this is the 31st times which dangerous<br />
confrontations as such between American and Iranian boats in the southern Gulf waters<br />
occurred .60<br />
The Commander of the US 5th fleet, Bill Orben, stated that the number of the unsafe<br />
and unprofessional maneuvers of the Iranian boats in the first half of 2016 doubled from<br />
last year. He added that in spite of the limited power of the boats in comparison to the<br />
American military ships, their threats in the Arab Gulf were real .61<br />
General of US Central Command in the Middle East and North Africa 'Stenkam' Joseph<br />
Votel warned that wrong calculations might cause a navy military combat with Iran<br />
in the Arab Gulf. He added that 'Al-Quds Legionary' affiliated with the IRGC did some<br />
40 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
Donald Trump: President of the United States<br />
provocative moves against US ships in the past<br />
period in the Arab Gulf. 62<br />
»»<br />
Trump Promises Iranian Navy a Harsh Response<br />
The newly elected American President Donald<br />
Trump’s threats against Iran were not only<br />
concerning his rejection of the nuclear agreement,<br />
but they also included other files such as his promise<br />
of a harsh response to any Iranian ship harassing US<br />
naval ships and boats in Arabian Gulf waters. These<br />
threats came when Trump, in front of his supporters<br />
in Florida during his electoral campaign, said, “when<br />
they surround our beautiful destroyers with their<br />
small boats and they start making signals which<br />
they are not supposed to be doing, they are then<br />
trying to control the waters with weaponry power.”<br />
He demanded to re-enforce US military control to<br />
emphasize US power and its role as ‘World Leader.’ 63<br />
In this regard, the American Magazine ‘Foreign Affairs’ sees in Trump’s new government<br />
a necessity that would tend toward counterattacking the threat which Iran poses,<br />
especially in the naval arena where the US enjoys supremacy. It also demanded red lines<br />
be drawn to guarantee any provocations by Iranian were not ignored, and to establish a<br />
more comprehensive policy regarding Iran to limit its expanding ambitions. 64<br />
»»<br />
Iranian Reactions to Trump’s Threats<br />
In response to Trump’s threats about the necessity of sinking Iranian boats in the<br />
Arabian Gulf if American ships were harassed, the General Staff of the Iranian Armed<br />
Forces Mohammed Bagheri underestimated the importance of these threats. He<br />
considered that Trump’s impulsive statements during his electoral campaign, his threats<br />
to sink Iranian boats, and his inquiry about the condition of American sailors after they<br />
had been arrested and their boats took over; all came under the umbrella of Trump’s<br />
electoral propaganda. 65<br />
The former Commander of the Revolutionary Guard (IRGS) Mohsen Rezai announced<br />
that his country had no intention of fueling the conflict that had gone on from the start<br />
of the Revolution up to the present day and that his armed forces were considered an<br />
essential factor in the stability and security of the Gulf and also, that it would be normal if<br />
Iran’s reaction to any kind of attack were significant.<br />
»»<br />
Signs of Iranian Harassment against American Warships<br />
The Washington Institute for Far East Policies claimed, in a report that was prepared<br />
about this issue, that the IRGC was increasing its provocations and harassment against<br />
US Marines in the region in coordination with fundamentalists from the Iranian regime.<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
41
These provocations had a local political dimension that was directly addressing Hassan<br />
Rouhani’s Government, which was calling for stronger ties with the West.<br />
This report also observed that fundamentalists in Iran need to renew their<br />
confrontations with America to justify their enormous budget allocations, which they<br />
receive annually for the military, intelligence and security purposes. 66<br />
Kalaf Kabshan, Chairperson of Eurasia Group and expert in Iranian Affairs said that in<br />
spite of the billions of dollars, which were pumped into Iran after lifting the sanctions,<br />
Tehran still sees in the United States a barrier that is stopping European and Asian banks<br />
from funding its projects. 67 Some observers of Iran’s continued presence in international<br />
waters said that it was an attempt to keep away US Marines and distract their attention<br />
from Iranian ships carrying weapons and supplies to its allies in Yemen, Syria, and<br />
Lebanon. As a result of the intense surveillance by US marines on shipping, some Iranian<br />
ships carrying supplies to the Houthis last October had to return after being intercepted<br />
by American warships; this was the 5th shipment of Iranian weapons to the Houthis<br />
which the US had prevented in eighteen months.<br />
2- Iranian Strategy to Expand its Presence in International Waters<br />
During the second half of 2016 Iran increased its ships and fleets in international<br />
waters under different pretexts, such as protecting its vessels from pirates, developing<br />
relationships with other countries, ensuring these countries’ welfare in local, regional,<br />
and international waters, and guaranteeing the safety of marine navigation routes in free<br />
waters.<br />
This expansion, which is in accordance with Iran’s larger plan of expanding regionally<br />
and internationally, is about consolidating Iran’s presence along the coastline of the<br />
Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. This is the policy of the commander of the Iranian<br />
Navy Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, who announced last November that, “Our fleet, soon,<br />
will be surrounding Africa and sailing across the Atlantic Ocean.” As part of achieving<br />
this goal, Iran paid visits to and carried out joint naval maneuvers in Africa and Asia, for<br />
example in South Africa, Tanzania, China, Sri Lanka, and India.<br />
Admiral Habibollah Sayyari also confirmed in his statement that the continued presence<br />
of Iranian naval fleets in free waters is part of the country’s policy of developing ties with<br />
every other country in the world. He added that sending these fleets to international<br />
waters aims to increase trust and cooperation between Iran and these countries. It<br />
also limits the policy of fear of Iran, ‘Iran phobia,’ which is a policy that some countries<br />
implement, and a fixed idea, which Iranian officials use, that is, “sending peace and<br />
friendship message all over the world.”<br />
Sayyari added that his country had so far sent 43 fleets to international waters, which<br />
were accompanied by 3,800 trading ships and oil tankers. The 44th fleet visited Tanzania<br />
and South Africa. 68<br />
»»<br />
Iranian Ambitions in Building Naval Bases in Syria and Yemen:<br />
The General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Mohammed Baqeri revealed Iran’s latest<br />
ambitions when he said that Iran needs naval bases in different regions and that a day<br />
42 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
would come when it would need bases in Yemen and Syria or any other floating naval<br />
base. He claimed these bases would be 10 times stronger due to their nuclear capability<br />
and they would represent a “deterrent for enemies.”<br />
One day after these declarations, the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the naval<br />
forces to reinforce their presence in international waters and said he considered their<br />
existence clear proof of what he called “Iran’s efficiency” and its power.<br />
Sayyari and Baqeri’s declarations are not the same as the almost daily ones Iranian<br />
officials used to make. Instead, they reflect a clear policy, not of a tendency to dominate,<br />
which is not new, but of a new means. This was the first time Iranian officials had spoken<br />
about naval expansion outside the Arabian Gulf, where Iranian naval movements can be<br />
understood as part of Iran’s direct security. The declarations about reinforcing Iran’s naval<br />
presence in international waters and about fixed or floating naval bases that exceeded<br />
Iran’s security in its regional waters were only to demonstrate Iran’s policy of expansion. 69<br />
The significance of these naval bases in Yemen and Syria is represented by Yemen’s<br />
proximity to the strategic trading location of the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, which is<br />
considered one of the most important naval pathways. If Iran establishes a naval base<br />
in this country, it will give it unfettered access to the Red Sea. Furthermore, establishing<br />
a base in Syria would also contribute to Iran’s policy of expansion to include the<br />
Mediterranean Sea, which would make it easier for Iran to support its allies in Lebanon<br />
and Syria, as well as giving it the possibility of being near European coastlines. 70<br />
Iran’s expansion in regional and international waters irritated the former American<br />
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who said that the greatest challenge facing the Middle<br />
East is the possible dominance of Iran in the region, which he described as “imperialistic<br />
and Jihadist.” He also demanded Washington to oppose Iran’s regional expansion and to<br />
act like a country. 71<br />
Some observers have difficulty visualizing Iranian naval bases in Yemen and Syria in<br />
the meantime because establishing them would require that these two countries are<br />
indeed capable of making this serious decision, which would allow the Iranian regime<br />
to establish military bases there. They say that the regime still has many obstacles and<br />
barriers to cross in order to be able to achieve its huge strategic ambitions. They also<br />
considered Mohammed Bagheri’s statement about the bases in Yemen and Syria to be<br />
nothing more than a propaganda speech that Iranian leaders usually make. 72<br />
»»<br />
Military Cooperation with Foreign Countries:<br />
First: Iranian-Pakistani Cooperation<br />
Political, security, and economic interests in Iran and Pakistan merge to an extent that<br />
has encouraged the two countries to get over the border tensions caused by opposition<br />
groups of the Justice Army, which took over a location in Pakistani territory to carry out<br />
its operations against the security forces and the RG. Pakistan’s anger over the Indian-<br />
Iranian agreement regarding the joint operation of the Iranian Chabahar Port has also<br />
been assuaged. Islamabad considers that this port might operate at the expense of<br />
Gwadar Port. In a meeting that brought together the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
43
Sharief and the Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani in September 2016 on the sidelines of<br />
the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Rouhani stated that the two countries’<br />
security was connected, stressing that they need to increase their cooperation in defense<br />
areas.<br />
These calls were met by a quick response from Islamabad in October 2016. This is when<br />
Iranian naval forces carried out maneuvers with their Pakistani counterparts in Karachi<br />
Port, in which 43 Iranian naval squads and 4 fighters took part. These maneuvers focused<br />
on rescue operations and marine salvage in Pakistani regional waters. 73<br />
With regard to Iran’s participation in these maneuvers, the commander of the Iranian<br />
Navy Admiral Habibollah Sayyari said that the 43 squads completed their missions<br />
successfully in free waters. 74<br />
Second: Iranian-Chinese Cooperation<br />
After the Chinese economy had reached an advanced level in the ranks of the Great<br />
Powers, China realized the necessity of its military strength-keeping pace with its<br />
economic situation. Chinese leaders firmly believed that the military had a pivotal role to<br />
play in supporting China’s objectives and national interests.<br />
Due to its interest in modernizing its weapons and army, and in rebuilding what had<br />
been destroyed since the Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war, and due to the American<br />
sanctions, Iran wanted to strengthen its ties with China instead of using Western or<br />
American technology.<br />
Iran hoped that Beijing would continue its supply of rocket technology and the<br />
necessary equipment to develop ammunition and arms factories, as well as the exchange<br />
of expertise in the nuclear field. 75<br />
This Iranian-Chinese military cooperation dates back to the 1980s when China offered<br />
weapons, ballistic and tactical missiles, and anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran during its war<br />
against Iraq. Beijing helped to rebuild Iranian weapons, which Iran had owned since the<br />
Shah. The most advanced Iranian weapons were designed under Chinese supervision.<br />
They also contributed to developing Chinese weapons such as the ‘Noor,’ which was<br />
developed from the Chinese ‘Ho 802’ and ‘Al-Naser’ missiles, and which was designed by<br />
the Chinese Hongdo Group. 76<br />
In recent years, Tehran has sought to strengthen its military relationship with China<br />
before signing more armament deals. These attempts were met with Chinese approval,<br />
which was made very clear in the declarations by Chinese military officials. The Chinese<br />
Defense Minister Chang Wanquan told the commander of the Iranian Navy Admiral<br />
Habibollah Sayyari, who visited China in October 2014 that Beijing did indeed want to<br />
strengthen its military ties with Iran. On a number of different occasions, the Chinese<br />
Defense Minister said Iran was a strategic partner for his country, especially in crucial<br />
matters, and he emphasized the necessity of reinforcing and developing military and<br />
defensive cooperation between the two countries.<br />
In the negotiations, that Iran held with the Six Major Powers in Vienna, China insisted<br />
over and over again on lifting the sanctions imposed on weaponry by the United Nations.<br />
44 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
In spite of the nuclear agreement, they confirmed the ban on Iran obtaining advanced<br />
weapons for the time being. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced that both<br />
Russia and Iran would continue to make weapons deals according to the procedures of<br />
the United Nations Security Council.<br />
In light of Iranian fears about a change in American policy toward Iran after Trump had<br />
become the new President in the White House, Iran had to increase its military alliances<br />
with its traditional allies such as the Chinese.<br />
This Iranian military cooperation with Beijing was in accordance with China’s desire to<br />
have some leverage over Donald Trump, who had announced his interest in cooperating<br />
with Taiwan in the near future, which was in gross violation of the American-Chinese<br />
agreement to commit to China alone.<br />
According to this close cooperation between the two countries, the Chinese Defense<br />
Minister Zhang Wan Chuan visited Tehran with a high-level group of military delegates<br />
and met his counterpart General Hossein Dehghan. Both sides discussed various bilateral<br />
regional and international issues.<br />
Dehghan confirmed that this closer relationship and wide-ranging military defensive<br />
cooperation with China was one of Iran’s main diplomatic and defensive priorities. During<br />
the meeting, a military defense agreement between the two countries was signed that<br />
“reinforces the military defensive cooperation” and the “exchange of expertise in the<br />
military field, especially in training and counter-terrorism.” 77<br />
At the same time General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammed Baqeri<br />
announced the formation of a joint committee between Iran and China to commence<br />
work as soon as possible. Baqeris also considered the visit of the Chinese Defense<br />
Minister to Iran a huge turning point in the developing cooperation between Tehran and<br />
Beijing. 78<br />
During his meeting with the Chinese Defense Minister in Tehran, General Staff of the<br />
Iranian Armed Forces Mohammed Baqeri called for the signing and implementation of a<br />
memorandum of understanding between the two countries, giving his assurance that the<br />
defense relationships are in the best possible shape. He also announced Iran’s readiness<br />
to expand its military defenses to include carrying out mutual military maneuvers,<br />
referring to his country’s determination and will to improve the military relationship<br />
between the two countries to “a strategic level of cooperation.” 79<br />
»»<br />
Future Signs of the Military Relationship between Iran and China:<br />
1. China occupying second place after Russia in exporting weapons to Iran, and through<br />
the agreements signed by Tehran to make public its cooperation with China after many<br />
years of secret operations due to the international prohibitions on Iran.<br />
2. Iran hopes through developing its military cooperation with China to engage in new<br />
alliances even if this means playing the fight against terror card, which the Chinese<br />
Defense Minister referred to in his last visit to Tehran. He said that their cooperation in<br />
the fight against terror and other issues in the region were the reasons for his country’s<br />
military cooperation with Tehran.<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
45
3. China seeks to achieve its objectives in the region and has shown its aspiration more<br />
than once to increase its military cooperation with Iraq and Syria. In this way, it says that<br />
there is the possibility of achieving this objective with Iran’s help, which enjoys unique<br />
and powerful relationships with these countries.<br />
4. Some observers see in this ‘glasnost’ policy with China that Iran is sending a message<br />
to Moscow that Tehran is capable of forging new alliances if Russia breaks its promises<br />
and commitments; whereas others see this Iranian-Chinese cooperation as Iran<br />
attempting to cooperate with Moscow and Beijing in order to confront Washington and<br />
its allies in the region.<br />
5. China’s ‘glasnost’ in Iran is part of China reinforcing its power over Asian countries.<br />
6. Tehran sees in Beijing an international ally to increase its influence in the region.<br />
Third: Iran’s Cooperation with the Sultanate of Oman<br />
As part of the international military cooperation between Iran and other countries, Iran<br />
intends to carry out joint maneuvers in the Arabian Gulf with the purpose of conducting<br />
training procedures in relief and marine salvage, as well as increasing cooperation<br />
between Iran and Oman during emergencies.<br />
»»<br />
Iran and the Syrian War<br />
Until recently, Tehran claimed that it had not sent fighters to Syria, that its participation<br />
in the war was limited to sending experts and counselors as consultants to the forces of<br />
the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, and that it had not taken part in combat. However,<br />
after the deaths of many Iranian soldiers and officers who were sent into the war, Syria<br />
has been witnessing for the past six years, Iran admitted the deaths of senior military<br />
leaders and mourned them under the slogan “Jihad Duty.” The announcement of the<br />
deaths of soldiers and officers in Syria has become almost daily news in the media.<br />
»»<br />
More than One Thousand Iranians Dead in Syria<br />
The latest statistics about the number of Iranians killed in Syria indicate more than 1000<br />
personnel that Iran sent to fight in the war. This is according to the Head of the Institution<br />
of Martyrs and Veterans Mohammed Ali Shahidi Mohlati, although the Iranians confirm<br />
the numbers killed from the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) and the Iranian army exceed the<br />
numbers stated in the media.<br />
This is the second time an<br />
Iranian official has confirmed<br />
the number of soldiers killed<br />
in Syria since the previous<br />
list last September, where<br />
Shahidi announced that 400<br />
Iranians had been killed; also<br />
killed were large numbers of<br />
fighters that Iran recruited<br />
from Afghanistan and<br />
Pakistan to support the Syrian<br />
46 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
Bashar Al-Assad regime. They are called ‘the Defenders of the Shrines of Ahl Al-Bayt’ in<br />
Iran in reference to the holy Shiite shrines in Syria. 80 A large number of IRGC leaders have<br />
been killed in the last few years in battles in Syria including Ahmad Ghulami, Hossein<br />
Hamedani, Shafia' Shafi'e, Reza Ferzaneh, Dario Shadersti, Ishmail Haidari, Hadi Kabaf,<br />
and Abdallah Iskandari. 81<br />
The last of the senior RG leaders killed in Syria was Major General Gholam Reza<br />
Smajie. Smajie was killed in combat against the Syrian Opposition in Aleppo. He held<br />
the positions of ‘an official of operations in the RG headquarters in the east of Iran’ and<br />
‘Command of the artillery regiment Naser 5th Brigade.’ He was also head of intelligence<br />
in an artillery squad and a missile regiment. 82<br />
Vast Criticism against the Regime for being involved in the Syrian War<br />
As a result of the increase in the numbers of dead in Syria, many Iranians launched a<br />
huge storm of criticism reflecting their anger about the role of the government and the<br />
IRGC in Syria. This wave of criticism included sarcasm about the phrases, which Iranian<br />
officials were using to justify their interference in Syria, such as: Linking the interference<br />
with Iran’s national security and deterring the threat of ISIL, in spite of the fact that ISIL<br />
does not carry out any military operations inside Iran. 83<br />
‘Twana,’ which is an Iranian civil society website, interacted with the campaign and<br />
posted the number of the civilians killed along with those responsible for the killing. The<br />
site commented that: “Al-Assad’s troops are at the top of the list of causes of civilian<br />
deaths,” and that taxes and Iranian oil funds were being spent on murdering women and<br />
children in Syria. 84<br />
Some Iranian newspapers raised the subject of the numbers killed and the interference<br />
by the RG in Syria. For example, the ‘Bahar’ newspaper mentioned in one of its headlines<br />
that the recent developments taking place on the battlefields in Syria had caused an<br />
increase in the numbers of Iranians killed there. This number was increasing daily<br />
because of the Iranian military presence there.<br />
The newspaper strongly criticized the Iranian strategy of protecting Bashar, which was<br />
based on two premises:<br />
• Keeping national security threats away from Iranian borders.<br />
• Preserving an axis of resistance in the region under Iranian leadership, while calling the<br />
Iranian regime to deal realistically with this matter. 85<br />
»»<br />
Calling on Rezai to Raise Morale<br />
This widespread criticism of the continued losses of Iranian militias in Syria forced the<br />
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to call on the retired General Mohsen Rezai, former leader<br />
of the IRGC, who suddenly appeared in public wearing a full military uniform. 86<br />
Some Iranian analysts considered that the IRGC had been deliberately spreading the<br />
news about Rezai taking over leadership of the troops in Syria with the purpose of raising<br />
the morale of Iranian officials after it had greatly declined because of the recent losses. 87<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
47
The Iranian ‘Fars’ news agency, run by the IRGC, questioned the reasons behind calling<br />
on Rezai. The answer came from General Rezai himself in a speech in which he expressed<br />
his sorrow and anger about the massive losses among the Iranian troops participating in<br />
the war. He threatened to take revenge on those who killed the soldiers and called them<br />
terrorists and Takfirists.<br />
»»<br />
The Future of Iran’s Presence in Syria<br />
After the fall of Aleppo and concluding the agreement between Russia and Turkey<br />
about the evacuation of civilians and armed guerrillas from this historical city, Iran sensed<br />
danger in its future presence in Syria. This was reflected in statements by a spokesman<br />
from the Iranian Foreign Ministry, who warned that his country would not allow Syria to<br />
become a sharing of interest zone; he stated that any talk about this issue was worthless<br />
and supports the theory that Iran’s actions on the ground started with occupying Aleppo<br />
and ended with the evacuation agreement of civilians and fighters from the eastern parts<br />
of the city, and also evacuating the villagers from the Shiite Kafriya and Nabl. In spite of<br />
the effective role played by Russia and Turkey after taking the initiative in Syria and calling<br />
all the main conflicting groups to the negotiation table in Astana, Kazakhstan, Iran’s fear<br />
its role being downsized in spite of its calls for meetings increased.<br />
Therefore, the future of Iran in Syria will fundamentally be based on the outcome of<br />
these negotiations, and in case of their failure, Iran will encourage both Russia and Bashar<br />
Al-Assad to continue military action through mobilizing the Idlib Front to guarantee its<br />
control over the largest area in Syria, thus ensuring the continuity of Al-Assad.<br />
»»<br />
Change of Military Commands<br />
Last November the Supreme Leader and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Ali<br />
Khamenei issued two separate decrees to appoint Commander Ahmed Reda Bordestan,<br />
who was the commander in charge of the ground forces and vice-President of the<br />
Iranian Armed Forces, to replace Abdolrahim Mousavi, who was sacked from his position<br />
after only five months of being appointed on May 5th 2016 so that he could replace<br />
General Gholam Ali Rashid. In another decree, Commander Haidari was appointed the<br />
commander of the ground forces affiliated with the Iranian army. 88<br />
In December 2016, the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Revolution Ali Khamenei issued<br />
a decree to appoint General Gholamhossein Gheybparvar head of the Basij troops and<br />
general vice-President of the Armed Forces for Basij Affairs, as a replacement for General<br />
Mohammed Reza Naqdi, who was appointed an assistant for the cultural and social<br />
affairs of the IRGC.<br />
Gholamhossein Gheybparvar took leadership of the Emam Al-Hussein Base after its<br />
former leader Hossein Hamedani was killed in Syria. He also took leadership of the ‘Fajr’<br />
guards in Fars province. 89<br />
» » Conclusions<br />
• In spite of Rouhani’s orientation toward decreasing the IRGC’s budget in 2016, he<br />
changed his plan to find a balance between the army and the guards and increased their<br />
budget in 2017, which reached a maximum of 6.9 billion dollars.<br />
48 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
• The objections by the Defense and Security Committee in the Iranian Parliament about<br />
the decrease in the IRGC’s budget in 2016 had a great impact on its increase in 2017. This<br />
committee saw that Iran was facing internal and external threats that demanded more<br />
support for the RG.<br />
• The RG assured its greater authority over that of the government and that it will be the<br />
right hand of the Iranian regime in its implementation of its foreign plans and expansionist<br />
policies in the near future.<br />
• Through its continuous announcements about its war industries to establish a unique<br />
position among other regional powers, Iran aims to establish stability with nuclear powers<br />
such as Pakistan and India and to compete with Turkey and Russia in their influence in the<br />
Central Asian States.<br />
• A large part of the ongoing Iranian training and maneuvers for years has focused on<br />
military and psychological aspects to stop whomever Iran considers its internal and external<br />
enemies.<br />
• The harassment of American ships by IRGC boats has assumed a local political dimension<br />
that is directed towards Rouhani's Government, which demands stronger relationships<br />
with the West.<br />
• Harassing the American ships in Gulf waters in order to escape from the observation of<br />
the American ships that imposed on the Iranian ships, which are loaded with weapons and<br />
supplies for its allies in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon.<br />
• Iran’s plans for expansion in international waters are part of its larger expansionist policy.<br />
• Iranian officials’ statements about the necessity of building bases in Yemen and Syria<br />
reveal the Iranian regime’s intentions for naval expansion beyond the waters of the Arabian<br />
Gulf.<br />
• Iranian naval maneuvers in international regional waters could be understood from a<br />
straightforward security perspective. Enforcing Iran’s naval presence in international waters<br />
and establishing naval bases outside the national security zone and regional waters are<br />
both parts of Iran’s expansionist policy.<br />
• Iran still encounters many obstacles and barriers in establishing bases in neighboring<br />
countries. Baqeri’s statements about his country's intention to establish bases in Yemen<br />
and Syria are only part of Iranian propaganda rhetoric which Iranian leaders often use.<br />
• Tehran’s alliance with China, its second ally after Russia, is because of its wish to<br />
modernize its artillery, to be provided with missile technology and the necessary<br />
equipment to develop weapons and ammunition factories.<br />
• Due to Iran’s fears of a change in American policies after the new American president<br />
Donald Trump gained power, Iran had no choice but to reinforce its military alliances with<br />
its traditional allies such as China and Russia.<br />
• China has the second rank in weapon exportation to Iran after Russia, and after the<br />
Chinese Defense Minister's visit to the country, Beijing was able to restore its cooperation<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
49
publically after many years of secret collaboration due to the international prohibition<br />
on Iran.<br />
• Iran’s openness toward China is seen by observers as an attempt to send a message to<br />
Moscow that Tehran is capable of forging new alliances if Russia backs out of its promises<br />
and commitments. Other observers see in this collaboration an attempt to actively<br />
cooperate with Moscow and Beijing so as to be able to confront Washington and its allies<br />
in the region.<br />
• Tehran sees in Beijing an international ally to increase its alliances in the region.<br />
• The Iranian regime has been exposed to a major campaign of criticism at home due to<br />
its participation in the war in Syria and the large numbers of casualties in the RG and the<br />
army.<br />
• Iran’s fear of a smaller future role in Syria can be seen in its attempt to disrupt the<br />
Turkish-Russian agreement, the detention of civilians, and linking the failure of the<br />
agreement with the evacuation of villagers from the Shiite villages of Nabl and Al-Zahra.<br />
• If the Astana negotiations fail, the Iranians will turn to the Idlib Front to continue<br />
its fight in order to take control of a large part of Syria that would enable Al-Assad to<br />
continue his rule and to guarantee Iran’s influence in Syria.<br />
50 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
The Security File<br />
Introduction<br />
The Supreme Council of Iranian National Security is in charge of internal security and<br />
formulates defense and security policies within a general political framework that<br />
are specified by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The Council's other duties include<br />
the coordination of political, security, social, cultural, and economic activities that are<br />
relevant to defense and security plans. The Council consists of the Presidents of three<br />
authorities, judicial, legislative, and executive, as well as the President of the General<br />
Staff of the Armed Forces, an Official of Planning and Budget Affairs the Foreign and<br />
Interior Ministers, the Security Minister, and the Leaders of the RG and the Army.<br />
According to the Iranian Constitution, the supervision of specific national security<br />
policies is the responsibility of the Supreme Council of Iranian National Security,<br />
along with the Ministry of Security, the Army and the IRGC. However, it seems that<br />
the appointment and specification of national security policies are only entitled for<br />
the IRGC which exploited the support and huge capabilities in implementing other<br />
agendas represented through the repression of those whom the Regime calls the<br />
Enemies of Revolution, also committing the most horrible atrocities and violations<br />
against non-Persians.<br />
»»<br />
Repression of non-Persians<br />
Non-Persians, Kurds, Arabs, Balochis, Turkmen, and Azeris represent more than half<br />
the population of Iran, but for many years, the Iranian regime has carried out acts of<br />
repression and marginalization against them in an attempt to take these people away<br />
from their homes and integrate them with Persians in order to destroy their identities<br />
and subvert their cultures. The regime has not only subverted their cultures, it has<br />
also engaged in political and economic discrimination, as well as demographic.<br />
Since the Revolution, the regime has forcefully reacted against ethnic and religious<br />
minorities who have demanded their rights. The absence of dialog between<br />
the Government and the non-Persian minorities has led to the emergence of<br />
political movements and various armed factions, a lot of which have engaged in<br />
bloody conflicts. Many of those killed were from these armed factions. However,<br />
it is remarkable that the regime has not dealt realistically with this, and the two<br />
parties have not met to discuss how their legitimate objectives can be obtained.<br />
This repressive policy has continued to destroy all human rights, and bans the use<br />
of ethnic minority languages in schools and government departments, as well as<br />
repressing those demanding more political participation or economic, social, and<br />
cultural rights. They have also been subject to threats, arrest, and imprisonment.<br />
Moreover, the children of these ethnic minorities have been deprived of jobs in<br />
the public sector, which has intensified feelings of injustice, marginalization, and<br />
oppression. 90<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
51
First: The Security Situation in Kurdistan-Iran<br />
In the past six months, Kurdistan province in Iran has witnessed a remarkable escalation<br />
in attacks by unknown armed men on public institutions and police stations; there have<br />
been fights between the IRGC and the security forces and liberal movements and those<br />
opposing the regime.<br />
»»<br />
Announcing the Destruction of 'Cells' Planning Attacks<br />
In the last few months the Iranian authorities have spoken about confrontations with<br />
some armed men and killing them, as well as preventing other attempts which wanted to<br />
target a number of areas, as follows:<br />
The announcement by the Ministry of Interior about security members from the<br />
Ministry of Intelligence destroying a cell in the east of the country, which was carrying<br />
out serious, attacks and consisted of four men; one was killed and the three others were<br />
arrested; a large amount of explosives was seized along with them. 91<br />
In Western Iran, the killing of 12 cell members after a raid by the Iranian air force was<br />
announced; this cell was planning to cause explosions in areas in Western Iran until it was<br />
prevented from doing so. 92<br />
In the same province, Iranian forces said that it had destroyed a cell loyal to anti-<br />
Revolution groups and killed 12 of its members, explaining that fighters and intelligence<br />
from the IRGC Al-Najaf Base in Kermanshah province had clashed with the cell. The<br />
commander said that three IRGC members were injured in the attacks. Large quantities<br />
of weapons and ammunition were seized. 93<br />
In another operation that Kermanshah witnessed, three men, ‘Takfirists,’ were killed.<br />
The Commander of the Security Forces in that province, Montchehr Aman Elahi, said<br />
that a special squad of security forces clashed with three terrorists in a neighborhood<br />
in Kermanshah, which led to the killing of all the armed men, saying that the forces had<br />
found weapons: Kalashnikovs and explosive belts. 94<br />
In Sanandaj, the capital of Kurdistan province, a police station was attacked by unknown<br />
armed men with machine guns, which resulted in the injury of one police officer. After<br />
the attack, every town in Kurdistan was put on a high state of alert and police officers<br />
were stationed on the streets and in sensitive locations.<br />
In Kermanshah, Iranian MP Heshmatollah Flaht Beshahl was the subject of an<br />
assassination attempt, which led to the loss of a number of his escorts. The Chief of the<br />
National Security and Foreign Politics Committee in Parliament Ala' Deen Brojrdi said that<br />
the failed assassination attempt was a pre-prepared terrorist plot. Brojrdi referred to the<br />
return of people who are against the Revolution to their activities inside Iran. He said that<br />
a clash between the IRGC and the anti-Revolution elements took place recently. 95<br />
In the Kiltchi area in Marivan city, IRGC troops succeeded in preventing an attack that<br />
was being planned by gunmen. This announcement by the IRGC said that these men<br />
were planning to carry out operations in the area, but they escaped after suffering severe<br />
losses. A number of guns were seized. 96<br />
52 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
In another incident in Marivan, one officer was killed and three others were injured due<br />
to explosives being thrown at a police car by an unknown man riding a motorbike. 97<br />
The military faction of the Free Society and Eastern Democracy Group with all its<br />
members announced its responsibility the attacks targeting IRGC and Basij sites in<br />
Serdashto and Marivan cities. An announcement issued by the group said that it had<br />
killed no fewer than 26 RG and Basij members in different operations in the Gandharan<br />
area, Sardasht province, and in Kolgadr, Marivan. 98<br />
»»<br />
Protests on the Anniversary of the Assassination of the Leader of the Kurdistan<br />
Workers' Party<br />
In another escalation, the Iranian Kurdistan Workers' Party organized a general<br />
protest on the occasion of the assassination of its leader Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou<br />
in the Austrian Capital Vienna in 1989. The party accused the IRGC of the assassination<br />
of Ghassemlou after he called for negotiations about the Kurdish cause. This party is<br />
considered the most important Kurdish opposition in Iran and has 70 years of political<br />
and combat experience. It has always invited Kurds to express their opposition to the<br />
arrests, assassinations, and oppression, except that the Iranian Regime has continued to<br />
pursue its members and calls them terrorists. 99<br />
In response to the general protest that the party called for, large Kurdish cities in Iran<br />
such as Sanandaj, Mahabad, Kermanshah, and Kamyaran witnessed sit-ins and shop<br />
closures. A few weeks before its call for this general protest, the PKK started a huge<br />
military campaign, which spread its troops throughout Kurdistan areas. This resulted<br />
in fierce combat with the IRGC, which led to the death and the injury of dozens of IRGC<br />
members, among which were senior officials. The PKK said that the objective of this<br />
campaign was to reorganize different social powers inside Kurdistan and to mobilize them<br />
to confront any future repression by the RG and security forces in the future. 100<br />
Second: The Security Situation in Al-Ahwaz<br />
Recently the Iranian Regime has continued its systematic repressive policy against<br />
the Arab minority. Al-Ahwaz and the surrounding Arab areas have witnessed a number<br />
of random arrests and raids. These practices against the Arabs are part of the Iranian<br />
authorities’ comprehensive security plan to repress any activities and demands for a long<br />
period of time.<br />
1- Iranian Intelligence Establishes a University in Al-Ahwaz:<br />
To tighten its grip on the Arabs and practice more surveillance over their activities in<br />
Al-Ahwaz, in the north of Iran, the Intelligence and Security Department announced that<br />
the Ministry of Intelligence and Security was planning to establish a university of ‘Security<br />
and Intelligence’ in this city to control the political and cultural activities, and to develop<br />
security methods in order to cope with the levels of danger that exist in Al-Ahwaz<br />
province for Iranian security. 101<br />
2- Iranian MP's Discuss the Security Situation in Al-Ahwaz<br />
The National Security and Foreign Policy Committee in the Iranian Parliament<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
53
dispatched a number of its members to Al-Ahwaz to discuss important security issues,<br />
focusing mainly on the movements that are against the policies of the Iranian regime<br />
among the citizens of that area. The committee admitted the overall expansion of these<br />
movements at large in Al-Ahwaz.<br />
The committee made accusations against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of supporting<br />
and funding the separatist movements in Al-Ahwaz. 102<br />
In spite of the fact that Iranian officials are aware of the seriousness of the issues<br />
there, ranging from poverty to unemployment, to the spread of injustice, and their links<br />
with the acts of violence which Al-Ahwaz witnesses, they still accuse the Gulf States<br />
of supporting the Al-Ahwaz people and affecting the security and the stability of the<br />
country. Iran describes these movements, which demand human rights and an end to<br />
injustice, as ‘separatist groups’ who want to divide Iran on a national level. A number<br />
of these members were executed for their participation in military operations, which<br />
targeted the institutions of the Iranian regime in this province.<br />
3- Raiding and Arresting Campaign in Al-Falahia in Al-Ahwaz<br />
In November 2016, troops from the security forces and the RG raided the houses of<br />
a number of citizens and arrested dozens of them in Al-Falahia in Al-Ahwaz in the east<br />
of Iran. The official website of the Arab Front for the Liberation of Al-Ahwaz stated that<br />
the arrests took place after the funeral of Al-Sheik Abdallah Ben Budir, Al-Sheikh of the<br />
Bani Tamem Tribe in this city, following accusations of attacks on security members and<br />
police cars in the province, as well as the seizure of a number of guns and weapons by the<br />
security members during their combat with the mourners. 103<br />
Six days after this incident at the funeral of Al-Sheikh Abdullah Ibn Budair, the Minister<br />
of Intelligence Mahmoud Alawi paid a sudden visit to the city of Abadan in the north of<br />
Al-Ahwaz to control the security situation there. To avoid any breaches in the security<br />
situation or any escalation of the protests and battles, the Minister of Intelligence called<br />
on the Arab tribal Sheiks in Abadan, Mohammerah, and Al-Falahia to cooperate with the<br />
security forces to ease tensions there. 104<br />
54 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
4- Continued Obliteration of the Al-Ahwaz Identity and the People’s Removal from<br />
their Arab Homelands<br />
As part of the Iranian regime’s attempt to obliterate the Arab identity in Al-Ahwaz and to<br />
remove the people there from their cultural environment, the authorities continued its<br />
policy of raiding homes to confiscate all the satellite dishes under the pretext of fighting<br />
Takfirists and cultural invasion. The regime announced that it would persecute everyone<br />
working in this regard.<br />
The Ahwazis and observers put these repressive policies against Arabs down to the<br />
Iranian regime’s fear of spreading awareness among the people in these areas. 105 This<br />
fear is apparent in a number of statements by Iranian officials, the last of which was<br />
reported by the official agency ‘IRNA’ about the previous Minister of Intelligence Haider<br />
Moslehi, who said that “the Wahabi strategy” in Iran was planning to change the ideology<br />
of the elite and the people in Al-Ahwaz province. He demanded that the Persian elite<br />
continues their efforts to address this phenomenon, which he called the “expansion<br />
of Wahhabism” in Ahwaz, considering the trend among young Arabs of changing their<br />
beliefs to Sunni Islam a grave danger to Iranian national security. 106<br />
Third: The Security Situations in Sistan and Baluchestan<br />
Despite owning large quantities of gas, oil, gold, copper, and uranium in Sistan and<br />
Baluchistan province, where there is a large population of Sunnis from the Baluchi race<br />
(north-east Iran), it is considered one of the most economically deprived provinces in<br />
Iran with a low economic growth rate, extreme poverty, a high unemployment rate,<br />
smuggling, and drug dealing included in the crises this province is suffering from.<br />
As a result of the regime’s continuation of its policies of discrimination and<br />
marginalization against Baluchis, local resistance movements have continued their<br />
activities against the regime. In recent months, the movement has clashed with the IRGC<br />
and other security forces in a number of areas, especially border ones. The IRGC claims<br />
its clashes with the Baluchi Liberation Movement are mostly related to combating drug<br />
smuggling. Nevertheless, the RG denies the real reasons the Baluchis carry guns, such as<br />
ongoing executions of Sunnis, killing scientists, knocking down mosques, closing schools,<br />
oppression, injustice, and poverty.<br />
1- Clashes and Arrests:<br />
The RG mostly justifies its clashes with the Baluch Liberation movement as a way of<br />
combating drug smuggling, to stop ISIL from encroaching on Iranian territory, and to<br />
eliminate the ‘Enemies of the Revolution.’ In order to continue with this, security officials<br />
in Sistan and Baluchistan province announced that the clashes taking place between<br />
armed men and Iranian police officers in the Mahestan area had resulted in the death of<br />
one armed gunman and an officer called Sadiq Amiri. 107<br />
The clashes took place from Sistan and Baluchistan province to the border city of<br />
Saravan, where the IRGC raided a camp of armed men, which resulted in clashes between<br />
the two parties; one IRGC member was killed and another injured.<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
55
According to a report by the Youth Journalists’ website, the Public Relations Department<br />
in the IRGC announced that the Guards clashed with an opposition group on December<br />
18th in Saravan city. Their opponents managed to escape the country. 108<br />
In another incident, the authorities in Baluchistan caught 13 Qurbaga Makran members<br />
who were accused of smuggling drugs. The Chief of Police in Sistan and Baluchestan<br />
General Hossein Rahimi said that Qurbaga Makran is considered the biggest drug<br />
smuggler in Eastern Iran. This smuggler started his activities in 1990 but stopped for<br />
fear of arrest for a short period. Then he continued his activities at the end of 2014. He<br />
continued, “This person was able to collect 800 tons of narcotics in Afghanistan and<br />
managed to sell them with his network of members in Tanzania, Somalia, Iran, and<br />
Arabian Gulf countries. He made a huge amount of money from this operation.” He also<br />
said that police officer had managed to catch this convict after six failed attempts, as well<br />
as seizing his property consisting of 76 houses in 8 cities, and 15 bank accounts. 109<br />
5- The Future of Mobilization in non-Persians Areas<br />
Internally, Iran has witnessed intensive mobilization in recent months among non-<br />
Persians in Al-Ahwaz, Kurdistan, and Baluchistan in the form of armed clashes with the<br />
security forces and the RG; this is in addition to organizing dozens of demonstrations and<br />
international conferences in order to put pressure on the Iranian regime to recognize the<br />
rights of these minorities.<br />
The Iranian strategy towards Al-Ahwaz is based on changing the demographic map of<br />
the non-Persian population and to obliterate the identities of its own people in order to<br />
merge them with the Persian national fabric.<br />
Since the triumph of the Revolution under the leadership of Khomeini in 1979, Iran<br />
has used several justifications to repress these liberation movements from spreading<br />
in provinces inhabited by non-Persian minorities. Sometimes it has accused them of<br />
forming alliances with foreign regimes, and of treason and spying for the West. At other<br />
times it has accused them of being drug dealers and smugglers, of spreading radical<br />
ideas, and of antagonizing the Jurist Leadership regime; these accusations against non-<br />
Persian people in Al-Ahwaz, Kurdistan, and Baluchistan have taken on a new dimension<br />
in the few past months after a number of the liberation movements in these areas were<br />
accused of working for the benefit of certain Arab countries.<br />
The Iranian regime fears that the non-Persian people’s cause is now considered more<br />
dangerous as a result of the state of polarization and the new instability which the area<br />
is witnessing. This is apparent in the probability that this cause will attract huge support<br />
from Arab countries. As a result, Iran sees this as a ticking time bomb and a potential<br />
cause of a regional conflict.<br />
Iran also fears that some regional powers might use the non-Persian people’s cause as<br />
a way to interfere in the situation there and to continue the conflict internally through<br />
providing financial, political, and media support for the liberation movements in these<br />
provinces.<br />
56 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
Recently, the movements representing the non-Persian people in Iran have conducted<br />
a number of meetings and conferences where they discussed the future of these<br />
movements and the struggle to get back their stolen rights. They concluded that no<br />
transformation or radical change in the ethnic minority crisis was possible, at least for<br />
the time being, without having a broad front that includes all the minorities with their<br />
different regions, affiliations, and languages. These calls for coordination and unity on a<br />
broad front increased the Iranian regime’s fears. So it started to intensify its repressive<br />
campaigns, to tighten its grip on the areas of unrest, and to search for new plans to stop<br />
any movements of that kind, knowing that these people on the fringes of Iran, and that if<br />
they were to decide on unity their confrontation with Iran would be extremely difficult.<br />
Another issue is that 90% of Iran’s wealth comes from non-Persian areas, specifically<br />
from the Arab Ahwaz; therefore, any increase in the strength of the liberation movement<br />
will certainly pose a huge threat to the Iranian economy, and will subject it to more<br />
pressure and a state of national, political, and economic insecurity.<br />
»»<br />
Future Scenarios in the Iranian Regime's Dealings with the non-Persians.<br />
In light of the changes this area is witnessing, the increase in the activities of non-<br />
Persian populations and Iran’s fear of the transformation of the ethnic minorities issue<br />
into a crisis that might threaten the security and stability of the country, there are<br />
a number of scenarios about how the Iranian regime will deal with the non-Persian<br />
minority issue in the near future.<br />
First Scenario: Responding to the Demands of the non-Persians<br />
This scenario depends on how Iran uses its security policy against the Liberation<br />
movements and those demanding ethnic minority rights. It also depends on the fact that<br />
ignoring this issue might lead the country into crises and dangerous conflicts, particularly<br />
in the areas where these people live such as Kurdistan, Baluchistan, and Al-Ahwaz. They<br />
are located near Iran’s borders and neighboring countries; an expansion of the tribes and<br />
nationalities from these countries might worsen the disagreements and ignite long-term<br />
conflicts.<br />
Therefore, if this scenario takes place it remains subject to how much real political will<br />
there is in the Iranian regime, as well as its ability to convince the political and military<br />
movements which put their separation from Iran as one of their priorities to reconsider<br />
their demands, and to put on the negotiating table a future strategy that is acceptable to<br />
all parties and that guarantees the unity of the country.<br />
Second Scenario: Establishing a Unified Front to include all the Movements<br />
Representing non-Persian People<br />
This scenario is based on establishing a national front or an organized coalition that<br />
includes all the non-Persian minorities (Kurds, Arabs, Baluch, Azeris, and Turkmen).<br />
Judging from the realization of these minorities on the necessity of taking the issue of the<br />
'Faith and Line Unity' as a pushing card to play on the Iranian Regime in order to change<br />
how it deals with the issue and to respond to their demands. Adopting this scenario,<br />
however, might lead Iran into a dangerous chaos of confrontations with armed groups,<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
57
security forces, and the RG. The Iranian regime could also consider that this front aims to<br />
tear the country apart. As a result, Iran will tighten its security grip.<br />
Third Scenario: The Iranian Regime Continuing its Policy of Security Dealings with<br />
non-Persian People<br />
This scenario is based on the Iranian regime continuing its security policies and<br />
following a repressive strategy and persecution against the non-Persian minorities<br />
justified by fighting Communist and Wahhabi movements, confronting foreign<br />
intelligence espionage, fighting drug smuggling, and fighting enemies of the regime.<br />
Although the minorities’ demands are all legitimate, mostly they do not move beyond<br />
asking for removing injustice and marginalization, being allowed to participate in political<br />
life, and being given more freedom. However, the regime insists on rejecting these<br />
demands because achieving any of these aims will threaten Iran’s national security and<br />
tear the country apart.<br />
What makes possible the Iranian regime’s ongoing security dealings regarding the<br />
demands of the non-Persians is its intensive security strategy against these ethnic<br />
minorities and its rejection of international invitations and reports by Human Rights<br />
Organizations which call for the cessation of oppressive practices against these people.<br />
It also continues to accuse external parties (United States) and certain Arab countries of<br />
disturbing the security and stability in Iran.<br />
»»<br />
The Human Rights Situation in Iran<br />
After Hassan Rouhani became President of Iran in 2013 his government did its best<br />
to clean up the Iranian regime for the international community and to get rid of the<br />
country’s records of human rights violations, although what actually happened during<br />
that time was contrary to expectations, especially with the number of executions of<br />
Iranians reaching a record high. This made Iran one of the leading countries in the world<br />
to execute its citizens.<br />
During the second half of 2016, Iran continued its execution policy against ethnic and<br />
religious minorities<br />
and children, giving<br />
different reasons such<br />
as antagonizing the<br />
regime, corruption, drug<br />
trafficking and spreading<br />
radical ideas.<br />
Various human rights<br />
organizations expressed<br />
their deep concern<br />
about Iran’s continual<br />
executions and said that<br />
the sentences were always<br />
handed out by courts,<br />
58 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
which lacked independence and neutrality. Most of them were for mysterious crimes or<br />
practices that are not supposed to be criminalized. A remarkably a high percentage of<br />
these human rights violations in this country are against non-Persians.<br />
1- Executions of Kurds<br />
The most prominent of the executions Iran that have carried out in recent months was<br />
the mass execution of 22 Sunni Kurds who were charged with committing terrorist acts.<br />
Among those executed was Hassan Amini, the principal of Eman Al-Bukhari School for<br />
Religious Sciences, the Mufti, and the Shariah judge in Sanandaj. The prosecution in<br />
Kurdistan province issued a statement confirming the execution was of those it called<br />
‘Salafi Takfirists,’ who had committed terrorist acts almost four years ago: “The death<br />
sentences were carried out against civilians from a Takfiri terrorist group known as ‘Al-<br />
Tawhid’ and ‘Al-Jihad’ on Tuesday 2nd August 2016.” 110<br />
Sources very close to the families of those executed revealed that the convicts were<br />
subject to the most atrocious kinds of torture before their executions. One of the families<br />
confirmed to the Advocates of Human Rights Center in Kurdistan that when they saw<br />
their son’s body, the signs of torture were very clear. His arms and legs were broken and<br />
disfigured. Another family also said that the signs of torture were clear on the bodies; the<br />
arms and legs were fractured and disfigured. Most of the executed men had blackened<br />
faces and were covered with bruises.<br />
Most of these men were arrested by intelligence services in Kurdistan during the period<br />
2009-2011 and were kept in solitary confinement. Before their trial, they could not hire a<br />
lawyer to defend them, or even contact their families. 111<br />
The Iranian authorities carried out another mass execution against the Kurdish political<br />
activist Mohammed Abd Alihi, who was charged with ‘Al-Harabah’ along with five<br />
other prisoners convicted of drug trafficking. In Urmia prison in Western Azerbaijan<br />
in northwest Iran, Abd Alihi, who was affiliated with the Komaleh Party, was arrested<br />
in March 2010 after being pursued by RG intelligence. He was shot and taken to the<br />
hospital. A few hours later, he was handcuffed and taken to prison for investigations.<br />
After many years of torture and detention, the Revolutionary Court in Mahabad<br />
sentenced him to death in 2014. After two years, the Diwan of the Supreme Court<br />
approved the verdict, which was in March 2016, and in August 2016 the sentence was<br />
carried out. 112 Abd Alihi’s lawyer said that the court did not use law and justice against his<br />
client and he dismissed the idea that Abd Alihi had fired guns at the police. 113<br />
»»<br />
Kurds’ Anger at Executions in Kurdistani Iraq and Syria<br />
The execution of 22 Kurds sparked the anger of the Kurds in Kurdistani Iraq against<br />
Iran, in spite of local and international calls demanding the Iranian authorities organize<br />
a retrial and not implement death sentence against them. People in Iraq’s Kurdistan<br />
province denounced the ongoing oppressive practices by the regime against the Kurds<br />
in Iran, and demanded interference from international and human rights organizations<br />
to stop the oppression and the practices which aim to wipe out the Kurdish civil rights<br />
workers, activists, and thinkers in Kurdistani Iran by framing them with a number of<br />
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59
charges and executing them. People demanded the Government in Kurdistan to interfere<br />
and demand that Tehran stops oppressing the Kurds. 114<br />
In Syria, the Kurdish National Council condemned the Iranian regime’s practices against<br />
Kurdish activists and civilians. A statement by the General Assembly of the Kurdish<br />
National Council in Syria declared that for a long time the Iranian regime had interfered<br />
in the region through its militias, which had become a stress factor and tended to spark<br />
crises in the region. It continued its criminal activities against the Kurds in Iran through<br />
mass executions of Kurdish activists. The statement also added, “The Kurdish people in<br />
Iran are demanding their national and democratic rights, except that the regime in its<br />
latest executions breached all international customs and laws.” 115<br />
2- Executions against Arab Al-Ahwaz<br />
Khuzestan in southeast Iran also witnessed executions. The provincial Judicial<br />
Department issued a death sentence against three people accused of being involved in a<br />
“terrorist act” that resulted in the deaths of three security officers, as well as an attack on<br />
the Earthquake Monitoring Center in Al-Hamidieh in the same province. 116<br />
Bander Bin Abbas, where the Arab minority live in southeast Iran, also witnessed a<br />
number of executions. The death sentence was handed out to two people in public in the<br />
city center. The men were charged with attacking a girl in 2014, photographing her, and<br />
threatening to post the photos online if she filed a complaint with the authorities. 117<br />
3- Executing Children and Teenagers<br />
Iran executed 75 children between 2005 and 2015; 13 children were executed just<br />
last year, according to Amnesty International, in spite of the fact that Iran is one of the<br />
countries signed up to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which<br />
bans the application of the death penalty against children.<br />
Recently Iran executed a 19-year-old teenager called Hassan Afshar in Arak prison<br />
for “being charged with rape committed when he was 18.” Iran was also supposed to<br />
execute another teenager called Ali Reza Tajiki on August 3rd, 2016, but the execution<br />
was delayed because of international pressure on Iran. In a report about Iran, Amnesty<br />
International revealed that almost 160 teenagers have been sentenced to death, most of<br />
whom were under the age of 18. The organization also expressed its concern regarding<br />
the increase in the number of teenagers executed in Iran. 118<br />
4- Audio Recording of the Mothari Renews Debate about the 1988 Executions:<br />
The executions in Iran in 1988 brought the subject back as being the most debated in<br />
Iran, especially after the release of a recorded audiotape of Sheik Hossein Montazeri,<br />
who was Khomeini’s Deputy. On this recording, which his son Ahmed released, Montazeri<br />
warned the prosecutor, the vice-President, and representatives from the Ministry of<br />
Security and Intelligence in Evin prison, whom he called ‘the Death Committee,’ that<br />
these executions of political opponents were the worst criminal acts to be committed in<br />
Iran since the time of the Revolution. He also warned them that history would forever<br />
remember their names as criminals 119 Rouhani’s Government was embarrassed by<br />
the release of this audio footage, as the officials who were responsible for the mass<br />
60 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
executions in 1988 now held senior positions in the Government, including the Minister<br />
of Justice Mostafa Bour Mohammadi, who was one of the ‘Death Committee’s’ members.<br />
The parliamentary vice-President Ali Montazeri demanded in a letter sent to the<br />
Minister of Justice Mostafa Bour Mohammadi that he explain the circumstances of the<br />
executions. This letter was met with a fierce wave of criticism from the Conservatives in<br />
Parliament, who demanded Montazeri’s expulsion from Parliament, although Montazeri<br />
had said that the purpose of the letter was to explain the circumstances of the executions<br />
in order to close this file for good. 120<br />
Five former MPs regretted the 1988 executions and considered the many recent<br />
executions of Sunni prisoners “solid proof of the unfortunate approach” the judicial<br />
authorities follow and their lack of commitment to the “power of law and justice.” These<br />
MPs said that the only way to get out of this current situation is through law and justice,<br />
and to allow for dialog. 121<br />
A media advisor for the IRGC Hamid Reza Moqadem Far accused Ahmed Montazeri of<br />
plotting with the CIA, MI5, and the Mujahedin Khalq Organization to spread the audio<br />
footage, explaining that the recording of Montazeri’s statements is proof of either his<br />
son’s naivety or his involvement with foreign intelligence agencies. He criticized some<br />
people for spreading the audio footage and considered it a distortion of Khomeini’s<br />
image and an attempt to bring back to life the Mujahedin Khalq Organization, which lost<br />
many of its members due to these executions.<br />
»»<br />
The Trial of Montazeri’s Son<br />
Three days after the release of the audio footage, the Clerical Court summoned<br />
Ahmed Montazeri and charged him with spreading the Islamic regime’s secrets and with<br />
strengthening the alliance between Saudi Arabia and the Mujahedin Khalq Organization.<br />
Ahmed Montazeri denied the charges and said that the audio footage did not contain<br />
anything new, which was not mentioned in his father Hossein Ali Montazeri’s documents<br />
about the 1988 executions. The audio with Sheik Montazeri's voice stressed that it had<br />
nothing to do with strengthening the alliance between Saudi Arabia and the Mujahedin<br />
Khalq Organization and that the reason for the tension between Tehran and Riyadh was<br />
because the attack on the Saudi Arabian Embassy had happened without punishing the<br />
attackers. 122<br />
In November 2016, Clerics Court sentenced Montazri with 21 years of imprisonment,<br />
the court then amended the sentence to 6 years because of his old age, furthermore, he<br />
had a brother killed in Iraq-Iran war. 123<br />
»»<br />
Reactions after the Rejection of Montazeri’s Trial<br />
A week after Montazeri’s trial 151 political and human rights activists issued a joint<br />
announcement in which they strongly criticized the trial and confirmed their solidarity<br />
with him. They said that Montazeri’s trial was not fair because the Clerical Court was<br />
not legal and they promised to use all means possible to prevent the verdict. 124 Six<br />
clergymen stated that the verdict of the Clerical Court regarding Montazeri was proof of<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
61
this miscarriage of justice and a violation of the law, as well as being against basic human<br />
rights, Iranian Law, and the foundations of doctrine and jurisprudence. 125<br />
5- Executions in Iran and their Future<br />
It seems that the grave statistics about executions in Iran, especially the drugs-related<br />
ones, have raised the concern of Iranian officials. A member of the legal and judiciary<br />
committee in the Iranian Parliament Abu Al-Fadel Abu-Turabi said that the executions so<br />
far were for drug dealers and smugglers, and did not end up with the expected result. He<br />
said that a plan to reduce death sentences for drug crimes was proposed in Parliament<br />
and submitted to different specialized centers to give their opinions. Abu-Turabi stressed<br />
that there should be a strict limit on executions for drug crimes and that this punishment<br />
should only be for armed gangsters who smuggle drugs systematically. He also stressed<br />
that he does not agree with a full cancellation of the death sentence for drug crimes, but<br />
it should be limited. 126<br />
The Iranian Minister of Justice Mostafa Bour Mohammadi said that the death sentence<br />
cannot be canceled, although he admitted that this punishment has not been effective in<br />
recent years. He said that executions couldn't be canceled because there are a number<br />
of saboteurs in the country who cannot be controlled except through executions,<br />
noting that this issue is under Islamic control and meets with a lot of support from Iran’s<br />
judiciary. 127<br />
The head of the legal and judiciary committee in the Iranian Shura' Council Allah Yarm<br />
Alkashai also called for a restricting the death sentence and stopping executions on a<br />
large scale to reduce its disadvantages, pointing out that members of the committee<br />
had studied a proposal for reducing the death sentence for drugs crimes. He said that<br />
due to the negative impact, which the death sentence has on the convicted person’s<br />
family, the legal and judiciary committee in Parliament was working on changing the laws<br />
concerning the execution of drug criminals. This means that the proposal will not include<br />
all convicts, but only those related to drug crimes. 128<br />
As a result of these ongoing demands, the Iranian Parliament recently voted on a<br />
bill that called for replacing the death sentence with another one for cases of drug<br />
smuggling, but for keeping the death sentence for cases of armed drug smuggling.<br />
For other cases, other penalties were specified. This proposal will be discussed by a<br />
specialized committee and then voted on for a final time in Parliament.<br />
According to the suggested amendments, alternative penalties for drugs cases will<br />
include prison sentences of 25-30 years or life in prison instead of execution if Parliament<br />
approves this law permanently. 129<br />
It is worth pointing out that these procedures are only about restricting the death<br />
sentence in relation to drug crimes, but not for any other crimes. This clearly shows that<br />
Iran will continue its execution policy in other areas in the near future. The objective of<br />
these procedures and decisions is to reduce the criticism Iran is exposed to from human<br />
rights organizations.<br />
62 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
Some observers who hoped that the period after the nuclear agreement would witness<br />
a change in Iran’s attitude toward the horrible human rights situation in the country<br />
perceived it as a total failure, as a year and a half after the nuclear agreement, no changes<br />
have taken place. Instead, things are further deteriorating.<br />
In spite of the harsh criticism from local and international human rights organizations<br />
about the human rights situation in Iran, the regime takes the view that these executions<br />
are the only preventive measure to push any internal danger that might threaten the<br />
survival and continuation of the regime. Furthermore, Tehran is afraid of any coalition<br />
that might exist among opposition movements and their future unity. Therefore, it has<br />
escalated the executions and increased repressive practices in case of this.<br />
»»<br />
Iran and ISIL<br />
After many questions being raised about ISIL not carrying out any operations against<br />
Iranian targets in spite of the apparent enmity between the two sides, a number of<br />
Iranian officials released statements about frustrating any ISIL operations in different<br />
areas in Iran, without giving any evidence or information to prove these claims.<br />
In the past six months, a lot has been heard in the media about exposing cells affiliated<br />
with ISIL in many areas, especially near the border. In this context, the Minister of<br />
Intelligence Mahmoud Alawi talked about destroying an ISIL cell that was led by one<br />
of the leaders of the organization in the west of Iran and striking them a painful blow<br />
through complex intelligence operations in coordination with secret agents and security<br />
forces. Alawi thinks that carrying out terrorist attacks at different gatherings and in<br />
religious areas in the heart of the country is one of the objectives planned by those<br />
‘terrorists.’ He announced the killing of four armed men and the arrest of a number of<br />
them, along with the seizure of a large quantity of explosives, equipment, suicide belts,<br />
weapons, and hand grenades. 130<br />
In the same context, the Iranian Minister of Intelligence Mohammed Alawi revealed<br />
that more than 1500 Iranians were planning to join the ranks of ISIL, except that his<br />
Ministry gave guidance and advice to a number of them while arresting<br />
others to prevent them from joining terrorist groups. He stressed<br />
the need to raise awareness in young people, and to guide<br />
and warn them about the dangers of these groups. 131<br />
The leader of the ground forces affiliated with<br />
the Iranian army Major Ahmed Reza Bordistan<br />
said that “a dismantling of a terrorist cell took<br />
place in the west of the country and that<br />
its members were those who had joined<br />
ISIL in Syria, received their training and<br />
come back to Iran to carry out terrorist<br />
operations.” He said that security forces<br />
killed two of them. Bordistan accused<br />
ISIL of sending a number of its elements<br />
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63
to Iranian territory, especially the cities of Naft Shahr and Qasr Shirin, as well as to<br />
eastern parts of the country. 132<br />
»»<br />
Rezai Claims that ISIL Wanted to Target Friday Prayers, which Ministry of Interior<br />
Denies<br />
Statements by officials continued to reveal ISIL plans to launch attacks inside the<br />
country. What was most significant about this was the claim by the Secretary General of<br />
the Expediency Council and former leader in the RG Mohsen Rezai about ISIL’s intention<br />
to carry out a suicide attack in Tehran; the attackers were supposed to be provided with<br />
bombs for the attack during Friday prayers, but they were arrested by security forces and<br />
the IRGC mid-way between Hamadan and Tehran.<br />
The first reaction to Rezai’s statements came from Hossein Zu Faqari, assistant to the<br />
Minister of the Interior for Intelligence and Internal Security Affairs, stating that “it is<br />
possible that we encountered situations like this in the past, but recently we have not<br />
received any reports about it.” He added, “Takfiri groups have many times sought to<br />
execute destructive attacks in the country, but all of their attempts were failures thanks<br />
to our security forces and intelligence operations.” 133<br />
Zu Faqari, who denied Rezai’s claims, was harshly criticized, so he changed his statement<br />
when he said that destabilizing Iran through targeting Friday prayer locations was one of<br />
ISIL’s programs in late 2015, saying that his statements were not against Rezai. Then he<br />
confirmed that the Ministry of the Interior did not have any new information, stating that<br />
ISIL was planning to target mosques where Friday prayers take place. 134<br />
An assistant at the Strategic Investigations of National Security in the Ministry of<br />
Intelligence announced that security forces were able to seize around two tons of<br />
explosives in Garmsar in Semnan province, Northern Iran. He said that ISIL members<br />
were planning to cause explosions in at least ten locations in Iran. 135<br />
In spite of the widespread publicity, the war, and the enmity in the Iranian media toward<br />
ISIL, Tehran has not been exposed to any attacks by that organization, and it went a long<br />
time without attacking Iraq or Syria. In Syria, ISIL fought the Free Army and targeted<br />
the revolutionary forces, but they avoided any clashes with the IRGC and the militias<br />
affiliated with it such as Hezbollah, or with other sectarian militias, which are common on<br />
Syrian soil; this proves that ISIL and Iran have a close relationship.<br />
»»<br />
Restrictions on dual nationality holders:<br />
The Iranian regime has sharply escalated the campaign of harassment and arrests,<br />
which it began a few months ago against citizens with dual nationality, with those<br />
detained facing various unconvincing accusations, including espionage. The campaign<br />
began in March 2016 with the arrest of Homa Hoodfar, a Canadian-Iranian university<br />
lecturer, who was released after a few months of detention; she claimed that during<br />
this time she had been repeatedly tortured by IRGC personnel, to force her to confess<br />
to false accusations made against her. Next, in August 2016, Abdolrasoul Dorri-Esfahani,<br />
an Iranian-Canadian member of the negotiation team that had negotiated the landmark<br />
2015 nuclear deal with six major world powers, was arrested on charges of receiving<br />
64 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
funds from US and British institutions in exchange for sensitive financial and economic<br />
information about Iran. Esfahani, who was the chief financial officer for Iran in the<br />
nuclear deal negotiation team, had enjoyed a distinguished career, working at the Iranian<br />
defense ministry following the 1979 ‘Islamic revolution’. He then went on to work in the<br />
US, where he served as a member of a US Treasury committee and headed the body<br />
responsible for investigating the Iranian funds seized by Washington during the period of<br />
US sanctions before he emigrated to Canada. 136<br />
»»<br />
Tehran’s motives in raising the issue of dual citizenship:<br />
There are several reasons for Iran’s decision to put pressure on dual nationals, including:<br />
1. Economic motives: To prevent dual nationality holders, especially Americans, from<br />
competing with investments controlled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).<br />
Last October, the Iranian judiciary sentenced Iranian-American businessman Siamak<br />
Namazi, the former head of strategic planning in Iran’s Crescent Petroleum Company,<br />
to ten years’ imprisonment, along with his elderly father Mohammed Baqir Namazi,<br />
the former head of the United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF). Siamak<br />
Namazi had previously worked for several years as a consultant in Iran, encouraging<br />
foreign companies to invest in the country. 137<br />
Iranian observers believe that the arrest and imprisonment of the Namazis, father, and<br />
son, was intended to send a deterrent signal to other wealthy dual nationality holders<br />
in the worldwide Iranian diaspora, in order to dissuade them from assisting foreign<br />
companies to invest in the country; in addition, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps<br />
wished to discourage possible competition with its own massive economic power base.<br />
This theory received further support in November last year, when Hussein Ali Haji<br />
Dlidjani, a member of the regime’s Planning Commission and of the parliamentary<br />
budget and accounts committee, directed new accusations at ten prominent Iranian<br />
company directors with dual nationality, accusing them of posing a grave risk to Iran’s<br />
national interests and of selling the country to foreigners.<br />
Dlidjani accused high-level company directors and decision-makers with dual nationality<br />
of inflicting a level of damage on Iran so immense that it was almost impossible to repair.<br />
Amongst those accused of this grave allegation, he named Mohammad Reza Khavari, the<br />
former Executive Director of the Melli Bank, and Sirrus Nasseri, a member of the team<br />
that took part in earlier nuclear negotiations during the Khatami government, as well as<br />
Abdolrasoul Dorri Esfahani, as mentioned above. 138<br />
2. Security motives: The IRGC uses these measures against dual nationals as a means<br />
of preventing foreign businesses from challenging its own monopoly in Iran; it justifies<br />
this approach by claiming that dual nationals pose a risk to national security. To indicate<br />
the seriousness of these supposed concerns over security, Tehran’s Chief Prosecutor,<br />
Abbas Jafari Dowlat-Abadi, recently announced prison sentences of 10 years apiece<br />
for six defendants convicted of espionage and cooperation with the US administration,<br />
including Siamak Namazi and his father, as mentioned earlier.<br />
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65
Abadi said that the 10-year prison sentences issued against the defendants, with the<br />
other four named as Farhad Abdullah Saleh, Kamran Qaderi, Nizar Zakka and Ali Reza<br />
Amdwar, most of whom held dual nationality, were justified because they were convicted<br />
of espionage and cooperation with the US administration. Abadi further indicated that<br />
the judiciary in Tehran is still investigating a number of very important files concerning<br />
sensitive security and economic issues related to the defendants, including Baqir Namazi<br />
and his son.<br />
According to the sentences delivered, the court also ordered Baqir and Siamak Namazi,<br />
Farhad Abdullah Saleh, Kamran Qaderi, Nizar Zakka and Reza Amdwar to pay a collective<br />
total of $4.8 million to the Iranian state, asserting that this was the amount of money<br />
they had been paid by ‘hostile states’ to implement their projects in Iran. 139<br />
Contrary to the widespread belief that the restrictions on citizens with dual citizenship<br />
were aimed to embarrass Rouhani’s government, undermine its credibility and diminish<br />
its popularity, the evidence actually suggests that the Rouhani administration has been<br />
directly involved in implementing this policy, as demonstrated by remarks from the<br />
Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi, who announced recently that his ministry had<br />
sacked 39 senior officials with dual citizenship or holding ‘American Green Cards’. Alavi<br />
added that the 39 officials in question were among 79 senior ministry officials who were<br />
interrogated by intelligence officers about their nationality.<br />
The minister further stressed that his ministry would sack any official holding any<br />
dual citizenship, or indeed any citizenship other than Iranian, offering those with dual<br />
citizenship a stark choice between giving up their citizenship of another country to<br />
become solely Iranian citizens, or continuing with dual citizenship; in the latter case, he<br />
asserted, they would receive notification that they were no longer able to continue to<br />
work for the intelligence ministry. 140<br />
»»<br />
Fire incidences: Vital economic sites are exposed to a series of fires:<br />
Over the past six months, a series of fires in locations across Iran has sparked heated<br />
public debate, due to the fact that the blazes have targeted sensitive facilities central to<br />
the Iranian economy. The fires also exposed the weakness of Iran’s emergency services,<br />
due to the excessive time is taken to extinguish the blazes; they also embarrassed the<br />
regime, as a result of the confused and contradictory statements made by officials about<br />
the causes of the fires.<br />
»»<br />
The most important of these fires:<br />
On 6 July 2016, a massive blaze broke out following an explosion in Tower Number 8001<br />
of the Abu Ali Sina complex, located in the special economic zone in Khomeini Port in the<br />
city of Mahshahr in Al-Ahwaz, southwest Iran. Although the blaze was extinguished the<br />
next day, another blaze then broke out in one of the reservoirs in the same tower, with<br />
the blazes causing heavy losses estimated at millions of dollars. Overlooking the Arabian<br />
Gulf, the city of Mahshahr (or Bandar-e Mahshohr in its native Ahwazi Arabic name),<br />
located near Abadan city, is the center of most of Iran's petrochemical industries. An<br />
armed Ahwazi Arab resistance movement calling itself the ‘Hawks of Al-Ahwaz’ claimed<br />
responsibility for the explosion, which triggered the fire.<br />
66 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
The Hawks of Ahwaz movement said in a written statement, copies of which were<br />
distributed in the town of Bandar-e Mahshohr the next day, that the Iranian regime’s<br />
‘inhumane excesses and ongoing arbitrary policies denying the rights of Arab people of<br />
Ahwaz’ had left them no option other than to respond with the ‘massive and seismic’<br />
attack on the plant, which they considered to be a blow ‘against the [Iranian regime’s]<br />
repressive policies’, adding that they would continue to target the regime’s economic<br />
centres in Ahwaz for as long as these injustices continued.<br />
Less than 48 hours later, also in Mahshahr, another huge fire broke out in another unit in<br />
Imam Khomeini Port, engulfing part of the petrochemical unit which is primarily involved<br />
in manufacturing plastic materials, although firefighters managed to quickly extinguish<br />
the blaze.<br />
During the same 48-hour period, four people were killed or injured by explosions in two<br />
pipelines near the city of Bushehr in the Gnawa region. 141<br />
Elsewhere, a massive fire broke out at one of the petrochemical stores in the Beeston<br />
petrochemical complex in Iran's Kermanshah region, causing considerable material damage.<br />
Yet another blaze broke out in the control room of the Ports and Maritime Organization<br />
in Assaluyeh region, the main artery for regional imports and exports and a vital hub for<br />
attracting Iranian and foreign investors, while a separate blaze caused severe damage<br />
to the chemical waste storage unit at Imam Khomeini Port, which overlooks the Arabian<br />
Gulf. 142<br />
»»<br />
Multiple regime narratives on the causes of continuing fires:<br />
Observers speculate that these installations were subjected to arson attacks, as a<br />
reaction by the ethnic minority groups in Iran to the regime’s policies of marginalisation,<br />
persecution, arrests, imprisonment and torture, which are exacerbated against<br />
minorities due to the racial discrimination prevalent in the Iranian society. The majority<br />
of the Iranian public believes that the regime-controlled media efforts to conceal the<br />
news about most of these fires can be considered as evidence of the regime’s efforts to<br />
hide important details, particularly in relation to the damage inflicted on oil installations,<br />
and many Iranians have suggested that these facilities were likely attacked. Meanwhile,<br />
Iranian regime officials have offered various, often conflicting, accounts for the reasons<br />
behind the fires, summarised as follows:<br />
• Ahmad Mahdavi, the Secretary-General of the Federation of Petrochemical Industry<br />
Professionals, believes that the fires recently experienced in the Assaluyeh area, are<br />
signs of a probable future oil disaster in this region, and says that these areas lack the<br />
necessary safety procedures and designated equipment. He confirmed that the fires,<br />
which affected a number of petrochemical complexes, were due to negligence by the<br />
human resources within these complexes. 143<br />
• Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh said that the reason for the frequent fires that<br />
occurred in the petrochemical facilities was the lack of adequate investment in the field<br />
of "health, safety and environmental" protection, and the companies’ lack of interest in<br />
doing so. 144<br />
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67
• Secretary-General of the Supreme Council of the Virtual Domain, Abul- Hassan<br />
Firuzabadi, said that cyber-attacks were likely to be the main cause of these fires. 145<br />
Civil Defence Chief Gholam Reza Jalali rejected the hypothesis that cyber-attacks are<br />
the reason for the incidents at the petrochemical facilities, although he stressed that the<br />
United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia pose a threat to Iran in the cyber sector, adding<br />
that these countries are making great efforts to target the online infrastructure of Iran.<br />
He declared that the weakness of the safety services structure had led to the recent<br />
blazes in the petrochemical plants, and called for the creation of strong safety services<br />
in Mahshahr and Assaluyeh, and by those involved in carrying out the oil extraction in<br />
Ahwaz. 146<br />
In light of the Iranian regime’s oppression of ethnic minorities and denial of their<br />
basic rights for decades, these minorities may continue to target locations of economic<br />
importance and sensitive sites, in order to express their outrage at this gross injustice and<br />
at the deteriorating economic and security situation affecting their already impoverished<br />
areas, particularly the regions of Ahwaz, Kurdistan and Baluchistan.<br />
»»<br />
Conclusions<br />
The past six months have seen a significant escalation in the attacks by insurgents<br />
against some Iranian government institutions, as well as against the forces of the<br />
Revolutionary Guards and the army, particularly in the provinces of Kurdistan and<br />
Baluchistan.<br />
Iranian authorities continue their policy of random arrests and raids in a number of<br />
areas of Ahwaz.<br />
There are new Iranian plans to censor courts on Ahwazi political and cultural activities.<br />
Iranian officials have resumed their habitual attempts to blame others rather than<br />
examine the reasons and motives for the armed resistance movements; they are<br />
now pointing the finger at Saudi Arabia, accusing it of supporting and financing these<br />
oppressed groups.<br />
The Revolutionary Guards often justify their clashes with the Baluchi liberation<br />
movements by falsely invoking the fight against drug smuggling, claiming that they are<br />
preventing the penetration of "Daesh," into Iranian territories, or claiming that they<br />
are targeting non-specific "enemies of the revolution," although they never refer to the<br />
actual reasons behind the insurgent movements, which are primarily due to poverty,<br />
unemployment, repression, and marginalisation.<br />
The Iranian regime is fearful of uprisings against it by the long-oppressed non-Persian<br />
ethnic groups in Iran due to the state of polarization and the new regional balances,<br />
particularly since these groups are now receiving considerable support from the peoples<br />
in Arab nations. This is causing grave concern within the regime, which views this subject<br />
as a ticking time bomb and a possible central issue contributing to a region-wide conflict.<br />
The Iranian regime also fears that some regional powers are using the grievances of<br />
Iran’s non-Persian peoples as a pretext to incite turmoil and to move the regional conflict<br />
68 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
into Iran itself through the provision of financial, political and media support for the<br />
liberation movements in these troubled regions.<br />
A high proportion of the human rights violations and oppression carried out by the<br />
Iranian regime within Iran are perpetrated against non-Persian peoples and religious<br />
minorities in the country.<br />
Iran has concluded that pursuing its long-time policy of executions of activists, whom it<br />
misrepresents as criminals, has not produced the desired result.<br />
In order to mitigate the international criticism of the executions, Iranian regime officials<br />
took the initiative to call for the commutation of the death penalty for drug-related<br />
offenses, though not for other crimes.<br />
The limited discussion on the reduction of the death penalty for drug-related offenses<br />
proves that the regime intends to continue its policy of executions in the other regions for<br />
the foreseeable future.<br />
Despite the widespread use of ‘War on Terror’-style propaganda by the Iranian regime’s<br />
media and the declarations that the regime is supposedly combating Daesh, Iran has<br />
notably not been exposed to any attacks by the terrorist group.<br />
Economic and security motives lie behind the Iranian regime’s arrests and<br />
imprisonment of citizens with dual nationality in Iran. The primary economic motive is to<br />
prevent those with dual nationality from competing economically with businesses and<br />
investment led by the Revolutionary Guards, with the security issue used as a pretext by<br />
the Revolutionary Guards to prevent foreigners from entering the country supposedly in<br />
order to thwart the security threat they pose.<br />
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69
Economic part<br />
In this part of the strategic report on the economic factors during the second half<br />
of 2016, we will focus on three main themes, which reveal the macroeconomic<br />
indicators and which helped to shape the Iranian economy in the covered period.<br />
We also examine the effects on the vital sectors of the economy and measure the<br />
impact on Iranian citizens’ livelihoods, exploring the progress and possible future<br />
trends for each of the three themes.<br />
The first theme addresses the most important economic indicators for Iran<br />
during the past six months, suggesting possible scenarios for future economic<br />
growth in Iran based on these indicators. The second theme refers to the<br />
evolution of the banking sector in the year following the nuclear deal and to<br />
possible upcoming changes in Iran’s exchange rate by the end of 2017, while the<br />
third theme measures the standard of living of Iranian citizens and the degree to<br />
which the regime’s policy has been influenced by the economic variables to date<br />
and in the future.<br />
»»<br />
First Axis: Iranian economy indicators and future scenarios<br />
Introduction<br />
Iran's economy during the second half of 2016, experienced a range of different<br />
economic variables, some of which were positive, such as the ability to almost<br />
double oil exports, and attaining the ability to re-attract investments in the global<br />
energy companies, many of which had avoided investment in Iran for fear of being<br />
affected by the international sanctions imposed on the country. Along with the<br />
increased investment in the non-oil sector geared to the local consumer, and<br />
the increasing exports of non-oil merchandise, other sectors, including airlines<br />
and tourism, also achieved remarkable growth, with the government already<br />
formulating a plan to make the tourism sector a primary source of foreign income<br />
for the country's future, in addition to enabling Iran to restore part of its funds<br />
frozen abroad, estimated at tens of billions of dollars.<br />
The past six months have seen some of the negative economic variables divided<br />
into internal indicators, such as the deterioration of the exchange rate and the<br />
loss of a significant portion of its value, which resulted in worrying implications for<br />
inflation and a reduced purchasing power for citizens, along with lower rates of<br />
consumption and production.<br />
The Iranian government also raised the amount offered in cash support for<br />
thousands of families in recent months in the context of removing subsidies for<br />
millions of families in order to reduce government spending and unveil economic<br />
austerity policies during the next phase despite the continued record high rates<br />
of unemployment in recent months, as this policy contradicts with the economic<br />
70 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
status quo. Meanwhile, several obstacles continue to impede foreign investment,<br />
despite the government's implementation of new policies to support its growth plans.<br />
Without confronting and eliminating these obstacles, while targeting high growth rates,<br />
without an accurate determination of how to finance these plans and the absence of<br />
a unified strategic vision between the political leadership and the religious leadership<br />
of Iran on the increasing economic growth mechanisms, in addition to the continued<br />
financial corruption that hampers growth efforts and economic reforms. Besides the<br />
internal indicators and the foreign challenges indicators that have occurred during<br />
the past few months, such as Iran's dependence on oil revenues, reference may also<br />
be made to creating a higher risk if prices did not go up, and the failure of the "OPEC"<br />
efforts to increase prices after the installation of the oil production size of the Member<br />
States. Furthermore, Iran was planning to produce a much higher volume than the<br />
existing frozen production, in addition to the negative impact of Trump's success in<br />
the US elections on the investments coming to Iran and the volume of trade exchange<br />
between the state and its foreign partners. A further aspect is the return of the strained<br />
economic relations between Iran and the countries of the outside world as a result of the<br />
disagreements in the foreign policy of the state and its interference in the armed conflicts<br />
in the region.<br />
We will separate and analyze the following economic changes experienced by Iran<br />
over the past months, both positive and negative groups, and then project scenarios for<br />
the path of economic growth in Iran in the near future based on the economic changes<br />
experienced by the Iranian economy recently. This enables us to build more than one<br />
future scenario according to the quality of these variables and the strength of its impact<br />
on the course of economic growth for Iran.<br />
»»<br />
Positive signs during the last six months and their economic repercussions<br />
Iran has been able to almost double the size of its oil exports by the end of 2016<br />
after the lifting of the oil embargo following the nuclear deal and the doubling of<br />
financial revenue and was able to re-attract major investments from prominent energy<br />
companies after those investments were lost during the period of the sanctions. One of<br />
the most prominent returnees in 2016 is the French energy giant " TOTAL " with its first<br />
international investment in the energy sector since the lifting of sanctions, followed by<br />
the company "Shell". After six years from ceasing its operations in Iran, "TOTAL" signed<br />
one of the main items of the agreement with an investment of $ 4.8 billion for the<br />
development phase 11 of the South Pars field in partnership with the China National<br />
Petroleum Corporation and "Petro pars" of Iran, an agreement that is supposed to be<br />
completed in early 2017.<br />
This bold step taken by the ”TOTAL” will encourage other energy companies to proceed<br />
with the investment in the energy sector in Iran as long as international conditions are<br />
favorable.<br />
Iran, upon introducing a new model for the agreements of oil and gas known as the<br />
"Iranian oil contract", will enable foreign investors to enter into a partnership with Iranian<br />
companies and offers the best incentives as opposed to previous purchase transactions.<br />
This represents a motivational step to attract investors to work in this sector, and it is<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
71
expected to come with good results. Iran is also focused on new contracts and requires<br />
the completion of a large number of the projects using the local workforce in order<br />
to cope with the high unemployment crisis amid Iranian young people, particularly<br />
university graduates, who are associated with the highest rate of unemployment in the<br />
Iranian society.<br />
Investments also increased in consumer-related non-oil sectors such as at industry<br />
level. Iran is a massive and growing consumer market requiring large investments in order<br />
to meet the consumer market needs and fill the productivity gap in the market, with<br />
many of its factories either operating on a part-time basis or suspending their operations.<br />
They are reliant on foreign investments for advancing their development, which depends<br />
on the extent of the government facilities provided to investors and the improvement of<br />
the investment climate for attracting foreign capitals and the increasing integration of the<br />
Iranian economy into the global economy.<br />
The exports of non-oil-related merchandise also grew by 6% during the first half of 2016<br />
compared to the same period in 2015, 147 accounting for $ 4.35 billion during the first<br />
seven months of 2016, according to official data.<br />
Some sectors, including airlines and tourism, have seen a remarkable growth recently,<br />
with a significant increase in the number of flights expected in the near-term following<br />
the end of a crisis over an agreement on passenger transport with the US aviation<br />
authorities, which ended at the end of 2016 with Iran’s purchase of almost 200 civilian<br />
passenger aircraft from the American Boeing company and the European Airbus firm. 148<br />
The Iranian air travel sector is expected to be revitalized after the United States allowed<br />
Airbus to sell 106 civilian passenger aircraft to Iran, with both domestic and overseas<br />
flights expected to increase, as Iran restores flights to some of the world capitals after a<br />
long period of lacking the necessary planes and equipment. Similarly, Iran’s hotel sector<br />
also expects to see a sharp increase in bookings together with a surge in direct and<br />
indirect employment in the tourism sector.<br />
The Iranian government is banking heavily on growth in the tourism sector, with a plan<br />
in place to make tourism the leading sector in terms of income generation via foreign<br />
currency by 2025. The government has already taken concrete steps towards achieving<br />
this objective , investing in a renovation programme in order to update a number of the<br />
country’s ageing hotels, as well as investing in the aviation sector and implementing a<br />
maritime tourism transport programme in collaboration with neighbouring countries<br />
in the Gulf, particularly the Sultanate of Oman, so as to allow tourists to travel by boat<br />
between the ports of Chabahar in Iran and the Omani capital of Muscat, which began<br />
operating at the end of 2016.<br />
The government is hoping that growth in the tourism sector will help to reduce the<br />
country’s dependence on oil and gas, as well as help to boost its foreign currency reserves<br />
and increase employment in the areas of tourism and related services, thus helping to<br />
alleviate the current unemployment crisis.<br />
72 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
Finally, Iran's central bank has been able to recover part of the funds previously frozen<br />
in overseas banks. The overall sum is estimated at the US $30 billion, the bulk of which is<br />
still frozen in European, American and Asian banks. When the Iranian government is able<br />
to restore the remainder of the funds frozen overseas, estimated to be between the US<br />
$100 and 150 billion, this will boost the level of the country’s cash reserves and help to<br />
strengthen the stability of the domestic currency and as well as fund local development<br />
plans if the capital is used wisely.<br />
Over the past six months, however, a series of obstacles and negative economic<br />
indicators have emerged that may pose challenges to achieving the targeted economic<br />
growth; some of these are internal indicators, while others are of external nature.<br />
We start with the challenging internal indicators. The first of these is the constant<br />
deterioration of the Iranian Riyal currency exchange rate, particularly in 2016, which has<br />
lost 17 percent of its value, coupled with the negative repercussions of this on the Iranian<br />
economy. The fall of the local currency's exchange rate against foreign currencies has led<br />
to an increase in the cost of imported goods, particularly in the case of manufacturing<br />
equipment and modern technology, thus hindering the renovation plans for the local<br />
industry, which has suffered the worst effects of the economic sanctions imposed on Iran<br />
for many years in this sector.<br />
Secondly, the deterioration of the exchange rates has an additional negative impact<br />
on citizens, with the resulting rising inflation halting economic growth, resulting in<br />
decreased consumption levels and a declining purchasing power among citizens,<br />
adversely affecting the families already suffering due to a limited income, with the<br />
production rates also falling as a result. During 2016 alone, the Iranian Toman lost around<br />
17% of its value by year-end compared to the beginning of the year.<br />
Thirdly, the primary victim of the deteriorating exchange rate is represented by the<br />
government’s austerity plans to raise direct cash support for a large proportion of Iranian<br />
households in recent months. 149 This support was intended to compensate families by<br />
increasing subsidies for some essential goods such as bread, electricity, and fuel, and to<br />
compensate for the decline in their purchasing power. It is worth mentioning that the<br />
direct cash support from the government was the primary cause of the decline in poverty<br />
rates in Iran until 2013, after which the poverty rates rebounded when the support was<br />
reduced. It is likely, therefore, that Iran will see a further increase in poverty rates in the<br />
near future with the government planning to completely eliminate the planned subsidies<br />
in a bid to reduce expenses.<br />
This trend for an austerity government is likely to have an inevitable negative effect on<br />
future growth rates since the fall in income means further reduced consumer spending<br />
and a consequent drop in the production rates leading to an increase in commodities on<br />
the market and a spiral of recession. This was indeed the government’s greatest concern<br />
for the Iranian economy throughout the economic sanctions period.<br />
Fourthly, Iran continues to suffer from high unemployment rates with over 12.5<br />
percent of the country’s workforce out of work as of the end of 2016. This follows a brief<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
73
improvement on the record unemployment levels over recent years, with the number of<br />
unemployed individuals increasing by a further 700,000 by the year-end.<br />
This rate is the highest recorded in the past five years, with continuing public discontent<br />
over the low number of jobs available for the country’s young people; indeed, helping<br />
to create more job opportunities for young workers was one of key election promises of<br />
President Rouhani in his first term. Nevertheless, around 7 million Iranians are currently<br />
unemployed, with most of them being young people with university qualifications.<br />
Furthermore, several obstacles continue to impede the foreign investment that the<br />
Iranian government is banking on in order to raise economic growth rates and advance<br />
development in various sectors, and particularly in the energy sector. Despite the<br />
government’s best efforts, these obstacles continue to deter foreign investors, with<br />
the government being unable to successfully address them and to achieve the desired<br />
growth.<br />
Among the most prominent obstacles to attracting direct investment are the poor rates<br />
of exchange for foreign investors, with both the official and black market exchange rates<br />
increasing the cost of doing business, leading to faltering financial budgets and additional<br />
economic burdens for potential investors.<br />
In addition, differences remain in the strategic foreign investment visions of the<br />
government and the state’s religious leadership, with the government’s objective<br />
to attract foreign direct investment curtailed to some degree by the sixth Five-Year<br />
Development Plan (2015-2020), which is supervised and shaped by the objectives of the<br />
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who prioritizes a need for an increased reliance on<br />
a “resistance economy”. The basis of Khamenei’s “resistance economy” is to encourage<br />
the resumption of efforts in order<br />
to make Iran entirely economically<br />
self-reliant, by implementing<br />
this isolationist strategy, which is<br />
unwelcoming to foreign investment<br />
in sectors such as energy, and<br />
industry that desperately requires<br />
more urgent investments<br />
compared to other sectors.<br />
The investment requirements of<br />
the oil and gas sector are estimated<br />
at around $200 billion, a sum<br />
which is not available to the Iranian<br />
government without foreign aid<br />
if we disregard the technical and<br />
technological shortcomings of<br />
this sector. The lack of investment<br />
in this area will hinder economic<br />
reforms and the implementation<br />
74 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
thereof is becoming steadily more difficult because of the aging technology currently<br />
being used, which is left over from the years of economic siege. Iran’s oil and gas sector<br />
requires years of research and development funding in order to bear real fruit and to<br />
become a reliable industry, with the biggest loser of the current system being the Iranian<br />
economy, which is suffering as a result of the conflict between rival political approaches<br />
in Iran, one led by Iran's Supreme leader, and the other led by President Hassan Rouhani.<br />
In the same context, the unrealistic targeted growth rates are to be particularly<br />
observed, both in the next government budget and in the sixth Five-Year Plan. The<br />
upcoming budget sets the target growth rate at 7.7%, while the Sixth Development Plan<br />
sets it at 8.5%, with neither determining the means of financing this wildly optimistic<br />
rate. This has been a recurrent problem in the case of previous Iranian governments’<br />
budgets, which failed to recognise that it is not sufficient to rely on finance from the<br />
proceeds of foreign investment alone since the volatile nature of Iran's political relations<br />
with other nations and major powers are dependent on foreign investment as a basis for<br />
an unrealistic and implausible method of financing.<br />
Finally, the ongoing financial corruption in Iran is severely impeding development<br />
efforts and drains billions from the country's wealth in a number of ways, including<br />
massive tax evasion, which is estimated to account for annual losses to the treasury of<br />
between 20 and 30 thousand billion tomans (between US$6 billion - US$9 billion), a<br />
significant sum particularly when considering that tax is a major source of revenue for the<br />
government budget, as well as for the state finance expenses.<br />
Corruption continues to be endemic in Iran, with Transparency International’s latest<br />
report rating the country at number 131 from a total of 167 countries worldwide in terms<br />
of corruption.<br />
Other methods of financial corruption include illegally established commissions<br />
conducting deals with foreign companies estimated to be billions of dollars worth, as<br />
well as bribery and embezzlement, with senior officials up to the level of government<br />
ministers involved in embezzling billions and paying massive bribes. Such cases are<br />
occasionally covered by the Iranian media, including:<br />
1- The issue of astronomical salaries for government officials during 2016, with the<br />
current Iranian President Hassan Rouhani accused of paying salaries to government<br />
officials which are allegedly more than 10 times the average of a conventional salary,<br />
with one Ministry of Health official reportedly receiving a monthly salary of 200 million<br />
Tomans (US$60,000). These allegations are a particularly sensitive aspect for Rouhani’s<br />
government since he led a major campaign in order to address the corruption of the<br />
previous government under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with Rouhani forced to apologise<br />
and vow an investigation of the alleged corruption after being severely embarrassed<br />
when facing the same scandal. 150<br />
2- A number of relatives of the state’s religious leaders, including the son of Ali<br />
Khamenei, have been involved in corruption-related cases, with Mojtaba Ali Khamenei,<br />
the son of the Supreme Leader, facing unofficial allegations for embezzling an estimated<br />
1.6 billion Euros in oil revenues; the monies were reportedly deposited in his bank<br />
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75
account by the Central Bank of Iran in 2011, although following revelations about the<br />
case, the scandal was quickly hushed up, with no formal action taken against him.<br />
3- Another case involved the head of the Iranian Judiciary, Sadiq Larijani, who was<br />
accused of receiving bank transfers to his account exceeding US$310 million from 63<br />
different bank accounts, with the funds reportedly representing financial guarantees paid<br />
by the defendants in court cases. When MP Mahmoud Sadeqi demanded that the head<br />
of the Iranian parliament’s economic transparency commission open an investigation<br />
into the involvement of Larijani and a number of state officials in the controversial case,<br />
Iranian police surrounded his [Sadeqi’s] home at night and arrested him over unspecified<br />
allegations by order of the judiciary.<br />
4- Another controversial case involved the prominent Iranian businessman Babak<br />
Zanjani, who was accused of embezzling large sums of up to $2.7 billion in state funds in<br />
the form of commission within a network involving several former government officials<br />
during the former government of President Ahmadinejad. Zanjani was subsequently<br />
sentenced to death for his involvement in the case, with a large number of those<br />
allegedly involved also arrested. The case is still underway due to the large number<br />
of defendants involved, including companies and government banks and financial<br />
institutions.<br />
5- The form of corruption known as "Shandiz", in which officials with state-backed real<br />
estate companies have been accused of embezzling imaginary funds, with the amount to<br />
date estimated at US $27 billion; those affected have demanded the return of their stolen<br />
money or of the apartments for which they have received only a fraction of the price.<br />
6- Another scandal involved loans from the state-run Provident Fund for educationalists<br />
which has provided credit facilities for loans worth 8,000 billion Tomans ($2.4 billion),<br />
with the indictments targeting IMF officials who have reportedly received massive bribes<br />
in exchange for credit facilities.<br />
These are only a few of the many cases of massive state corruption exposed by the press<br />
in recent years.<br />
The continued prevalence of financial and administrative corruption in Iran and the lack<br />
of any adequate and serious efforts to confront it continues to hamper the state’s efforts<br />
to increase the rates of development, particularly in the light of the lack of transparency<br />
and of accurate data and information, with the government being involved in large-scale<br />
cover-ups of many incidences of corruption, which are only disclosed when they become<br />
a useful tool for putting pressure on political opponents, and between competing<br />
political blocs in the country; this shows that there is no real political will to tackle the<br />
widespread corruption, with no serious steps being taken in order to do so.<br />
The most important external challenges likely to affect Iran’s future economic growth<br />
rates are focused on three important aspects:<br />
Firstly, reference is made to the need to stabilize oil export revenues after stabilizing the<br />
country’s oil production levels from the beginning of January 2017 at a level of 3.8 million<br />
barrels a day, according to the agreement with the OPEC. This decision was made despite<br />
76 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
the absence of rising prices in the form desired by those responsible, as was the decision<br />
to stabilise the oil production volume, which is contrary to Iran’s plans to increase the oil<br />
production to more than 4 million barrels by the end of the Iranian year, that is to say in<br />
March 2017, with this measure intended to support growth and increase cash income.<br />
Oil prices may not rise as expected after a decision to reduce the production at the end of<br />
November last year, particularly since a number of countries, including Libya and Nigeria,<br />
did not participate in the decision to reduce the production at the time, being more<br />
concerned with the security conditions which temporarily affected the oil output; these<br />
countries may increase the production rates as soon as the security conditions improve.<br />
In this case, the resulting increase in the global oil supply means that the price of oil will<br />
fall once again and that OPEC’s decision will be a major success.<br />
Secondly, the election of Donald Trump as the president of the United States of<br />
America will affect Iran's economy directly and indirectly, through financial restrictions<br />
on Iranian companies, which have financial dealings outside the country, and the<br />
expected imposition of new sanctions. Washington is also studying the possible<br />
introduction of legislation in order to impose higher fines on international companies<br />
doing business with Iranian firms in which the Revolutionary Guard own more than 25<br />
percent, an escalation of the existing policy, which imposes fines on firms dealing with<br />
Iranian companies in which the Revolutionary Guards’ holdings exceed 50 percent.<br />
The US Congress has also extended the existing sanctions on Iran, some dating back<br />
to 1996, which will certainly exacerbate the existing challenges for Iran in relation to<br />
the trade exchange rates between Iran and the outside world, as well as potentially<br />
impeding foreign investment in Iran for fear of US sanctions, with the growth rate of<br />
future investments expected to be inevitably affected by losing capitals after Iran was<br />
able to attract investors relatively well after the nuclear deal, particularly in the fields of<br />
conventional and renewable energy.<br />
One of the supporting indicators to these expectations in recent months is the declining<br />
level of trade between Iran and the US during the month of November 2016 after Donald<br />
Trump won the presidential election. Trade declined by as much as 80 percent in the<br />
previous month, falling to $9.7 million compared to $51.5 million dollars in the month of<br />
October of the same year, according to the US Census Center.<br />
The future scenario for foreign investment in Iran will be influenced by its relations with<br />
the world and how these influence the regional and global environment, particularly in<br />
the case of the international companies associated with the US financial system and the<br />
energy industry in the United States, the largest producer and consumer of energy in the<br />
world.<br />
The advent of the Trump presidency has ushered in a state of anticipation and<br />
uncertainty for foreign investors, with no clear vision of what the overall joint work plan<br />
will be at the end of the period of the deal signed by the US with Iran in mid-2015, which<br />
has eased sanctions on Iran for the time being. There is also uncertainty over what new<br />
sanctions may be imposed and approved by the Congress on Iran; what is clear, however,<br />
is the hostility declared by Trump to Iran, and his desire to further escalate this matter; it<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
77
appears very likely that the Trump administration will impose more severe sanctions on<br />
the Iranian economy, or even cancel the nuclear deal with Iran.<br />
In this unclear climate, foreign investment will be delaying the implementation of<br />
already concluded agreements and the beginning of actual work on the existing deals.<br />
Some oil and gas companies may resort to the tactics of delays and evasion in order to<br />
escape the market in a timely manner, including those such as France’s petrochemical<br />
giant Total and Malaysia’s Petronas, which decided to return to investing in Iran after the<br />
easing the sanctions initially imposed in 2004; both of the aforementioned companies<br />
had agreed to develop Phase 11 in the South Pars gas field.<br />
The two companies’ procrastination coincided with the deterioration of the relations<br />
between Iran and the West following the 2004 sanctions, with the agreements not<br />
working out as initially planned; Iran eventually had to hand over the project to the<br />
National Oil Company of China in 2009, but the latter failed to achieve the desired<br />
progress, withdrawing its participation at the end of 2012, with Total deciding to try again<br />
in 2016 following the lifting of the sanctions.<br />
Third: Economic relations between Iran and other nations are once again strained due<br />
to Iran’s foreign policy position and increased interference and military intervention in<br />
regional conflicts in some Middle East countries, including its ongoing support for armed<br />
groups listed as a terrorist.<br />
The continuation of these tensions suggests that the indirect obstacles impeding the<br />
growth of the Iranian economy are likely to persist, including problems with overseas<br />
bank transfers to and from Iran from, although these have theoretically already been<br />
lifted in accordance with the 2015 JCPOA. This is likely to lead to the further international<br />
isolation of Iran as it grapples with its domestic problems and loses out on foreign<br />
investment to its overseas competitors, with the depletion of financial resources likely<br />
to curb its ability to continue its involvement in regional military conflicts. Furthermore,<br />
despite the lifting of international sanctions over a year ago, the level of international<br />
banking transactions with Iranian banks remains modest, and it is certainly not<br />
commensurate with the size of the Iranian economy.<br />
In the beginning of 2017, the British company BP, one of the world's largest oil<br />
companies, announced its official withdrawal from deals on the Iranian market, in which<br />
it had been set to help develop oil and gas fields. This was a significant decision and had<br />
some impact on Iran’s deals with BP’s two biggest competitors, Royal Dutch and Total,<br />
with many predicting that smaller foreign oil and gas companies could follow BP’s lead.<br />
The reason given by BP for its withdrawal was that this was a purely commercial<br />
decision, with the company citing the possibility of larger investment revenues in other<br />
regions internationally. Unofficially, however, the real reason behind BP’s decision<br />
was political; with 40 percent of the company owned by American shareholders, and<br />
Americans accounting for 30 percent of its employees, Iran’s prohibition on American<br />
citizens’ involvement in Iranian business activities, the company was placed in an<br />
awkward situation.<br />
78 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
»»<br />
Two future scenarios<br />
With reference to both the positive and negative indicators mentioned above, we<br />
conclude that there are two possible scenarios for the progress of the economic growth<br />
in Iran in 2017; the first is to suppose that the Iranian economy will continue to grow at<br />
the current rate based on a number of observations, while the second scenario assumes<br />
a possible decline in the economic growth rates due to the presence of a wide range of<br />
challenges which may impede the economic development.<br />
The first scenario:<br />
According to this scenario, we expect a high economic growth rate to be achieved in Iran<br />
over the course of 2016 to continue at rates ranging between 4 percent and 4.4 percent,<br />
reaching a possible growth rate of 4.6 percent over the course of 2017 with a decline in<br />
the fiscal deficit of the budget also predicted by the World Bank. 151 This can be achieved<br />
if the Iranian government is able to overcome the political and economic challenges<br />
hindering increased growth, and the economy continues to grow at the rates it formerly<br />
achieved in 2016 without encountering any irreversible factors.<br />
This scenario is based on a number of factors, predominantly among which is an<br />
increase in foreign investments, particularly in the energy sector, as well as raising<br />
fiscal revenues if oil prices increase after the implementation of the OPEC agreement<br />
reducing the production levels which came into force in January 2017 and if all the<br />
members adhere to their commitment to freeze production without any increase. This<br />
also requires a number of other conditions, including an increase in the export of oil<br />
and gas products and the development of petrochemical industries and of more oil<br />
and gas fields after the agreements signed by the Iranian government, which followed<br />
the lifting of the international sanctions in the beginning of 2016. Deals between the<br />
Iranian oil and gas sector with major companies such as France’s Total , the Anglo-Dutch<br />
corporation Shell, Britain’s BP, and Italy’s Eni, along with the presence of other major<br />
international companies in Iran may encourage other international firms to invest in the<br />
country’s energy sector, particularly with the introduction of new oil contracts issued by<br />
the government in order to provide more incentives in order to attract investors to this<br />
sector.<br />
Achieving this objective would also bring about a surplus in the balance of trade as a<br />
result of increased<br />
oil exports,<br />
bringing them up<br />
to the previous<br />
pre-sanctions<br />
level of around 3.8<br />
million barrels per<br />
day. 152<br />
This would also<br />
entail an increase<br />
in non-oil exports<br />
Toman Exchange Rate to US Dollar<br />
Data Source: Central Bank of Iran<br />
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79
with higher investments, taking advantage of lower overseas export costs following<br />
the lifting of the longstanding commercial and banking sanctions, particularly with the<br />
European Union, an important Iranian trade partner for the export of carpets, oil, and<br />
spare parts. Iran also needs to import large quantities of manufacturing equipment,<br />
along with technological expertise and hi-tech products, in order to ensure an increase in<br />
non-oil exports, boost economic growth rates and increase foreign currency earnings.<br />
Hypothetically, attracting more foreign investment in Iran’s oil sector and increasing<br />
its non-oil exports is possible on the condition that the country overcomes the current<br />
domestic and external obstacles to attracting foreign investment and resolves the<br />
obstacles impeding bank transfers to and from Iran; achieving this depends on improving<br />
the political and economic ties between Iran and other nations, and particularly with the<br />
United States during the coming period.<br />
Achieving this would promote the restoration of the remainder of the funds frozen<br />
abroad and provide opportunities for economic growth, particularly if the funds are<br />
invested in productive projects, thus increasing the production rates in order to help in<br />
operations, as well as stimulating the labor market and stabilizing the local currency.<br />
The second scenario<br />
Unlike the first scenario, the current scenario is expected to see a reduced economic<br />
growth in Iran over the course of 2017 compared to the same period in 2016 based on a<br />
combination of negative indicators monitored during 2016, and particularly in the second<br />
half of 2016; this scenario, predicted by the International Monetary Fund, visualizes<br />
growth rates of between 3 percent and 3.5 percent. 153<br />
The IMF reached this assessment following a visit to Iran by a delegation of the IMF at<br />
the end of 2016 after a break of two decades. During the visit, the officials suggested that<br />
the Iranian government should request funding loans from the IMF.<br />
This scenario foresees negative GDP growth rates in Iran, with this assumption based on<br />
the existence of a set of significant risks and challenges that may pose difficulties for the<br />
chances of increasing Iran's economy growth rates in the short term if the government<br />
is unable to overcome them. These serious problems pose significant challenges in a<br />
number of vital domestic sectors, in addition to the external challenges which are no less<br />
important in the degree of influence on the Iranian economy.<br />
Based on the current scenario, a range of domestic challenges is likely to affect the<br />
future growth rates, including the existence of a number of obstacles impeding the direct<br />
foreign investments which the Iranian government considers to be the most important<br />
basis of growth, as well as the deteriorating exchange rate and its negative impact on<br />
economic and social conditions, along with the increase in inflation rates and financial<br />
defaults for companies and manufacturing facilities, high unemployment and continuing<br />
financial corruption, all of which hinder the growth and economic reform efforts.<br />
The government seems unlikely to formulate the necessary plans and solutions to these<br />
crises in the near future, with the recession continuing in the industrial and consumerist<br />
sectors, and with increasing numbers of factories either closing or operating at reduced<br />
80 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
capacity. This, in turn, reduces the chances of lowering the unemployment rates in the<br />
near term, unless the government takes serious steps to reopen the factories that have<br />
suspended production and to provide financial support to the manufacturers facing<br />
difficulties in order to boost their production.<br />
Besides the domestic challenges, other external challenges contributing to the<br />
likelihood of this scenario will affect future growth rates, most notably the threat<br />
of Iran's dependence on oil revenues if prices do not rise and OPEC’s efforts fail in<br />
increasing current prices after the introduction of an oil production cap by the member<br />
states including Iran. Other factors are the negative impact of Trump's success in the US<br />
elections on the investments coming to Iran and the low volume of trade with the outside<br />
world.<br />
Increasing tensions in the political relations between Iran and other countries as a<br />
result of the Iranian regime’s armed intervention in regional conflicts will result in further<br />
economic pressure, with this intervention also further adding to the increased spending<br />
outside the country's borders and waste of financial resources on activities which will<br />
not benefit the local economy or the Iranian citizens, and will exacerbate the crisis of the<br />
fiscal deficit instead of being used in order to drive economic growth.<br />
»»<br />
Second Axis: the Iranian banking system exchange rate a year after the nuclear<br />
deal and the direction of future progress.<br />
Introduction<br />
The power of any 21st-century economy is measured by several parameters; amongst<br />
the primary measures are the power and sophistication of the country’s banking system,<br />
the level and effectiveness of services provided to citizens and domestic and foreign<br />
investors, and the volume of financial and technical assistance and facilities available.<br />
In Iran’s case, we are talking about the banking system of a country that has been under<br />
economic sanctions for many years, leading inevitably to greatly reduced strength and<br />
efficiency in its banking system, whose foreign activities were effectively suspended,<br />
leaving this sector wholly dependent on its domestic financial services and unable to<br />
send or receive funds outside Iran.<br />
After the signing of the nuclear deal, Iran’s banking sector was freed from the<br />
restraints, which had limited it under the terms of the nuclear agreement signed on<br />
paper. This does not mean, however, that everything that was signed would be applied<br />
on the ground. That is why the conditions of this vital sector, more than a year after the<br />
nuclear agreement was implemented, need to be evaluated to determine the extent<br />
of its development and to try to anticipate the future course of its movements. These<br />
areas are covered in this report. It should also be noted that despite the agreement, the<br />
domestic currency exchange rate in Iran declined in the second half of 2016, leading<br />
to a crisis with both economic and social repercussions, despite the increase in state<br />
revenue from foreign exchange and the achievement of a surplus in the trade balance<br />
following the resumption of oil exports. Economically, this was theoretically supposed<br />
to lead to currency reevaluation even if Iran’s currency declined against others. At least<br />
Iran is not like China, which reduced the value of its currency deliberately to increase the<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
81
competitive advantage for its export market.<br />
We can conclude that the pace of decline in Iranian currency has not subsided in the<br />
period since the signing of the nuclear deal, with several factors influencing the stability<br />
of the currency market, which is linked to the structure of the Iranian economy rather<br />
than to the nuclear deal. This is what we will analyze in detail in this report, which will<br />
next attempt to anticipate what the Iranian Tomans exchange rate may look like at the<br />
end of 2017.<br />
First: The banking system:<br />
More than a year has passed since the Joint Action Plan came into force (the<br />
comprehensive Joint Action Plan nuclear agreement) between Iran and the group of<br />
five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. This plan lifted the<br />
ban on the international banking deal with Iran's banks and the possibility of transfer<br />
to and from it internationally. Iran has been eagerly waiting for this matter because it<br />
desperately needs to attract foreign investment, which it relies on as a major foundation<br />
to fund the sixth- Five-Year Development Plan, as well as to take over energy export<br />
revenues to new markets. The markets recovered after the lifting of the oil export ban,<br />
especially the European markets, which stopped trading for the bank with Iran during the<br />
period of sanctions. During this time, the International Trading System, “Swift” for Iranian<br />
banks, was decommissioned.<br />
Despite the lifting of the international embargo on dealing with Iranian banks since<br />
the beginning of the previous year, the practical reality is seen in the routine warnings<br />
issued to international banks, particularly major European banks, over dealings with their<br />
Iranian counterparts, and in the Iranian regime's fears of falling under prospective US<br />
financial penalties in the event of resurgent tensions in relations between Iran and the<br />
United States.<br />
Among the most prominent achievements of the nuclear deal for Iran in the financial<br />
sphere was the opening of a number of European banks’ branches in Tehran, along with<br />
the reciprocal opening of branches of Iranian banks in Europe. This followed a series of<br />
negotiations between Iran and several European countries on reestablishing banking<br />
relations. Valiollah Seif, the Governor of the Iranian Central Bank, led these on Iran’s part<br />
with Iranian banks subsequently opening branches in Greece, Germany, France, Austria,<br />
Hungary, and other European countries, although the transactions are still confined to<br />
small banks.<br />
The major financial institutions and corporations in the United States are still unwilling<br />
to cooperate with Iran despite attempts to reassure the White House before the end<br />
of former President Barack Obama’s term in office, with the US Treasury Department<br />
issuing new business guidelines in October 2016 which aimed to facilitate financial<br />
transactions in dollars between Iranian and American financial institutions. This allowed<br />
US banks and financial institutions who were previously banned from dealing with<br />
Iran to conclude some deals there in dollars, on the condition that remittances did not<br />
enter into the US financial system. In addition to this, another step was taken by the US<br />
Treasury Department in the same month to lift a complete ban on financial transactions<br />
82 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
with Iranian companies controlled by individuals included on a list of US sanctions.<br />
Despite attempts by the previous administration to reassure American companies<br />
and institutions, many remain reluctant to enter the Iranian market, and inevitably<br />
this hesitation and caution will increase in the future in the event of Trump adopting<br />
a hardline policy towards Iran that could further escalate tensions between the two<br />
nations.<br />
Second: The Iranian currency's exchange rate against the US dollar:<br />
When the nuclear agreement initially came into force in January 2016, i.e. over a year<br />
ago, the US dollar was equivalent to 3,000 Iranian Tomans (approximately equals to 10 US<br />
dollars) as a result of lifting the oil embargo and increased oil exports, a primary source<br />
of foreign currency. To achieve the balance of trade surplus, it is assumed theoretically<br />
that increasing dollar reserves with the Iranian government would result in a rise in the<br />
value of Iranian currency against the dollar, particularly as dollars become available in<br />
Iran again after shortages caused by the economic blockade. When one follows the actual<br />
exchange value of the dollar against the Iranian Toman, however, we find that this logical<br />
economic interpretation does not apply in this case, with one dollar equivalent to 3,170<br />
Tomans in October 2016, and 170 Tomans more than the dollar value in January of the<br />
same year.<br />
One month after that in November, the Toman’s value fell further, with one dollar<br />
standing at 3,220 Tomans, with another decline in the New Year. This all took place<br />
despite the previous sanctions against Iran having been lifted a year earlier and Iran<br />
seeing a sharp increase in dollar reserves. What were the reasons for this continuous<br />
decline, and what does the future hold for the Iranian currency in light of these changes?<br />
We seek to answer the following:<br />
• The reasons for the deterioration of the exchange rate, despite an easing of sanctions.<br />
There are several reasons for the continued decline of the Iranian currency exchange<br />
rate despite the passage of more than a year since the nuclear deal was implemented.<br />
Some of these reasons are due to external factors, while others are the result of the<br />
existence of structural problems and internal crises afflicting the Iranian economy and<br />
reflected by extension on exchange rates.<br />
First: the existence of a series of cumulative exogenous variables:<br />
At the beginning of 2017, the dollar curve continued to rise against Tomans, with the<br />
dollar hitting a new record high against the Iranian currency, reaching 3,300 Tomans per<br />
dollar. This crisis has old and cumulative roots, which led to the current exchange rate;<br />
its sources are not the result of activities over recent days or months or the last year<br />
alone. Since the 1990s, Iran has gone through several transformations and changes in<br />
the exchange rate, which has been greatly affected by political tensions with the world<br />
powers, primarily the suffocating economic blockade imposed by the USA in the ‘90s.<br />
This was followed by international sanctions at the beginning of the second millennium,<br />
the draconian sanctions imposed by the West in 2012 in response to the regime’s<br />
development of its nuclear program had a strong effect on the currency exchange rate,<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
83
with the greatest impact caused by the imposition of a ban on Iranian oil exports, the<br />
backbone of the Iranian economy and by far the largest source of foreign currency for<br />
many years after the US blockade. Every political or economic crisis has affected the<br />
Iranian currency's exchange rate against the dollar, and by extension against other foreign<br />
currencies.<br />
Exchange rate of Tomans vs. dollars from 1992-2016 (Data Source: Central Bank of<br />
Iran)<br />
The previous graph shows the large spikes in the official exchange rate over the 24-year<br />
period from 1992 to 2016, with the Toman first showing a significant rise against the<br />
dollar after 2001. The sharpest rise, of 430 percent in total, was seen between 2001 and<br />
2003 as the US sanctions intensified, soaring from a rate of 143 Tomans per dollar, which<br />
it had maintained for the previous nine years, to hit 785 Tomans per dollar within two<br />
years.<br />
The dollar continued to rise in value while the Toman continued falling, reaching 1,200<br />
Tomans to the dollar in 2012 as the European sanctions were implemented. Thereafter,<br />
the Toman’s value fell even faster, reaching almost 2,500 Tomans to the dollar in 2013, an<br />
increase of 108 percent in one year, coinciding with the imposition of Western sanctions<br />
on Iranian oil exports.<br />
Second: declining state reserves of foreign currency:<br />
Affected by the tense political relations with the West over more than two decades,<br />
there has been a commercial blockade over the same period, which intensified at the<br />
beginning of 2012 with the ban on oil exports, the main source of foreign currency for<br />
Iran, and the simultaneous drop in non-oil exports to European countries, in addition<br />
to the continuation of the freezing of Iran’s overseas funds and assets estimated to be<br />
in the billions of dollars. Although there is no confirmed official data on the volume and<br />
development of Iran's foreign currency reserves in recent years, various international<br />
sources indicate that it ranged between 115 and 125 billion dollars in 2015, while<br />
statements from the Minister of the Iranian economy in December 2016 indicated that<br />
the volume of Iran’s foreign reserves stood at around $100 billion, meaning a sharp fall<br />
in foreign reserves at a rate of between 15 and 20 percent in 2016, a major decline in just<br />
one year.<br />
Third: the historic presence of more than one exchange price in Iran:<br />
There is more than one exchange rate in Iran, there is a fixed-rate government<br />
exchange rate and the free market exchange rate, with the second being the one more<br />
widely referenced after the introduction of a ban on foreign dealings with state-owned<br />
enterprises in March 2013. The free market exchange rate was the first of a series of<br />
measures taken by the Iranian government to control the tumbling exchange rate and the<br />
elimination of the parallel market. The government plans to activate the second phase of<br />
its program to introduce a unified exchange rate in March 2017 when banks will deal only<br />
on the basis of the free market price. It is worth mentioning that Iran was set to introduce<br />
84 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
a unified exchange rate during the nineties but the policy was suspended, thus opening<br />
the way for the return of the parallel market.<br />
Fourth: the growing role of the parallel market in Iran:<br />
The increasing role of the parallel market in Iran means that the government has been<br />
unable to tighten control over exchange rates to accommodate the difference between<br />
the two prices due to the lack of government-owned banks able to meet the demand<br />
for foreign currency. This has led to a situation in which requests for foreign currency<br />
are directed to the parallel market rather than state-owned banks to meet the needs of<br />
foreign exchange but at a price higher than the official price.<br />
The difference between the two rates can rise to around 20 percent and sometimes<br />
more, reaching a dollar exchange rate on the free market of around 3,900 Tomans to the<br />
dollar at the beginning of 2017 after remaining at approximately 3,500 Tomans to the<br />
dollar over the previous seven months.<br />
Fifth: dependence on unstable sources of foreign currency and the continuation of<br />
banking restrictions:<br />
Given Iran’s increased dependency on the fickle and unstable source of oil export<br />
revenues as its primary means of obtaining foreign currency, the government and state<br />
are more likely to suffer financial instability, especially after the decline in oil prices two<br />
years ago, leaving the government with a budget deficit. This situation is likely to worsen,<br />
particularly if the decrease in foreign currency revenues coincides with continuing<br />
increased military spending in regional armed conflicts.<br />
The continuing restrictions and obstacles imposed on bank transfers that are still in<br />
place affect exchange rates to some degree and increase the cost of obtaining foreign<br />
currency, ultimately significantly raising the price. These restrictions also lead to delayed<br />
access to the funds obtained from oil exports and pressure on the dollar reserves, with<br />
rising imports in return after the easing of international sanctions.<br />
Sixth: Rising imports:<br />
The easing of the international embargo since the beginning of 2016 led to increased<br />
pressure on Iran’s foreign reserves to make up for years of deprivation, both at<br />
the individual level to meet the needs of various commodities and at the level of<br />
manufacturers whose production technology became outdated, leaving them unable<br />
to upgrade their production facilities by introducing new equipment to enhance<br />
manufacturing rates.<br />
Seventh: Economic recession:<br />
The economic recession has led to long-term stagnation in manufacturing, forcing many<br />
manufacturers to either cut back or end their operations for long periods, with nonoil<br />
exports falling and foreign currency sources drying up. As a result of the recession,<br />
the domestic economic growth rate continued to be negative in 2012 and 2013 before<br />
recovering slightly in 2014, although only at a modest rate of growth.<br />
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85
Eighth: Increased liquidity (cash flow) in recent years:<br />
Liquidity is a key factor in maintaining a state’s financial stability, affecting both inflation<br />
and currency values. In June 2016, the level of cash flow in Iran was 29 percent higher<br />
than the same period in 2015, although the growth rate did not exceed 4.5 percent. This<br />
higher than average cash flow, exceeding the economic growth rate, led to rising prices<br />
and declining currency values.<br />
Ninth: Extreme vulnerability of the Iranian currency market to fluctuating external<br />
events:<br />
The Iranian currency market is affected by a number of external factors, the latest<br />
of which is the impact of Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential election.<br />
Trump is known for his strong opposition to Iranian regime policy, leading to increasingly<br />
pessimistic predictions about the future of the Iranian economy following his election<br />
win due to his repeated threats to cancel the nuclear deal.<br />
Threats such as this have a strong negative impact on the influx of foreign investment<br />
into Iran, increasing concerns among foreign investors who are fearful of being subjected<br />
to possible American financial penalties. This is an issue of major concern to investors<br />
since Trump’s presidency, and as such has had a significant impact on the Iranian<br />
economy.<br />
On the other hand, Trump’s success has boosted hopes and optimistic forecasts for the<br />
performance of the US economy, which in turn has reflected directly on the US dollar's<br />
strength globally against other currencies, including the Iranian one. Certainly, after the<br />
disclosure of his protectionist policy concerning American industry and manufacturing,<br />
along with the elimination of some trade agreements, this deprived the US Treasury of<br />
tariffs and increasing competition in foreign markets for American products. This, along<br />
with other similar economic trends, has strengthened hopes for a stronger US economy<br />
and has reflected positively on the American stock exchange, and in rising dollar values<br />
against other global currencies, certainly including the Iranian Toman.<br />
• Attempting to analyze the possible future direction of the Iranian banking system and<br />
currency exchange rates… where to next?<br />
In regards to developments in Iran’s banking system, we can say that the Iranian<br />
government succeeded in making some progress in this sector after the nuclear<br />
agreement, and was able to increase the financial facilities provided for local companies<br />
and manufacturers, as well as closing a large number of non-performing ‘phantom’ bank<br />
accounts. The government was also able to open branches of some Iranian banks in<br />
Europe, as well as opening branches of some Western banks in Tehran to facilitate rising<br />
rates of business transactions with European countries, especially in Eastern Europe.<br />
However, progress is limited since Iran is only dealing with smaller banks, with the larger<br />
European banking institutions still holding back from involvement despite improving<br />
trade relations with Iran following the nuclear deal, not to mention the complete absence<br />
of major American banks. Thus, the future growth and development in this sector and<br />
its openness to the world needs more time and depends on the improvement in Iran's<br />
relations with the USA in the first place.<br />
86 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
The cancellation of restrictions on Iranian bank transfers is unlikely to happen in<br />
the near-term due to pressure from the United States, reinforced by the presence of<br />
Trump at the helm who is still threatening to cancel the nuclear deal and continues to<br />
threaten Iran with more sanctions, in addition to the US Congress extending the previous<br />
sanctions on Iran, some dating back to 1996, towards the end of 2016.<br />
The year that passed after the easing of sanctions on Iran, has proved that the United<br />
States remains the most powerful arbiter of the global financial system, with the ability<br />
to switch between the implementation of certain provisions of international conventions<br />
such as the nuclear deal, for example, meaning that the nuclear deal has become – as it<br />
was described by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei - just ink on paper.<br />
The official dollar-Toman exchange rate by the end of the fourth quarter of 2017 could<br />
reach 3,400 Tomans per dollar using mathematical models based on average prices in the<br />
recent period, according to predictions made by the ‘Trading Economics’ site on global<br />
economic variables. 154 Meanwhile, another scenario predicts that the Toman’s value<br />
could fall even further, positing a possible exchange rate of 4,900 Tomans to the dollar<br />
by the end of 2017. 155 The decision of Iran's central bank to unify the exchange rates by<br />
the end of Iran’s fiscal year in March 2017, after allowing some banks free circulation<br />
of foreign currency in December 2016, will enhance the prospects for unification of the<br />
exchange rate at a low value for Tomans against the US dollar in the future.<br />
Other indicators point to Tomans’ value declining further in the short term: these<br />
include the American economic policies adopted by the Trump administration, which<br />
boost the chances of a stronger US economy and increase the strength of the dollar<br />
against foreign currencies, in addition to raising the US Federal Reserve interest rate<br />
on the dollar in December 2016, meaning a strong likelihood of further increases in the<br />
interest rate on the dollar during 2017, which will further enhance the strength of the<br />
dollar against the Iranian Tomans and other foreign currencies.<br />
On the other hand, we note that Iran’s hope of increasing its foreign currency reserves<br />
depends on to a large degree on oil prices returning to the levels seen two-and-a-half<br />
years ago. If this does happen, it may take time until the prices recover to their previous<br />
levels, with many variables affecting the possibility of it occurring; depending on an<br />
unstable source to provide foreign currency reserves to finance state expenditure is a<br />
major risk.<br />
It is ironic that at the beginning of 2017, before the start of the new fiscal year<br />
(2017/2018), Iran had already briefly broken through the previous dollar exchange rate<br />
barrier of 3,300 Tomans before the Toman slightly regained its value, settling slightly<br />
below this figure. If Iran is determining the budget for the 2017-18 fiscal year on the<br />
basis of a 3,300 Toman per dollar exchange rate, how is it likely to look by the end of this<br />
period?<br />
It’s also noteworthy that Iran’s continuing and increasing military expenditure on<br />
engagement in a number of regional conflicts beyond its borders is rapidly eroding the<br />
country’s remaining currency reserves, putting further pressure on future exchange<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
87
ates if the volatile regional situation endures, and Iran continues to fund and engage in<br />
military conflicts on varying fronts in nations including Yemen, Iraq, and Syria.<br />
Finally, it must be noted briefly that the economic and social consequences of a<br />
future decline in the Iranian currency exchange rate would highlight the economic<br />
consequences of falling exchange rates during a period of constantly rising inflation rates<br />
due to the high cost of imported goods and imported raw materials, which would also be<br />
reflected unfavorably in product prices on the market.<br />
This decline also affects levels of domestic investment and increases financial costs,<br />
especially given the need to import foreign manufacturing equipment and to convert<br />
foreign investors' profits abroad. On the other hand, however, the exchange rate<br />
depreciation will offer positive export opportunities and a greater price advantage to<br />
offer a competitive edge for Iranian exports.<br />
As for the social consequences of rising inflation, the falling real value of income and of<br />
consumers’ purchasing power, especially with modest growth rates and the suspension<br />
of production by many manufacturers resulting in high unemployment, rising inflation<br />
and reliance on imports to meet domestic requirement, is increasing the suffering of<br />
Iranian citizens, especially when the most basic commodities such as medicines and<br />
other essential items must be imported.<br />
»»<br />
Third Axis: Iranian citizens’ standards of living - what comes next?<br />
Iranian citizens suffered greatly during the periods of economic sanctions, which had<br />
a massive negative effect on the quality of life; after getting their hopes up for greater<br />
prosperity as a result of the nuclear deal, they are now finding that this optimism was<br />
misplaced and largely illusory. Although many Iranian politicians, led by the current<br />
president, Hassan Rouhani, promised great improvements in living conditions in the<br />
wake of the nuclear deal, Iranians are finding a year after economic sanctions were lifted,<br />
that standards of living are declining rather than improving, with 2016 seeing a drastic<br />
downturn.<br />
As in any nation, citizens’ standard of living is affected by a wide variety of factors<br />
which interact to shape the living standards for the population. These include variables<br />
such as inflation rates, employment, growth in manufacturing and service sectors, and<br />
levels of government spending and investment in domestic and foreign sectors. Based<br />
on developments in these variables, we can provide a clearer picture of developments in<br />
Iranians’ standard of living after the nuclear deal and explore the possible direction for<br />
citizens' standard of living in 2017.<br />
First: Future economic conditions and their impact on citizens' living standards:<br />
Here, we will focus on a number of economic variables, which affected events during<br />
the past year, focusing on the second half of the year, before analyzing the economic and<br />
social repercussions on the lives of citizens in Iran:<br />
1- Two significant events occurred during the past six months which will inevitably have<br />
drastic consequences on citizens' living standards in the future if the government fails to<br />
take action to remedy the social situation; these were the government’s cancellation of<br />
88 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
financial subsidies for thousands of the poorest Iranian citizens, which were withdrawn<br />
in order to reduce the general deficit budget of the government, and the deterioration of<br />
the Iranian Toman’s exchange rate against foreign currencies.<br />
The withdrawal of the aforementioned subsidies from over 200,000 Iranian citizens<br />
during the second half of 2016-won consent from the Iranian parliament which plans<br />
to expand the cancellation of subsidies to millions more. Implementation of this policy<br />
was previously postponed more than once for fear of popular anger but was recently<br />
approved with the approaching end of the first term of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani.<br />
The cancellation of financial subsidies paid to some 200,000 Iranian citizens will lead to<br />
a decline in living standards and increase the suffering of the poorest members of Iranian<br />
society. 156 Expanding this program to remove financial support available to many fourmember<br />
families who rely on this money to live, will adversely affect at least one million<br />
people in the country.<br />
Although this policy provides the government with additional financial resources, it<br />
has serious social consequences, increasing the suffering of the poorest families, while<br />
reducing the rates of consumption and aggregate demand for goods and services, and<br />
increasing the chances of a recession and the resulting negative effects for the market as<br />
economic growth slows down generally. The provision of direct cash support subsidies,<br />
introduced following the cancellation of subsidies for energy and bread in late 2010,<br />
was directly responsible for reducing the poverty rate in Iran from 15 percent to 9<br />
percent between 2010 and 2013 on the basis of an estimated poverty line of $5.5 per<br />
day. Removal of this support means that poverty levels are likely to return to levels even<br />
worse than before.<br />
The second event, which will certainly adversely affect living standards for Iranian<br />
citizen, is the aforementioned steep deterioration of the Iranian Toman’s exchange rate<br />
over the last few months in 2016 (the recent deterioration in the price of Iranian Tomans<br />
is part of the series declines which began with the second millennium and worsened<br />
in 2013 with the entry into force of ban on export of oil). It will be followed by the<br />
deterioration of the domestic foreign exchange rate against the rising price, inflation,<br />
and the high cost of imported goods, as well as the rising cost of raw materials involved in<br />
local manufacturing, and it will reflect on greatly increased prices of products.<br />
The most profound impact will be on the poorest members of Iranian society,<br />
particularly with rising prices for staple foodstuffs and basic goods, such as food and<br />
medicine; high prices and a lack of any locally manufactured alternatives will lead<br />
to greater illness and increased morbidity and mortality rates in such difficult living<br />
conditions. The government will ultimately be forced to intervene to subsidize these<br />
goods financially again or face public anger which may develop into physical violence.<br />
2- There are officially nearly 5 million unemployed young men in Iran from a total of<br />
seven million unemployed, with average unemployment rate rising in recent months<br />
by more than 12%, meaning that Iran now ranks among the nations with the highest<br />
unemployment rates regionally, in 22nd place out of 25 countries, with Iranian<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
89
authorities predicting that unemployment levels will continue to rise, reaching 13 million<br />
within the next ten years. 157<br />
This reveals the government's inability to change the course of the unemployment rate<br />
over the past year and the need for it to take action to tackle it in the coming months,<br />
assuming they do not actively rise in this period.<br />
The high unemployment rate is also intensified by the ongoing crisis in manufacturing.<br />
Once the largest employment sector in Iran along with agriculture, many factories and<br />
companies are shutting down as their equipment and products become obsolete and<br />
outdated after years of economic blockade, leaving Iranian producers even more unable<br />
to compete with cheaper goods smuggled from abroad.<br />
Also, many of the factories and other manufacturing facilities still operating are running<br />
at less than 20 percent of their production capacity as a result of the increase in debt and<br />
financial problems, as well as obstacles in bank transfers faced by 70% of Iran’s domestic<br />
industries. According to Iranian officials, increases in the debts owed by state-owned<br />
companies in areas such as housing and construction to private sector lenders have<br />
exposed many businesses to the risk of bankruptcy or mass redundancies, which would<br />
further increase the unemployment rate as well as exacerbating the existing housing<br />
problem.<br />
The lack of funds is also leaving Iranian workers in some sectors like manufacturing and<br />
construction facing greater risks as employers cut back on safety and security measures,<br />
leading to a situation where an average of five individuals are being injured or killed daily<br />
in work-related accidents.<br />
3- as a result of the introduction of ill-conceived monetary policies in the second half of<br />
2016, inflation is expected to increase in the coming period, with the amount of currency<br />
issued by the central bank at the end of September 2016 being 30 percent higher than<br />
the sum issued in the same month in 2015. 158<br />
As a result of increasing the GDP of Iran in the same year by no more than 4.5<br />
percent, while increasing the currency in circulation approximately sevenfold, the rate<br />
of economic growth reflects the economic mismanagement of the country, and will<br />
inevitably lead to rapidly rising prices and of course to increasing poverty among the<br />
already poor and the dwindling middle classes, along with the collapse of the value of<br />
individuals’ savings.<br />
The inflation rate recorded during the second half of 2016 stood at around 11 percent<br />
compared to the same period of 2015; even though this is high, it is still better than the<br />
highest rate Iran reached in 2012 when it recorded an all-time record inflation rate of 45<br />
percent. The country is also witnessing steep rises in the costs of residential rents, and of<br />
food, especially imported foodstuffs, affected by declines in exchange rates.<br />
4- The issue of housing, in general, is becoming a major crisis in Iran, particularly<br />
plaguing citizens on a low income, with Iranian workers spending an average of 60<br />
percent of their basic salary on housing, 159 according to Hadi Abavi, the Secretary General<br />
of the Trade Unions Congress in Iran. Due to these exorbitant costs, workers are forced to<br />
90 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
seek additional work to meet the remaining requirements of life for themselves and their<br />
families. This, in turn, exacerbates the crisis of rising government debt to the benefit of<br />
the private sector in the housing sector, with this increase impeding the ability of private<br />
companies to complete construction projects and worsening the real estate crisis on a<br />
large scale. As a result of this worsening housing shortage, rents are likely to continue<br />
to rise, increasing the suffering of the already poor and the evermore-straitened middle<br />
classes to extreme levels in the coming period. If the government fails to intervene<br />
rapidly to increase public spending on reconstruction and housing, as the next year's<br />
budget has allocated 18% of the expenses for the reconstruction and construction (about<br />
60 thousand billion Tomans, or $18 billion) to address this crisis that is squeezing the<br />
citizens and draining their already low income, it may take years of hard work to resolve<br />
this crisis and to ameliorate the worst of the negative effects, and their repercussions on<br />
citizens' living standards.<br />
Second: The new budget plan and its possible impact on a citizen in the future:<br />
The Iranian government’s new budget plan for 2017 contains a number of points<br />
indicating that it will adversely affect citizens’ standard of living when compared to the<br />
budget of 2016, as the level of government spending is not commensurate with the size<br />
of the state's resources.<br />
While the total expenditure for the 2016 budget was $96 billion, this was limited due to<br />
the low oil prices at the time, and because Iran was still struggling to increase the volume<br />
of its oil production after concluding the nuclear deal. However, the budget for 2017,<br />
totaling $97 billion, increases this sum by only one billion dollars on the previous year<br />
(also, if we note that the government’s figure is based on the official rate for the dollar<br />
set by the government at 3,300 Tomans per dollar, although the free market value per<br />
dollar currently stands at 3,900 Tomans, meaning the real value of the budget falls to $82<br />
billion); this means that the budget was devised solely on the basis of austerity according<br />
to an economic crisis blueprint. This is despite the fact that the current economic outlook<br />
is certainly not worse than last year, which saw oil prices fall to below $40 per barrel,<br />
while the government has worked to increase oil export levels and open new markets<br />
after years of sanctions, increasing oil production volume by the end of 2016 by more<br />
than 1.5 million barrels, while the price per barrel rose from $40 to $55 by January 2017.<br />
These factors meant that the government should have been able to provide an expanded<br />
budget to help confront the economic crisis and to significantly increase the expenditure<br />
for the 2017 budget compared to its 2016 predecessor in line with the increased financial<br />
resources of the state in this period. The new budget, however, is far smaller than the<br />
financial resources that should be available, which raises questions about the state’s<br />
spending outside the expenditure announced in the state budget. All this comes at the<br />
cost of achieving the improvements in Iran’s economic and social wellbeing which are<br />
supposedly the government top priority, particularly after Iran’s emergence from a<br />
year-long arduous economic siege which has already had a grave impact on the living<br />
standards and real income of citizens and on rates of investment, as well as causing<br />
worsening unemployment.<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
91
To make it clear by what level the state's resources have increased in the 2017 fiscal year<br />
compared to 2016, we should assess the oil and gas export revenues, in addition to tax<br />
revenues, corporate profits and revenue from Iranian public sector facilities.<br />
Oil export is the primary revenue source; according to the lowest estimates, Iran<br />
exported almost two million barrels in 2016 at an average price of $45 a barrel. On this<br />
basis, the income from oil exports during the year would amount to US$ 32.8 billion. At<br />
the beginning of 2017, Iran exported at least 2.2 million barrels at a supposed price of $50<br />
a barrel (with the price currently standing at the US $55.50 per barrel and OPEC planning<br />
to increase this to more than $70 by the end of this year) thus, the total oil revenues<br />
during 2017 can be calculated at $40.1 billion. This represents an increase of $7 billion<br />
compared with the previous year and is expected to increase if the price of oil maintains<br />
or exceeds its current levels.<br />
Expected domestic tax revenues in the 2016/2017 budget reached 149 thousand<br />
billion Tomans (around $45 billion at an exchange rate of 3,300 Tomans per dollar) while<br />
the projected tax revenues in the next fiscal year's budget amounted to 157 thousand<br />
billion Tomans ($ 47.5 billion at an exchange rate of 3,300 Tomans per dollar), a 5 percent<br />
increase on the tax revenues for 2016.<br />
In other words, the next budget revenues would be at least $ 87.6 billion in oil revenues<br />
and taxes only, without calculating the revenues from gas exports, petrochemicals, and<br />
other commodities, which Iran is famous for exporting. While the budget revenues of last<br />
year were $77.8 billion (calculating the oil export revenues and taxes), the next budget<br />
from oil and tax revenues has only increased by 12.5% on last year's budget revenues.<br />
This was not reflected in an increase in the size of the budget and directing these<br />
resources to increase public spending and adoption of a growth-based economic policy.<br />
In addition to budget austerity, there is no effort to ensure impartiality in spending or<br />
development on various parts of Iran in terms of allocations and distribution of budget<br />
to ensure that all provinces have equal development and guarantee a decent standard<br />
of living for all the citizens. The capital Tehran holds the largest percentage of the budget<br />
allocation, while other areas inhabited by ethnic minorities remain marginalized and<br />
deprived; Sistan and Baluchistan province, for example, receive no more than 1 percent<br />
of government revenue, despite almost three million Baluchi people living there in<br />
desperate poverty.<br />
The direct result of this lack of justice in the allocation distribution for urban<br />
development is an increase in rates of internal migration from disadvantaged areas to<br />
developed urbanized regions in Iran, which further increases pressure on the facilities<br />
and services in these regions, ultimately reducing the general quality of services provided<br />
to all residents of these areas.<br />
Conclusion:<br />
From the aforementioned data, we conclude that there are serious flaws in the<br />
management of Iran’s state revenue management, meaning that the government is<br />
incapable of improving the people's living standards, which commensurate with the size<br />
92 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
of the Iranian economy, instead of imposing an austerity budget and spending on offbudget<br />
items. With little or no difference between the 2017 budget and its predecessor,<br />
and despite the massive changes affecting the Iranian economy after the easing of<br />
sanctions, restoring the volume of exports oil abroad and in surging global oil prices<br />
during the year, are expected to increase revenues compared to last year.<br />
This austerity budget shows that despite an increase in revenues, there are massive,<br />
undeclared expenditures outside Iran’s official budget, primarily in regional military<br />
conflicts, which are very well known to the Iranian people and indeed the peoples of the<br />
region. Instead of increasing investment and expenditure to improve the living standards<br />
of the people and reduce unemployment, that saw a rise by over 12 percent during the<br />
second half of 2016, the austerity budget will exacerbate a continuing decline in living<br />
standards, resulting in even greater unemployment levels, as is already being seen,<br />
without any noticeable changes during the first half of 2017.<br />
In conclusion, including the large number of negative economic variables that have<br />
been clarified previously, all the data points to real and worsening problems, which<br />
plague the lives of Iranian citizens. This reflects an economic policy by the Iranian<br />
government which will see a declining state role in the economy, despite the great<br />
potential shown by the Iranian economy, suggesting a downwards trajectory and<br />
worsening living conditions for the majority of Iranians if no positive action is taken<br />
to avert this and if the government fails to intervene urgently to correct the current<br />
situation.<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
93
ENDNOTES<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/JKR4CIZ<br />
اساسی قانون در جمهور رییس واختیارات وظایف فرهنگ: - 1 HTTP://CUTT.US/SLD6M<br />
والمسيرة السيرة الخامنئي علي الميزان: موقع منتديات - 2 HTTP://CUTT.US/CVC<br />
الجديد، اإليراني الرئيس هو من 24: -فرانس 3 HTTP://CUTT.US/0HUSR ۱۳۵۹<br />
سال اغاز مناسبت به نوروزی بیام اي: خامنه على الله ايت اثار ونشر حفظ دفتر - 4 HTTP://CUTT.US/TC99W 78<br />
شماره 1385، قم شهریور وباهنر رجایی شهیدان وبزرگداشت دولت هفته آغاز گلبرگ: مجله - 5 HTTP://CUTT.US/QNW2F<br />
ويكم، هفتاد مجمع در إيران أولويتهاي ديبلماسي: - 6 HTTPS://GOO.GL/SXTSQX 1395<br />
ابان 10 است، کرده عمل برجام در خود تعهدات همه به ایران روحانی: فارس، - 7 1395HTTPS://GOO.GL/WJVMOI<br />
ابان 27 بزند، هم به را برجام دستاوردهای نمیتواند هیچکس روحانی: حسن فردا: راديو - 8 HTTPS://GOO.GL/FI5TDL 1395<br />
ابان 23 کن، خالص برجام شر از را ما ترامپ: به کیهان پیام ايسنا، - 9 HTTP://CUTT.US/O9AFE<br />
كرد تر مقاوم را إيران اقتصاد برجام، ستاريفر: افتاب: - 10 HTTP://CUTT.US/1KLF<br />
نفت، وزیر معاون زبان از نفتی جدید قراردادهای ویژگی انتخاب: - 11 است-<br />
مرکزی بانک »دستور سازندگی: انقالبی- نهادهای تحریمی خود به وسپه ملت بانکهای واکنش مشرق، - 12 HTTP://CUTT.US/MMIB<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/JOBGI<br />
كابينه، ترميم د روحاني هوشمندي شناس: جق جواد محمد - 13 HTTP://CUTT.US/3K9FZ<br />
1395/07/28. داد؟ استعفا چرا گودرزی محمود اقتصاد: دنیای - 14 HTTP://CUTT.US/LPYR4 ۱۳۹۵.<br />
مهر ۱۳ کنند. می بازی عاشورا شب در جنوبی وکره ایران جوان: خبر باشگاه - 15 HTTP://CUTT.US/AZ5WY<br />
فهمیده، حسین درس حذف درباره فانی پاسخ بازتاب24: - 16 HTTP://CUTT.US/5H3JS 1395<br />
آبان 10 سیاسی، های حساب تسویه قربانی نفت صنعت: جهان - 17 .1395 آبان 2 نمیدهد، رأی پیشنهادی وزرای به دربست صورت به لِس مَجْ هیأترئیسه: عضو شهروند، - 18 HTTP://SOO.GD/WM6M<br />
HTTP://SOO.GD/FCIX 1395<br />
مرداد 23 است، کرده پیدا تمایل اصولگرایان به روحانی حجاریان: جم، جام - 19 HTTPS://GOO.GL/LJSJJK 1395<br />
مهر 8 نکته، وچند دولت اقتصادی دشواریهای اقتصاى، دنياي - 20 HTTPS://GOO.GL/BOJKVG 1395<br />
مهر 19 1400، سال تا طلب اصالح نامزد به اجارهای نامزد ترجیح كيهان، - 21 1395<br />
مهر 25 سالمت، به ما واز خیر به شما از نشوید، کاندیدا دیگر روحانی: به قدوسی کریمی توصیه إيران، عصر - 22 HTTPS: //GOO.GL/I5DAF3<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/YUVTJ8<br />
نمیشوند ایران بعدی رییسجمهور آقایان این آفتاب، - 23 2016<br />
نوفمبر 15 لِس، مَجْ در وکردها بلوچها فراکسیون تشکیل از دولت حمایت فيله، دويتشه - 24 HTTPS://GOO.GL/EQ6TBU<br />
94 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
- 25 ايسنا، نامه علی مطهری به رئیس جمهور درباره قانونشکنی در مشهد، 30 ايان 1395<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/9LWAZB<br />
- 26 فارس، دستور رییس جمهور به وزیران کشور ودادگستری در پاسخ به نامه علی مطهری، 1 آذر 1395<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/9QW54V<br />
- 27 شاخه سبز، وزير كشور دستور بررسی علت لغو سخنرانی مطهری را صادر كرد، 1 اذر 1395 ص3<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/IFKUJL<br />
- 28 بي بي سي فارسي: استاندار خراسان رضوی: لغو سخنرانی مطهری بر اساس مکاتبه بااطالعات سپاه بود، 2 اذر 1395<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/E96I7L<br />
- 29 شرق ديلي، توقف بازداشت نماينده تهران، 9 اذر HTTPS://GOO.GL/OGI4DF 1395<br />
- 30 نسيم، 102 شکایت دولت از ۱۲ رسانه، 19 ابان HTTPS://GOO.GL/11HGQM 1395<br />
- 31 نسيم، خودتان شفاهًا یا کتبًا بارها گفتهاید که چرا با فالن روزنامه وسایت برخورد نمیکنی، 17 ابان 1395<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/1UNH5U<br />
- 32 بي بي سي فارسي، اژهای: دولت گزارشی درباره حقوقهای نجومی به قوه قضائیه نداده است، 23 ابان 1395<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/10Y5UP<br />
- 33 صحيفة سبق، "روحاني" يؤجل خالفاته مع الحرس الثوري ويمنحه ميزانية تاريخية للتوسع اإلجرامي، 10 ديسمبر 2016<br />
HTTPS://MOBILE.SABQ.ORG<br />
- 34 األمن والدفاع العربي، زيادة التمويل العسكري في ميزانية حكومة روحاني بنسبة 70 بالمئة HTTPS://GOO.GL/1Y9TKD<br />
- 35 زمان نيوز: ایران چه تسلیحاتی را میتواند صادر کند، HTTP://CUTT.US/WZGZP<br />
36 -الجيش العربي، أنواع األسلحة اإليرانية ودواعي التسلُّح HTTPS://GOO.GL/WS0943<br />
37 -عصام المجالي، رسالة ماجستير، تأثير التسلح اإليراني على األمن الخليجي منذ انتصار الثورة في 1979، جامعة مؤتة، صص<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/S0BEQW .45-46<br />
- 38 فارس نيوز، نخستین"شناور تندرو برد بلند بالگردبر" ساخت سپاه رونمایی شد، 23 شهريور 1395<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/4JZK5C<br />
39 -تسنيم، العميد فدوي: جيل جديد من فرقاطات "الشهيد ناظري" هو قيد التصنيع، 8 نوفمبر 2016<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/CG56AW<br />
- 40 دنياي اقتصاد، عملیاتی شدن سپر دریایی ارتش در مکران، 9 ابان HTTP://CUTT.US/LXUV 1395<br />
- 41 األمن والدفاع العربي، إيران: تدشين منظومات بحرية جديدة واإلعالن عن خطط مستقبلية، 29 نوفمبر 2016<br />
HTTP://SDARABIA.COM/?P=41347<br />
- 42 العالَم، القوة البحرية اإليرانية تستعرض أحدث إنجازاتها، 29 نوفمبر HTTPS://GOO.GL/WSP5TV 2016<br />
- 43 تسنيم، إيران تزيح الستار عن طائرة تشويش من دون طيار، 1-8-2016 – HTTPS://GOO.GL/OAJ62G<br />
- 44 آرمان امروز، رونمايي از پهپاد دوربرد "صاعقه"، 11 مهر HTTPS://GOO.GL/6TN0LJ 1395<br />
- 45 آفرينش، براي دفاع از خود حد ومرز ومحدوديتي نميشناسيم، 11 مهر HTTPS://GOO.GL/NSRKDI 1395<br />
- 46 مواقف، أول "طائرة مسيَّرة انتحارية" تدخل الخدمة في القوة البحرية للحرس الثوري. HTTPS://GOO.GL/1ET1JQ<br />
- 47 تسنيم، أولین پهپاد ساخت دانش آموزان ایرانی با نام ساحر رونمایی شد، 2 اذر HTTP://CUTT.US/ONMM 1395<br />
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- 48 جام جم، رادار ایرانی »مطلع الفجر ۳« رونمایی شد، 1 ابان HTTPS://GOO.GL/NDHHXZ 1395<br />
- 49 تسنيم، إيران تكشف عن صاروخ "ذو الفقار" الذي يبلغ مداه 750 كيلومترًا، 21 سبتمبر 2016<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/LVI4HU<br />
- 50 فارس، انهدام پهپاد توسط جنگنده میگ 28 29، مهر HTTPS://GOO.GL/VFNW7P 1395<br />
- 51 ايلنا، شلیک موشک نصر وبمب قاصد/ انهدام اهداف زمینی توسط جنگندههای اف۴، 28 مهر 1395<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/CD90VZ<br />
- 52 الف، تست مثبت بمبها وموشکهای ایرانی، 28 مهر HTTPS://GOO.GL/DPE8P5 1395<br />
- 53 وكالة ايسنا، آغاز رزمایش پدافند پرتویی »حضرت روحالله« در کاشان، 4 مهر HTTPS://GOO.GL/FXMRWX 1395<br />
- 54 صحيفة كيهان، إيران تُجرِي مناورة في الدفاع اإلشعاعي، 26 سبتمبر 2016. HTTPS://GOO.GL/KYPHRU<br />
- 55 اطالعات، برگزاری رزمایش بزرگ یاوران انقالب اسالمی در رابر، 2 ابان HTTPS://GOO.GL/ZM9DED 1395<br />
- 56 نسل فردا، رزمایش بزرگ "الى بیت المقدس" برگزار شد، ص2، 15 ابان HTTP://CUTT.US/XWPU 1395<br />
57 -األنصار، انطالق مناورات “محمد رسول الله )ص(” الكبرى للجيش اإليراني، 11 ديسمبر 2016<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/7UMJKE<br />
- 58 األمن والدفاع العربي، الجيش اإليراني يزيح الستار عن طائرة مسيَّرة جديدة تُطلَق يدويّ ًا، 12 ديسمبر 2016<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/3GLHHR<br />
- 59 األمن والدفاع العربي، الجيش اإليراني يزيح الستار عن طائرة رعد االنتحارية، 13 ديسمبر 2016<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/5AYUOA<br />
- 60 شرق ديلي، رویارویی ناوشکن آمریکایی با شناور نظامی ایران، 17 شهريور HTTPS://GOO.GL/TXFZAN 1395<br />
- 61 جام جم، تهدید قایق های تندرو ایران در خلیج فارس بسیار واقعی است، 18 شهريور HTTPS://GOO.GL/I7EGMZ 1395<br />
- 62 عصر إيران، فرمانده آمریکایی: "اشتباه محاسباتی" ممکن است سبب درگیری نظامی با ایران شود، 10 شهريور 1395.<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/RT6DXV<br />
- 63 رويترز، ترامب يتوعد برَدّ قاسٍ على أي مضايقة إيرانية للبحرية األمريكية، 10 سبتمبر 2016<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/OTMXSW<br />
64 - IRAN'S GROWING NAVAL AMBITIONS, WHY IT WANTS NAVAL BASES IN SYRIA AND YEMEN<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/KGVXVW<br />
- 65 روسيا اليوم، رئيس األركان اإليرانية: تهديدات ترامب مجرَّد مزحة، 10 نوفمبر HTTPS://GOO.GL/ELHRAZ 2016<br />
- 66 صالح حميد، ماذا تريد إيران من تصعيد تهديداتها في المياه الدولية، 29 نوفمبر HTTPS://GOO.GL/4WNDVI 2016<br />
- 67 دينا جمال، زوارق تتحرَّش بسفن حربية أمريكية.. هل يستمر اللعب اإليراني ب”النار” في الخليج، 7 سبتمبر 2016<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/RK0WJA<br />
- 68 فارس، حرکت ناوگروه 44 نیروی دریایی ارتش به طرف اقیانوس اطلس، 21 مهر HTTPS://GOO.GL/KPKKYL 1395<br />
- 69 أحمد يوسف أحمد، رسائل الهيمنة اإليرانية، 6 ديسمبر HTTPS://GOO.GL/E8NSGV 2016<br />
70 - IRAN'S GROWING NAVAL AMBITIONS, WHY IT WANTS NAVAL BASES IN SYRIA AND YEMEN<br />
- 71 اليوم برس، ألول مره.. إيران تكشف عن ضرورة إقامة قاعدة عسكرية إيرانية في اليمن، 26 نوفمبر 2016<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/KGVXVW<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/ZCIDML<br />
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- 72 خالد عكاشة، إيران والبحث عن النفوذ االستراتيجي البحري، 10 ديسمبر HTTPS://GOO.GL/JNOEN5 2016<br />
- 73 جام جم، رزمایش مشترک دریایی ایران وپاکستان آغاز شد، 10 مهر HTTP://SOO.GD/1Z3I 1395<br />
- 74 جمهوري إسالمي، دريادار سياري، ماموريت ناوگروه چهل موفقیت آمیز بود، 15 مهر HTTPS://GOO.GL/RHLMS6 1395<br />
- 75 موقع مقاتل، مصالح جمهورية الصين الشعبية وأهدافها في الشرق األوسط HTTP://CUTT.US/IXMKB<br />
- 76 المنتدى العربي للدفاع والتسلُّح، إيران والصين: أسرار مذهلة، 12 أكتوبر HTTPS://GOO.GL/GOXFJW 2010<br />
- 77 خبرنكاران جوان، امضای توافقنامه دفاعی امنیتی بین ایران وچین با حضور وزرای دفاع دو کشور، 24 ابان 1395<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/KP8NH<br />
- 78 تسنيم، ایران وچین "کمیسیون مشترک همکاریهای نظامی" تشکیل دادند، 24 آبان HTTP://CUTT.US/YMR2O 1395<br />
- 79 فارس، أمادگی ایران برای برگزاری رزمایش مشترک با چین، 24 ابان HTTP://CUTT.US/0ELHI 1395<br />
- 80 شروع الين، بيش از »يک هزار نفر« إيراني در سوريه شهيد شدهاند، 2 اذر HTTP://CUTT.US/NDLA9 1395<br />
- 81 راديو فردا، واکنش سپاه به گزارشها از »شکنجه ومرگ« یک عضو سپاه اهواز، 21 مهر HTTP://CUTT.US/TOYQ 1395<br />
- 82 راديو فردا، یک »فرمانده ارشد سپاه پاسداران« در درگیریهای سوریه کشته شد، 6 آبان 1395HTTP://CUTT.US/O9UCO<br />
- 83 صاد، ارتفاع عدد القتلى من قيادات الحرس الثوري اإليراني في سوريا، 28 نوفمبر HTTP://CUTT.US/EJMML 2016<br />
- 84 ميكرو سوريا، حملة واسعة من نشطاء إيرانيين ضدّ التدخُّل اإليراني في سوريا، 17 سبتمبر 2016<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/FWNAIU<br />
- 85 شام، من كثرة القتلى اإليرانيين في سوريا... الصحف اإليرانية بدأت توجه االنتقادات لحكومتها، 29 أكتوبر 2015<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/YQ96O<br />
- 86 أورينت، غضب إيراني من أداء روسيا في معارك حلب وخامنئي يستدعي رضائي، 13 مايو 2016<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/DIQOWM<br />
- 87 حملة واسعة من نشطاء إيرانيين ضدّ التدخل اإليراني في سوريا HTTPS://GOO.GL/FWNAIU<br />
- 88 الخليج الجديد، خامنئي يُقِيل موسوي ويُجرِي تغييرًا محدودًا في القيادة العليا للجيش، 20 نوفمبر 2016<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/AOEY59<br />
- 89 وكالة تسنيم، انتصاب سرتیپ "غالمحسین غیبپرور" به ریاست سازمان بسیج، 17 اذر 1395<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/R0W8RN<br />
- 90 عائشة احمد المري، االقليات في إيران.. أزمة وطن أم أزمة مواطنة؟، مجلة آفاق المستقبل، العدد 5، مايو 2010<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/EZZF5B<br />
- 91 إيرنا، یک تیم تروریستی توسط وزارت اطالعات در شرق کشور متالشی شد، 2 اذر ماه 1395<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/6TGDR<br />
- 92 اطالعات، هالکت ۱۲ تروریست با پشتیبانی آتش سنگین هوانیروز، 15 مهر HTTPS://GOO.GL/AAMRUF 1395<br />
- 93 وطن امروز، هالکت 12 تروریست در درگیری با سپاه پاسداران، 14 مهر HTTPS://GOO.GL/QBWTWH 1395<br />
94 -عصر إيران، پلیس: کشته شدن 3 تکفیری در درگیری مسلحانه در کرمانشاه، 26 مرداد 1395<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/HDED1B<br />
- 95 فارس، بروجردي: محاولة اغتيال النائب "فالحت بيشه" مخطَّ ط إرهابي، 10 يوليو HTTPS://GOO.GL/V3CXEK 2016<br />
- 96 ايلنا، حمله ناکام تروریستها به منطقه »گلچی در« شهرستان مریوان، 20 مهر 1395<br />
HTTP://SOO.GD/HWHR<br />
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- 97 تسنيم، پرتاب شیء انفجاری به داخل خودروی گشت پلیس در مریوان، 20مرداد HTTPS://GOO.GL/IDSXHG 1395<br />
- 98 إذاعة فردا، شاخه نظامی »کودار« از کشته شدن »شماری از اعضای سپاه« خبر داد، 21 مهر 1395<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/F8MIX<br />
99 -العربية، كردستان إيران.. تصعيد مسلَّح غير مسبوق، 12 يوليو HTTPS://GOO.GL/RV5BRF 2016<br />
- 100 أورينت، ديكتاتورية فرس إيران.. قمع في الداخل واعتداء في الخارج HTTPS://GOO.GL/L9RM77<br />
- 101 الوطن الجديد، إيران تنشئ جامعة للدراسات األمنية واالستخبارية في األحواز، 5 نوفمبر 2016<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/2MGZL5<br />
- 102 سابق، مزاعم األمن اإليراني: حراك األحوازيين "تكفيري" مدعوم من السعودية، 15 نوفمبر HTTPS://SABQ.ORG 2016<br />
- 103 المرصد، قوات األمن والحرس الثوري تداهم منازل األحوازيين، 19 نوفمبر HTTPS://GOO.GL/ZCJG3C 2016<br />
- 104 وكالة تستر، وزير المخابرات اإليرانية يزور األحواز للسيطرة على األوضاع األمنية، 29 ديسمبر 2016<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/REEBGD<br />
- 105 الوئام، السلطات اإليرانية تبدأ حملة مصادرة األطباق الالقطة من مدينة شاور باألحواز، 10 أكتوبر 2016<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/AETBDR<br />
- 106 وزير المخابرات اإليرانية يزور األحواز للسيطرة على األوضاع األمنية، مصدر سابق.<br />
- 107 صحيفة اطالعات، شهادت یک پلیس در شهر مرزی مهرستان، 26 ابان HTTP://CUTT.US/TCXOH 1395<br />
- 108 راديو فردا، نیروهای سپاه در منطقه مرزی سراوان با گروهک تروریستی درگیر شدند HTTP://CUTT.US/RMQON<br />
- 109 عصر إيران، شناسایی ودستگیری ۱۳ همدست قورباغه مکران، 28 مهر HTTPS://GOO.GL/JUKXSZ 1395<br />
- 110 جام جم، اطالعیه دادگستری کردستان در خصوص إعدام عوامل تکفیری وسلفی، 13 مرداد 1395<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/03PZP2<br />
- 111 إيران برس، زندانیان اهل سنت قبل از إعدام وحشیانه شکنجه شدند، 25 مرداد HTTPS://GOO.GL/EB3LVB 1395<br />
- 112 إيران تعدم 5 سجناء بينهم السياسي الكردي محمد عبد اللهي HTTPS://GOO.GL/8XQXCK<br />
- 113 راديو زمانه، محمد عبدالهی وپنج زندانی دیگر إعدام شدند،۱۹ مرداد HTTPS://GOO.GL/SY5J8X 1395<br />
- 114 إعدامات إيران للكرد والسُّ نَّة تثير انزعاج المجتمع الكردي، 8 أغسطس HTTP://CUTT.US/JNQ4 2016.<br />
- 115 المَجْ لِس الكردي يُدِ ين اإلعدامات الجماعية بحقّ النشطاء الكرد في إيران HTTPS://GOO.GL/PJVBJA<br />
- 116 عصر إيران، إعدام 3 نفر درخوزستان به جرم عملیات تروریستی27مرداد HTTP://SOO.GD/9AO7 1395<br />
- 117 اعتماد، دو متجاوز به عنف در بندرعباس إعدام شدند مرداد 1395،ص4.28 HTTPS://GOO.GL/YNXHBG<br />
- 118 راديو فردا، عفو بینالملل: یک نوجوان دیگر در ایران إعدام شده است، 13 مرداد HTTPS://GOO.GL/INQFVU 1395<br />
- 119 العربية نت، إيران تطلب حذف وثيقة تُدِ ينها بسبب آالف اإلعدامات بشهرين، 10 أغسطس 2016<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/UGLD6<br />
- 120 الشرق األوسط، لعنة صيف اإلعدامات تطارد كبار مسؤولي النظام، 31 أغسطس 2016HTTPS://GOO.GL/ZX4GSL<br />
- 121 المرصد، نواب سابقون يصدرون بيانا يعتبر إعدامات 1988 عار على إيران، 24 أغسطس 2016<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/XOQ2NJ<br />
- 122 إيران سكوالريسم، احمد منتظری به جاسوسی وتبانی با عربستان ومجاهدین متهم شد، 7/9/1395.<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/JKGM3K<br />
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- 123 خبر فارسي، احمد منتظری به شش سال زندان وخلع لباس محکوم شد، 9 آذر HTTPS://GOO.GL/HND4M3 1395<br />
- 124 راديو فردا، بیانیه ۱۵۱ فعال سیاسی ومدنی در اعتراض به حکم زندان منتظری، 14 آذر 1395<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/ZELCU<br />
- 125 إذاعة فردا، شش نواندیش دینی: حکم احمد منتظری دهنکجی به عدالت است، 10 آذر HTTP://SOO.GD/CI4H 1395<br />
- 126 تسنيم، ابوترابی: إعدامهای مواد مخدّر نتیجه مطلوب نداشته است، 27 مهر HTTPS://GOO.GL/EYXKDO 1395<br />
- 127 دنياي اقتصاد، پورمحمدی: مجازات إعدام کارآمد نبوده است، 8 آبان HTTPS://GOO.GL/GXOZLC 1395<br />
24ساعت، - 128 مجازات إعدام را در حد زیاد اجرا نکنیم، 16 ابان HTTP://CUTT.US/PHKWD 1395<br />
- 129 بي بي سي، مَجْ لِس ایران بایک فوریت طرح جایگزینی إعدام برای مجرمان مواد مخدّ ر موافقت کرد، 3 اذر 1395<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/HK6O<br />
- 130 تسنيم، جزئیات جدید از انهدام هسته وارداتی داعش26، مرداد HTTPS://GOO.GL/SW9NXS 1395<br />
- 131 جام جم، ۱۵۰۰ جوان ایرانیرا از پیوستن به داعشمنصرف كرديم، 5 شهريور HTTPS://GOO.GL/OENXZN 1395<br />
- 132 اعتماد، دو ایراني پيوسته به “داعش” به هاكت رسيدند، 12 مرداد -1395 ص2 HTTP://CUTT.US/DYDY<br />
- 133 راديو فراد، وزارت کشور ادعای رضایی درباره عملیات “داعش” در ایران را تکذیب کرد، 10 مهر 1395<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/FZJLK<br />
- 134 مشرق، ذوالفقاری: صحبتهای بنده در مقابل سخنان رضایی نبود، 10 مهر1395 HTTPS://GOO.GL/YDTOFS<br />
- 135 خبر أونالين، کشف 2 تن مواد منفجره در گرمسار، 25 ابان 1395HTTP://CUTT.US/CTRP<br />
- 136 النبأ، مزدوجو الجنسية والتغيير الناعم في إيران، 29 أكتوبر HTTPS://GOO.GL/UQW2YD 2016<br />
- 137 راديو آزادي، سیامک نمازی وپدرش هر یک به ده سال حبس محکوم شدند، 18 أكتوبر 2016HTTP://CUTT.US/0LXMR<br />
- 138 وطن امروز،بیش از 10 مدیردوتابعیتی منافع کشور را به خطر انداختهاند، 27 ابان HTTP://CUTT.US/1XS9H 1395<br />
- 139 رجا نيوز، جزئیات جدیدی از حکم محکومیت ۶ جاسوس آمریکا در ایران، 28 مهر HTTPS://GOO.GL/8OY02Z 1395<br />
- 140 النبأ، مزدوجو الجنسية والتغيير الناعم في إيران، 29 أكتوبر HTTPS://GOO.GL/UQW2YD 2016<br />
- 141 مهر، آتش سوزی پتروشیمی بندرامام خمینی مهار شد، 16 مرداد HTTPS://GOO.GL/3ZORYA 1395<br />
- 142 تسنيم، آتش در انبار ضایعات پتروشیمی بندر امام خاموش شد، 26 مهر HTTPS://GOO.GL/6HWHFX 1395<br />
- 143 خبرگزاری مهر، احتمال فاجعه بزرگ نفتی در عسلویه/ دالیل وقوع سلسله حوادث، 12مرداد 1395<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/1BR4AN<br />
- 144 أبرار اقتصادي، دلیل آتش سوزی های متعدد در صنعت پتروشیمی، 13 مرداد 1395، ص4 HTTP://CUTT.US/RIE3X<br />
- 145 اطالعات، بررسی احتمال حمله سایبری در آتشسوزیهای اخیر، 21مرداد HTTPS://GOO.GL/3PTLMW 1395<br />
- 146 تسنيم، حمالت سایبری دلیل آتشسوزی پتروشیمیها نبوده است، 24 مرداد HTTPS://GOO.GL/USYL9Z 1395<br />
- 147 وكالة أنباء اسنا. إیران تحقق نموا فی صادرات السلع غیر النِّفْطية. 9 أكتوبر HTTPS://GOO.GL/P9RLL5 2016<br />
- 148 بضغوط من الواليات المتَّحِ دة األمريكية أُجّل تنفيذ الصفقة مرات عديدة. وتمتلك الواليات المتَّحِ دة حقّ تصنيع أجزاء من طائرات<br />
"إيرباص" األوروبية، وبناءً عليه ال تستطيع "إيرباص" بيع الطائرات إال بموافقة أمريكية.<br />
- 149 قدس، یارانه 30 میلیون ایرانی امسال قطع می شود، 3 شهريور 1395. HTTP://GOO.GL/ZMZS5V<br />
- 150 مركز المزماة للدراسات والبحوث. 2016. ملفات الفساد التي أثارت ضجة في إيران. HTTPS://GOO.GL/4WVBM2<br />
151 - <strong>THE</strong> WORLD BANK, OVERVIEW. 2016.HTTPS://GOO.GL/N240WA<br />
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- 152 توصلت "أوبك" إلى اتفاق تاريخي بنهاية نوفمبر 2016 يقضي بخفض اإلنتاج بما يعادل 1.2 مليون برميل شهريّ ًا، وستوقف إيران<br />
إنتاجها عند 3.8 مليون برميل يوميّ ًا وَفْق هذا االتفاق، وهو المعدَّل الذي اتُّفق عليه لمستوى إنتاج إيران ما قبل العقوبات الغربية عليها.<br />
153 - IMF.2016. IMF STAFF COMPLETES 2016 ARTICLE IV MISSION TO ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF<br />
IRAN. HTTPS://GOO.GL/8NQO3I<br />
154 - TRADING ECONOMICS. 2017. IRANIAN RIAL FORECAST 2016-2020.<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/L12FXV<br />
155 - RESEARCH, PLANNING AND BUDGETING DIVISION ECONOMIC RESEARCH UNIT. 2015. FOR-<br />
EIGN CURRENCY MARKET IN IRAN OVERVIEW & FORECAST. HTTPS://GOO.GL/68MEMK<br />
- 156 قدس، یارانه 30 میلیون ایرانی امسال قطع می شود، 3 شهريور 1395. HTTP://GOO.GL/ZMZS5V<br />
- 157 وكالة أنباء فارس، تأیید بیکاری ۷ میلیونی در صحن علنی مَجْ لِس/ پیشبینی بیکاری ۱۱ میلیون نفری تا سال 7 ۱۴۰۰، مهر<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/JMZYPA،1395<br />
- 158 همشهري أونالين، بانك مركزي: نرخ تورم به 8.8 درصد رسيد، 5 مهر 1395، HTTPS://GOO.GL/VWWJ6Q<br />
159 -مركز الخليج العربي للدراسات اإليرانية. 60% من رواتب عمال إيران تنفق على السكن. 15 ديسمبر 2016.<br />
100 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
ARAB AFFAIRS<br />
Axis One: The Future of GCC-Iranian<br />
Relations in a Troubled Region<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
W<br />
hile GCC-Iranian relations have diversified in the<br />
past few decades amid cold feelings and tension,<br />
particularly in late 2016, there were recently some alarming<br />
indicators concerning Iran’s future behavior towards the<br />
GCC in the post-nuclear deal stage with the P5+1 during<br />
2015 and the second half of 2016. Certain facts indicate<br />
an escalation in the pace of Iran’s interventionist nature<br />
towards some Gulf States, particularly Bahrain, Saudi<br />
Arabia, and its Gulf neighbors, Iraq and Yemen, as well as<br />
burgeoning disputes between the two sides regarding some<br />
controversial files, principally in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.<br />
In addition, the lack of any international deterrent increases<br />
the risk of ill-considered behavior by Iran that may occur in<br />
this security troubled and politically fragmented regional<br />
environment. There is also the risk of complex and growing<br />
crises, as well as increasing conflicts that involve regional<br />
and international sides, and non-state organizations like<br />
(ISIL) and other armed groups. This is notwithstanding what<br />
this region represents that is of crucial importance for the<br />
global economy due to its major role in the global oil market<br />
in terms of production, exportation, and oil reserves.<br />
Therefore, this article seeks to review the causes and<br />
motives of Iran’s interventionist behavior toward some of<br />
the Gulf States to illuminate the correlation between this<br />
approach and the nuclear deal. This article also attempts to<br />
observe the dimensions and features of relations between<br />
Iran and the GCC, including the trends during the second<br />
half of 2016, and to explore the future path of Gulf-Iranian<br />
relations and their outcomes.<br />
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101
First: Determinants of Gulf-Iranian Relations<br />
First of all, the determinants of relations between two or more international units,<br />
or between one international unit and a group of other international units provide a<br />
set of variables that can cause the external political behavior of any of these units and<br />
their influence on their mutual foreign relations, as well as determining the course of<br />
their prospective relations. Despite the different classifications of internal and external<br />
determinants and the degree of their impact on foreign policy behavior and international<br />
relations, they provide a distinctive character for foreign policy. The interaction and<br />
complexity of these variables lead to the formation of a specific pattern of external<br />
political behavior, and then the configuration of international relationships. In other<br />
words, the more an international unit maintains relative and non-relative capabilities<br />
along with a cognitive component, the more this unit will be able to carry out an effective<br />
and influential foreign policy toward other international units. Furthermore, if those<br />
other international units do not own the same relative capabilities, there will be an<br />
unbalanced relationship and a tug-of-war between cooperation and conflict, particularly<br />
if these units are involved in any of the complex crises and far-reaching conflicts in the<br />
region. 1<br />
According to the figures from and foreign policy analysis by foundations for<br />
international units, there are prominent determinants for Gulf-Iranian relations:<br />
1. The State Geo-Strategic Determinant<br />
The state geo-strategic determinant plays a pivotal role in defining and circumscribing<br />
its foreign policy and international relations through a natural interaction between<br />
its geographical components and political system, and in what impact it will have<br />
on its foreign policy toward other international units. 2 Geographical factors have<br />
major importance in determining their impact on the relations between two or more<br />
international units; a state’s geography has a significant impact on the nature of the<br />
external behavior of that state, which reacts according to other states’ external behavior<br />
to compose the phenomenon of relations between these countries. 3 The diversity,<br />
location, and extent of a state’s natural resources may have a more serious effect on<br />
its decision-makers, also providing them with a number of alternatives and options. In<br />
this regard, Napoleon Bonaparte said, “The leader cannot afford a foreign policy except<br />
what is dictated by the country’s geography.” Therefore, geographic location affects state<br />
policy; it determines the movement of its essential framework and the nature of threats<br />
that it may encounter. 4<br />
The Gulf region consists of eight states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the<br />
UAE, Oman, Iraq, and Iran) located in a unique geographical area. This region is of great<br />
importance. It also comprises several islands of military and economic importance, and<br />
whoever controls them can control the sea-lanes toward the Indian Ocean and into<br />
the Gulf, as well as Strait of Hormuz, the only exit for Gulf oil exports to the rest of the<br />
world. The Strait of Hormuz also connects the Arabian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and<br />
the Arabian Sea; the US Department of Energy estimates that this strait yields 16.5 to 17<br />
million barrels of oil per day or about 20% of the global oil demand and about 40% of the<br />
nautical oil transported for global trade. The Arabian Gulf also extends to Southwest Asia,<br />
102 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
and to the closest point, the Indian Ocean comes to Central Europe and Asian Russia.<br />
Therefore, the Arabian Gulf is considered the core of the Middle East. The Arabian Gulf<br />
connects directly with the Euphrates River, along which Syria and the Mediterranean<br />
Sea can be reached. Turkey and the Black Sea can be accessed via the Tigris River, as well<br />
as Iran and the Qazvin Sea, and from there to Russia through natural causeways, or to<br />
Afghanistan. 5<br />
Given Iran’s geographical location in the Gulf region, we can see that Iran has a strategic<br />
advantage through its domination of vital sea-lanes, an ancient theory that political<br />
scientists called the “Core of the World”. If this location lends great importance to the<br />
whole region, it has granted Iran a distinctive and strategically important position, as<br />
a bridge connecting the Arabian Peninsula, China, India, and Southeast Asia. In other<br />
words, Iran is regarded as the key to the Middle East. Iran has always been considered<br />
part of a global tug-of-war due to its geo-strategic location and regional influences. The<br />
main objective of the Iranian ruling elite is to maintain Iran’s status of excellence in the<br />
context of changing the balance of power.<br />
On the other hand, “The Fifth Development Plan of Iran” in 2003 within the framework<br />
of the “20th Horizon” Charter identified the peculiarities of Iran’s foreign policy in<br />
general, and toward the Gulf region in particular, by selecting the first vital area of<br />
Iranian politics to transform Iran by 2025 to “The first center regionally within a group<br />
of geographically nearby countries of sectarian and dogmatic elements as the Arab Gulf<br />
Countries, Iraq and Yemen,” countries that are entered in the Iranian dictionary as “The<br />
Shiite Full Moon.” 6 Also, the recent statement by Khamenei’s advisor on international<br />
affairs, Ali Akbar Velayati, that “The southern coast of Iran, the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz,<br />
and Ajman, are the most important strategic borders to form the Shiite full moon,” is<br />
transparent evidence. These countries are first in the field of Shiite geopolitics for several<br />
reasons:<br />
A. The geographical proximity of these countries.<br />
B. The sectarian compositions of these countries include Shiites, which traditionally,<br />
in religious terms, or politically, pledge allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader, and it is<br />
estimated that they make up 55-60% of the population in Iraq, 20% in Syria, 30% in<br />
Yemen, 25-35% in Lebanon, and 55-60% in Bahrain. 7<br />
2. The Oil-ECHO Determinant<br />
Iran is an important trading partner for some Gulf States, predominantly for the United<br />
Arab Emirates; for example, Iranian statistics indicate that there are about eight thousand<br />
Iranian companies engaged in commercial activities in the UAE, and at the level of<br />
bilateral trade relations in 2011 the UAE’s exports made up about 31% of the total Iranian<br />
imports. Iran has become the third largest export market for the UAE, receiving nearly<br />
11% of its total exports. 8<br />
The latest estimations indicate that the total oil production by the GCC amounts to<br />
16.23 million barrels per day, while the oil reserves amount to 496.6 billion barrels.<br />
Natural gas production is 303.5 billion cubic meters annually and there are natural gas<br />
reserves consisting of 41.838 billion cubic meters. Iran’s oil production is almost 4.2<br />
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103
million barrels per day, with reserves amounting to 137 billion barrels; its natural gas<br />
production is about 146 billion cubic meters annually, and its natural gas reserves amount<br />
to 29 thousand billion cubic meters. 9<br />
In other words, Gulf oil is still the main source for many Western countries’ economies,<br />
which is reflected in the national security strategies of all these countries, which insist<br />
on securing their sources of oil and its methods of transportation. This issue was the first<br />
part of American national security strategy, especially in the years after the US invasion<br />
of Iraq, followed by British national security strategy in 2003, which also included the<br />
need to protect energy sources. Finally, this energy security issue was integrated into<br />
the European Union’s foreign policy in 2006. Furthermore, NATO’s decision to establish<br />
a center specialized in energy security during the Chicago summit in 2012 reveals the<br />
western countries utmost attention toward this case. This means that since the United<br />
States assumed responsibility for protecting and preserving Western interests in the Gulf<br />
region, the main objective of the US was to ensure the flow of oil from the Gulf region<br />
to the United States and Western countries in general, without any constraints and at a<br />
reasonable price. This required implementing security policies that would maintain the<br />
security of the oil-producing countries, whereby Western countries, and especially the<br />
US, would generally pay more attention to the Gulf region; this is inconsistent with Iranian<br />
policy, which opposes any Western presence in the region, considering that the security<br />
of the Gulf is the responsibility of its eight bordering countries. 10<br />
Despite many estimations and views which indicate the United States may be capable of<br />
obtaining energy self-sufficiency in the years to come, the most important expectations<br />
were of the US Energy Information Administration in mid-January 2013, which revealed<br />
an increase in crude oil production in the United States during 2013 and 2014 amounting<br />
to 1.61 million barrels per day from shale oil production. If this anticipated increase is<br />
added to the increase in US crude oil production of 2.48 million barrels a day since 2008,<br />
then the total increase will total approximately 4.09 million barrels per day. However, this<br />
does not mean that the West will be using mostly Arabian Gulf oil, at least not in the near<br />
future. 11<br />
3. Sectarian Links and Population Increases<br />
These connections are represented by the relationship between Iran and the Shiite<br />
sect in the Gulf States, as Iran is deemed to be the largest Shiite state in the world. Their<br />
geographical proximity also makes transportation and communication between Iran and<br />
the Gulf States more possible. The two regions also have demographic and social links,<br />
whereby many Gulf families are of Iranian origins, such as in Bahrain, Kuwait, and the<br />
UAE. 12<br />
4. The US Invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its Impact on the Regional Balance of Power<br />
The issue of imbalance in the balance of power is one of the Gulf region’s main<br />
dilemmas; this imbalance has three levels:<br />
First: The imbalance between the Gulf region and the world as a whole; with vital<br />
global interests lying in this region, it will remain one of the most important areas of<br />
international competition, especially in light of the delicate security situation that the<br />
104 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
Gulf States suffer from, a matter that makes the Gulf region a place of polarization, where<br />
regional players seek to dominate and other international players to intervene.<br />
According to the structure of regional interactions, three interactive roles can be<br />
distinguished by three powers:<br />
A. Pressing Power: The United States, NATO, the European Union, and Russia.<br />
B. Anti-Power: (Iraq in the past and Iran currently).<br />
C. Balancing Power: The Gulf States.<br />
If the role of each Constraining and Anti-Power is not clear, the role of the Balancing<br />
Power is beginning to make progress, although it has been absent during most of these<br />
interactions. This chaotic situation has increased after the changes and events in the Arab<br />
world since 2011, including a decline in the role of the most important and influential<br />
states such as Egypt. 13<br />
Second: The imbalance between the six Gulf States and Iran on human and military<br />
levels. The military forces of all the GCC States number approximately 363,600 active<br />
troops, compared to 532,000 troops in Iran. This disparity in military capabilities between<br />
the Gulf and Iran is a result of variations in population; estimates indicate that the GCC<br />
population does not exceed 50 million, while the population of Iran stands at 75.2 million<br />
people, according to the Statistics Committee website in Iran.<br />
Third: The imbalance between the GCC countries themselves, where Saudi Arabia is the<br />
largest country, two are medium-sized countries, the Sultanate of Oman and the UAE, and<br />
three are small countries, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait.<br />
This state of imbalance is reflected in the policies of the Gulf region’s players. The<br />
tremendous oil wealth of the Gulf States and their inability to defend themselves<br />
militarily means they continued to rely on Western international powers to protect<br />
them through bilateral security agreements after the war of the liberation of Kuwait in<br />
1991. Furthermore, four Gulf countries (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE) signed the<br />
strategic Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with NATO in 2004, which entails the cooperation<br />
between these countries on many security issues, thus granting them the option to<br />
defend themselves through mobilization, regional alliances, military neutrality, and<br />
international alliances. 14<br />
The Gulf States’ position contradicts the Iranian vision in terms of Gulf security; Iran<br />
believes that the Arabian Gulf is a closed lake, and bears the responsibility for the regional<br />
security of the states bordering it. Therefore, any foreign presence - according to Iran’s<br />
vision - is a straightforward threat to the security of the Gulf; in other words, the presence<br />
of any other state in the eight states bordering the Gulf, which are (the GCC, Iraq, and<br />
Iran). For example, Iran refused to recognize the content of Damascus Declaration as an<br />
Arab formula for the security of the Arabian Gulf in 1991. 15 Before 2003 the third player,<br />
Iraq, was a major threat to the Gulf States as a whole and to Kuwait in particular since<br />
the Iraqi invasion in 1990, but Iraq’s removal from the regional stability equation after<br />
the US invasion in 2003 led to a change in the Gulf’s regional balance of power. With<br />
the disbanding of the Iraqi army, the decline in the economic performance of the state,<br />
and the enduring absence of security, Iraq has become an area of polarization between<br />
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105
the regional powers. Moreover, one of the main results of the US invasion was that this<br />
buffer country (Iraq) turned into an arena that attracted the interests of regional players<br />
who wanted conflict, which had repercussions not only for Iraq, but for the neighboring<br />
countries in general, and particularly the Gulf States. 16<br />
Second: Gulf-Iranian relations, heading where?<br />
The political analysis that attempted to ascertain the direction of Gulf-Iranian relations<br />
over a period of six months (June to December 2016) and their projected scenarios<br />
required looking into the progress of GCC-Iranian relations since the Iranian Revolution<br />
in 1979. This was with regard to the strategic bi-annual report period, during which the<br />
region witnessed:<br />
A. A notable intensification of conflict and friction between the region’s countries.<br />
B. New Russian-Iranian-Turkish alliances and the convergence of bilateral interests,<br />
despite the historical differences.<br />
C. Regional and international campaigns to confront ISIL and liberate the occupied<br />
towns in Iraq and Syria.<br />
D. The Russian-Iranian seizing of Aleppo by the excessive application of heightened<br />
military force via land and air missile strikes to resolve and contain the crisis and<br />
shifting the internal balance of power in favor of their strategic ally [Bashar al-Assad].<br />
Furthermore, to accomplish tangible gains on the ground, and to force the opposition<br />
to accept this fait accompli before the new US president Donald Trump took power in<br />
January 2017, thus signaling a new era for the Oval Office.<br />
Accordingly, the Gulf-Iranian relations will be divided into three main phases, the most<br />
recent period being broadly studied in the third phase.<br />
First Phase: Before the Iranian Revolution of 1979<br />
This period witnessed both calm and tension between the Gulf States and Iran.<br />
The strained relations were, in fact, a consequence of Iranian efforts to gain regional<br />
sovereignty over the Gulf region. The evidence for this is as follows:<br />
A. Iran’s occupation of Mohammerah, the capital of the Arab region of Ahwaz in 1925.<br />
B. Iranian interference in Bahrain, the consequent intervention of the United Nations,<br />
and the 1970 referendum in Bahrain, the results of which showed the people’s desire for<br />
Bahrain’s independence and its own Arab identity. In the aftermath, Iran responded by<br />
occupying three UAE islands: Minor Tunb, Greater Tunb, and Abu Musa in February 1971<br />
according to an agreement with the British administration. Despite all efforts to restore<br />
these UAE islands peacefully, any attempts up to the present day have not produced a<br />
positive result.<br />
C. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi attempted to put in place a defense pact with the Gulf<br />
countries in the region, but the idea did not succeed. 17<br />
The calm that persisted between the two sides during that period was because these<br />
events took place during the Cold War era (1946-1991). The conservative regimes on both<br />
sides of the Gulf marked radical Arab nationalism and Communism as a serious threat.<br />
The Gulf and Iran players sought to ensure the security of the Gulf to secure energy, the<br />
106 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
primary source of their economies. Also, the Shah tried to enter Western alliances, as<br />
well as relations with Israel and Turkey, to address the Nazarene expansion that was<br />
taking place at that time. Saudi-Iranian coordination was a conspicuous feature of these<br />
Gulf-Iranian relations, where the relationships were associated with the so-called ‘Parallel<br />
Pillars Policy,’ in other words, the Western countries’ reliance on Iran and Saudi Arabia to<br />
maintain their interests in the region. 18<br />
Second Phase: During and After the Iranian Revolution, 1979<br />
This period witnessed increased tension between the Gulf States and Iran because<br />
of the Iranian leaders’ adoption of policies and slogans that posed a threat to the<br />
security and stability of the Arabian Gulf States after the 1979 revolution. Slogans such<br />
as “Exporting the Revolution” were intended to spread Shiism outside Iran’s borders,<br />
particularly to the neighboring countries and region, hence starting uprisings similar to<br />
the Iranian Revolution, as well as fighting the US-connected Muslim rulers who rejected<br />
the Revolution. The former Iranian leader Khomeini declared in a speech on Feb. 11th<br />
1980 that he was going to export the Revolution to neighboring countries and the whole<br />
region, according to Article 154 of the Constitution of the Revolution, which stipulates,<br />
“Iran should work to establish the government of truth across the globe and protect the<br />
legitimate struggle of the oppressed people anywhere.” 19<br />
The Gulf States later realized during this period that the revolutionary doctrine of the<br />
Iranian regime posed a threat to their actual existence in addition to its [Iran’s] desire<br />
to export the Revolution as a mandatory duty. Moreover, using religious discourse as a<br />
vital tool, because they [Gulf States] contain an important Shiite component that may<br />
respond, in addition to the geographical proximity to the Iranian environment, also for<br />
geopolitical and strategic reasons.<br />
The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) increased the Gulf States’ fears and<br />
anxiety; Iraq was also very cautious of this new Iranian movement, due to the Iraqi Shiite<br />
population and Iran’s previous insistence on occupying Iraqi territories, which the Algiers<br />
Accord ordered to be returned to Iraq in 1975. Despite the fact that Saudi Arabia and the<br />
GCC countries distanced themselves during the early stages of the war in order to oppose<br />
it, they exposed some of Iran’s violations, and some of their oil tankers were vulnerable<br />
and unprotected in the face of Iranian military attacks. Then came the so-called “Theory<br />
of Umm Al-Qura” declaration as an immediate reaction to the failure of the “Exporting<br />
the Revolution” principle, which proposed turning the city of Qom into the religiously<br />
venerated and spiritual capital of the Islamic world instead of Makkah. These variables<br />
were key catalysts for the emergence of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981. Another<br />
catalyst was the assassination attempt on the Emir of Kuwait by Shiites in the mideighties,<br />
one of “Exporting the Revolution” policies. 20<br />
Tehran later favored adopting a sort of political moderation during the reign of Hashemi<br />
Rafsanjani from July 28th, 1989 until one year prior to the end of Mohammad Khatami’s<br />
reign in 2003, which coincided with the US invasion of Iraq in April of that year. This<br />
political moderation was represented by improving and promoting relations with the six<br />
Gulf States, and by visits from the foreign ministers of Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, and Saudi<br />
Arabia in 1991, followed by the mutual visits by the late King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz<br />
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107
– Crown Prince at that time – to Tehran, and the Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani<br />
to Riyadh, respectively. 21 What counted as a great leap forward in the progress of Gulf-<br />
Iranian relations was Rafsanjani’s desire to stop “Exporting the Revolution” and to adopt<br />
a policy non-interference in Iran’s internal affairs of State, as well as to strengthen the<br />
ties of cooperation with neighboring countries. Also part of this “Policy of Neutrality”<br />
approach was the rejection of Iran’s support for Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in 1991; many<br />
of the GCC-Iranian meetings were confirmations of this approach. In these circumstances,<br />
Rafsanjani stated, “We feel that there is no reason to trigger any kind of dispute with the<br />
countries in the southern arena of the Gulf,” although following Rafsanjani’s statement<br />
in June 1994 Iran announced it would not abandon the islands and refused international<br />
arbitration. Iran’s actions to expand control over those islands were an obstacle to the<br />
overall normalization of Gulf-Iranian relations during that era. 22<br />
During Khatami’s presidency, in 1997 relations between Iran and the Gulf States<br />
witnessed an unprecedented improvement, and there appeared to be a shared<br />
conviction to continue these relations. Moreover, it was an important time in terms of<br />
the cessation of the Gulf States’ complaints about Iranian interference in their internal<br />
affairs, particularly with regard to Tehran’s retreat from “Exporting the Revolution” and its<br />
adoption of policies of moderation and openness, as the tone of dialogue between these<br />
civilizations improved. Also contributing to these enhanced relations between the two<br />
sides were mutual visits at the highest levels, including a call from Iran’s Defense Minister<br />
of the time, in order to develop a joint security strategy to achieve strong and sustained<br />
security in the region, also emphasizing that the ending of the US military presence in<br />
the Gulf Region would reduce tensions. Furthermore, Iran would not object to signing a<br />
security defense treaty with the Gulf countries. 23<br />
Third Phase: After the Fall of Saddam Hussein’s Regime in 2003<br />
Tensions reappeared in Gulf relations after the Conservatives gained power in 2004,<br />
when the former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the elections, with his<br />
conservative movement controlling the Iranian Parliament and starting to implement<br />
expansionist policies in an unprecedented fashion. In addition, there was a revival of<br />
Shiite geopolitics, which promoted intervention in order to serve Iranian interests in three<br />
critical areas. The first included Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Gulf States because<br />
of their geographical proximity and the acquisition of Shiite communities there. It also<br />
included a return of the “Exporting the Revolution” principle.<br />
This new and unprecedented increase in tensions in Gulf-Iranian relations involved<br />
several new regional, international, and sequential variables.<br />
The First Variable: The removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 from<br />
the regional arena.<br />
The former Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein’s regime, was an obstacle to Iran’s<br />
ambitions in the region as a whole; he started a war that lasted eight years with Iran,<br />
which damaged its defenses and military capabilities, and weakened it on an economic<br />
level, and which paved the way for Iran to take an expansionist initiative that intervened<br />
in Iraqi affairs as soon as Saddam’s regime was gone in 2003. Iran aimed to become the<br />
108 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
primary player in Iraqi internal affairs; this opportunity could not be bypassed in terms<br />
of its projects and plans, and maybe more than the direct occupier [the U.S.A.] itself,<br />
exploiting the US preoccupation of being a “direct occupation power,” as in Iraq, when<br />
the Gulf States was concerned about the Iranian expanded influence in it [Iraq] after the<br />
US invasion 2003. Iran took full advantage of the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and of<br />
the spreading chaos in Iraq; as such Iranian expansionism posed a security dilemma for<br />
the Gulf States because of its role in perpetuating the security problem in Iraq through<br />
its support for certain armed militias both financially and military. One issue that worries<br />
the Gulf States with regard to Iran’s plans is its aim to promote sectarianism in the region,<br />
which would destabilize the security of these countries. 24<br />
The Second Variable: The outbreak of the so-called “Arab Spring” in early 2011.<br />
The “Arab Spring,” which erupted in five Arab countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen,<br />
and Syria) contributed to producing a successful time for Iran regarding many Arab<br />
countries’ internal affairs and their fear of revolutions alike. Furthermore, there was<br />
concern among regional and international players about this revolutionary movement<br />
and its impact on their interests in the region. Consequently, Iran stepped into this chaos<br />
in support of these revolutions, particularly in Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen, considering<br />
them an “Islamic awakening” inspired by the political mobility of the Iranian Revolution in<br />
1979. However, when these revolutions reached its traditional Syrian ally, Iran intervened<br />
to halt the fall of Bashar Assad’s regime. 25 Syria is of major importance for Iran, as it serves<br />
Iran’s overall strategy in the region by acting as a vital link between Tehran and Hezbollah.<br />
Syria also provides Tehran with secure corridors to send armaments to Hezbollah in<br />
Lebanon in order to redress – according to Iranian strategy – the Arab regional strategy,<br />
which aims to reduce the increased geopolitical power of Iran. 26<br />
Third Variable: The signing of the nuclear deal with P5 +1 in 2015.<br />
If the first variable demolished the obstacles facing Iran and its plans, and the second<br />
one granted an opportunity to intervene in troubled countries with a Shiite population,<br />
the third variable provided an economic boost for Iran as a result of the lifting of economic<br />
sanctions, which had put a significant restriction for a long time on the implementation of<br />
its expansionist strategy. Also, the US recognition – and international also – of the Iranian<br />
regime’s legitimacy came with a pledge not to assist any Iranian opposition, and with<br />
the acceptance of Tehran as a prominent regional power in the Middle East; all of this<br />
comprised a serious response from the United States and the international community<br />
to Iran’s positions and demands. Therefore, these three variables provided Iran with<br />
the crucial opportunity, the finances, and the international recognition to expand and<br />
intervene in the region’s countries’ affairs in a manner that stoked peace and security in<br />
the region and increased tensions with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 27<br />
The Iranian regime’s interference extended to the internal affairs of the GCC countries<br />
throughout both of Ahmadinejad’s terms in office, particularly the second one. He stated<br />
during the first era that “the Islamic Republic is the flag bearer of Islam and [its] global<br />
missionary,” adding, “An Islamic Revolution happened through the martyrs’ blood in<br />
Iran, and the wave of Islamic revolution will soon include the entire world,” which raised<br />
concern in the (GCC) countries again.<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
109
What underlay the high levels of tension during Nejad’s terms in office?<br />
• Strengthening Iran’s nuclear capabilities to increase the uranium enrichment levels at<br />
the Natanz facility and heavy water production at the Arak facility.<br />
• Supporting Bahraini Shiites, including the Shiite ‘Wefaq Society’ to incite riots in the<br />
Kingdom in 2011.<br />
• Providing total support for and assistance to the Shiites in the Qatif Region of Saudi<br />
Arabia to incite riots there in late 2011.<br />
• The provocative visit by Ahmadinejad in 2012 to the UAE’s ‘Abu Musa Island,’ which<br />
warped the facts and asserted Iran’s sovereignty.<br />
• Establishing Iranian spy cells in most Gulf countries (a number of these espionage<br />
networks were dismantled, in Bahrain in 2010, in Qatar in 2011, in Kuwait in 2010 and<br />
2012, in the United Arab Emirates in 2013, and in Saudi Arabia in 2013).<br />
• Unprecedented Iranian incursions into neighboring Gulf countries (Iraq and Yemen),<br />
as well as into Syria and Lebanon, financially, militarily, and through other means, which<br />
threatened the security and stability of the Gulf Region.28<br />
When the reformist President Hassan Rouhani took the helm in June 2013, this<br />
increased the hope in the countries of the region in general and the Gulf in particular that<br />
they would be able to establish stable relations with Iran according to the principle of<br />
good neighborliness. Shortly after Rouhani’s victory, however, he remarked, “To improve<br />
relations with neighboring countries at all levels is a key priority, including the Kingdom<br />
of Saudi Arabia. It is possible to convert rivalry between the two countries to a mutual<br />
respect. The neighboring countries and the Arab countries are our fraternal allies, and<br />
Saudi Arabia is a fraternal ally and neighboring country that has historical, cultural and<br />
geographical ties with Iran.” Those remarks do not reflect a fundamental shift in relations<br />
toward key conflict issues between the GCC countries and Iran, such as:<br />
A. Achieving transparency and positive intentions toward the Iranian nuclear program<br />
by ensuring that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), rather than the Iranian<br />
regime, is the only official entity entrusted to confirm that this program is peaceful.<br />
B. The issue of the three UAE Islands.<br />
C. The Gulf-Iranian stance on Arabian Gulf security.<br />
D. The problem of the Iranian nuclear program.<br />
E. The Iranian regime’s threats to impede navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.<br />
F. Iranian interference in the GCC countries’ internal affairs.<br />
G. Iranian interference in the neighboring Gulf countries. 29<br />
Although Saudi Arabia plays a critical role in promoting regional and global security<br />
alike, Gulf-Iranian relations cannot be reduced solely because of Iran’s relations with<br />
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as five other countries are also having problems with Iran.<br />
These include Iranian interference in Bahrain’s affairs, as well as the UAE, where the three<br />
islands (Minor Tunb, Greater Tunb, and Abu Musa) remain under Iran’s rule, with the<br />
regime still refusing to resolve this issue through international arbitration. 30<br />
110 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
Rouhani’s remarks on Iranian interference in the (GCC) countries’ affairs did not express<br />
any new sentiments; perhaps the clearest iteration of Iran’s overall foreign policy stance<br />
towards its neighboring countries, particularly during Rouhani’s presidency, was offered<br />
by the Iranian ambassador to Iraq Hassan Danaii, who said, “Iranian foreign policy<br />
is [already] drawn and is principled, and cannot be changed. In other words, Iranian<br />
policy towards the neighboring countries, including the GCC countries will not contain a<br />
significant change.” 31 This stance has become apparent through Iran’s persistence with<br />
its interventionist policies toward the internal affairs of the Gulf Cooperation Council<br />
countries. It can also be added that:<br />
• The continuity and complexity of the Gulf-Iranian conflict.<br />
• Intensifying Iranian incursions into the neighboring Gulf countries, to the extent of de<br />
facto occupation.<br />
• The destruction of Saudi diplomatic premises in Tehran and Mashhad in 2016, which<br />
led Saudi Arabia to sever ties with Iran.<br />
The strained relations between the two sides have endured since the beginning<br />
of Rouhani’s presidency, but the provocative nature of the Iranian regime’s political<br />
discourse and behavior has taken a qualitative turn for the worse in conjunction with<br />
the negotiations launched by the West over Tehran’s nuclear program, which resulted in<br />
the signing of an agreement between the two sides in early July 2015. The nature of the<br />
political discourse emanating from senior Iranian political and military officials toward<br />
the Gulf States in recent months appears to show a notable shift in the Tehran decisionmakers’<br />
perceptions of the role that could or should be played by Iran in the region.<br />
Observers of this situation cannot explain this approach, and Iranian interventional<br />
behavior toward some of the (GCC) countries, without linking this as a dependent<br />
variable to the entrance of the six world powers into the nuclear program negotiations<br />
with Iran, greatly boosted Tehran’s confidence on the basis of its greater power. 32<br />
Iranian regime officials have made a number of notable statements in this regard, the<br />
foremost of which was an announcement by former Revolutionary Guards commander<br />
and military advisor to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei that “Our western borders do<br />
not end at Shalmaja on the western Al-Ahwaz borders with Iraq, but [extend] to southern<br />
Lebanon, and this is the third time that our influence has reached the Mediterranean<br />
coast.” 33 Some political analysts in the Gulf Region have warned that the Arab countries,<br />
and particularly the GCC countries, would pay the price of a nuclear deal between Iran<br />
and the six world powers. While it is not unusual for Iranian regime officials to periodically<br />
issue such bombastic statements, it is striking that Tehran has recently escalated its<br />
hostile rhetoric toward some Gulf countries after maintaining balanced relationships with<br />
them for decades, moving from verbal grandstanding to interventionist actions. The most<br />
prominent example of this is the official Iranian authorities’ tendency to take unilateral<br />
action, by allowing domestic oil companies to expand their exploratory activities in the<br />
‘Dura’ oil field shared by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. This led to threats of renewing<br />
earlier disputes over this field and to the possibility of a political and diplomatic crisis<br />
between Iran and Kuwait, which was only averted by Kuwait’s spirit of responsibility and<br />
concern for their good-neighborly relations. 34<br />
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111
The last few years have seen many indicators of Iranian interference in the internal<br />
affairs of some Arab Gulf States, reflecting the discrepancy between the Iranian<br />
regime’s declared policy narrative and its actions on the ground. In this context, Bahraini<br />
Foreign Minister Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa stated that his country had seized<br />
quantities of explosives smuggled in naval boats coming from Iran in July 2015, which<br />
were “sufficient to remove Manama from existence.” 35 In addition, the Kuwaiti judiciary<br />
indicted 24 people, in what became known in local media as the “Abdali Terrorist Cell,”<br />
for “communicating with the Republic of Iran and Hezbollah which worked to carry out<br />
hostile acts against Kuwait by bringing and making explosives and machine guns, and<br />
listening devices without a license and with intent to commit crimes.” 36<br />
Third: GCC-Iranian relations during the second half of 2016<br />
From the beginning of June 2016 until the end of December in the same year, Gulf-<br />
Iranian tensions reached a peak in statements and political behavior concerning a<br />
number of contentious issues, including the occupation of the UAE islands in 1971, the<br />
destruction of Saudi diplomatic premises in Tehran and Mashhad in 2016, and regional<br />
protests against the death penalty issued by Saudi Arabia against Shi’ite cleric Nimr al-<br />
Nimr. As a result of these tensions, the Saudi authorities severed diplomatic ties with Iran,<br />
since which relations between the two countries have been strained at best.<br />
The biannual report period witnessed a new surge concerning some issues:<br />
1. Ongoing Saudi Arabia-Iran conflicts<br />
Since the severing of diplomatic relations between the two nations, which clearly affects<br />
the region’s security and stability, this conflict has continued to rage for several reasons:<br />
A. The Iranian regime’s ambitions and its desire to implement its plans at the expense of<br />
Saudi Arabia’s security and stability.<br />
B. Iranian attempts to lead the Islamic world through its expansionist Shiite project.<br />
C. Saudi Arabia’s ability to thwart the Iranian regime’s ambitions and plans, to detect and<br />
expose them in front of the regional and international community.<br />
D. Mutual accusations of interference in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon, with Iran,<br />
accusing Saudi Arabia of supporting the Sunni population, while Saudi Arabia accuses Iran<br />
of supporting the Shiite population.<br />
• A number of issues have exacerbated the level of conflict between the two countries:<br />
A. Saudi Arabia using the Iranian opposition card: The Iranian regime expressed<br />
resentment at the participation of Prince Turki Al-Faisal, the chairperson of the King Faisal<br />
Center for Research and Islamic Studies, in the Conference of the Iranian opposition<br />
in Paris in July 2016. The senior Saudi official’s participation in this event also showed<br />
that Saudi Arabia has cards which can be utilized in its increasing struggle with Iran, and<br />
was intended as a message to Tehran that “Riyadh can do the same as you do,” which<br />
reportedly made Iran rethink its policies and reopen files such as the investigation into the<br />
attacks on Saudi diplomatic premises. 37<br />
B. Saudi-Iranian differences toward regional crises: Conflicts were taking place in Syria,<br />
Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon prior to the election of President Michel Aoun in Lebanon in<br />
late October 2016. While Iran accused the Saudi authorities of being responsible for the<br />
112 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
opposition in Syria, and for the Sunnis in Yemen and Iraq, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia<br />
in return accused Iran of backing Shiite operations against Sunnis in these four countries<br />
with money, weapons, and fighters in order to implement its expansionist plans in these<br />
nations and to launch the construction of its supposed empire. 38<br />
C. Saudi-Iranian differences over the Hajj pilgrimage: Saudi Arabia and Iran disagreed<br />
on the proper ways to ensure the security and safety of pilgrims carrying out the Hajj<br />
pilgrimage to Makkah during the negotiations hosted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,<br />
with more than 70 countries around the world signing memorandums of understanding<br />
in order to ensure the security and safety of pilgrims. Tensions between Iran and Saudi<br />
Arabia prevented the Iranian Delegation of Hajj Affairs from signing the MoU for Iranian<br />
pilgrims.<br />
• The main differences concerning the Hajj pilgrimage were as follows:<br />
1. The issue of transferring Iranian pilgrims to Saudi Arabia after the suspension of direct<br />
flights between the two countries, which numbered nearly 150 flights a month, with the<br />
Iranian delegation demanding that the paragraph in the MoU concerning civil aviation be<br />
reworded so that the transport of pilgrims could be divided between Iranian and Saudi<br />
airlines, a measure contrary to international regulations. 39<br />
2. After the Iranian regime insisted on issuing visas for its pilgrims from inside Iran and<br />
in light of the severed diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia suggested as a<br />
compromise measure that the visas could be issued through a third country, a suggestion<br />
strongly rejected by Iran, which considered this an affront to its regional and international<br />
prestige, along with the suggestion that electronic tracking could be used to enable the<br />
Iranian Hajj Affairs department to print visas for pilgrims in Iran.<br />
3. The Iranian delegation insisted that clauses should be included in the MoU to allow<br />
Iranian pilgrims to establish gatherings for a ‘Camille’ prayer and a ‘Baraa’ ceremony, as<br />
well as a ‘visit prayer,’ although the Saudi authorities asserted that such gatherings would<br />
hinder the movement of other pilgrims from the Islamic world, as well as being designed<br />
to divert the Hajj from its primary purpose as a religious duty, and to be used as an effort<br />
to politicize the Hajj through the chanting of slogans such as “Death to America” and<br />
“Death to Israel.”<br />
These issues have not yet been resolved, with the Supreme Leader actively escalating<br />
the tensions over them through his message to the Saudi leadership on September 5th<br />
2016, which went far beyond acceptable standards of political discourse, with Khamenei<br />
stating, “Rulers of sedition who framed the Islamic world in internal wars and killed<br />
and wounded innocent people by establishing and equipping evil Takfirist groups to<br />
manipulate politicians and do not know God.” 40<br />
One day after this controversial outburst, the Mufti of Saudi Arabia Sheikh Abdul Aziz<br />
al-Sheikh responded by accusing Khamenei of opposing Islam and using his speeches to<br />
incite hostility with the Sunni community, saying, “Khamenei’s attack on Saudi Arabia<br />
and [violence towards the] Saudi procedures of Hajj season is not surprising for those,”<br />
adding, “We must understand that those are not Muslims; they are the sons of the Magi,<br />
and their hostility to Muslims is ancient, and specifically against Sunnis.” 41<br />
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113
While Iranian regime officials continue their offensive comments and the exchange<br />
of accusations between the two countries also continues, the indicators suggest<br />
that Saudi Arabia successfully organized and managed the 2016 Hajj, with the sacred<br />
annual pilgrimage ending without any problems. The Iranian regime remained<br />
uncharacteristically silent on this, with many Iranians having been prevented from<br />
attending the pilgrimage in 2016 not by the regime but by strict procedures implemented<br />
by Saudi Arabia, thwarting the Iranian regime’s plans to politicize and exploit the Hajj to<br />
spread chaos and sedition. This showed the success of Saudi Arabia’s firm rejection of<br />
Iran’s efforts to impose conditions that would have introduced politics and sectarianism<br />
into the pilgrimage by including ceremonies and rituals far beyond those which are part<br />
of the Hajj, part of the Iranian regime’s effort to disrupt the event and incite sectarian<br />
divisions under the false pretext of “internationalizing” the event, which already brings<br />
pilgrims from all around the world, but in reality cynically using the sacred pilgrimage as a<br />
tool in the regime’s efforts to export “Khomeini’s Revolution.” Other Iranian pilgrims who<br />
entered Saudi Arabia through a third country were welcomed like all other pilgrims, with<br />
only the Iranian regime’s efforts to mar the sacred event stymied.<br />
While Saudi Arabia’s success in foiling Tehran’s efforts to politicize the Hajj pilgrimage<br />
was widely welcomed by Muslims worldwide, the Iranian Supreme Leader’s rage at being<br />
thwarted in this objective was made clear by his unprecedented outburst against the<br />
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as seen above. 42<br />
• The Iranian stance behind the assassination attempt of Sabhan: Despite denials by<br />
the Iranian regime, Iran is a longstanding master in ordering the assassination of various<br />
nations’ ambassadors. Iraqi Shiite militias, including the ‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq,’ the ‘Majame’<br />
Akram al-Kaabi,’ and particularly the ‘al-Sadr Al’wal Brigade’ militia led by Murtaza<br />
Abboud al-Lami, attempted to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Iraq Samer Sabhan<br />
in August 2016. This was a lethal retaliation for a simple statement by Sabhan that Iraq<br />
should retain its own identity and unity, in accordance with the confirmed Arabian<br />
political vision for Iraq’s Arab identity. In response to this statement, the Secretary<br />
General of the ‘Abu Fadl Abbas’ Shiite militia called for the immediate assassination or<br />
expulsion of the Saudi Ambassador to Iraq, the clearest possible indication of Iranian<br />
involvement. Despite this, the Iraqi government remained silent toward these serious<br />
threats, in light of the Iranian regime’s stated wish at the beginning of 2015 that it did not<br />
want to see the resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, which<br />
were severed after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.<br />
This followed years of Iranian regime attacks on various countries’ diplomats and<br />
diplomatic premises, beginning with the attack on the American Embassy in Tehran in<br />
November 1979, and also including the assassination of Kuwaiti diplomat Najib al-Rifai<br />
in Madrid in 1982, as well as the attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran in August 1987.<br />
The US also confirmed the discovery of an Iranian plot to assassinate the then-Saudi<br />
Ambassador to the United States and current Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir in<br />
October 2011 as well as the attacks on the Saudi diplomatic headquarters in Tehran and<br />
Mashhad in 2011. 43<br />
114 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
2. The growing Iranian threats towards Bahrain<br />
Iranian interference in Bahrain has been continuous since Manama’s sovereign<br />
decision to withdraw citizenship from the Shiite cleric Issa Qassem in late June 2016<br />
over his call for and support of riots at the Pearl Roundabout in 2011. As well as plotting<br />
to overthrow the leadership in Bahrain, the Iranian regime has strongly rejected the<br />
decision announced by Bahrain, acting as though Tehran were a guardian for another<br />
independent state component, with Quds Force commander General Qassem Suleimani<br />
issuing statements which directly reject Bahraini sovereignty and which are considered to<br />
constitute direct interference in the internal affairs of a UN member state, when he said,<br />
“Issa Qassem is a red line; to [withdraw citizenship from] him means to set fire to Bahrain<br />
and the region, and mistreating him will be the beginning of a bloody uprising in Bahrain,<br />
and will lead to the fall of its regime.” 44<br />
These statements have no legal or diplomatic standing, but reflect the Iranian regime’s<br />
policy; they are not an expression of personal sentiment by General Suleimani, but a<br />
demonstration of the Iranian regime’s ambitions in the region. They offer compelling<br />
evidence of Iran’s direct intervention in the internal affairs of its neighbors and show<br />
clear support for Bahraini insurgents to mobilize against the Bahraini regime, proving<br />
definitively that Iran has been behind the periodic public disturbances, which have taken<br />
place in Bahrain since 2011.<br />
3. The escalation in UAE-Iranian differences<br />
A primary determinant of political relations between the UAE and Iran is the situation<br />
of the conflict over the three islands Greater Tunb, Minor Tunb, and Abu Musa, which<br />
were taken control of by Iran after the evacuation of British troops from the Gulf in<br />
1971. Another issue affecting the status of Iranian-UAE relations is the Iranian regime’s<br />
interventions in the affairs of the UAE’s Gulf neighbors and fellow GCC member states,<br />
which threaten the security of the Gulf, and which led the UAE to reduce the status of<br />
diplomatic relations with Iran to the level of chargé d’affaires rather than a full ambassador.<br />
As a result, bilateral relations have been strained. In this context, in June 2016 the UAE<br />
rejected the passage of an Iran-Oman gas pipeline across its territory, extending from the<br />
Iranian Hormozgan province to the port of Sahar in Oman. The 400-kilometer pipeline<br />
consists of two parts, with the initial 200-kilometer ground pipeline in Iran itself extending<br />
from Rodin to Mubarak Mount in Hormozgan province in southern Iran, whilst the<br />
subsequent 200-kilometer stretch connecting the Mount Mubarak pipeline to the Omani<br />
port of Sahar runs under the Gulf. The pipeline, estimated to cost $1.5 billion in total, will<br />
allow Iran to export around 28 million cubic meters of gas to Oman over a 15-year period.<br />
The UAE leadership is aware that the Iranian regime needs the UAE more than the UAE<br />
needs Iran, and that it would be easy for the UAE to find an alternative trade partner to<br />
replace Iran, which accounts for only 7.5 percent of the total volume of the UAE’s annual<br />
trade figures; Iran relies far more heavily on the UAE for the import of goods, although with<br />
goods shipped via the UAE accounting for 29 percent of its total imports, this means that<br />
Iran would have difficulty in finding an economically viable commercial alternative to the<br />
UAE, particularly given its geographic proximity, with the Emirates’ ports being the closest<br />
and cheapest for Iran. 45<br />
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115
Fourth: Conclusions of the biannual strategic report period<br />
After reviewing the history of Iranian-Gulf relations generally and relations between<br />
the two sides during the period of the biannual strategic report, in particular, there are<br />
several conclusions:<br />
A. Tehran’s interventionist behavior toward some of the Gulf States and countries such<br />
as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon indirectly affects and is affected by, Gulf security, meaning<br />
that everyone suffers from the impact. The entire region’s security is impacted by this.<br />
A number of indicators show that these events have seen a qualitative upward trend<br />
in terms of controversial issues affecting all the aforementioned aspects (the UAE<br />
Islands, Gulf security, and the Iranian regime’s intelligence activities in the Gulf, as well<br />
as its intervention in other states’ internal affairs, including the nuclear file), with the<br />
emergence of new conflicts during this period. These include the intervention crisis in<br />
Bahrain, the tensions over the Hajj pilgrimage and associated statements by the Iranian<br />
Supreme Leader, and increasingly hostile Saudi-Iranian and UAE-Iranian relations, all<br />
as a result of recent events in the region and Iran’s strengthening its regional presence.<br />
Variables affecting these relations include the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the ‘Arab<br />
Spring’ uprisings of 2011, followed by the nuclear deal between Tehran and the West in<br />
July 2015, during which Tehran revealed its hegemonic aspirations, based on the regional<br />
expansion of its greater power.<br />
B. In general terms, Iran’s interventionist policies saw no reduction during the Rouhani<br />
era, especially during the period covered by this strategic report; on the contrary,<br />
they increased significantly. Changing faces in Iran’s government has little impact; the<br />
president is not the primary decision-maker in the Islamic Republic. Iran has strived to<br />
attain its strategic objectives since the theocratic regime first came to power in 1979,<br />
whether a Conservative or Reformist president has been the titular head of government,<br />
and has always aimed to become the dominant regional power. In other words, periods of<br />
calm within the regime will always be followed by periods of tension, particularly towards<br />
the neighboring GCC nations. The regime has never changed the cornerstone of its policy<br />
and constitution, which is to play a dominant regional role rather than following any<br />
principles of good neighborliness or cooperating in regional security through respect for<br />
other regional nations’ sovereignty and independence; Iran does not intend to abandon<br />
its interventionist policies. The level of negative Iranian influence in the Gulf Region<br />
became notable in Rouhani’s era, as it did during the era of one of his predecessors,<br />
Mohammad Khatami, while Hezbollah was founded in Lebanon during the presidency of<br />
Rafsanjani. Iran’s system of governance is based mainly on loyalty to the Supreme Leader;<br />
one example of this is Abu al-Hasan al-Sadr, who was nominated and strongly supported<br />
the presidency of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who even said of al-Sadr, “This is my son.”<br />
When differences arose between Khomeini and this adoptive “son,” however, al-Sadr fled<br />
the country, seeking political asylum in France.<br />
C. The GCC countries have adopted a consistent policy toward Iran during the report<br />
period based on mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs, as well as<br />
repeatedly calling for the establishment of positive and cooperative relations. The<br />
GCC member states adopted this policy in an effort to contain Iran, to achieve regional<br />
116 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
stability, and to resolve any problems or crises threatening this stability. It was felt that<br />
this would enable both the Arab Gulf States and Iran to rationally overcome and negotiate<br />
their differences so as to move away from mutual hostility and toward a state of regional<br />
coexistence, convergence, and cooperation, and avert exclusion and marginalization in<br />
the regional security arrangements, particularly in light of the region’s crucial geopolitical <br />
importance and sensitivity of various related issues, not only for the regional countries<br />
but for the entire world.<br />
D. Many reasons underlie the increasing instability and escalation of tensions in GCC-<br />
Iranian relations, forcing the GCC member states to formulate possible options and<br />
alternative scenarios of how to deal with Tehran in the upcoming phase, particularly given<br />
the regime’s insistence on its unchanging policies towards the Gulf countries, which have<br />
triggered many crises in the region. The development of these problems and tensions<br />
in Gulf-Iranian relations indicates that Iran bears primary responsibility for this situation<br />
due to its constant persistence in adopting a hostile and demeaning stance toward<br />
fellow regional nations, and continuing with its interventionist policies and escalation of<br />
tensions with the Gulf States, despite the tireless efforts of the latter to express goodwill<br />
toward Tehran and to display their readiness to develop relations and resolve contentious<br />
issues through diplomacy and dialogue.<br />
E. Proof of the GCC countries’ goodwill is not required; the member states have shown<br />
complete flexibility towards Tehran on many issues, only to repeatedly encounter<br />
hostile Iranian policy in response, with Iran more interested in pursuing its project of<br />
regional hegemony in its efforts to dominate the resources of the region and threaten<br />
other regional countries. Bearing this in mind, achieving any improvement in Gulf-<br />
Iranian relations depends on Iran taking positive qualitative steps in its policy towards<br />
neighboring countries, especially the GCC member states, and requires concrete<br />
policies, beginning with putting an end to Iranian interference in the GCC member states’<br />
affairs generally and Bahrain’s in particular. Furthermore, Iran must reach a satisfactory<br />
settlement over the Occupied UAE Islands, taking into consideration the GCC’s insistence<br />
on the UAE’s absolute right of ownership over these territories. Tehran also needs to<br />
show a genuine intention to end the crisis over its nuclear program crisis, with 12 months<br />
already having passed since the interim agreement with the P5+1 countries.<br />
F. In order to resolve mutual differences with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)<br />
nations, the Iranian regime would have to implement changes in its policy towards them,<br />
with the current differences representing an insurmountable impediment to developing<br />
positive relations. The primary issues requiring changes in Iranian policy to resolve these<br />
problems are:<br />
1. The conflict over the three UAE Islands.<br />
2. Gulf-Iranian tensions over Arabian Gulf security.<br />
3. The Iranian nuclear program crisis.<br />
4. Iranian threats to obstruct navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.<br />
5. Iran’s interference in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries’ affairs, and Iranian<br />
intervention in the neighboring Gulf countries.<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
117
Fifth: The Future for Gulf-Iranian relations<br />
In light of the previous conclusions, as well as the rapidly changing regional and<br />
international developments, and taking into account the multiplicity and complexity<br />
of the files and issues of cooperation and conflict between the GCC countries and Iran,<br />
it is difficult to predict the direction of these relations accurately; however, it can be<br />
estimated through three possible scenarios for Gulf-Iranian relations in the foreseeable<br />
future:<br />
First Scenario: Breakthrough in relations<br />
This scenario is based on mutual dialogue between the Gulf nations and Iran through<br />
official periodical communication channels in terms of key issues of dispute already<br />
mentioned. The Gulf perspective sees this scenario as achievable, but the possibility<br />
of bringing about this scenario remains limited so long as there is little sign of a sincere<br />
desire on Iran’s part to give priority to the principles of good neighborliness and the<br />
attaining of mutual interests, or to abandoning expansionist and hegemonic aspirations<br />
and projects. At present, Iran’s continuing with its expansionist project and its current<br />
policies in the region, along with regional and international events that have been helpful<br />
to the regime’s objectives, mean this scenario will remain excluded.<br />
Second Scenario: Full conflict<br />
This scenario is based on an escalation in tensions between Iran and the GCC States<br />
precipitating further imbalance in mutual relations and reaching the extent of a full<br />
military clash. Although the possibility of this scenario has increased, particularly given<br />
the Iranian misconception that the Gulf States cannot stand against its ambitions due to<br />
inequality in terms of military power and human resources, and the problems caused<br />
by Tehran’s control of Baghdad and interference in Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria, not to<br />
mention its numerous affiliated Shiite militias and its sectarian influence on segments of<br />
the Gulf communities, it is still less likely since the foreign policies of the Gulf States are<br />
based on avoiding the use of military force wherever possible and resolving regional and<br />
international disputes by diplomatic and political means. There are also international<br />
restrictions in place to deter any intemperate behavior on the Iranian regime’s behalf,<br />
which include:<br />
1. Maintaining the safety of sea-lanes in the region.<br />
2. Increasing the military capabilities of the Arabian Gulf States and alliances established<br />
by Saudi Arabia, such as the Arab Coalition and the Islamic Coalition.<br />
3. The continuity of the new US administration’s commitment to Gulf security.<br />
Third Scenario: Tension and cooperation<br />
This scenario represents the continuation of the current situation, which characterizes<br />
the volatile relations between the two sides before and during the period covered by<br />
this report, which ranged between convergence and cooperation at some times and<br />
high levels of tension and hostility at others. This scenario seems most likely, with the<br />
region still troubled by tensions between Iran and regional states over various issues,<br />
especially in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. Generally, there are regulations which should direct<br />
the future course of Gulf-Iranian relations in order to achieve a resolution of these issues<br />
118 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
which is mutually satisfactory for both parties and which contributes to strengthening<br />
the Gulf region’s security and stability and enhancing the welfare of its nations’ peoples.<br />
The greatest onus in achieving this scenario, however, is on Iran, which has continuously<br />
sought to achieve and expand regional dominance and influence beyond the rules and<br />
norms of international relations. In order to achieve this scenario, the Iranian regime<br />
must meet the following conditions:<br />
1. Working constructively with mutual respect and non-interference in the internal<br />
affairs of other states.<br />
2. Respecting territorial sovereignty and recognized borders.<br />
3. Respecting the rules of sea-lanes and rights of passage, especially in the Arabian Gulf<br />
and the Strait of Hormuz.<br />
4. Halting the provocative statements of some officials, which include hinting at the<br />
possibility of using force.<br />
The most important factor in deciding the form of future relations between the Iranian<br />
regime and the GCC States will be the willingness or otherwise of Iranian decision-makers<br />
to develop positive relations with the Gulf capitals. If the Iranian regime is willing to make<br />
goodwill gestures in order to establish positive cooperation with these states, especially<br />
as Iran’s interests are restricted to strengthening its relations with the neighboring Gulf<br />
region, this would allow Iran to expand and enhance its relations on both the regional and<br />
international levels, due to the high status and significant credibility of the GCC countries<br />
both in the Arab region and globally.<br />
Second Axis<br />
Iran’s Role in the Neighboring Gulf Countries Iraq and Yemen<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
Iran has played an active role in the region generally and in neighboring Gulf countries<br />
such as Iraq and Yemen specifically since the 2003 US invasion and occupation of Iraq.<br />
As a result, these two countries (Iraq and Yemen) have become isolated from regional<br />
political and security developments; this is not to mention the massively increased<br />
Iranian presence and influence there. This is apparent in a number of ways, including the<br />
positions adopted by the Iraqi leadership during the second half of 2016, represented by<br />
Iranian demands to integrate the Tehran-affiliated Shiite militias into the Iraqi army, and<br />
the procrastination by the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen in ending their armed control<br />
of Sanaa. Also apparent in Yemen is the formation of a ‘parallel government’ by Houthi-<br />
Saleh that is clearly intended to challenge the legitimate government of President Abed-<br />
Rabbo Hadi Mansour. All these scenarios demonstrate different aspects of the Iranian<br />
regime’s central role, which have resulted from changes in the internal balances of power<br />
in Iraq and Yemen, as well as from other regional and international events.<br />
Limits of the Iranian role in Iraq and Yemen, its challenges and consequences during the<br />
biannual report period:<br />
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119
First: Iraq as a springboard for Iran’s expansionist strategy<br />
The US invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime in May 2003<br />
provided a critical opportunity for the Iranian Republic to implement its sectarian plans,<br />
taking advantage of the US role as a ‘direct occupation’ power. Thereafter, Iran extended<br />
its influence massively inside Iraq, becoming the political frontrunner in the Iraqi arena,<br />
especially after the outbreak of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011. The Iranian regime<br />
not only formed militias and Shiite-affiliated groups in Iraq to implement its agenda, it<br />
went further, shaping the Iraqi regime and incorporating Shiite militias into the Iraqi army<br />
to strengthen its military foothold, with its militias playing a central role in the ongoing<br />
battles in Iraq to liberate Iraqi territories from the terrorist organization ISIL, most<br />
recently in Mosul.<br />
There were several motives for Iran’s incursion as a key player in the Iraqi arena:<br />
A. The sectarian dynamic in Iraq.<br />
B. Iraq’s status as one of the Shiite crescent countries.<br />
C. Geographical proximity to Iran.<br />
D. A strategic springboard into the region.<br />
E. Preventing the emergence of a new united Iraq.<br />
F. U.S. policy in Obama’s era.<br />
Zalmay Khalilzad, the former US Ambassador to Iraq and Afghanistan, and US<br />
Ambassador to the United Nations from 2007 to 2009 wrote an article reflecting how<br />
Iran had become a key player in Iraq through its political, military, and cultural incursions.<br />
Khalilzad admitted, “The US think tanks are almost convinced about the loss of Iraq to the<br />
Iranians.” The late chairperson of the Expediency Council Hashemi Rafsanjani said, “If Iraq<br />
and Iran united, they would have the first word in the region.” 46<br />
The third phase of the Iranian regime’s Shiite expansionist doctrine – after the first two,<br />
namely deployment and politicization – is the ‘Militarization of Shiism,’ a term describing<br />
the militarization of Iraqi and other Arab Shiite populations, being trained, equipped, and<br />
prepared to become both formal and informal groups of fighters.<br />
During the second half of 2016, Iraq witnessed a tactical shift in the Iranian regime’s<br />
strategy and its own military capabilities as Tehran moved to the full ‘Militarization of<br />
Shiism’ within the neighboring Arab nation, enabling the Iranian-backed militias there to<br />
reach the stage of imposing proxy rule via arms, with Iraq now in a state of readiness for<br />
full occupation through its lack of ability to confront the Iranian militias militarily. That<br />
is the main axis of Iran’s external actions, and what remains for the Iranian targets are<br />
details or relatively straightforward procedures revolving around this strategic behavior.<br />
This is the highest level of Iranian plans being affected, whether detailed strategic plans or<br />
political practices, future plans for the Shiite community, diplomatic, informational, and<br />
economic, etc. 47<br />
The ‘Integration of Shiism’ or the Shiite militias’ integration in the existing<br />
regimes legitimizes their nature and provides official cover for their activities in the<br />
implementation of the Iranian Supreme Leader’s orders. This was the reason behind<br />
Iran’s pressure on the Iraqi government to integrate its proxy Shiite ‘Popular Mobilization<br />
120 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
Forces’ (PMF) militias within the Iraqi army (see table below), which was a key focus of<br />
repeated messages from Tehran to Baghdad in recent months. Iran regularly warned<br />
Abadi’s government of the possible dire consequences of the battle of Mosul without<br />
changing the status of the PMF militias, warning that failure to integrate them would<br />
encourage Iraqi and international parties to dissolve them. Tehran’s constant warnings<br />
ultimately drove Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Abadi to issue a formal decision on July<br />
26th 2016 integrating the PMF militias into the Iraqi army, and led the Iraqi Council of<br />
Representatives to approve the ‘Popular Mobilization Authority Act’ on November 26th<br />
the same year, with 170 deputies of the 208 who attended the session voting in favor.<br />
This new legislation means that the PMF militias are now a single military entity within<br />
the Iraqi Armed Forces under the command of the General Commander of the Armed<br />
Forces, and consisting of an appointed leadership, general staff, and combat brigades, to<br />
be subject, along with its affiliates, to the endorsed military laws. 48<br />
The passing of the Popular Mobilization Authority Act led to negative repercussions both<br />
inside Iraq and abroad due to its provision of legal and official cover for the PMF’s crimes,<br />
with the militias’ actions now having full legal authority as part of the country’s official<br />
armed forces. This legislation allows the PMF militias’ members to claim military ranks<br />
within the Iraqi army and will contribute to its degradation, making the country’s armed<br />
forces increasingly<br />
wholly sectarian in<br />
nature. In this context,<br />
it is worth mentioning<br />
the statement by Hadi<br />
Al-Amiri, the leader of<br />
the Badr Brigades, a<br />
prominent PMF militia<br />
responsible for multiple<br />
crimes and ethnic<br />
cleansing, who boasted<br />
in August 2016 that<br />
the PMF militias had<br />
become stronger than<br />
the regular Iraqi army.<br />
The Popular<br />
Mobilization Authority<br />
Act will be a major<br />
factor in fueling wider<br />
regional conflicts,<br />
with the legalizing of<br />
the Iranian regime’s<br />
influence in Iraq and<br />
its official integration<br />
into the Iraqi army<br />
giving the militias legal<br />
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121
cover to move into Syrian territory (where many are already present, albeit unofficially)<br />
under the false pretext of prosecuting ISIL. This in turn will drive several regional parties<br />
to deem the PMF a transnational militia engaged in proxy wars on Tehran’s behalf, which<br />
will contribute to further ratcheting up levels of sectarianism in the region, revealing<br />
the success of the Iranian regime’s efforts to ‘institutionalize’ the conditions of its allies<br />
in Iraq and its tools of strategic influence there. The main risk of this legislation and its<br />
consequences will be in turning the Iraqi military into the main party in the future Shiite-<br />
Sunni conflict. Moreover, the fact that the Iraqi military is now shaped and governed<br />
by sectarian considerations eliminates any endeavor aiming to turn it into a national<br />
institution uniting all Iraqis, effectively aborting any efforts to turn Iraq into a unified state<br />
of equal citizenship for all. 49<br />
1- Shift in Iran’s strategy from integration to empowerment<br />
Iran not only integrated the armed militias with the Iraqi regime but is also seeking<br />
to enable them to expand their geographical scope and bring new areas under their<br />
influence in order to become the main player and primary controller in the Iraqi political<br />
arena. To this end, the Iranian regime has been supporting the Shiite Mobilization Forces<br />
with money and weapons to control Mosul. Operations to bring Mosul under their control<br />
began immediately after the Iraqi government’s official statement on the morning of<br />
Monday, October 17th, 2016, although the city had been under occupation by the ISIL<br />
since June 2014. Mosul is the last Iraqi city under ISIS control, with the terrorist group<br />
already driven out of Fallujah, Ramadi, Tikrit, Beiji, and Sinjar. The PMF’s central role in<br />
liberating Mosul was emphasized in a statement by senior Iranian official Ali Velayati, the<br />
President of the Center for Strategic Studies in the Iranian regime’s Expediency Council,<br />
who said on September 16th 2016, “If not for the Popular Mobilization next to Fallujah<br />
liberating forces, it would not be liberated from ISIL.” The Commander of the IRGC’s Quds<br />
Force, General Qassem Suleimani, visited the Nineveh city borders in August 2016 in<br />
order to prepare for the Mosul battle and was already participating in the beginnings of<br />
the fight before moving to the battle of Aleppo. 50<br />
At the time of publication, the battle for Mosul has so far lasted over four months,<br />
contrary to many predictions that it would be resolved within weeks given the tens of<br />
thousands<br />
of troops<br />
and militia<br />
members<br />
involved and<br />
the massive<br />
military<br />
superiority of<br />
their arsenal<br />
of weapons<br />
compared<br />
with those of<br />
the ISIL group.<br />
This has led<br />
122 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
many experts and specialists to question the reasons for the prolonged crisis, especially<br />
in light of the horrendous humanitarian conditions, with more than 200,000 residents<br />
from the city fleeing their homes by December 2016 and over 68,000 being registered as<br />
permanently displaced by the UN up to that time.<br />
It is apparent that the main problem lies not in the liberation of Mosul, but in the ‘next<br />
day strategy’ or post-ISIL phase for control of the city between the parties involved,<br />
with the city and region being subject to very different and contradictory political<br />
projects. In this context, the Iraqi parliament voted on September 26th, 2016 to maintain<br />
Nineveh’s unity within its historical borders, and prevent any efforts to change its legal<br />
and administrative status. The battle of Mosul has already spiraled into several other<br />
battles, causing massive destruction; these developments further complicate the already<br />
complicated efforts to achieve stability in Iraq, with reconstruction hampered as many of<br />
the displaced people fear returning to their homes and cities due to well-founded fears of<br />
persecution by the Shiite militias, which are already responsible for multiple human rights<br />
violations. Although it is likely that the battle will ultimately succeed in ridding Mosul<br />
of ISIL, domestic and regional tensions mean that this tactical success could quickly be<br />
transformed into a strategic setback. 51<br />
At the Iraqi domestic level, the leaders of the main political factions have put forward<br />
three projects, although none of these is likely to be implemented, despite the support of<br />
the Iranian regime and the US administration for certain projects:<br />
1. The Sunni Project: Based on converting Nineveh into an independent territory<br />
comprising several provinces to maintain Nineveh as an entity in order to ensure that<br />
it will not be divided due to national and ethnic conflicts. The region includes several<br />
provinces after converting the districts of Tall Afar, Makhmour, and Nineveh Plains into<br />
provinces, then turning Mosul into a province and the regional capital.<br />
2. The Kurdish Project: Close in nature to the Sunni project, this would turn Nineveh<br />
into several provinces, and implement Article 140 of the Constitution, which requires<br />
resolution in the disputed areas. Moreover, this would determine the population of<br />
the border areas with Iraq’s Kurdistan region in case they decide to remain in Nineveh<br />
or continue as part of the region through a referendum to be supervised by the United<br />
Nations, after which Nineveh would be converted into a region. This project is consistent<br />
with the Americans’ objectives. 52<br />
3. The Shiite Project: This project, adopted by Abadi’s government and the Shiite<br />
Mobilization militias, and backed by Iran, would see Mosul maintain its pre-ISIL status.<br />
This has been rejected by the Kurds and is considered impossible, while the Sunnis see<br />
it as a precursor for returning to the previous problems that caused the emergence of<br />
ISIL in the first place. According to this project, which led Iran to support Abadi, the Iraqi<br />
army would control these areas, meaning in reality that they would be under the de facto<br />
control of Tehran’s proxy militias.<br />
However, resolving the problem through any of these projects is unlikely to happen<br />
because they are contradictory with regard to Iraq’s interests and visions. Consequently,<br />
the dispute over the establishment of a Sunni region has flared up again, whether to<br />
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123
exclude this option or to find another formula to maintain the unity of Iraq. Furthermore,<br />
the Kurdish President Massoud Barzani has demanded a new arrangement that would<br />
allow the creation of three provinces for ethnic minorities in Sinjar, Tal Afar, and the<br />
Nineveh Plain, as well as the formation of a domestic administration that would take<br />
into account the diversity of the population, giving them the choice of staying within the<br />
current administrative boundaries or joining the Kurdistan Region. 53<br />
This problem is not only political but military as well because the Kurdish Peshmerga<br />
forces have played a prominent role in the battle of Mosul after taking control of the<br />
northeastern and southwestern areas of the city. The battle to liberate the ‘Qayyarah’<br />
area near Mosul showed the important role the Peshmerga have in providing logistical<br />
support and securing corridors; this role became clear in the battle of Mosul, especially<br />
as the Peshmerga forces’ positions were closer and better than the Iraqi army was at<br />
positioning. At the beginning of September, the Peshmerga forces were 12 and 25 km<br />
away from Mosul, when the Iraqi army units were about 50 km away. Also, the Peshmerga<br />
do not instill fear in the people of Mosul as the Popular Mobilization militias do. It is<br />
doubtful that the battle of Mosul will be won without the critical involvement of the<br />
Peshmerga. It is also difficult to imagine this role without a clear political agreement,<br />
which requires mutual trust, and nothing indicates the availability of a sufficient amount<br />
of it [trust] yet.<br />
Away from its internal conflicts, Iran also has interests in post-ISIL Mosul as part of<br />
a wider ambition to weaken the Sunni groups, and determine the future of Tal Afar in<br />
western Mosul. As well as being home to the Shiite Turkmen, Tal Afar will possibly provide<br />
Iran with a location on either side of the intersection of the Kurdish areas, Iraq, Syria, and<br />
Turkey. Furthermore, it will enable Iran to open a land corridor to Syria and the Lebanese<br />
Hezbollah, being well aware that the Anbar Road is fraught with dangers. The Iranian<br />
regime encourages the participation of the Popular Mobilization in that battle, under<br />
the pretext of protecting the Turkmen Shiites and Tal Afar people in Mosul in order to<br />
have a large presence in the battle, which is considered by some politicians in the Iranian<br />
regime, before the Baghdad politicians, to be decisive in determining the nature of Iran’s<br />
influence during the next phase. In other words, allowing Popular Mobilization militias<br />
to participate heavily in the battle of Mosul is an opportunity for the Iranian regime to<br />
convert its political influence in Iraq into actual field control. 54<br />
On the other hand, it does not seem that Turkey is interested in playing a key role in<br />
the battle of Mosul, which Turkey considers part of its security area in the north of Iraq.<br />
Moreover, whoever has the upper hand in Mosul will have the upper hand in Iraq in the<br />
near future; Ankara knows this very well and fears that Iran or Kurdish opponents of<br />
Turkey will gain the upper hand in Mosul. Therefore, Turkey desires military involvement<br />
in the battle of Mosul, based on what was approved by the Turkish Parliament with<br />
a majority of 298 votes out of 396 at the end of September 2016 to allow the Turkish<br />
military to intervene in Syria and Iraq. This new Act of Parliament authorized Turkish<br />
armed forces to use force in Syria and Iraq and to take action if there are any risks related<br />
to Turkey’s national security. In addition, the Turkish Parliament voted overwhelmingly<br />
to extend this Turkish military mission for one more year in order to continue its military<br />
124 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
operations in Iraq and Syria. This extension will allow the Turkish military to move and<br />
carry out all military operations until the end of October 2017 outside its borders,<br />
especially in Iraq and Syria. 55<br />
Iran is aware that the Peshmerga’s contribution to the battle of Mosul will consolidate<br />
the presence of the Irbil Government in the city’s vicinity and facilitate the deployment<br />
of its defenses in the disputed territories, as well as facilitate trade and economic<br />
communication with Turkey. The Popular Mobilization militias are aware that the Sunni<br />
powers’ return to Nineveh will reinforce the position of those Maliki’s government tried<br />
to confront in recent years. Tehran clearly wants to keep Turkish influence out of Iraq<br />
and Kurdistan as part of its policy in Syria. 56 The participation of the Popular Mobilization<br />
militias in the battle of Mosul has geostrategic importance for the Iranian regime, as it<br />
confirms for all the players in the Arab, regional, and international arenas that it used the<br />
US occupation of Iraq to serve its own interests and increase its territorial gains. This was<br />
particularly the case for “Iran’s path toward the Mediterranean,” which emerged in 2014<br />
in a plan, which the Iranian regime had worked on three decades ago to create a corridor<br />
through Iraq and Syria linking Iran with the shores of the Mediterranean in order to give<br />
Tehran greater influence in the region. This corridor begins in Baquba-Diyala province, the<br />
nearest Iraqi city to the Iranian border, and toward Shirqat city in Salah-Uddin province,<br />
which the Shiite militias dominated in September 2016. Then it extends to Tal Afar and<br />
Sinjar, which were controlled by the ‘Be Ka Ka’ forces from Syria from November 2016,<br />
crosses the border between Iraq and Syria at Rabia, and goes through ‘Qamishli’ and<br />
‘Ain Alarab’ (Kobani) down to Afrin, which are areas controlled by the Kurdish people’s<br />
protection units. The Iranian regime believes the corridor is “in the right place.”<br />
The Iranian corridor to reach the Mediterranean will not only promote the Shiite<br />
Crescent, which Iran has been working on for decades, but it will also change the nature<br />
of Iran’s presence in the entire Arab world. The British Observer quotes Martin Chilov,<br />
the Middle-East Affairs Administrator, “Iran is working hard to achieve this geostrategic<br />
objective,” whereby it can move goods and people along that corridor, which is guarded<br />
by its own forces or other affiliated forces in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. 57 Aleppo is<br />
also a critical area for the completion of this corridor, as Tehran has frequently invested<br />
its efforts there and mobilized thousands of troops to control the city. Chilov added that<br />
securing Aleppo is an important stage in the corridor project, which passes the Shiite<br />
towns of Nabl and Zahra, then the outskirts of Homs, and on to the Syrian coast, the<br />
stronghold of the Alawites and secured by Russia.<br />
Prolonging the crisis has other reasons, including those related to the intended<br />
complexity of the relationship between Irbil and Baghdad concerning the issue of<br />
Peshmerga-liberated areas. Iranian-backed Abadi is sticking to the Peshmerga’s<br />
withdrawal from the liberated areas, which is based on the agreement between the<br />
federal government and the Kurdish forces, and which includes “an explicit clause for the<br />
Peshmerga forces’ withdrawal from the liberated areas after the liberation of Mosul to<br />
their locations pre-operations.” Massoud Barzani, President of the Iraqi Kurdistan region,<br />
refused to cede the liberated areas and confirmed his agreement with the US not to<br />
withdraw from the areas that the Kurdish Peshmerga forces liberated from ISIL, declaring<br />
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125
that these forces lost 11,500 killed or wounded in the battles against the organization. 58<br />
In addition, there is the fear of Tal Afar and conflicting parties during the post-ISIL<br />
phase, especially the Iranian-backed Shiite Mobilization forces. Turkish Foreign Minister<br />
Mouloud Tchaouc Ihsanoglu said that his country would take security measures if the<br />
Shiite Mobilization forces made any threats to Turkey’s security, adding: “We insist on<br />
protecting the rights of our Turkmen brothers in Tal Afar.”<br />
Otherwise, ISIL benefited from all these incidents, as well as methods of combat,<br />
including:<br />
A. Laying mines on the five bridges over the Tigris River.<br />
B. Setting fire to oil wells to obstruct incursions and to prevent jet fighters from hitting<br />
their targets.<br />
C. Burning the eastern villages to prevent Kurdish forces from advancing.<br />
D. Suicide car bombs.<br />
E. Benefiting from some open ports on the Syrian border to get reinforcements and<br />
support, which boosted its defenses.<br />
The nature of the battlefield also provided four approaches:<br />
A. The southern approach, which starts from south of ‘Qayyarah’ and extends along the<br />
river to the city of Mosul, and is controlled by the Iraqi army.<br />
B. The eastern approach, which starts from the territory of the Kurdistan region and is<br />
controlled by the Peshmerga forces and some national Sunni Mobilization forces.<br />
C. The western approach, which starts from Tal Afar and is controlled by the Popular<br />
Mobilization forces.<br />
D. The northwest approach, which starts from the areas surrounding Mosul’s dam; it is<br />
considered a suitable area for mobilization, and is controlled by the Shiite Mobilization<br />
forces.<br />
The military objective is to retain some areas not occupied by troops to force ISIL to<br />
withdraw toward the Syrian border. 59<br />
2. The Challenges of Iran’s role in Iraq<br />
Despite the developments in Iraq during the second half of 2016 that were in the<br />
interests of Iran’s growing influence in Iraq, it is difficult to ignore many of obstacles that<br />
hinder the Iran’s role there, such as:<br />
A. The deteriorating economic situation in Iran, despite the lifting of international<br />
sanctions, and the high costs of Iran’s involvement in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen,<br />
especially in light of the disparity between Iran’s liberalist society and the religious<br />
authorities, which reflects negatively on Iran’s role in Iraq and the wider region.<br />
B. Iran’s influence, its militias associated with sectarian practices, accusations of<br />
repeated human rights violations, crimes, and demographic changes against the Sunni<br />
population, as well as differences with the Kurdish parties. All of this will lead to the<br />
emergence of a ‘Denial sectarian’ movement inside Iraq composed of various factions,<br />
especially if it receives anti-Iranian international and regional support. This is to be<br />
expected during the post-ISIL phase to prevent Iran’s growing role, which considers Iraq as<br />
a starting point for the rest of the region.<br />
126 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
C. The next stage could lead to a power struggle in Iraq between the political forces and<br />
Shiite armed militias, who consider themselves the only holders of power and influence<br />
in the fight against ISIL. Moreover, regaining control over cities and regions that were<br />
controlled by ISIL that has large military capabilities on ground, which deploys chaos<br />
and restore the international intervention in Iraq. This could lead to the emergence of<br />
powerful movements and national opponents to Iran’s role and presence in Iraq.<br />
D. The possibility of a divergence between the Iraqi Government and Iran, in light of the<br />
need to put in place the declared program of Abadi’s Government, as well as the terms<br />
of the political agreement that this Government was based on, including its promise<br />
not to allow regional interference in Iraqi affairs, and to restore stability in Iraq’s foreign<br />
relations.<br />
E. Despite the United States’ acceptance of Iran’s presence in Iraq, in light of the security<br />
crisis with ISIL the US position will be reshaped to curb Iran’s role in Iraq or the wider<br />
region due to opposition by Republicans in the US Congress, pressure from the pro-Israel<br />
lobby, a Republican winning the US Presidency, and the strategic relations between the<br />
United States and the Arabian Gulf.<br />
F. The Saudi’s orientation, especially after the accession of King Salman bin Abdul<br />
Aziz, is to cooperate with Qatar and Turkey on counter-terrorism, which emerged with<br />
the Saudi’s leadership of the Arab-regional coalition against the Houthis in ‘Operation<br />
Decisive Storm,’ and which attracted regionally important states such as Pakistan. Also,<br />
this was a call to form a Sunni axis in the region to counter Iran’s growing role, given the<br />
decline of Arab influence.<br />
3. The future of Iran’s role in Iraq and the expected trends<br />
The bottom line is that Iran’s role is growing in Iraq, contrary to Syria, where its role<br />
is declining. Iran’s role in Iraq did not grow due to its [Iran’s] power, but because of<br />
internal, regional, and international variables that paved the way for it. Iran’s role in Iraq<br />
is generally negative, and the “infinite conflicts” are clear evidence that these conflicts<br />
resulted in a fragmented state [Iraq, and the occupation of vital cities by ISIL, Mosul still<br />
being under ISIL control. Moreover, there is a lack of a strong national army representing<br />
Iraqi unity; Iraq has turned into a hotbed for terrorists from various countries in the<br />
region, and politically Iraq has lost its unity. There are calls to split it into three separate<br />
entities, and the bloody sectarian conflict between Iranian participants has also<br />
completed the economic impoverishment of Iraq.<br />
When ISIL’s control of Iraqi cities and territories has ceased, it is expected that Iran will<br />
consolidate its role in Iraq in a manner that achieves its interests and serves its objectives<br />
on various political, security, and religious levels for its regional expansion. This is in light<br />
of the international variables and orientations adopted by Rouhani’s administration. It is<br />
possible, according to facts, for Iran’s role in Iraq to take on multiple dimensions:<br />
A. The Political Dimension: Due to the direct Iranian presence, and the Iraqi movements’<br />
need for Iran’s support to stay in power, Tehran will play a political role by influencing the<br />
political process and government’s orientation, as well as working to achieve a balance<br />
between the religious allied parties, supporting them to control Iraqi State institutions<br />
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127
and excluding the influence of national powers that oppose Iran’s role in Iraq.<br />
It is expected that Iran will keep the Iraqi government in a state of being unable to<br />
separate from Iran’s influence, as well as seeking to attach the position of the Iraqi<br />
Government to Tehran’s one [position] regarding Arab issues and developments. Iran<br />
will also have an effect on Iraqi Arab, regional, and international relations regarding what<br />
happened when Iraq declared its position with Iran during ‘Operation Decisive Storm,’<br />
which was led by Saudi Arabia against the Houthis in Yemen.<br />
In light of Iraq’s major position in Iran’s strategy in the region, not only on a<br />
political level but also on a religious one, it does not seem that Iran intends to<br />
miss any opportunities in Iraq. The events in the region have encouraged Iran to<br />
pay Iraq more attention, such as ISIL’s control of large parts of Iraq demonstrating<br />
the importance of Iraq’s security for Iran, due to its [Iraq’s] prominent role as a<br />
defensive line. There was a similar situation Syria, where Iran’s inability to declare<br />
a divine victory in Aleppo after gaining control of it at the end of December 2016,<br />
and the differences over Syria between Russia, Iran, and Turkey, as well as the<br />
slump in oil prices, were all signs confirming that Iran will not abandon, at least<br />
partially, its gains in Iraq. In exchange, the continued sectarian policies in Baghdad<br />
will lead to “infinite conflicts” in Iraq, and thus the scenario of the tribal ISIL-led<br />
uprising against al-Maliki – which came in response to their anti-sectarian policies – will<br />
be repeated, and which raises fears of an “Iranian coming era” that may start in Iraq.<br />
These fears are rooted in the significant Iranian moves in the region, whether in Syria,<br />
Lebanon, or Yemen.<br />
B. The Security Dimension: The security crisis and the escalation of ISIL’s role in Iraq have<br />
shown the nature of Iran’s multifunctioning security role. Since the beginning of the crisis,<br />
the direct presence of Iran’s security and intelligence agencies has emerged in Iraq; they<br />
began their field deployments on the pretext of protecting religious places and shrines,<br />
and to help the Iraqi security agencies confront ISIL.<br />
• It is expected that this presence will remain during the next phase with certain<br />
justifications:<br />
1. Reorganizing Iraqi security forces.<br />
2. Providing security and intelligence agencies with consultations to counter terrorism.<br />
3. Protecting religious shrines.<br />
In addition to the direct security presence in Iraq, the Iran-linked Shiite militias represent<br />
an indirect security presence for Tehran in Iraq. This dimension will give more momentum<br />
to Iran’s influence in the course of future events in Iraq.<br />
C. The Religious Dimension: Iran’s attempts to control the Shiite religious authorities in<br />
Iraq, thus reducing the effects of Arab-oriented clergies or those who do not recognize<br />
the principle of the Jurist Leadership. Furthermore, to consolidate the influence of the<br />
Iranian-origin clergies, through suppressing the religious seminaries “Hawzas” in Najaf in<br />
favor of Iranian seminaries of Qom.<br />
128 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
Second: The future of Iran’s role in the Yemeni crisis<br />
Since the start of the Arab Spring in early 2011, Yemen has witnessed conflicts of<br />
control between the various political forces, a deterioration of security in all provinces, a<br />
deterioration of the economy, and a low standard of living. The situation also worsened<br />
on all levels with the Iran-backed rebels coup over the legitimacy of Yemen’s rulers<br />
headed by Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and their control of the capital Sanaa in September<br />
2014 by force in order to destabilize the internal forces and impose their political choices<br />
on Yemen and the future of the crisis through Iran’s support with money and weapons<br />
and its alleged plan of regional expansionism. Since that date, the crisis has become more<br />
complicated, and its regional influence has increased, particularly Iran’s influence, thus<br />
forcing the rebels to refuse the negotiations and initiatives put forward during the second<br />
half of 2016 to settle the crisis unless the Houthis become an entity in the new Yemeni<br />
equation. So, will the Houthis continue with their confrontations to lead Yemen into a civil<br />
war, or will they all approve stability and a national partnership, with all parties accepting<br />
the UN envoy Ismail Ould Sheikh’s recent initiative? What are the external influences on<br />
the Yemeni crisis? And, what are the features of the political landscape in Yemen in the<br />
future?<br />
1. Yemen’s geostrategic importance for Iran<br />
Yemen has geostrategic importance at the southern entrance of the Red Sea and its<br />
[Yemen’s] control of one of the most important shipping lanes in the region. The Strait of<br />
Bab el-Mandeb, through which oil tankers go to the Red Sea, bound for the Suez Canal<br />
directly to the main markets in Europe and the United States. As well as ‘Mede’ Port,<br />
which has been sought after by the Iranian-backed Houthis more than once and who still<br />
control it in various ways, Yemen has borders with some Gulf countries, for example Saudi<br />
Arabia, the Gulf ‘core of unity,’ and the main anti-Iranian areas in the region.60<br />
Iran gaining a foothold in Yemen reinforces its regional presence and helps it control the<br />
main entrances and exits to the international oil trade. Strategists and scientists say that<br />
whoever has oil is like a gold treasury owner, and whoever controls the corridors crossing<br />
other countries is like the owner of the key to this treasury. Since we are talking about the<br />
Gulf, its oil resources, and its neighbor Iran, the Gulf’s oil tankers, in order to transport oil<br />
to the West for example, need to use international sea-lanes from the Strait of Hormuz<br />
and the Gulf of Aden, through the Strait of Bab el Mandeb to the Red Sea, and finally the<br />
Mediterranean. Iran has realized the importance of this strategy, Hormuz is already under<br />
its control, and it is constantly trying to force Bab al-Mandab under its control; proof of<br />
this is Iran’s support for the Houthis’ last attempt to take over Sanaa, if it were not for<br />
‘Operation Decisive Storm’ led by Saudi Arabia.61<br />
2. Iran’s strategy in Yemen<br />
Iran’s strategy in Yemen included several options such as the Houthis in the north and<br />
the armed movement in the south; it began with a search for a self-governing authority<br />
in Saada, and for a mini-state on the border with Saudi Arabia. Then, with the aim of<br />
creating a military organization parallel to the state, similar to Hezbollah as a state within<br />
a state, it wanted the armed movement in the south to be part of that organization.<br />
However, the former Saleh regime, through its alliance with Iran and direct or indirect<br />
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129
military coordination on the ground, provided a new opportunity to fully control Yemen,<br />
which is what happened in the Houthis’ coup in Sanaa on September 21st, 2014.<br />
Therefore, Iran put Yemen as the first vital area in its expansionist strategy and supplied<br />
the rebels with tons of arms shipments through Eritrea against former President Ali<br />
Abdullah Saleh in order to implement its [Iran’s] strategy there. The Yemeni Revolution<br />
created an opportunity for Iran to implement its plans in Yemen, so they increased the<br />
arms shipments for the Houthis to become a powerful force in Yemen and to gain access<br />
to power and carry out Iran’s plan, which had also supported their former coup attempt<br />
in Sanaa. Moreover, the Iranian MP Ali Reza Zakani declared Sanaa as the fourth Arab<br />
capital to extend the Iranian Revolution. This led Saudi Arabia to respond to an official<br />
request from President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi after leaving Yemen in March 2015 to<br />
intervene to save his country from Houthi-Iranian aggression and to recover towns seized<br />
by the Houthis. Consequently, the Arab military coalition appeared and liberated 70% of<br />
Yemeni territory from the rebels. Since he took the helm in February 2012 until the time<br />
of this report, President Hadi has<br />
called on Iran not to interfere<br />
in his country eight times, most<br />
recently on October 7th, 2016. In<br />
early November 2016, US sources<br />
confirmed that five weapons<br />
shipments from Iran, which<br />
would have helped the Houthis’<br />
war against the people and the<br />
legitimate government in Yemen,<br />
had been seized.62<br />
Constantly, the Brigadier<br />
General of Basij Mohammad<br />
Source: http://cutt.us/RTnD2<br />
Reza Naghdi stated in September<br />
2016, “The banner of the Islamic Revolution is flying in Yemen along with Syria and<br />
Iraq.” Also, Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran’s Supreme Leader’s advisor, confirmed in October<br />
2016 that Iran would not remain silent, and would not hesitate in supporting its allies in<br />
Yemen, pointing out that Iran had provided support for Yemen as much as possible, and<br />
would continue to do so. Also, there were statements from religious leaders Hussein<br />
Nouri Hamedani and Sheikh Nasser Makarem Shirazi on November 11th, 2016 that<br />
the Houthi group was under Iranian control in the region to counter their adversaries<br />
in the Middle-East, and that their country would not hesitate in providing all forms of<br />
support for them.63 Moreover, a spokesperson for the Revolutionary Guards told the Fars<br />
news agency that the Houthis in Yemen had Iranian missiles and that they had attacked<br />
positions belonging to the Yemeni army with an Iranian-made missile named ‘Zilzal 2’ on<br />
November 5th, 2016.64<br />
130 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
3. Increasing Iranian support for the Houthis in Yemen<br />
According to its strategy, Iran sought to create a state of instability by bombing the<br />
military in order to change the balance of power in Yemen, the result of which was a living<br />
“Tragic Reality” and Yemen being on the brink of a systemic collapse and endless conflicts.<br />
This is especially in the light of the failure of international and regional efforts to hold<br />
peace talks between the parties involved in the crisis up to the date of the publication of<br />
this report.<br />
Iran’s support for the Houthis is clearly reflected in Yemen during the second half of 2016:<br />
A. Disabling the negotiations option: Negotiations were initiated between the rebels<br />
and Saleh’s party along with the Abed Rabbo Hadi party in Kuwait in April 2016 and<br />
continued until July 2016 with no results. Especially with Saleh-Houthis’ insistence to<br />
act as the so-called “Blocking Minority,” in an attempt to clone Hezbollah’s experience in<br />
Lebanon. These negotiations were conducted before the basic conditions for a peaceful<br />
settlement of the conflict had been confirmed, which demonstrates their ‘maturity.’<br />
Houthi-Saleh considered that were standing firm in the face of coalition air attacks and<br />
still controlled Sanaa, believing that they were at the ‘fruit-picking’ stage. The coalition<br />
countries realized that they had exhausted every possibility and that international<br />
legitimacy and the Security Council resolutions had allowed them to retake Sanaa and<br />
stop the Houthi expansion through air strikes for more than a year and a half. However,<br />
the remaining task was no longer possible using the same methods and the same tools,<br />
and it cannot be said that the liberated areas were completely returned to legitimate<br />
forces. Thus, the coalition countries preferred to continue negotiations while they failed<br />
to declare Houthi-Saleh the Yemeni Supreme Council.65<br />
B. Rejecting the international and UN initiatives: The doors of the UN and international<br />
initiatives are still closed, because of Houthi-Saleh not getting the green light from<br />
Iran, and then rejecting the solution and settlement initiatives for the crisis and ending<br />
the state of conflict in Yemen, including the US initiative on August 25th 2016, which<br />
suggested “forming a national unity government with the participation of the Houthis<br />
and delivering heavy weapons and ballistic missiles for the state, as well as evacuating<br />
the Houthis out of Sanaa.” This initiative was accepted by the Yemeni state and the Arab<br />
coalition to resolve the crisis and a return to security and stability in Yemen despite its<br />
deviation from the references of the political solution (the GCC initiative and executive<br />
mechanism, the result of the national dialogue, UN resolution No. 2216). This initiative<br />
also required the rebels first to recognize the elected Hadi Presidency, and then to hand<br />
over their heavy weapons and withdraw from the cities and institutions, prior to their<br />
participation in any government.66<br />
When the Houthi-Saleh alliance got the green light from Iran for responding to the<br />
most important requirement for the Houthis, which was to form a joint authority before<br />
embarking on their withdrawal arrangements and handing over their heavy weapons<br />
before the recent initiative, which the UN envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Sheikh put forward<br />
on October 25th, 2016, despite President Hadi’s refusal on several items:<br />
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131
First: Recognize President Mansour Hadi as transitional President with limited powers,<br />
and select new a vice-President, as agreed by all political parties.<br />
Second: Form a military and security supreme commission to oversee the Houthis’<br />
withdrawal from the cities and handing over their heavy weapons.<br />
Third: Form a national unity government to be shared equally between the legitimate<br />
coalition and the Houthis, and the insurgents start to withdraw from the areas specified<br />
under category ‘A’: Sanaa, Taiz, and Hodeida, within one month.<br />
Fourth: Amendment of the Federal Constitution draft, according to the agreement that<br />
took place during the national dialogue conference, no longer than one month after<br />
signing the settlement agreement.<br />
Fifth: Elections must take place under international supervision a year after the<br />
agreement is enforced.67<br />
This initiative has revealed a number of controversial issues and complexities in<br />
the crisis:<br />
First: The contrasting positions between the internal parties and regional players alike<br />
in this crisis. The way that the Yemeni parties dealt with this initiative seems in the eyes<br />
of observers to raise more than one question about their seriousness about reaching<br />
a peace agreement to end the war in Yemen. The Hadi Government rejected the plan<br />
and confirmed their full adherence to the Gulf initiative, its executive mechanism, the<br />
national dialogue outcomes, and relevant UN resolutions, particularly decision No.<br />
2216.68 Moreover, they considered it as a chance for the coups and an input to appoint<br />
Vice-President for the Republic that has the president powers to transfer the executive<br />
power to Houthis and to make the presidency in Yemen symbolic or partial, as in Lebanon.<br />
Second: How to apply this initiative, in order to gradually exclude President Hadi and his<br />
deputy Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar from the political scene, while there is no mention of former<br />
President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Houthis’ commander Abdel-Malek al-Houthi, who<br />
are facing strict international sanctions. The first requirements to resolve the political<br />
impasse lie, in the estimation of experts and observers, in a clear future position for both<br />
President Hadi (who has international recognition of his legitimacy to rule) and former<br />
Presidents Saleh and Abdul-<br />
Malik al-Houthi (who control<br />
the political capital and several<br />
provinces in the country).<br />
It is known that the solution to<br />
this conflict is no longer in the<br />
hands of the Yemenis alone, but<br />
also with the coalition countries<br />
led by Saudi Arabia on the one<br />
hand, and Iran (political and<br />
strategic supporter of the Houthis)<br />
on the other hand. It does not<br />
seem, according to the points<br />
132 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
of view of many experts, that Riyadh will accept any peace plan in Yemen that does not<br />
provide an acceptable long-term partner on its southern borders, and which guarantees<br />
it a clear role in the political future of Yemen to preserve security and stability. Moreover,<br />
confronts the Iranian scheme and deters the arsenal of ballistic missiles, as well as, Iran’s<br />
ambitions and expansionist projects.69<br />
On the other hand, there are many opinions that see the initiative as a compromise<br />
which gives each side its demands for the sake of security and to maintain its legitimacy,<br />
and which rejects the Houthis’s project to eliminate the ruling institution. The initiative<br />
states that the Houthis have to pull their fighters out of the main cities, Sanaa, Hodeida,<br />
and Taiz, and hand over their weapons. There were points of difference between the<br />
negotiators, but the withdrawal of militias and arms achieves the desired domestic peace,<br />
and proves the legitimacy of the governmental forces, which is also a way to measure the<br />
seriousness of the Houthis and the reality of their position, which cannot be known by<br />
the promises of their representatives in the negotiations. The international envoy’s ideas<br />
required the Houthis to create a buffer zone with Saudi Arabia, through the withdrawal<br />
of all gunmen inside Yemeni territory bordering Saudi Arabia beyond thirty kilometers to<br />
prevent justifications of engagement and aggression.<br />
C. Take Unilateral Arrangements: The failure of the negotiations resulted in Saleh-Houthi<br />
taking unilateral steps to complicate the crisis by forming a coalition ‘the Supreme Council<br />
of Yemen,’ headed by Saleh Al Samad, on July 28th, 2016. The council consisted of ten<br />
members (five Houthis and five for Saleh) and started its operations on August 15th, 2016<br />
in order to manage the country’s political, military, security, economic, administrative,<br />
and social affairs.70<br />
This unilateral move was considered as a clear violation of the country’s constitution,<br />
which was approved by the Houthis in February 2015. There were talks in Kuwait, and<br />
even a UN Security Council decision to settle the conflicting parties’ differences politically,<br />
as well as the terms of the Gulf initiative and UN Security Council Resolution No. 2216,<br />
which calls for “all Yemeni parties to refrain from taking unilateral actions that could<br />
undermine the process of political transition in the country, and invite them to stop all<br />
actions that included within the scope of legitimate government power.” Moreover, this<br />
reflects the Russian support for the Council, despite its constitutional breach, for the<br />
Yemeni problem to become an international playing card, and it seems that Moscow<br />
has found the Yemeni card to be a trump card in Syrian affairs. In addition to the United<br />
Nations’ and the UN Security Council’s abandonment of resolving the region’s affairs, and<br />
the powerful Iranian influence in Russia, there was the Russian veto against Ismail Ould<br />
Sheikh Ahmed’s Vision, which was backed by the Arab coalition, America, and Britain.<br />
Since that time, the two parties’ visions have diverged (the legitimate government and<br />
Houthi-Saleh) beyond the borders in terms of calming the situation and their demands<br />
to solve the Yemeni crisis; therefore, the legitimate government led by Hadi was<br />
summoned to:<br />
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133
• Talks on September 21st, 2016 about the transfer of the Central Bank of Sanaa<br />
controlled by Houthi-Saleh forces to Aden, in order to restore the authority of the<br />
country’s financial decisions, which was rejected by the Houthis because it would,<br />
according to economists, strangle them financially and economically, and about preparing<br />
for the internal battle for the liberation of the capital Sanaa and disarmament the Houthis<br />
of weapons through which they conducted their war, recruited fighters and bought tribal<br />
and military loyalties.71<br />
• The desire of the legitimate government to launch a new currency, because the<br />
foreign currency reserves at the Central Bank in Sanaa, which are controlled by Houthis,<br />
fell to $700 million due to the Houthis squandering about $4 billion of central bank<br />
reserves on military operations against the legitimate government. There was a move<br />
to cancel all the stolen money that the militias possessed after the deficit grew as a<br />
result of declining government revenues and a lack of economic exports in Yemen as a<br />
result of the war led by Houthi-Saleh’s forces, and to control the central bank and the<br />
foreign exchange reserves. The state also faces being unable to maintain its legitimacy<br />
by continuing to pay employees’ salaries in the public sector, in the military institutions,<br />
and securing the needs of its citizens. All this is in light of the significant decline in many<br />
Yemeni expatriates’ salaries. Moreover, there is an almost total absence of investments or<br />
production in general because of the state of destabilization in Yemen.72<br />
Saudi Arabia, the leader of the Arab coalition in Yemen, did not stand by as a spectator,<br />
and called for the two parties to negotiate, where the Arab coalition also called for a<br />
comprehensive political settlement in Yemen on September 26th, 2016 and not just<br />
a truce, as the Houthis proposed on September 25th, 2016, but a ceasefire on Saudi<br />
Arabia’s borders in exchange for halting air strikes launched by the coalition on the<br />
Houthis. The Saudi embassy in Washington also submitted a proposal for a peaceful<br />
settlement, which included four items:<br />
A. The withdrawal of forces from Sanaa and other vital cities.<br />
B. The transferal all heavy weapons and missiles from ‘Ansarullah’ and its allies to a third<br />
party.<br />
C. The formation of a national unity government.<br />
D. Respect for the security, integrity, and inviolability of international borders.73<br />
4. The results of Iranian support for the Houthis<br />
From the start of negotiations and the National Dialogue in March 2013, which<br />
continued until the end of the second half of 2016, no significant progress was made,<br />
as each party was seeking to attract the others onto its land. Therefore, the legitimate<br />
government delegation continued to confirm the need for delivering heavy and medium<br />
weapons for the legal government, and for the rebels to withdraw from the cities and<br />
their consequent control of the state and its institutions. There was also the need for<br />
a resumption of the political process by discussing the draft constitution. In contrast,<br />
the Houthi-Saleh delegation was calling for the formation of a unity government that<br />
included the rebels in an attempt to copy the experience of Hezbollah in Lebanon,<br />
which was rejected by the government. In brief, the legitimate government delegation<br />
prioritized a withdrawal, while the Houthi-Saleh delegation wanted to form a national<br />
134 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
unity government. The legitimate government delegation wanted UN resolutions to be<br />
put in place, and the Houthi delegation wanted new grounds for negotiations, based on<br />
the dismissal of UN resolutions, and to establish a new legitimacy.<br />
Package of challenges is against the resolve of crisis, including:<br />
A. The Houthi-Saleh belief that a new reality on the ground will occur when forming the<br />
political supreme council.<br />
B. The Houthi-Saleh refusal to hand over their weapons.<br />
C. The ability of the new US Administration headed by Donald Trump to support<br />
consultations which can rebuild confidence between the parties of the conflict.<br />
D. The sectarian and religious nature of the crisis has complicated matters and<br />
helped terrorist groups to gain supporters to fight on the battlefronts and a favorable<br />
environment for expansion, especially after their taking control of large parts of<br />
Hadhramaut province and other parts of Shabwa and Abyan provinces.<br />
Some evidence confirms that the rebels would prefer not to negotiate, except when<br />
necessary, and on the condition of not losing their political goals, slogans, and principles<br />
regarding their eternal struggle. Therefore, negotiation, peace, and coexistence seem to<br />
be their secondary priority, while ideological and sectarian objectives are their first and<br />
last priority, and any agreement with them is only an interim solution.<br />
Houthis has been always disabling truces and commitments through position such as:<br />
A. Refusing to commit to the Gulf initiative signed by Saleh and other political powers in<br />
November 2011.<br />
B. Refusing to commit to the outcomes of the National Dialogue, which lasted from<br />
March 2013 until January 2014.<br />
C. The decision on the division of territories, which was issued in February 2014, and<br />
which included naming six territories within the framework of the Federal State, as<br />
agreed in the National Dialogue, where the fifth territory included Saada, Sanaa, Thamar,<br />
Omran, and Azal regions, but the coup attempt in 2014 broke all these agreements.<br />
D. The partnership and peace agreement on September 21st, 2014, and its security<br />
protocol, especially the issue of disarmament.<br />
E. Evading international resolutions such as Resolution No. 2216 and trying to overcome<br />
this resolution to show their coup was a struggle against aggression, although their<br />
aggression was categorized as war crimes in Omran, Damaj, and Sanaa less than seven<br />
months before ‘Operation Decisive Storm.’ The insistence on the decisiveness of these<br />
international resolutions as a platform for any essential negotiated solution is necessary,<br />
but it should be noted that the negotiations, peace, and homeland are secondary values <br />
in the Houthi mindset, which still insists on the Iranian model.<br />
It seems that the UN delegates’ initiatives were unable to achieve a breakthrough in<br />
the crisis, due to the state of non-acceptance of toward the initiative’s terms. While<br />
the crisis continues, and Yemeni blood is still being spilled, three major cities in Yemen<br />
(Sanaa, Taiz, and Hodeida) are still under Houthi siege. Ould Sheikh presented what he<br />
called “new proposals” for the Yemeni President at the end of December 2016 and not “a<br />
solution map.” The proposals called for not compromising with the powers of President<br />
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135
Hadi as elected president, for ending the coup, for the withdrawal of militias, and for the<br />
handover of arms, according to the three terms of reference adopted by the legitimate<br />
government (the GCC initiative, results of the comprehensive National Dialogue<br />
Conference, and UN Security Council Resolution No. 2216). Moreover, this item must<br />
be signed before moving to the second proposal, which represents a political pathway<br />
and includes the appointment of a vice-President and the formation of a national unity<br />
government. The guarantor for the government to enforce these proposals is the Quartet<br />
UN Peace Committee in Yemen, and the guarantor for the Houthis is the Sultanate of<br />
Oman.<br />
Ould Sheikh has forgotten that the Houthis defaulted when Resolution No. 2216 was<br />
issued and rejected it, because it was issued under Chapter No. 7, which means that the<br />
Security Council has the right to use any means, including force, to enforce the Resolution<br />
after exhausting all peaceful means through ambassadors and international envoys.<br />
Ould Sheikh invitation for Houthis to the first Geneva Conference was a clear recognition<br />
for them as an entity, on condition for Houthis to recognize the UN resolution, and they<br />
did recognize that in the United Nations General Assembly session in 2015. After that,<br />
everyone was surprised, including Ould Sheikh, when the Houthis declared their rejection<br />
of Resolution No. 2216 at the first Geneva meeting. The second meeting that was held in<br />
Swiss Biel ended in the same way as in Geneva, as the consultations hosted by the State<br />
of Kuwait lasted for nearly three months without making any real progress on the ground<br />
to enforce Resolution No. 2216. Even the withdrawal from the three main cities in Yemen<br />
(Sanaa, Taiz, and Hodeida) was not achieved; also, the Houthis provocations of and<br />
threats to the neighboring countries did not stop, no political prisoners were released,<br />
and the handover of weapons, the return of looted funds, and the withdrawal to Saada<br />
did not happen.<br />
5. Developments in Yemen in favor of legitimacy<br />
The control of one conflicting party and its expansion in geostrategic and geopolitical<br />
areas at the expense of the other party in a crisis may give it the ability to impose<br />
conditions and change the balance of power in its favor. While the total area of Yemen<br />
is 587.881 km², the legitimate government controls nearly 399.794 km² of that area,<br />
the Houthi-Saleh militias control nearly 176.252 km², and the remaining area is being<br />
fought over by the two parties, which amounts to approximately 11,835 km² in separate<br />
areas in the country. The legitimate wider control is not limited to the main part of <br />
Yemeni territory, but it controls strategic areas and provinces such as Hadhramaut in the<br />
southeast of the country, and Marib in the northeast because of its large oil reserves that<br />
supply the whole country.74<br />
After a long period of procrastination by the Houthi-Saleh faction in accepting the<br />
international resolutions related to the settlement of the Yemeni crisis, ending their<br />
control of Sanaa, and handing over their weapons to the state, the legitimate government<br />
launched a military operation at the end of December 2016 called ‘Golden Spear’ to<br />
regain control of Hodeida, Taiz, and Sanaa from the Houthi-Saleh militias, where the<br />
legitimate forces succeeded, along with the Arab coalition that was supporting the<br />
military operations, getting back some important cities in the coastal region of Thabab-<br />
136 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
Taiz that had been under Houthi control. In addition to Alkhazzan, the Omari and Central<br />
Mountains, and Owaid and Nuba, the legitimate forces entered Nahim, Taiz, Albaida,<br />
Alwazeia Front, and Albarh on the main road linking Taiz and Hodeida. Then, in Aliari city<br />
near Ajdah in western Taiz, the legitimate forces surrounded an Omari camp where the<br />
Houthis were stationed, which forced some leaders of the Houthi-Saleh forces to join<br />
the ranks of the legitimate forces after vice-President Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar called for the<br />
military leaders to join them in confronting the Houthis and to restore legitimacy.75<br />
The legitimate forces took control of the city of Mokha on the west coast in Taiz<br />
governorate; this strategic port shifted the internal balance of power in the conflict in<br />
favor of President Hadi and his legitimate forces. In other words, controlling Mokha will<br />
cut a major supply route for weapons for the Houthi-Saleh forces; this is one of the most<br />
important sea lanes to be used for smuggling and will lead to a reduction in the suffering<br />
of the people of Taiz by opening a new outlet for them. Also, opening the road toward the<br />
port of Hodeida is to take control of the entire coast of Yemen, including its borders with<br />
Saudi Arabia, and if the legitimate forces carry on and take control of the port of Hodeida<br />
itself, the Saleh-Houthi militias will become trapped on the ground and at sea, thus<br />
becoming squeezed more and more.<br />
The liberation of Mokha, which is located 96 kilometers from the city of Taiz, is<br />
important for controlling the legitimate forces at the strategic port on the Red Sea 72 km<br />
away from Bab al-Mandab port. The Yemeni national army controls the city Mokha, which<br />
overlooks the most important transport routes (the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean,<br />
and East Africa), thus enabling the Yemeni government to secure an international corridor<br />
through which more than 1,000 ships pass per day. Moreover, securing the western coast<br />
of Yemen from Mokha to Mede port in the west of the country will prevent the smuggling<br />
of weapons, and the empire of the Houthi-Saleh in Mokha will also vanish.76<br />
Based on the above, several<br />
scenarios can be predicted for the<br />
future of Yemen:<br />
A. The return of conflict: The<br />
return of widespread conflict will<br />
occur, especially in light of the<br />
Houthi-Saleh’s realization that they<br />
can still make gains on the ground<br />
by controlling Sanaa, and their<br />
announcement of the Supreme<br />
Council of Yemen. Despite their loss of<br />
the strategic locations of Hodeida and<br />
Taiz with the resumption of ‘Operation<br />
Decisive Storm,’ this scenario requires<br />
huge financial costs and new political<br />
calculations under the direction of the<br />
new US administration.<br />
Source: http://cutt.us/AprG<br />
source: http://cutt.us/8pY5q<br />
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B. Continuing negotiations and launching initiatives: This scenario assumes that the<br />
crisis in Yemen can be resolved in a truce through international pressure on all parties to<br />
accept the UN envoy’s initiative. However, this will depend on how serious the parties<br />
are about the conflict in light of the rebels’ unwillingness to accept the international<br />
resolutions. This scenario is unlikely.<br />
C. The political solution: This solution will follow the legitimate forces’ military successes<br />
and strategic victory, making the Houthi-Saleh forces think about handing over their<br />
weapons to the state and ending their control of Sanaa after the legitimate forces’<br />
control of many cities and strategic areas. Observers agree that the liberation of Mokha<br />
is an important milestone on the ground, which opens up a new phase to complete the<br />
liberation of the remaining areas still under the control of Houthis. Once control of Taiz<br />
and Hodeida is restored, this means three ports (Mokha, Hodeida, and Salif), as well as<br />
the strategic Bab al-Mandab, will have been lost by the Houthis, in other words, the loss<br />
of their control of all seaports and Sanaa.<br />
Third axis<br />
The future of Iran’s role in the Syrian crisis… A rise or fall?<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
Resolving the internal crisis between the conflicting parties and their regional and<br />
international allies at the expense of one of them will never calm down the crisis. The<br />
most important phase in the history of internal or international crises and wars is the<br />
so-called the ‘next step.’ Each side out of the victorious parties will make political and<br />
strategic calculations to maximize their gains, even at the expense of other members of<br />
the winning team. Iran and Russia, whose interests coincided in Syria, backed the Syrian<br />
President Bashar Assad’s Regime with money and weapons to win the battle, and strongly<br />
intensified their support since the beginning of June until the end of December 2016<br />
to break the opposition using excessive force by land and air on Aleppo. Consequently,<br />
Aleppo fall before receiving the new US president Donald Trump got into power in Jan.<br />
20th, 2016.<br />
When the battle had still not finished, the Syrian Regime announced on December 22nd,<br />
2016 its control of Aleppo along with Russian-Iranian support to change the balance of<br />
power in Syria. Then, there were differences between Russia and Iran which broke out<br />
over the Russian-Turkish agreement to end hostilities in Syria at the end of December<br />
2016 without Syria or Iran being present in a manner that made observers of Syrian<br />
affairs ask questions about possible ways of ending the crisis in Syria. Whether because<br />
of the escalating disputes over the involved parties’ roles in the Syrian conflict, similar to<br />
the Hezbollah militias or because of the increasing possibility of an agreement between<br />
Moscow and Washington under the new US President’s administration, these may not<br />
correspond to Iran’s interests. Moreover, Iran’s expansionist strategy in the region will be<br />
impacted by the Russian orientations and the new US president trends that will be on the<br />
contrary of his predecessor toward Iran.<br />
138 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
First: The axes of Iran blocking for political settlement to the Syrian crisis<br />
States not interested in the political settlement of a crisis usually go to the military<br />
option to resolve it in favor of strategic partners to implement regional and international<br />
agendas. In this context, Iran has used the military option to bury the Syrian Revolution<br />
and the ongoing crisis for Assad’s benefit. The Iranian Republic’s position was also made<br />
clear through the announced political trends at the previous Geneva conferences as well<br />
as its unlimited military support for the Assad Regime during the second half of 2016<br />
to take control of Aleppo and to end the crisis for several reasons in order to block any<br />
political settlement:<br />
1. The Political Axis:<br />
This point can be considered central to Iran’s policy, because Iran sees Bashar Assad<br />
as a red line that cannot be crossed for ideological reasons, in addition to privileges<br />
granted by Assad for Iran’s influence in Syria. Therefore, Iran defends Assad’s Regime at<br />
all international forums, as Syria is considered a strategic objective for Iran, as it lies on<br />
a direct sectarian route that extends from Iraq, through Syria, to Lebanon, and then to<br />
the Arabian Gulf. Moreover, this expansion project evolved in Ahmadinejad’s era with<br />
the inauguration of the ‘fifth development plan’ within the framework of the (Twentieth<br />
Horizon), which was founded on a sectarian basis to allow Iran by 2025 to be “in first place<br />
regionally at all levels.”77<br />
Iran realizes that the fall of Bashar Assad will cause dangers for its borders, and it will<br />
lose a key ally and a strong card to use against the West and Israel, while its success will<br />
make Syria subject to Iran as in Iraq. If that happens, the scope of Iran’s influence will<br />
extend from Western Afghanistan to Beirut, which in turn will radically shift the balance<br />
of power in the region and bring about Iran’s dream to be the dominant power in the<br />
Arabian Gulf. This new situation would allow Iran to force the major international powers<br />
to abandon any thoughts about destroying Iran, due to the fact that its influence, which<br />
is expanding gradually, may pose unpredictable risks, and give greater legitimacy to the<br />
Regime inside Iran or other countries in the region.<br />
In connection with the above, Syria serves Iran’s broader strategy in the region; it<br />
represents a vital link between Tehran and Hezbollah, which is considered one of the<br />
most important results of the Iranian Revolution. They are considered members of an<br />
axis of resistance against Israel and Western ambitions in the region. Syria also provides<br />
Tehran with defenses for its arms corridors to Hezbollah in Lebanon on the one hand,<br />
and addresses – according to Iran’s strategy – the Arab regional axis, which is designed to<br />
contain the expanding geopolitical power of Iran on the other hand. Syria is at the heart of<br />
Iran’s strategy, and the Iranian leader Ali Khamenei said in August 2016 “If we do not fight<br />
in Aleppo and Samarra, we have to fight in Kermanshah and Tehran.”78 Iranian thinker<br />
Mehdi Tayyip also said in 2014 “If we attack the enemies and they want to take either<br />
Syria or Ahwaz, the priority will be for Syria, if Syria survives, we can restore Ahwaz, but if<br />
we lose Syria, we cannot keep on Tehran.” Then Mohammad Ali Jafari said in November<br />
2016, “Iran alone decides the fate of Syria, and the major powers have to negotiate with<br />
them to determine the fate of countries in the region including Syria.” These statements<br />
are evidence of its strategy, so Iran did the following:<br />
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139
1. Rejected the Turkish operation launched by Ankara on August 24th 2016 in Northern<br />
Syria in Jarablos to protect the Turkish border, and to cut the road to the Syrian Kurdish<br />
Democratic Party in order to control Jarablos and prevent them from joining the Kurds<br />
in Syria’s northwest in Afrin region, which is considered a strategic threat to its national<br />
security.79<br />
2. Rejected the truce agreement signed by the US and Russian powers in September<br />
2016 to establish a ‘truce’ between Assad and the opposition factions to stop the war,<br />
which was introduced on the first day of Eid al-Adha on September 12th 2016, and<br />
ended on September 19th 2016 due to US-Russian differences about the list of terrorist<br />
organizations and identifying moderate opposition and armed opposition, as well as the<br />
simultaneous withdrawal of Bashar Assad’s and opposition forces from the strategic road<br />
of Castelo.<br />
3. Stood against the political process adopted by Russia and Turkey at the end of<br />
December 2016, which caused a conflict with the Russians, who do not mind Assad’s<br />
exclusion from the first international understanding with the United States for a<br />
political solution to the Syrian situation. Iran qualifies information about the presence<br />
of Hezbollah in Syria, the Syrian state post-war, its efforts to restore the Assad regime.<br />
Iran also is not accepting any Kurdish canton or self-management in Syria. The reason is<br />
that Iran afraid of the Iranian Kurds who are erased from the Iranian political scene, to<br />
do similar political demands. And, restoring Assad’s influence in Syria, means the Iranian<br />
hegemony on the borders of Assad’s state.80<br />
This refutes the responses of the former Commander of Revolutionary Guards Major<br />
General Hamedani (killed in Syria in October 2015) on the question of the Iranian people,<br />
“Why did we go to Syria?” which was published in November 2016, and that “Syria is the<br />
first country to officially recognize Iran’s Revolution and closed the Iraq-Mediterranean<br />
oil pipeline during the Iraq-Iran war, which inflicted heavy losses in Iraq, thus Syria<br />
sacrificed its gains, as they got huge profits from transit and transmission of oil through its<br />
territory. Syria also provided Iran with ammunition, after many countries did not deliver<br />
our purchased weapons under the pretext that the revolution will fall. Also during the<br />
Iran-Iraq war, Syria gave us a missile, while no country gave us, at a time that Syria had<br />
agreements with the Soviet Union and disabled these agreements for Iran.”81<br />
2. The Military Axis<br />
The Iranian military role manifested in Syria through waged sectarian militias from<br />
Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, resulting in a growing Iranian influence<br />
in Syria. Iran also had control over the decision of Assad’s regime through deploying<br />
these militias in Syria to fight against the Syrian people under the sectarian slogans<br />
and committed brutal massacres against them. These militias took over the Al-Qusayr<br />
countryside west of Homs, the majority of the border with Lebanon, and the outskirts<br />
of Damascus. They also participated in the battles for Aleppo and the surrounding<br />
countryside and tried to buy off militia thugs to weaken ‘the Syrian Arab army’ in order<br />
for its military force to reign supreme in Syria. Initially, Iran’s fight in Syria was described<br />
by Ali Khamenei as immigration, Jihad, and defending ‘Ahl Albeit,” He also said that the<br />
140 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
door of the martyrs was open again. He then summarized all these terms as a “war on the<br />
infidels” in October 2016.82<br />
The total number of Iranian forces in Syria is estimated to be than 70,000, including the<br />
Guard’s elite forces (8,000-10,000), the army (5,600), the Iraqi militia (about 20,000),<br />
the Afghan militias Fatimiyoun (15,000-20,000), the Lebanese Hezbollah (7,000-10,000),<br />
the Pakistani militias Zaynabioun, and from other countries (5,000-7,000). The most<br />
important point according to internal reports by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the<br />
remaining troops in the Syrian<br />
army number fewer than<br />
50,000 soldiers, and the forces<br />
of the Revolutionary Guards<br />
are greater than the Syrian<br />
forces, so they dominate the<br />
scene there.83<br />
Iran did not stop there;<br />
Brigadier General Mohammad<br />
Ali Falaki announced the<br />
formation of cross-border<br />
Shiite military forces called<br />
the ‘Shiite Free Army’ in<br />
Syria. According to Falaki, the Shiite Free Army consists of the Fatimiyoun Brigade, the<br />
Zaynabioun Brigade, the Haidarioun Brigade with Iraq’s Shiites, and Hezbollah, which<br />
are divided into the Lebanon Shiites and other Shiites in Syria. Most of the Hezbollah<br />
members in Syria are descended from the Damascus Shiites, Nabl and Zahra. All of these<br />
Shiite military brigades form the Shiite Free Army led by Qassem Suleimani.84 Thus, Iran’s<br />
interference in Syria and its rejection of a political settlement has taken on “a sectarian<br />
character,” and it does not hesitate to show its sectarian goal in coming to Syria.<br />
source: http://cutt.us/c3SRl<br />
Second: The Inconsistency of Iranian-Russian interests in Syria<br />
“In politics, there is no lasting friendship or lasting enmity, but there are permanent<br />
interests, wherever the interests of two or more States consist, the relationship will be<br />
strengthened, and if not, the relation will experience tension.” Consistent with this rule,<br />
the Russian-Iranian interests conflicted in Aleppo at the end of December 2016 despite<br />
the convergence and agreement between the two countries to break the opposition<br />
and bury the Revolution before Trump, but Russia has ruled out Iran and Assad of the<br />
negotiations with Turkey on cease-fire in Aleppo, this provoked Iran, so it worked to block<br />
this agreement repeatedly, to inform Moscow that any future agreement must pass<br />
from Tehran. In other words, Russia’s disregard for Iran is also a message for Tehran that<br />
Moscow’s role in Syria is not as the role of America in Iraq, but to serve its interests, not to<br />
hand over Syria to Iran.85<br />
Russia has long been a concern with the demise of Syria as Russian politicians<br />
acknowledge that the waiver of Syria will bring about heavy economic losses and<br />
cancellations of investment, as well as major military contracts signed with Damascus;<br />
thus losing its’ strategic advantages within the region. Russian-based investments in<br />
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141
Syria amounted to $19.4billion, and opportunities to export goods to Syria with an<br />
annual average of $1.1 billion86 are in place. Russia also has infrastructure, energy and<br />
tourism companies based in Syria; for example, the natural gas company Astroa Trans<br />
Jazz, which implements projects worth $1.1 billion dollars and has established a plant<br />
200km east of Homs. Astroa Trans Jazz also provides the technical support for the Arab<br />
Gas Pipeline project. Moreover, the TAT Naft Russian Energy Company also has a project<br />
with the Syrian national oil company, as it does with other companies within the steel,<br />
transportation, nuclear energy and agricultural equipment fields; its’ opportunity to<br />
participate in the reconstruction projects of Syria are estimated to be $60 billion.87<br />
Additionally, Russia has armament contracts with the Assad regime - estimated to be<br />
worth $4 billion in 2011 - and Syria is ranked seventh internationally amongst the top<br />
buyers of Russian weapons. Between 2000 and 2010, Russia sold weapons worth $1.5<br />
billion to Syria and exported 17% of the total global arms exports annually. The Middle<br />
East accommodates 16% of those exports - the second-largest market for Russian arms<br />
after South-East Asia.88<br />
Due to the Syrian crisis, Russia will lose both these economic and military contracts as it<br />
is in favor of the Russian economy; they will lose the economic value for the waiving $9.8<br />
billion of the total Syrian debt to the Soviet Union, amounting to $13.4 billion. Russia has<br />
preferred Syria for some time, since the loss of the Libyan card and the size of Russia’s<br />
economic losses resulting from the fall of the regime; as Russia did not take any spoils<br />
from the Libyan war, only the reconstruction contracts.89<br />
Moscow fears it will be held out of a new political equation, with Russian decision<br />
makers considering Syria to be the last card of the region since losing Libya. A Russian<br />
presence in Syria ensures them to be an influential figure in the new equation within<br />
Syria and the region on a whole. If the political map is re-arranged to maximize the<br />
strategic advantages, it ensures its’ old dream to restore the Tsarist Russia glories of the<br />
Mediterranean. Russia also realizes that the demise of the Syrian card will exclude it<br />
forever - in the context of the European and US balance of power and the framework of<br />
distribution regarding roles and spoils.90<br />
An observer of the Russian scene believes that Moscow will not alter its’ position<br />
towards the Syrian crisis, utilizing political maneuverings in different directions despite<br />
the international pressures exerted upon them. This indicates that Russia is seeking<br />
to avenge the indignity of receiving criticism - since the fall of Iraq and up until Libya’s<br />
demise - thus confirming its’ international prestige. This attitude reflects the keenness<br />
of President Putin to confirm his worth as Russia’s leader and not as a weak state under<br />
the American hegemony. Therefore, Putin will inevitability take a strong position to<br />
defend Russia’s vital interests, thus maintaining its’ foothold and strategic platform for its’<br />
interests in the certain region.91<br />
Furthermore, Russia aims to maintain the Tartus naval base, which has a significant<br />
strategic and military importance along the Mediterranean coast. This base is one of<br />
Russian’s key naval bases; it is a crossing gate for the region and a foothold for Russia in<br />
the Mediterranean. Upon realizing the strategic advantages of Tartus, the former Soviet<br />
142 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
Union signed an agreement with Syria in 1971 during the Cold War to build a Soviet<br />
military base in Tartus to support the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean.92 The priority of<br />
this base declined amongst Russian politicians with the collapse of the Soviet Union in<br />
1991, yet gained priority again during the first decade of the new millennium. The new<br />
leaders’ strategies aimed to restore relations with old allies and create new allies within<br />
the region; such as Putin and Medvedev, who have led Russia since the beginning of the<br />
new millennium.93<br />
Therefore, it is not surprising that Moscow will protect its’ base in Tartus, particularly<br />
since the Ukraine threatened to close the Sevastopol base - the largest foreign Russian<br />
base on the Black Sea - because of differences between the two countries; thus limiting<br />
Russia’s future role within the region.94<br />
It was expected that the Kremlin would state its’ dissatisfaction on 29 December 2016<br />
regarding the Iranian’s behavior during the battle of Aleppo and beyond; as Tehran had<br />
worked to show its’ control on the battle as it primarily took to the ground through its’<br />
allied militias. At that point, Tehran attempted to record their military achievements in<br />
Aleppo by employing and amplifying the militias’ role - shown by Qassem Suleimani’s<br />
presence in the Citadel of Aleppo – and, in return, downplaying Russia’s military role that<br />
relied on air strikes; however, the decisive factor was on the ground. Iran also attempted<br />
to derail the agreement after its’ collusion with ISIL in Palmyra and their militias’<br />
aggressive campaign against innocent populations in ‘Wadi Barada’ in the Damascus<br />
countryside, as well as the continued shelling of towns and villages in rural Aleppo areas.<br />
Third: The Iranian-Russian contentious issues on Syria<br />
The Russian-Iranian dispute manifested during the agreement between Russia and<br />
Turkey on 27 December 2016, which displaced civilians and revolutionaries from Aleppo<br />
without Iran or its’ ally Assad be aware; as Russia holds the political decision in Syria and<br />
the allies are purely for implementation. Iran tried to block the evacuation in Aleppo and<br />
the Russians threatened to open fire during the evacuation process that included the<br />
Iranian and Assad regime militias. Thus, Russian warplanes targeting the Iranian militias<br />
in the al-Rashideen area acts as a message for Iran to implement the decisions taken by<br />
Russia; Iran then complied with Moscow’s desire, thus revealing the Russian pressure on<br />
Iran and showing them to be a secondary player in Syria. However, the mullahs of Iran felt<br />
their influence in Syria was declining in favor of an alliance between Russia and Turkey<br />
- contrary to what was planned by the Iranians since the military intervention early in<br />
the conflict, i.e., to transform Syria into an Iranian influence as they had done in Iraq. In<br />
addition, part of this scheme was to give the Syrian conflict a pure sectarian dimension, as<br />
was the Lebanese Hezbollah’s military intervention.95<br />
Iran expressed its’ anger at the UN Security Council Resolution No. 2328, provided<br />
by Russia on 26 December 2016, which guaranteed the protection of civilians from<br />
violence; Tehran has recognized that the events were going against their own interests.<br />
Ali Shamkhani, the Secretary-General of the Supreme Council of the Iranian national<br />
security, stated that such a decision would pave the way for more tension in Syria and<br />
benefit the terrorists. This became the first incident of Russian-Iranian disagreements.<br />
Having pushed Iran to one side, the Russian positions rolled on after the battle of Aleppo<br />
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143
to confirm that the city will not be left in the hands of the Syrian regime, militias of Iran or<br />
even for the Lebanese Hezbollah. While Tehran was hoping to address a speech of ‘divine<br />
victory’ that confirmed the dominance of Iran over Syria’s future - attributing the victory<br />
achieved in Aleppo to the Iranian militias exclusively - instead Aleppo is now besieging<br />
Iran and driving it into a corner.96<br />
Iran considers its’ interest in the military escalation and continues to fighting until they<br />
change their demographic composition by concluding agreements on excluding militants<br />
and their families from the cities and certain regions (due to military pressure and siege<br />
activity) to be replaced by the original Shiite inhabitants; from Idlib to Damascus and<br />
the Lebanese borders. This explains the attempts to ignite the situation and violate the<br />
ceasefire agreement.97<br />
The Russian-Turkish agreement showed confusion, and resulted in the Syrian Foreign<br />
Minister, Walid Muallem, visiting the Iranian capital on 30 December 2016 to meet with<br />
his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif, to discuss the content of the agreement<br />
and its impact on the Syrian regime, as well as the Iranian role. This is because they<br />
involved two ironies, which largely concerned Syrians and Iranians:<br />
First, only Russia and Turkey completed the agreement, despite the strong Iranian role<br />
in the Syrian equation;<br />
Second, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mouloud Ihsanoglu, stressed the absence of<br />
any role for Assad in Syria’s future and his call to Iran to put pressure on their militias to<br />
respect the ceasefire agreement is a clear reference to the so-called Hezbollah.98<br />
The Iranian-Russian status shows an escalating dispute since the Russian’s intervened<br />
in the Syrian crisis; whether through the issue of Assad’s continued power, the future of<br />
the Iranian militias, the Russian relationship strategy with Israel, or the Iranian ambitions<br />
in obtaining naval port in Syria. This change of pattern by the Russians when dealing with<br />
Iran is based on their international interests with the United States, the West, Israel, and<br />
Turkey; meaning that the decision is in Russia’s hand and Iran are only implementing.<br />
Thus, Russia suggests a need to curb Iran’s growing role in Syria and paves the way for<br />
this by buying the loyalty of thugs and turning them from the Iranian side to the Russian<br />
through the offering of money and weapons. Russia has also managed to attract various<br />
military arms, such as the Quds Palestinian Brigade in Aleppo and the Desert Falcons<br />
militia deployed in the Alawite areas of the Syrian coast.99<br />
Among the Iranian-Russian disputes in Syria are:<br />
A. The dispute over the future of Iranian militias in Syria - The most prominent major<br />
dispute between Russia and Iran is the future of the Iranian militias in Syria. This issue has<br />
forced Iran to kill the Syrian people in Damascus and its’ countryside, as well as Homs and<br />
Aleppo. Iran is seeking to consolidate its influence by cloning dozens of sectarian militias -<br />
like Hezbollah - to ensure its’ sectarian project. This collided with Russia’s interests, which<br />
are far from the Iranian religious ideology. Thus they refused to fight sectarian battles<br />
on the one hand, nor the presence of undisciplined sectarian militias along the borders<br />
of Israel. Therefore, Russia facilitated Israel in targeting Hezbollah leaders through<br />
a security agreement between Moscow and Tel Aviv. Iran then planted Hezbollah in<br />
144 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
southern Lebanon to blackmail Israel and push them to enter into negotiations. After Iran<br />
converted the conflict from Israel to the sectarian conflict (Sunni-Shiite), the region gave<br />
orders to Hezbollah to end the conflict with Israel. The Iranian officials state that Russia is<br />
not pleased with Hezbollah’s presence in Syria. Therefore it deals with the Iranian militias<br />
per the Israeli vision and its’ understanding with Washington DC on the vital task of<br />
militias in alliance with Russia in Syria or with Washington in Iraq.100<br />
When Iran tried to escape the Russian orders, Russian fighter planes targeted the Iranian<br />
fighters on the ground; resulting in the deaths of high-ranking officers and the bombing<br />
of more than one Almolouk barrier near Homs, Khanasir and north of Aleppo. The pace<br />
of the Russian bombing targeted the headquarters of IRGC and the Hezbollah militia<br />
in the villages of Nebl and Zahra, yet Russia has recognized this and justified that it was<br />
their error. Therefore, they targeted the al-Nujaba Iraqi Shiite movement in Mount Azzan<br />
(south of Aleppo), as well as, a barrier for these militias on the Khanasir road in Aleppo,<br />
this indicates the depth of differences and settled accounts to take over Syria.101<br />
B. The Iranian-Russian dispute over Assad’s survival: This point formed the most<br />
sensitive and influential part of the relations between the two nations; Iran believes<br />
that the survival of Assad is a red line that cannot be bypassed, at least as it appears<br />
in the Iranian political statements of the media and the suffering of heavy losses to<br />
maintain the regime. However, Russia does not adhere to the Assad regime and does<br />
not mind his departure - the first international understanding with the United States<br />
for a political solution to the Syrian file. Iran is now convinced that Moscow was using<br />
Assad as a card to gain new interests and is working to replace Assad with someone that<br />
ensures its’ interests in Syria and the region and that the differences relate to the date of<br />
his departure before or after the transitional period. Iran has stated on more than one<br />
occasion that there is no consensus with Russia regarding the future of Assad. Tehran is<br />
betting its’ the long-term military solution to impose the survival of Assad, while Moscow<br />
seeks to have a limited time intervention and looks to involve Washington and regional<br />
countries to reach a solution that maintains all its’ interests.102<br />
C. Dispute over Iran’s sectarianism in Syria: Since the Khomeini era of 1979, he stressed<br />
the Shiite characters of Iran and began to deploy Shiism in the region based on the Shiite<br />
central. Tehran also focused its’ strategy to establish military arms that have aided its’<br />
expansion into Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen through doctrinal links by facilitating the<br />
involvement of many Shiites to defend the Assad regime. Those Shiites fought against<br />
the Sunni majority, which led to the sectarian conflict to create an expansive Shiite entity<br />
that exceeds Iran’s national borders; stretching from Iran to Lebanon, including Iraq and<br />
Syria, to ultimately re-establish the Persian Empire. Russia insists upon the possibility<br />
of establishing a federal republic and is aware of the Iranian concerns to expand in the<br />
region, as well as its’ rival not exceeding Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Russia knows<br />
that Iran is orbiting American politics, especially in cooperation over decades regarding<br />
Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and is also aware of<br />
America’s complicit position with Iran in their nuclear program. Also, the Iranian media<br />
insulting America is just a local media consumption, while the official Iranian position<br />
towards the US strategy is clear in the Middle East.103<br />
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145
D. Disputes over the nature of the relationship with the Gulf States: The goals of Russia<br />
differ from Iran in terms of the nature of relations with the Arab Gulf countries and the<br />
world in general. Russia looks forward to solid political and economic relations with the<br />
Arab Gulf states. Conversely, Iran increases its’ state of hostility with the surrounding Arab<br />
nations with more interventions, harassments, and abuses, as well as conjuring up issues<br />
that stand in a region on the edge of tension and confrontation. It is known that the Gulf<br />
States own the solution of the Syrian crisis and that the role of these States is necessary to<br />
reach understandings and agreements between the regime and major influential powers<br />
in the Syrian opposition factions. Therefore, Russia could be an accepted mediator, while<br />
the presence of Iran could complicate any efforts to resolve the crisis.104<br />
Fourth: Aspects of Russian-Iranian differences in Syria<br />
Military: The Russian-Iranian dispute worsened during the last month of 2016, thus<br />
reflected in the Russian air force targeting the Iranian militia that attempted to disrupt<br />
the Russian-Turkish agreement in Aleppo. Tehran previously attempted this when Iran<br />
attempted to sidle out of Russian orders and the Russian pilots targeting the Iranian<br />
fighters on the ground, resulting in the deaths of high-ranking officers; the air force<br />
bombed more than one Almolouk barrier near Homs, Khanasir and north of Aleppo.<br />
The pace of the Russian bombing campaign targeted the headquarters of the IRGC and<br />
Hezbollah militia in the villages of Nebl and Zahra; Russia has recognised this and justified<br />
that it occurred in error, going on to target the Alnujaba Iraqi Shiite movement in Mount<br />
Azzan (south of Aleppo) and a barrier for these militias on Khanasir road in Aleppo - thus<br />
indicating the depth of differences and the settlement accounts to take over Syria.105<br />
Russia bought the loyalties of thugs and turned them from the Iranian side to the Russian<br />
by offering money and weapons, as well as attracting various military arms such as<br />
the Quds Palestinian Brigade in Aleppo and the Desert Falcons militia deployed in the<br />
Alawite areas of the Syrian coast. Thus, the Iranians respond by attempting to disable the<br />
ceasefire agreement and block any political settlement in Syria.<br />
Security: Iran attempted, through its’ intervention, to restore the role of a police officer<br />
by way of an understanding with Washington and Moscow; they pledged to transfer the<br />
struggle against Israel to sectarian conflicts, depending on its’ military arms (Lebanese<br />
Hezbollah, Iraqi Popular Shiite Mobilization, and Houthis in Yemen). Then, it prompted<br />
Hezbollah to the south of Lebanon to improve conditions for negotiations with Israel and<br />
attempted to control the border in the Golan area to protect Israel and pressurize it at the<br />
same time to reap regional and international gains. Israel agreed with Russia with regards<br />
to Syria maintaining its national security and targeted Hezbollah in Damascus countryside<br />
and Quneitra; thus, killing prominent leaders of the party.106<br />
Politically: Russia knows that Iran orbits American politics - especially in cooperation for<br />
decades in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria - and is aware of<br />
the American’s complicit position with Iran in its’ nuclear program. In addition,<br />
the Iranian media insulting America is just for local media consumption, while<br />
the official Iranian position towards the US strategy is clear in the Middle East.<br />
Yet the United States is concerned that the Iranian position in the region and its’<br />
alliance with the Russians regarding the Syrian war. In the last American-Russian<br />
146 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
understanding, there was an agreement on common data dictating a political<br />
solution in Syria for the Syrians alone, meaning the removal of any future role for<br />
Iran in Syria. 107<br />
Economically: Tehran has since been trying its’ intervention with the Assad regime to<br />
launch a direct maritime line with Syria; to increase trade exchanges between the two<br />
countries, as shipping is the main source of global economy. Where sea-lanes play an<br />
important role in the formation of this trade movement - and due to its importance -<br />
Iran is seeking the Mediterranean Sea to diversify their sources of income. Therefore,<br />
they need to control Damascus and the borders between Syria and Lebanon to ensure<br />
their access to the Mediterranean and the finance of its militias. Therefore, the Iranians<br />
do not accept settlements that will end the Syrian war as it would be considered an<br />
abandonment of Iran’s regional ambitions. Thus, the Russian-Israeli-US understandings<br />
came to curtail due to the role of Iran in Syria.<br />
Fifth: The Iranian escalation boundaries with Turkey on Syria<br />
Iran and Turkey have succeeded over the past six years to neutralize their differences<br />
over the conflict in Syria, even though these differences are not marginal as they<br />
stood next to one another at the conflict parties - in parallel with the breadth of these<br />
differences. However, when an international and regional supportive trend appeared<br />
to reach a political settlement for the Syrian crisis, disputes were brought back to the<br />
forefront again, which was evident during the trilateral Turkish-Iranian-Russian talks on<br />
20 December 2016; or through the Turkish-Russian bilateral negotiations that ended<br />
with a declaration of a cease-fire, where the differences had reached such a high extent<br />
that the existing policy no longer had any importance or relevance - especially in Tehran<br />
and Ankara. However, that does not mean that the Iranian escalation against Turkey will<br />
reach an unprecedented phase, especially since Tehran cannot risk entering into an open<br />
conflict with Turkey in Syria - at least at the current stage. 108<br />
Hence, it is more likely that Iran will adopt a so-called ‘policy of waiting’ until foreseeing<br />
what will accrue in the Astana negotiations of 23 January 2017 and the meetings of<br />
the Geneva 4 which will take place on 8 February 2017. This is because it is concerned<br />
currently with maintaining relationships with both Turkey and Russia until the positions of<br />
the new US President will be clear with regards to the nuclear deal, or accusations to Iran<br />
of supporting terrorism; despite senior Iranian officials welcoming the Russian efforts to<br />
cooperate with Turkey to strengthen the chances of success of the Astana negotiations<br />
that aimed to enhance the ceasefire agreement reached on 20 December 2016. Also,<br />
by agreeing on the basic themes in upcoming talks that will take place in Geneva on 8<br />
February, this does not negate the many fears inside Iran concerning the consequences<br />
that can be imposed by the high level of current understandings between Russia and<br />
Turkey, or the potential shifts in Russia’s policy towards Syria.<br />
The Russian-Turkey cooperation in the fight against ISIL in Albab City ascends the Iranian<br />
fears, given that it can broaden the scope of the Turkish influence inside Syria; particularly<br />
with reports indicating that Turkey is seeking to ensure the preservation of its’ military<br />
existence in Albab city, even after the end of the military operations launched by the<br />
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147
‘Euphrates Shield’ forces which received Russian support in air strikes against ISIL sites.<br />
This suggests, per the vision of Tehran, that Turkey is trying to adopt the same policies<br />
that have already been pursued in Iraq, which is based on the consecration of the military<br />
role in Syria to preserve gains achieved by either the ‘Euphrates Shield’ or to expand the<br />
scope of security and political understandings with Russia. 109<br />
Here, one can state that Iran was keen to adopt a ‘policy of waiting’ when dealing with<br />
those understandings, due a fear of consequences that can be imposed, that cannot deny<br />
its’ strong need to maintain strong ties with the two countries; especially as a situation<br />
that may escalate with Trump’s arrival to the White House. Indicators began to emerge<br />
with some lawmakers hinting for an act that would ensure the State Department include<br />
Revolutionary Guards within the terrorist organizations – those that threaten the security<br />
of the world.<br />
Sixth: Absence of US variables in the Syrian crisis<br />
While Russia has become the most influential figure in the Syrian equation throughout<br />
the crisis in general (and during 2016 specifically), the American role declined in turn.<br />
The era of American hegemony in the Middle East ended during the reign of former US<br />
President Barak Obama, who adopted a principle based on two main axes:<br />
First: The former American president believed that America’s strength stems from<br />
inside cohesion, rather than international relations, of its foreign authority. 110 Also, the US<br />
national security does not pass within international politics but is reinforced by a strong<br />
society; such as the ‘Obama Care project.<br />
Second: Obama’s political beliefs seek to actively contain the states, which were<br />
considered to be quarreling until shortly before he entered the White House; enemy<br />
states such as China, Iran, and Russia, which have been allowed to move in the region.<br />
Many important meetings and conferences regarding the Syrian crisis have taken place<br />
without the United States; the latest was the Iranian-Turkish-Russian trilateral meeting,<br />
held in December 2016. Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated that the Russian-<br />
Turkish-Iranian trio-frame would be the most effective way to solve the Syrian crisis,<br />
discussing the ‘failure’ of the United States and the international support group for<br />
Syria., whilst also stressing the importance of the United Nations in resolving the Syrian<br />
crisis. The United States has tried to play down its’ absence from the trilateral meeting<br />
in Moscow over the Syrian conflict, stating that it was ‘not ignoring’ the issue and that it<br />
does not reflect a decline in America’s influence in the Middle East. Remarkably, the lack<br />
of any Arab or Gulf side at the meeting indicated that the Arab parties are ineffective in<br />
resolving Arab crises, either in global nor regional meetings. 111<br />
The Israeli strategic ally of Washington DC in the region selected its’ tactical long<br />
perspective over four red lines and these will not move without an intervention into the<br />
Syrian multilateral conflict:<br />
148 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
A. Preventing Assad forces from approaching the ceasefire lines in the occupied Golan;<br />
B. Preventing Hezbollah and Iran from exploiting the war in Syria to smuggle<br />
sophisticated weapons, especially missiles into southern Lebanon to support the military<br />
arsenal of Hezbollah;<br />
C. Preventing the positioning of armed groups fighting Assad forces and his allies<br />
near Golan;<br />
D. Preventing the Russian intervention in the Syrian war from obstructing the movement<br />
of the Israeli army from achieving the three previous objectives.<br />
In the past, Israel succeeded in forcing its’ opponents or competitors not to skip the four<br />
abovementioned lines during the Syrian conflict. As an observer who does not interfere in<br />
the events except for procedures required by the red lines, the Israeli air force launched<br />
several raids on Syrian army sites near Golan under the pretext of preventing the arrival<br />
of Iranian weapons to Hezbollah. Tel Aviv announced on 28 November 2016 that its’<br />
warplanes raided a site for ISIL in the south of Golan, yet the Israeli military stated that the<br />
raid was a response for ISIL targeting the army near the ceasefire line. 112<br />
More importantly, Israel seized a recognition from Russia of its’ interests in Syria,<br />
where Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in his speech before the United Nations<br />
in September 2016 that ‘Russia recognises the right of Israel to defend its’ interests in<br />
Syria’, as evidenced by the Russian reaction to the Israeli attacks against the Syrian army;<br />
that Israel’s estimation was true and that Russia would not stand against Israel’s freedom<br />
to work on the Syrian front. These measures have enabled Israel to achieve several key<br />
objectives until the latter half of September 2016:<br />
First: The absence of a cost component because of achieving its’ goals without the need<br />
for large-scale military intervention in conflict with Syria;<br />
Second: Pushing Hezbollah to focus on the Syrian front to help Assad instead of directing<br />
great interest in Front of the conflict with Israel;<br />
Third: Israel’s ensuring of Iran’s preoccupation to defend its’ interests in the Arab region,<br />
instead of seeking to produce nuclear weapons, and then Israel becoming an observer to<br />
win new allies from the regional and international powers involved in the Syrian conflict,<br />
with them being the only regional power that does not drain in the conflict; this enables a<br />
long-term strategy to reap big gains when reorganising the influential regional powers in<br />
the area. 113<br />
Israeli analysts have been questioned over Syria’s future, and the observer position of<br />
Israel will remain unchanged until the end of the first half of 2017 at least. Then, it will<br />
draw lines between Russia and the United States to end the Syrian conflict, especially<br />
with Trump’s trend to adopt a conciliatory policy with Russia on this file. Also, Israel<br />
is waiting for steps to be taken by Iran in other conflicting areas (such as Yemen), and<br />
whether they are moving towards more pressure on Arab countries. This offers Israel<br />
more space to move closer to these countries being threatened by Iran, even exploiting<br />
Turkey to achieve this penetration - as Ankara was standing against Assad and his allies.<br />
Alternatively, Iran would only strengthen its’ position in Syria and restore confidence<br />
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149
with the West by giving up its’ sensational policies to stabilize the region, going on to put<br />
pressure on the Arab countries. 114<br />
Seventh: The future scenarios of the Iranian role in Syria.<br />
Usually, future scenarios for any international roles in internal crises would be drawn<br />
considering the orientations of the crisis parties towards each other, the power cards<br />
possessed by each of the parties and the regional and international relations. Also, their<br />
visions to achieve the greatest gains and influence within a ‘state of crisis’ and whether it<br />
allows unequal parties to gain a share of the power and influence in the new equation. In<br />
this context, the Iranian role in the Syrian crisis waits for three scenarios:<br />
First Scenario: The escalation of the Iranian role in Syria<br />
It is likely that the Iranian role in the Syrian equation will escalate after the fall of Aleppo<br />
to achieve its’ objectives and expansionist ambitions at the expense of Syrian interests; as<br />
Syria is a key part of the sectarian plan to restore Iran’s imperial. There are indicators for<br />
this scenario to be achieved:<br />
A. Holding cards that can be moved and affected, Iran still controls the battlefield on<br />
the ground through armed military militias (Shiite Free Army: Brigades of Zaynabioun,<br />
and Haidaraon, Fatimyoun, Hezbollah, Abu-Fadel Abbas, ‘Asaeb Ahl Alhaqq’, ‘national<br />
defence’ militia (estimated to be 80,000) and cloned from Basij;<br />
B. The Iranian strategic visions with leaders working hard to implement these visions<br />
through a variety of institutions, using power tools, in a manner making them able to earn<br />
and buy loyalties from some political and intellectual leaders based outside the Shiite<br />
mainstream, especially from the leftists and liberals. This exploits the differences in some<br />
of the representatives with the Islamic current and disagreements with leftist and liberal<br />
forces with Arab regimes, as well as the need for those leaders to offer material support<br />
which would expand its’ influence in the Arab elite sector;<br />
C. The Arabian inaction state and visions variations, especially in conflict zones such<br />
as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. If Arabs continue to deal with threats from Iran with<br />
hesitation, it is expected not only to expand in Syria, but the Shiite militias will intervene<br />
into more Gulf States. Iran aims to direct its’ control within the region, especially when it<br />
controls the second-largest oil reserve in the Iraqi region, and the largest armed human<br />
mass (Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Alawites in Syria, and<br />
Houthis in Yemen). The Iranian forces would move freely from the east until the Syrian<br />
coast on the Mediterranean Sea, thus establishing its’ presence in the Arabian Sea and<br />
the Gulf of Aden.<br />
These Iranian cards are not enough for implementing the demographic composition<br />
change plan for the people and the Syrian territory, by continuing to conclude agreements<br />
on the militants and their families escaping from the cities and certain regions - due to<br />
military pressure and siege - and replacing the original inhabitants with Shiites (from Idlib<br />
to Damascus and the Lebanese borders). This explains the attempts to ignite the situation<br />
and violate the ceasefire agreement, as this plan requires special capabilities on regional<br />
and international levels.<br />
150 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
Second Scenario: The Iranian role fortitude<br />
This scenario indicates the arrival of the Iranian project in Syria and the permitted<br />
regional and international extent, as the Iranian role stands in fortitude throughout<br />
the Syrian-liberated territories by Shiite militias without progress through regional<br />
pressures, such as Turkey or Russia. However, this scenario is also unlikely, as the<br />
Iranian dictionaries do not contain the so-called ‘principle of stability’. The Iranian<br />
project is expansionist, especially in the presence of a clergy at the top of the Iranian<br />
regime to return them to their Persian glories, and this is contrary to Russian and Turkish<br />
interests.<br />
Third Scenario: Demise of Iran’s role<br />
This scenario - the most likely one - indicates the demise of Iran’s role in Syria and<br />
prevents Iran from making any strategic progress after Aleppo, turning it into a circle that<br />
surrounds Iran and its gains achieved in Syria since the outbreak of revolution in 2011; as<br />
a result of the Turkish-Russian alliance against the Iranian plans upon feeling that Iran’s<br />
desire to declare victory and strategic control on influential areas contradicted with<br />
Russian interests. In addition to the outbreak of the Iranian-Russian differences, in which<br />
Russia will not allow Iran to expand its’ interests in Syria, the Iranian authorities realise<br />
that Russia owns possibilities and has a relative capacity to be a key player in the control<br />
of political and military equations in Syria – more so than Iran, who do not enjoy the same<br />
Russian military and political capabilities. The strategic understandings between Russia<br />
and Washington DC are based on protecting Israel’s security and to not compromise the<br />
oil’s security. This explains the launching of Russian’s hand in Syria, while Iran complies<br />
on ground to Russia. Iran is facing difficult choices: if it confronts Russia, it will get into<br />
confrontations with everyone and will respect whomever maintains its’ relationship with<br />
Moscow to avoid big losses in Syria and the region, even if that leads to more hostilities in<br />
the Arab and Islamic societies.<br />
The Iranian-Russian differences in Syria revolve around the future and survival of the<br />
Iranian militias in Syria and Iran’s desire to obtain access to the sea; where Iran adopts<br />
ideological project towards demographic changes to evacuate Sunnis and resettle Shia<br />
in some areas. While the Russian project was not as ideological as the Iranian targets,<br />
Russia has realistic political objectives presented by its’ influence on the Syrian coast.<br />
Russia now has a foothold in the Middle East at the expense of the United States, as<br />
the Russians hoped to obtain US concessions on international issues such as Ukraine,<br />
the missile shield, the lifting of economic sanctions and differences between the two<br />
countries towards the region. Russia does not consider Saudi Arabia an enemy; for<br />
example, it intends to give the Sunni Arabs opponents a stake in the government in Syria,<br />
thus keeping its’ relationship with the Arab countries and Turkey. However, Iran is actively<br />
trying to undermine the participation of the Syrian opposition. Add to this the differences<br />
and historical crises between the two countries, and the lack of confidence given in<br />
the short period in which Iran allowed Russian fighter planes to use its bases to bomb<br />
the Syrian opposition sites. The priorities of Russia in its’ international alliances are not<br />
consistent with a strategic partnership with Iran. For instance, Russia does not support<br />
Iran’s accession to Shanghai security organization, as China and Kazakhstan - the two<br />
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151
strategic partners for Russia - are opposed to joining Iran for private international political<br />
considerations. Moreover, the relationship with these two countries is much important<br />
for Russia than the relationship with Iran and strong ties with Iran at the expense of<br />
the Arab countries in the long-term could hurt its’ relationship with the Muslims Sunni<br />
citizens.<br />
It is not the differences with Russia alone what undermines the role of Iran in Russia, but<br />
many additional factors. For instance:<br />
A. The US variable, with the new President Donald Trump’s arrival to the White House on<br />
20 January 2017 and what can be posed by his stance against the nuclear deal with Iran<br />
and its’ project;<br />
B. The nature of the new US administration which rejects the pattern of Obama<br />
administration in dealing with Iran and its’ expansionist project;<br />
C. The role of Iran in Syria being isolated from its’ social incubator, unlike the case for<br />
Lebanon and Iraq;<br />
D. The bloc of movements under one command after the fall of Aleppo, thus it can<br />
withstand any attack;<br />
E. The huge financial cost that is required by the Iranian project considering the Iranian<br />
economy deterioration, despite the lifting of economic sanctions.<br />
Although the meeting of Russian, Turkish and Iranian foreign ministers concerning<br />
Syria on 12 December 2016 pointed out the position of Turkish policy toward Damascus,<br />
and Ankara’s position consensus with Tehran for the need to give a priority to counterterrorism<br />
and not to overthrow the Syrian regime, the three parties differed on<br />
Hezbollah. Where the Turkish Foreign Minister called to cut support from it as a necessity,<br />
to ensure the ceasefire agreement in Syria, his Russian and Iranian counterparts did not<br />
share the same opinion. Lavrov stated that the presence of Hezbollah in Syria is illegal and<br />
came at the request of the then-Syrian government. Zarif said (with a smile) to his Turkish<br />
counterpart, ‘Iran respects Ankara’s positions, including the position toward Hezbollah’,<br />
but stressed that this position is not shared.<br />
Finally, if mentioning the foregoing games theory, we can see that Iran is the losing party<br />
in Syria; it did not just lose a huge financial cost when eliminating the opposition and<br />
control of Aleppo, it also lost the lives of generals and fighters of military and non-military<br />
forces. Aleppo was also trapped in turn, before losing the Sunni world due to the sectarian<br />
war against all Sunnis; not only in Syria but in targeted countries such as Iraq, Lebanon,<br />
Yemen and other Arab and Islamic countries. The US overlooked the Iranian expansion,<br />
which has ended with Obama’s departure; all these issues will make Iran besieged. Such<br />
a position could weaken Iran but, at the same time, will make them take aggressive and<br />
violent steps and this is what may be seen in other Arab countries.<br />
152 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
ENDNOTES<br />
1- د.أحمد يوسف أحمد ومحمد زبارة، مقدِّمة في العَالقات الدولية، )القاهرة: مكتبة األنجلو المصرية، 1996(، ط1، ص80.<br />
- 2 راسل ه. فيليدوج، أتزل بيري، الجيوبوليتيكيا، ترجمة يوسف مجلي، )القاهرة: دار الكرنك، 1981(، ط1، ص63.<br />
- 3 د.عليّ الدين هالل، بهجت قرني )محرران(، السياسات الخارجية للدول العربيَّة، )القاهرة: مركز البحوث والدراسات السياسية، 1994(،<br />
ط1، صص 31 32.<br />
- 4 راسل ه. فيليدوج، أتزل بيري، الجيوبوليتيكيا، مرجع سبق ذكره، ص65.<br />
- 5 د.أشرف كشك، العَالقات الخليجية اإليرانية: الواقع وآفاق المستقبل، )المنامة: مركز البحرين للدراسات الدولية واالستراتيجية والطاقة،<br />
دراسات(، مارس 2014، ص9، متاح على الرابط:HTTP://CUTT.US/CAQQW<br />
- 6 فادي عيد: البدر الشيعي باإلقليم، )بوابة إفريقيا اإلخبارية، مركز التيَّار الحر للدراسات السياسية واالستراتيجية(، 21/1/2015،<br />
متاح على الرابط: HTTP://CUTT.US/BYQ0O<br />
- 7 د.ناصر العمرة، ود.محمد العبدة، وأحمد الصويان: خريطة الشيعة في العالَم - دراسة عَقَدِ يَّة تاريخية ديموغرافية استراتيجية، )القاهرة:<br />
مركز الرسالة للدراسات والبحوث اإلنسانية، ط3(، 2012، ص144.<br />
- 8 سامية عبد الله، المقاطعة االقتصادية.. سالح خليجي جديد في الصراع المحتدم مع إيران، الراصد اإلعالمي للمقاالت، 1/6/2016<br />
متاح على الرابط: HTTP://CUTT.US/T5X53<br />
- 9 دول مَجْ لِس التعاون: لمحة إحصائية، )األمانة العامة: مَجْ لِس التعاون لدول الخليج العربيَّة(، العدد الرابع، قطاع شؤون المعلومات -<br />
إدارة اإلحصاء، مارس 2014، ص-ص 19-20، متاح على الرابط: HTTP://CUTT.US/GU4L<br />
- 10 د.أشرف كشك، العَالقات الخليجية اإليرانية: الواقع وافاق المستقبل، )المنامة: مركز البحرين للدراسات الدولية واالستراتيجية<br />
والطاقة(، مرجع سبق ذكره، ص11.<br />
- 11 وليد خدوري، تداعيات زيادة انتاج النِّفْط األمريكي، العربيَّة نت، 27/1/2013، متاح على الرابط:<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/GQ0M<br />
- 12 مستقبل العَالقات الخليجية-اإليرانية بعد االتفاق النووي، مركز الروابط للبحوث والدراسات االستراتيجية، المركز اإلعالمي،<br />
4/10/2016، متاح على الرابط: HTTP://CUTT.US/K9LIZ<br />
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- 13 د.أشرف كشك، العَالقات الخليجية اإليرانية: الواقع وافاق المستقبل، مرجع سبق ذكره، ص12.<br />
- 14 بول سالم، العراق بعد عشر سنوات على الغزو األمريكي، صحيفة الحياة، 31 مارس 2013.<br />
- 15 محمد صادق الحسيني، الخليج بحرية مغلقة واألمن اإلقليمي مسؤولية الدول المتشاطئة عليه، مجلة آراء حول الخليج ع 41 فبراير<br />
2008، ص37.<br />
- 16 عيد، محمد، أثر أحداث 111 سبتمبر على الترتيبات األمنية الوطنية والجماعية في منطقة الخليج العربي 1990-2007، )جامعة<br />
القاهرة: كلية االقتصاد والعلوم السياسية، 2011(، صص 111-134.<br />
- 17 عرفات جرغون، العَالقات الخليجية اإليرانية: الصراع، االنفراج، التوتُّر منذ عام 2003 إلى حدود عام 2008، دار العربي للنشر<br />
والتوزيع، ط1، ص46.<br />
- 18 العَالقات الخليجية اإليرانية: االستقرار في مواجهة الثيوقراطية التوسُّ عية، مركز الروابط للبحوث والدراسات االستراتيجية،<br />
23/1/2017، متاح على الرابط: HTTP://CUTT.US/R0LVZ<br />
- 19 د.صباح الموسوس، ود.محمد السعيد إدريس )مشاركان(، ود.عبد الله فهد النفيسي، وأ.عبد الله الطنطوي )محرران(: المشروع<br />
اإليراني في المنطقة العربيَّة واإلسالمية، )القاهرة: دار البشير للتوزيع والنشر، ط1(، 2015، ص102.<br />
- 20 منصور حسن العتيبي، السياسة اإليرانية تجاه دول مَجْ لِس التعاون الخليجي )1979-2000(، )جامعة القاهرة: كلية االقتصاد<br />
والعلوم السياسية، رسالة دكتوراه(، 2004، ص66.<br />
IBID. P. 70 - 21<br />
- 22 ماجد صالح الديحاني، العَالقات الخليجية اإليرانية بعد أزمة الخليج الثانية )1999-2002(، )جامعة الدول العربيَّة: معهد البحوث<br />
والدراسات العربيَّة(، 2004، ص56.<br />
- 23 صالح عبد الرحمن المانع، العَالقات الخليجية اإليرانية إبان فترة حكم الرئيس محمد خاتمي، الكويت، مركز دراسات الخليج والجزيرة<br />
العربيَّة، 1999، ص64.<br />
- 24 سلسلة تقارير التوغُّل اإليراني في الدول العربيَّة، التوغُّل اإليراني والصراعات الال متناهية في العراق، مركز الخليج العربي للدراسات<br />
اإليرانية، تاريخ النشر: 22/6/2016. متاح على الرابط: HTTP://CUTT.US/7FR1D<br />
- 25 د.محمد بن صقر السلمي، استراتيجية إيران تجاه الثورات العربيَّة: تكتيك جديد يستثني سوريا واليمن، العربيَّة، 12/4/2015،<br />
متاح على الرابط: ، HTTP://CUTT.US/7M0Q9 باإلضافة إلى أثر ثورات الربيع العربي على المشروع اإليراني 3/3، ملفات<br />
إيرانية، مركز المزماة للدراسات والبحوث: متاح على الرابط:<br />
- 26 محمد عباس ناجي، “االنكماش: مستقبل الدور اإلقليمي اإليراني بعد الثورات العربيَّة”، السياسية الدولية: متاح على الرابط:<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/VPVBA<br />
- 27 د.أشرف كشك، االتفاق اإليراني الغربي: المصالح تتصالح، موقع مركز البحرين للدراسات االستراتيجية والطاقة، بتاريخ 27 نوفمبر<br />
2015، على الرابط التالي: ANALYSISR/BH.ORG.DER ASAT.W<br />
- 28 د.أشرف محمد كشك، رصد التدخُّالت اإليرانية في شؤون مملكة البحرين ودول مَجْ لِس التعاون لدول الخليج العربيَّة، نماذج خالل عامي<br />
2011 و2012، تقرير غير منشور، مركز البحرين للدراسات االستراتيجية والدولية والطاقة، عام 2012.<br />
- 29 د.أشرف كشك، العَالقات الخليجية اإليرانية: الواقع وآفاق المستقبل، مرجع سبق ذكره، ص16.<br />
IBID. P. 17 - 30<br />
- 31 عبد الوهاب بدرخان، دالالت فرصة روحاني وآفاقها في الداخل والخارج، صحيفة الحياة 23 يونيو 2013.<br />
- 32 محمد بدري عيد، مستقبل العَالقات الخليجية-اإليرانية بعد االتفاق النووي، مركز الجزيرة للدراسات، 8/10/2015، متاح على<br />
154 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
HTTPS://GOO.GL/MZC7GS<br />
الرابط: 2015.<br />
مايو 17 لألنباء، فارس وكالة - 33 2015.<br />
سبتمبر 17 19158(، ( العدد اللندنية، الحياة صحيفة إيران، مع االتفاق ثمن سندفع نحن الخازن، جهاد - 34 على<br />
متاح 2015، سبتمبر 10 اإللكتروني، مصر دوت موقع المنامة، إلزالة تكفي إيران من المهرَّبة المتفجرات البحرين: خارجية وزير - 35 HTTP://CUTT.US/5XBJC<br />
الرابط: الرابط:<br />
على متاح 21/7/2016. أونالين، الخليج العبدلي”، “خلية قضية في متهم إعدام تؤيِّد كويتية محكمة - 36 HTTP://CUTT.US/JE82E<br />
ص64.<br />
اإليرانية، للدراسات العربي الخليج مركز الرياض، 2016، يوليو لشهر اإليرانية الحالة تقرير السعودية-اإليرانية، العَالقات تجاذبات - 37 العربي<br />
الخليج مركز الرياض، 2016، أغسطس لشهر اإليرانية الحالة تقرير اإليرانية، السعودية العَالقات في السياسي التوتُّر - 38 ص33.<br />
اإليرانية، للدراسات HTTP://CUTT.US/RK0GR<br />
است کرده سیاسی را حج مسئله عربستان أوحدی: في: تي برس - 39 HTTPS://GOO.GL/PKTNIJ<br />
1395، شهريور 17 ندارد، را شریفین حرمین اداره لیاقت آلسعود ملعونه شجره کیهان، - 40 HTTPS://GOO.GL/4RBSJH<br />
41 - <strong>THE</strong> WASHINGTON POST, SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN ACCUSE EACH O<strong>THE</strong>R OF NOT REALLY<br />
BEING MUSLIM, 7/9/2016: HTTPS://GOO.GL/7MVNFJ<br />
ص28.<br />
اإليرانية، للدراسات العربي الخليج مركز الرياض، 2016، سبتمبر لشهر اإليرانية، الحالة تقرير اإليرانية، السعودية السجاالت تصاعد - 42 ،۱۳۹۵ شهریور ۲۰ است، کرده هراسان را آلسعود تروریسم با مبارزه در وعراق ایران مشترک پیروزیهای فارس، وكالة - 43 HTTPS://GOO.GL/5BCTKL<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/1UL4AP<br />
فارس: أنباء وكالة - 44 HTTP://SOO.GD/WHBL<br />
مهر: أنباء وكالة )صHTTPS://GOO.GL/FSVZGS:)4<br />
اقتصادي ابرار صحيفة - 45 9/8/1395، 2716،<br />
شمارة بود، استعمارگران اهداف راستاي در ٨ساله جنگ برنامهريزي شرق، صحيفة - 46 HTTPS://GOO.GL/T5ZGOI<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/JGBKY<br />
الرابط: على متاح 10/1/2016، 51، العدد اإللكترونية، الراصد التشيُّع، عسكرة رميح، طلعت - 47 الرابط:<br />
على متاح 16/11/2016، ، عربيّ األخبار، نَّة، السُّ بغياب الشعبي الحشد قانون يُقِرّ العراق برلمان - 48 HTTP://CUTT.US/ULUAL<br />
على<br />
متاح 29/11/2016، المستقبل، دراسات مركز العراقي، الجيش في الحشد إدماج تداعيات الطائفية.. مأسسة عدلي، أحمد - 49 HTTP://CUTT.US/MS6WC<br />
الرابط: HTTPS://GOO.GL/IW5A5E<br />
1395، شهريور 29 العراق، إلى يتوجه جنتي أمروز، آرمان - 50 HTTPS://GOO.GL/IW5A5E<br />
1395، شهريور 29 العراق، إلى يتوجه جنتي أمروز، آرمان - 51 العربي<br />
الخليج مركز الرياض، 2016، أغسطس لشهر اإليرانية الحالة تقرير ، اإليرانِيّ والدَّور بالعراق الموصل تحرير معركة مستقبل - 52 ص26.<br />
اإليرانية، للدراسات IBID. P. 27 - 53<br />
IBID. P. 28 - 54<br />
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IBID. P. 29 - 55<br />
- 56 جهان صنعت: نبرد موصل وهشدارهایی به مقامات عراق،28 مهر 1395، HTTP://CUTT.US/KNSN<br />
- 57 موقع نامه، انگلیس: ایران نقش مهمی درعراق دارد، 28 م8ر 1395، HTTP://CUTT.US/BERNA<br />
.IBID - 58<br />
.IBID - 59<br />
- 60 عبدة سيف القصلي، اليمن.. األهمية االستراتيجية واألطماع الدولية واإلقليمية، نشوان نيوز، تقارير وتحقيقات، 14/7/2010،<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/VVOMK<br />
- 61 مركز الخليج العربي للدراسات اإليرانية، التوغل اإليراني والصراعات الال متناهية في اليمن.. هل ما زال اليمن سعيدً ا؟، 21 يوليو<br />
،2016 تقارير، HTTP://CUTT.US/3C64K<br />
- 62 وكالة أنباء اإلذاعة والتلفزيون، اتهام ارسال سالح از ایران به یمن بی اساس است، ۰۵ شهريور ۱۳۹۵، HTTP://SOO.GD/<br />
BZ7K<br />
- 63 ارنا، المرجع مكارم شيرازي: حرب اليمن اختبار للبشرية 09/11/2016، HTTP://CUTT.US/XWDFP<br />
- 64 صحيفة آرمان امروز، عربستان بايد اشتباهات خود در يمن را بپذيرد، 11 آبان ۱۳۹۵، HTTP://CUTT.US/TJDCO<br />
- 65 مركز الخليج العربي للدراسات اإليرانية، التوغل اإليراني والصراعات الال متناهية في اليمن.. هل ما زال اليمن سعيدً ا؟، 21 يوليو<br />
،2016 تقارير، HTTP://CUTT.US/3C64K<br />
- 66 وكالة فارس HTTPS://GOO.GL/Q466MD HTTP://SOO.GD/27UA<br />
- 67 صحيفة آرمان امروز، استقبال إيران از آتشبس يمني - يمني، 27 آبان ۱۳۹۵، HTTP://CUTT.US/T5HRY<br />
- 68 فردا نيوز، منصور هادی طرح صلح یمن را رد کرد، 8 ابان 1395، HTTPS://GOO.GL/B2XPTG<br />
- 69 الف، الف، ادعای سخنگوی ائتالف عربستان علیه یمن درباره ایران، 13 مهر HTTPS://GOO.GL/6ZVTO3 1395،<br />
- 70 وكالة تسنيم، چه سرنوشتی در انتظار طرح کری درباره یمن است؟ HTTP://CUTT.US/7QZ5V<br />
- 71 ايسنا، انتقال بانک مرکزی از صنعا به عدن وإصالحات در دولت مستعفی یمن، 29 شهريور HTTPS://GOO.GL/،1395<br />
WPPLXB<br />
- 72 مهر، امیر عبد اللهیان: سکوت دنیا در قبال جنایات سعودی در یمن غیر قابل توجیه است، ۱۰شهریور ۱۳۹۵،<br />
HTTP://SOO.GD/WBKZ<br />
- 73 تسنيم، السفارة السعوديَّة في واشنطن تنشر مقترَحً ا للتسوية السلمية في اليمن، 30/8/3016،<br />
HTTP://BIT.LY/2BBK48Q<br />
- 74 اليمن.. تَقدُّم للقوات الشرعية في محور باب المندب، شرق أوسط، سكاي نيوز، 31/12/2016، HTTPS://GOO.GL/<br />
YHMEFT<br />
- 75 اليمن.. تَقدُّم قوات الشرعية في صنعاء ونهم وتعز والبيضاء، العربيَّة نت، HTTPS://GOO.GL/CHQ866 27/12/2016<br />
- 76 مراقبون: تحرير مدينة المخاء يرجح كفة “الشرعية” في اليمن، إرم نيوز، HTTP://CUTT.US/PFSAD<br />
- 77 المركز العربي لألبحاث ودراسة السياسات، إيران في أفق عام 2025، وحدة تحليل السياسات | 01 مايو، 2016،<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/UKL3K<br />
- 78 وكالة تسنيم، تسنيم، ایران وروسیه متحدین اصلی دولت وملت سوریه هستند، 19 مهر 1395<br />
- 79 انتخاب، واکنش ایران به ورود تانکهای ترکیه به سوریه، ۰۴ شهريور ۱۳۹۵، HTTP://SOO.GD/U07R<br />
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- 80 مصطفى تركي، الصراع الروسي اإليراني على سوريا.. تقاسم نفوذ أم تصفية حسابات، 1 ديسمبر 2016، بلدي نيوز،<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/BJX6Z<br />
- 81 وكالة فارس، سخنان منتشر نشده شهید همدانی درباره دالیل حضور ایران در سوریه ۹۵/۰۸/۱۶،<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/QFFSH<br />
- 82 الميليشيات الطائفية تتصدر المشهد السُّ وري، الجزيرة نت، HTTP://CUTT.US/WTV07 16/12/2016،<br />
- 83 أبعاد الدور اإليراني في معركة حلب الدائرة في سوريا، تقرير الحالة اإليرانية لشهر أكتوبر 2016، الرياض، مركز الخليج العربي<br />
للدراسات اإليرانية، ص50.<br />
- 84 إذاعة فردا، یک فرمانده سپاه: تشکیل ارتش آزادیبخش شیعی به رهبری سلیمانی، ۲۸.مرداد.۱۳۹۵<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/HSXBHD<br />
- 85 راديو فردا، مخالفت روحانی با درخواست آمریکا برای توقف پروازهای جنگی برفراز شمال سوریه، ۱۵مهر ۱۳۹۵،<br />
HTTPS://GOO.GL/RKCKIO<br />
- 86 حمزة عماد الدين موسى، روسيا: عن الموقف الروسي ضدّ الثورات العربيَّة في ليبيا وسوريا، نور سورية، 20/3/2012.<br />
- 87 عاطف معتمد، العَالقات العربيَّة الروسية في ظلّ التحوُّالت الدولية، ورقة عمل في: ملتقى العَالقات العربيَّة الروسية، مركز الجزيرة<br />
للدراسات، الدوحة، قطر، 2009.<br />
.IBID - 88<br />
- 89 بينة الملحم، هل تَغيَّر الموقف الروسي من الثورة السُّ ورية؟، الرياض 3/2/2013.<br />
- 90 هاني شادي، روسيا والربيع العربي. مصالح ومخاوف، مجلة الديمقراطية، 1/4/2012.<br />
- 91 لماذا تستميت روسيا في الدفاع عن قاعدتها في طرطوس؟، أخبار الخليج، ترجمة، أورينت برس، 1/7/2012.<br />
.IBID - 92<br />
.IBID - 93<br />
- 94 تساؤالت حول ما إذا كانت روسيا تملك مفاتيح الحلّ في سوريا.. مخاوف من خسارة نفوذهم في الشرق األوسط والقاعدة البحرية في<br />
المتوسط وعميل موثوق لصناعاتها الدفاعية/ كارين دي يونغ، الشرق األوسط، ترجمة، واشنطن بوست، 1/7/2012.<br />
- 95 تركي مصطفى، مظاهر وآليات ونتائج الصراع الروسي-اإليراني في سوريا، بالدي نيوز، 23/12/2016، متاح على الرابط:<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/YXCVM<br />
.IBID - 96<br />
- 97 راشد صالح العريمي، حلب تحاصر إيران، 9/12/2016، متاح على الرابط: HTTP://CUTT.US/J5AE8<br />
- 98 اتفاق وقف النار يربك مشروع إيران بربط سوريا والعراق، المرصد السُّ وري لحقوق اإلنسان، 31/12/2016، متاح على:<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/FEINQ<br />
- 99 من بوتين ل»خامنئي«: روسيا أوالً أيها العجوز.. وسوريا لن تكون العراق، مركز الروابط للبحوث والدراسات االستراتيجية،<br />
:26/12/2016<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/SWEPB<br />
.IBID - 100<br />
- 101 تركي مصطفي، الصراع الروسي اإليراني على سوريا.. تقاسم نفوذ أم تصفية حسابات، بالدي نيوز، 31/12/2016:<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/HO6D<br />
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- 102 صفقة اإلجالء بحلب تكشف عن خالف روسي إيراني، أسوشييتد برس إنترناشيونال، 20/12/2016:<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/B0LIZ<br />
- 103 مظاهر وآليات ونتائج الصراع الروسي-اإليراني في سوريا، مركز الدارسات والبحوث االستراتيجية، 1/12/2016:<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/OGQP<br />
- 104 تركي مصطفي، الصراع الروسي اإليراني على سوريا.. تقاسم نفوذ أم تصفية حسابات، بالدي نيوز، 31/12/2016:<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/HO6D<br />
- 105 دالالت قصف الطيران الروسي على قواعد إيران وحزب الله في حلب، الدرر الشامية اإللكترونية، 30/11/2016:<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/GNKN5<br />
- 106 راشد صالح العريمي، حلب تحاصر إيران، 9/12/2016، متاح على الرابط: HTTP://CUTT.US/J5AE8<br />
- 107 تركي مصطفي، الصراع الروسي اإليراني على سوريا.. تقاسم نفوذ أم تصفية حسابات، بالدي نيوز، 31/12/2016:<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/HO6D<br />
- 108 نضوج الخالفات: حدود التصعيد اإليراني مع تركيا حول سوريا، مركز المستقبل لألبحاث والدراسات المتقدمة،<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/QKML0<br />
.IBID - 109<br />
- 110 عقيدة أوباما أم استراتيجية الواليات المتَّحِ دة؟، نظرة في كتاب »عقيدة أوباما.. االستراتيجية األمريكية اليوم«،<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/EGPLT<br />
- 111 روسيا وتركيا وإيران تتفق على رؤية للتسوية بسوريا، اجتماع وزراء خارجية روسيا وتركيا وإيران انتهى بإعالن مشترك بشأن تسوية<br />
محتملة في سوريا، الجزيرة نت،<br />
HTTP://CUTT.US/4EUZQ<br />
- 112 سعيد عكاشة، “المراقب الرابح”: مستقبل “الخطوط الحمراء” إلسرائيل بعد معركة حلب، مركز المستقبل لألبحاث والدرسات<br />
المتقدمة، :22/12/2016 HTTP://CUTT.US/4HGEN<br />
.IBID - 113<br />
.IBID - 114<br />
158 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
INTERNATIONAL<br />
AFFAIRS<br />
The Future of American-Iranian<br />
Relations in a Changing World<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
The Bush Administration classified Iran<br />
as part of the Axis of Evil (Iran, Iraq, and<br />
North Korea). It believed that the United States<br />
should apply pressure on the Iranian regime<br />
and favored threatening the use of a military<br />
option against the Iranian nuclear program.<br />
On the contrary, with arrival of the Democratic<br />
Barack Obama in the White House in 2009<br />
the United States policy toward Iran changed.<br />
Obama sought engagement with Iran without<br />
preconditions and led successful negotiations<br />
for a nuclear deal intended to dismantle Iran’s<br />
nuclear capabilities. In July 2015, Iran signed<br />
a comprehensive agreement on its nuclear<br />
program with the P5+1 Group.<br />
In this report, we will discuss the American-<br />
Iranian correlation during the Obama<br />
administration in the second half of 2016, the<br />
impact of this policy on Iran’s strategy in the<br />
Middle East region, and finally US-Iran relations<br />
after the succession of the Republican Donald<br />
Trump to the United States Presidency.<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
159
First: The American-Iranian relations during the Obama Presidency.<br />
During the Obama era, US-Iran relations received a boost, unlike during that of his<br />
predecessor George W. Bush, who adopted a confrontational and offensive policy against<br />
Iran because of their different views about the United States’ internal and foreign policies.<br />
On succeeding to the US presidency, Obama adopted two major strategies:<br />
1. He tended to focus on the<br />
United States interior in order<br />
to implement his ideas, which<br />
were akin to moderate Socialism.<br />
He believed that the American<br />
strength is through unity and<br />
internal development rather than<br />
international relations, external<br />
superiority, and involvement in<br />
conflicts outside its borders. He<br />
also believed that the United<br />
States national security does not come about through international political channels but<br />
through a strong society based on equality and quality services for all people such as the<br />
health project ‘Obama Care.’<br />
Obama cut military spending and withdrew from hot spots around the world such<br />
as Iraq and Afghanistan, and urged countries to defend their homeland security<br />
and sovereignty without direct intervention from Washington. During Obama’s two<br />
terms in office, the limited American military involvement in international conflicts<br />
came into effect in order to save American lives and money. 1 His major focus was on<br />
American society and its problems such as immigration, healthcare, education, and<br />
the environment. Obama faced serious criticism over his foreign policies from elite US<br />
politicians; however, he won two terms of presidency.<br />
2. During his presidential campaign, Obama advocated direct negotiations with<br />
America’s adversaries and a policy of containment toward the countries in the Axis of Evil<br />
– as classified by the Bush administration. On his inauguration, Obama brought Iran to the<br />
table and finally reached the nuclear deal on the Iranian nuclear program, which paved<br />
the way for Tehran to resume its status in the international community.<br />
As a result, the United States removed sanctions imposed on Tehran and released tens<br />
of billions dollars of Iran’s frozen assets in the United States.<br />
This is clear evidence that Washington had made concessions in order to reach this<br />
agreement and come up with the joint statement that outlines the following:<br />
a. Iran is required to reduce its nuclear facilities and limit the level of uranium enrichment<br />
at 3.67%.<br />
b. Convert the Fordo facility – the most important enrichment facility – into a physics,<br />
nuclear, and technology research center.<br />
c. Install no more than 5060 centrifuges.<br />
160 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
d. Provide the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors with access to any<br />
suspicious site and military installations in coordination with Tehran.<br />
e. Stop building nuclear plants working on heavy water.<br />
f. Iran will not be able to transfer any equipment from one nuclear plant to another for 15<br />
years.<br />
g. Implement an embargo on the importation of any materials used in the ballistic<br />
missiles program for eight years.<br />
h. An arms embargo for five years.<br />
i. Develop a mechanism to restore sanctions within 65 days in case Tehran fails to comply<br />
with the accord. 2<br />
Iran’s Benefits from the Nuclear Deal<br />
a. Iran’s frozen assets will continue to be so for another eight years and the travel ban on<br />
most personnel and commissions that participated in the nuclear program for five years.<br />
However, all sanctions will be terminated when the IAEA verifies Iran’s implementation of<br />
its key nuclear commitments.<br />
b. Oil exportation will be fully resumed at the time the deal comes into force.<br />
c. Resumption of relations with the United States through President Obama’s friendly<br />
letter to the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in April 2016, in which he expressed<br />
his best wishes and hopes for the birth of a new coalition. This move toward Iran was<br />
suspicious and worrying in light of Iran’s failure to fulfill its commitments to the IAEA and<br />
its persistent violation of human rights inside Iran. In other words, the American silence<br />
toward these Iranian practices reveals secret collaboration and conformity between both<br />
sides.<br />
In fact, Obama tended to lessen the American presence in the international arena and<br />
adopted a policy of understanding and containment of US rivals. This paved the way for<br />
Iran to be a major player in the Middle East and to take control of four Arab countries,<br />
Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. In fact, the Obama administration’s foreign policy<br />
contradicts the beliefs of Republicans, who promote a key American role in the world,<br />
getting involved in all international affairs, and deterring regional powers.<br />
Second: The American-Iranian relations timeline during the second half of 2016.<br />
1. On Jul, 17th,2016, two American diplomats released a secret document about the<br />
Iranian nuclear deal that stated that Tehran can continue its nuclear program immediately<br />
after the end of the Obama Presidency. The Associated Press reported that this document<br />
is a secret appendix to the nuclear deal, which allows Iran to replace more than five<br />
thousand old centrifuges with 3500 state-of-the-art ones in 11-15 years, which would<br />
decrease the time needed for Iran to develop nuclear weapons from one year to six<br />
months after installing the new centrifuges.<br />
2. The Obama administration rejected a draft law introduced by Congress to disclose<br />
the accounts of Iranian high-ranking officials (the Supreme Leader, members of the<br />
Expediency Discernment Council, the Minister of Intelligence, Chief of the Revolutionary<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
161
Guard’s (RG) Intelligence, and high-ranking RG officers such as Commander of the Al-<br />
Quds Division Qassem Suleimani and others) under the slogan, “Transparency of the<br />
riches and property of Iran’s leaders.” The American administration justified its rejection<br />
of the draft law, saying that it would hurt the United States’ credibility in front of the<br />
P5+1 Group and Iran because it would entail American violation of its nuclear deal<br />
commitments and lifting of the sanctions imposed on Iran.<br />
3. In essence, the draft law was binding to the US government. It demanded to reveal the<br />
sources of income and channels of expenditure of high-ranking Iranian officials through<br />
a comprehensive report prepared by the American Department of Treasury within nine<br />
months after passage of the law.3<br />
4. On the contrary, the Obama administration never reacted to the demands from sixty<br />
American Congressmen to freeze arms deals with Saudi Arabia totaling $1.15 billion<br />
dollars. The Obama administration justified this position – as pretended – as a response<br />
to the Arab coalition’s airstrikes under the leadership of Saudi Arabia in Yemen, leading to<br />
the deaths of many Yemeni civilians 4 .<br />
1. This American condoning of Iran was confirmed by the Iranian Foreign Minister<br />
Mohammed Javad Zarif in a meeting with former US Secretary of State John Kerry on the<br />
sidelines of the UN General Assembly meetings in September 2016. Zarif said that he had<br />
received American promises to urge European countries to enhance trade relations with<br />
Iran and especially European banks. 5<br />
This policy opened the door for Iran to invest and export its oil freely without obstacles<br />
after suffering $160 billion in oil-frozen assets; nevertheless, the unemployment rate was<br />
13.5% of the total population, which is 2.2 million people. In order to overcome this social<br />
problem, the Iranian government needs to create 800 thousand jobs annually.<br />
2. US-Iranian relations are fluctuating. There are several points of disagreement between<br />
both sides that are still unresolved on Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and the harassment of the<br />
Iranian boats of the American ships in the Arabian Gulf. This resulted in an unusual move<br />
by the Democratic administration to evade the Republicans’ accusations about the<br />
nature of the relations between the Obama administration and Tehran’s leaders. With the<br />
approach of the end of his presidency, President Obama extended decree number 12170,<br />
dated 11/14/1979, concerning the state of emergency in the US following the Iranian<br />
Revolution in 1979. Consequently, Obama extended the non-nuclear and non-terrorist<br />
activities-related sanctions for one year on Tehran for what he stated in his executive<br />
order, “Although the historical nuclear deal assures a peaceful Iranian nuclear program,<br />
there are certain Iranian behaviors and policies that oppose the American interests in<br />
the region. Iran is proceeding in posing an unusual serious threat to the national security,<br />
foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”<br />
3. Decree 12170 was issued by President Jimmy Carter thirty-six years ago. The<br />
Department of the Treasury was ordered to freeze Iranian assets in the United States,<br />
including their accounts in American banks and their branches abroad. Five months<br />
later, Carter announced the severing of diplomatic relations with Iran and an embargo<br />
on exporting American goods to this country, including food and medical products. After<br />
162 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
that, an embargo was also imposed on the importation of Iranian products to the United<br />
States. Since then, every consecutive US President has tightened sanctions on Tehran. 6<br />
4. The American House of Representatives held a session to discuss extending sanctions<br />
on Tehran, which were supposed to end on 12/31/2016 – unless extended – for another<br />
ten years until December 31st, 2026, especially those related to its nuclear and missile<br />
activities. The law allows the imposition of trade, energy, defense, and banking sanctions<br />
on Tehran, which were imposed for the first time in 1996, targeted investments in its<br />
energy sector, and deterred its nuclear ambitions. 7<br />
Third: The impact of Obama’s doctrine on both the American and Iranian roles in the<br />
Middle-East region<br />
Obama’s distancing strategy from the regional crises<br />
paved the way for Iran and Russia to take the lead in the<br />
region. Iran found the time suitable to implement its<br />
plans and ambitions in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon.<br />
In addition, Iran has occupied some Arab capitals and<br />
dispatched its militias to those countries to protect its<br />
gains and implement its plans in the region. Iran has also<br />
gone too far in its threats to the GCC countries through<br />
enabling the Shiite militias – under the slogan of political<br />
reform – to legalize Iran’s armament programs and make<br />
them a regional leverage on the GCC countries.<br />
Former US President: Barack Obama<br />
Below are the consequences of Obama’s doctrine on<br />
the American role in the Middle East compared to the<br />
growing Iranian role:<br />
1. Paying a ransom to Iran to free American hostages.<br />
In the middle of 2016, the US Department of State admitted to the Wall Street<br />
Journal, “The Obama administration dispatched an airplane loaded with $400 million<br />
to release American citizens detained by Tehran for espionage accusations and working<br />
against Iranian national security as an initial payment of a mutual deal amounting<br />
to $1.7 billion.” 8 This information was confirmed by the current US President, the<br />
Republican Donald Trump during his presidential campaign, when he attacked Obama<br />
and the Democratic candidate at that time Hillary Clinton saying, “We knew after the<br />
acknowledgment of the Department of State that President Obama lied about the $400<br />
million paid to Iran.” He added, “This money is not for the hostages, this is a ransom, in<br />
fact, he lied in public concerning this issue.” As a result, some congressmen presented a<br />
draft law that banned the Obama administration from paying any more money to Iran. 9<br />
2. The Iranian boats’ harassment of US Navy ships.<br />
Statistics reveal that there have been thirty harassment incidents by Iranian boats<br />
against the US Navy ships in the Arabian Gulf starting from the beginning of 2016. The<br />
Iranian Navy also detained ten American sailors during the nuclear deal negotiations<br />
in 2015, but released them after a short time, which was described by the US press as<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
163
“humiliating.” During the second half of 2016, the Gulf witnessed several other incidents:<br />
A. On Aug. 8th, 2016 four Iranian RG boats approached the American destroyer U.S.S.<br />
Nitze in the Strait of Hormuz. The American response was confined to being “seriously<br />
concerned,” leading to the withdrawal of the American destroyer to de-escalate tension.<br />
B. In October 2016 Iranian missiles targeted American warships at Bab Al-Mandeb<br />
and in the Gulf of Aden, which demonstrated the reality of Iran’s violations, which are<br />
threatening international security in international sea lanes.<br />
1. Release of Iran’s Frozen Assets.<br />
The Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei announced that his country received $36 billion for<br />
signing the nuclear deal, although there was a contradiction about the exact amount of<br />
Iran’s frozen assets resulting from international sanctions. Some Iranian sources said that<br />
the assets amount to $100-120 billion; nevertheless, the Iranian central bank denied<br />
these figures and announced that the exact number was only $32 billion in international<br />
banks, that only $29 billion would be released within 5-6 months, that there was $23<br />
billion in Japan, Korea, and the UAE, while the other $6 billion was frozen in India.<br />
Furthermore, the Iranian Finance Minister denied the $120 billion that was published by<br />
some Iranian news media and said that Iran’s frozen assets in oil revenues totaled around<br />
$35 billion, in addition to another $22 frozen in China in financial statements.10<br />
Based on that assumption, Iran favored Hillary Clinton to win over Donald Trump<br />
because of her position toward the nuclear deal. Hillary was completely satisfied with the<br />
nuclear deal and spent a year and a half with her Chinese and Russian counterparts to<br />
reach the agreement, which is evident in her statement when she said, “The country that<br />
imposed heavy sanctions on Iran has succeeded in bringing it to the negotiating table. In<br />
fact, Barack Obama and John Kerry have reached the nuclear deal and halted the Iranian<br />
nuclear program without firing one bullet.” 11<br />
On the contrary, Trump adopted a hardline position against the deal with Iran when he<br />
announced – during has presidential campaign – that he would repeal the agreement<br />
with Iran as his top priority if he won the presidency. During his campaign, Trump raised<br />
many questions about the future of the nuclear deal and criticized it sharply saying it<br />
was “A bad deal,” and “Shame on Washington,” and “This disastrous deal.” Trump added,<br />
“Washington has given Iran everything for nothing; the nuclear deal has released $150<br />
billion in exchange for nothing; the growing Iranian influence in four countries – Iraq,<br />
Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon – is unacceptable.” 12<br />
In the same context, a spokesperson from the American Department of State Mark<br />
Toner said, “Based on Trump’s statements, the Iranian nuclear deal might be repealed.” 13<br />
However, the question arises here as to how can Trump repeal an agreement signed by<br />
five countries other than the US, four of which are members of the Security Council?<br />
All Trump can do is increase monitoring Iran regarding uranium enrichment, ban the<br />
importation of nuclear materials, and impose sanctions. In addition, US partners in the<br />
Middle-East region opposing the nuclear deal can do no more than what they did before<br />
164 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
the agreement, such as attempting to influence the US Interior, challenging the nuclear<br />
deal, and building an anti-Iran coalition on all levels.<br />
Moreover, Trump threatened to take decisive action against any Iranian ship that<br />
approaches US Navy ships in the Gulf. He also criticized Iranian interference in the affairs<br />
of other countries in the region and its ambitions to occupy Iraq. Previously, Trump said<br />
that Iran was supporting terrorism to destabilize the security of the Middle East, accusing<br />
it in his speech to the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) of being behind<br />
terrorist attacks in twenty-five countries and on five continents around the world. He also<br />
criticized the Obama administration for paying Iran to release American hostages. 14<br />
In the same context, Iranian political analyst and former diplomat Seyyed Hossein<br />
Mousavian said that the normalization of relations between Iran and the United States is<br />
not possible in the near future for many reasons:<br />
A. The Iranian Supreme Leader and the Iranian people distrust the United States and its<br />
promises.<br />
B. Some countries such as Israel and the GCC countries are moving their lobbies and<br />
making their utmost efforts to sabotage US-Iranian relations. 15<br />
Fourth: Possible scenarios for future US-Iranian relations<br />
After Republican Donald Trump became President of the United States on 11/18/2016,<br />
there are three possible scenarios for US-Iranian relations:<br />
1. The continuation of the nuclear deal with the commitment of both sides and a nonconfrontational<br />
policy.<br />
The Trump administration will respect the United States’ international commitments<br />
and stick to its nuclear deal obligations. In essence, the agreement is not a bilateral<br />
agreement between only these two countries; it is an agreement between the<br />
international P5+1 Group and Iran.<br />
The other countries’ part of the agreement will not correspond to the American<br />
willingness to terminate the deal and adopt a military option, or even reconsider some of<br />
the articles of the agreement, which took ten years to reach. The High Representative of<br />
the European Union for Foreign Affairs Frederica Mogherini said that the nuclear deal has<br />
been approved by the Security Council, which means that this is neither a bilateral nor a<br />
unilateral agreement, but a multinational agreement between the P5+1 Group and Iran.<br />
2. Review of the nuclear deal.<br />
Trump’s advisor for foreign affairs, Waleed Faris stated that the new administration<br />
intends to take the nuclear deal to Congress for review and amendment of its articles.<br />
Iran’s fears arose after Donald Trump became President of the United States. President<br />
Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Javad Zarif sent cold congratulatory letters to the new<br />
US President, which increased Iran’s fears. On the other hand, the two American major<br />
parties – Democratic and Republican – both have something against the nuclear deal.<br />
European-American companies also achieved nothing from the agreement as a result of<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
165
a recession in the Iranian economy, slow economic growth, high unemployment, and the<br />
IRGC’s control of the entire Iranian economy.<br />
In fact, the RG has used billions of the US-released dollars to fund militias and back<br />
Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria through its support of Hezbollah and the Afghani elements<br />
(Fatimiyoun), and the other militias in Iraq and Yemen.<br />
3. A new stage of confrontation and a resumption of sanctions.<br />
This is the most probable scenario. The programs and statements of the American<br />
presidential candidates reflected their foreign policies if won the Presidency. Most of<br />
Trump’s statements during his campaign indicated that this scenario would likely be<br />
implemented according to the slogan, “All options are possible against Tehran including<br />
the military option,” and a resumption of sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missiles and terrorist<br />
activities. It may also include some other Iranian organizations on the list of terroristsupporting<br />
organizations.<br />
During his campaign, Trump said, “I will not tell you what I’m going to do with the<br />
disastrous nuclear deal.” Later he said that he would rip up the historical agreement<br />
negotiated by the Obama administration. “The deal is one of the worst agreements I have<br />
ever seen in my life. Iran is the biggest supporter of terrorism in the world that is now<br />
swimming in $150 billion released by the United States,” Trump said. He also threatened<br />
Iranian boats approaching American warships in the Gulf when he said, “If any military<br />
personnel of any country harasses our soldiers, we will destroy them.”<br />
Hence, the Iranian options Zarif mentioned concerning the nuclear deal are limited<br />
and contradict his statements. The first statement by Donald Trump after he became<br />
President of the United States confirmed that the US would realign with its most<br />
important ally Britain, which had just withdrawn from the European Union not only<br />
on the Iranian nuclear deal, but also on several international issues such as the NATO,<br />
the Ukrainian situation, and re-stabilizing the oil markets. This alliance between both<br />
countries will stand against Iran’s ambitions, which aim – since the Khomeini’s Revolution<br />
in 1979 – to incite disorder and instability in the Middle East and target Arab political<br />
regimes.<br />
EU-Iranian Relations<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
The European Union countries build their relations with other countries based on two<br />
variables, each country’s own foreign policy and one common foreign policy for the EU, as<br />
designated by EU organizations such as the EU Council 16 , the European Commission 17 , the<br />
European Parliament 18 , and the European Council. 19<br />
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty was the first step toward a joint security and foreign policy<br />
for the EU. The second of the three foundations of the Maastricht Treaty was approved<br />
in 1999 20 , followed by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. This led to the establishment of a<br />
common EU foreign policy through the establishment of a permanent headquarters for<br />
the European Council, relocating the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs<br />
166 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
and Security Policies, and the establishment of a diplomatic body called The European<br />
External Action Service as a Foreign Ministry for the EU.<br />
The European Union’s vision for unifying its foreign policy relies on the balance between<br />
the European Confederacy, which is based on the ultranationalist concept, which<br />
means adopting a form of joint supremacy for the EU countries through ultranationalist<br />
organizations 21 , and the Confederate view, which is based on governmental and liberal<br />
beliefs, which means coordinating between the various countries’ national identities to<br />
come up with a common political policy that guarantees the interests of all the member<br />
states and enhances their positions in the international arena.<br />
»»<br />
European foreign policy between the European Union Council and the European<br />
Parliament<br />
The EU policy-making process is divided between the European Union Council and the<br />
European Parliament. The EU Council is considered the European Foreign policy-maker<br />
as stated by the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon. Article 14 of the treaty states that the Council is<br />
to make suitable decisions on international questions and identify the EU’s goals. The EU<br />
Parliament has the right to participate in the decision-making process with the Council. If<br />
the Parliament rejects any procedures, the Council cannot make any decisions, as stated<br />
by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. 22 This is called “decision-making by groups.” The Treaty of<br />
Lisbon renamed this process, which has become “The ordinary legislative procedure,”<br />
whereby the Council receives approval from the Parliament before making any specific<br />
decisions of great importance. Hence, the European Parliament plays a major role in<br />
planning a common foreign policy for the EU, which has a big impact on European-Iranian<br />
relations. 23<br />
»»<br />
Limitations of the European Foreign Policy toward Iran<br />
The European Union is the biggest regional cooperative organization in the world. It<br />
has an independent entity away from its member countries. However, the EU has some<br />
limitations on its foreign policy toward Tehran, which differ from each country’s national<br />
limitations in approaching Iran as follows:<br />
a. Economic Limitations<br />
The EU is the second biggest economy in the world after the United States. Its net<br />
income amounted to $16 trillion US dollars in 2015.<br />
Iran was the fourth oil-producing country in the world before the embargo on Iranian<br />
oil exportation. It is also a major buyer of European products and a significant economic<br />
partner for the EU. The EU was the fourth biggest partner for Iran until 2012 after China,<br />
the UAE, and Turkey. Iranian exports to the EU amounted to 5.5 billion Euros, while<br />
its imports amounted to 7.4 billion Euros. Oil and other products represented 90%<br />
of European imports from Iran, which caused a sharp decline in the Iranian economy<br />
following the imposition of sanctions, and reduced the trade between both sides that had<br />
amounted to 12.8 billion Euros in 2012.<br />
b. US Policy toward Iran<br />
The nature of the US-Iranian relations is considered an important factor. Despite its<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
167
strategic alliances, the United States takes punitive actions against the D’Amato Law to<br />
strengthen financial sanctions against foreign companies investing more than $20 million<br />
in the Iranian oil sector, which is also known as the ISA (The Iranian Sanctions Act), which<br />
has been extended by the US Congress for another ten years. Iran considered this law as a<br />
violation of the nuclear deal. The positions of US Congress and the Obama administration<br />
were contradictory; John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, used the rights granted to him<br />
by the nuclear deal and repealed anything violating the agreement, which, according<br />
to the US administration’s point of view, saved the nuclear deal. 24 On the other hand,<br />
the EU was committed to the agreement with Iran and rejected the new US President<br />
Donald Trump’s statements, but at the same time raised their fears of a resumption of US<br />
sanctions on Iran. In fact, the EU’s has attempted to adopt independent economic policies<br />
in recent years, although it has been working with the United Sates for many years on its<br />
strategy toward Iran.<br />
c.The Iranian Nuclear Deal<br />
Iran’s commitment to the nuclear deal is an important determiner of EU-Iranian<br />
relations. The EU has been fully committed to the UN sanctions on Iran concerning its<br />
nuclear program since July 2010. 25<br />
With the release of information about Iran’s nuclear ambitions in the mid-1990s, the EU<br />
took certain measures to deter Iran’s nuclear program through freezing its funding and<br />
technology, and the imposition of trade, economic, and financial sanctions.<br />
• On Aug. 12th 2010, the EU strengthened the sanctions on Iran. It banned any joint<br />
actions with Iranian oil or gas companies and prevented all member countries from giving<br />
insurance to the Iranian government. It also banned the exportation and importation of<br />
weapons and dual-usage products that could be used for uranium enrichment, as well as<br />
selling or transferring any energy equipment or technology used by Iran to search for and<br />
refine natural gas.<br />
• In May 2011, the EU countries’ Foreign Ministers extended sanctions and included 100<br />
new companies and individuals, including Iranian maritime companies.<br />
• In October 2011, the EU included 29 individuals involved in human rights violations in<br />
the sanctions, increasing the number to 61 people.<br />
• On Dec. 1st, 2011, the EU blacklisted 180 Iranian individuals and froze all new contracts<br />
to buy and transport Iranian crude oil, but allowed members states that had valid<br />
contracts to buy oil until 1st July 2012.26<br />
In fact, the Iranian oil sanctions dealt Iran a severe blow and forced it to come to the table<br />
and negotiate the nuclear deal.<br />
d. Iran’s interference in the affairs of Middle-East countries<br />
Following the eruption of the so-called Arab Spring Revolutions in 2011, Iran became<br />
a major player in the Middle East. Iran violated the Security Council resolution banning<br />
the export of weapons to Syria and Yemen. It is also participating actively in the war in<br />
Syria with its forces and militias, and inciting disorder in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, and<br />
168 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
Yemen. Consequently, Iran’s actions and disregard of good neighborly conduct became<br />
intolerable for the EU and the international community.<br />
The fourth Arab-European meeting at the headquarters of the Arab League in December<br />
2016 was headed by the Tunisian Foreign Minister Khamis Aljinhawi on behalf of the Arab<br />
countries, and Federica Mogherini on behalf of the EU. They condemned Iran’s behavior<br />
and its presence on Iraqi soil. 27<br />
The EU representatives also expressed their concern about Iran’s interference in Arab<br />
countries’ affairs. They stressed that Arab-Iranian relations should be based on good<br />
neighborly conduct and non-interference in each other’s affairs, the respect of selfdetermination,<br />
independence, and settling conflicts peacefully in compliance with the UN<br />
Charter and international law. 28<br />
e. Iran’s Human Rights Record<br />
The imposition of European sanctions on Iran coincided with its bad human rights<br />
record following the Iranian presidential elections of 2009. On April 12th, 2011, the EU<br />
took measures (visa bans and freezing assets) against the individuals responsible for the<br />
deteriorating human rights situation in Iran, especially the executions of large numbers<br />
of Iranians. These sanctions were extended in October 2011, March 2012, and March<br />
2013, and were revised in April 2015 to include 83 more individuals and one organization.<br />
In addition, the Foreign Affairs Council was held on March 23rd, 2012, who decided to<br />
impose an EU ban on the exportation of communications control technologies.<br />
In 2004, Iran stopped negotiations with the EU concerning the human rights situation<br />
that started in 2002. In September 2013, The Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad<br />
Zarif expressed his willingness to resume negotiations in his meeting with Mrs. Katherine<br />
Ashton on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting. 29<br />
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169
These five factors determine EU-Iranian relations based on current events and the<br />
complicated decision-making process inside the EU.<br />
The EU Boosting Trade Relations with Iran and its Strategy toward this Country<br />
Following the nuclear deal in July 2015 and its practical implementation in January<br />
2016, the international nuclear-related sanctions on Iran were repealed. The EU countries<br />
resumed their economic ties with Iran one after another. The following tables compare<br />
the amount of trade between Iran and some EU countries in September 2016 and the<br />
same month of 2015 before signing the nuclear deal:<br />
On January 18th, 2017 the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica<br />
Mogherini announced that trade between the EU and Iran had increased by 63% in the<br />
nine months since the lifting of the sanctions imposed on Tehran. 30<br />
Despite the continuation of the banking obstacles between both sides and Iran’s sharp<br />
criticism of the agreement, this big and rapid development in trade relations between<br />
Tehran and the EU following the nuclear deal reflects the EU’s desire to do business with<br />
Iran.<br />
»»<br />
The EU’s Strategies toward Tehran<br />
The EU-Iranian economic relations following the nuclear deal diminished the EU’s<br />
influence on Iran’s policies concerning its human rights record and regional practices. In<br />
fact, this open policy toward Tehran will remove the EU’s ability to play a major role in the<br />
international arena due to Iran’s violations of the Security Council resolutions related to<br />
violence in the Middle-East, which provoked the EU Parliament to release the so-called<br />
‘EU Strategy toward Iran’ in 2016, which included several terms and conditions Iran has to<br />
comply with in order to maintain relations with the EU:<br />
• Iran is required to play a major role in solving the political crises in Iraq, Yemen, Syria,<br />
Lebanon, and Afghanistan based on international law and the sovereignty of these<br />
countries.<br />
• Cancel the execution sentences in Iran and review Article 91 of the Penal Law 2013 to<br />
stay the executions on people below 18 years old as a first step.<br />
• Iran is required to carry out judicial reform with the help of the EU.<br />
• Iran has to take the necessary steps to create a transparent environment for<br />
international investments and fight corruption on all levels, especially related to the<br />
recommendations of the World Financial Group (FATF), and stop funding terrorist groups.<br />
• Establish an efficient control system on European exports to prevent the dual-use of<br />
certain goods and technologies in a way that violates human rights or is against the EU.<br />
• Establish trade and economic relations with its neighboring countries according to the<br />
principles of the World Trade Organization in order to set up a strong trade and economic<br />
bloc in the region – the EU can help establish this regional coalition.<br />
• Observe the valid economic and financial sanctions not included in the nuclear deal.<br />
Make transparent the activities of European companies in Iran.<br />
170 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
• Use the Euro as the official currency for dealing with Iran in order to prevent the US<br />
authorities from imposing sanctions – as happened before – against some European<br />
banks.<br />
• Iran is required to sign a nuclear safety and security treaty with the suggestion of<br />
holding regional talks about it.<br />
• Maintain air safety (air navigation) and provide technical assistance and basic needs for<br />
Iranian companies to be removed from the European blacklist.<br />
• Take the necessary measures to protect the human rights of immigrants and Afghan<br />
refugees in Iran, including their right to a fair trial and equality before the law.<br />
• Take the question of the multinational ‘Iranian-Europeans’ into consideration, as the<br />
arrests of these people hinder the rapprochement between the EU and Iranian society,<br />
and allow Iranian immigrants in Europe to travel freely to Iran, their original homeland.<br />
• Iranian strategic interests should be implemented through the resumption of regional<br />
stability; hence, Iran has to avoid rivalry with major regional countries.<br />
• Iran is required to cancel the death penalty for drug-related crimes, which will decrease<br />
the large numbers of executions in Iran.<br />
• Iran is to join the UN Convention on the Rights of Children and review the trials of all<br />
guilty under-age children who have been sentenced to death.<br />
• Iran is to fully cooperate with all UN procedures concerning human rights and allow<br />
international human rights organizations to carry out their missions.<br />
• Iran is to comply with the EU principles on human rights, including human rights<br />
activists.<br />
• Iran is to respect its commitments according to the Iranian Constitution; the<br />
International Covenant on Civil and Political rights; the International Covenant on the<br />
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; freedom of speech; and individual, social, and<br />
political rights. It must establish peaceful think tanks and religious and ethnic assemblies,<br />
end discrimination based on gender, language, religion, opinion, race, sexual orientation,<br />
or any other aspect including equality before the law, and establish equality in education,<br />
healthcare, and vocational opportunities.<br />
• Iran is to review the Criminal Procedures Code of 2014 to guarantee a fair trial and rule<br />
out all confessions under torture.<br />
• Iran is to guarantee the rights of religious and ethnic minorities and protect them by<br />
law.<br />
Iran is to promote equality between men and women in all legal and civil<br />
matters, which means equal opportunities in all aspects of life; economic,<br />
cultural, social, and political. 31<br />
»»<br />
Opening an EU delegation in Tehran<br />
Following the announcement of the EU strategy towards Iran, the EU made moves to<br />
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171
open an EU delegation in Tehran, which was expressed by Richard Howitt, designer of<br />
the EU strategy toward Iran when he said, “The nuclear deal was the turning point in our<br />
relations towards Iran. Despite our problems with this country concerning the recognition<br />
of Israel, democracy, and human rights, we have to open an EU delegation in Iran and<br />
resume talks about the human rights issues.” 32<br />
On the other hand, Iran’s Reformist movement believes that Iran cannot achieve any<br />
progress in the human rights field without harming its national sovereignty. However, the<br />
Conservative movement that is in power rejects negotiating with the EU on this issue,<br />
which was apparent in their position toward the visit of the German Finance Minister<br />
Sigmar Gabriel in October 2016, who announced the German and EU conditions for<br />
cooperation with Iran. Consequently, Gabriel’s visit turned into a political issue for the<br />
Iranian political elite, who rejected this visit and considered any meeting with Gabriel as a<br />
betrayal of the country. This was an accusation for Rouhani and his Government when the<br />
Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Ali Larijani refused to meet Gabriel. 33<br />
Nevertheless, the Syrian crisis was a top priority for the EU High Representative for<br />
Foreign Affairs in her talks with Iranian officials. This is considered the cornerstone of the<br />
EU’s strategy toward Iran because of the burden of the huge waves of immigrants from<br />
Syria to Europe.<br />
Although the Russian participation in the war in Syria has undermined Iran’s role, the<br />
EU is certain that Iran is a major player in this crisis. Hence, the EU has used its conditions<br />
as a bargaining chip and compromised its position with Iran. In fact, the EU believes<br />
that opening an EU delegation in Iran will pave the way for stronger influence on Iranian<br />
policies on certain issues than that of the United States.<br />
The EU’s statements about opening a delegation in Iran undermined Iran’s political<br />
maneuvering. They had no choice but to reject the EU’s suggestion, saying that it would<br />
be a center of espionage for the West in Iran.<br />
In fact, Trump’s succession to the US Presidency revised Iran’s calculations. Tehran has<br />
turned to Europe more than ever. It believes that the European nuclear deal countries,<br />
along with Russia and China, support Iran against Trump’s tendency to resume sanctions<br />
on Tehran, although the British position is less warm than the other European partners<br />
due to the nature of the British-American alliance and the British Prime Minister Theresa<br />
May’s participation in the GCC Summit.<br />
May announced her support for Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, and her<br />
commitment to a partnership with the GCC countries against the Iranian threat. 34<br />
Iran has called on Germany and France to put pressure on the United States to respect<br />
its nuclear deal commitments. In fact, with this increasing pressure from the US, Tehran<br />
is likely to agree to the EU’s conditions concerning the EU delegation in Iran, the Syrian<br />
crises, and the human rights situation.<br />
Indeed, the EU’s strategy toward Iran turned within a month into cooperation with<br />
Tehran. It significantly influenced Iran’s relations with the EU member states immediately,<br />
which reflects the seriousness of the EU decision-making process within the framework<br />
172 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
of the unanimous European policies,<br />
especially regarding German-Iranian<br />
relations.<br />
»»<br />
German-Iranian Relations<br />
Germany is committed to its EU allies.<br />
It efficiently participates in the EU and<br />
NATO organizations, adopts unanimous<br />
EU policies, and complies with all its resolutions. It is the second biggest sponsor of NATO<br />
after the United States. It has the highest number of US military installations in Europe<br />
and the most short-range nuclear missiles. On the military and security levels, Germany<br />
is highly dependent on the United States; nevertheless, its economic capabilities give it a<br />
form of independence and power in the international arena. 35<br />
»»<br />
Aspects of German Foreign Policy toward Iran<br />
There are five aspects of EU foreign policy toward Iran. Germany has other aspects in its<br />
approach to Tehran as follows:<br />
»»<br />
Mediation between Russia and the West<br />
Germany plays an intermediary role in the disputes between Russia and the West.<br />
With the implementation of European economic sanctions on Russia due to its military<br />
intervention in Georgia and Ukraine, the German-Russian trade exchange rate decreased<br />
by 25% 36 after reaching 50 billion Euros in 2015. The development of Russian-Iranian<br />
relations following the nuclear deal and their military cooperation on the Syrian crisis<br />
at the level of strategic relations boosted German-Iranian ties. Germany adopted a<br />
less tense position than its other European partners toward the joint Iranian-Russian<br />
cooperation in Syria.<br />
»»<br />
The Recognition of Israel<br />
Germany stressed the recognition of Israel as a condition for normalizing relations<br />
with Tehran, which was strongly rejected by Iran. For Germany, this is a basic condition<br />
because of German-Israeli relations. Israel is Germany’s third trading partner after<br />
the United States and China. They have strong ties and cooperate on all African<br />
developmental projects, which is evident in the German Christian Democratic party’s<br />
beliefs – headed by Angela Merkel – that the security of Israel is a part of Germany’s<br />
national interests. It is a non-negotiable issue, as stated by Merkel in the Israeli Knesset. 37<br />
»»<br />
The Foundations of Germany’ Foreign Policy toward Iran<br />
Trade<br />
The German economy is the strongest in Europe. It represents 20% of<br />
the European economy and is the fourth biggest in the world after the US, China, and<br />
Japan. The quarterly report showed that the German economy had entered a strong<br />
stage of growth. The German growth rate increased from 1.2 to 2.1% in 2015, while in<br />
2016 it was 1.8%.<br />
In light of Germany’s attempts to create new markets for its products, Iran was an<br />
area of competition for EU countries. The German Finance Minister paid three visits to<br />
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173
Iran; one in 2015 and two visits in 2016. He negotiated many trade deals with Iranian<br />
officials, including updating industries that were purchased in the 1970s and needed<br />
development. According to the statistics, Iran is the second economic partner for<br />
Germany outside Europe after the United States.<br />
During the second half of 2016, Germany agreed short and long- term contracts with<br />
Iran, except for Siemens, concerning the establishment of a railroad for $1.7 billion.<br />
However, some German economic delegates who visited Iran recognized that there were<br />
too many obstacles for investment or signing long-term contracts with Iran.<br />
In fact, there are many obstacles facing German-Iranian relations.<br />
A. Money laundering.<br />
This obstacle damages the business environment in Iran and calls for more economic<br />
sanctions on Iranian banks, which prevents them from doing business with EU countries.<br />
As a result, the Iranian President activated the FATF contract that was signed during<br />
the term of former President Ahmadinejad to combat money laundering. In fact,<br />
Ahmadinejad could not enforce the contract due to internal pressure, especially from the<br />
Revolutionary Guard Corps.<br />
B. The human rights record.<br />
The executions of 12-year old children, although Iran used to postpone them until<br />
the age of 18. Iran’s participation in war crimes in Syria was also a major obstacle facing<br />
German-Iranian relations, which made it difficult for Iran – as the German Minister Sigmar<br />
Gabriel said – to be a special economic partner for Germany. 38<br />
C. The American restrictions that were not influenced by the nuclear deal on American<br />
and international banks and financial organizations doing business with Tehran.<br />
D. The EU has banned 80 Iranian personnel from traveling to EU countries or holding talks<br />
with them because of their involvement in terrorist activities and human rights violations.<br />
Furthermore, the EU has banned doing any armament deals with Iran or exporting any<br />
equipment that could be used in Iran’s nuclear program. However, Germany aims to<br />
increase its trade with Tehran by up to five billion Euros during the next two years and by<br />
ten billion Euros in the next five years, as stated by Folker Teyler, Chief of the Trade Sector<br />
in the German Chamber of Industry. Indeed, trade between the two countries amounted<br />
to 2.1 billion Euros and rose by another 10% during the first half of 2016. 39<br />
»»<br />
Cooperation in the Energy Sector<br />
Iran intends to implement two stages of the Bushehr nuclear plant to generate<br />
electricity. The second and third stages save 22 million barrels of oil annually to produce<br />
the same amount of electricity generated by the reactor. The second stage produces<br />
1057 Megawatts, while all other Iranian electricity stations generate 75,000 Megawatts,<br />
with a 6% increase in its annual oil consumption. 40 So far, Iran exports electricity to Iraq,<br />
Azerbaijan, and Pakistan, and is planning an ambitious project to export electricity to<br />
Turkey and Europe after building twenty nuclear plants to produce electricity.<br />
Germany has a long history of nuclear cooperation with Iran. It has state-of-the- art<br />
174 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
technology and respects deadlines. During the last six months of 2016, Germany and<br />
Russia competed to win the development contract for the Bushehr plant. Russia did not<br />
comply with the economic sanctions on Iran and continued its work in the Bushehr plant<br />
and other projects in Iran, ignoring the international pressure.<br />
On the other hand, Iran sought to please Germany by granting German companies the<br />
privilege to develop the natural gas fields in Iran, especially Siemens, which suffered a<br />
decrease in its activities in this sector after buying a gas extraction unit from Dresser-Rand<br />
for $7.8 billion. Siemens welcomed this invitation from Iran, saying that it was committed<br />
to its obligations toward Iran during hard times but at the same time would comply with<br />
international regulations, using the same Russian company’s slogan. 41<br />
»»<br />
Banking Cooperation<br />
The United States dollar ban in Iran remained in place after signing the nuclear deal.<br />
No decree was issued by the US to reassure EU banks that they would not be subject to<br />
a fine for having done business with Iran before September 2015. However, Some EU<br />
countries such as Germany gave Iranian banks permission to open branches in Germany.<br />
Consequently, three Iranian banks, The Middle East Bank, the Persian Bank, and Sina<br />
Bank opened branches in Munich in Bavaria. 42 Nevertheless, no German bank has opened<br />
a branch in Iran, despite the German Finance Minister Sigmar Gabriel’s official request<br />
during his first visit to Iran in August 2015. Wali Allah Saif, the Iranian Central Bank’s<br />
Governor, met this request with a cold response when he said, “Any German bank can<br />
open a branch in one of the free economic zones, and has to comply with the rules of the<br />
foreign economic facilities working in these zones.” 43<br />
»»<br />
Conclusions<br />
Based on the above, we can conclude the following,<br />
1. The unanimous EU foreign policy is a major factor in determining the nature of the EU’s<br />
strategy toward Iran.<br />
2. The EU Parliament, in particular, has the greatest influence on the EU’s strategy toward<br />
Iran.<br />
3. The EU Parliament’s decision-making process concerning foreign policy complies with<br />
EU values even if it contradicts the economic interests of the EU member states.<br />
4. There is a strong relation between the EU and Arab countries. Both sides hold regular<br />
meetings that can be used by the Arab countries to force Iran to comply with international<br />
law and respect the good neighbor policy with them, and stop escalating tension in the<br />
Middle East.<br />
5. EU-Iranian relations are expected to improve due to the pressure exerted by the Trump<br />
administration on both sides.<br />
6. Germany and France are expected to provide Iran with political support in relation to<br />
the nuclear deal in the face of Trump’s pressure and threats.<br />
7. German commitment to the EU’s strategies could force Iran to improve its human<br />
rights record.<br />
8. Trump’s growing pressure on Iran will improve the EU-Iranian rapprochement and the<br />
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175
possibility of opening an EU delegation in Iran.<br />
9. The EU’s strategies vary from one member state to another based on the political trend<br />
of the ruling party in each EU member state.<br />
10. The European Socialist Leftist Parties are closer to Iran than the Right.<br />
11. Russia-Iranian Relations<br />
For a long time, Russian-Iranian relations fluctuated between cooperation, rivalry, and a<br />
change of strategic priorities. In fact, the rivalry has been the dominant feature of Russia-<br />
Iranian relations throughout history. However, these relations have recently strengthened<br />
since the succession of Hassan Rouhani to the Iranian Presidency and the achievement<br />
of the nuclear deal with Russia’s help and support. During the last few months, both<br />
countries have taken serious steps to improve relations in the economic and military<br />
sectors, as well as on other regional and international issues.<br />
»»<br />
The Syrian Crisis<br />
Away from the Kremlin’s goals, Russia announced that its intervention in Syria was at<br />
the request of Bashar Assad and due to the approval of the Russian Union Council on<br />
delegating authority to President Vladimir Putin to use the Russian Armed Forces outside<br />
the country. Hussein Share’ati, the Iranian Supreme Leader’s advisor when he announced<br />
that the Russian intervention was at the request of Iran to save Assad’s regime in Syria,<br />
confirmed this announcement.<br />
The Chief of the Think Tank Institute reporting to the Republican Guards (RG) Sa’adallah<br />
Zra’i asserted that Russia had sent its forces to Syria two days after the visit of an Iranian<br />
military delegate to Moscow. 44 Iranian newspapers also reported from the Russian<br />
newspaper Gazeta about the role of the Iranian Al-Quds Militia Commander Qasem<br />
Suleimani in convincing Russian President Vladimir Putin to go to war in Syria and to halt<br />
the Syrian Revolution, although Putin is concerned about the future of Assad and feels<br />
that the situation in Syria has become disastrous and complicated. 45<br />
During the last few months, Tehran has created a new military position called ‘the<br />
political, military, and security coordinator with Russia and Syria’ and appointed Admiral<br />
Ali Shamkhani, the Secretary General of the Higher Council for Iranian National Security,<br />
to this position. 46<br />
»»<br />
Russian Bombers Use Iran’s NOGA Airport to Carry Out Strikes in Syria<br />
The Russian-Iranian military use in and political coordination on the Syrian crisis peaked<br />
when Iran gave permission for the Russian 2-22 m3 bombers to launch strikes in Syria<br />
using Iran’s Noga air force base in Hamadan. This step shocked observers of Iranian affairs,<br />
as this was the first time since the Revolution of 1979 that Iran had allowed foreign forces<br />
to use its military installations.<br />
In fact, the Noga air force base was used by the Iranian regime to stop the attempted<br />
coup following the Revolution. At first, it was called the ‘Har Base,’ but later it was<br />
renamed Noga after the pilot Mohammed Noga, who was loyal to the Revolution, and<br />
who was killed in the war against the Kurds. 47<br />
176 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
Contradiction about the Russian Military Presence in Iran<br />
The Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Russian bombers had taken off from<br />
the Iranian air force base and destroyed five arsenals in Syrian cities. The announcement<br />
said, “The Russian long-range 3M23-TU bombers and the 34-SU fighters took off from<br />
Hamadan air force base and attacked ISIS and Al-Nusra Front in the cities of Aleppo, Deir<br />
ez-Zor, and Idlib.” 48<br />
The publication of photos of the Russian bombers at Noga air force base in Hamadan<br />
and the press release by the Russian Ministry of Defense confused Iranian officials<br />
with their contradictory messages. Hours after the release of this news, the Speaker of<br />
Parliament Ali Larijani said that the Russians’ presence at this base was temporary, which<br />
made the Iranian Chief of Staff respond by saying that Parliament had nothing to do with<br />
this affair, and the use of the base came about through a trilateral cooperation between<br />
Iran, Russia, and Syria to strike armed groups in Syria. He also criticized the Russians for<br />
revealing this secret information. 49<br />
The Secretary General of the Higher Iranian Security Council Admiral Ali Shamkhani<br />
confirmed this news and said that the Russian airplanes in Hamadan had come at the<br />
request of Iranian military advisors to provide air cover and logistical support for the<br />
war effort in Aleppo, saying that their presence was proof of Iran’s strength, not its<br />
subordination. He added that the aim of the press release about Russia’s use of the air<br />
force base was just to flex its muscles and introduce itself as a major player in the war in<br />
Syria. 50<br />
Chief of the National Security Committee in the Iranian Parliament Aladdin Brojardi<br />
asserted that the Russian use of the Noga air force base was for passage and refueling<br />
purposes only, which did not violate Article 146 of the Iranian Constitution, adding that<br />
the goal of the Russian airplanes there was to confront ISIS.<br />
Brojardi reappeared and confirmed that Article 146 prohibited the use of any Iranian<br />
base by foreign forces even for peaceful purposes, asserting that Russia had been using<br />
this base for a while in secret. 51<br />
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177
Some attributed this contradiction by Iranian officials to the disagreement between<br />
the two branches of authority about the Russian use of this air force base, which violated<br />
one of the basic principles of the Revolution and the Iranian Constitution, which is, “The<br />
rejection of any form of interference in the internal affairs of and the deployment of<br />
foreign forces in Iran.” 52<br />
Consequently, spokesperson from the Iranian Foreign Ministry Bahram Qasemi<br />
announced the suspension of Russian use of the Iranian air force base as an attempt<br />
by the Iranian regime to calm tensions inside the country; nevertheless, Speaker of the<br />
Iranian Parliament Ali Larijani denied Qasemi’s statement – as reported by the Iranian<br />
news agency Farsi News – saying that the Russians were still using Noga air force base in<br />
Hamadan to launch air strikes in Syria. 53<br />
»»<br />
The Possibility of the Resumption of the Russian Military Activities in Iran<br />
Despite the contradictions by Iranian officials on this issue, the use of Noga air force<br />
base paved the way for more Russian-Iranian military cooperation. Iranian officials never<br />
denied the resumption of this cooperation such as Hussein Dehqan, a senior official<br />
at the Iranian Ministry of Defense, who criticized the Russians for revealing the secret<br />
agreement between the two countries. In an interview with the Kremlin-backed TV<br />
channel, ‘Russia Today’ Dehqan added that his country would give Russia permission to<br />
use Hamadan air force base at their request. 54<br />
»»<br />
Russian Motivations for Using Noga Air force Base<br />
1. A Russian show of force and their ability to build new alliances in the Middle East.<br />
2. Showing that the Russian bombers’ capabilities are equal to the American ones and<br />
that they know that the US used their strategic B-1B bomber against ISIS at Ain Alarab<br />
(Kobani), in the countryside east of Aleppo in 2014, and then again in the Syrian Manbij<br />
recently.<br />
3. Imposition of the status quo of the world to ensure that Russia is one of the key players<br />
in the Middle-East region. 55<br />
4. In addition to the tactical and operational factors, the use of the Iranian Noga air<br />
force base as a Launchpad for Russian warplanes reflects the strategic development of<br />
both Russia and Iran. Knowing that this is the second air force base used by Russia in the<br />
Middle East after Hmeimeim to carry out its operations in Syria. 56<br />
5. The use of Noga air force base decreases the flight times of the Russian warplanes by<br />
up to 60%.<br />
6. The Russian air force used to use 2-22m3 bombers starting from airports in the<br />
Republic of Northern Ossetia in southern Russia, as the Syrian Hmeimeim air force<br />
base was not ready for these warplanes, which are the largest bombers in the world.<br />
Furthermore, the use of Noga air force base gives more security to the Russian planes<br />
compared to Hmeimeim air force base, which lies within the theater of operations in<br />
Syria. 57<br />
178 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
»»<br />
Iran’s Motivations for Giving Permission for Russians to use Noga Air force Base<br />
1. Iran’s military failure in Syria and the critical situation when confronting the Syrian<br />
opposition and other armed groups.<br />
2. The Russian use of Noga air force base is considered a massive failure for Iran’s<br />
sectarian militias, especially in Aleppo. 58<br />
3. The killing of large numbers of Iranians and Shiite militias reporting to Tehran in the war<br />
in Syria.<br />
4. Securing the Assad Regime in the face of the progress of opposition forces on the<br />
ground.<br />
»»<br />
Russian-Iranian Disagreements<br />
The Russian-Turkish agreement about the evacuation of civilians and stranded gunmen<br />
in Aleppo revealed hidden disagreements between Russia and Iran. Several observers of<br />
Iranian affairs believe that the Russian-Iranian alliance in Syria was fragile and imposed by<br />
the regional conditions and the interests of both sides in this country.<br />
After the Turkish-Russian agreement about the ceasefire and the evacuation of civilians<br />
and gunmen, Tehran noticed that Russia was starting to make agreements that violated<br />
Iran’s strategy in Syria, which is clear evidence that Russia had taken the lead in the<br />
Syrian conflict, and had become the savior of the Assad Regime in exchange for Turkish<br />
protection of the opposition’s armed groups. 59<br />
Iran denied any disagreement with Russia, although Russia’s warning about responding<br />
to any shooting during the evacuation process from Aleppo, even if the offender was from<br />
the regime’s armed forces or its militias, is evidence of disagreement between both sides.<br />
The Russian-Turkish agreement about the evacuation of civilians and gunmen with the<br />
approval of the UN, and the Security Council Resolution concerning the deployment of<br />
observers in Aleppo increased Iran’s fears about its future in Syria; consequently, the<br />
RG refused entrance to international observers to Syria under the pretext of espionage.<br />
It sought, with its proxies, to obstruct the Turkish-Russian agreement through creating<br />
obstacles and conditions such as the evacuation of the residents of Fo’ah and Kofriah,<br />
who were surrounded by the opposition forces. They also bombed a number of<br />
neighborhoods to obstruct the civilian evacuation from Aleppo and took civilian hostages.<br />
»»<br />
Points of Disagreement Between the Two Countries<br />
1. The Russian-Turkish agreement included the preservation of the Syrian Regime,<br />
but not of Bashar Assad, which was rejected by Iran. This is the most critical point of<br />
disagreement between the two countries. Bashar Assad is a red line for Iran, while Russia<br />
does not mind getting rid of him. This Russian position worried Iran and led it to believe<br />
that Moscow was using this issue to gain more benefits by exchanging Assad for another<br />
President who would guarantee Russian interests in Syria and the region.<br />
2. The Russian position toward the future of Iranian militias in Syria; Iran was seeking to<br />
preserve its influence through the deployment of military proxies and dozens of Shiite<br />
militias such as Hezbollah based on the Iraqi model to help it enforce its expansionist<br />
policy.<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
179
3. The immediate Russian exit from Syria and its attempts to find solutions to end the<br />
Syrian crisis will negatively impact Iran’s military forces in Syria.<br />
»»<br />
The Future of the Russian-Iranian Coordination on the Syrian Crisis<br />
Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Iran has improved its position in Syria. However,<br />
today Iran is not alone in this country. Russia cannot leave Syria as easily as Iran expected,<br />
especially after the big gains it made in Aleppo and the key role it plays in the Syrian crisis.<br />
Russia succeeded in signing an agreement with Turkey about the evacuation of civilians<br />
and gunmen, and in bringing all the fighting parties in Syria to the table in Astana to find a<br />
final solution to this crisis.<br />
Russian control of Syrian affairs and its disregard of Iran’s role provoked Iran when the<br />
Revolutionary Guards Commander criticized how Russia was dealing with Tehran on the<br />
Syrian crisis, saying that his country had made great sacrifices in Syria.<br />
In fact, the Russian-Iranian positions on the Syrian crisis are growing apart, which is<br />
evident in the goals of each side. Moscow seeks to achieve certain strategic goals and to<br />
introduce itself as an influential superpower in the world, while Iran aims to expand its<br />
sectarian ambitions and dominate Syria, which was evident in the statements by Major<br />
General Mohammed Ali Jafari, the RG commander, when he said, “Aleppo as the first<br />
line of the Iranian Revolution.” The Iranians feel they are the most eligible side to take<br />
over Syria because of the billions of dollars they have spent and the thousands of lives<br />
they have lost in this country. In fact, Iran’s influence over the Syrian regime, the Syrian<br />
decision-making process, and the theater of operations would encourage the Iranians to<br />
turn against any one of its interests, even its strategic ally Russia.<br />
Some observers believe that Russia cannot bully Iran and diminish its role completely,<br />
especially if the Astana meetings succeed with a total ceasefire in Syria.<br />
»»<br />
Military Cooperation<br />
Russia sought to regain its share of the arms market after the decrease in oil prices and<br />
trade with Western countries due to the Russian occupation of the Crimean Peninsula,<br />
while Iran sought to improve its military power and technology due to the continuation of<br />
American sanctions and its inability to improve ties with the West, even after the lifting of<br />
the sanctions imposed on Tehran following the nuclear deal.<br />
Russia and Iran made several agreements in the second half of 2016. They signed<br />
arms deals amounting to billions of US dollars to provide Tehran with state-of-the-art<br />
weapons and technologies. The frozen arms deals between both countries such as the<br />
S-300 defense missile systems, Kalashnikov machine guns, warplanes, and joint military<br />
exercises were completed by both sides.<br />
1. The S-300 defense missile systems deal was completed.<br />
The S-300 is a Russian-made long-range air defense missile system deployed to protect<br />
industrial and administrative organizations and military installations. It is manufactured<br />
by the Russian Almaz Scientific Industrial Corporation and has many versions of the same<br />
missile: the S-300P was designed for the Soviet air defense forces to intercept airplanes and<br />
Cruise Missiles, and was later developed in many versions to intercept ballistic missiles. 60<br />
180 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
In December 2007, Iran signed a contract with Russia to purchase the S-300 missile<br />
system. However, due to the nuclear-related sanctions imposed on Iran, in 2010 the<br />
Russian President at the time Dmitry Medvedev put a hold on the arms deals with Iran<br />
including tanks, armed vehicles, large caliber artillery, helicopter gunships, warships, and<br />
missiles.<br />
Three months before signing the nuclear deal, Russia lifted the arms ban against Tehran.<br />
The Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree, which lifted the sanctions on selling<br />
S-300 missiles to Iran. After signing the nuclear deal in the Austrian capital Vienna in July<br />
2015, Russia started handing over the missile systems to Tehran.<br />
In August 2016, Iran’s Defense Minister Hussein Dehqan announced the completion of<br />
the Russian S-300 missile system deal and their deployment in their positions by Iranian<br />
air defenses. 61<br />
Iranian TV announced the deployment of the missile systems at Fordo nuclear plant<br />
near Qum city about 130 Kilometers from Tehran. On the contrary, the British Jane’s<br />
Defense Weekly Journal refuted Iran’s claims, saying, “Based on the satellite photos,<br />
Iran has deployed the missile systems at their air defense base in Afsariah district on the<br />
outskirts of Tehran.” 62<br />
2. Iran Receives the Kalashnikov 103 Machine Guns<br />
Iran also received the first shipment of Kalashnikov 103s from Russia. According to the<br />
Iranian Tasnim news agency, the new machine guns were handed over to a special unit<br />
in the Iranian army. The other Kalashnikov AK-103 version is one of the most popular<br />
and developed versions in the Russian Kalashnikov family. Only five countries have<br />
this weapon officially; Russia, India, Venezuela, Libya, and Namibia. Recently, some<br />
documentary films have reported that some Saudi military personnel have these guns. 63<br />
Some observers of Iranian affairs connect the Kalashnikov deal with the ongoing<br />
political and security instability facing the Iranian Regime in the provinces of Kurdistan,<br />
Baluchistan, and Ahwaz. They also link the deal with Iran’s deteriorating economic<br />
conditions and its state of preparedness for the upcoming elections next May to prevent a<br />
repetition of the events of the 2009 presidential elections, which were quashed violently<br />
by the Iranian Regime.<br />
3. New Warplanes and Armament Deals<br />
Russia signed new armament deals to sell 48 SU-30 warplanes to Iran starting from<br />
2018. Iranian officials also asked their Russian counterparts for permission to design this<br />
kind of aircraft locally using Iranian materials for cheaper prices 64 , which was confirmed<br />
by the Iranian Minister of Defense Hussein Dehqan, who announced that his country was<br />
ready to do business with any country that fulfilled its commitments to Tehran, except the<br />
United States and Israel.<br />
The Russian SU-30 is a multi-task warplane provided with network radar and stateof-the-art<br />
smart weapons that enable it to engage with ten ground and air targets at<br />
the same time. It was designed by the Sukhoi Bureau and manufactured at the Erkotisc<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
181
factory, which belongs to the Russian company Erkot for the military industry. The Russian<br />
air force deployed this new fighter in 2012. 65<br />
Deputy Commander of the Iranian armed forces Ahmed Riza Bordistan announced that<br />
his country was negotiating the purchase of new Russian warplanes to improve its air<br />
force’s capabilities. 66<br />
In November 2016 an Iranian parliamentary delegate held talks in Russia to make a $10<br />
billion dollar agreement to buy T90 tanks, artillery systems, and helicopters. 67<br />
In this regard, Chief of the Asian Directorate at the Russian Foreign Ministry announced<br />
that Iran had prepared a list of arms to buy from Russia. He added that the list included<br />
tanks, warplanes, weapons, and equipment that were included in the sanctions imposed<br />
on Iran and that Russia had to go the Security Council for approval to respond positively to<br />
Iran’s requests. 68<br />
4. Military Exercises<br />
Russian and Iranian forces conducted their first air exercises in Iran as part of the eighth<br />
international exhibition, which was held on Kish Island. Russia displayed a number of its<br />
warplanes, especially the new Sukhoi model.<br />
In August 2016, Iran participated in an international military competition in Russia,<br />
where they agreed to conduct more military exercises and exchange advisors. 69<br />
5. Russian Navy Ships Dock at Iranian ports<br />
Russia dispatched an armada that included a Tatarstan warship, a Grad Soiz Esk frigate,<br />
and some other warships to the Iranian port of Anzali. The Russian Defense Ministry<br />
announced that the goal of this move was to strengthen international cooperation<br />
between the countries surrounding the Caspian Sea. 70<br />
In the middle of November 2016, some Russian naval units docked at the Iranian Bandar<br />
Abbas port. Russian officers and soldiers were allowed to enter Iranian territory and tour<br />
some military installations and tourist sites. 71<br />
6. Nuclear and Electrical Power Cooperation<br />
Following the completion of the Bushehr nuclear plant in September 2011, Iran<br />
considered Russia to be a strategic partner and signed new agreements with Moscow to<br />
build new nuclear plants.<br />
In September 2016 Chief of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi<br />
announced an agreement with Russia to build the second stage of the Bushehr nuclear<br />
plant in Southern Iran. The agreement included the construction of two more nuclear<br />
plants for $10 billion in order to generate about 1400 Megawatts of electricity. 72<br />
According to Salehi, the first nuclear power station was supposed to start working by the<br />
end of 2016 73 , while the second was supposed to start in 2017. Salehi also confirmed that<br />
these two plants would save 22 million barrels of oil annually from the amount used to<br />
generate electricity in power stations. 74<br />
182 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
7. Cooperation in the Oil Field<br />
On Dec. 13th, 2016, the Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak visited Tehran as head<br />
of a delegation of 500 Russian personnel. He signed a memorandum of understanding,<br />
whereby the Russian Gazprom Corporation was given the go-ahead to develop two big<br />
Iranian oil fields, Jankoulah and Jashmah Khosh, near the border with Iraq.75<br />
On the sidelines of the meetings, Novak announced that his country was prioritizing<br />
large oil projects in Iran, which reflected positively on the relations between the two<br />
countries. 76<br />
In addition, Iran granted five more oil fields to other Russian Corporations: Mansouri<br />
and Aab Taimouri were given to the Look Oil Company; Baidar Gharb went to Zara Bejneft,<br />
and the Tat Naft Company was given the rights to study the Dahlaran oil field. 77<br />
One day after this agreement, the Iranian Oil Minister Began Zanganah announced that<br />
the Russian Ross Naft Corporation was willing to participate with an Iranian company to<br />
develop the Iranian Azadkhan field and three more: Yaran, Kobal, and Bangastan. 78<br />
Furthermore, some Russian companies held talks with Iranian officials to buy Iranian oil,<br />
which was confirmed by the Iranian Oil Minister Began Zanganah when he said that Iran<br />
had agreed to sell 100 thousand barrels of oil to Russia. According to the Iranian Minister,<br />
half of this amount would be sold to Russia in cash, while the other half would be in<br />
exchange for technical and engineering services. 79<br />
8. Cancellation of Visa Requirements Between the Two Countries<br />
In a step to enhance their cooperation, the fifth Russian-Iranian Joint Committee agreed<br />
to facilitate the issuing of visas for tourists traveling between the two countries starting<br />
from 2017. 80<br />
The memorandum of understanding between both sides included a complete<br />
cancellation of visa requirements in three consecutive phases: The first is the cancellation<br />
of business and educational visas, the second is for tourist groups, and the third is the<br />
complete cancellation of visas between Russia and Iran. 81<br />
9. Cooperation in the Banking Sector<br />
For many years, banking transactions have been the biggest obstacle facing Iran in<br />
developing its trade relations with other countries. However, following the nuclear deal,<br />
the banking environment has become suitable for several countries, especially Russia, to<br />
open bank accounts and facilitate trade with Iran. The Russian Trade Bank and the Iranian<br />
Exports Development Bank made agreements to facilitate trade between Russia and Iran<br />
using their local currencies and to establish a joint bank to also facilitate trade. 82<br />
10. Cooperation in Space<br />
Russia and Iran agreed to cooperate on space-related issues such as the purchase of<br />
satellite images, launching satellites belonging to universities, and training astronauts.<br />
Moreover, the Russians urged Iran to adopt the Russian GLONASS system in Iran, which is<br />
an equivalent to the US GPS system. 83<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
183
»»<br />
The Future of the Military and Economic Cooperation Between Russia and Iran<br />
The Russian-Iranian cooperation cannot be described as strategic. It is deemed<br />
necessary because of the internal, regional, and international conditions that have<br />
obliged the two countries to cooperate and improve their relations, which seem strong,<br />
but in essence are full of serious differences and disagreements.<br />
Both sides are looking after their own interests. Iran is seeking to secure itself and<br />
improve its worn out military arsenal, as well as to acquire a strong ally outside Europe<br />
and the United States, at least temporarily. On the other side, Russia is seeking to open<br />
new markets to sell its military hardware in light of the severe drop in oil prices and<br />
the European economic sanctions imposed on it after its occupation of the Crimean<br />
Peninsula.<br />
Despite their points of disagreement on the Syrian crisis that might diminish trust<br />
between the two countries, the economic, military, and industrial cooperation between<br />
Russia and Iran is expected to continue due to the need of each side for the other. In fact,<br />
they can overcome their differences and achieve these interests at least for the moment,<br />
although there is a state of mistrust between the two countries and fears of a breakdown<br />
in relations in the future. Moscow believes that Iran might sacrifice its relations with<br />
Russia if there is a rapprochement between Tehran and Washington, while Iran fears that<br />
Russia might do the same just to achieve its interests, which is evident in the S-300 missile<br />
system 84 deal that was put on hold in 2010 and never completed until the nuclear deal<br />
was signed in July 2015.<br />
» » Conclusions<br />
1. Iran claimed that the Russian intervention in Syria was at the request of Tehran.<br />
2. Iran’s permission for Russian warplanes to use the Iranian Noga air force base in<br />
Hamadan was a surprise for all observers, as this was the first time Tehran had given this<br />
permission to a foreign country.<br />
3. The release of photos of Russian warplanes photos at the Noga air force base confused<br />
Iranian officials, who made contradictory statements because of this violation of the<br />
Iranian Constitution and values of the Revolution.<br />
4. Russia deployed its warplanes in Iran to launch strikes in Syria, and to impose this<br />
status quo on the world to ensure it is one of the key players in the region’s crises and<br />
demonstrates its ability to establish new alliances.<br />
5. The Russian use of the Noga air force base to launch strikes in Syria is evidence of the<br />
failure of Iranian forces and sectarian militias in Syria, especially in Aleppo and recognition<br />
of the inevitable fall of Bashar Assad without Russian intervention.<br />
6. The Turkish-Russian agreement to evacuate civilians and gunmen from Aleppo was the<br />
spark for a disagreement between Moscow and Tehran.<br />
7. After the Turkish-Russian agreement about the ceasefire and the evacuation of<br />
civilians and gunmen, Tehran felt that Moscow had started to make secret agreements<br />
that violated Iran’s strategy in Syria.<br />
184 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
8. The Turkish-Russian agreement included securing the Syrian regime, but not Bashar<br />
Assad, which was rejected by Iran.<br />
9. Iran seeks to expand its influence in Syria through the establishment of military proxies<br />
and dozens of sectarian militias based on the Iraqi model.<br />
10. Moscow aims to achieve some strategic goals, to preserve its gains in Syria, and find<br />
a way out of the crisis. As for Iran, its ultimate goal is to achieve its sectarian expansionist<br />
goals and make Syria another extension of its regime.<br />
11. Iran has suffered serious losses in Syria and fears the failure of its future plans in this<br />
country. This might direct it to create obstacles to make the Astana talks fail by any means<br />
possible.<br />
12. Russia seeks to restore its position in the military industry markets after the<br />
deterioration of oil prices and Western sanctions against it. This encouraged Moscow to<br />
do business with Tehran, which is eager to improve its worn-out military equipment.<br />
13. In light of the refusal of many countries and international companies to do business<br />
with Tehran even after the nuclear deal, Iran favored cooperation with Russia and has<br />
made several agreements in the energy, oil, space, and banking sectors.<br />
14. The Russian-Iranian cooperation cannot be described strategic. It is a relation<br />
deemed necessary due to internal, regional, and international factors.<br />
15. Despite the points of disagreement between both sides on the Syrian crisis, their<br />
cooperation in the economic, military, and industrial sectors is likely to continue, at least<br />
at the present time.<br />
»»<br />
Closure<br />
Iran’s internal policies deteriorated in the second half of 2016 due to the failure of<br />
its foreign policy and external trade. On an internal level, the political movements<br />
witnessed a state of tension between the Presidency and the Supreme Leader. Another<br />
confrontation also took place between the Islamic Shura Council, representative of<br />
Iran’s legislative authority, and the judicial authority on more than one big question.<br />
Furthermore, the Iranian President stood his ground against the RG, which looks down<br />
on the Iranian regular army, and ended up with the court-martial of an RG commander. In<br />
the middle of all this rivalry between the authoritarian organizations in Iran, the Iranian<br />
citizens’ trust in their regime diminished massively after a series of financial scandals that<br />
involved every state-run organizations and Iranian political movement.<br />
»»<br />
Security<br />
Iran witnessed an escalation of military operations carried out by Kurdish separatists in<br />
Western Iran. Destructive activities by Arab separatists in Ahwaz province increased with<br />
oil facilities and petrochemical factories being set on fire. The state of instability in border<br />
areas with Pakistan, Sistan, and Baluchistan province also continued.<br />
The Iranian Regime sustained its policy of restrictions on Afghan immigrants, despite<br />
the need for their expertise in Iran’s labor market; however, the Iranian Government has<br />
never assisted them or improved their conditions as legal residents.<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
185
»»<br />
The Military<br />
Iran continued its expansionist policy outside its borders and suffered big losses in lives<br />
and equipment, especially in the war in Syria, despite its reliance on Shiite militias from<br />
Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Furthermore, the funds granted to these Shiite<br />
militias to support the war in Syria have deprived the Iranian people of Iranian assets that<br />
were released following the nuclear deal.<br />
Iran also diminished its national pride and spirit of independence and non-submittal to<br />
greater powers by giving permission to the Russian warplanes to launch attacks in Syria<br />
starting from Noga air force base in Hamadan province, leading to a state of discontent in<br />
Iran.<br />
During the second half of 2016, Iran received Russian S-300 missile systems and<br />
Kalashnikov machine guns, although it is worth noting that Iran’s armament deals with<br />
Russia were mainly for defensive weapons, which is evidence that Russia is restricting selling<br />
offensive weapons to Iran in the case of any expected conflicts of interests.<br />
»»<br />
The Military Industry<br />
The capabilities of Iran’s military industries are suspect. Iran has never exported any<br />
weapons, which is evidence of their combat inefficiency. Furthermore, these industries<br />
were originally developed in North Korea and China, and introduced under Iranian names.<br />
All in all, the Iran’s military exports have been limited to tens of millions of dollars in<br />
exchange for exporting light guns and ammos.<br />
Iran has deployed its Navy in international waters. Iranian vessels docked at ports in<br />
East Africa and the Indian Ocean. They also sailed to the Syrian coast and the Eastern<br />
Mediterranean. At the same time, Iranian speedboats in the Arabian Gulf continued their<br />
harassment of American warships but stopped these activities following Donald Trump’s<br />
succession to the US Presidency<br />
»»<br />
Economics<br />
Iranian oil exports increased following the nuclear deal in 2016. Iran also succeeded in<br />
re-attracting large investments in its energy industry after the lifting of sanctions. The<br />
most prominent companies resuming their activities in Iran were the French Giant ‘Total’<br />
followed by ‘Shell’ after a six-year break.<br />
Non-oil exports reached just 6%, which reflects the low quality of Iran’s industries. There<br />
were insufficient agricultural products for local consumption, a shortage in the production<br />
sector’s funds, and an inability of Iranian banks to provide the necessary funds for struggling<br />
industries under the pretext of huge governmental debt for local banks.<br />
Following the nuclear deal, Iran received funds from its frozen assets in the United States<br />
and from its oil exports to India.<br />
The Iranian inflation rate has decreased, but unemployment remains high. The Iranian<br />
economy cannot provide the Iranian people with any improvements in their living<br />
conditions, as announced previously by the government.<br />
The Iranian currency’s exchange rate deteriorated against the dollar. All prices have<br />
186 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
isen, which has become a great burden for Iranian citizens. The Iranian people have<br />
complained about the economic performance of Rouhani’s government, especially after<br />
the announcement that it had decreased the Iranian currency’s exchange rate against the<br />
dollar to support the budget deficit.<br />
On a regional level, Iran integrated its Public Mobilization Forces (PMF) into the Iraqi<br />
military. It was apparent that the Iraqi political leadership was unable to control these forces<br />
after a request from Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi for the PMF to comply with the<br />
orders and regulations of the Iraqi military leadership.<br />
»»<br />
The Military<br />
Iran went to war in Aleppo in Syria. Its strategy was based on the genocide and evacuation<br />
of the Sunni population in cooperation with the Assad regime. The international community<br />
condemned Iran’s war crimes, which became evident when Russian forces confronted<br />
Iranian militias to prevent them from carrying out more crimes. In fact, Russia used this to<br />
avoid international condemnation after its barbaric strikes and blockades and starvation<br />
policies in Syria. Nevertheless, the Turkish- Russian rapprochement implied a Russian<br />
tendency to limit Iran’s role in Syria.<br />
In Yemen, Iran has continued its support for the Houthi rebels and deposed President<br />
Ali Abdullah Saleh. However, the Houthi-Saleh forces fell apart under strikes by legitimate<br />
Yemeni forces supported by the Arab Coalition.<br />
»»<br />
On the international level<br />
Following the nuclear deal, European countries moved toward Iran and started significant<br />
business relations with this country. They made economic agreements and increased their<br />
political relations through mutual visits. However, the EU’s fears of the resumption of US<br />
sanctions have limited long-term contracts between Europe and Iran.<br />
With the start of this EU strategy toward Iran, new conditions emerged to continue economic<br />
cooperation between both sides. However, Iran refused to comply with these conditions, which<br />
was evident when the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament refused to meet the German Economic<br />
Minister during his visit to Iran.<br />
»»<br />
US-Iranian Relations<br />
Iran received large amounts of its frozen assets in the United States following the nuclear deal.<br />
The US also allowed Iran to purchase civilian airplanes from American Boeing and European<br />
Airbus. However, the US Congress has extended the ISA law concerning the extension of economic<br />
sanctions on Iran for another ten years, which was another setback for Iran’s achievements during<br />
the Presidency of Barack Obama. Moreover, new statements and tendencies from the US prove<br />
that the time for compromise with Iran has passed.<br />
»»<br />
Russia-Iranian Relations<br />
Russian-Iranian relations have reached a state of strategic partnership through their alliance in the<br />
war in Syria, Iran’s permission for Russian warplanes to launch strikes in Syria from the Noga air force<br />
base, military cooperation through armament deals, joint exercises, and the signing of long-term<br />
contracts to build the second and third stages of the Bushehr nuclear plant. Nevertheless, indicators<br />
of a Russian-Iranian break-up are apparent, especially in the Syrian crisis.<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
187
ENDNOTES<br />
Martin S. Indyk, The end of the U.S.-dominated order in the Middle East, March 15, 2016, -1<br />
http://cutt.us/dKHeE<br />
2- حسين شبكشي، عقيدة أوباما، الشرق األوسط، 22 مارس 2016.<br />
3- تسنيم، تسنيم، تهدید أوباما به وتوی طرح ضدّ ایرانی موسوم به شفافیت مالی، 1 مهر 1 1395، مهر 1395،<br />
https://goo.gl/4EQ6Nm<br />
4- تسنيم، فورين بوليسي: 60 عضوً ا من الكونغرس يطالبون أوباما بتجميد بيع أسلحة للسعودية، 30/8/2016،<br />
http://bit.ly/2bZBKMy<br />
5- شهروند، ظریف خبر داد: تعهد آمریکا برای رفع نگرانیها در مورد سرمایه گذاری در ایران، 5 مهر 1495،<br />
https://goo.gl/8Btmjj<br />
6- آفرينش، تمديد أوباما لحالة الطوارئ ضدّ إيران، http://cutt.us/lmpdp<br />
7- وكالة تسنيم، تمديد العقوبات اإليرانية ل10 سنوات يشير أن المعتمدين على أمريكا واهمون، 16 نوفمبر 2016،<br />
https://goo.gl/ydGJaU<br />
8- موقع الصحفيين الشباب، اوباما برای آزادی زندانیان آمریکایی در ایران 400 میلیون دالر پرداخت کرد، ۱۳ مرداد -، ۱۳۹۵<br />
http://soo.gd/zxNW<br />
9- بي بي فارسي، هل تدفع الحكومات فدية؟، آیا دولتها باج میدهند؟، 19 مرداد 1395، http://soo.gd/cjAE<br />
10- وكالة تنسيم، رجال الحكومة يرون القوة فقط في الواليات المتحدة /الحكومة تحدد مصير ال36 مليار دوالر المحرَّرة إليران، 7 نوفمبر<br />
،2016<br />
https://goo.gl/QiwUL1<br />
11- زيتون، بازخوانی نظرات نامزدهای ریاست جمهوری امریکا چه کسی برای إیران بهتر است؟، 7 مهر 1395،<br />
https://goo.gl/fCcF94<br />
12- موقع الف، واشنگتن: تعلیق توافق هستهای ایران در دوران ترامپ محتمل است، ۲۰ آبان ۱۳۹۵،<br />
http://cutt.us/l7daX<br />
13- برترين ها، ترامپ: در کنار هم در برابر ایران میایستیم، ۱۰ آبان ۱۳۹۵،<br />
http://cutt.us/TBh2h<br />
14- صحيفة سياست روز: تكيه برتار وپود پوسیده، 15 مهر 1395،<br />
https://goo.gl/HdJypX<br />
15- مهر، دبلوماسي إيراني سابق: تطبيع العَالقات بين إيران وأمريكا في المستقبل القريب أمر مستبعد،<br />
http://cutt.us/4TZDv<br />
188 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
The EU Council: defines the general direction and priorities of the EU member states. It -16<br />
brings together the EU leaders to set the EU’s political agenda. It represents the highest level<br />
between the EU countries and comprises Ministers of member states. It generally decides by<br />
unanimity or qualified majority 72, 27% of the total votes. It also requires the approval of the<br />
majority of member states that represent 62% of the total population of the EU. Each member<br />
state has a number of representatives based on its population. The leadership rotates between<br />
member states every six months. http://cutt.us/rMn1a<br />
The EU Commission: Allocates the general budget of the EU and oversees its implementa- -17<br />
tion. It represents the EU in the international negotiations, has the right to sign agreements with<br />
other countries outside the EU, and has big authority in accepting new members. Each member<br />
state has one member and decision is based upon majority. http://cutt.us/rMn1a<br />
The European Parliament: Has some legislative rights, and supervisory and advisory respon- -18<br />
sibilities. It oversees the activities of the EU commission and approves its members. It participates<br />
in the law-making process, ratifies the international agreements and new members, and<br />
has wide authorities in relation to the EU budget. It comprises of 751 members of all member<br />
states based on their population. People of each member state elect their representatives in the<br />
EU Parliament through direct elections each five years. http://cutt.us/rMn1a<br />
The European Council: is a meeting between the heads of states or governments members -19<br />
of the EU and President of the EU Commission. The meeting is held 2-3 times a year to decide<br />
on the economic and political policies and draw the EU general policy. Usually headed by the<br />
member state heading the EU Council. Decisions are made by majority, and is not considered<br />
one of the administrative organizations of the EU. http://cutt.us/rMn1a<br />
20- د.حسين طالل مقلد: السياسة الخارجية لالتحاد األوروبي في نظريات العَالقات الدولية، مجلة الفكر، العدد التاسع، كلية الحقوق<br />
والعلوم السياسية جامعة محمد خيضر بسكرة، الجزائر 2013م، ص50.<br />
.Ibid, p.54 -21<br />
22- حسين طالل مقلد: دور المؤسسات فوق القومية في تعزيز تكامل االتحاد األوروبي: البرلمان األوروبي نموذجً ا، ص74<br />
http://cutt.us/1TzWx<br />
23- د حسين طالل مقلد: محدِّدات السياسة الخارجية واألمنية األوروبية المشتركة، مجلة جامعة دمشق للعلوم االقتصادية والقانونية،<br />
المجلد 25، العدد األول، 2009، ص627.<br />
24- الجزيرة: تمديد قانون داماتو ومصير االتفاق النووي.<br />
http://cutt.us/3QJ5<br />
25- موقع الدبلوماسية الفرنسية: االتحاد األوروبي وإيران،<br />
http://cutt.us/Xfa90<br />
The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016<br />
189
26- الجزيرة: سجلّ العقوبات الدولية ضدّ إيران.<br />
http://cutt.us/LBHiX<br />
27- شبكة أخبار العراق: وزراء خارجية الدول العربية ونظراؤهم من دول االتحاد األوروبي يرفضون التدخُّل اإليراني في العراق،<br />
http://cutt.us/zktg<br />
28- البوابة: قرارات االجتماع المشترك لوزراء الخارجية العرب واألوروبيين،<br />
http://cutt.us/TE0Y2<br />
29- موقع الدبلوماسية الفرنسية: االتحاد األوروبي وإيران،<br />
http://cutt.us/Xfa90<br />
30- وكالة أنباء فارس: االتحاد األُورُوبّي: التبادل التجاري مع إيران ازداد 63 بالمئة،<br />
http://cutt.us/o19l<br />
،European Parliament: <strong>REPORT</strong> on EU strategy towards Iran after the nuclear agreement -31<br />
http://cutt.us/bw7Om<br />
32- شيرازه: تاسیس دفتر اتحادیه اروپا در ایران راهی برای نفوذ،<br />
http://cutt.us/IX4Zj<br />
33- دویچه وله فارسی: دفتر اتحادیه اروپا در تهران؛ جبهه جدید کشمکشهای جناحی،<br />
http://cutt.us/dW5Ec<br />
34- روسيا: تيريزا ماي تتعهّد أمام زعماء الخليج بمواجهة الخطر اإليراني،<br />
http://cutt.us/n0tp<br />
35- مشرق: ایران وآلمان؛ پس از برجام،<br />
http://cutt.us/kUDs<br />
36- محمد حسن طاهری: بررسی اهداف ومنافع روسیه، ترکیه وآلمان در قبال یکدیگر، إيران- يوريكا موسسه إيراني مطالعات أوروبا<br />
وأمريكا، ۱۳۹۵.<br />
http://cutt.us/8Kco4<br />
37- مالئکه. حسن، روابط آلمان واسرائیل در دوره صدارت آنگال مرکل؛کلید فهم سیاست خارجی آلمان در خاورمیانه، فصلنامه تحقیقات<br />
سیاسی بینالمللی،شماره هفدهم، سال1392،ص90<br />
38- محمد حسن گاهری: بررسی اجمالی پرخاشگری کالمی مقامات آلمانی علیه ایران،<br />
http://cutt.us/1McY3<br />
39- دویچه وله فارسی: خیز شرکتهای آلمانی برای گسترش چشمگیر صادرات به ایران<br />
http://cutt.us/U0Y6F<br />
40- إيالف: بدء أعمال البناء في مفاعلين نوويين جديدين في إيران، 10 سبتمبر 2016م<br />
http://cutt.us/WH9L<br />
41- المسوق العرب: مجموعة سيمنس األلمانية تسعى للفوز بمشروعات في إيران،<br />
http://cutt.us/f6cnS<br />
190 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
42- هافينغتون بوست عرب: بنوك إيرانية تفتح فروعً ا لها في مدينة ميونيخ.<br />
http://cutt.us/46z7<br />
43- وكالة أنباء شينخوا: ألمانيا تفتتح بنكً ا في إيران لتسهيل التجارة<br />
http://cutt.us/EkBOn<br />
44- التدخل الرُّوسي في سوريا كان بطلب من إيران<br />
https://goo.gl/SyRJs8<br />
45- وطن امروز: حينما ترك الحاج قاسم كارتًا فوق طاولة بوتين، 15 أكتوبر<br />
http://cutt.us/Nupx5<br />
46- مركز تحقيقات راهبردي، ایران شمخانی را به عنوان هماهنگ کننده نظامی با سوریه وروسیه منصوب کرد، 25 خرداد 1395<br />
http://www.mtrd.ir/news<br />
47- العربية، قاعدة همدان.. خفايا وأسرار الحلف الروسي اإليراني، 2 أغسطس 2016<br />
http://cutt.us/owErf<br />
48- عصر ایران، وزارت دفاع روسیه: تایید حضور جنگنده های روسیه در ایران، 25 مرداد1395<br />
https://goo.gl/lK43Wh<br />
49- الشرق األوسط، تصريحات متباينة حول انطالق الطائرات الروسية من همدان، 24 أغسطس 2016<br />
https://goo.gl/3aDL63<br />
50- جام جم، روس ها با اعالم خبر حضور جنگنده هایشان در همدان بی معرفتی کردند، 1 شهريور 1395<br />
http://soo.gd/dtPA<br />
51- موقع انتخاب، بروجردی: استفاده از پایگاه هوایی نوژه برای عبور هواپیماهای روسی وسوختگیری است،30 مرداد1395<br />
https://goo.gl/pujHo5<br />
Scott Peterson، Behind Russia-Iran cooperation over Syria، a larger goal -52<br />
https://goo.gl/JLi6nr<br />
53- العربية، إيرن تكذب نفسها: روسيا ال تزال تستخدم قاعدة همدان، 23 أغسطس 2016<br />
http://cutt.us/FhwdZ<br />
54- الرياض، إيران تعتزم فتح قاعدة همدان الجوية مجدَّدًا أمام روسيا، 27 ديسمبر 2016<br />
https://goo.gl/2L1krN<br />
55- عمر صفر، لهذه األسباب تستخدم روسيا قاذفاتها في سوريا انطالقًا من همدان، 19 اغسطس 2016<br />
https://goo.gl/OkuPtD<br />
56- موقع بوستجي، قاذفات روسية في إيران: خطوة تكتيكية.. بأبعاد استراتيجية، 17 أغسطس 2016<br />
https://goo.gl/fCf611<br />
57- روسيا اليوم، لماذا إيران.. دوافع استخدام قاعدة همدان وفوائدها، 17 اغسطس 2016<br />
https://goo.gl/MIua8U<br />
58- علي حسين باكير، دالالت استخدام روسيا قواعد عسكرية في إيران، 18 أغسطس https://goo.gl/QJUnzD 2016<br />
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191
59- نون بوست، تقاسم للنفوذ أم نزاع هيمنة.. مالمح الخالفات الروسية اإليرانية بحلب، 1 يناير 2017<br />
https://goo.gl/yrN0vT<br />
60- رسميّ ًا.. إيران تكشف مهامّ صواريخ »إس 300« الروسية على أراضيها، 30 أغسطس https://goo.gl/WR16f6 2016<br />
61- عصر إيران، وزیر دفاع: سامانه موشکی اس 300 به طور کامل تحویل ایران شد، 20 أغسطس 2016<br />
https://goo.gl/5gkvus<br />
62- مشرق، ادعای نشریه انگلیسی در مورد محل استقرار »اس300-« در ایران، 18 شهريور 1395<br />
https://goo.gl/VyMPon<br />
63- روزنامه إيران، خرید کالشنیکفهای جدید، 17 مرداد – 1395 http://soo.gd/fRjQ<br />
64- بمساعدة روسية... إيران تنوي تطوير قواتها الجوية واتجاه إلنتاج الطائرات محلِّيّ ًا، 28 يونيو 2016<br />
https://goo.gl/WnctWQ<br />
65- الجيش العربي، إيران تجدد رغبتها في شراء مقاتالت جديده، 25 نوفمبر https://goo.gl/lOvd1Q 2016<br />
66- اطالعات، امیر پوردستان: خرید جنگندههای جدید در دست اقدام است، 4 اذر http://cutt.us/dgpyw 1395<br />
67- سكاي نيوز عربية، إيران تطلب شراء أسلحة ب10 مليارات دوالر، 14 نوفمبر https://goo.gl/Lyq7Oj 2016<br />
68- المدن، صفقة أسلحة روسية-إيرانية ب10 مليارات دوالر، 14 نوفمبر https://goo.gl/3MgcYj 2016<br />
69- فارس، مباحثات إيرانية روسية إلجراء مناورات عسكرية مشتركة، 2 أغسطس https://goo.gl/NAoZ0n 2016<br />
70- تسنيم: ناوگروه رزمی ارتش روسیه وارد آبهای ایران شد،۲۷ مهر ۱۳۹۵، http://cutt.us/nx8wL<br />
71- تسنيم: یگان تحقیقاتی نیروی دریایی روسیه در بندرعباس پهلو گرفت،28 ابان http://cutt.us/AUXKJ 1395<br />
72- إيران تشرع ببناء مفاعلين نوويين بتعاون روسي https://goo.gl/SnW2DM<br />
73- وكالة أين اإلخبارية: إيران: بدء تنفيذ المرحلة الثانية لمحطة بوشهر الكهروذرية،10/9/2016، http://cutt.us/RRrzX<br />
74- إيالف: بدء أعمال البناء في مفاعلين نوويين جديدين في إيران،10 سبتمبر 2016م http://cutt.us/WH9L<br />
75- سي إن بي، اتفاقيات نفطية بين إيران وروسيا ستبصر النور في يومين، 13 ديسمبر https://goo.gl/VQWyUA 2016<br />
76- مهر نيوز، تعاون إيران وروسيا االقتصادي تحت مجهر اإلعالم الغربي، 15 ديسمبر https://goo.gl/vb7yyN 2016<br />
77- تسنيم، جزئیات واگذاری ۷ میدان نفتی ایران به شرکت های روسی، 23 آذر https://goo.gl/xRzr6d 1395<br />
78- مهر نيوز، شركة »روس نفت« تُبدِ ي رغبتها في العمل مع الشركات اإليرانية لتطوير حقل آزادكان، 14 ديسمبر 2016<br />
https://goo.gl/Adaa5P<br />
79- تسنيم، فروش روزانه ۱۰۰ هزار بشکه نفت ایران به روسیه در مرحله نهایی شدن، 23 اذر 1395<br />
https://goo.gl/TPTVWJ<br />
80- الوفاق، إيران: تفاهم افزايش همكاري دانشگاهی ایران وروسیه در مذاكرات مسكو، 28 نوفمبر 2016<br />
https://goo.gl/OuXbjZ<br />
81- سبوتنيك: إلغاء التأشيرات بين إيران وروسيا قريبًا، 21 أكتوبر 2016م http://cutt.us/VjDjP<br />
82- الوفاق أونالين: تأسيس مصرف إيراني-روسي يعتمد العملة الوطنية للبلدين، 16 سبتمبر http://cutt.us/jqjh8 2016<br />
83- إيرنا: الفضاء هو المجال األوسع للتعاون اإليراني الروسي، 27 يوليو https://goo.gl/vSjwSY 2016<br />
84- مركز الروابط للبحوث والدراسات، الشراكة اليقظة: مسارات التحوُّل في العَالقات الروسية اإليرانية https://goo.gl/ygYoD<br />
192 The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016
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The First Biannual Strategic Report Dec. 2016