הישראלי לדמוקרטיה- מרץ 2017

Report 

The Jerusalem 

R 

Democracy 3.0 

Challenges and Opportunities in the Information Age

The Jerusalem 

ReportR 

4 Turning back the tide 

To tackle the crisis of democracy we must restore 

the public’s faith in its governing institutions 

by Yohanan Plesner 

6 Welcome to 21st century politics 

Poorly funded and under threat from personalization and 

social media, political parties are in decline 

by Elli Wohlgelernter 

9 Under the radar screen? 

Israel’s security agencies have sweeping surveillance 

powers, but are subjected to few checks and balances 

by Yuval Shany 

10 Terrorism in the digital age 

How does Israel confront terrorist threats in an era of 

online incitement and lone-wolf attacks? 

by Terrance J. Mintner 

IDI 

12 Israel’s next economic miracle? 

Haredim and Arabs must be integrated into society and 

economy to take the start-up nation to the next level 

by Gilad Malach and Nasreen Hadad Haj-Yahya 

14 Flexonomics 

In a dynamic labor market, challenged by technological 

disruption and increasing longevity, flexibility is key 

by Ilan Evyatar 

16 How is it going? 

A snapshot of Israeli democracy from the 2016 Israeli 

Democracy Index 

REUTERS 

18 A threat to the foundations of Jewish 

peoplehood 

Leaving issues of religion and state to an ultra-Orthodox 

monopoly is leading to estrangement between Israel and 

the Diaspora. New arrangements must be reached 

by Yedidia Stern 

19 Democracy at risk 

Citizens must lead the way in the battle 

against political corruption 

by Mordechai Kremnitzer 

FLASH90 

Magazine Editor: ILAN EVYATAR 

Copy Editors: YAKIR FELDMAN, DANIEL HABERMAN 

Manager of Business Development: REUT LEVY 

Graphic Artists: HANA BEN-ANO 

In partnership with IDI 

Cover illustration: Peecheey

GPO 

PROVIDING A CRUCIAL MIRROR 

Israeli society is undergoing significant 

changes. We have moved from a society 

of one majority alongside many minorities 

to a society made up of four increasingly 

equal “tribes.” 

These tribes have separate education systems 

and often live in separate towns and 

cities. They do not have the opportunity 

to meet each other, they do not know each 

other, and so, tragically, they rarely understand 

each other. They each have different 

identities and aspirations. 

Our challenge and our duty as a society is 

to build bridges of understanding and mutual 

respect between these different groups 

and forge a modern and new agenda, a new 

Israeli hope. 

Importantly, and in contrast to other 

democracies, Israel needs to reinforce itself 

from within while it is under attack from 

without. Throughout the years, Israel's 

democracy has developed alongside the 

struggle against terrorism and the need to 

maintain Israel's security. 

There are also social and economic gaps 

inside Israel – between the periphery and 

the center, between the ultra-Orthodox 

and mainstream, and between Arabs and 

Jews. These gaps are wide and potentially 

dangerous. Closing them is a strategic need, 

and the right steps have begun to be taken. 

Our ability to promote an inclusive vision of 

the “Israeli dream” depends on our ability 

to close these gaps and provide hope to each 

and every young person in Israel – in Kiryat 

Shmona, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Modi’in Illit 

and Rahat alike. 

The research carried out by the Israel 

Democracy Institute provides a crucial mirror 

for us to look in and see clearly the challenges 

and opportunities we face. It helps us continue 

to be a beacon of freedom and equality in a 

difficult region. It helps Israel be a light to the 

nations and a light for ourselves. 

I am delighted to see this cooperation with 

The Jerusalem Report, in looking deeper at 

some of these important issues. 

Reuven Rivlin 

President of the State of Israel 

COURTESY IDI 

VISION, PASSION, DEDICATION 

I 

joined the Israel Democracy Institute’s 

leadership shortly after stepping down as 

US Secretary of State, because I believed 

then and still believe today that one of Israel’s 

biggest challenges is to maintain an open 

society while existing in a permanent state 

of siege. Over the years, IDI has proven itself 

equal to that challenge. 

Whether one considers the overhaul of the 

national budgeting process, the tremendous 

investment in political and electoral reform 

and improved governance, or the sustained 

and thoughtful advocacy on behalf of civil 

liberties – Israel is a better place for IDI’s 

efforts. 

Today, Israel and the rest of the world are 

facing a new danger: the war being waged 

by Islamic State and Iran in the name of 

religion. After centuries of successful separation 

between religion and war, the two are 

becoming intertwined in the 21st century. 

We have to be focused and uncompromising 

in confronting this challenge. 

A second big challenge of the age is 

how to govern over diversity in the age of 

transparency. Governments everywhere 

are struggling to come to terms with the 

consequences of the information revolution 

and the extraordinary movement of people 

across borders. Perhaps Israel, a start-up 

nation enduring in a sea of autocracy, can 

serve as the “city upon a hill” envisioned by 

its founders. 

In these times of extraordinary change 

and upheaval, IDI’s efforts to strengthen the 

institutions and values that underlie Israeli 

democracy are more important than ever 

before. I believe in the Institute’s vision, and 

in the passion and dedication of its team. 

I hope that Israel’s friends and supporters 

will do what they can to help IDI succeed in 

its mission. 

George P. Shultz 

Former US Secretary of State 

Honorary Chair, IDI International Advisory Council 

DEMOCRACY 3.0 APRIL 2017 

3

Commentary Yohanan Plesner 

Turning back the tide 

To tackle the crisis of democracy we must restore 

the public’s faith in its governing institutions 

WESTERN LIBERAL democracy is in crisis. 

From America to France, Hungary to the 

United Kingdom, the past year has seen the 

growing power of right-wing, populist, often 

illiberal movements in many Western states. 

It is no longer an isolated incident – one local 

election here, one national referendum there 

– but rather a worldwide pattern. 

Even Israel is not immune. To begin putting 

forward solutions and turning back the 

tide, both at home and abroad, we first have 

to understand what happened. 

We live in an age of rapid and disruptive 

technological, social, economic and 

ideological change. Technology has been a 

blessing, but it has also increased the burden 

on our old patterns of communication, 

institutions, and politics. 

Social media, to take one key example, 

has had a giant impact on subverting the traditional 

mediating organs of our representative 

government – parliament, political 

parties, and legacy media. This has enabled 

senior officials (and those who want to be 

senior officials) to communicate directly 

and personally with the public, thereby circumventing 

political parties. 

But at the same time, absent these mediating 

organs, social media also leads to the creation 

of echo chambers, compartmentalized 

“safe spaces” where objectivity biases and 

tribalism rule supreme. Citizens increasingly 

only hear what they want to hear; politics 

has become personalized, angry, and often 

populist. There is no longer an objective 

reality. This gives rise to terms such as “posttruth” 

world of “fake news” and “alternative 

facts.” 

While post-modern relativism isn’t new, 

what is new is the speed and reach of the 

phenomenon. Social media is the accelerator 

for an ideological revolution that Israeli 

political theorist Prof. Yaron Ezrahi recently 

compared to the Renaissance. If back then, 

science sidelined religion as civilization’s 

anchor, then it now seems that science is itself 

being marginalized. The only question 

is – by what? Especially in uncertain times, 

where no fact can be trusted, people seek 

stability. Authoritarian and fundamentalist 

tendencies are increasingly viewed as attractive 

options. 

Anti-establishment 

attitudes and 

plummeting trust 

in both politics and 

politicians have been 

fed by government 

underperformance 

To be sure, social media isn’t the only 

technological disruptor responsible for our 

current moment of crisis. In recent decades, 

globalization has led to widespread economic 

dislocation for what was previously 

viewed as the bedrock of Western liberal 

democracy: the middle class. Whole industries 

have been downsized or eliminated; 

jobs have gone to developing economies; 

wages have stagnated. All the while, those 

with the appropriate training and education 

seem to benefit from the thrust of globalization. 

As they have in the past, economic 

convulsions and large income disparities 

lead, almost inevitably, to the rise of populist 

sentiments and strongman leaders offering 

quick – and simplistic – fixes. 

In the face of such changes, our traditional 

democratic institutions appear helpless. Anti-establishment 

attitudes and plummeting 

trust in both politics and politicians have 

been fed by government underperformance. 

The plunging levels of trust are fed by justified 

concerns. Special interest groups have 

tremendous and disproportionate impact 

on politicians and on national-level decision-making. 

The public sentiment that the 

democratic system is not well-geared to 

serve the greater public has much to rely on. 

AS A UNIQUE member of the family of 

Western democracies, Israel hasn’t been 

spared. The structural economic reforms 

ushered in since the mid-1980s have led to 

major growth and a strong connection to the 

globalized economy, but also to a level of 

income inequality not previously known 

in Israel’s socialist past. The cost of living 

is one of the highest in OECD countries 

and many Israelis, especially young couples, 

can no longer afford to buy their own 

home. The gap between the modern Israeli 

geographic “center” and the stagnating “periphery” 

has widened. 

Thanks to the Israel Democracy Institute’s 

annual polling work, we can actually 

quantify the eroding public trust in Israel’s 

4 DEMOCRACY 3.0 APRIL 2017

AMIR COHEN / REUTERS 

governing institutions. According to our 

most recent Israeli Democracy Index from 

December 2016, only 26.5% of the public 

actually trust the Knesset (down from 35% 

the year before) and 27% trust the government 

(down from 36%). Political parties 

fared even worse, with only 14% of the 

public expressing trust in them (down from 

19%). Almost as alarming, trust in the media 

dropped significantly, with only 24% of 

the public – down from 35.5% the year before 

– responding in the affirmative. 

The last year has witnessed an escalation 

in hostilities between the media and the 

government. Israeli politicians, like their 

counterparts around the world, take to social 

media to speak directly to the public – 

and to blast the media. The media, for its 

part, is seen as biased and subjective. Both 

sides lose in the process. 

Israel’s public space, contentious in the 

best of times, has become overtly hostile to 

competing ideas and perspectives. A rational 

and unifying national conversation about the 

truly important issues has been taken hostage 

by Facebook. This is the manifestation of a 

crisis in our own political system, and in our 

own democratic institutions. 

So, what needs to be done? Like in the 

rest of the world, we cannot turn the clock 

back on technological progress. But in all 

the spheres mentioned above, more has to 

be done to soften the negative consequences 

of the rapid changes we are witnessing. 

Anti-establishment sentiment and plummeting 

trust in democratic institutions can be 

remedied by more effective, responsive and 

transparent governance (and, indeed, governing 

systems). The economic disparities 

brought about by globalization have to be 

ameliorated by a real emphasis on root causes 

and a structural economic reform agenda that 

promotes a revitalized social fabric. Both the 

political class and the media have to exhibit 

greater responsibility, emphasizing fact and 

reason over polemics and vitriol. Above all, 

the institutions of public life have to return to 

a unifying Zionist discourse based on the liberal 

and democratic values upon which Israel 

was so successfully founded. 

THE GOOD news is that the Israel Democracy 

Institute (IDI) was founded with this 

exact mission in mind: to bolster through 

independent research and action the institutions 

and values of Israel as a Jewish and 

democratic state. 

In the economic sphere, we are working 

to put forward crucial reforms regarding the 

labor market that will hopefully (re)instill 

some faith among those who have been left 

behind, ensuring their future in a dynamic 

and flexible knowledge economy. 

Similarly, in the ultra-Orthodox and Arab-Israeli 

sectors, we are devising plans for 

greater integration – economic, social, normative 

and political – to increase overall national 

cohesion. With regard to the ultra-Orthodox, 

this means standing up for our constitutional 

values without giving up on the 

fastest growing segment of the Israeli population. 

With regard to Arab-Israelis, 20% of 

the country, it is imperative that they feel fully 

integrated in the national fabric, helping to 

undermine both the appeal of extremism (on 

their end) and populism/nativism (among 

segments of the Jewish-Israeli population). 

National security, too, is a major focus of 

IDI’s work – as it is increasingly in many 

other Western states. We are working toward 

recommendations on how to win the 

global struggles against terror while, at the 

same time, upholding our democratic and 

liberal values. Security versus democracy is 

a question Israel has long experience with; 

it is a balancing act. It is our strongly held 

belief, however, that one need not, and must 

not, come at the expense of the other. 

All of these efforts, in truth, depend to a 

large extent on the quality of our political 

system. Here, too, we are doubling down on 

our efforts to improve the quality of the civil 

service, reduce unnecessary governmental 

regulations, and combat the scourge of public 

corruption – all with the goal of boosting 

public trust in government. We are also 

pursuing our longstanding plans for political 

reform – in the electoral system, political 

parties, and Knesset – in order to boost the 

stability, performance and quality of government. 

All of these will, we believe, counteract 

the growing personalization of politics 

and the decline in substantive policy debates. 

Ultimately, the best antidote to the virus of 

anti-establishment sentiment is to improve the 

public’s faith in the system, values, and ideas 

that govern their lives. More work undoubtedly 

needs to be done. But it is only through such 

efforts that the crisis in Western liberal democracy 

currently unfolding across the globe can 

be stopped and, in time, reversed. 

Yohanan Plesner is president of the Israel 

Democracy Institute. 


5

VIEWPOINT YUVAL SHANY 

Under the radar screen? 

Israel’s security agencies have sweeping surveillance powers, 

but are subjected to few checks and balances 

THE SNOWDEN revelations about the existence of classified surveillance 

programs run by the US National Security Agency led to a 

number of important legal and policy changes in the United States, 

including the tightening of institutional safeguards and introduction 

of new limitations on government data collection and analysis. Specifically, 

intelligence services in the United States lost their authority 

to engage in the bulk collection of domestic telephone metadata 

(call logs), while new restrictions were placed on the use of incidental 

information collected through surveillance of foreign targets. 

Heightened concerns over striking a correct balance between the 

interest of governments in accessing data for security reasons and 

individual privacy rights have also manifested themselves in other 

contexts. 

For example, the European Union’s Court of Justice recently issued 

a decision to strike down domestic laws in the United Kingdom 

and Sweden that required telecommunication companies to 

retain their customers’ metadata (including information about their 

call location and on-line traffic logs) for prolonged periods of time. 

Furthermore, in many other countries, including Colombia, South 

Korea, New Zealand and South Africa, a lively public debate is taking 

place over the limits of governmental surveillance power. 

In light of these developments, the lack of attention being paid in 

Israel to issues of security surveillance is rather surprising. Especially 

given that existing laws in the country give domestic security agencies 

very broad powers of collection and access to data and metadata. 

Though Israel’s security apparatus undoubtedly has the technological 

capacity to access and utilize that data, the state imposes few institutional 

constraints and oversights on its surveillance activities. 

On the one hand, police access to communications content and 

metadata is placed under rather strict regulation – as mandated by 

the provisions of the Wiretapping Law and the Communications 

Data Law – and is subject to meaningful judicial controls. On the 

other hand, security services’ access to data and metadata is more 

loosely regulated. Data needed for national security purposes can 

be intercepted without judicial involvement – with ministerial authorization, 

subject to the approval of the attorney general (who 

must periodically report to a Knesset committee). Moreover, access 

to metadata is regulated by secret regulations. It also appears that 

surveillance activities undertaken by Israeli security agencies may 

be exempt from the scope of Israel’s Privacy Protection Law. Apparently, 

neither law nor practice limits the retention period of data 

held by telecommunication companies or by the security agencies 

that receive copies. Restrictions on retention and access to caller 

identification information are few and far between. 

Another area that appears to be sparsely regulated is data mining 

– the use of powerful search functions to extract and cross reference 

information available to the public. Since the Wiretapping 

Law allows the monitoring of “public conversations” for reasons of 

national security, it could be argued that data mining of publicly accessible 

social media and other on-line sites is not precluded under 

existing legislation. 

Finally, it’s unclear whether the prime minister has exercised 

his powers under the Bezeq Law to authorize the installation of a 

communications infrastructure, which could include interception 

devices, since under the provisions of the abovementioned law, any 

exercise of such power may be kept secret for national security purposes. 

The overall picture is that Israeli security agencies retain considerable 

surveillance powers, subject to very few checks and balances. 

Although some administrative and very limited judicial and 

parliamentary oversight does exist, much of the activity in this field 

occurs below the radar screen and appears to be subject to limited 

controls. This is a cause for concern and could invite – as we have 

seen in the US and in other countries – abuse of power and massive 

curtailment of privacy rights. 

How can Israelis’ privacy be better protected, without harming 

national security or creating the next Snowden? A few ideas should 

be considered: 

First, the appointment of an independent data protection ombudsman 

(such an office already exists in several countries), who would 

have the necessary security clearance to review laws and policies in 

the field of surveillance. Such an ombudsman could, in principle, 

also examine complaints about misuse and abuse of authority by 

security agencies and generate a greater degree of accountability. 

Second, a right to notification should be established, informing 

individuals whenever possible – generally, after the fact – that data 

or metadata relating to them was reviewed by a relevant security 

agency. Such a notification would allow individuals to mount 

a challenge, before judicial or administrative agencies, to surveillance 

activity they deem to be improper, rendering existing practices 

much more transparent. 

Finally, it is important for Israel to have a public discussion on 

the rights of data subjects (citizens) to control the information about 

them and their activities, as well as to review existing surveillance 

laws in light of the existence of such new rights. 

We thus need to figure out how to strike a more appropriate balance 

between important national security interests and newly defined 

privacy interests of all individuals living in a digital age. ■ 

Prof. Yuval Shany is a senior fellow in the Israel Democracy 

Institute's Center for Security and Democracy. 

IDI research assistant Amir Cahane contributed to this article. 


9

Terrorism in the 

digital age 

How does Israel confront terrorist threats in an era of online 

incitement and lone-wolf attacks? By Terrance J. Mintner 

THE VIDEOS posted on social media during 

the so-called “knife intifada” of 2015/16 

are hard to forget. In one viral video, a man 

wrapped up in a Palestinian keffiyeh demonstrates 

how to subdue and stab a victim. After 

each jab, he applies a final twist to the knife 

– adding insurance to the life-ending aim of 

his actions. 

For many observers, it was social media like 

this that fueled incitement. 

Today, a year since those fateful events, Israel 

has ramped up online surveillance. But as 

it grapples with preventing another wave of 

attacks, what is it doing to safeguard democracy? 

What price must Israel pay to be safe? 

Researchers at the Israel Democracy Institute 

have proposed answers for protecting the 

queen of democratic rights: free speech. They 

include recommendations for better understanding 

incitement, monitoring threats, prosecuting, 

ensuring transparency and fostering 

social values for this era of interconnectedness. 

The notion of incitement has become commonplace 

among policymakers; they see it as 

ground zero in the fight against digital terrorism. 

The Removal of Criminally Offensive 

Content from the Internet bill, known as the 

“Facebook bill,” is the government’s attempt 

to regulate social media. As the bill inches 

closer to becoming law, it continues to raise 

heated debate. 

One point of agreement among analysts is 

that incitement is always incitement to something, 

and if that something is a clear call 

to violence or terrorism, then such content 

should be taken down immediately and criminal 

charges should be weighed. 

Anyone familiar with social media knows 

we are talking about tens of thousands of posts; 

monitoring them requires further criteria. 

Dr. Amir Fuchs, head of the Israel Democracy 

Institute's Defending Democratic Values 

program, says the law includes a probability 

clause – if content is probable to cause violence 

it should be targeted. For authorities, he 

says, “This makes sense. They try to find the 

inciting posts that have the most reach, likes 

and shares.” They can then evaluate such 

threats without having “to issue an indictment 

for everything.” 

In doing so, he adds, authorities must “try 

to maintain a coherent policy about when they 

indict and when they do not.” They are starting 

to do this, but Fuchs recommends that the 

government publicly disclose this policy in 

detail. The move would be a win for democratic 

transparency. 

While incitement to violence and terrorism is 

fairly clear-cut, incitement to racism is a much 

stickier issue; though it’s certainly not new, it is 

endemic on both sides of the conflict. For example, 

during the recent period of heightened 

tensions, there were reported cases of Israelis 

chanting “death to Arabs” or posting similar 

content online. Most posters did not write this 

with an intention to kill, says Fuchs, explaining 

that for free speech purists being prosecuted for 

such a statement would be problematic. But it 

could happen. Currently, the only legal criteria 

for prosecuting racial inciters are that their 

words must be “purposeful.” 

That’s admittedly vague, says Fuchs. The 

more important factor is how much danger 

racial speech can cause. 

“Only the most heinous speech about violence 

and racism should be criminal,” he says. 

Dr. Tehilla Shwartz Altshuler, director of 

IDI’s Center for Democratic Values and Institutions, 

agrees that for Israel, “a country based 

on the memory of the Holocaust, it’s more 

difficult not to criminalize racist speech.” But 

like Fuchs, she says it should only be enforced 

in “extreme cases.” 

Col. (res.) Liron Libman, a senior IDI researcher 

and former head of the IDF’s International 

Law division, shares this concern. 

“In the ’30s and ’40s, racial incitement was 

the beginning, and where it ends makes us 

more careful about such speech,” he says. It 

can’t just be tolerated, as some fierce advocates 

of free speech would like. “If you’re 

more pessimistic about human nature and the 

ability to spread fear and hate among people, 

then you’ll be a bit more careful, instead of 

just leaving it to the marketplace of ideas.” 

A more careful approach is evident in the 

Facebook bill. The Israeli government “wants 

to have the power to issue court orders to 

Facebook or Twitter,” says Fuchs. As it stands 

now, he explains, it does not have this authority 

and can only request that these platforms 

take down posts it deems dangerous. 

Altshuler understands why the government 

is preoccupied with stemming incitement 

from abroad. 

“A Palestinian kid can look through his 

Facebook feed and view a guy in Yemen calling 

on Palestinians to take up knives and kill 

Jews in Gush Etzion,” she says. 

Little can be done in this case. Technology 

and its interconnectedness bring opportunities 

and dangers, notes Altshuler. But she believes 

social media platforms already understand this 

and quickly remove violent or racist content. 

10 

DEMOCRACY 3.0 APRIL 2017

So what to do about someone in Israel who 

posts such content? 

“You use criminal law, you press charges,” 

Altshuler says. What you do not do is “impose 

censorship before things are even said 

in a democracy.” 

She charges that supporters of the bill are 

veering toward censorship in their aim to endow 

an administrative judge with powers to 

withdraw arbitrarily content posted by Israeli 

citizens. They argue this is essential “not only 

in terms of national security, but also national 

order.” But national order can mean anything, 

she objects, and could be used to suppress protests 

against the government. “You make the 

open and promising Internet a tool with which 

to monitor the deeds or content of citizens.” 

What is gained by taking incitement cases to 

criminal court? Altshuler argues that, “It forces 

the government to think twice before pressing 

changes.” The legal process effectively 

checks government power by compelling it to 

“make arguments.” She says she is concerned 

that the Facebook bill is more about getting 

votes than keeping Israelis safe. According 

to Facebook’s published transparency report, 

Facebook blocked 962 pieces of content in the 

first half of 2016 (January-June) in Israel. 

Libman echoes these sentiments: “You 

shouldn’t judge in advance. It’s better to judge 

in hindsight and to deter in this way.” By 

judging in advance “it is harder to appeal and 

have deliberation over whether certain speech 

should be criminalized.” He adds that when 

cases go to court, strong procedural demands 

are also needed “to make sure these are deserving 

cases... and free speech is not hurt.” 

What does Facebook make of all this? 

Jordana Cutler, the company’s head of policy 

in Israel, begins by clarifying that the bill 

is not only about Facebook. Its nickname does 

not help people understand what’s in the legislation, 

she explains. “It’s about the power 

of the Israeli courts to force any Internet platform 

to remove content worldwide.” 

Facebook has undoubtedly come a long way 

since the “knife intifada.” Instead of actively 

inspecting content, the company relies on a 

system of reporting by users about potential 

instances of incitement. Cutler explains that 

Facebook encourages users to read its community 

standards, which go well beyond calls for 

terrorism or violence, to include content such 

as hate speech, praising terrorist acts, bullying 

and sexual harassment. Anything that is reported 

and violates these standards, she explains, is 

subject to review by a team of specialists, including 

Hebrew-speaking Israelis. Just recently, 

the company has worked with other tech 

giants to streamline and improve this process 

for terrorist videos. Cutler says this is the way 

A mannequin holding a knife and wearing 

a jacket that reads, "Stab!" is seen outside 

a clothes shop in Khan Younis, in the 

southern Gaza Strip, November 2015. 

to tackle problems of incitement, “not by legislation, 

but by having people in the industry 

come together and collaborate.” 

When Facebook receives requests from 

the Israeli government to delete content, she 

explains, the company weighs them against 

its community standards and anything in violation 

is quickly removed. She clarifies that 

there are no separate standards for Israel. 

It remains to be seen if the bill will become 

a law. What’s clear is that things are changing 

fast, almost too fast for the government to 

keep up. 

Fuchs says we are “in the process of adjusting 

to the era of social media. It always takes 

time and there is a gap between the government 

and the real world adapting.” 

How exactly do average people adapt? Can 

people monitor themselves? 

Fuchs responds with an intriguing anecdote. 

He remembers a time before social media 

when all we had were “comments to articles 

on Ynet or other websites from anonymous 

users, like ‘the guy from Tel Aviv.’” The remarks 

were extremely violent, he recalls, to 

the extent that experts began exploring penal 

initiatives, “so the government and police 

could investigate the IPs of those who were 

behind them.” 

“It was thought that the comments were violent 

because of anonymity,” Fuchs continues. 

“But in the era of social media, people holding 

a baby who are clearly identified can say the 

most violent things. It’s very unpredictable. 

People are not shy about expressing their 

views, which can lead to incitement.” 

Fuchs says we can improve this situation by 

focusing on education and how students learn 

about the “other” in their midst. 

For Altshuler, we need to improve our “digital 

literacy” by understanding how we communicate 

on social media. “People talk differently 

when they talk to a machine,” she says. 

“They are willing to give more private details. 

They are willing to say things to other people 

they would never say face-to-face.” 

What’s the remedy? 

Civil society organizations have already begun 

helping people reflect more on their online 

interactions and the impact of their words 

so they can better grasp the limits of free 

speech. In this way, “social progress can be 

made also with social media,” Altshuler says. 

And IDI is part of the discussion as the government 

and Knesset debate the Facebook bill 

and other ways to tackle online incitement. 

The institute even recently hosted the head 

of Facebook Europe and Israel for a strategic 

discussion on the subject. 

While the researchers say they are sympathetic 

to the government’s desire to bridle 

this wayward beast that is social media, 

they say digital literacy for the members of 

government is a first step in making sound 

decisions on the matter. This will help ensure 

that as legislative decisions about how 

to balance security and democracy in the 

digital age are made, they will ensure Israelis’ 

basic values are upheld, including freedom 

of speech and expression. 

These are hallmarks of a democratic value-system 

that must continually find ways to 

march in lockstep with the feverish pace of 

technological change, Altshuler says. 


11

Commentary Gilad Malach and Nasreen Hadad Haj-Yahya 

Israel’s next 

economic miracle? 

Haredim and Arabs must be integrated into society and 

economy to take the start-up nation to the next level 

TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION and 

material prosperity are the hallmarks of the 

start-up nation. However, certain sectors 

of Israeli society are not experiencing the 

benefits of our hi-tech economy. With Arabs 

and haredim on the periphery, Israel is 

like a five-cylinder engine running on only 

three cylinders. 

In order to propel Israel’s economy forward, 

we must look inward and take advantage 

of these two readily available but hitherto 

untapped resources. It is time to stop 

treating Arabs and haredim as liabilities 

who produce a drag on economic performance 

and start treating them as resources 

that could vault Israel’s economy into the 

top 10 of the OECD. 

How? Improved education. 

While the haredi and Arab communities 

might appear to be very different, they have 

more in common than they want to admit. 

And the pathways to their success may be 

quite similar. 

Both the haredi and Arab populations, 

which amount to a combined 30 percent of 

Israel’s population, are effectively cut off 

from the rest of Israeli society. The haredim, 

who totaled approximately 1,000,000 

people at the end of 2016 (11% of the population), 

for generations have chosen to 

erect “walls of holiness” to separate themselves 

from the rest of society and ensure 

the continuity of their cherished religious 

traditions. 

Similarly, the Arab citizens of Israel, who 

totaled 1,800,000 at the end of 2016 (21% 

of the population), live in separate, homogeneous 

towns and study in separate school 

systems from their Jewish neighbors. In 

addition, most Jews in Israel do not speak 

Arabic, and the level of Hebrew among 

many Arabs is relatively low, increasing the 

challenge of living shared lives. 

It is time to stop 

treating Arabs and 

haredim as liabilities 

who produce a 

drag on economic 

performance 

Today, the majority of haredi students 

study in educational networks partially 

exempt from Education Ministry requirements. 

Only 10% of haredi students earn 

matriculation certificates, versus 70% of 

their non-haredi peers. Similarly, only 

around 50% of Arabs earn matriculation 

certificates. The matriculation exam is taken 

by high school seniors to determine for 

which universities and university majors 

they can apply. 

When it comes to employment, haredi 

men and Arab women find themselves in a 

similar position. In 2016, the employment 

rate stood at 52% for haredi males and 

77% for Arab males, as compared to 87% 

among non-haredi males. Among women, 

corresponding figures were 73% for haredi 

women, 32.3% for Arab women, and 82% 

among non-haredi Jewish women. 

The proportion of haredim and Arabs living 

beneath the poverty line is much greater 

than that of non-haredi Jews: roughly 54% 

of haredim and 53% of Arabs live in poverty, 

as opposed to 10% of the rest of the 

Jewish population in Israel. 

However, the walls are beginning to crack. 

The public, politicians, academicians 

and the media are waking up to the need to 

ensure haredim and Arab citizens of Israel 

integrate into the economy and society, 

and have equal opportunities for success. 

This is both the moral and practical thing 

to do, for the benefit of haredim, Arabs, 

and for Israeli society as a whole. 

FOR STARTERS, both populations need to 

increase their schools’ focus on core subjects, 

such as science and math; mathematical 

ability is proven to be a major predictor 

of students’ future success in the labor market—especially 

the knowledge economy. 

Likewise, there need to be shifts in the 

curriculum to better prepare students for 

employment. In the Arab school system, 

this might mean changing the Hebrew-lan- 


RONEN ZVULUN / REUTERS 

guage curriculum from one that celebrates 

literature to one that ensures a high level of 

practical Hebrew. In both school systems, 

this would mean improving the English-language 

offerings to prepare students for jobs 

in the increasingly global marketplace. 

Integrating Arab 

and haredi citizens 

into society and the 

economy will foster 

greater solidarity 

among all Israelis 

Further, much of the job market and opportunities 

for social mobilization revolve 

around the army. The IDF has a department 

dedicated to assisting released soldiers. It 

also offers courses to help soldiers complete 

their matriculation exams while serving, 

employment opportunities specifically 

aimed at decommissioned soldiers, and tax 

benefits for companies that hire recently released 

military personnel. 

However, most Arab citizens are exempt 

from army service because of the enduring 

conflict. And due to cultural and religious 

challenges, the majority of haredim request 

an exemption from service. 

Therefore, just as the state managed in 

previous years to successfully increase the 

number of haredim who serve in the IDF, the 

state and its Arab leaders need to come to an 

agreement about alternative volunteer opportunities 

for the Arab community's young men 

and women. 

Israel must simultaneously invest in geographically 

convenient and culturally sensitive 

career training programs for young 

Arabs and haredim. 

ALTHOUGH MUCH of the responsibility 

for change rests with the non-Arab, 

non-haredi Jewish majority, the leadership 

of these two sectors could do more to advance 

the cause. 

In fact, with the Arabs and haredim together 

constituting almost one-third of Israel’s 

population, their political representatives 

(the haredim as part of the governing 

coalition, and the Arabs as part of the opposition) 

should be able to form an effective 

lobby to accomplish these changes. Cooperation 

between Arabs and haredim would 

help their respective populations and also 

advance Israeli society toward a future of 

greater solidarity and social cohesion. 

Admittedly, working together poses complex 

challenges. Our recent Israeli Democracy 

Index found that while most haredim 

believe in democracy, they want to limit 

the right of freedom of expression and full 

equality of Israel’s Arab minority. 

However, there have been times in the 

past where the two communities collaborated 

politically on issues relating to religious 

rights and child allotments. They can use 

those past wins as stepping-stones for the 

future. 

And even if collaboration proves difficult, 

Arab politicians could take a lesson 

from haredi leaders about how to advocate 

for their constituencies. Moreover, the time 

has come for Arab political leaders to be 

considered for participation in the governing 

coalition and be able to sit around the 

table when the most important decisions are 

made for the State of Israel. 

Of course, while haredi politicians are 

making demands of the government, they 

should also consider supplanting the traditional 

focus on matters of personal status 

with forward-looking concern for the 

practical aspirations of their constituency, 

which according to all surveys wants 

to escape poverty. 

Ultimately, integrating Arab and haredi 

citizens into society and the economy will 

foster greater solidarity among all Israelis 

and could set the stage for Israel’s next economic 

miracle. 

 

Dr. Gilad Malach is the director of the 

Ultra-Orthodox in Israel program and 

Nasreen Hadad Haj-Yahya is director of 

the Arab-Jewish Relations program at the 

Israel Democracy Institute. 


13

FLEXONOMICS 

In a dynamic labor market, challenged by technological 

disruption and increasing longevity, flexibility is key 

By Ilan Evyatar 

WE LIVE in a rapidly changing world. 

A world where longevity is increasing, 

requiring us to work for many more years; 

a world where we will have to change careers 

frequently and to constantly acquire 

new skills; a world where we will have to 

compete in a global marketplace and where 

technology and automation create perpetual 

disruption and threaten to take over our jobs. 

It is a reality that creates both challenges 

and opportunities, but also one that markets 

must be prepared for in order to be able to 

compete, thrive and prosper, and to enable all 

sectors of society to participate. 

The Israel Democracy Institute’s Center 

for Governance and the Economy is tackling 

the challenges this brave new world poses 

to Israeli society, and has brought together a 

task-force with representatives from across 

government ministries, the business sector, 

labor unions and academia – in fact anyone 

involved in or researching the field. 

“Our aim was first of all to bring together 

all the relevant parties, to collect all the 

available knowledge, to see what direction 

things can be expected to go and how we 

can prepare for and adapt ourselves to these 

developments,” says the Center’s director 

Daphna Aviram-Nitzan. 

According to Aviram-Nitzan, the labor 

market is already out of sync with the needs 

of both employers and workers, with every 

element, from labor laws to training, outdated 

and in need of reform. 

Aviram-Nitzan explains that what IDI, as a 

neutral body, aims to do is sit around the table 

with these variant parties and create a strategic 

vision for the future of the labor market. 

“If we don’t come up with models for the 

future,” she says, “it will be a threat to the 

stability of the regime and democracy.” 

One of the issues the project is focused 

on is labor reforms aimed at creating conditions 

that will on the one hand enable employers 

greater flexibility to compete in dynamic 

markets, yet at the same time create 

security for workers, who will need retraining 

and a social safety net as they transition 

between jobs. 

If the education system 

is better, then people 

have better skills and 

are better equipped to 

deal with a changing 

labor market 

In order to understand the reforms required, 

the Center set out to map the labor 

market and understand its current status. 

Prof. Yotam Margalit, a political economist 

who co-directs the Center’s Labor 

Market Reform program, says that one of 

the things they are seeing is a growing increase 

in the divide between educated and 

non-educated workers. 

The labor market, he explains, can be 

divided into insiders and outsiders – insiders 

being those who are, for example, 

protected by union coverage – and then 

subdivided into educated and uneducated 

workers. It is those who are “uneducated 

outsiders” that are the most vulnerable 

members of society and in need of protection, 

Margalit explains. 

“In reforming the labor market,” says 

Margalit, “we need to think how we improve 

the prospects of all workers, but particularly 

of those low-skilled outsiders.” 

One of the ways of doing that, he says, is 

by investing in what is known as Active Labor 

Market Policies (ALMP), government 

programs to intervene in the labor market 

by providing retraining schemes, employment 

subsidies and help finding jobs. Israel 

however currently spends only about a third 

of the OECD average on such programs. 

“Those programs are a major way to help 

low-skilled outsiders, because they are the 

ones who tend to find themselves searching 

for new jobs, as their jobs tend to be less 

secure,” says Margalit. 

But he also notes that on the other side 

of the coin, “We need to think about how 

to maintain a productive and agile economy 

and that means there should be some 

package deal that would entail increased 

flexibility for employers on the one hand, 

but would also increase job prospects or 

security for workers, on the other.” 

Better security, Margalit explains does not 

mean clinging to jobs, but rather creating a 

system that provides workers with better 

opportunities for training and finding new 

jobs, while giving them greater protection 

and a stronger social safety net for the period 

when they are looking for a job. 

He says that Israel needs to adopt a higher 

net replacement rate (NRR), the term used 

for comparing how much an unemployed 

worker receives when compared to their 

last salary. 

“If you provide people with a higher NRR 

then you are giving them better opportunities 

to find a new job, and secondly, if you 

do lose your job, it isn’t the end of the world 

as you are not broke or struggling. Such a 

system would enable workers to live with 

the idea of greater flexibility, which could 

mean not just firing workers, but sometimes 

shifting workers from one unit to another or 


ISSEI KATO / REUTERS 

reducing them for a period of time to less 

than full employment.” 

Another area where Margalit points out a 

need for a major improvement is the education 

system. 

“We have to improve the system so that 

we don’t have to rely on people having to 

catch up later in life,” he says. “If the education 

system is better, then people have better 

skills and are better equipped to deal with a 

changing labor market.” 

A changing labor market doesn’t just 

present challenges to people’s careers. 

Prof. Eytan Sheshinski, who recently 

joined the Center as a senior researcher, explains 

that pensions are being dramatically 

affected by market dynamics and all the more 

so as a result of the increase in longevity. 

Sheshinski, who headed the commission 

that created the eponymous Sheshinski laws 

on taxation of natural resources, is also an 

expert on pension design and has worked 

with several foreign governments. 

“Longevity is a paradox,” Sheshinski 

says. “On the one hand, life expectancy rises, 

but on the other, the pensions blanket is 

too short.” 

Sheshinksi’s current IDI research looks 

at how to “balance” the system to protect 

weaker groups in society. Pensions today, 

unlike in the past, depend on accumulation, 

he explains and that puts people 

with a lower participation rate in the labor 

market and those who find themselves 

having to change jobs frequently at a disadvantage. 

Women for example tend to 

work less and retire earlier than men so 

they have lower accumulation. 

Furthermore, longevity increases disproportionately 

for the rich because life is extended 

today by costly medicinal means and 

therefore people at a higher end of the income 

scale are living longer. So with a uniform 

conversion rate (the factor by which 

the sum of accumulation is converted into 

an annual retirement benefit based on life 

expectancy and mortality rates), the poor 

are subsidizing the rich who get a pension 

for more years. 

As for the problem of transitional unemployment, 

Sheshinski says that with an 

increase in the mobility of labor, the government 

should fill the gap by maintaining 

worker’s pension rights for a limited period 

of time when they are between jobs. He 

supports use of interest and capital gains, 

but not principal, from the sovereign wealth 

fund created by the Sheshinski laws on excess 

profits on natural resources, to beef up 

pensions. 

Humanoid robots work side by side 

with employees in the assembly line at 

a factory near Tokyo, Japan. Will robots 

leave humans without jobs in the future? 

Perhaps the hottest topic today, when it 

comes to the debate on the labor market, 

is automation and the threat that machines 

and artificial intelligence will take over our 

jobs. 

“Automation is part of the reality that 

workers face,” says Margalit. “On the one 

hand, some jobs are becoming redundant, 

but, on the other, automation is creating 

new jobs. The jobs robots will do in the 

future will require people to operate them. 

There will be new jobs of which we are currently 

unaware.” 

Sheshinski says there are more pressing 

concerns than robots. 

“I don’t believe in the theory of a fixed 

amount of jobs available, people can move 

into service industries, education, etc.,” he 

says. “The economy is resilient. I don’t 

believe robots will replace people. Robots 

will do some jobs and people will find other 

forms of employment. 

“I am a great believer in the flexibility of 

the economy.” 

 


15

HOW 

IS IT 

GOING? 

A SNAPSHOT 

OF ISRAELI 

DEMOCRACY 

FROM THE 

2016 ISRAELI 

DEMOCRACY 

INDEX 

HOW DO ISRAELIS FEEL 

ABOUT ISRAEL? 

of respondents 

see Israel’s overall 

situation 

HOW DOES ISRAEL RANK AGAINST 

OTHER DEMOCRACIES? 

International Indicator 

The Israel Democracy Institute 

4 Pinsker Street. POB 4702. Jerusalem 

Tel. +972-2-530-0888 | en.idi.org.il 

info@idi.org.il |

WHAT IS THE GREATEST INTERNAL 

EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO ISRAEL? 

of respondents agree that Israelis 

CAN ALWAYS RELY 

ON ONE ANOTHER 

81% 

WHO DO ISRAELIS TRUST? 

of respondents are 

of respondents agree 

that to deal with the challenges 

confronting it,

VIEWPOINT YEDIDIA STERN 

A threat to the foundations 

of Jewish peoplehood 

Leaving issues of religion and state to an ultra-Orthodox monopoly is leading to 

estrangement between Israel and the Diaspora. New arrangements must be reached 

ISRAEL IS defined by law as a “Jewish and democratic state.” 

However, many Israelis disagree about the meaning of each of these 

terms and how to synthesize them. And this disagreement likewise 

percolates deeply into the very foundations of the partnership between 

Israel and a large segment of Diaspora Jewry. 

What is the nature of this disagreement? How should it be addressed? 

The relationship between religion and state has been in fullfledged 

crisis mode for decades. 

As per the status quo, decisions on key religious issues are implemented 

with an ultra-Orthodox worldview through the Chief 

Rabbinate and Israeli politics. Specifically, this haredi monopoly 

applies to issues such as the definition of Jewish identity (who is 

a Jew?); avenues of joining the Jewish people (how does one convert?); 

personal status (marriage and divorce); the nature of Israel’s 

public spaces (the Sabbath); status of women in various contexts; 

funding of religious services; and kashrut. 

Although these arrangements are enforced only in Israel, they have 

had a negative impact on the country’s relationship with Diaspora Jewry, 

where the Orthodox are only a minority. For many Jews outside of 

Israel, a non-Orthodox religious community is a defining feature of 

Jewish identity. Yet Israel treats such non-Orthodox streams unfairly. 

The state does not recognize the religious validity of their activities 

in important fields, such as conversion, and it discriminates against 

them in various domains, including prayer at the Western Wall. 

Members of non-Orthodox religious communities are regularly 

subjected to insulting statements by Israeli public figures – representatives 

of the haredi community, among many others. 

The harmful result is a growing estrangement between the sons 

and daughters of the Jewish people in Israel and the Diaspora. Religion, 

which should be an element that deepens Jewish identity and 

the meaning of living a Jewish life, has become a centrifugal force, 

distancing Jews from each other. 

For years, the Israel Democracy Institute, along with other Israeli 

institutions, has worked to devise balanced solutions to each of the 

main issues of this disagreement. It is our belief that these solutions 

would be acceptable to the majority of Jews in Israel, if presented to 

them directly and free of political pressures. However, the secular 

ruling parties, which rotate in and out of office, have almost totally 

avoided making changes to the regulations that govern issues of 

religion and state. 

Why do Israeli politics give in to haredi preferences? 

The main reason is that the Israeli public is not sufficiently engaged 

in the matter to feel a need to take responsibility for issues 

of religion and state. The Israeli agenda is overloaded with other 

challenges—security, foreign policy and socioeconomic. 

On the other hand, the haredi parties, which represent only about 

10 percent of Israeli society, use all their political power to implement 

their preferences regarding religion and state issues. These 

matters are at the top of their agenda, and they are willing to join 

any government, right- or left-wing, that is willing to maintain existing 

arrangements in this domain. 

Thus, it has become a foregone conclusion that a party that wants 

to form a government must bow to haredi demands on issues of 

religion and state. 

THE SOLUTION can come only from a significant change in Israeli 

public opinion. The general public will not join the struggle until 

it understands that the current arrangement does not affect only 

people who require specific religious services, and certain minorities, 

such as immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Reform 

Jews. The Israeli public must understand that religion and state issues 

have a bearing on the very meaning of Judaism in our generation 

and on the character of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. 

Israelis must be made aware that surrendering to the haredi minority’s 

demands is fraying the threads of unity that bind Jews in 

Israel and the Diaspora, thus deteriorating Diaspora Jewry’s commitment 

to the State of Israel and Zionism, and weakening Jewish 

identity among Jews in Israel and abroad. 

So dire are the circumstances that what appears to be little more than 

homegrown coalition compromises on issues such as the Western Wall 

or funding of non-Orthodox streams, are in fact a threat to the foundations 

of the common peoplehood of Jews in Israel and the Diaspora. 

This is not a call to oppose the haredim; their views are valuable 

and important. However, it is necessary to adopt arrangements that 

respectfully balance different worldviews. Appropriate solutions 

must maintain the official place of religion in Israel, while respecting 

the democratic values that are an integral part of the identity of 

both Israel and Jews of the Diaspora. 

The public campaign for such changes must be strong enough to 

force Israeli politics to react. And it must dispel ignorance. 

Repair is required, and without delay. 

■ 

Prof. Yedidia Stern is vice president of research at the Israel 

Democracy Institute. 


VIEWPOINT MORDECHAI KREMNITZER 

Democracy at risk 

Citizens must lead the way in the battle against political corruption 

SOME 25 years ago, then-minister of the interior Aryeh Deri was 

convicted of graft, fraud and breach of trust and served close to 

three years in prison. Today, he’s back in government, serving as 

Minister of Development of the Negev and Galilee. Deri’s return to 

politics despite his conviction begs two questions: Are politicians 

deterred from committing acts of corruption? Why isn’t the public 

using its power to eradicate corruption? 

The battle against government corruption must be based on criminal 

law enforcement and should encompass both appointed and 

elected public officials. Good government requires equality before 

the law, in which the same law applies to the policeman and the 

government minister. In other words, when there is a reasonable 

suspicion that the suspect will be convicted, charges should be 

pressed, whether the suspect is a tax collector or the prime minister. 

The Israeli legal system has a commendable record for systematically 

implementing this principle of equality under the law, on 

the level of investigation and in many cases (though not all) on the 

level of prosecution. This has been true even at the highest echelons 

of government; a former president, prime minister and chief rabbi 

have all recently been convicted and punished for corruption. 

However, no effort to stamp out corruption in government will 

succeed if it is not based on a public expectation of good conduct 

that goes beyond the mandatory minimum, as outlined in a country’s 

Criminal Code and letter of the law. For example, a false statement 

made by an Israeli public official in relation to his/her position 

may not necessarily rise to the level of a criminal offense, but 

should still be regarded as unacceptable by the Israeli public. 

Ultimately, the public has the overwhelming power to eradicate 

corruption by simply not accepting such behavior. Non-acceptance 

can be expressed by the citizenry’s demand to remove from power 

(through voting against or targeted pressure) a public figure that 

has strayed from the path of just governance and respect for the rule 

of law. This type of deterrent is possibly more effective than one 

provided by the criminal justice system. 

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, including elected officials, are public 

trustees, charged with acting at all times for the benefit of the citizenry. 

If the public does not insist on a code of ethics and honest 

and trustworthy appointed and elected officials, these officials will 

not strive to meet such standards. 

For publicly accepted norms of conduct to be upheld, the false 

claim that “all politicians are corrupt,” which effectively justifies 

Aryeh Deri is escorted by policemen as he walks out of prison in 

2002, after serving two years of a three-year sentence for corruption. 

corrupt behavior, must be rejected. If this false premise is accepted, 

any hope for successfully combatting government corruption is lost. 

It is also essential that public norms be applied equally to all public 

figures regardless of their political agenda. Otherwise, we will see 

fissures in the bond between a sovereign nation’s citizens and their 

representatives, and the viability of our democracy will be at risk. ■ 

Prof. Mordechai Kremnitzer is vice president of research at the 

Israel Democracy Institute. 

NIR ELIAS / REUTERS 


19

IDI 2016 BY THE NUMBERS 

The Institute in the Media and Digital World 

300 

radio interviews 

1,000 

press mentions 

200 

op-eds published in 

the print media 

100 

TV interviews 

N 

12,000 

newsletter subscribers 

38,000 

Hebrew-speaking Facebook 

followers; an increase of 

9,000 followers in 2016 

11,500 

English-speaking Facebook 

followers; an increase of 

7,120 followers (a 70% 

increase!) in 2016 

8 

presentations at various 

Knesset caucuses 

39 

meetings with 

Knesset members 

and ministers 

25 

books 

published 

presentations before the Knesset 

Constitution, Law and Justice 

Committee; 19 presentations before 

other Knesset committees 

25 

16 

IDI research quoted by judges in 

5 Supreme Court rulings and 11 

other court rulings 

31 

50 

seminars, roundtables 

and other events 

policy statements sent to 

the Ministerial Committee 

on Legislation and other 

Knesset committees 

The Israel Democracy Institute | 4 Pinsker Street. POB 4702. Jerusalem | Tel. +972-2-530-0888 | en.idi.org.il | info@idi.org.il |

Welcome to 

21st century politics 

Poorly funded and under threat from personalization and social 

media, political parties are in decline By Elli Wohlgelernter 

TRUST IN public institutions has been 

falling for years, and now it’s reaching critically 

low numbers. But the Israel Democracy 

Institute is offering some solutions that 

might help turn things around. 

First, the data from its recent polling: 

* Three-quarters of Israelis feel that politicians 

are detached from the needs and 

problems of their voters. 

* Only a third of the public believes 

Knesset members work hard and are doing 

their job. 

* Seventy-nine percent agree with the 

statement that politicians look out more 

for their own interests than for those of the 

public. 

* Trust in political parties is down to less 

than 14%, versus 19% last year. 

It’s a broken system, says IDI President 

Yohanan Plesner, fueled in part by two main 

problems. One, naturally, is lack of money. 

The other is a relatively new phenomenon: 

social media. 

People don’t realize, says Plesner, that 

the parties are small and weak institutions. 

Once upon a time, there were party-affiliated 

organizations and institutions touching 

almost every aspect of a citizen’s life, such 

as youth movements, newspapers, sports 

clubs, trade unions, even healthcare organizations. 

All these local affiliations provided 

their parties with institutional clout and financial 

resources. 

Today, the majority of these organizations 

has either vanished or is completely 

detached from politics, leaving every party 

pitifully poor. 

We discovered that 

social media has 

played a role in 

helping break existing 

democratic institutions, 

such as political parties 

“A decade ago I was secretary-general 

of Kadima, the largest party in the country. 

Our party was considered the wealthiest, 

and I ran a budget of only $5 million a 

year,” says Plesner who was a member of 

Knesset (2007-2013) for the now defunct 

party. “It’s the equivalent of a mom and 

pop shop, a grocery store! This is one aspect 

that people are less aware of – these 

parties are weak institutions.” 

The internal election system within parties 

is also a problem. On the one hand, 

there is the primary system that began with 

potential in the early 1990s but has now become 

a “bankrupt structure,” says Plesner, 

because of the activist element within each 

party that draws it to the fringes. 

“The remedy that was introduced was 

the single-decision-maker party, where 

the decision-maker nominates everyone 

and basically makes all decisions. It’s 

not a political party in the sense of an 

arena that grows leadership, has authentic 

representation of different aspects 

of society, and serves as a platform for 

debating and contesting ideas. The single-manager, 

single-leader parties became 

a solution to the genuine sicknesses 

of the party primaries, but they solved 

one problem and created another.” 

Plesner says many factors contribute to a 

growing irrelevancy of political parties, not 

the least of which is social media. 

“It was initially perceived as the epitome 

of a democratic means of exchange of information 

and communication, and in a sense 

manifesting democratic ideals. But we discovered 

that social media has played a role 

in helping break existing democratic institutions, 

such as political parties.” 

The change in the public’s feelings toward 

politicians and political parties cannot 

be “blamed” on social media. It is no one’s 

fault, just a classic example of the law of 

unintended consequences. 

“When Mark Zuckerberg created Facebook, 

he didn’t have in mind what it would 

do to our democratically elected institutions. 

He thought it would be a nice way of sharing 


BAZ RATNER / REUTERS 

information between friends,” notes Plesner. 

One unintended consequence of the force 

of social media has been a transformation 

toward the personalization of politics, 

whereby the individual politician becomes 

the brand, while the importance of the political 

party declines. 

“People are no longer identifying with 

parties, with institutions,” Plesner says. 

“They no longer see themselves as part 

of a party. It’s more about the personality 

of the No. 1: ‘Do I sympathize with him?’ 

‘Do I like him?’ ‘Is he like me?’ ‘Do we 

belong to the same identity group?’ This 

gives rise to identity politics, questions 

of character and not so much ideology. 

And in this respect, the party becomes 

less important.” 

The result is that parties barely have any 

kind of serious ideological discussions 

about policy. 

“THERE ISN’T even a pretense of pretending 

to have those kinds of debates and 

discussions about ideas, and what the party 

represents,” says Plesner. 

In Israel, the personalization of politics is 

more extreme than elsewhere. Israeli citizens, 

more so than the citizens of any of the 

other 24 democracies studied by IDI, prefer 

to “like” the leaders of their parties on social 

media instead of the parties themselves. 

Some Israeli politicians, such as Prime 

Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Yair Lapid 

and Naftali Bennett, stood out for the absolute 

number of online followers they attracted 

– even more than politicians in countries 

far more populous than Israel. 

Part of their popularity can be attributed 

to their being social media savvy. On the 

web, politicians gain easy, inexpensive and 

direct access to their constituents without 

going through traditional media or party 

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 

stands out for the number of his online 

followers. 

networks. Indeed, Israeli party leaders were 

more active on Facebook and Twitter than most 

of their counterparts in other democracies. 

Gideon Rahat, director of IDI’s Political 

Reform program, says to break the domination 

of the individual, “you have to take personalization 

and put it back within the party. 

“So imagine you are tweeting, or connecting 

on a Facebook page, with a party. 

Someone from the party, an individual, 

is sustaining this link with you, maybe a 

spokesperson, or a politician from the party. 

But he is doing it within the party’s web 

page, from its twitter account. This would 

be a huge difference. It sounds romantic but 

it is not. What is the party at the end of the 


7

day but a collection of people?” 

Plesner encourages the parties to leverage 

the digital tools available to grow 

party engagement on social networks. 

This, he says, would drive people to take 

part more regularly in the political process, 

as voters logging onto Facebook 

and Twitter would not only hear from 

individual politicians promoting their 

personal agendas. 

One idea often floated is to raise the vote 

threshold for passing entry into the Knesset. 

Rahat disagrees. 

“THE REMEDY cannot be a higher threshold 

- the threshold is now at a moderate 

level, and should be kept there because 

otherwise it would block important parts of 

society from gaining representation in the 

Knesset,” Rahat says. “So the level right 

now is OK, 3.25%, somewhat moderate, 

and you cannot really raise it more than 

5% without being too harsh. So this is not 

the solution.” 

People no longer see 

themselves as part 

of a party. It’s more 

about the personality 

of the No. 1 

Rahat continues, “Our idea is giving incentives 

to political parties and politicians 

to run in clear pre-election coalitions. The 

idea is that after the election, the prime minister 

would be the one who is heading the 

list that got the highest percentage of votes. 

He or she would be the prime minister unless 

there is a coalition of 61 members of 

Knesset or more who are ready to support 

an alternative designate.” 

IDI’s solution to internal party structure issues 

would be to hold semi-open primaries. 

The parties would receive funding for their 

internal elections in exchange for a thorough 

regulation. Opening up the parties would enable 

a much broader segment of the public to 

take part in choosing the party leader and the 

list of candidates for the Knesset. 

“In this way, future members of Knesset 

will not have to be liable to small niche interest 

groups, whether its extreme ideological 

interests, economic interests or municipal 

interests,” says Plesner. “All of these will be 

meshed together in a much larger pot.” 

More open primaries would require establishing 

screening mechanisms to weed out 

extremists, such as requiring payment of a 

nominal fee and a statement of ideological 

affiliation. That would make it difficult for 

external opponents to sabotage a candidate 

or party from within. Plesner recommends 

that primaries for every party be held on the 

same day, paid for and run by the General 

Election Committee. 

The state should also step in and help the 

main parties financially, by allocating party 

funding so that part of it is designated for 

ideological activity and not spent solely 

on campaigns. A think tank foundation or 

ideological center would be established for 

every party above a certain threshold, provided 

by the government. 

“We see it in Germany, where each party 

has an affiliated foundation,” explains Plesner. 

“There are very strict rules regarding 

Yair Lapid is the single decision maker in 

his Yesh Atid party. 

the use of their federal dollars. You can’t 

spend them on buying off activists. But 

they actually have serious research arms, 

and they become serious bodies that generate 

ideas, debates, they grow leadership – 

so they serve some of the really important 

roles that parties should serve.” 

Plesner says that when Germany started 

rebuilding its democracy after World War 

II, the country understood that those democratic 

institutions could not be taken for 

granted, and should be supported. 

“As long as you set serious criteria to ensure 

that the money is spent properly – and enforce 

those criteria – then it is better to provide 

public funds. And, it ends up becoming a lot 

cheaper than relying on donations for which 

someone then owes favors,” says Plesner. 

Plesner and Rahat are hoping their reform 

recommendations to strengthen political 

parties will be applied, thereby reversing 

the public’s growing lack of trust in institutions 

and political parties. No less than the 

continued viability of Israel’s democratic 

form of government is at stake. 

RONEN ZVULUN / REUTERS

הישראלי לדמוקרטיה- מרץ 2017

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