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Case Comment 25<br />

Case Comment<br />

Mr Andrew Steele - v - PJM Valeting Limited (1) – and - Hertz (UK) Limited (2)<br />

Application on behalf of Hertz (UK) Limited (2) to strike<br />

out pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a) – namely that the statement<br />

of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing<br />

the claim<br />

Stockport County Court – before District Judge Dignan<br />

Shortly after filing their Defence, and prior to the parties<br />

dealing with Directions Questionnaires, D2 filed the abovementioned<br />

application. The solicitor’s witness statement in<br />

support of the same contained three specific arguments.<br />

The first subsequently fell away (prior to the application<br />

being heard the Claimant successfully amended their Particulars<br />

of Claim).<br />

The second was based upon ‘common sense’ with reference<br />

to case law (involving distinguishable facts).<br />

The third was the most unusual, namely that:<br />

· The QOCS provision was originally implemented to ensure<br />

that the ‘deserving claimant’ could still gain access to<br />

justice and protect their case;<br />

· In D2’s solicitor’s experience an unfortunate and unintended<br />

consequence of the reforms is the bringing of frivolous<br />

claims; and<br />

· This claim amounted to wasteful litigation and common<br />

sense dictated that the claim should be struck out with<br />

D2 then being in a position where they could enforce the resulting<br />

costs order.<br />

From the Claimant’s perspective, it very much seemed as<br />

though the application was motivated by a desire to circumvent<br />

the QOCS principle. Importantly, this latter point (the<br />

third submission re QOCS and the ‘deserving claimant’) was<br />

not pursued by Counsel at the hearing, and therefore the<br />

application hung simply on the ‘common sense’ argument<br />

and the case law. The Claimant deployed a wealth of arguments<br />

in response to the application, and indeed succeeded<br />

in their submissions that the application should be dismissed.<br />

In reaching his decision the Judge concentrated on<br />

the point that the evidence (that would be forthcoming in<br />

due course) needed to be considered; he noted that the<br />

case relied on by D2 was based upon a decision whereby<br />

the evidence did not establish that the object was not reasonably<br />

safe.<br />

The decision on costs was particularly interesting.<br />

The Claimant, pursuant to CPR 45.29H, would usually have<br />

been limited to fixed recoverable costs in the sum of £250<br />

plus VAT.<br />

The Claimant applied under CPR 45.29J for a finding that<br />

there were exceptional circumstances in this matter, requesting<br />

that the Judge summarily assess costs utilising a<br />

costs schedule that totalled £2905 plus VAT.<br />

The Judge focussed on three main points in finding in<br />

favour of the Claimant that exceptional circumstances applied<br />

(noting that exceptional circumstances means consideration<br />

of all of the circumstances) which can be<br />

summarised as follows:<br />

1. The hurdle of the claim needing to be ‘bound to fail’ (CPR<br />

3.4.2) was, as found by him in his judgment, never to going<br />

to be reached. D2 had exhibited to their application a Court<br />

of Appeal decision that was fact-specific. It’s easy to say in<br />

hindsight that the application shouldn’t have been made,<br />

but it certainly shouldn’t have been when it pinned its<br />

colours to an irrelevant case.<br />

2. If this application had succeeded it would have meant the<br />

claim was dismissed and QOCS would automatically be disapplied<br />

pursuant to CPR 44.15(1)(a). D2 would have been<br />

able to enforce an order for costs without permission from<br />

the court. That is a “significant, a very significant, potential<br />

outcome”. The consequences of the application were therefore<br />

critical.<br />

3. D2’s Counsel quite rightly didn’t refer to the third submission<br />

as found in the in the solicitor’s witness statement in<br />

support of the application (re QOCS and the ‘deserving<br />

claimant’). The argument offered a critique of the QOCS provision<br />

and made reference to policy decisions and the truthfulness<br />

of claimants. It was a misconceived ground and<br />

there was no basis for making that argument.<br />

The Claimant was ultimately awarded £2,200 plus VAT in<br />

costs, a grand total of £2640, nearly 9 times the fixed recoverable<br />

sum.<br />

Barrister Nyssa Cronie from Express Solicitors (In house)<br />

Solicitor with conduct of the case Kimberley Kirkby Express<br />

Solicitors

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