Fall 2017 JPI

1701 and the achievement of a peaceful situation on the southern border of the country. UNIFIL II
has also carried out humanitarian activities, particularly in connection with the provision of medical
and educational services, including lectures on the dangers posed by cluster bombs. 45 This is important
from a practical point of view, but it also has symbolic value since reconstruction of welfare systems
in southern Lebanon used to be handled by Hezbollah, who had de facto replaced the government and
gained popular support. Finally, the political and diplomatic achievement of monthly tripartite
meetings has enabled dialogue on security and confidence-building issues between the parties involved
(IDF and LAF). 46 This is the only forum of debate between Israel and Lebanon, as these two countries
do not maintain diplomatic relations.
Despite positive achievements, in May 2008, international concerns were raised about the
effectiveness of UNIFIL II, when intense clashes broke out between Christian and Shiite factions.
The situation further deteriorated during the Gaza crisis (December 2008 to January 2009), which
included sporadic rocket launches from Lebanese territory and the Israeli response with artillery fire.
At present, there is still a risk of additional rocket and artillery fire exchanges, not to mention the
perennial threat posed by the arsenals of weapons that continue to exist in the area. 47 This is the part
of the mandate in which the Lebanese Government and UNIFIL II have not yet achieved satisfactory
results. The border with Syria is still used to deliver weapons and related material to Hezbollah, which
contributes to a potential long-term instability, giving Israel a motive and an excuse for not
cooperating. Israeli authorities have publicly denounced the arms trade, as did the Israeli ambassador
to the UN, who blamed UNIFIL II for Hezbollah’s capacity to circumvent authorities and keep
rearming. Moreover, UNIFIL II has failed to prevent the IDF from flying over Lebanese airspace,
and it has also been unable to prevent Israel from occupying Lebanon, thereby contravening resolution
1701 (2006). 48 Neither has Israel succeeded in cooperating by providing information on the exact
number and location of cluster munitions used during the war. From July 2006 to March 2009, 27
civilians were killed and 238 injured as a result of cluster munitions, a figure that must be added to the
14 deaths and 43 wounded resulting from demining activities. 49 Furthermore, neither Resolution 1701
nor the mandate of the UN Forces envisage the possibility that UNIFIL II may act on its own initiative
in complying with the proposed embargo measures. This embargo requires demand from the
Lebanese authorities, and its approval conceals the reformulation of the operation’s mandate.
Therefore, the key issues to be addressed for the assurance of peace are: the exchange of Lebanese
and Israeli prisoners, the continuing Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace, and respect for the arms
embargo.
HOW SUCCESSES AND FAILURES PREDICT THE FUTURE OF LEBANON
Lebanon’s future is based on the results and shortcomings of UNIFIL II mission in particular
and the inherent unfulfilled promises of PKOs in general. Resolution 2373 on August 30, 2017, has
45 Nicholas Blandorf, “UN shifts toward aid projects in Lebanon,” The Christian Science
Monitor. Boston: The First Church of Christ Scientist, Published February 8, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0208/p07s02-wome.html
46 Ídem.
47 “Middle East” (S/RES/1884), United Nations. Approved August 29, 2009. Accessed December 10, 2017.
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1884(2009)
48 Anthony H Cordesman, “Lebanese Security and the Hezbollah,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (2006): 20,
http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/lebanese-security-and-the-hezbollah---anthony-cordesman---csis-report-2006.pdf
49 “Middle East” (S/RES/1884), United Nations. Approved August 29, 2009. Accessed December 10, 2017.
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1884(2009)
JPI Fall 2017, pg. 33