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editor's focus<br />

LAPTOPS BLITZED IN UNDER 30 SECONDS<br />

WHAT IF YOUR LAPTOP COULD BE 'BACKDOORED' VIA A TECHNOLOGY ALMOST EVERYONE USES AND<br />

TRUSTS: INTEL. IT'S NOT SIMPLY A POSSIBILITY, HOWEVER - IT'S BEEN REPORTED AS HAPPENING ON<br />

A MASSIVE SCALE<br />

It was interesting and worrying, to see an<br />

alert on a security issue that allegedly has<br />

been affecting most corporate laptops,<br />

allowing an attacker with physical access to<br />

'backdoor' a device in less than 30 seconds.<br />

According to F-Secure, the vulnerability<br />

allows an attacker to bypass the need to<br />

enter credentials, including BIOS and Bitlocker<br />

passwords and TPM pins, and thus to gain<br />

remote access for later exploitation. It exists,<br />

according to the company, within Intel's<br />

Active Management Technology (AMT) and<br />

potentially affects millions of laptops globally.<br />

The security issue "is almost deceptively<br />

simple to exploit, but it has incredible<br />

destructive potential", says Harry Sintonen,<br />

who investigated the issue in his role as<br />

senior security consultant at F-Secure. "In<br />

practice, it can give an attacker complete<br />

control over an individual's work laptop,<br />

despite even the most extensive security<br />

measures."<br />

DEVICE FLEETS<br />

Intel AMT is a solution for remote access<br />

monitoring and maintenance of corporategrade<br />

personal computers, created to allow<br />

IT departments or managed service providers<br />

to better control their device fleets. The<br />

technology, which is commonly found in<br />

corporate laptops, has been called out for<br />

security weaknesses in the past, but the pure<br />

simplicity of exploiting this particular issue<br />

sets it apart from previous instances. The<br />

weakness can be exploited in mere seconds<br />

without a single line of code.<br />

The essence of the security issue is that<br />

setting a BIOS password, which normally<br />

prevents an unauthorised user from booting<br />

up the device or making low-level changes to<br />

it, does not prevent unauthorised access to<br />

the AMT BIOS extension. This allows an<br />

attacker access to configure AMT and make<br />

remote exploitation possible.<br />

To exploit this, all an attacker needs to do is<br />

reboot or power up the target machine and<br />

press CTRL-P during bootup. The attacker<br />

then may log into Intel Management Engine<br />

BIOS Extension (MEBx) using the default<br />

password, 'admin', as this default is most<br />

likely unchanged on most corporate laptops.<br />

The attacker then may change the default<br />

password, enable remote access and set<br />

AMT's user opt-in to 'None'<br />

The attacker can now gain remote access to<br />

the system from both wireless and wired<br />

networks, as long as they're able to insert<br />

themselves onto the same network segment<br />

with the victim. Access to the device may also<br />

be possible from outside the local network<br />

via an attacker-operated CIRA server.<br />

06<br />

computing security Jan/Feb 2018 @CSMagAndAwards www.computingsecurity.co.uk

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