Introduction to Religious Theories of Morality

e important to its survival. Given these facts, it seems that diversity must have a significant
role to play in moral judgment, but NLT does not provide any obvious way of accommodating it.
Indeed, NLT seems to suggest that we morality requires that we should avoid diversity and
novelty and instead focus on uniformity and sameness. But how far should we take adherence
to what we perceive to be the natural moral law? Would it require us to stop discovering new
technologies or innovative practices because they are “unnatural”?
Finally, the emphasis of law and regularity in NLT does little to explain supererogatory or
heroic moral action. Moral monsters commit evils that are unusual and seem “unnatural” for
their singularity. But the same can be said of moral saints who perform acts that are just as
unusual and hence seemingly “unnatural.” Great moral heroes like Mahatma Gandhi behaved
(and encouraged others to behave) in ways that are hardly commonplace in our observations of
nature or even of what we might regards as “natural” human behavior, and yet we see positive
moral significance in saintly behavior—indeed, moral significance that many would regard as
even more powerful and righteous than that which stems from obedience to law. Arguably the
most laudable moral action is in some sense “unnatural” because it is so out of the ordinary and
goes above and beyond what natural law asks of us. This suggests that NLT is too limited a
theory to express the full range of moral action and consequence.
Lessons of DCT and NLT
DCT and NLT share in common the basic idea that morality is primarily about obligation
and adherence to law. Hence these theories frame moral action in terms of obedience and
conformity. But the fact that we recognize and value diversity and creativity in moral life
suggests that this theoretical approach to morality is too narrow. While DCT and NLT may
contribute something to our understanding of the relationship between religion and morality,
they are not adequate accounts of moral and ethical life.
When we examine both DCT and NLT, we can see that both theories connect moral
righteousness with authority—in the sense that there is an author of the creation that authorizes
actions so that they will align with the author’s intent. When we think of authority we tend to
assume a source of power and rules or a plan that stem from that source of power. This leads
us to think in terms of obedience. Hence DCT and NLT frame morality in terms of power and
obedience—and we see that this framing seems inadequate and distorted. What is missing? If
we think more closely about the concept of an author we see that it is not simply about power
and control. Authors of fiction will sometimes talk about the characters they create as having
lives of their own and say that sometimes these characters will surprise them! Many writers
start a story without knowing how it will end, and discover the conclusion in the process of
creating the story. Authors who have these experiences value them despite the lack of control
they feel—in some case, because they lack this control and are free to enjoy the surprise.
These descriptions of the act of creation and creativity suggest that the idea that it is about
intent and control is too narrow an understanding of the concept of authority.
If this is so, then perhaps thinking about God as author of the universe should include
the possibility that God may be surprised at what happens. Perhaps God is not best understood
as a lawgiver who tells human beings what to do, but rather as a creator who calls upon
creatures to creatively participate in the unfolding of the creation. This would provide a
plausible explanation of the value of free will. DCT and NLT interpret free will as the capacity to