Introduction to Religious Theories of Morality

INTRODUCTION TO RELIGIOUS THEORIES OF MORALITY:
DIVINE COMMAND THEORY AND NATURAL LAW THEORY
Daniel Forbes and Matthew Pierlott
West Chester University of Pennsylvania
Draft, Summer 2013
Introduction
What is it that makes an action right or wrong? In modern ethical thought there are two
main theoretical approaches to answering this question, and they differ on what it is that is the
source of moral value. Deontological ethical theories argue that the rightness or wrongness
of an action is something intrinsic to the character or nature of that action, and the results of the
action are morally neutral. For example, according to a deontological approach lying itself as an
action is something that is morally deficient or even morally "ugly". Even if the action has good
consequences this is morally irrelevant according to a deontological approach; the action’s
intrinsic wrongness is what makes it morally deficient, and any good in the consequences of the
action does not make up for this. A deontological ethicist argues that the ends do not justify the
means. Lying is a wrong action, and so it cannot be justified by any positive results it might
produce.
By contrast teleological ethical theories (more commonly known as
consequentialism) argue that the wrongness of an action is something extrinsic to the action,
and is determined exclusively by the action’s results or consequences. According to
consequentialism the action itself is morally neutral, and the value of the action is determined by
the consequences of the action. In other words, it is the consequences of action that bear moral
significance, and the action is merely a means to an end. For example, lying as an action by
itself is morally neutral because it can have good or bad consequences; whether or not a lie is
right or wrong depends entirely upon whether the consequences of the lie are morally good or
morally bad. Usually consequentialism focuses on whether or not the consequences of an
action are beneficial or harmful in some familiar way—whether or not they cause happiness or
suffering, for example.
These theoretical approaches do not think of rightness or wrongness in necessarily
religious ways; the deontological ethicist can think that lying is intrinsically morally wrong or
"ugly" whether or not he or she believes in God, and the consequentialist judges actions right or
wrong depending upon whether or not they cause benefit or harm, without regard to God at all.
But some believe that religion is necessary for the reality of morality because without a divine
power to determine what counts as good and evil, or what counts as right and wrong, there is no
justification for thinking that anything, action or consequence of action, has any value
whatsoever. According to this stance without God there can be no true value, no good or evil,
and hence religious belief is essential to moral judgment.
Here we will discuss religious theories of morality specifically from the perspective of the
Abrahamic religious traditions—that is, the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions. The
theories discussed here, Divine Command Theory and Natural Law Theory, have their origin in

moral philosophy from the Abrahamic traditions, and they are particularly influential in moral and
ethical thought in Western culture.
Divine Command Theory
There are two main theoretical approaches to religious morality that differ significantly
from typical deontological or consequentialist approaches. One is called Divine Command
Theory (DCT). According to DCT the moral value of a human action is extrinsic to both the
action and to the consequences of the action for human beings. Instead, the moral value of an
action is intrinsic to God’s will regarding that action. If God wills that one should perform an
action, then this gives the action positive moral value and hence makes it morally right, and if
God wills that one should not perform an action, then this gives the action negative moral value,
and hence makes it morally wrong. In other words, all moral value is situated in God’s will, and
without God’s will no action or consequence of an action could have any moral value. It is
God’s will that creates moral right and wrong, and so without God’s will there would be no such
thing as good or evil of any sort.
From a religious or spiritual perspective, there are some compelling aspects to DCT that
make it plausible. God is creator of the universe, and hence everything that exists owes its
reality to God. Why should morality be any different? From this perspective it is reasonable to
think of morality as another of God’s creations. Moreover, God is usually conceived to be
omnibenevolent—that is, wholly good. Again, it makes sense to think of God as the source of
all that is good, including the standards for what counts as good and, by that token, what counts
as bad as well. Finally, God as the creator is the ultimate power guiding the universe, and so
God is the only being who would have the authority and power to promulgate and fully enforce
moral law through judgment. Hence it makes sense to think of God’s will as law, particularly for
morality.
It is important to carefully distinguish DCT from deontological and consequentialist
approaches. DCT specifically locates moral value in God’s will and choice. Hence it is very
different from deontological or consequentialist reasoning about ethics. For example, consider
the Biblical commandment “You shall not kill.” Why is killing wrong? Suppose we say that
killing is wrong because it causes harm to the victim and those who care about him, and it also
harms the perpetrator because she becomes more vicious and morally deficient by taking such
actions. Then God issues the commandment because killing as an action has bad
consequences for those affected by the act. This is a consequentialist interpretation of the
commandment against killing because the wrongness of killing is intrinsic to the consequences
of the action. Thus even if God did not issue the commandment, we would still know that killing
would be morally wrong (or, more precisely, it would still be wrong, whether we knew it or not)
because its results are morally bad. This leaves God’s commandment out of the equation, and
so this interpretation is inconsistent with DCT.
Suppose instead that we say killing is wrong because it is a depraved and morally ugly
action. Then God issues the commandment against killing because of something intrinsically
bad about the act of killing. This is a deontological interpretation of the commandment against
killing. Thus even if God did not issue the commandment, killing would still be morally wrong
because of the intrinsic character of the action, which is what makes it morally bad. So this
interpretation is also inconsistent with DCT.

DCT argues that moral value cannot be found in either the action or its consequences.
Morality is situated in God’s will and not anywhere else. So according to DCT moral value
cannot be present in actions or consequences without God’s concurrence of will. It follows that
DCT interprets the wrongness of killing to be situated in God's commandment itself—it is the
command that makes killing wrong, not the intrinsic character of the action of killing or its
results. Actions and their consequences are morally neutral by themselves; just by looking at
the actions or their results, we would not be able to identify them as morally good or morally evil.
If God had made no commandment about killing, then killing (and its consequences) would be
neither right nor wrong. To illustrate this aspect of DCT, consider another Biblical source, the
story of Abraham and Isaac. God has promulgated a commandment that we should not kill
other human beings. But then he issues a commandment to Abraham to sacrifice his son. God
seems to have issued contradictory commandments: killing is wrong, but now Abraham is to kill
his own innocent son. But according to DCT what makes an action right or wrong is not its
intrinsic character or its consequences, but its expression of obedience to God’s will. Abraham
has received a direct command from God, and so the morally right thing to do is obey the
command. Therefore the morally right action is for Abraham to carry out the sacrifice. But
before Abraham can do so, God commands Abraham not to—it has been a test of his faith.
Now Abraham has a new commandment to follow: do not kill your son. Again, moral
righteousness is defined by obedience to God’s commandment, so the morally right action now
is for Abraham to obey this new command. In short, right and wrong are determined through
obedience to the commandment. The character of the action itself and its consequences are
not morally significant; indeed, if they were, it would be very difficult to describe how God’s
commandments to Abraham make moral sense! Only God’s will has moral significance, and so
acting in accord with God’s will is the only criterion for morality.
Challenges to DCT
DCT has some peculiar and unpalatable consequences, some of them connected with
the features of the theory that initially make it sound plausible. First, it makes morality in some
sense arbitrary, because God has omnipotence and free will and hence can command anything
whatsoever. What makes killing wrong according to DCT is the fact that God commands us not
to do it; but what if God had instead commanded us to kill? According to DCT because God has
free will God could very well have promulgated a commandment to kill, and that would have
made killing morally righteous. But many would argue that killing is wrong, either because it is a
morally ugly action or because it has evil consequences, and it does not make sense that God
could have made killing “right” simply by commanding it. The story of Abraham and Isaac, while
on the surface it appears to support DCT, actually illustrates this point. In scripture God
commands Abraham to sacrifice his son. Though Abraham follows DCT in obeying this
commandment, he has moral concerns about it. His moral concerns are not about whether or
not God really has commanded this of him, but whether or not this command could really be
morally right. This evidence suggests that it is not enough to say that morality is simply created
by God’s will, for Abraham apparently has some independent standard for determining the
morality of an action that allows him to question the morality of the commandment. The fact that
it makes sense to be able to question reports of God’s will suggests that we have some moral

sense of the righteousness or wrongness of actions or their consequences that does not stem
from knowledge of God’s will.
Second, DCT contradicts our intuitions about morality, actions, and consequences.
Most of us think that certain actions have intrinsic characteristics as actions that make them
morally right or wrong, and we could recognize this wrongness even if we didn’t know of a divine
commandment about the action, or even if we didn’t believe in God. For example, most people
would say that there is something heroic and righteous about attempting to save a life, even if
the attempt fails. We do not need to know God’s will concerning saving the lives of others to
recognize the righteousness of the action; even someone who is not religious would recognize
the value inherent in such an action. Moreover, most of us think that certain sorts of
consequences of actions have intrinsic positive or negative value relevant to the morality of
action, and this too can be recognized even if one does not know God's will, or even if one does
not believe in God at all. Most people would say that suffering is wrong (or at least bad), and if
this is true then the intentional action to promote suffering is wrong—and this is not something
that has to be connected with religious belief. There is something that seems obviously bad
about suffering and needless pain that doesn’t require any further explanation or justification of
its wrongness. It seems ridiculous to say that we would not know if suffering were good or bad
if we didn't know what God thought of it! Even nonhuman animals that cannot even conceive of
God recognize that suffering is bad and avoid it; some even instinctively act to alleviate suffering
where they recognize it. Hence the claim that moral right and wrong are determined exclusively
by God’s will and commandment seems indefensible.
Another challenge to DCT is that without knowledge of God’s will it becomes impossible
to know whether or not an action is right or wrong. Abraham is able to make a judgment about
what to do because God speaks to him to issue a commandment, but few would say that God
speaks to them in any clear or direct way. Without a clear commandment it becomes very
difficult to ascertain what God’s will is, and hence for someone who accepts DCT it becomes
very difficult to ascertain what right and wrong are. Perhaps one might argue that we should
look to scripture to identify God’s commandments, since they are promulgated quite clearly
there. But are they? There are disagreements about the interpretation of scripture and its
significance to moral decision-making. For example, different denominations within Christianity
take different stances on how to interpret scriptural statements regarding sexuality; where there
is disagreement there is evidence that a commandment is not clear or obvious (or even that
there is dispute about whether or not there is in fact a commandment!). Moreover, there are
commandments issued in scripture that not many take seriously anymore—for example,
punishment of adultery by stoning. Arguably some commandments clearly fit the needs of
people at the time the commandments were issued, but would not be appropriate in the modern
world where human needs and problems are different. However, notice that this argument
actually implies that there are consequentialist reasons for changes in God’s commandments—
which is inconsistent with DCT. To sum up: if we can question whether scripture provides
consistently relevant moral guidance, we have reason to question whether it is sufficient as a
source of evidence for identifying God's will.
Finally, some might argue that God reveals commandments through one’s sense of
conscience. According to this argument if you consult your inner sense of right and wrong
through reflection or prayer, you will know God’s will. But this can be challenged as well, on the

same grounds. We sometimes find ourselves in situations where our conscience seems unsure
about what is right and what is wrong, and prayer and reflection do not necessarily help. Where
one is not sure what is commanded, it is difficult to be obedient!
In summary, DCT is not a very persuasive theory. In fact, the universality of certain
moral values—including prohibitions against killing and exhortations to keep promises—are so
pervasive in cultures of diverse religious traditions that it makes better sense to think that
morality should be located in either actions or their consequences (or possibly both). This
suggests that morality is not best explained or understood in terms of obedience to divine will or
commandment, and that DCT is not a viable moral or ethical theory. Is there another option that
can reflect the belief that God is the ultimate source of morality, without reducing morality to
God’s commandments?
Natural Law Theory
The other major theoretical approach to moral value that often defines moral right and
wrong in religious terms is Natural Law Theory (NLT). NLT can sometimes be described in
“secular” rather than religious terms, but it is not clear whether such framing really masks a
religious perspective or assumes a ‘Nature’ that plays a role similar to that of ‘God’ anyway. In
any case, NLT originates in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, a medieval Catholic theologian and
moral philosopher, so it makes sense to look at it as a religious theory of morality.
NLT takes a broader perspective on the nature of God’s power in an effort to avoid the
problems facing DCT. NLT focuses on the fact that God’s will is not only responsible for
commandments to human beings, but also for the existence and operations of all the universe.
Hence our understanding of God’s will needs to go beyond just explicit commands from God
about our actions, and needs to extend to implicit commands that can be seen in the natural
phenomena of the world. According to NLT, moral laws are not fundamentally different from the
laws of nature like the scientific laws of physics or the laws of biology. Scientific laws of nature
are commandments of God that regulate how nature works, and God’s issuance of these
commandments makes nature function in the regular and predictable ways that it does. So
gravity, according to NLT, is a sort of commandment from God that determines how massive
bodies will interact with one another: they are attracted to one another by means of
gravitational forces. However, the laws of physics work in necessary ways, so that it is
impossible to disobey these laws. You cannot disobey the law of gravity, for example! It affects
your actions and their consequences whether you want it to or not. Moreover, the laws of
nature work together to form a system of nature that can be understood by means of scientific
study. The laws do not contradict one another, nor do they change; they collectively create a
universe that has a permanent and uniform nature that can be mathematically described and
predicted. It is this fact that makes it possible for us to observe, understand, and predict the
behavior of the natural world. Without the uniformity and coherence of the laws of nature it
would not be possible for us to guide our actions in any meaningful way. If gravity did not
function in a lawful way, but changed randomly, we would not be able to anticipate the
consequences of our actions, and so we wouldn’t be able to survive. NLT, then, argues that the
regularity and predictability of nature are a sign of God’s providence, and evidence of God’s will.
However, human beings have freedom of the will; this means that they have the capacity
to obey or disobey other sorts of laws. These laws according to NLT are the moral laws, and

these laws only apply to beings who have freedom of the will. These laws are facts of nature
just like the laws of physics, and they too regulate a system of nature that is permanent and
uniform, but the only difference is that human beings have the unique ability through freedom of
the will to disregard or act against these laws. When we act in accord with these moral laws, we
act “naturally” and as the laws command us to do; when we act against these laws we act
“unnaturally” and contradict these commands and hence act against the uniformity of the
system of nature. So, for example, it is a law of nature that human beings should not kill one
another. When we obey this law we live in accord with the moral laws implicit in nature, and
when we use our free will to violate this law we act against nature. The evidence that there is in
fact a natural moral law prohibiting killing is that when human beings kill one another it promotes
fear, distrust, and disorder. When we do not kill we live more harmoniously and happily
together. This tells us that there is a natural moral law prohibiting killing, and disobedience of
this moral law has its own built-in consequences: it disrupts the order that exists naturally.
NLT is commonly used in ethical arguments that object to behaviors and practices that
some consider “unnatural” because they seem to contradict the uniformity of how the world
works. For example, some argue that same-sex relationships are morally wrong because they
are “unnatural”—same-sex relations contradict the uniformity of nature observable in sexual
reproduction, and involve sexual behavior that cannot produce offspring. Similar sorts of
arguments can be made concerning the morality of sexuality (nontraditional sex, contraception,
artificial insemination, etc.), abortion, cloning, cosmetic surgery, and other activities or behaviors
that can be argued to contradict or disrupt “natural” patterns of behavior or lifestyles.
Natural Law Theory has an advantage over DCT in that it does not require that we know
God’s explicit will about an action or a consequence in order to determine whether or not it is
moral. We only need to observe nature and learn what the natural laws are by observing the
regularities of how natural things behave. Hence it is not necessary to believe in God or even to
be religious in order to know what is moral; this also explains how diverse religious traditions as
well as nonbelievers can have similar moral values, since believers of any religion can learn the
correct moral values from observing and learning about nature through experience. (However,
according to NLT if one believes in the “true” religion then one enjoys knowing the true and real
basis for the existence of moral values: they originate in God’s acts of creation and regulation
of a systematic and uniform universe.)
NLT also has an advantage over DCT in that it can explain how actions and
consequences can seem to have an intrinsic moral value even when one does not know of
God’s will or does not even believe in God. Because “natural” actions and their consequences
manifest their moral value because their very natures reflect the presence and consequences of
God’s will, one in a certain sense can “see” God's will in the rightness and wrongness of the
action or consequence without actually recognizing it as God’s will. If one is not religious one
may mistake this value for something that just happens to be in the action or consequence, but
in fact the value stems from God’s institution of the eternal and natural law. Similarly to DCT,
according to NLT without God these actions and consequences could seem neither right nor
wrong to us, neither good or bad; the difference is that according to NLT we don’t need to know
this in order to know moral right and wrong.
Note that NLT in this way also avoids the problem with DCT that God’s commandments
could be arbitrary. NLT assumes that God’s will is consistent and uniform, and all the

commandments fit into a coherent and intelligible system of nature. Hence God could not
simply command anything; if it contradicts the order of the rest of nature, or changed the
regularity of how the universe works, this would make the command illegitimate. This explains
how Abraham could question the morality of the commandment to sacrifice his son: it goes
against the natural law against killing.
Challenges to NLT
Despite these advantages over DCT, NLT faces some significant challenges of its own
that put the viability of this moral theory into doubt. One major challenge to NLT is that despite
the idea that we can learn morality from observation of the uniformity of nature, it nevertheless
fails to give clear guidance about identifying right and wrong because there’s no obvious way of
distinguishing natural law from social convention or mere prejudice. Human behavior and
activity is so strongly shaped by custom and tradition that the uniformity of patterns of behavior
may have less to do with being “natural” and more to do with cultural “habit.” For example,
there is evidence that some nonhuman animals engage in same-sex sexual activity. Is it
possible that cultural taboos against same-sex activity among humans are more of a
consequence of traditional belief than of innate natural tendencies? This sort of question is not
easy to answer—and NLT implies that it should be easy to answer through observation of
nature!
Moreover, nature can exhibit regularities that we intuitively consider inconsistent with
moral behavior. Consider the example of prohibiting murder: we see nonhuman animals,
including higher primates, sometimes exhibit murderous behavior toward one another. If NLT is
correct then this sort of behavior arguably may be considered “natural” and hence morally
righteous (or at least morally permissible). Can the defender of NLT argue that these
nonhuman animals are violating moral laws and hence behaving “unnaturally”? Since we do not
typically think of nonhuman animals as moral agents with moral responsibility for their actions
based in freedom of the will, NLT cannot explain such behavior as willful violation of natural law.
The defender of NLT will have to argue that the nonhuman animal that acts murderously
behaves “unnaturally” because it is in some way defective. But to admit that nonhuman animal
behavior exhibits defects and therefore at times diverges from what is “natural” effectively
admits that observations of nature may not reliably indicate to us just what is natural or good!
The defender of NLT might respond to this objection by arguing that where we observe
greater uniformity we see what is natural. Since murderous behavior is not the norm for
behavioral interactions it is “unnatural” even if it happens frequently among nonhuman animals.
However, the fact that NLT focuses on the uniformity of nature as the basis of moral law
indicates that it does not provide a clear place for recognizing and understanding the value and
significance of diversity. It is undeniable that natural systems, particularly living ecosystems and
organisms, thrive by means of promoting diversity of characteristics and behaviors. If traits and
behaviors were completely uniform among a population of organisms, then the stability of that
population would be very sensitive to environmental changes; a significant change in that
environment could make the population’s behaviors suddenly maladaptive and could lead to
catastrophe. We can observe the same thing in human social systems: they do not exhibit
completely uniform behaviors among their members, because diversity and specialization
makes human cooperation possible. The diversity of behavior even within a culture seems to

e important to its survival. Given these facts, it seems that diversity must have a significant
role to play in moral judgment, but NLT does not provide any obvious way of accommodating it.
Indeed, NLT seems to suggest that we morality requires that we should avoid diversity and
novelty and instead focus on uniformity and sameness. But how far should we take adherence
to what we perceive to be the natural moral law? Would it require us to stop discovering new
technologies or innovative practices because they are “unnatural”?
Finally, the emphasis of law and regularity in NLT does little to explain supererogatory or
heroic moral action. Moral monsters commit evils that are unusual and seem “unnatural” for
their singularity. But the same can be said of moral saints who perform acts that are just as
unusual and hence seemingly “unnatural.” Great moral heroes like Mahatma Gandhi behaved
(and encouraged others to behave) in ways that are hardly commonplace in our observations of
nature or even of what we might regards as “natural” human behavior, and yet we see positive
moral significance in saintly behavior—indeed, moral significance that many would regard as
even more powerful and righteous than that which stems from obedience to law. Arguably the
most laudable moral action is in some sense “unnatural” because it is so out of the ordinary and
goes above and beyond what natural law asks of us. This suggests that NLT is too limited a
theory to express the full range of moral action and consequence.
Lessons of DCT and NLT
DCT and NLT share in common the basic idea that morality is primarily about obligation
and adherence to law. Hence these theories frame moral action in terms of obedience and
conformity. But the fact that we recognize and value diversity and creativity in moral life
suggests that this theoretical approach to morality is too narrow. While DCT and NLT may
contribute something to our understanding of the relationship between religion and morality,
they are not adequate accounts of moral and ethical life.
When we examine both DCT and NLT, we can see that both theories connect moral
righteousness with authority—in the sense that there is an author of the creation that authorizes
actions so that they will align with the author’s intent. When we think of authority we tend to
assume a source of power and rules or a plan that stem from that source of power. This leads
us to think in terms of obedience. Hence DCT and NLT frame morality in terms of power and
obedience—and we see that this framing seems inadequate and distorted. What is missing? If
we think more closely about the concept of an author we see that it is not simply about power
and control. Authors of fiction will sometimes talk about the characters they create as having
lives of their own and say that sometimes these characters will surprise them! Many writers
start a story without knowing how it will end, and discover the conclusion in the process of
creating the story. Authors who have these experiences value them despite the lack of control
they feel—in some case, because they lack this control and are free to enjoy the surprise.
These descriptions of the act of creation and creativity suggest that the idea that it is about
intent and control is too narrow an understanding of the concept of authority.
If this is so, then perhaps thinking about God as author of the universe should include
the possibility that God may be surprised at what happens. Perhaps God is not best understood
as a lawgiver who tells human beings what to do, but rather as a creator who calls upon
creatures to creatively participate in the unfolding of the creation. This would provide a
plausible explanation of the value of free will. DCT and NLT interpret free will as the capacity to

diverge from God’s commandments through disobedience. If this is all there is to free will, then
we would seem to be better off without it. We would be better off if we could not help but obey
God’s will, so that we could never violate it and only do as God commands, since the only real
exercise of free will according to DCT and NLT is to disobey. If free will only gives us the
capacity to violate rules, it is emptied of value.
Moreover, DCT and NLT in a sense make morality very easy—do what God wills! But
free will would seem to make morality much harder, since it makes it possible to disregard and
diverge from God’s will. However, if we think of God not primarily as authorial lawgiver but as
author of a creation that may produce surprises, free will has a different meaning and
significance. Instead of a mere capacity to obey or disobey, free will may be better understood
as a capacity to generate novelty and find new ways of acting and living that create more value
than would be the case in the absence of free will. This interpretation of moral life gives free will
a clear value that is not limited to a choice about whether or not to obey, and so it exhibits a
richer understanding of ethics than DCT or NLT can provide.
This alternative interpretation of divine “authority” seems to be a better fit for thinking
about the relationship between morality and religion. While obedience and conformity are major
features of religious life, all major religions also appreciate the moral significance of diversity
and moral creativity and heroism. These aspects of morality are best understood in terms of
moral exemplars rather than in terms of laws or commandments. This suggests that scripture
can be interpreted not only as a source of moral laws or commandments, but also as a source
of depictions of moral exemplars whom we should emulate, and whose moral praiseworthiness
goes beyond simple obedience to law. Hence the role of religion in moral theory may have less
to do with what creed one believes and adheres to and more to do with the sort of life one leads
and how this influences one’s approach to moral decision-making.