Tanveer Ahmed, JK v Sweden and the burden and standard of proof
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<strong>Ahmed</strong>, <strong>JK</strong> v <strong>Sweden</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>burden</strong> <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard <strong>of</strong><br />
pro<strong>of</strong><br />
1. In <strong>the</strong> Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal, verification by <strong>the</strong> State <strong>of</strong> documentary or<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r evidence is sometimes, but rarely, required to assist an<br />
applicant to establish his claim: see MA (Bangladesh) v SSHD [2016]<br />
EWCA Civ 175 at §29; PJ (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2015] 1 WLR 1322 at<br />
§29, explaining <strong>and</strong> confirming <strong>the</strong> Tribunal decisions in <strong>Ahmed</strong> v<br />
SSHD [2002] Imm AR 318; MJ v SSHD [2013] Imm AR 799; <strong>and</strong> NA<br />
v SSHD [2014] UKUT 205.<br />
2. In MA (Bangladesh) at §30 per Lloyd-Jones LJ, as he <strong>the</strong>n was, it was<br />
conceivable that exceptionally <strong>the</strong>re might be a duty where evidence<br />
<strong>of</strong> central importance was capable <strong>of</strong> straight forward verification.<br />
On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, at §45 verification added nothing to a claim<br />
which was clearly unfounded.<br />
3. <strong>Ahmed</strong> held that <strong>the</strong>re was no general principle by which deciding not<br />
to verify documentary or o<strong>the</strong>r evidence, even if it was supportive <strong>of</strong><br />
a protection claim, led to a presumption <strong>of</strong> protection.<br />
4. As a general proposition <strong>of</strong> law, this rule came to be known as <strong>the</strong> rule<br />
in <strong>Tanveer</strong> <strong>Ahmed</strong>.<br />
5. It has survived repeated challenge in <strong>the</strong> tribunal <strong>and</strong> in this court. In<br />
particular, it is said in <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> PJ (Sri Lanka) that it cannot be<br />
challenged on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> second section <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
European Court <strong>of</strong> Human Rights in Singh v Belgium, 33210/11, 2<br />
October 2012: see MA (Bangladesh) at §28, per Lloyd-Jones LJ.<br />
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6. In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> PJ (Sri Lanka) at §30 per Fulford LJ, <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
second section in Singh v Belgium was <strong>the</strong> exceptional case that<br />
proved <strong>the</strong> rule in <strong>Tanveer</strong> <strong>Ahmed</strong>.<br />
7. Fulford LJ held that on <strong>the</strong> facts <strong>of</strong> Singh v Belgium <strong>the</strong> European<br />
Court <strong>of</strong> Human Rights found that a central piece <strong>of</strong> evidence capable<br />
<strong>of</strong> easy verification had been ignored at two different levels <strong>of</strong><br />
decision making by <strong>the</strong> national authorities. In <strong>the</strong>se circumstances,<br />
<strong>the</strong>re was exceptionally a duty <strong>of</strong> verification, breach <strong>of</strong> which<br />
violated Article 3.<br />
8. The actual decision in PJ (Sri Lanka), however, to allow <strong>the</strong> appeal in<br />
that case, did not turn on <strong>the</strong> rule in <strong>Tanveer</strong> <strong>Ahmed</strong> or on any duty <strong>of</strong><br />
verification, but instead at §41 it turned on a failure to appreciate a<br />
relevant fact.<br />
9. Never<strong>the</strong>less, it is trite that in our law, it is a rare case that cannot be<br />
dismissed without verification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> central claims <strong>of</strong> an applicant,<br />
even when <strong>the</strong>y are supported by documentary or o<strong>the</strong>r evidence, if,<br />
in <strong>the</strong> round, <strong>the</strong> applicant is not found to be credible.<br />
10. In European Union law <strong>and</strong> in Convention law <strong>the</strong> opposite applies<br />
<strong>and</strong> only rarely may a protection claim be dismissed without<br />
verification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> documentary or o<strong>the</strong>r evidence which supports<br />
such a claim.<br />
11. The Qualification Directive (Directive 2004/83/EC), for example,<br />
does not even call for a credibility assessment in every case. It is<br />
reserved for those cases in which aspects <strong>of</strong> an applicant’s statements<br />
are not supported by documentary or o<strong>the</strong>r evidence: see Article 4(5),<br />
transposed into domestic law by Immigration Rule, paragraph 339L.<br />
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12. According to <strong>the</strong> case law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Strasbourg Court, it is only when <strong>the</strong><br />
evidence adduced by an applicant is incapable <strong>of</strong> showing substantial<br />
grounds for believing he or she would face a real risk <strong>of</strong> treatment<br />
prohibited by Article 3 that <strong>the</strong> national authorities may dispense<br />
with <strong>the</strong> need to verify <strong>the</strong> evidence before rejecting a claim for<br />
international protection.<br />
13. The case law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> European Court <strong>of</strong> Human Rights repeatedly<br />
emphasises that <strong>the</strong> position <strong>of</strong> a person about whom information is<br />
presented, which gives strong reasons to question <strong>the</strong> veracity <strong>of</strong> his<br />
or her submissions, but who none<strong>the</strong>less adduces documentary or<br />
o<strong>the</strong>r evidence capable <strong>of</strong> proving his protection claim, is very<br />
different from <strong>the</strong> person who is not able to adduce evidence capable<br />
<strong>of</strong> proving an international protection claim.<br />
14. In <strong>the</strong> former case <strong>the</strong> national authorities are prohibited from<br />
removing <strong>the</strong> applicant until such evidence is verified <strong>and</strong> any doubts<br />
about it are removed. In <strong>the</strong> latter case under <strong>the</strong> Procedures<br />
Directive (2005/85/EC), for example, <strong>the</strong> applicant may be subject to<br />
accelerated procedures: Article 23(4).<br />
15. These propositions emerge from <strong>the</strong> strong line <strong>of</strong> decisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
different sections <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> European Court <strong>of</strong> Human Rights in RC v<br />
<strong>Sweden</strong>, 41827/07, 9 March 2010, at §50 <strong>and</strong> 53 <strong>and</strong> MA v<br />
Switzerl<strong>and</strong>, 52589/13, 18 February 2015, at §55 <strong>and</strong> 59-69, which<br />
address <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> documentary or o<strong>the</strong>r evidence, but were not<br />
referred to in PJ (Sri Lanka) or MA (Bangladesh).<br />
16. It emerges from <strong>the</strong> same line that <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Strasbourg<br />
Court in Singh v Belgium, again whilst concerned with documentary<br />
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or o<strong>the</strong>r evidence, was in fact at §103 illustrative <strong>of</strong> a wider principle<br />
<strong>of</strong> more singular importance, declared by <strong>the</strong> Gr<strong>and</strong> Chamber in<br />
Article 3 cases generally <strong>and</strong> most recently in its decisions on <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>burden</strong> <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> in <strong>the</strong> assessment <strong>of</strong> international<br />
protection claims: see <strong>JK</strong> v <strong>Sweden</strong>, 59166/12, 23 August 2016, at<br />
§91-98, or in so-called medical cases: see Paposhvili v Belgium,<br />
41738/10, 13 December 2016, at §186-187.<br />
17. The Gr<strong>and</strong> Chamber holds in <strong>JK</strong> v <strong>Sweden</strong> that to ensure asylum<br />
applicants have <strong>the</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> doubt, <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>burden</strong> is discharged<br />
when <strong>the</strong>y adduce evidence, which is capable <strong>of</strong> proving real risk on<br />
return, whereupon <strong>the</strong> <strong>burden</strong> shifts to <strong>the</strong> government to dispel any<br />
doubts or uncertainty.<br />
18. Accordingly an applicant need only “adduce evidence capable <strong>of</strong><br />
proving” <strong>the</strong>re are substantial grounds for believing removal would<br />
expose him or her to a real risk <strong>of</strong> ill-treatment; <strong>and</strong> that where such<br />
evidence is adduced, it is for <strong>the</strong> Government to “dispel any doubts<br />
about it”: see <strong>JK</strong> v <strong>Sweden</strong>, cited above, §91; Paposhivili v Belgium,<br />
cited above, §186-187; FG v <strong>Sweden</strong>, 43611/11, 23 March 2016, §120<br />
(GC); Saadi v Italy, 37201/06, 28 February 2008, §129 (GC); NA v<br />
UK, 25904/07, 17 July 2008, §111 (4th section); RC v <strong>Sweden</strong>, cited<br />
above, §50 (3rd section); MA v Switzerl<strong>and</strong>, cited above §55 (2nd<br />
section).<br />
19. The general statement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> protection principle by <strong>the</strong> Gr<strong>and</strong><br />
Chamber in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> Paposhvili v Belgium at [186], [187] is<br />
accepted by this Court in AM (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2018] HRLR 9,<br />
[2018] EWCA Civ 64 at [16] per Sales LJ, who states that whereas<br />
<strong>the</strong> applicant has <strong>the</strong> overall <strong>burden</strong> <strong>of</strong> proving a protection claim, in<br />
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<strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Gr<strong>and</strong> Chamber this is achieved by raising a prima<br />
facie case <strong>of</strong> infringement <strong>of</strong> Article 3, which <strong>the</strong>n casts an evidential<br />
<strong>burden</strong> onto <strong>the</strong> national authorities which seek removal.<br />
20. This principle (<strong>the</strong> protection principle), which only requires that an<br />
asylum applicant adduce evidence capable <strong>of</strong> proving his case, is also<br />
<strong>the</strong> general governing principle to be found in <strong>the</strong> case law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Court <strong>of</strong> Justice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> European Union.<br />
21. In Case C-277/11, MM v Minister for Justice, Equality <strong>and</strong> Law Reform<br />
<strong>and</strong> O<strong>the</strong>rs, judgment <strong>of</strong> 22 November 2012, at [64], cited by <strong>the</strong><br />
Gr<strong>and</strong> Chamber in <strong>JK</strong> v <strong>Sweden</strong> at [49], <strong>the</strong> CJEU held:<br />
“In actual fact, that ‘assessment’ takes place in two separate stages. The first<br />
stage concerns <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> factual circumstances which may<br />
constitute evidence that supports <strong>the</strong> application …”<br />
22. Once evidence is adduced which is capable <strong>of</strong> proving an application,<br />
<strong>the</strong> <strong>burden</strong> shifts <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> defending state must “remove all doubt”: see<br />
Singh v Belgium at [103], cited in MA (Bangladesh) v SSHD at [25]<br />
per Lloyd-Jones LJ.<br />
23. The greater duty to remove all doubt (<strong>the</strong> protection principle)<br />
encompasses a lesser duty to verify documents going to <strong>the</strong> crux <strong>of</strong> an<br />
asylum claim, which are capable <strong>of</strong> belief or in o<strong>the</strong>r words, which<br />
are capable <strong>of</strong> proving a claim for international protection.<br />
24. Despite this Court’s broad assent to <strong>the</strong> protection principle as cited<br />
above in AM (Zimbabwe) at [16] <strong>and</strong> MA (Bangladesh) at [28], <strong>the</strong>re<br />
remains a fundamental difference in <strong>the</strong> application <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> protection<br />
principle to asylum claims by courts or tribunals in <strong>the</strong> UK with <strong>the</strong><br />
position at supra-national level.<br />
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25. The root difference is that an objective test applies at supra-national<br />
level to <strong>the</strong> determination <strong>of</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r an applicant has adduced<br />
evidence capable <strong>of</strong> proving his or her protection claim.<br />
26. At <strong>the</strong> supra-national level, evidence is not capable <strong>of</strong> proving a<br />
protection claim if <strong>and</strong> only if no reasonable tribunal could find it<br />
capable <strong>of</strong> proving a protection claim. It is submitted that this is <strong>the</strong><br />
protection principle.<br />
27. Ano<strong>the</strong>r way <strong>of</strong> expressing <strong>the</strong> protection principle is that if on one<br />
legitimate view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> evidence, it is capable <strong>of</strong> proving a protection<br />
claim, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> <strong>burden</strong> shifts to <strong>the</strong> government to dispel any doubts<br />
about it.<br />
28. Thus in RC v <strong>Sweden</strong> at §50, <strong>and</strong> MA v Switzerl<strong>and</strong> at §55, even<br />
though it was accepted by <strong>the</strong> European Court <strong>of</strong> Human Rights that<br />
on one view it was reasonable for <strong>the</strong> national determining<br />
authorities to harbour strong doubts over <strong>the</strong> asylum seekers’<br />
submissions, never<strong>the</strong>less those doubts were not such, after taking<br />
account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> asylum seekers’ explanations (RC v <strong>Sweden</strong> at §52-57;<br />
MA v Switzerl<strong>and</strong> at §59-63), as to render <strong>the</strong> documentary or o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
evidence incapable <strong>of</strong> proving <strong>the</strong>ir protection claims (RC v <strong>Sweden</strong> at<br />
§53; MA v Switzerl<strong>and</strong> at §63-69).<br />
29. As a result <strong>the</strong> national authorities were condemned for rejecting <strong>the</strong><br />
asylum applicants’ claims under Article 3 without taking steps to<br />
remove <strong>the</strong> doubt to which <strong>the</strong> documentary or o<strong>the</strong>r evidence gave<br />
rise.<br />
30. By contrast historically at <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tribunal in a domestic<br />
setting in <strong>the</strong> U.K. a judge asks whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> evidence adduced by an<br />
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applicant proves <strong>the</strong> protection claim to <strong>the</strong> lower st<strong>and</strong>ard, not<br />
whe<strong>the</strong>r on one view it is capable <strong>of</strong> proving <strong>the</strong> claim. The <strong>burden</strong><br />
does not shift <strong>and</strong> where in <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Tribunal <strong>the</strong> case fails<br />
<strong>and</strong> on one view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> evidence, <strong>the</strong> Tribunal is entitled to that<br />
decision, <strong>the</strong>n in law at <strong>the</strong> domestic level it was <strong>of</strong> no fur<strong>the</strong>r<br />
account that a judge in <strong>the</strong> same or different Court or Tribunal could<br />
reasonably take a different view: see Otshudi v SSHD [2004] EWCA<br />
Civ 893 at [20] <strong>and</strong> [23], a case where two different adjudicators reached<br />
opposing, but apparently legally tenable views, on <strong>the</strong> same evidence given by<br />
two bro<strong>the</strong>rs in separate asylum appeals.<br />
31. The domestic position was <strong>the</strong> very anti<strong>the</strong>sis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> position under<br />
<strong>the</strong> Convention: if a case could fail, it may very well do, even if on<br />
one legitimate view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> applicant’s evidence, it was capable <strong>of</strong><br />
proving his or her claim. Whereas under <strong>the</strong> Convention, if a case<br />
may succeed it should do, unless <strong>the</strong> national authorities are in a<br />
position to remove any doubt about it.<br />
32. In domestic law, once <strong>the</strong> view was taken that an applicant might be<br />
disbelieved, his account <strong>and</strong> any documentary or o<strong>the</strong>r evidence in<br />
support <strong>of</strong> it, might be <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong>ten was rejected in <strong>the</strong> round, with no<br />
attempt at verification. Whereas under <strong>the</strong> Convention it will be a<br />
rare case where <strong>the</strong> State can refuse a protection claim without<br />
verification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> documentary or o<strong>the</strong>r evidence which supports it.<br />
33. Questions <strong>of</strong> expediency or <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> difficulty or <strong>the</strong> costs associated<br />
with verification are subordinate, it is submitted to <strong>the</strong> procedural<br />
guarantees <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> absolute protection <strong>of</strong>fered by Article 3 which<br />
requires <strong>the</strong> rights under it are meant to be effective above all: MA v<br />
Switzerl<strong>and</strong> at [65]; <strong>JK</strong> v <strong>Sweden</strong> at [97]; Singh v Belgium at [103].<br />
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34. If a judge in a domestic Tribunal finds an applicant has proved his<br />
case to <strong>the</strong> lower st<strong>and</strong>ard, by definition, <strong>the</strong> decision is more than a<br />
finding that <strong>the</strong> evidence adduced by him or her is capable <strong>of</strong> proving<br />
a protection claim.<br />
35. The initial function dem<strong>and</strong>ed <strong>of</strong> a judge by <strong>the</strong> case law <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
European Court <strong>of</strong> Human Rights in <strong>the</strong> assessment <strong>of</strong> a protection<br />
claim, is routinely performed by <strong>the</strong> Tribunal in <strong>the</strong> review <strong>of</strong> cases<br />
certified under section 94 as clearly unfounded.<br />
36. Claims, which on one view may legitimately succeed on <strong>the</strong> evidence,<br />
or which are arguable on <strong>the</strong>ir face <strong>and</strong> which are <strong>the</strong>refore not<br />
clearly unfounded, according to <strong>the</strong> test in R (Razgar) v SSHD [2004]<br />
2 AC 368: see ZT (Kosovo) v SSHD [2009] 1 WLR 348 at [54] per<br />
Lord Hope, must be capable by definition <strong>of</strong> discharging <strong>the</strong><br />
applicant’s <strong>burden</strong> <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> for <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> <strong>JK</strong> v <strong>Sweden</strong>;<br />
Paposhvili v Belgium; or <strong>of</strong> shifting <strong>the</strong> evidential <strong>burden</strong> in<br />
accordance with AM (Zimbabwe) v SSHD cited above.<br />
37. Given <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court in Kiarie v SSHD; Byndloss v<br />
SSHD [2017] 1 WLR at [54], [35] per Lord Wilson that a proposed<br />
appeal for <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> section 82 must be taken to be arguable in<br />
<strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> a certificate that it is clearly unfounded, it follows that<br />
in order to give effect to <strong>the</strong> protection principle in accordance with<br />
<strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> highest domestic Court: in every protection appeal<br />
<strong>the</strong> applicant’s <strong>burden</strong> is discharged from <strong>the</strong> outset <strong>and</strong> it falls in<br />
each case to <strong>the</strong> Secretary <strong>of</strong> State to dispel <strong>the</strong> doubt on appeal.<br />
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BECKET BEDFORD<br />
21 May 2018<br />
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