EU Competition Law Update - Arnold & Porter LLP
EU Competition Law Update - Arnold & Porter LLP
EU Competition Law Update - Arnold & Porter LLP
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
<strong>EU</strong> <strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Update</strong><br />
11 July 2012<br />
<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> (Brussels) <strong>LLP</strong> is a limited liability partnership organized under the laws of the State of New York that is regulated<br />
by the Brussels Bar. It is an affiliate of <strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> <strong>LLP</strong>, a limited liability partnership organized under the laws of the District<br />
of Columbia, which does not itself practice in Brussels.
<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Update</strong><br />
Seminar/Webinar<br />
11 July 2012<br />
4:00 p.m. – 5:00 p.m. CET<br />
60 minutes<br />
Table of Contents<br />
Agenda ..................................................................................Tab 1<br />
Presentation Slides ...............................................................Tab 2<br />
Moderator/Speaker Biographies............................................Tab 3<br />
Marleen Van Kerckhove, Silvio Cappellari, Axel Gutermuth<br />
Practice Overview .................................................................Tab 4<br />
<strong>EU</strong> <strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong> Practice
Tab 1: Agenda
<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Update</strong><br />
Seminar/Webinar<br />
11 July 2012<br />
4:00 p.m. – 5:00 p.m. CET<br />
60 minutes<br />
Agenda<br />
I. Introduction............................................................................4:00 – 4:05 p.m.<br />
Marleen Van Kerckhove, Antitrust/<strong>Competition</strong> Practice, <strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> <strong>LLP</strong><br />
II. Presentation and Discussion .................................................4:05 – 4:50 p.m.<br />
Speakers:<br />
Marleen Van Kerckhove, Antitrust/<strong>Competition</strong> Practice, <strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> <strong>LLP</strong><br />
Silvio Cappellari, Antitrust/<strong>Competition</strong> Practice, <strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> <strong>LLP</strong><br />
Axel Gutermuth, Antitrust/<strong>Competition</strong> Practice, <strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> <strong>LLP</strong><br />
III. Questions and Answers.........................................................4:50 – 5:00 p.m.<br />
Attending this webinar qualifies you for one accredited CPD hour - Ref 2616/ARPO.<br />
CLE is pending.
Tab 2: Presentation Slides
Agenda<br />
� Cartel enforcement<br />
Webinar:<br />
<strong>EU</strong> C<strong>Competition</strong> titi L<strong>Law</strong> U<strong>Update</strong> d t<br />
Marleen Van Kerckhove<br />
Silvio Cappellari<br />
Axel Gutermuth<br />
11 July 2012<br />
– Substance – Dow/DuPont (GC) and Window Mountings (EC)<br />
– Procedure – new Best Practices, “Manual of Procedure” and dawn raid litigation<br />
– Private enforcement – disclosure issues<br />
� Mergers<br />
– Trends: Policy and Statistics<br />
– Interesting cases<br />
� Abuse of dominance<br />
– Commission activity<br />
– Court judgments: Post Danmark, Microsoft, Tomra, Telefónica<br />
� Q&A<br />
2
Overview<br />
� Substance<br />
Cartel Enforcement<br />
– GC: DuPont and Dow => liability of JV parents<br />
– Statistics on GC proceedings<br />
– EC: Window Mountings => fines<br />
� Procedure<br />
– Reform of the EC’s procedural framework<br />
– EC’s EC s “Manual Manual of Procedure Procedure”<br />
– Litigation on dawn raids (AG Bot in E.On)<br />
� Private enforcement – disclosure issues<br />
– Aftermath of Pfleiderer<br />
– Disclosure under Regulation no. 1049/2001<br />
4
Substance<br />
� GC: Dow and DuPont (Chloroprene Rubber), 2 February 2012<br />
– Court confirmed parent liability for 50/50 JV due to “economic, organizational and<br />
legal links”<br />
– Need to prove ability to exercise decisive influence and actual exercise of such<br />
influence<br />
• Ability I: parent representatives in Member Committee, which had broad approval rights<br />
on strategic issues (appointment/dismissal of board and management members,<br />
approval of business and strategic plans ...) )<br />
• Ability II: approval of JV creation by the EC, which had found joint control<br />
• Actual exercise: decisions by the Member Committee, inter alia, (i) to appoint top<br />
managers; (ii) to close a production plant in the UK; and (iii) to conduct an internal<br />
audit into potential cartel participation<br />
Substance (cont’d)<br />
� GC: Dow and DuPont (cont’d)<br />
– Counter-arguments of the parent companies rejected<br />
• No knowledge of the cartel => irrelevant<br />
• Full-function character of the JV<br />
=> economic autonomy does not necessarily translate into strategic autonomy<br />
• Only “negative control”<br />
=> veto rights sufficient, power to impose decisions not necessary<br />
• Concept of “single economic entity” contradicts case-law on applicability of Article 101<br />
TF<strong>EU</strong> tto contractual t t lrelationship l ti hi bbetween t parents t and d JV<br />
=> no legitimate expectation that previous EC approach will be maintained<br />
– Conclusions<br />
• Confirmation of GC’s and EC’s tough stance on parent liability also for JVs<br />
• Important (though not surprising) clarifications on full functionality and negative control<br />
• Always fact-specific analysis (Industrial Bags, 6 March 2012 – no liability of JV parents<br />
due to insufficient factual evidence presented by the EC) 6<br />
5
Substance (cont’d)<br />
� Some statistics on GC proceedings (3/2011 – 3/2012)<br />
– 75 rulings concerning 13 EC decisions<br />
• 40 x EC decision upheld, 27 partial annulments, 8 total annulments<br />
• Reduction of total fines from <strong>EU</strong>R 3.6 billion to <strong>EU</strong>R 3.0 billion<br />
– Successful arguments<br />
• Wrong/insufficient analysis of the facts<br />
=> 23 successful claims (14 relating to duration)<br />
• Incorrect application of the Fining Guidelines<br />
=> > 14 successful claims (in particular cooperation and unequal treatment)<br />
• Parent liability<br />
=> 5 successful claims<br />
• General issues<br />
=> 5 successful claims (length of proceedings, time bar, no exercise of full jurisdiction)<br />
� CJ<strong>EU</strong> proceedings: 9 rulings concerning 4 EC decisions<br />
– 7 x GC ruling upheld, 2 annulments<br />
Substance (cont’d)<br />
� EC: Window Mountings, 28 March 2012<br />
– Decision more than 4.5 years after dawn raids<br />
– Total fines of <strong>EU</strong>R 86 million imposed on 9 companies<br />
– Exceptional application of point 37 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines as most cartel<br />
participants were single-product firms => significant fine reductions<br />
“Although these Guidelines present the general methodology for the setting of<br />
fines, the particularities of a given case ... may justify departing from such<br />
methodology.” th d l ”<br />
– Yet another example of EC’s increased flexibility on fines<br />
– EC stressed fact-specific nature of the decision – but potentially far-reaching<br />
implications<br />
7<br />
8
Substance (cont’d)<br />
� Other EC decisions<br />
– Freight Forwarders, 28 March 2012<br />
• Decision 4.5 years after dawn raids<br />
• Total fines of <strong>EU</strong>R 169 million imposed on 14 companies<br />
• Follow-up to Air Cargo case – but apparently different approach to single and<br />
continuous complex infringement (4 separate cartels)<br />
– Water Management, 27 June 2012<br />
• Decision 3.5 years after dawn raids – even though only 3 companies involved<br />
• Total fines of <strong>EU</strong>R 13.7 million imposed on two companies<br />
• Sixth settlement case<br />
– Mitsubishi and Toshiba (GIS), 27 June 2012<br />
• Re-adoption of decision after GC annulment (unequal treatment due to different<br />
reference years)<br />
• Significant fine reductions – <strong>EU</strong>R 218.6 million => <strong>EU</strong>R 131.6 million<br />
Procedure<br />
� Reform of EC EC’s s procedural framework for antitrust investigations<br />
– Notice on Best Practices<br />
• State of play meetings at key points of the proceedings<br />
• Access to key documents already during investigative phase<br />
• Information in the SO about parameters for fine calculation<br />
– Extended mandate of the Hearing Officer<br />
• Supervision regarding effective exercise of rights of defence throughout the proceedings<br />
• In particular in charge of disputes about privilege issues and self-incrimination<br />
• Strengthened role in preparation and conduct of Oral Hearings<br />
– Best Practice Guidelines for the submission of economic evidence<br />
• Recommendations regarding content and presentation of economic analysis<br />
• Guidance on response to requests for quantitative data<br />
9<br />
10
Procedure (cont’d)<br />
� Publication of EC’s EC s “Manual Manual of Procedure Procedure”<br />
– EC’s internal guidelines on the handling of antitrust investigations published in<br />
March 2012<br />
– Triggered by the request of a lawyer under Regulation no. 1049/2001<br />
– 278 pages – 28 chapters, inter alia dealing with the handling of complaints, the<br />
treatment of cartel whistleblowers and the decision processes within the EC<br />
– Chapters on sector inquiries and fines/remedies still “under construction”;<br />
chapter on dawn raids kept out completely (“protection of the investigation”)<br />
Procedure (cont’d)<br />
� Litigation on dawn raids<br />
– AG Bot, opinion in E.On case, 21 June 2012<br />
• GC upheld EC decision imposing a fine of <strong>EU</strong>R 38 million on E.On for breaking of seal<br />
• Bot: GC did not fully exercise its jurisdiction but largely relied on the EC’s fine calculation<br />
• Necessary: proportionality analysis based on turnover data – fine must be proportionate to<br />
(i) the seriousness of the infringement (breaking the seal); and<br />
(ii) the fine that E.On would have incurred if found guilty of a cartel infringement<br />
• Also: fine must have sufficient deterrent effect if compared to the infringer’s financial means<br />
– May 2011: <strong>EU</strong>R 8 million fine for breaking of seal imposed on Suez Environment and<br />
Lyonnaise des Eaux<br />
– March 2012: fines of <strong>EU</strong>R 2.5 million imposed on two Czech companies for<br />
obstruction of a dawn raid inspection<br />
• Unblocking of e-mail account after it had been blocked by the EC<br />
• Diversion of incoming e-mails from a blocked account to a server<br />
11<br />
12
Private Enforcement – Disclosure<br />
� Aftermath of CJ<strong>EU</strong>’s CJ<strong>EU</strong> s landmark Pfleiderer ruling<br />
– Germany: Pfleiderer II, 18 January 2012<br />
• No access to leniency applications and supporting documentary evidence<br />
• Interest in effective leniency program prevails<br />
– UK: National Grid (GIS), 4 April 2012<br />
• No request for access to corporate statements; but documents at issue likely included<br />
leniency materials (or explanations on leniency materials)<br />
• Pfleiderer balancing test to be applied also to documents in the EC’s file<br />
• Focus on principles of legitimate expectations and proportionality<br />
• Legitimate expectations: no greater exposure of leniency applicant to follow-on claims<br />
• Proportionality: (i) information available from other sources?; (ii) relevance of the<br />
information to the private damage action<br />
• Result: disclosure of additional 32 paragraphs of the EC’s decision; very limited<br />
access to RFI responses; no access to SO responses 13<br />
Private Enforcement – Disclosure (cont’d)<br />
� Aftermath of Pfleiderer (cont’d)<br />
– Joint Resolution by the Heads of the <strong>EU</strong>’s 27 NCAs of 23 May 2012:<br />
The NCAs are “determined to defend the effectiveness of leniency programs in<br />
order to ensure a high level of anti-cartel enforcement.”<br />
“[L]eniency materials should be protected against disclosure to the extent<br />
necessary to ensure the effectiveness of leniency programs.”<br />
� <strong>EU</strong> legislation on private enforcement<br />
– EC “Roadmap” foresees legislative proposal still in 2012 – probably a directive<br />
– Topics:<br />
• Access to the case file/protection of leniency programs<br />
• Standing of indirect purchasers/passing-on defense<br />
• Ways to make NCA decisions legally binding throughout the <strong>EU</strong><br />
14
Private Enforcement – Disclosure (cont’d)<br />
� Disclosure under Regulation no. 1049/2001<br />
– GC: EnBW (GIS), 22 May 2012<br />
• EC: no access to case file due to “unreasonable burden” to check the individual documents for<br />
business secrets or other confidential information<br />
• GC: any exception to general access right to be interpreted and applied strictly – EC needs to<br />
assess all options to grant access “in a concrete, specific and detailed manner”<br />
– CJ<strong>EU</strong>: Édition Odile Jacob, 28 June 2012<br />
• EC had turned down access request by a complainant in merger proceedings<br />
• GC: EC needs to demonstrate “in a concrete and individual manner” that disclosure would<br />
run counter to protection of commercial interests and/or protection of the investigation<br />
• CJ<strong>EU</strong>: “general presumption” that disclosure of EC’s correspondence with merging parties<br />
and third parties would undermine both objectives<br />
• Same presumption for EC-internal documents if proceedings are pending or likely to be reopened<br />
• Relevance also for antitrust files?<br />
Mergers<br />
15
Statistics<br />
January 2012 - June 2012<br />
� Phase I decisions: 116, of which<br />
– 79 under the simplified procedure<br />
– 3 with commitments<br />
� Phase II decisions: 3, of which<br />
– 2 with commitments<br />
– 1 prohibition<br />
� Phase II proceedings initiated: 6<br />
� Appeals bro brought: ght 44, of which hich<br />
– 3 against a clearance decision (both with and without<br />
commitments, both by merging party and by third parties)<br />
– 1 against a prohibition decision<br />
Trends<br />
� Review certain aspects of merger control<br />
regime:<br />
– Capture (certain) non-controlling minority acquisitions<br />
– More streamlining between EC and national regimes<br />
� Simplification of the process:<br />
– Pre-notification contacts: short, , informal, , flexible (see (<br />
also priority issue below)<br />
– Simplified procedure: further streamline<br />
17<br />
18
Priority principle in merger assessments<br />
� Seagate/Samsung: 4 to 3<br />
– First EC contact on 3/14; notified and announced on 4/19<br />
– Unconditional clearance after Phase II<br />
� Western Digital/Viviti: 3 to 2<br />
– Announced on 3/7; first EC contact on 3/10; notified on 4/20<br />
– Conditional clearance after Phase II (on appeal)<br />
� Seagate/Samsung decision:<br />
– “competitive competitive conditions existing at the time of notification constitute<br />
the relevant framework”<br />
– “neither necessary nor appropriate to take into account future<br />
changes [...] resulting from subsequently notified transactions”<br />
– “legal certainty, transparency and objectivity”<br />
Dawn raids in merger investigation<br />
� Caterpillar/MWM (19 October 2011 – published in 2012):<br />
– Phase II investigation – closed without commitments<br />
– Inspections shortly after opening of Phase II re concerns over:<br />
• Lack of bidding data<br />
• Provision of misleading information<br />
• Early implementation<br />
– Art 11(3) letter sent to industry association (IESG) and certain of<br />
its members requiring the handing over or completion of share<br />
and/or d/ biddi bidding ddata t<br />
Note: in parallel, the EC started an Article 101 investigation into the<br />
issue, which according to unconfirmed press reports has since<br />
been closed<br />
19<br />
20
Parallel EC and national investigations<br />
� Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria (pending)<br />
– Both mobile network operators in Austria – 4 to 3<br />
transaction<br />
– Prior to acquisition, Orange will sell YESS! customers<br />
to A1 Telekom Austria (but conditional on first deal<br />
closing)<br />
– Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange is before EC and<br />
Orange/A1 Telekom Austria is before Austrian<br />
competition authorities – both are currently in Phase II<br />
– Austria asked for referral back<br />
Foreclosure<br />
� Google/Motorola Mobility (“MM”) (13 February 2012):<br />
ttwo vertical ti l relationships l ti hi<br />
– Google’s Android mobile OS (share attributed to Google) and<br />
Motorola Mobility’s smart mobile devices<br />
– Motorola Mobility’s standard essential patents as key inputs into<br />
the smart mobile devices industry<br />
� Assessment OS – competitor foreclosure:<br />
– Ability to foreclose: Google’s ability to favour one or other<br />
Android partner p will not change g as result of merger g<br />
– Incentive to foreclose: doubtful that Google could capture more<br />
profits from favouring MM’s devices rather than having a large<br />
base for its search and advertising services<br />
– Effects: any foreclosure would have limited impact since most<br />
competing OEMs have alternatives to turn to<br />
21<br />
22
Foreclosure (cont’d)<br />
� Potential concerns re MM’s SEPs<br />
– Raising royalty levels<br />
– Forcing potential licensees into cross-licenses on terms they would not otherwise have agreed to<br />
– Excluding competitors from the market<br />
� Ability<br />
– Despite FRAND obligations, Google has some ability to seek or threaten injunctions; but only<br />
applies to non-licensees Apple and Microsoft where MM has already sought injunctions – hence,<br />
not merger specific<br />
� Incentive<br />
– MM’s current maximum per-unit royalty is non-merger specific and Google has limited incentives to<br />
raise that level (incl. FRAND)<br />
– Google internal documents show that aim of transaction is to protect Android ecosystem rather than<br />
impede competition competition, plus Google public commitment to FRAND (see letter); plus threat of counter-<br />
suits<br />
– None of Google’s internal documents provide evidence that Google would seek injunctions against<br />
its competitors with the aim of ultimately excluding them from the market<br />
� Effect: not merger specific<br />
Prohibition and market definition<br />
� Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext (1 February<br />
2012)<br />
– European financial derivatives traded on exchanges,<br />
i.e., exchange-traded derivatives<br />
– Not substitutable with “over-the-counter” trade<br />
derivatives<br />
– CCreating i near-monopoly l with i h hi high h bbarriers i to entry,<br />
less innovation and no off-setting efficiencies (see<br />
below)<br />
23<br />
24
Prohibition and efficiencies<br />
� Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext<br />
“It is very rare that we have concerns that prompt a prohibition<br />
decision. But this did happen in the Deutsche Börse/NYSE<br />
Euronext deal this year, where we found that the transaction<br />
would have created a de facto global monopoly on derivatives<br />
with European underlyings. In that case, we rejected the<br />
efficiency claims that money would be saved by the netting of<br />
margins, in part because there was no evidence that without<br />
competition these savings would be transmitted to the investors.<br />
So let me say something about efficiencies. We are accused of<br />
not taking productive efficiencies into account when we assess<br />
mergers. This is not true and efficiency claims are always<br />
carefully assessed when they are submitted.<br />
But we cannot accept efficiencies when their benefits are not<br />
transmitted to the economy in term of prices or innovation but<br />
are instead kept as private profits.” (Almunia, 22 June 2012)<br />
Commitments<br />
� Sony/Mubadala/BMI (19 April 2012) – music publishing<br />
– Issues identified in online licensing of copyright<br />
– Concern focused on online licensing of Anglo-American chart<br />
hits in the EEA as an indispensable part of any online platform<br />
offering (in partcular UK and Ireland)<br />
– Divestiture of global rights to four catalogues and recent and<br />
future works of 12 contemporary Anglo-American artists<br />
� Western Digital/Viviti (23 November 2011) – hard disk<br />
drives<br />
– Need to preserve competition as well as innovation; explicit<br />
obligation imposed that buyer of divested assets should have<br />
innovation capability<br />
25<br />
26
Commission activity<br />
� No decisions.<br />
Abuse of dominance<br />
� Samsung (January 2012), Motorola (April 2012): Cases opened re alleged<br />
failure to honor commitments made to the European Telecommunications<br />
Standards Institute (ETSI) by seeking and enforcing injunctions in various<br />
Member States’ courts against competing mobile device makers based on<br />
alleged infringements of certain of its patents which it had declared essential to<br />
implement European mobile telephony standards.<br />
� Thomson Reuters: Offered Article 9 commitments rejected after market test<br />
(March 2012), improved commitments offered in May 2012. Alleged abuse:<br />
preventing customers or competitors from translating Reuters Instrument Codes<br />
(RIC) to alternative identification codes of other data feed suppliers (“mapping”).<br />
� MathWorks (March 2012): Case opened re alleged refusal to provide<br />
competitors with end-user software licenses and interoperability information<br />
(similar to Microsoft case). Products concerned: commercial control systems.<br />
28
Post Danmark: Overview<br />
� Preliminary ruling, ECJ, 27 March 2012, case C-209/10 – Grand Chamber<br />
� Post Danmark had a monopoly for addressed letters and parcels under a certain<br />
weight and a universal service obligation in that regard<br />
� Relevant market : distribution of unaddressed mail in Denmark – liberalized, but<br />
Post Danmark dominant – same distribution network as for addressed mail<br />
� Competitor Forbruger-Kontakt active in distribution of unaddressed mail<br />
� Forbruger initially had contracts with three large Danish supermarket chains,<br />
which switched to Post Danmark in 2004<br />
� National authority found that Post Danmark had abused its dominant position on<br />
the market for delivery of unaddressed mail by charging Forburger’s former<br />
clients lower rates than its existing clients without justification<br />
� Post Danmark appealed in Denmark, Danish Supreme Court referred to ECJ<br />
Post Danmark: Predatory pricing (1)<br />
� AKZO test for predatory pricing (ECJ 27):<br />
– Prices below average variable costs: abusive<br />
– Prices below average total costs: abusive if they are part of a plan to eliminate a<br />
competitor<br />
� In this case:<br />
– Selective low prices (to clients of competitor)<br />
– For one customer (Coop), the resulting price level was lower than Post<br />
Danmark’s average total cost for the business of delivery of unaddressed mail,<br />
but higher than its average incremental costs (~ average variable costs)<br />
– An intention to foreclose rivals in the sense of AKZO has not been established<br />
29<br />
30
Post Danmark: Predatory pricing (2)<br />
� “[A] policy by which a dominant undertaking charges low prices to certain major<br />
customers of a competitor may not be considered to amount to an exclusionary<br />
abuse merely because the price that undertaking charges one of those<br />
customers is lower than the average total costs attributed to the activity<br />
concerned, but higher than the average incremental costs pertaining to that<br />
activity […]” (emphasis added)<br />
� “In order to assess the existence of anti-competitive effects in circumstances<br />
such as those of that case, it is necessary to consider whether that pricing<br />
policy, without objective justification, produces an actual or likely exclusionary<br />
effect, to the detriment of competition and, thereby, of consumers’ interests.”<br />
� Thus, a selective price cut for one customer leading to prices in the second<br />
AKZO category does not constitute an “automatic” predatory pricing abuse, but<br />
an abuse is not excluded.<br />
� Relevance of plan to foreclose?<br />
Post Danmark: Discrimination<br />
� Question for preliminary ruling explicitly asked for the existence of an<br />
exclusionary abuse (ECJ, 18)<br />
� ECJ, 30: “The presence of price discrimination […] cannot of itself suggest<br />
that there exists an exclusionary abuse.”<br />
� Reply: “[…] may not be considered to amount to an exclusionary abuse<br />
merely because” (emphasis added)<br />
�� Thus Thus, selective price cuts may constitute a discrimination abuse – but under<br />
what circumstances?<br />
31<br />
32
Microsoft: Overview<br />
� GC, 27 June 2012, case T-167/08<br />
� Application for annulment regarding the <strong>EU</strong>R 899 million periodic penalty payment<br />
imposed against Microsoft in 2008<br />
� Reason for penalty: Microsoft’s non-compliance with the 2004 Commission decision from<br />
June 2006 to October 2007 (16 months)<br />
– NB: Earlier penalty of <strong>EU</strong>R 280.5 million for period from December 2005 to June 2006<br />
� 2004 decision required Microsoft to make interoperability information available “on<br />
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms” (Article 5(a) of 2004 decision)<br />
– Interoperability between (i) Microsoft Windows PCs and (ii) work group server operating systems<br />
– Only specifications of protocols, not Microsoft’s source code<br />
� 2008 decision held that interoperability information was not offered on reasonable terms<br />
before October 2007<br />
� GC upheld the Commission’s decision, but reduced the fine to <strong>EU</strong>R 860 million because it<br />
found that the Commission had not correctly assessed the gravity of Microsoft’s conduct<br />
Microsoft: Two preliminary aspects<br />
� GC: Obligation g to apply ppy “reasonable terms” not too<br />
unspecific, can be the basis for a periodic penalty<br />
payment in case of non-compliance<br />
� GC: Dominant company must offer reasonable terms on<br />
its own initiative<br />
33<br />
34
Microsoft: Assessment of “reasonableness” –<br />
strategic value vs intrinsic value of information<br />
� Commission and GC: the remuneration must not reflect<br />
the “strategic value” of the information, but only the<br />
information’s “intrinsic value”<br />
� Strategic value = remuneration rates reflecting the value<br />
resulting from the mere ability to interoperate (GC, 142)<br />
� All Allowing i Microsoft Mi ft to t charge h strategic t t i value l “would “ ld in i<br />
effect allow [Microsoft] to transform the benefits of the<br />
abuse into remuneration for the grant of the license”.<br />
(GC, 142)<br />
Microsoft: Assessing the intrinsic value of<br />
interoperability information<br />
� Work Group Server Protocol Pricing Principles to determine intrinsic<br />
value (GC, 31):<br />
i. Protocols = Microsoft’s own creation (not taken from the public domain)?<br />
ii. Protocols = innovation (they must be novel and not obvious to persons skilled in<br />
the art, interpreted as under the European Patent Convention)?<br />
Commission: found that only a very small part of the protocols in question<br />
include innovative information; and<br />
iii. Market valuation of comparable technologies required, excluding the strategic<br />
value stemming from the dominant position of any such technologies.<br />
Commission: comparable technologies are offered remuneration-free by<br />
Microsoft and by other undertakings<br />
� GC endorsed this approach and its application by the Commission.<br />
35<br />
36
Microsoft: Some implications<br />
� Burden on dominant company p y to establish reasonable<br />
royalty rates – procedural safeguards do not help.<br />
� Assessment of intrinsic value practically possible?<br />
� No explicit guidance for situations where patented<br />
technology has to be licensed on reasonable terms –<br />
ddecision i i iis li limited it d to t Microsoft’s Mi ft’ “N “No PPatent t t agreement”. t”<br />
� Impact on FRAND licensing in the context of standard<br />
setting?<br />
Tomra: Overview<br />
� ECJ, 19 April 2012, C-549/10 P<br />
� Appeal against the dismissal, by the GC in September 2010, of an<br />
application for annulment against a March 2006 Commission<br />
decision fining various Tomra entities <strong>EU</strong>R 24 million<br />
� Dominant position on several national markets for reverse vending<br />
machines (very high market shares for Tomra: above 70% or<br />
event t 95%)<br />
� Abuse : exclusivity agreements, individualized quantity<br />
commitments and individualized retroactive rebate schemes<br />
(period 1998-2002)<br />
� ECJ dismissed application, upheld Commission decision 38<br />
37
Tomra: Interesting Points (1)<br />
� Confirmation that anti-competitive intent is not relevant for the finding of abuse,<br />
and an intention to compete on the merits is no defence – but intent is one<br />
factor that can be taken into account<br />
� Foreclosure of a “substantial” part of the market is sufficient for a finding of<br />
abuse – precise “market coverage” of behaviour does not need to be<br />
established (was approximately 40%)<br />
� ECJ 42: “[T]he foreclosure by a dominant undertaking of a substantial part of the<br />
market cannot be justified by showing that the contestable part of the market is<br />
still sufficient to accommodate a limited number of competitors.”<br />
– “Customers on the foreclosed part of the market should have the opportunity to benefit from<br />
whatever degree of competition is possible on the market.”<br />
– “Competitors should be able to compete on the merits for the entire market and not just a part of it.”<br />
– “It is not the role of the dominant undertaking to dictate how many viable competitors will be allowed<br />
to compete for the remaining contestable portion of demand.”<br />
Tomra: Interesting Points (2)<br />
� Retroactive (loyalty) rebate schemes: not necessary to make a price<br />
– cost comparison of the dominant company. Largely reliance on<br />
old case law.<br />
– ECJ, 79: “The loyalty mechanism was inherent in the supplier’s ability to drive out<br />
its competitors by means of the suction to itself of the contestable part of<br />
demand.” It “is not necessary to assess the actual effect of the rebates on<br />
competition given that it is sufficient to demonstrate that the conduct at issue is<br />
capable of having an effect on competition” competition (or tends to restrict competition<br />
–<br />
ECJ, 68, 72).<br />
� Commission’s 2009 Guidance Paper on exclusionary abuses<br />
mentioned, but found to be irrelevant for a decision adopted in 2006<br />
39<br />
40
Telefónica: Overview<br />
� GC, 29 March 2012, cases T-336/07 (Telefónica) and T-398/07 (Spain)<br />
� Application for annulment of a July 2007 Commission decision imposing a<br />
fine of <strong>EU</strong>R 152 million on Telefónica<br />
� Abuse: Margin squeeze (2001 to 2006) as between<br />
– prices offered by Telefónica to downstream competitors for wholesale broadband access to<br />
Telefónica’s network at a regional and national level and<br />
– Telefónica’s Telefónica s prices for retail broadband access (downstream market).<br />
� GC dismissed application, upheld Commission decision<br />
� Telefónica has lodged an appeal<br />
Telefónica: Interesting points (1)<br />
� Margin squeeze test does not have to be carried out on the basis of an<br />
optimal mix of available wholesale access products, which are offered in<br />
separate product markets.<br />
– Thus, available local loop wholesale access (no abuse) was not relevant for the assessment<br />
of abuse on the market for national and regional wholesale access<br />
� Confirmation that margin squeeze is a separate abuse (Deutsche Telekom).<br />
– Excessive pricing on upstream market not relevant<br />
– Predatory pricing on downstream market not relevant<br />
� Confirmation that dominance on downstream market is not required<br />
(TeliaSonera).<br />
41<br />
42
Telefónica: Interesting points (2)<br />
� Confirmation that margin squeeze should be assessed based on prices and<br />
costs of the dominant firm (as efficient competitor test) (Deutsche Telekom)<br />
– “Whether an undertaking in a dominant position would have been sufficiently efficient to offer<br />
its retail services to end users otherwise than at a loss if it had first been obligated to pay its<br />
own wholesale prices for the intermediary services.”<br />
� Confirmation that strategy of dominant company can also be relevant.<br />
� GC upholds Commission’s calculation of Telefónica’s costs under the<br />
discounted cash f flow method and the “period-by-period “ approach”. ”<br />
� Commission was right in holding that the margin squeeze probably<br />
reinforced the barriers to entry and expansion and that the competition<br />
would have probably been stronger in the retail market absent the abuse.<br />
Thank you!<br />
43
Tab 3: Moderator/Speaker<br />
Biographies
arnoldporter.com<br />
<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> (Brussels) <strong>LLP</strong> is a limited liability partnership organized under the laws of the State of New York that is regulated by the Brussels Bar. It is an affiliate of <strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> <strong>LLP</strong>, a limited liability partnership organized<br />
under the laws of the District of Columbia, which does not itself practice in Brussels.<br />
Marleen Van Kerckhove<br />
Partner<br />
Marleen Van Kerckhove heads up the firm's<br />
European competition practice and its Brussels<br />
office. Her practice encompasses advice and<br />
representation before <strong>EU</strong> and national antitrust<br />
agencies on merger control, abusive conduct,<br />
price fixing and other restrictive practices, as<br />
well as litigation before European courts. She<br />
has steered many transactions successfully through <strong>EU</strong> and national<br />
merger control reviews across various industry sectors.In addition, she<br />
has advised extensively on the application of <strong>EU</strong> competition law to<br />
the pharmaceutical sector, and on the interplay between antitrust and<br />
intellectual property law. Ms. Van Kerckhove is a frequent speaker at<br />
programs and conferences in Europe, Japan and North America.<br />
Representative Matters<br />
� General Electric and NBCU Universal in connection with the<br />
Comcast- NBCU joint venture.<br />
� General Electric in its acquisition of Dresser Inc. Clearance in<br />
the <strong>EU</strong> and in multiple jurisdictions world-wide.<br />
� Sanyo in its merger with Panasonic. Obtained clearance in the<br />
<strong>EU</strong>.<br />
� European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries<br />
Associations (EFPIA) before the European Court of Justice and<br />
the General Court in its intervention supporting AstraZeneca in<br />
its appeal against the European Commission's decision finding<br />
an Article 82 infringement with respect to certain of its alleged<br />
regulatory and IP conduct.<br />
� Pfizer in its acquisition of certain animal health businesses<br />
from Schering-Plough. Clearance in the <strong>EU</strong>.<br />
� Finmeccanica in its acquisition of DRS Technologies.<br />
Clearance in multiple jurisdictions world-wide.<br />
� Major international company with respect to a global<br />
competition compliance audit.<br />
� SBC in its acquisition of AT&T. Obtained clearance in multiple<br />
jurisdictions world-wide.<br />
� Cisco in its acquisition of Scientific-Atlanta. Obtained clearance<br />
in the <strong>EU</strong>.<br />
Contact Information<br />
Marleen.VanKerckhove@<br />
aporter.com<br />
tel: +32 (0)2 290 7817<br />
fax: +32 (0)2 290 7899<br />
1, Rue du Marquis -<br />
Markiesstraat, 1<br />
B-1000 Brussels<br />
Practice Areas<br />
Antitrust/<strong>Competition</strong><br />
FDA and Healthcare<br />
Telecommunications,<br />
Internet, and Media<br />
Education<br />
LLM, London School of<br />
Economics, University of<br />
London, 1987<br />
Diploma European <strong>Law</strong>,<br />
University of Nancy, France,<br />
1983<br />
LLB, University of Leuven<br />
(KUL), Belgium, 1982<br />
Admissions<br />
Brussels, Belgium
� Boston Scientific in its acquisition of Guidant. Obtained clearance in the <strong>EU</strong> and multiple other<br />
jurisdictions world-wide.<br />
� Group of consumer electronics companies before the European Commission with respect to an<br />
Article 82 EC Treaty complaint regarding abusive licensing conduct.<br />
� Pfizer in its acquisition of Pharmacia. Obtained clearance in the <strong>EU</strong> and multiple other<br />
jurisdictions world-wide.<br />
� General Electric in its proposed acquisition of Honeywell, assisting both with the notification to the<br />
European Commission and the subsequent appeal to the Court of First Instance.<br />
� Pfizer in its acquisition of Warner-Lambert. Obtained clearance in the <strong>EU</strong> and multiple other<br />
jurisdictions world-wide.<br />
Rankings<br />
� Chambers Global 2012 for <strong>Competition</strong>/European <strong>Law</strong>: Belgium<br />
� PLC Which lawyer? 2012: Recommended for <strong>EU</strong> Life sciences: <strong>Competition</strong>/Anti-trust<br />
� PLC Which lawyer? 2012: Recommended for competition/anti-trust<br />
� PLC Which lawyer? 2012: Recommended for <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Competition</strong><br />
� PLC Which lawyer? 2011: Endorsed for <strong>Competition</strong>/anti-trust (Belgium), <strong>EU</strong> Life sciences:<br />
competition/anti-trust (European Union), and <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Competition</strong> (European Union)<br />
� Chambers Europe: Europe’s Leading <strong>Law</strong>yers for Business 2011 for <strong>Competition</strong>/European <strong>Law</strong><br />
� The Legal 500 EMEA 2011 for <strong>Competition</strong><br />
� The International Who's Who of <strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong>yers 2011<br />
� Chambers Global: The World's Leading <strong>Law</strong>yers for Business 2011 for <strong>Competition</strong>/European<br />
<strong>Law</strong><br />
� Euromoney's Guide to Women in Business <strong>Law</strong> 2010: included as an Expert in <strong>Competition</strong> and<br />
Antitrust<br />
� Global <strong>Competition</strong> Review's "Women in Antitrust" 2009<br />
Articles<br />
� Marleen Van Kerckhove, Asim Varma and Marco Ramondino "<strong>EU</strong> Regulatory Procedures In The<br />
Pharmaceutical Sector" <strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong>360 Jul. 2010<br />
� Asim Varma and Marleen Van Kerckhove "Getting The Deal Through: Pharmaceutical Antitrust -<br />
Overview" Global <strong>Competition</strong> Review 2010<br />
� Marleen Van Kerckhove and Asim Varma "Getting The Deal Through: Pharmaceutical Antitrust -<br />
Overview" Global <strong>Competition</strong> Review 2009<br />
Marleen Van Kerckhove<br />
<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> <strong>LLP</strong> 2
� Tim Frazer, Luc Gyselen, Marleen Van Kerckhove, Asim Varma and Barbara H. Wootton "Getting<br />
The Deal Through: Pharmaceutical Antitrust" Global <strong>Competition</strong> Review 2008<br />
� Deborah L. Feinstein, Marleen Van Kerckhove and Barbara H. Wootton "Merger remedies in the<br />
<strong>EU</strong> and US" Practical <strong>Law</strong> Company's Cross-border <strong>Competition</strong> Handbook, Volume 1, 2007/08<br />
� Marleen Van Kerckhove "Getting The Deal Through: Intellectual Property & Antitrust - European<br />
Union" Global <strong>Competition</strong> Review 2008<br />
� Marleen Van Kerckhove "<strong>EU</strong> Merger Control: Can You Be Compensated When Things Go<br />
Wrong?" The American <strong>Law</strong>yer October 2007<br />
� Marleen Van Kerckhove "The Application of Article 82 EC Treaty to The Pharmaceutical Sector -<br />
Some Recent EC Guidance" The European Antitrust Review. [Reproduced with permission from<br />
<strong>Law</strong> Business Research. This article was first published in the October 2005 Issue.] 2006<br />
� Marleen Van Kerckhove "Parallel Trade in Pharmaceutical Products Following the EJC's Bayer<br />
Judgment: Can a Case be Made Under Article 82 EC Treaty?" The European Antitrust Review,<br />
2005<br />
� Ian Kirby, Lincoln Tsang, Marleen Van Kerckhove and William W. Vodra "Parallel Trade in the <strong>EU</strong><br />
and US Pharmaceutical Markets" Global Counsel Life Sciences Handbook, 2005/2006<br />
� Ian Kirby, Marleen Van Kerckhove and William W. Vodra "Parallel Trade in the <strong>EU</strong> and US<br />
Pharmaceutical Markets" Global Counsel Life Sciences Handbook 2004/2005<br />
Presentations<br />
� Marleen Van Kerckhove "Life-Cycle Management & Settlement Strategies Post Sector Inquiry"<br />
18th Annual <strong>EU</strong> Pharmaceutical <strong>Law</strong> Forum, May 12, 2009<br />
� Marleen Van Kerckhove "Patent Misuse and Abuse in the US and Europe: the Case of<br />
Pharmaceuticals" ABA Section of Antitrust <strong>Law</strong>/GW <strong>Law</strong> School <strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong> Center,<br />
November 20, 2008<br />
� Marleen Van Kerckhove "4th Annual In-House Counsel Forum on Pharmaceutical Antitrust"<br />
American Conference Institute, May 20,.2008<br />
� Marleen Van Kerckhove "Recent Antitrust Developments for Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology<br />
Companies" BIO conference, 2008<br />
� Marleen Van Kerckhove "Lifecycle Management of Pharmaceutical Products" 17th Annual <strong>EU</strong><br />
Pharmaceutical <strong>Law</strong> Forum, May 8, 2008<br />
� Marleen Van Kerckhove "Abuse of Dominance - What is the Scope of This Remedy?"<br />
<strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong> & Policy Forum, Toronto, April 2006<br />
� Marleen Van Kerckhove "The Application of <strong>EU</strong> and US Antitrust <strong>Law</strong> to Pharma and Biotech<br />
Companies" IBC Life Sciences Conference, London, April 2006<br />
� Marleen Van Kerckhove "<strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong> and Parallel Trade" <strong>EU</strong> Pharmaceutical <strong>Law</strong> Forum,<br />
Brussels, May 2005<br />
� Marleen Van Kerckhove "Private Antitrust Enforcement in the EC and the US" IBA Annual<br />
Antitrust Conference, Fiesole, September 2004<br />
� Marleen Van Kerckhove "<strong>EU</strong> Merger Control" UCLA Mergers & Acquisitions, February 2004<br />
Advisories<br />
Marleen Van Kerckhove<br />
<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> <strong>LLP</strong> 3
� "First <strong>EU</strong> Judgment on Abusive Conduct Through Use of Regulatory Procedures in the<br />
Pharmaceutical Sector" Jul. 2010<br />
� "The EC Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Getting Real" Jul. 2009<br />
� "New Notice Clarifies <strong>EU</strong> Commission's Approach to Remedies in Merger Cases" Oct. 2008<br />
� "Quota Schemes: The New Rules for Pharmaceutical Companies--The European Court rules on<br />
the Use of Quota Schemes by Dominant Pharmaceutical Companies" Sep. 2008<br />
� "Schneider Electric v Commission - The European Court of First Instance Breaks Ground In<br />
Relation To Damages In Merger Cases" Jul. 2007<br />
� "Tetra Laval/Sidel--The European Court of Justice Clarifies the Standard of Proof and the Role of<br />
Behavioural Commitments in Merger Cases" Feb. 2005<br />
� "Restrictions of Supply by an Allegedly Dominant Pharmaceutical Manufacturer--Do They Infringe<br />
<strong>EU</strong> Antitrust <strong>Law</strong>?" Oct. 2004<br />
� "Restrictions of Supply by an Allegedly Dominant Pharmaceutical Manufacturer" Oct. 2004<br />
� "New <strong>EU</strong> Regulation on Technology Transfer Agreements" Apr. 2004<br />
� "EC <strong>Competition</strong> Policy After 1 May 2004 Frequently Asked Questions" Apr. 2004<br />
� "The Impact of the Amendments to the EC Merger Regulation (ECMR)" Jan. 2004<br />
Marleen Van Kerckhove<br />
<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> <strong>LLP</strong> 4
arnoldporter.com<br />
Silvio Cappellari<br />
Partner<br />
<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> (Brussels) <strong>LLP</strong> is a limited liability partnership organized under the laws of the State of New York that is regulated by the Brussels Bar. It is an affiliate of <strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> <strong>LLP</strong>, a limited liability partnership organized<br />
under the laws of the District of Columbia, which does not itself practice in Brussels.<br />
Mr. Cappellari is a partner in the firm's antitrust<br />
and competition practice group. His practice<br />
focuses on a broad range of issues under<br />
European and German competition law.<br />
Mr. Cappellari has represented clients in highprofile<br />
merger control cases before the European Commission and the<br />
German Federal Cartel Office, including several second phase<br />
proceedings. He also has gained significant experience in international<br />
cartel cases, such as the recent investigations by the <strong>EU</strong> Commission<br />
concerning marine hoses, air cargo, subsea power cables and car<br />
components.<br />
In addition, Mr. Cappellari has a general antitrust counseling practice.<br />
He regularly advises clients on the compliance of joint ventures and<br />
other cooperation arrangements with Article 101 TF<strong>EU</strong>, as well as on<br />
questions of abusive conduct under Article 102 TF<strong>EU</strong>.<br />
Mr. Cappellari has gained significant experience, inter alia, in the<br />
energy, logistics, motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals, and media<br />
industries.<br />
Prior to joining the firm, Mr. Cappellari worked with other US law firms<br />
in Brussels and Washington, DC. He is fluent in German and Italian.<br />
Representative Matters<br />
� GE and NBCU in the creation of a joint venture with Comcast<br />
before the <strong>EU</strong> Commission<br />
� A major producer of car components in a cartel investigation<br />
under Article 101 TF<strong>EU</strong> before the <strong>EU</strong> Commission<br />
� A Japanese power cable manufacturer in a cartel investigation<br />
under Article 101 TF<strong>EU</strong> before the <strong>EU</strong> Commission<br />
� Cargolux, a leading global cargo airline, in a cartel investigation<br />
under Article101 TF<strong>EU</strong> before the <strong>EU</strong> Commission<br />
� A major Eastern European gas company in Article 102 TF<strong>EU</strong><br />
proceedings before the <strong>EU</strong> Commission<br />
� Siemens in its acquisitions of UGS Corporation and VA Tech<br />
AG before the <strong>EU</strong> Commission<br />
Contact Information<br />
Silvio.Cappellari@aporter.com<br />
tel: +32 (0)2 290 7815<br />
fax: +32 (0)2 290 7899<br />
1, Rue du Marquis -<br />
Markiesstraat, 1<br />
B-1000 Brussels<br />
Practice Areas<br />
Antitrust/<strong>Competition</strong><br />
Education<br />
LLM, Columbia <strong>Law</strong> School,<br />
1998<br />
German Bar Exam<br />
(Assessorexamen),<br />
Düsseldorf, Germany, 1996<br />
German <strong>Law</strong> School Exam,<br />
University of Göttingen,<br />
Germany, 1992<br />
Admissions<br />
Brussels (associate member)<br />
Frankfurt, Germany<br />
New York
� Novartis in the sale of its medical nutrition and baby food divisions to Nestlé and in its acquisition<br />
of Hexal AG before the <strong>EU</strong> Commission<br />
� CVC Capital Partners, a major private equity firm, in its acquisition of DSI Holding GmbH<br />
� Paramount in its acquisition of DreamWorks before the German Federal Cartel Office<br />
Rankings<br />
� Chambers Global 2012 for <strong>Competition</strong>/European <strong>Law</strong>: Belgium<br />
� Chambers Europe: Europe’s Leading <strong>Law</strong>yers for Business 2011 for <strong>Competition</strong>/European <strong>Law</strong><br />
� The Legal 500 EMEA 2011 for <strong>Competition</strong><br />
� The International Who's Who of <strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong>yers 2011<br />
� Chambers Global: The World's Leading <strong>Law</strong>yers for Business 2011 for <strong>Competition</strong>/European<br />
<strong>Law</strong><br />
Professional and Community Activities<br />
� Member, American Bar Association<br />
� Member, Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht<br />
Articles<br />
� Silvio Cappellari "Recent Developments in German Antitrust <strong>Law</strong>" The Computer and Internet<br />
<strong>Law</strong>yer, June 2012 (forthcoming)<br />
� Silvio Cappellari "Reverse Payment Settlements in the <strong>EU</strong> - Finding the Right Dosage"<br />
<strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong> International, November 2011<br />
� Silvio Cappellari "Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht" Article 8 ECMR, October 2011<br />
Advisories<br />
� "Recent Developments in German <strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong>" Jan. 2012<br />
� "N<strong>EU</strong>E ENTWICKLUNGEN IM D<strong>EU</strong>TSCHEN" Jan. 2012<br />
� "Neuere Entwicklungen im deutschen Kartellrecht" Jul. 2011<br />
� "Recent Developments in German <strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong>" Jul. 2011<br />
� "Neuere Entwicklungen im deutschen Kartellrecht" Jan. 2011<br />
� "Recent Developments in German <strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong>" Jan. 2011<br />
� "Recent Developments in German <strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong>" Mar. 2010<br />
Silvio Cappellari<br />
<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> <strong>LLP</strong> 2
arnoldporter.com<br />
G. Axel Gutermuth<br />
Counsel<br />
<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> (Brussels) <strong>LLP</strong> is a limited liability partnership organized under the laws of the State of New York that is regulated by the Brussels Bar. It is an affiliate of <strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> <strong>LLP</strong>, a limited liability partnership organized<br />
under the laws of the District of Columbia, which does not itself practice in Brussels.<br />
G. Axel Gutermuth is a member of the firm's<br />
antitrust/competition group with a focus on a<br />
broad range of competition law issues.<br />
Mr. Gutermuth assists and represents clients in<br />
merger control proceedings before the<br />
European Commission and the German Federal Cartel Office. He has<br />
participated in several second phase German and EC merger<br />
proceedings, including landmark cases such as Tetra Laval/Sidel and<br />
Oracle/PeopleSoft. In many of his cases, Mr. Gutermuth assesses<br />
merger filing requirements in jurisdictions around the world and<br />
coordinates the national filing procedures.<br />
As part of his general antitrust counseling practice, Mr. Gutermuth<br />
regularly advises clients on the compliance of joint ventures and other<br />
cooperation agreements with Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the<br />
Functioning of the European Union (formerly Articles 81 and 82 of the<br />
EC Treaty) and the specific rules on cooperation in distribution,<br />
research and development, technology transfer, and production. He<br />
has particular knowledge of the application of competition law in cases<br />
involving intellectual property rights. Moreover, Mr. Gutermuth has<br />
represented clients in cartel investigations, EC anti-dumping<br />
procedures, State aid procedures, and appeals to Court of Justice of<br />
the European Union. He advises clients on internal compliance<br />
procedures and recently concluded a comprehensive antitrust<br />
compliance review of a client's worldwide business in the energy and<br />
chemical sectors.<br />
Mr. Gutermuth has worked for clients in various industries, including<br />
chemical, energy, life science, healthcare, technology, metals,<br />
tobacco, defense and telecommunications/media.<br />
Representative Matters<br />
� Represent a large technology company in a pending<br />
acquisition before the European Commission.<br />
� Represent client in ongoing cartel investigation by the<br />
European Commission.<br />
� Internal competition compliance review of client’s worldwide<br />
operations in the energy and chemical sectors.<br />
Contact Information<br />
Axel.Gutermuth@aporter.com<br />
tel: +32 (0)2 290 7832<br />
fax: +32 (0)2 290 7899<br />
1, Rue du Marquis -<br />
Markiesstraat, 1<br />
B-1000 Brussels<br />
Practice Areas<br />
Antitrust/<strong>Competition</strong><br />
Education<br />
LLM, New York University<br />
School of <strong>Law</strong>, 1999<br />
German Bar Exam<br />
(Assessorexamen),<br />
Karlsruhe, Germany, 1998<br />
German <strong>Law</strong> School Exam,<br />
University of Heidelberg,<br />
Germany, 1996<br />
Certificate of Political<br />
Sciences, University of Aixen-Provence,<br />
France, 1993<br />
Admissions<br />
Brussels (associate member)<br />
Munich<br />
New York<br />
� Securing <strong>EU</strong> merger clearance for General Electric in its US$ 3<br />
billion acquisition of Dresser, Inc. and coordinating international filings in eight other jurisdictions.
� Representing Bucyrus International, Inc. in merger control proceedings before the <strong>EU</strong><br />
Commission and coordinating filings in several other jurisdictions regarding Caterpillar’s US$ 8.6<br />
billion acquisition of Bucyrus.<br />
� Securing German merger clearance for Finmeccanica SpA’s US$ 5.2 billion acquisition of DRS<br />
Technologies and coordination of international filings.<br />
� Representing German citizens as witnesses in a U.S. cartel damages class action regarding the<br />
taking of witness statements in Germany under the Hague Convention.<br />
� Coordinating international merger filings in Bucyrus International Inc.’s US$ 1.3 billion acquisition<br />
of Terex Corporation’s mining equipment business.<br />
� International merger control advice to General Electric on various transactions, including <strong>EU</strong><br />
merger filings.<br />
� Securing German merger clearance for a US$ 2.9 billion merger of pharmaceutical companies.<br />
� Advice on international merger control issues to Cisco Systems in its acquisitions of Starent<br />
Networks.<br />
� Counseling advice to a major international chemicals company regarding complex cooperation<br />
agreements for $1+ billion investments.<br />
� Participation in the representation before the European Commission and the General Court<br />
(previously, the Court of First Instance) of a major international investment bank regarding the<br />
violation of State aid obligations by an Accession Country.<br />
� Representing a leading German company in an abuse of dominance investigation before the<br />
German Federal Cartel Office.<br />
Rankings<br />
� Chambers Global 2012 for <strong>Competition</strong>/European <strong>Law</strong>: Belgium<br />
Professional and Community Activities<br />
� Mr. Gutermuth is author or co-author of several articles and publications on antitrust issues as<br />
well as a frequent conference speaker. He is a member of the Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht,<br />
the leading association of German speaking antitrust lawyers.<br />
Articles<br />
� G. Axel Gutermuth "Der neue Kartellrechtsrahmen für Forschungs- und<br />
Entwicklungsvereinbarungen" Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, March 2012<br />
� G. Axel Gutermuth "The Revised <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Competition</strong> Rules for Production and R&D Agreements<br />
Create a More Coherent Framework of Assessment and Provide Better Guidance to Companies"<br />
CPI Antitrust Chronicle, February 2011 (1)<br />
� G. Axel Gutermuth "Revision of the <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Competition</strong> Rules on Cooperation in Research &<br />
Development and Production: Scope for Further Improvement" CPI Antitrust Journal September<br />
2010<br />
� G. Axel Gutermuth "Article 82 Guidance: A Closer Look at the Analytical Framework and the<br />
Paper's Likely Impact on European Enforcement Practice" This article was originally published in<br />
GCP Magazine at www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org, February 2009<br />
G. Axel Gutermuth<br />
<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> <strong>LLP</strong> 2
� Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Sven B. Volcker and G. Axel Gutermuth "Unilateral Effects: The<br />
Enforcement Gap under the Old EC Merger Regulation" World <strong>Competition</strong> (Printed by Kluwer<br />
<strong>Law</strong> International) 2005<br />
� G. Axel Gutermuth, Thomas Mueller and John Ratliff "New European Licensing Rules Require<br />
Fresh Assessment of Existing and New Intellectual Property Licenses" Global Intellectual<br />
Property Asset Management Report, June 2004<br />
� G. Axel Gutermuth "Die <strong>EU</strong>-Fusionskontrolle ist umstritten" Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Jan.<br />
2003<br />
� G. Axel Gutermuth, Eric Mahr and Thomas Mueller "Navigating the Treacherous Shoals of EC<br />
Merger Clearance" International Financial <strong>Law</strong> Review Supplement, 2002<br />
� G. Axel Gutermuth, Paul von Hehn and Christian Duvernoy "New Regulatory Framework for<br />
Electronic Communications - The European Commission's Legislative Proposals" The European<br />
Antitrust Review, 2000<br />
Presentations<br />
� G. Axel Gutermuth "Standard Essential Patents, Injunctions and Abuse of Dominance", copanelist<br />
with DG <strong>Competition</strong>'s Chief Economist Kai-Uwe Kuehn and Pierre Régibeau at the<br />
Concurrences Journal's conference on "Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Recent Issues", April<br />
25, 2012" Jul. 2012<br />
� G. Axel Gutermuth "Article 102 TF<strong>EU</strong> - Recent Developments" at the GCR Live Third Annual <strong>Law</strong><br />
Leaders Europe, Brussels, November 15, 2011<br />
� G. Axel Gutermuth "New <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Competition</strong> Rules on Research and Development Agreements" at<br />
the Conference of the Global <strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong> Center, Brussels, February 16, 2011<br />
� G. Axel Gutermuth "The Revised Horizontal Agreement Guidelines" at the IBC Advanced<br />
<strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong> Conference, Brussels, November 23-24, 2010<br />
� G. Axel Gutermuth "The Reform of the <strong>EU</strong>'s Horizontal Rules" at the GCLC Lunch Talk, Brussels,<br />
June 7, 2010<br />
� G. Axel Gutermuth "IP & Antitrust" ESCP-Europe Business School, Paris, yearly event (2006-<br />
2011)<br />
Advisories<br />
� "Will the Lisbon Treaty Have an Impact on Future <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Competition</strong> Policy?" Dec. 2009<br />
� "Private Enforcement of EC State Aid <strong>Law</strong>--EC's Revamped Notice on the Role of National<br />
Courts" Mar. 2009<br />
� "Germany Limits the Reach of its Merger Control <strong>Law</strong> but Introduces New Foreign Investment<br />
Supervision" Feb. 2009<br />
� "Private Label Brands, "Must-Have" Brands, and Impact on Retailer Buyer Power" Feb. 2009<br />
� "European Commission Endorses A More Economic-Based Approach" Dec. 2008<br />
� "New Notice Clarifies <strong>EU</strong> Commission's Approach to Remedies in Merger Cases" Oct. 2008<br />
Multimedia<br />
G. Axel Gutermuth<br />
<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> <strong>LLP</strong> 3
� Tim Frazer and G. Axel Gutermuth. "The <strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> eComp KnowHow Series: <strong>Competition</strong><br />
Compliance Auditing Webinar" March 21, 2012.<br />
� G. Axel Gutermuth, Luc Gyselen and Susan Hinchliffe. "WEBCAST: First Half of 2011 in Review:<br />
Developments in European <strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong> that Every in-house Counsel Should Know" June 30,<br />
2011. (also available as a Podcast)<br />
G. Axel Gutermuth<br />
<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> <strong>LLP</strong> 4
Tab 4: Practice Overview
<strong>EU</strong> <strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong> Practice<br />
<strong>EU</strong> <strong>Competition</strong> – An Integrated Practice<br />
The <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Competition</strong> team offers the full range of competition law advice on<br />
mergers g and acquisitions, q , non-transactional representation, p , litigation g and<br />
counseling. We provide representation before EC, UK and other national<br />
competition authorities, as well as in European and national courts. We work<br />
with many companies on competition matters including:<br />
� antitrust issues, ranging from merger control over licensing and co-operative<br />
arrangements to market definition and potential abuse of a dominant position<br />
� distribution, and the establishment of lawful quota schemes and innovative<br />
cross-border compensation arrangements<br />
� services ranging from advice on the application of the law to agreements,<br />
conduct, and corporate strategies<br />
� obtaining gclearances for mergers, g , acquisitions, q , and joint j ventures from the<br />
European Commission and national competition authorities both within the <strong>EU</strong><br />
and internationally<br />
� advice/representation relating to cartel investigations, potential abuses of<br />
dominance, structuring of distribution and licensing agreements, strategic<br />
alliances, state aids, and public procurement issues
Why <strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong>?<br />
� We are the go-to-firm for antitrust in general, and antitrust in regulated markets working for clients<br />
located globally including in Europe, the Americas, Asia and Africa<br />
� Genuine inside knowledge of and well-connected well connected with the <strong>EU</strong> and Member State antitrust<br />
authorities<br />
� Native Danish/Dutch/English/French/German/Italian speakers<br />
� We are experienced in dealing with a range of industries, in particular:<br />
– Life sciences,<br />
– Fast-moving consumer goods,<br />
– Chemicals,<br />
– Transport & logistics,<br />
– Technology, media and telecommunications, and<br />
– EEnergy.<br />
Representative Matters – Mergers: <strong>EU</strong><br />
� General Electric/ Converteam (Phase 1)<br />
� Caterpillar / Bucyrus (Phase 1)<br />
� Intel / McAfee (Phase 1 with conditions)<br />
� General Electric / Dresser (Phase 1)<br />
� BASF / Cognis (Phase 1 with conditions)<br />
� Syngenta / Negocio Semillas Girasol Monsanto (Phase 2 with conditions)<br />
� Comcast / NBC Universal (Phase 1)<br />
� Schneider Electric / AREVA T&D Distribution activities (Phase 1)<br />
� Alstom Holdings / AREVA T&D Transmission activities (Phase 1)<br />
� Kraft Foods / Cadbury (Phase 1 with conditions)<br />
� Philip Morris International/Papastratos (Phase 1)<br />
� Renesas Technology / NEC Electronics (Phase 1)<br />
� Panasonic / Sanyo (Phase 1 with conditions)<br />
� General Electric /NewsCorp / Disney / Hulu JV (Phase 1)<br />
� Ryanair / Aer Lingus (Phase 2)<br />
� Kraft / Danone Biscuits (Phase 1 with conditions)<br />
� Sea-Invest / EMO-EKOM (Phase 2)
Representative Matters – Cartels: <strong>EU</strong> and <strong>EU</strong> Member States<br />
We are currently representing the following:<br />
�� Major player in the optical disk drive sector in an ongoing <strong>EU</strong> investigation<br />
� Large logistics company in an ongoing <strong>EU</strong> investigation<br />
� Power cable supplier in ongoing US and <strong>EU</strong> investigations<br />
� Private investment fund in an ongoing <strong>EU</strong> investigation<br />
� Manufacturer of automotive electronic components in an ongoing <strong>EU</strong> investigation<br />
� Financial institution in an ongoing <strong>EU</strong> investigation<br />
� Manufacturer of automotive wire harnesses in an ongoing g g <strong>EU</strong> investigation g<br />
� International energy company in a national investigation<br />
� Major supplier of transmission and distribution equipment in one German and two <strong>EU</strong> cases<br />
� Three clients in different investigations before the Belgian competition authority<br />
Representative Matters – Other: <strong>EU</strong><br />
� Litigation<br />
– AREVA in two appeals to the European Court of Justice and to the General Court<br />
against two European Commission decisions in the Gas Insulated Switchgear case<br />
and the Power Transformer case<br />
– European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries Associations (Intervener in<br />
the European Court of Justice appeal against the AstraZeneca judgment rendered<br />
by the General Court in July 2010)<br />
– Parent companies of the international removals company Team Relocations<br />
in their appeal to the General Court against the European Commission’s decision<br />
to hold jointly and severally liable for the fine<br />
– German witnesses in US private litigation in depositions under the Hague<br />
Convention on the taking of evidence abroad<br />
� State Aid<br />
– Belgian g Government (separate ( p <strong>EU</strong> clearances regarding g g State aid measures for<br />
manufacturers of plasma-derived medicines and for pharmaceutical companies<br />
involved in R&D)<br />
� Counseling/Advisory<br />
– Compliance programmes for numerous companies, including Sasol, in connection<br />
with an international extensive compliance audit, and an international FMCG<br />
manufacturer in connection with annual compliance audits
Representative Clients<br />
� ACAS / ECAS<br />
� Air Products<br />
� Allergan<br />
� AREVA<br />
� Astellas<br />
� AT&T<br />
� BASF<br />
� Bayer MaterialScience<br />
� Boston Scientific<br />
� Bristol-Myers Squibb<br />
� Bucyrus<br />
� Cargolux<br />
� CEPA<br />
� Cisco<br />
� <strong>EU</strong> Commission<br />
� General Electric<br />
� Genzyme<br />
Life Sciences – Representative Matters<br />
� Gilead Sciences<br />
� Intel<br />
� IPC Media<br />
� Ipsen<br />
� Komatsu<br />
� Kraft Foods<br />
� Kubota<br />
� Monsanto<br />
� NovoNordisk<br />
� Overgas<br />
� Pfizer<br />
� Philip Morris International<br />
� Ranbaxy<br />
� Renesas<br />
� RIZIV<br />
� Royal Belgian Shipowners<br />
� Sanyo<br />
� Sasol<br />
� Sea-Invest<br />
� Shire Pharmaceuticals<br />
� Visa<br />
Mergers and acquisitions:<br />
� Representing Boston Scientific in its acquisition of Guidant<br />
Abuse of dominance:<br />
� Representing EFPIA, the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, as<br />
an intervener before the European Courts in AstraZeneca’s appeal against a European<br />
Commission decision imposing a fine against AstraZeneca for alleged abuses of dominance<br />
Restrictive Practices:<br />
� Representing a pharmaceutical company in a European Commission investigation focusing on<br />
allegations of restrictive agreements regarding the entry of generic competition (“pay-for-delay”)<br />
� Representing a pharmaceutical company in an <strong>EU</strong> Member state investigation into potential<br />
restrictive agreements regarding the entry of generic competition<br />
Compliance, including parallel trade:<br />
� Advising gppharmaceutical companies p regarding g gthe European p Commission’s enforcement ppolicy y<br />
regarding parallel trade of pharmaceutical products<br />
� Advising pharmaceutical companies on various competition compliance matters, such as<br />
distribution strategies and competitor cooperation agreements<br />
Assistance in <strong>EU</strong> Commission’s general competition inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector:<br />
� Assisting several large pharmaceutical companies in the <strong>EU</strong> Commission’s general inquiry into<br />
the pharmaceutical sector
Fast Moving Consumer Goods – Representative Matters<br />
We have deep experience in advising FMCG suppliers on complex competition concerns. For example, we<br />
regularly advise on mergers and acquisitions affecting retail markets and provide advice on issues such as:<br />
competitive intelligence gathering; price recommendations; promotions and price-marked packs; trade<br />
discount schemes; price signalling; hub-and-spoke infringements; trade association activities and supply<br />
chain innovations.<br />
Representative matters in relation to FMCGs include:<br />
� Obtaining clearance for Kraft Foods’ US$19 billion hostile bid for Cadbury PLC from the European Commission<br />
including the negotiation of remedies required to secure Phase I clearance.<br />
� Obtaining clearance for Kraft Foods’ US$7.2 billion acquisition of the biscuit business of Danone from the<br />
European Commission and national competition authorities globally involving the negotiation of divestment<br />
remedies.<br />
� Obtaining clearance for Philip Morris International in relation to the acquisition of Papastratos SA, a transaction<br />
that was cleared without remedies on the basis of complex econometric modelling.<br />
� Providing a detailed compliance policy and online training tool for a large FMCG manufacturer including<br />
preliminary compliance audits and feedback sessions, development of training materials and advising on the<br />
substance of an online training system for employees.<br />
� Providing counselling to a European branded goods manufacturers trade association.<br />
Energy – Representative Matters<br />
We have significant experience in providing competition law advice to suppliers of energy equipment and major energy<br />
companies. Particular challenges arise in this area from the interplay between competition law and sector-specific<br />
regulation g and the shared enforcement powers p of the European p Commission’s <strong>Competition</strong> p and Energy gy departments.<br />
p<br />
Representative matters handled by our attorneys include:<br />
Mergers and acquisitions:<br />
� Securing <strong>EU</strong> merger clearance and coordinating worldwide merger filings for Areva regarding its acquisition of Alstom’s<br />
energy transmission and distribution business and the creation of a joint venture between Areva and Urenco in the uranium<br />
enrichment technology area.<br />
� Coordinating worldwide merger filings regarding the creation of a strategic alliance between GE Energy and Hitachi in the<br />
nuclear energy sector.<br />
� Securing <strong>EU</strong> merger clearance and coordinating worldwide merger filings for GE regarding various acquisitions in the energy<br />
equipment sector.<br />
� Representing Iberdrola in proceedings before the European Commission and national courts in relation to the proposed Gas<br />
Natural/Endesa merger.<br />
� Representing Energias de Portugal (EDP) in its application for annulment of the European Commission’s prohibition of the<br />
EDP/ENI/GDP merger before the General Court.<br />
� Securing <strong>EU</strong> merger clearance in relation to the merger of Austrian energy companies Verbund/EnergieAllianz.<br />
� Obtaining, on behalf of one of the sellers, merger clearance in Germany in relation to the E.ON/Ruhrgas merger and<br />
representing German energy utility companies in several merger control cases in Germany.<br />
� Representing Belgian transmission companies in merger proceedings before the Belgian competition authority.
Energy – Representative Matters (cont.)<br />
Cartels:<br />
� Representing Areva regarding the European Commission’s cartel investigations in the gas insulated switchgear and power<br />
transformer sectors and in the subsequent proceedings before the General Court Court.<br />
� Representing a major Japanese company regarding the European Commission’s cartel investigation in the power cables<br />
sector.<br />
Abuse of dominance:<br />
� Representing Overgas, one of Bulgaria’s largest privately held companies, as a complainant before the European<br />
Commission in abuse of dominance proceedings against the State-owned incumbents in the natural gas area.<br />
� Representing a leading wind turbine manufacturer in an abuse of dominance investigation of the German competition<br />
authority.<br />
Assistance in <strong>EU</strong> Commission’s general competition inquiry into the energy sector:<br />
� Assisting a large network operator in relation to the European Commission’s sector inquiry into the gas and electricity<br />
markets.<br />
� Representing a major gas company in the sector inquiry inquiry.<br />
State aid:<br />
� Representing the Hungarian government in ICSID arbitration proceedings brought by electricity generators Electrabel and<br />
AES, with special focus on stranded costs State aid issues.<br />
� Representing Energie Baden-Württemberg AG (EnBW) before the European Commission and the General Court in a<br />
challenge against the Commission’s authorization of the German CO2 emission trading plan (Case T-387/04).<br />
Compliance audit and advice:<br />
� Conducting an extensive internal competition compliance audit for a multinational company active in oil & gas exploration<br />
and in the area of petrochemical products.<br />
Technology, Media, Telecommunications –<br />
Representative Matters<br />
We have significant experience in advising TMT companies on complex competition concerns, including<br />
mergers and acquisitions and interventions in merger control procedures in the <strong>EU</strong> and in Member States,<br />
standard-setting, licensing, patent enforcement and litigation strategies<br />
Representative matters:<br />
� Securing <strong>EU</strong> merger clearance for Intel regarding its acquisition of McAfee, and coordinating international filings<br />
� Advising a provider of online music on <strong>EU</strong> competition law matters in relation to collecting societies<br />
� Advising one of the Majors in connection with a Commission investigation under Article 102 TF<strong>EU</strong><br />
� Advising one of the Majors regarding interventions in merger control procedures in several jurisdictions<br />
� Coordinating international merger filings for Cisco in its acquisition of Starent Networks<br />
� Representing NBCU in merger filings regarding Comcast’s acquisition of a majority stake in NBCU<br />
� Securing <strong>EU</strong> merger clearance for Siemens in its acquisition of UGS, a major US software developer<br />
� Representing NBCU in German merger proceedings relating to the intended creation of a video‐on‐demand<br />
platform
Chemicals – Representative Matters<br />
We have significant and long-standing experience from advising companies active in the (petro-) chemicals<br />
industry on a broad array of competition law concerns, including joint production, sub-contracting, joint<br />
purchasing and technical cooperation agreements, information exchanges, and merger control matters in the<br />
broadest sense:<br />
Representative matters in the chemical industry include:<br />
� Advising on the lawfulness of minority shareholdings in competing undertakings on behalf of several companies<br />
active in the petrochemical sector;<br />
� Advising on the lawfulness of production joint ventures, exclusive supply arrangements and swap agreements<br />
between several chemical companies;<br />
� Obtaining <strong>EU</strong> merger control approvals for BASF in relation to several acquisitions, most recently that of Cognis,<br />
another large chemical company;<br />
� Advising a large European chemicals company on international joint production / joint venture agreements with<br />
competitors; and<br />
� Advising Monsanto in various merger proceedings before the European Commission and coordinating<br />
international merger filings<br />
Transport & Logistics – Representative Matters<br />
We have significant experience advising companies active in transport and logistics, including shipping<br />
companies, airlines, freight forwarders and stevedoring companies, on matters ranging from international<br />
cartel investigations to <strong>EU</strong> merger control proceedings and cooperation agreements. Representative matters<br />
include:<br />
� Representing Mitsui OSK Lines in obtaining merger control clearance for its acquisition of Nissan Motor Carrier<br />
Company.<br />
� Representing Sea-Invest in connection with its acquisition of a controlling stake in stevedoring company EMO-<br />
EKOM, including in connection with the in-depth investigation by the European Commission under the <strong>EU</strong> Merger<br />
Control Regulation.<br />
� Representing Cargolux in the European Commission investigation into the Air Cargo cartel including the<br />
coordination of Cargolux’s defense in various other jurisdictions.<br />
� Representing several freight forwarding companies in connection with European and national cartel investigations.<br />
� Representing a group of leading liquid bulk shipping companies in relation to the establishment of a pool.<br />
� Representing the European Community Shipowners Association (ECSA) in discussions with the European<br />
Commission concerning the introduction of new guidelines on the application of <strong>EU</strong> competition rules to maritime<br />
transport.
Global<br />
Ranked in Globally, US, <strong>EU</strong>, Belgium<br />
6 lawyers ranked<br />
UK<br />
2 lawyers ranked<br />
Europe<br />
Leading firm in Belgium<br />
Leading firm in UK<br />
Leading firm in Europe<br />
5 lawyers ranked<br />
USA<br />
Top tier firm nationally<br />
Top tier firm in DC (10 years)<br />
Ranked in California<br />
11 lawyers ranked<br />
<strong>EU</strong>/UK/German Recognition<br />
Global Recognition<br />
Bill Baer – World’s Leading <strong>Competition</strong> <strong>Law</strong>yer (2 years)<br />
12 lawyers listed<br />
PLC <strong>Competition</strong> Super League<br />
Ranked #14 Worldwide<br />
Recommended for US, <strong>EU</strong> and Brussels<br />
PLC Which <strong>Law</strong> Firm?<br />
Recommended firm for <strong>EU</strong> and Belgium<br />
Leading ffirm for f US S and Washington DCC<br />
PLC Which <strong>Law</strong>yer?<br />
3 <strong>EU</strong> attorneys<br />
8 US lawyers<br />
Debbie Feinstein - “50 Most Influential Women<br />
<strong>Law</strong>yers in America”<br />
Ranked #1 in antitrust (8 years)<br />
Tier 1 in US<br />
(3 attorneys mentioned)<br />
Ranked in Belgium<br />
(3 attorneys mentioned)<br />
Ranked in UK<br />
(2 attorneys mentioned)<br />
Global<br />
Ranked No. 4 in the World<br />
Global Elite firm<br />
Recommended in Brussels<br />
USA<br />
Elite in Washington DC<br />
Women in Antitrust<br />
3 attorneys listed<br />
Chambers Europe 2011,<br />
<strong>Competition</strong>/European <strong>Law</strong> , BELGIUM<br />
This firm recently strengthened its <strong>EU</strong> competition practice with the recruitment of Annette Schild and Silvio<br />
Cappellari from Shearman & Sterling. The team now includes four German‐qualified partners, making it a perfect fit<br />
ffor clients li from f this hi jjurisdiction. i di i<br />
KEY INDIVIDUALS: Much admired department head Marleen Van Kerckhove is mainly recognised for her merger<br />
control expertise. Highlights include acting for Sanyo on the clearance of its <strong>EU</strong>R5.9 billion sale to Panasonic, which<br />
was the first merger between two major Japanese companies to come before the EC. She also has considerable<br />
experience of the pharma industry. Highly reputed partner Annette Luise Schild, who recently moved across from<br />
Shearman & Sterling, represented Areva in the competition and merger control aspects of the sale of its<br />
transmission and distribution businesses to Alstom and Schneider. Partner Luc Gyselen is praised for his<br />
performance on antitrust cases. He is also involved in state aid matters, recently assisting the Belgian government<br />
with obtaining clearance from the EC in relation to state aid measures for manufacturers of plasma‐derived<br />
medicines. "He knows how the Commission looks at things, the procedures that they use, and also the people who<br />
work there ‐ all of which is extremely helpful for us," say sources. "He also provides excellent practical judgement:<br />
he is not the kind of lawyer who expounds theories that are not ultimately helpful for your business ‐ he really tries<br />
to remove barriers." Partner Silvio Cappellari is recognised for his advice on merger control matters, especially<br />
before the EC, but also at a national level before the German and Italian competition authorities. He also handles<br />
Article 102 cases cases.<br />
<strong>Competition</strong>/European <strong>Law</strong>, <strong>EU</strong>ROPE‐WIDE<br />
<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> received a considerable boost recently, gaining a large share of Shearman & Sterling’s former<br />
practice in Germany, including the well‐known Annette Luise Schild. It has expanded its European team from 11<br />
to 18 lawyers and receives significant praise from clients. It is especially noted for its strength in the<br />
pharmaceutical sector. Merger control highlights include securing competition clearance for Kraft's GBP12 billion<br />
hostile bid for Cadbury and securing Phase 1 clearance of Panasonic’s acquisition of Sanyo. Other key clients<br />
include Philip Morris International and Monsanto.<br />
Sources say: “They are extremely responsive and thoughtful; they take the time to learn and understand our<br />
specific business.” “They have a good cross‐section of lawyers from a number of different jurisdictions so they are<br />
able to give an overview of the region, but we also benefit from their American style, given their roots.” “Unlike a<br />
lot of lawyers, they are prepared to put their heads on the block. They give good practical advice and suggest a<br />
real course of action.”<br />
15
<strong>EU</strong>/UK/German Recognition<br />
EMEA Legal 500 2011, <strong>Competition</strong><br />
<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> <strong>LLP</strong> is recommended for ‘“heavy” competition issues including cartel work and merger<br />
issues’, and the team’s ‘availability, friendliness and competence’. It secured <strong>EU</strong> competition clearance<br />
for Kraft Foods’ £12bn hostile bid for Cadbury, and Panasonic’s acquisition of Sanyo. It represented<br />
Areva before the General Court against two European Commission decisions in the gas insulated<br />
switchgear, and power transformer cases, and handles good state aid work. Annette Luise Schild is an<br />
‘extraordinary antitrust lawyer with excellent know‐how and judgement, perfectly connected within the<br />
Commission’. The team also provides German competition law advice, where Silvio Cappellari assists.<br />
Marleen Van Kerckhove is also recommended.<br />
UK Legal 500 2011, <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Competition</strong><br />
<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> (UK) <strong>LLP</strong> has advised on some big‐ticket merger work out of its London office, and is gaining<br />
expertise acting for clients on hostile acquisitions. It acted for Monsanto in the European Commission’s Phase II<br />
investigation of its sale of a business to Syngenta. Tim Frazer is well known for his representation of major<br />
pharmaceuticals companies, and Susan Hinchliffe is also recommended; both are ‘knowledgeable, practical,<br />
excellent to work with, and very responsive’.<br />
<strong>EU</strong>/UK/German Recognition<br />
Chambers 2012, UK / <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Competition</strong><br />
<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> is enjoying a burgeoning reputation and strong praise from market commentators. The team is described<br />
as "knowledgeable and practical" by sources and it offers in‐depth sector expertise in the moving consumer goods, retail,<br />
biotech, telecommunications and pharmaceutical industries. Recent highlights include advising Philip Morris on its<br />
proposed acquisition of Protabaco in Colombia.<br />
KEY INDIVIDUALS: Tim Frazer is "impressively responsive and commercial," according to market sources. He heads the UK<br />
competition practice and advises clients on issues across the full range of competition law. Susan Hinchliffe has been<br />
advising Monsanto in acquiring clearance from the EC to dispose of its global sunflower business to Syngenta.<br />
<strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> was named in and achieved second place in The <strong>Law</strong>yer's shortlist for "<strong>Competition</strong>/<br />
Regulatory Team of the Year ."<br />
JUVE 2012, German <strong>Competition</strong><br />
Ranked by JUVE for German competition law as one of very few law firms without a German office.<br />
“Recommended practice in antitrust with a visible presence in the Brussels market, as demonstrated by its work for<br />
BASF and Intel in complicated <strong>EU</strong> merger controls. The depth of its antitrust experience came to the fore in its<br />
representation of various parties in prominent antitrust proceedings last year. This is a team to take seriously,<br />
confirm competitors, who also point to its close ties to the well‐known US practice.”<br />
Strengths: Good contacts in the US and France, established international cooperation.<br />
Recommended lawyers: Annette Luise Schild (“one of the most important antitrust lawyers in Brussels” ‐<br />
competitor), Silvio Cappellari (“very competent and pleasant” ‐ competitor).
Snapshot of the <strong>EU</strong> team<br />
Marleen Van Kerckhove, Partner<br />
Marleen heads up the firm's European competition practice and its Brussels office. Her practice<br />
encompasses advice and representation before <strong>EU</strong> and national antitrust agencies on merger control,<br />
abusive conduct, price fixing and other restrictive practices, as well as litigation before European courts.<br />
She has steered many transactions successfully through <strong>EU</strong> and national merger control reviews across<br />
various industry sectors. In addition, she has advised extensively on the application of <strong>EU</strong> competition law<br />
to the pharmaceutical sector, and on the interplay between antitrust and intellectual property law. Ms.<br />
Van Kerckhove is a frequent speaker at programs and conferences in Europe, Japan and North America.<br />
Silvio Cappellari, Partner<br />
Silvio’s practice focuses on a broad range of issues under European and German competition law.<br />
He has represented clients in high‐profile merger control cases before the European Commission and the<br />
German Federal Cartel Office, including several second phase proceedings. He also regularly advises clients<br />
on the compliance of joint ventures and other cooperation arrangements with Article 101 TF<strong>EU</strong>, as well as<br />
on abuse cases under Article 102 TF<strong>EU</strong>.<br />
Tim Frazer, Partner<br />
Tim has over 25 years experience in competition and antitrust law representing and advising clients in a<br />
range of competition issues including merger, transactional, and conduct cases. He has particular<br />
experience in the Life Sciences industry including advising leading pharmaceutical companies on parallel<br />
trade, abuse, and other conduct issues, and on State aids. He divides his time equally between the firm's<br />
London and Brussels offices.<br />
Snapshot of the <strong>EU</strong> team<br />
Luc Gyselen, Partner<br />
Luc joined <strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> <strong>LLP</strong> in July 2004 after 20 years of public service at various <strong>EU</strong> institutions,<br />
primarily i il at t th the EEuropean CCommission i i (as ( a member b of f th the LLegal lSService i and d lt later hholding ldi several l senior i<br />
positions in DG COMP). His competition law practice encompasses advice and representation before <strong>EU</strong><br />
and national agencies on merger control, abusive conduct, cartels, other restrictive practices, and state<br />
aids.<br />
Susan Hinchliffe, Partner<br />
Sue advises clients operating in a variety of industry sectors including: pharmaceuticals branded<br />
consumer goods, and tobacco on a broad range of <strong>EU</strong> and UK competition law issues. Her<br />
competition law practice has a particular focus on merger control both in <strong>EU</strong> and UK, however she<br />
also advises on European product regulations applying to a broad range of sectors including food<br />
and chemicals (including registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemical<br />
substances).<br />
bt )<br />
Annette Schild, Partner<br />
Annette concentrates her practice in merger and acquisition transactions. Having worked in Brussels,<br />
Washington DC, and New York, she has successfully defended numerous companies in investigations of<br />
their proposed mergers by the <strong>EU</strong>, German, and French competition authorities. She has also advised on<br />
numerous other high‐profile matters, including cartel investigations, antitrust complaints, horizontal<br />
and vertical collaborations, commercial arrangements, and intellectual property matters. She regularly<br />
lectures on <strong>EU</strong> competition law issues and is a co‐author of the Munich and the Brussels commentaries<br />
on European and German competition law.
Snapshot of the <strong>EU</strong> team<br />
Contact Information<br />
Stephanie Birmanns, Counsel<br />
Stephanie is a German‐qualified lawyer and has more than a decade of experience advising on a broad<br />
range of matters under German and European antitrust law. She regularly represents clients in merger<br />
control cases before the European p Commission and the German Federal Cartel Office, , including g a number<br />
of complex second phase investigations with and without remedies. Her merger control practice also<br />
includes the assessment of filing obligations in other jurisdictions worldwide and the coordination of<br />
multijurisdictional filings.<br />
Niels Ersbøll, Counsel<br />
Niels is a Danish qualified lawyer and has more than ten years' experience practicing <strong>EU</strong> competition law.<br />
After a short term at the European Commission's Directorate General for <strong>Competition</strong>, and several years<br />
spent practicing in the Brussels‐based <strong>EU</strong> competition law groups of leading Danish and international law<br />
firms, he joined <strong>Arnold</strong> & <strong>Porter</strong> <strong>LLP</strong>'s Brussels office at the beginning of 2004, shortly after the office was<br />
established. He has extensive experience advising on cartels and other restrictive practices, merger<br />
control at <strong>EU</strong> and national level, , and compliance p counseling. g<br />
Axel Gutermuth, Counsel<br />
Axel assists clients in merger control proceedings before the European Commission and the German<br />
Federal Cartel Office. He has participated in several second phase German and EC merger proceedings,<br />
including landmark cases such as Tetra Laval/Sidel and Oracle/PeopleSoft. He regularly advises clients<br />
on the compliance of joint ventures and other cooperation agreements with Articles 101 and 102 of the<br />
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the specific rules on cooperation in distribution,<br />
research and development, technology transfer, and production, as well as in government<br />
investigations.<br />
Stephanie Birmanns, Counsel<br />
Luc Gyselen, Partner<br />
Direct Line: +32 (0)2 290 7816<br />
Direct Line: +32 (0)2 290 7831<br />
EE‐mail: mail: Stephanie Stephanie.Birmanns@aporter.com<br />
Birmanns@aporter com EE‐mail: mail: Luc Luc.Gyselen@aporter.com<br />
Gyselen@aporter com<br />
Silvio Cappellari, Partner<br />
Direct Line: +32 (0)2 290 7815<br />
E‐mail: Silvio.Cappellari@aporter.com<br />
Niels Ersbøll, Counsel<br />
Direct Line: +32 (0)2 290 7829<br />
E‐mail: Niels.Christian.Ersboell@aporter.com<br />
Tim Frazer, Partner<br />
Direct Line: +44 (0)20 7786 6124<br />
E‐mail: Tim.Frazer@aporter.com<br />
Axel Gutermuth, Counsel<br />
Direct Line: +32 (0)2 290 7832<br />
E‐mail: Axel.Gutermuth@aporter.com<br />
Susan Hinchliffe, Partner<br />
Direct Line: +44 (0)20 7786 6122<br />
E‐mail: Susan.Hinchliffe@aporter.com<br />
Annette Schild, Partner<br />
Direct Line: +32 (0)2 290 7814<br />
E‐mail: Annette.Schild@aporter.com<br />
Marleen Van Kerckhove, Partner<br />
Direct Line: +32 (0)2 290 7817<br />
E‐mail: Marleen.VanKerckhove@aporter.com