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35<br />
paid 738,000 pesos (59,372 USD) in bribes in Allende, but we don’t know how much they<br />
earned (the breakdown of monthly payments appears in the statistical appendix). In any<br />
case, it is striking how little it cost them to have the municipal police at their service.<br />
The significance of this subjugation was observed during the weekend of the<br />
vengeance campaign. The municipal authorities were warned days in advance of the<br />
violence that was to be unleashed, and even took part in it. The 20 municipal police officers<br />
were instructed not “to circulate in any patrol cars… and not to attend any calls for<br />
assistance,” and to “detain anyone with the surname Garza” ciii to be handed over to the<br />
Zetas.<br />
In the course of the operation a contingent of hitmen and municipal police “arrived<br />
and [we] broke in by force, firing our weapons” to the home of a Garza family member.<br />
They captured him, his wife and a young child. The Zetas forced them “into a patrol car” civ<br />
to take them to one of the two ranches where they were assembling their victims.<br />
During the weekend, they ransacked, vandalized and set fire to their victims’<br />
properties. The Zetas incited their neighbors to rob the homes before setting them alight<br />
and demolishing them with heavy machinery. The police officers who witnessed the<br />
plunder “just watched and said nothing.” cv<br />
The municipal authorities became accomplices or passive witnesses. Their presence<br />
was purely decorative. The person who was mayor of Allende in March 2011 declared in<br />
writing to the Attorney General that “I was not an eyewitness to the events,” that “I learned<br />
from isolated comments from people who had not witnessed the events either,” that “I<br />
never received any notification, complaint or police report from people or victims of the<br />
violent events.” The commander of the Public Security Directorate revealed that he had not<br />
received any complaint or information from any person or via any other means and that,<br />
since it is not within the municipality’s powers to undertake an investigation, he did<br />
nothing. Some testimonies refer to the participation of the municipal police in the looting of<br />
the destroyed houses.<br />
The City Council Act number 31 for Allende dated March 30, 2011, the first one<br />
subsequent to the events, makes no mention of the violence. The mayor’s office maintains<br />
no record of the enormous violence suffered in Allende in March 2011: for them, it is as if<br />
nothing happened.<br />
In summary:<br />
a) The criminal organization controlled the local security apparatus, and some of the police<br />
officers were an integral part of the Zetas.<br />
b) The municipal government was non-existent and its officials violated multiple Mexican<br />
and international laws. For example, they failed to meet the obligation to “immediately”<br />
report cases of forced disappearance.<br />
c) If the findings from Allende and Piedras Negras are repeated in other municipalities—<br />
and there is evidence that this is the case—then it would appear that local government is the<br />
weakest flank of the Mexican State.