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SHELF 9780435183127 HISTORY PAPER 3 THE COLD WAR AND THE AMERICAS (1945-1981) STUDENT 60p

SHELF 9780435183127 HISTORY PAPER 3 THE COLD WAR AND THE AMERICAS (1945-1981) STUDENT 60p

SHELF 9780435183127 HISTORY PAPER 3 THE COLD WAR AND THE AMERICAS (1945-1981) STUDENT 60p

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Ceasefire negotiations began in Kaesong in )une 1951. This location within<br />

Communist-held territory proved problematic, with several serious incidents<br />

including armed Chinese'mistakenly'entering Kaesong in August; a Chinese platoon<br />

leader was shot and it was claimed that a UN plane had bombed the site (Chen). The<br />

talks were then called off, before resuming in Panmunjom on 25 October 1951 (Chen).<br />

China continued to insist on a seat in the United Nations and an end to US support for<br />

Taiwan. Other obstacles to peace also remained.<br />

. Both North Korea and China were prepared to drag out the war indefinitely to secure<br />

their demands, knowing public opinion in the US was already tiring of a long, drawnout<br />

war.<br />

. Syngman Rhee was still looking to reunify Korea under his leadership and did not<br />

want to support any peace deal that prevented this.<br />

. Prisoners ofwar (POWs) were held by both sides, but many of those held in the south<br />

did not want to retum home. Lowe states that the US was aware of this problem but<br />

even they greatly underestimated the numbers who did not want to leave South Korea,<br />

suggesting that only around 5,000 out of 21,000 Chinese; 54,000 out of 96,000 North<br />

Koreans; 4,000 out of 1 5,000 South Koreans andT ,500 out of 38,000 civilians wished to<br />

go back either to China or North Korea. The Chinese delegates vehemently denied this<br />

andblamed the US forhaving'indoannated'the POWs in their camps. Therewere also<br />

disputes over the number of POWs in custody. The US claimed that only 25 per cent of<br />

US MIAs (Missing in Action) were on the lists. North Korea and China also claimed that<br />

44,000 names on previous lists were nowmissing. In january 1952, the US proposed<br />

voluntary repatriation and those who did not want to return home would be released,<br />

on condition they did not bear arms again in the conflict (Chen).<br />

. On 28 April7952, one of the negotiators for China, Li Kenong, pointed out:<br />

TheTruman administration might notwant to end thewar at this momentfor two reasons: frst,<br />

in apresidential eleaionyearTrumaflwas concemed that a soft appearance might jeopardize the<br />

Democratic Par-Ly's electoral position; second, in order to inuease military expenditures in the<br />

19 53 budget, the KoreanW ar had to be continued.<br />

fian Chen (2001).Mao's Chiaa ondthe Cold W'ar. University of North Carolina Press, p. 109.<br />

The peace talks dragged on with no resolution, despite attempts by India to intervene as<br />

an 'honest broker' and to offer suggestions on how the POW impasse could be resolved.<br />

This photograph, taken in ,1956,<br />

shows ex-prisoners of war, who<br />

had been given asylum in lndia,<br />

choosing to re ocate to Brazil.<br />

'hey<br />

"'e<br />

berrg addressed here<br />

by the Brazilian Ambassador in<br />

Delhi.<br />

52

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