A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Vol.I by Johann Eduard Erdmann 1890

§ 203 ,
8.] THOMAS AQUINAS. 437
cibihs or irascibilis^ these two sides of sensibility. The conception
of the habitus is then explained, and thus all the data
in the Aristotelian definition of virtue are given, but nevertheless
instead of it an Augustinian definition is adopted and
defended {!bid.y qu. 55). The Platonic-Aristotelian virtutes
mtellectiLales et mo 7'ales are designated as the acqtiisitcBy
or also
as the human virtues, the three theological as the iufuscB or
as the Divine, and among the latter charitaSy among the former
sapie^itia justitia are assigned the first place (Ibid.y qu. 62,
65, 68). Ckaritas gives to all the other virtues their proper
consecration. They are all supported by the gifts of the Holy
Spirit, which are seven in number, like the seven principal
virtues and vices. After extended discussions of sin and its
propagation the author takes up law, the revealed command of
reason, which is for the general good and which proceeds from
Him whose place it is to care for the whole (Ibid.y qu. 90).
The eternal law of the government of the world becomes, in
the consciousness of the intelligent creature, the /ex naturalisy
the basis of all human or positive laws, whose aim is only to
supplement for the general well-being that which the natural
law has left undetermined. To these forms of law are to
be added the law of God revealed in the Old and New
Testaments. Wherever positive laws conflict with the word
of God or with the lex naturalis they are not binding upon
the conscience. In the sectmda secundcBy in connection with
the discussion of justice and its activity in law, the relation
of positive and natural law is more precisely treated. At
first natural law is identified with the jiLS gentiuniy although
it properly has a wider significance, since it is to be extended
also to brutes. It is then pointed out that there are certain
relations which are not merely legal ones, as for instance the
parental and govermental, although those who stand in these
relations are from another point of view subjects of law (ii.
2, qu. 57 and 58). To give to every one his due is defined
as the principle of all justice. The investigations in regard to
the remaining virtues, in regard to the various elements of
grace and the mutual relation of the two, differ from those of
Alexander and Albert only in the fact that Thomas greatly
limits the liberii^n arbitriumy making it only the ability to
determine our willing by calling up various considerations
which act as motives. But even here it is maintained that
the first impulse to this comes from God, and that our prepara-
438 SECOND PERIOD OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.
[§ 203, 9.
tion also for the reception of grace is solely a work of grace.
Thomas is much less of an indeterminist than Albert.
9. The diligent study of the greatest of all philosophies
had led Albert to take an interest in the world, and the same
was true of Thomas, except that in his case it was not, as in
the case of the former, the world of sense which occupied him,
but the moral world, the State. Albert had left the Politics of
Aristotle unexpounded, and Thomas did the same with his
Natural History. In physics in general he only repeats what
Albert had taught. On the other hand, besides his commentary
upon ihQ Politics of Aristotle he wrote many things which have
to do with his views of the State. They are to be drawn partly
from his theological Summa and partly from works devoted
especially to the subject. Of the latter the Ertiditio principum
(vol. 17, Antwerp edition), a somewhat unscientific, book of
instruction for princes, is to be omitted, since it is hardly a
work of Thomas himself.
The four books De regimine principum
(Opusc., 20) likewise do not belong wholly to him, for
in the third book the death of Adolph of Nassau is mentioned.
His followers claim him as the author only of the first two
books, and ascribe the others to the Dominican Tholomseus
of Lucca (Bartholomaeus de Fiodonibus). The principal
ideas, which agree well with what is found elsewhere in his
works, are as follows : the members of the body constitute
a unity only by their submission to a principal organ ;
the
powers of the soul are united only by their subjection to
reason
;
and the parts of the world form one whole only by
their subordination to God. In the same way the unity of the
State becomes possible only through subjection to a ruling
chief. Man s helplessness, social impulse and power of speech
all prove him predestined for life in a State. The unity becomes
most complete when the ruling head is only one, and
the healthy monarchy is the best government, although its
abuse, the tyranny, is the worst. This is distinguished from
the monarchy by the fact that the ruler seeks his own instead
of the common good. Besides, as experience teaches, the
danger of tyranny is far greater in aristocracies and democracies,
than in a monarchy; and the probability that a violent
change will improve matters is always so small that a people
does better even under a tyrant to await the help of God, which
will come the more surely and quickly the more virtuous the
nation is. The aim of the State is to bring its citizens nearer