ANET article

Article 

Sin and Punishment: The Ethics 

of Divine Justice and Retribution 

in Ancient Near Eastern and Old 

Testament Texts 

Interpretation: A Journal of 

Bible and Theology 

2015, Vol. 69(3) 272 –287 

© The Author(s) 2015 

Reprints and permissions: 

sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav 

DOI: 10.1177/0020964315578205 

int.sagepub.com 

Angelika Berlejung 

University of Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany 

Abstract 

This article gives a short survey of concepts of “sin and sanction,” the “crisis of Wisdom,” and divine justice 

in ancient Mesopotamian texts and in the Old Testament. A concluding summary provides a comparison of 

these two ancient Near Eastern cultures’ understandings of the ethics of divine justice. 

Keywords 

Old Testament ethics, Retribution, Law, Divine will, Sin and sanction, Theodicy, Job, Qoheleth, Wisdom 

Introduction 

From a theological perspective, “sin” is a term that identifies human (individual and/or collective) 

misconduct before a god. This basic definition makes clear that the divine will provides the 

scale for the measurement of human behavior. Sin (“moral evil” 1 ) describes human intentions and 

actions that are qualified as evil, violent, wrong, or as vices and crimes. But passive aspects also 

are inherent, such as when a human being neglects or disregards divine orders. 

In many texts of the ancient Near East (ANE), including the Old Testament, sin is the result of a 

fundamental disturbance in the human-divine relationship and communication. Moreover, one sin 

creates subsequent sins, once that relationship has been damaged. Sin has social aspects, too, as it 

causes a serious disruption of interpersonal relationships, the social network, and life. Within this 

context, punishment is the divine or society’s reaction to the sinner. From a sociological perspective, 

sin and punishment were part of the social construction of reality in the ANE. Human actions, 

1 In contrast to “moral evil” (human actions) is “natural evil,” which consists of negative powers in the 

universe. 

Corresponding author: 

Angelika Berlejung, Universität Leipzig, Martin-Luther Ring 3, Leipzig, D-04109, Germany. 

Email: berle@rz.uni-leipzig.de 

Downloaded from int.sagepub.com at Middle East Technical Univ on February 10, 2016

Berlejung 273 

fate, disaster, and suffering were imbued with meaning 2 by socially accepted authorities and institutions, 

represented by the royal and priestly elite classes. 

This essay will focus on the human-divine aspects of “sin” and “punishment” only, even if 

the topic has serious social aspects as well. In the following discussion the conceptions of “sin 

and sanction” in ancient Mesopotamia and in the Old Testament will be sketched briefly, starting 

with the traditional view of the connection between sin and sanction and proceeding finally to the 

“crisis of Wisdom.” A concluding summary provides a comparison of characteristics of the ethics 

of divine justice in these two ANE cultures. 

Cave, Cave, Deus Videt! 

Societies of the ANE (including Israel) constructed the divine will as the foundation for human 

ethics. Divine judgment was conceptualized as the divine reaction to human thoughts and actions 

and presupposed that the gods observed human behavior and acted accordingly. 

In ANE literature, human-divine and interpersonal relationships are based on the divine will, 

which is revealed in preceding divine communications (through revelations, prophecies, oracles, 

and laws). Human beings have free choice to obey the divine will or not. If human beings obey, the 

human-divine relationship remains intact, and a deity responds with reward, benefits, and blessing. 

But if human beings disobey, the human-divine relationship is disrupted, and punishment ensues. 

In some instances, reconciliation is possible, and the relationship can start anew. But if the divine 

sanctions do not change human behavior, the sanctions may increase. 

Divine warnings, such as bad omens, can be interpreted as a kind of alert-system that indicate to 

human beings that they are going in the wrong direction. A human being, aware of having sinned, 

might act preemptively by offering confessions, pleas, atonement, or by performing cultic measures, 

along with a change in behavior, in order to seek forgiveness and redemption and to avoid 

punishment. Cultic rituals dealing with atonement and reconciliation can be regarded as a means of 

calming the divine anger before judgment leads to sanctions. 

This pattern, which implies a clear correspondence of human deeds and their consequences 

(Tun-Ergehen-Zusammenhang, the “deed-result connection” or “deed-consequence nexus”) can 

be found in ANE as well as in biblical texts to explain natural, political, social, and historical events 

as divine reactions to human actions. Thus, earthquakes, floods, defeat in battle, destruction of cities 

or political entities, rebellions, and exile are explained as the result of divine punishment for 

human wickedness. 

Sinfulness can be collective or individual. Sometimes, when many people experience a disaster 

that is perceived as divine punishment, sin can be ascribed to the collective (e.g. the people or the 

2 For discussion of disasters see Peter L. Berger, Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective (New 

York: Doubleday, 1963; repr. New York: Open Road Media, 2011), 134. 


274 Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology 69(3) 

city) or to its leaders. In these contexts, the concept of collective guilt is valid. In cases of individual 

disasters (such as sickness, 3 death, loss of family members, or loss of possessions), the same pattern 

explains the suffering of the individual who has been judged and punished for sins. In these 

cases, guilt is individual. 

Eventually, however, the experience of the contingency of human life led to a paradigm shift, a 

“crisis of Wisdom,” and the end of the traditional deed-consequence nexus. Responsibility for suffering 

shifted from humans to God (or the gods). Texts refer to the problem of innocent suffering 

and mention complaints and accusations against the deities or against the one God (as in the Old 

Testament). They point to the lack of balance between the behavior and the fate of innocent human 

being and ask God/the gods to intervene and end the suffering. This shift introduced the notion that 

the Deity/deities can make mistakes, and such a provocative concept, in turn, challenged notions of 

divine justice and infallibility, leading to basic discussions about theodicy. 

The Connection Between Sin and Sanction in Ancient 

Mesopotamia 

The Foundational Concept of the “Me” 

The me are the transcendental foundation of Sumerian and Assyrian-Babylonian religion and civilization. 

4 They represent the totality of phenomena (positive as well as negative elements) that surround 

kingship, cultic and daily life, the skills of writing and handicraft, law, and jurisdiction. The 

me determine the thinking and actions of both the gods and human beings. They are all the rules 

and regulations that the gods set in place to shape the present and settle the future. The me regulate 

the relationship of human beings to gods, inter-human relationships, and the position of the king, 

who is regarded as the mediator between mortals and the gods. Ideally, these relationships should 

be balanced and form a vertical axis (heaven–earth, and gods–king–people) as well as a horizontal 

axis (country–city–temple–human). These divine orders are the matrix for the construction and 

durability of civilization. 

Since the me also include the very basic principles for divine and human justice (Akkadian 

kittu[m] and misharu[m]—wisdom, jurisprudence, and decision-making) and ethical norms, they 

also give a structure and means of evaluation for any individual and collective thinking or action. 

The gods and their representatives rule and judge according to the me, which are the fundament for 

all divine (and royal) justice. The concept of me also reveals that the Mesopotamian view of the 

world order was very complex, as it contained and interconnected social, political, religious, and 

cosmic orders. Ethics, thinking, and the conduct of an individual or royal person, as well as politics, 

3 See Angelika Berlejung, “Auf den Leib geschrieben: Körper und Krankheit in der physiognomischen 

Tradition des Alten Orients und des Alten Testaments,” in Religion und Krankheit (ed. Gregor Etzelmüller 

et al.; Darmstadt: WBG, 2010), 185–216. 

4 Gertrud Farber, “Me,” RlA 7 (1990): 610–13. 


Berlejung 275 

cult, jurisdiction (on human and divine level), sin and sanctions, mildness and mercy, were all part 

of one interactive system. 

Divine Patronage of Law and the Connection Between Sin and Sanction 

Characteristic for the Mesopotamian conception of sin is legal process. Offenses were always identified, 

judged, punished, and solved within a judicial process, regardless of whether the offense was 

on a human or divine level. The oldest known law collections, the Sumerian codex of Ur-Namma 

of Ur (2111–2094 BCE), the Sumerian codex of Lipit-Ishtar of Isin (1934–1924 BCE), and the 

old-Babylonian codex of Hammurabi (1792–1750 BCE) combine juridical and non-juridical parts. 

Within their prologues and epilogues they refer to divine communication with the ruler, who was 

held responsible for the law, and thus for the basic principles of the establishment of normativity 

and of ethical conduct. The non-juridical parts also point to the divine patronage of royal lawgiving, 

and to the king as the one who was entrusted by the gods to establish order and justice in his 

country. 5 

The king’s efforts to grant justice by lawgiving and jurisdiction aimed to maintain the primordial 

balance (justice) and the me. He, and also his judges, stood under the surveillance and patronage of 

the gods, especially Shamash, the great judge of heaven and earth. 

Rituals, prayers, and Wisdom literature reflect the call and the care for order and justice. Balance 

within divine-human as well as inter-human relationships was the main concern. According to the 

concept of the deed-consequence nexus, the well-being of the king, country, and the individual was 

the result of piety towards the gods, while distress on the natural, political, social or individual level 

were considered as divine punishment for human sins. 6 

Within the polytheistic system, disasters could be explained as being caused by the higher gods. 

The smaller, local and personal (patronate) gods did not carry out the divine punishment, but they 

were not able to intervene against it. 7 The patronate gods could try their very best through supplication 

and intercession, but if the higher gods did not change their command, their decision to destroy 

a city came true. 8 Divine justice was therefore not absolute, but was part of an interactive and 

5 For example, see The Babylonian Laws 1: Legal Commentary (ed. G.R. Driver and John C. Miles; 

Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 14–24 and idem, Babylonian Laws 2: Transliterated Text, Translation, 

Philological Notes, Glossary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955; repr.: Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2007). 

6 Seminal is Hans-Peter Schaudig, “Erklärungsmuster von Katastrophen im Alten Orient,” in Disaster 

and Relief Management: Katastrophen und ihre Bewältigung (ed. Angelika Berlejung; FAT 81; Tübingen: 

Mohr, 2012), 425–43. 

7 See Mark E. Cohen, The Canonical Lamentations of Ancient Mesopotamia (2 vols.; Potomac, MD: 

Capital Decisions, 1988), 2:704–25 (esp. 711–14; 721–72). 

8 See Nili Samet, The Lamentation over the Destruction of Ur (MC 18; Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 

2014), 135–69. 



Mesopotamian stele, 900–800 BCE, from Temple of 

Marduk, Babylonia. British Museum, London. 

Photo Credit: Album/Art Resource, NY. 

inter-divine discourse with clear hierarchies. 

The gods could decide differently 

about human fates, but the stronger and 

higher gods prevailed. 

A Shift toward Theodicy 

Certain ANE texts reflect a critical 

rethinking of the traditional deed-consequence 

nexus. Doubts arose about traditional 

understandings of cosmic balance 

and divine justice. Theodicy 9 became a 

topic of the Wisdom and didactic literature, 

as evidenced in the Sumerian (ca. 

2200 BCE) and Babylonian versions (ca. 

1700–1600 BCE) of A Man and His God 

and Babylonian Job (ca. 1300 BCE), 10 

and the so-called Babylonian Theodicy 

(1200–1100 BCE). 11 The first two poems 

deal with the relationship of a man and 

his personal god. The Babylonian Job 

and Babylonian Theodicy discuss divine 

judgment over an individual in different 

manners. 

The Babylonian Job describes the god 

Marduk as the master of individual fate. 

Marduk knows human beings better than 

they know themselves. Therefore, sufferers who believed themselves to be pious and righteous had 

to learn that they were not. The sufferer deserved the divine punishments, even if he or she was 

not aware of his or her sins. The last section of the poem opens the only option for the sinner: a 

miraculous recovery from illness is not a proof of righteousness but an act of Marduk’s mercy after 

the god’s anger was appeased. Thus, human sin can be forgiven. 

9 See Sebastian Fink, “Die Frage nach Gerechtigkeit Gottes im Alten Orient,” Kaskal 9 (2012): 67–71; 

Gerald L. Mattingly, “The Pious Sufferer: Mesopotamia’s Traditional Theodicy and Job’s Counselors,” 

in The Bible in the Light of Cuneiform Literature: Scripture in Context III (ed. W.W. Hallo et al.; Ancient 

Near Eastern Texts and Studies 8; Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1990), 305–48. 

10 Takayoshi Oshima, Babylonian Poems of Pious Sufferers: Ludlul Bēl Nēmeqi and the Babylonian 

Theodicy (ORA 13; Tübingen: Mohr, 2015). 

11 Takayoshi Oshima, The Babylonian Theodicy (SAACT 9; Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 2013), 

xvi. 


Berlejung 277 

The poem itself thus refers to three possible ways to avoid or to ease divine sanctions: (1) protection 

of personal gods; (2) divination, dreams, and priestly support; and (3) absolute devotion to 

Marduk, who has power over lesser, personal gods and divination. Retribution and redemption are 

Marduk’s signs of divine power and the basis of the whole divine order. However, Marduk does not 

abandon suffering human beings. Instead the text argues that Marduk constantly observes them and 

reacts in balance with their behavior: if they accept their guilt and repent, Marduk removes their 

punishments and relieves their distress. If they fail to recognize their sins and do not turn to him, 

he might impose further sanctions on them. 

The Babylonian Theodicy argues differently: (1) Humankind has no innate ability to understand 

the divine will. Because of their falsehood, fraud, and deceit, humans cannot have full insight into 

divine justice. Thus no human being is fully just. (2) The wealth of the wicked does not persist. 

(3) Human piety (prayer, offerings, rituals) is the only way for humans to keep the divine-human 

relationship intact and the human life successful. 

The Babylonian Job and the Babylonian Theodicy always stress that the only way for mortals 

to keep communication and relationship with the gods intact is through piety and cultic observation. 

Human piety, and not human justice, is the focus of Mesopotamian thought. The superiority 

of divine justice and morality cannot be questioned. Trust in the gods is the only reliable basis for 

human life. 

The Connection Between Sin and Sanction in the 

Old Testament 

The Foundation: Yhwh’s Will Revealed through Torah and Prophets 

The pre-Priestly creation story in Gen 2:4b–8:22 establishes the fundamental proposition that 

Yhwh equipped all human beings with free will and moral autonomy. Each person can freely 

decide to obey Yhwh or not (Gen 3:1–13; Sir 15:11–20). The will of Yhwh is clear (Gen 2:16–17) 

and gives the scale for human conduct as well as divine judgment (Gen 3:14–24). Consequently, 

Yhwh punishes the primordial and paradigmatic disobedience of Adam and Eve toward a direct 

divine order. From that point on, the divine-human interaction and communication are disturbed. 

What can be observed in this general anthropological statement of the short creation story is also 

valid for the rest of the Torah. Yhwh reveals his will in orders and oracles (e.g., Lev 24:10–23; 

Num 9:1–14; 15:32–36; 27:1–11), longer law codices, and the complete Torah. Human obedience 

is rewarded, while disobedience is punished. 

The Book of the Covenant (Exod 20:22–23:33) is the oldest collection of laws within the Old 

Testament. The older, casuistic part of this collection reflects the customary law of a rural, shepherding 

culture. During a later editing process, this legal collection of the norms of daily life 

was anchored and founded in Yhwh’s will. In this collection, Yhwh is the only executive judge 

of heaven and earth, who observes human actions and rewards or punishes communities as well 



as individuals according to their deeds. 12 Divine blessing for human obedience and divine sanction 

for human disobedience are included after some law collections, such as Leviticus 26 and 

Deuteronomy 28, presupposing the ANE deed-consequence nexus. 13 Law and ethics are closely 

connected. 

The Pentateuch contains a number of collections of laws besides the Book of the Covenant: 

the Privilegrecht (covenant law in Exod 34:10–28), the Deuteronomic Law (Deut 12–26), and the 

Holiness Code (Lev 17–26). Almost all the laws of the Pentateuch are understood as the revelation 

of Yhwh at Mount Sinai/Horeb. However, different communication situations can be observed: 

while the instructions of the Decalogue have been proclaimed by Yhwh to the entire people of 

Israel (Exod 20:1; Deut 5:4), the other law codes have been sent to the people through the mediator 

Moses. In both cases the laws reveal Yhwh’s will and the scale for judgment. 

The Book of the Covenant and the Deuteronomic Law were submitted to the people with the 

demand for their explicit agreement. This theological construct stresses that Israel should not follow 

the laws out of compulsion, but through insight (cf. Deut 30:11–14). That this expectation 

did not work is explained in Deut 29:3 (also Deut 31:21–29) in retrospect to the disaster of 587 

BCE, which was interpreted as Yhwh’s punishment for Israel’s disobedience. Evidently, Israel did 

not yet have a full understanding of the law given at Mount Horeb. An additional intervention of 

Yhwh was needed, which was only announced after 587 BCE, and therefore represented a future 

hope: the gift of an understanding heart, with open eyes and ears. This corresponded to the prophetic 

announcements mentioned in Jer 31:31–34, when Yhwh is expected to write the law on the 

Israelites’ hearts. Similar is the idea in Ezek 36:26–27, when Yhwh will give a new heart and a new 

spirit to the Israelites, which will enable them finally to act according to the law. In this ideal case, 

human ethics would correspond perfectly to Yhwh’s will, and therefore sin and divine punishment 

would not exist any more. 

The balance between the will of Yhwh and the human obedience/disobedience is also a central 

topic in the prophetic literature. 14 The prophets are portrayed as speakers who announce the divine 

will (Mic 6:8) and judgment for sins, but also the chance for future salvation. 

In sum, according to the Old Testament, the divine will is encoded in the creation, given in 

the Torah, open to each human being (Pss 19; 119; Sir 1:1–10; 16:24–17:14; 24:23–34), and proclaimed 

through the prophets. Consequently a “sin” can be defined as a willful act against God, 

and ignorance is no excuse. 

12 Ulrich Berges, “Göttliches Gesetz und göttliche Gewalt,” in Gewohnheit, Gebot, Gesetz: Normativität in 

Geschichte und Gegenwart: eine Einführung (ed. Nils Jansen et al.; Tübingen: Mohr, 2011), 1–25. 

13 See Bernd Janowski, Ein Gott, der straft und tötet? Zwölf Fragen zum Gottesbild des Alten Testaments 

(Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2013), 78–82. 

14 See Patrick D. Miller, Sin and Judgment in the Prophets: A Stylistic and Theological Analysis (SBLMS 

27; Chico: Scholars Press, 1982). 


Berlejung 279 

The Deed-Consequence Nexus according to Tradition 

In order to explain the individual’s as well as Israel’s collective biography, a large number of biblical 

authors and redactors used the common ANE understanding of a nexus between human deeds 

and their consequences. 15 Already Genesis describes suffering as a consequence for human sins 

(Gen 3:14–19; 6:5–8; 9:22–27). The balance between human sin/righteousness and divine sanction/reward 

can be found in the narratives about the Israelites’ delayed arrival in the land (Exod 

32–34; Lev 10; Num 13–14; 20), the conquest and loss of the land (Joshua, Judges, 1–2 Kings), the 

rise and the decline of the monarchy (2 Kings 17:15–18; 22:19–20), and the Babylonian captivity. 

Thus, history was interpreted in a moral and theological way and became the model of education 

for the future. 

Traditional Wisdom literature focuses on the correspondence of human actions and their consequences 

(Pss 25:11; 32:5; 39:12; 41:5; 51:6; Prov 1–9; 11:5; 13:21). The basic presumption was 

that Yhwh is watching each human being, as well as the people of Israel as a whole, and reacts 

according to their behavior. Yhwh regulates the balance between human-divine and the inter-human 

relationships. That human sins against God also have social consequences is a basic conviction of 

this biblical literature. Thus, each human being stands with his or her thoughts and actions within a 

vertical axis (human-divine), and a horizontal axis (human-human) and has to behave in a way that 

does not damage but stabilizes this network and its inherent order. Sin disrupts these relationships, 

and the sinner remains apart from God and fellow creatures. 16 

When sin and punishment are collective, there is the possibility that innocent individuals are 

part of that collective. The innocent can become collateral damage in such cases: God kills the just 

and the unjust (Ezek 21:8–9), including children (Isa 9:16; 13:15–16; 51:20; Lam 2:21). 17 Because 

of this, Abraham intercedes on behalf of the innocent to convince Yhwh to save a small number of 

them (Gen 18:23–33; see also Ezek 14:12–14). 

15 John Barton (Ethics in Ancient Israel [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014], 211–21), summarizes 

to what extent consequences of actions come automatically or by divine intervention. Barton states that 

the Old Testament has—depending on the text genres—“both an automatic and an interventionist way 

of understanding the nexus between guilt and punishment” (217). Within the holistic worldview of the 

Old Testament, which is determined by Yhwh’s presence, the terms ”automatic“ vs. “interventionist” are 

anachronistic. In fact, there is a complicated system and dynamic of balance, which is better described by 

Samuel L. Adams (Wisdom in Transition: Act and Consequence in Second Temple Instructions [JSJSup 

125; Leiden: Brill, 2008], as “self-regulating” and “contingent” (free divine will). 

16 See also Janowski, Ein Gott, 239–41. 

17 See Ulrich Berges and Bernd Obermayer, “Gottes Gewalt gegen Kinder in den Büchern Jesaja und 

Klagelieder: Eine bibeltheologische Problemanzeige,” in Gewalt im Spiegel alttestamentlicher Texte 

(ed. Norbert Baumgart and Martin Nitsche; EThS 43; Würzburg: Echter, 2012), 53–75. 



Restoration of Communication and Balance 

That sin destroys communication is a point that characterizes biblical law, which can be understood 

as an expression of social and divine solidarity. The main concern here is not retribution or 

punishment but keeping intact the balance of inter-human and human-divine relationships. This 

understanding is also valid for the ius talionis (Exod 21:25; Lev 24:18–20; Deut 19:21), which is 

intended to limit blood feuds. Even the death penalty does not follow from retaliatory intentions. 

Rather, it aims for general deterrence and prevention (Deut 19:19–20) to protect the community 

of the people of God. 18 Consequently, the death penalty is limited to offenses and crimes that are 

perceived to endanger human-divine interaction. 

The prophetic literature also presupposes the connection of deeds and results. Judgment prophecy 

announced the end of Israel and Judah as a consequence for disrupted social solidarity and 

balance (Mic 2:1–3; Isa 5:8–9). Prophetic criticism interpreted political crisis as divine sanction 

for sin (Amos 2:4–8; 4:1–3; Hos 9:9; Isa 1:4–9; Jer 4–6; Ezek 4; 9; 20). The royal houses and their 

representatives were accused of neglecting law and justice (Jer 5:5; 21:11–22:19), as were the 

priests (Hos 4:4–11) and the common people (Jer 5:4; Hos 4:1–3, 12–14). Thus human suffering 

was perceived as a direct outcome of divine punishment for sins (Jer 30:15). 

Post-exilic literature develops the idea that only a portion of the people got the chance to restore 

the disturbed balance of human-divine communication. The people or representatives of the people 

searched for divine forgiveness through laments (Lamentations, Ezra 9), the confession of 

sins (Judg 10:10–15; 1 Sam 12:10; Lam 5:16, Ezra 9, Nehemiah 9, Daniel 9), 19 offerings, prayer, 

supplication, improvement of human conduct (e.g. Ezra 10), or atonement. 20 Within cultic contexts, 

purification rites formed part of the expiation and human-divine reconciliation. According 

to Leviticus 16 the annual cleansing ritual on Yom Kippur is necessary in order to restore and to 

preserve the purity of the altar and temple and at the same time to obtain forgiveness for human 

sins. All these activities aim toward the restitution and the “re-booting” of the system: inter-human 

and human-divine communication and interactions are restored, and any kind of a disastrous spiral 

of sin/evil was interrupted. Otherwise, the guilt of the past and of the present influenced the future. 

Final Judgment 

The restoration of the full world order and full justice on human and divine levels can be announced 

in prophetic expectation as part of the final divine judgment of Yhwh within a special day of judgment 

at the end of history or at the end of each personal life. Malachi 3:13–21 refers to doubts in 

the deed-result connection and announces the “day of Yhwh,” in which God will intervene in history 

and restore full order and justice in the world. The final judgment over sinners is announced, 

18 Eckart Otto, Theologische Ethik des Alten Testaments (ThW 3.2; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1994), 32–33; 

78–81. 

19 Janowski, Ein Gott, 253–59. 

20 Ibid., 263–316. 


Berlejung 281 

as well as the final reward for the righteous. Especially apocalyptic texts (as e.g. Isa 24–27) attest a 

separation of sinners and righteous people within the scenario of a final judgment. The benchmark 

for the judgment is the Torah. 

However, the final punishment of the sinner is not fully developed in the Old Testament (compare 

Dan 12:2–3). There is no real concept of individual judgment after death in the Old Testament. 

During their lifetime the people have the opportunity to prove their righteousness, but in death it is 

already clear on which side a person stands, so that an explicit court process or final evaluation is 

not necessary. After death, divine retribution will be imposed. 

The final divine judgment over all mortals is a theological necessity, because it is the only 

way to prove the historical power and justice of God. Human experience shows that deeds do not 

necessarily have the expected results during a lifetime; the good suffer and the evil prosper. The 

disturbed order will be restored after the end of time or after the end of an individual lifetime. Thus, 

the deed-consequence nexus has been moved outside of human time dimensions. 21 The punishment 

of sinners and the salvation of the righteous are beyond human experience in this world and are still 

a divine responsibility. In this aspect the final judgment for the righteous person is hopeful. 

Questioning of the Connection Between Sin and Sanction: 

The “Crisis of Wisdom” in the Old Testament 

Doubts about the correct balance between sin and sanction apparently arose in the late, exilic 

period, when the generation of those whose sin had resulted in the exile died, but the exile (perceived 

as divine punishment) continued. The exile in Babylonia was no longer identifiable as the 

result of sin, because the next generation had not committed any sins (yet) (Deut 24:16; Ezek 

18:2–4:20; Jer 31:29–30; Lam 5:7). This discrepancy precipitated a “crisis of Wisdom” about the 

nature of divine justice. This questioning of tradition is evident in some writings from the Wisdom 

books, including Psalms (e.g. Ps 44), the post-exilic books of Job (dated into the Persian period) 

and Qoheleth (dated in the Hellenistic period, ca. third cent. BCE). 

The Book of Job 

The book of Job questions the deed-consequence nexus as Job, the suffering protagonist, stresses 

his righteousness and innocence. 22 It has already been observed that the perspective of the literary 

prose framing the book of Job and the perspective of the discourses in the poetic core differ: 23 the 

21 For the eschatologizing of the deed-result connection into the afterlife in Wisdom literature, see Adams, 

Wisdom, 6–8. 

22 This is different in the Babylonian Job, because the protagonist refers to his piety toward the gods but 

finally accepts that he has neglected cultic obligations (= committed a sin). 

23 For the differences between prose and dialogues, see Hermann Spieckermann, Lebenskunst und Gotteslob 

in Israel: Anregungen aus Psalter und Weisheit für die Theologie (FAT 91; Tübingen: Mohr, 2014), 

81–83. With focus on redaction criticism see Roger Marcel Wanke, Praesentia Dei: Die Vorstellungen 



prose of the book of Job starts (Job 1:1–5) and ends (42:10–17) with the traditional deed-result 

connection. From Job 1:6 on, Job’s fate becomes the center of the controversy between Yhwh and 

Satan, and Job’s suffering starts. The reader knows, after the introduction, that Satan is attacking 

the innocent Job with Yhwh’s approval, and so his suffering is undeserved. Job himself offers in 

the prologue (1:21 and 2:10b) an explanation for his fate: “The good (things) we received from the 

god, but the evil we should not receive?“ (2:10b, author’s translation). With this rhetorical question 

in 2:10b, the narrative provides the first explanation of good and evil, welfare, and misfortune. In 

fact it is the only possible answer within a monotheistic system: Good, but also evil comes from 

Yhwh (compare Isa 45:6b–7). The question that remains is: why? 

The prose narrative of Job explains that it is human fate to accept Yhwh’s supreme authority, 

sovereignty, and ambiguity. 24 Job attributes everything to God, without doubting God’s justice or 

existence. The basic question, whether humans fear God without cause and objective (“for naught” 

in Job 1:9), and that they give up their devotion if God does not reward it immediately, is answered 

by Job in an ideal manner. He remains unbroken in his piety; thus Satan is refuted and proved to be 

wrong. In the epilogue (Job 42:10–17) Job is rewarded for this unconditioned piety and intercession, 

and Yhwh restores his life. Thus the suffering of Job was in fact not a divine judgment and 

punishment for previous sins. Rather, it was a temporally limited test. The prose portion of the book 

of Job suggests that all in all, human suffering is dissociated from previous human sins and from 

the idea of divine punishment. God is the ambiguous source of good and evil, and suffering is only 

a question of timing. 

While the character of Job in the prose narrative is portrayed as a devout and patient sufferer, 

the Job of the poetic core (starting with Job’s monologue in ch. 3) complains about his fate and 

accuses God directly. Satan, as the agent of God, is an invisible aggressor against Job who remains 

out of sight. But God is attacking Job “for no reason.” God is breaking God’s own law as it is given 

in the Torah and in creation. Such an infraction has been described as the “satanization of God.” 25 

Job argues that his deeds did not result in the expected outcome. He maintains his position (and the 

position of the framing narrative) that he is innocent and righteous, and therefore his suffering is 

unjustified. God is ambiguous, and Job concludes that human life has no clear order. 

von der Gegenwart Gottes im Hiobbuch (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013), 1–22. Referring to the deed-result 

connection, see Georg Freuling, “Wer eine Grube gräbt …” Der Tun-Ergehen-Zusammenhang und sein 

Wandel in der alttestamentlichen Weisheitsliteratur (WMANT 102; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 

2004), 143–56 (prose), 156–214 (dialogues). 

24 See the seminal article by Ulrich Berges, “Gnädig ist JHWH und gerecht” (Ps 116:5): Zur Ambiguität 

von Recht und Gnade im biblischen Gottesbild,” in Gnade vor Recht—Recht durch Gnade? (ed. C. 

Waldhoff; Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen und Reden zur Philosophie, Politik und Geistesgeschichte 

81; Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2014), 11–31 (here 28–30). 

25 Spieckermann, Lebenskunst, 87. He refers to the interaction between the novella and the dialogues in the 

book of Job referring to the actions of Yhwh. 


Berlejung 283 

The following dialogue (Job 4–28) discusses the relationship between justice, piety, fortune, 

and misfortune. Job’s friends argue mainly on the basis of traditional ANE sapiental patterns with 

confidence in a just world order, while Job rejects their arguments. He maintains that he is innocent 

(Job 10:6–7; 31). His suffering is unjustified and does not correspond to his deeds. Therefore he is 

accusing God and asks for a personal trial (Job 13:18–23). The dispute is divided into three speech 

sequences (Job 4–14; 15–21; 22–28). In the first sequence, five key-ideas are developed by Job’s 

friends: (1) There is a direct relationship between one’s behavior and one’s fate (deed-consequence 

nexus); thus Job’s suffering points to his guilt. (2) God’s justice cannot be doubted, because God 

always acts justly. (3) Suffering is a temporally limited punishment by God. (4) Repentance is 

necessary, and God’s mercy is possible. (5) Human beings never can be just in God’s eyes; the 

sinfulness of humankind belongs to humans as created beings (probably later additions: 4:17–19; 

15:14–17 and 25:1–6), and suffering is therefore part of the human condition. 

Within the first speech sequence, Job confesses his innocence, questions God’s justice, and 

sketches the ambiguity of God (Job 9:21–24). All this contrasts with tradition. Job’s own explanation 

for his fate is that God became his enemy, 26 even if he has no idea why (Job 6:4; 13:23–24). 

The second sequence of speeches (Job 15–21) sketches the horrid fate of the sinner judged by 

God (Job 15:20–35; 18; 20). Since this fate has close parallels to Job’s actual disastrous situation, 

his friends draw the logical conclusion (which was already announced in Job 9:20–29) that Job 

must be a sinner who has therefore to face divine punishment. Job vociferously contradicts this 

point (Job 21) and presents evidence to the contrary: the godless often prosper. 

The third speech sequence (Job 22–28) opens with Eliphaz, who directly accuses Job of committing 

a number of misdeeds (22:5–10) and ends with Job’s speech (Job 27) insisting on his innocence. 

Job 28, a song of Wisdom, strengthens the point that human beings have a faulty capacity for 

absolute understanding of the world (a point that is quite traditional). In his final plea (Job 29–31), 

Job claims that because of his righteousness and law-observance (which alludes in Job 31 to the 

Decalogue), he should not be obliged to suffer. His final appeal to God for an answer is retarded 

by the (secondary) insertion of the speeches of the fourth friend, Elihu. In his monologues Elihu 

stresses the justice of the creator (34:10–12) and suffering as God’s pedagogical means (already 

indicated by Eliphaz [5:17]). Elihu’s speeches argue on the grounds of the deed-result connection. 

With Yhwh’s answer in the divine speeches (Job 38–41), a new paradigm can be detected: God 

refers to God’s power as creator, as lord of Wisdom to the world order, and the limited abilities 

of human beings to understand. 27 God’s work and justice are hidden. Thus the divine and human 

realms are described as being completely different. The consequence of this speech finally is that 

divine justice stands outside of human insight and judgment. Job and Yhwh cannot enter a real 

26 For the hostility of God against human beings (Menschenfeindlichkeit Gottes) in the book of Job, see 

Wanke, Praesentia, 200–17. 

27 Spieckermann, Lebenskunst, 89–92; Freuling, Wer eine Grube, 223–30. 



lawsuit because they do not share the same experiences and categories. In his final reactions (Job 

40:4 and 42:2–6), Job accepts the huge distance between himself and God, and he surrenders. 

Yhwh’s answer to Job is twofold: at first glance, it is not a solution to Job’s situation and problem. 

But a second look reveals that God answers Job directly, and therefore gives up divine seclusion. 

There is, from now on, a direct human-divine communication that clearly proves that Yhwh 

is not Job’s enemy (at least from now on). The divine speech does not defend the deed-result 

connection but proceeds to other topics: Job is exposed in his transience and imperfection before 

his creator and is given insight into God’s ambiguity. Human suffering is dissociated from divine 

punishment. The plans of God are hidden, and human wisdom is not able to comprehend or judge 

God; the only solution for any intact human-divine interaction is confidence in God and maintaining 

direct communication. Thus, the epilogue (42:7–9) characterizes Job’s speeches as “right” in 

contrast to those of his friends, because Job was talking with God directly, while the friends only 

talked about God. God’s wrath at Job’s friends can only be appeased through Job’s personal intercessory 

prayer. 

The final conclusion can be: God is close to human beings; they are never alone. This proximity 

can be experienced as life-nurturing, but also as life-threatening. During suffering, ongoing piety 

is strictly recommended. It is better to maintain communication by accusing God than to fall into 

silence and full isolation. 

The Book of Qoheleth 

The book of Qoheleth (Ecclesiastes) is a profound relativization of the deed-result connection and 

traditional Wisdom. The sapiential reflections in this book reach to the border of life, time, and 

reality. Apart from the prologue (1:1–2:26) and epilogue (11:1–12:14), the book is structured into 

four sections (3:1–15; 3:16–6:12; 7:1–8:15; 8:16–10:20). 28 The negative evaluation of human life 

conditions (everything is extremely transitory, 1:2) leads to the following consequences: (1) Divine 

time and human time are different; God is the lord of both times and qualifies human time according 

to God’s will. The divinely ordained changes of time (Qoh 3:1–15) remain unpredictable and 

inscrutable to humans. (2) God is the boundary of human life (6:10–12). (3) There is a principle of 

carpe diem: God-given joys must be enjoyed by human beings in time (8:10–15). (4) The utility of 

Wisdom is limited: it does not help one defend against the ups and downs of fate (9:11–12; 10:8– 

15). The area of life in which Wisdom-orientation brings fruit is reduced to a minimum, and even 

this minimum remains threatened by the violence that human beings experience during their lifetime. 

The limits of Wisdom are always determined by God, whose activities and plans are hidden. 

28 Apart from the two epilogues and 3:17; 11:9b; 11:10b; 12:7, the book can be regarded a literary unit. 

See Jan C. Gertz, et al., Handbook of the Old Testament (London: T&T Clark, 2012), 611. According 

to Annette Schellenberg (Kohelet [Zürcher Bibelkommentare AT 17; Zürich: TVZ, 2013], 16–17), only 

12:9–14 are later additions, and a clear structure within 1:3–12:7 is lacking. 


Berlejung 285 

The four reflections have an anthropological starting point. From experience, the author of 

Qoheleth (“the preacher”) tries to provide insights about the divine order. But, unlike Job, God 

does not answer “the preacher” directly. God remains distant, and a direct human-divine communication 

does not take place. From the very beginning to the end of the book, the preacher is a 

lonely, searching person. The preacher’s search itself is already a well-known traditional sapiental 

topic; however, traditional Wisdom was convinced that there was a chance to make sense of life 

and creation, 29 a conviction that is completely missing in the book of Qoheleth. According to Qoh 

3:11, the human being is not able to find any sense and order in life and creation. 30 Instead, God has 

made endless searching part of the human condition (7:23–25). 31 The divine world order cannot be 

deduced from creation, and human beings have no way to reach a full understanding of God. The 

experiential search reveals only that God cannot be found (for a contradiction see Sir 6:27–28). 

Qoheleth’s evaluation of divine justice is characterized by pessimism. In Qoh 4:1–3 the preacher 

expresses indignation against the absurdities of life. This is balanced by Qoheleth’s conviction that 

God at least provides the basic needs of life (Qoh 5:7–9). But human experience contradicts the 

deed-result connection (Qoh 8:14). Whenever there is perversion of justice (Qoh 3:16), the preacher 

expects that God is just and that God judges the wicked and righteous (Qoh 3:17; 11:9). But God’s 

judgment is unpredictable and lies outside human categories or perception. Justice in the book of 

Qoheleth is not so much a theological problem but an anthropological one. The problem is not the 

justice of God, but the injustice of human beings. God created humankind to be upright/straight/ 

right (7:29), but humans go in wrong directions. Death, transience, and a futile eternal search for 

meaning characterize the human realm, while the divine realm remains distant and inscrutable. 

After his pessimistic analysis of the human situation, Qoheleth’s advice to his readers is very 

traditional: to fear God (Qoh 3:14; 5:6; 7:18; 8:12), to trust God (Qoh 9:4; 11:1–6), and (less 

traditional within the Old Testament) to enjoy the moment. 32 In sum, the pious preacher promotes 

an attitude that recognizes the limitations of one’s own actions and accepts God’s omnipotence as 

well as God’s hidden plans, which can be experienced by human beings as both joy and suffering. 

Both joy and suffering are God-given, and it is the task of humanity to identify the moment and to 

behave accordingly. 

29 Spieckermann, Lebenskunst, 94–95. 

30 For the different reflections on human cognition in the Old Testament, especially Qoheleth’s approach, 

see Annette Schellenberg, Erkenntnis als Problem: Qohelet und die alttestamentliche Diskussion um das 

menschliche Erkennen (OBO 188; Fribourg: Vandenhoeck, 2002), 2–4; 35–36. The limitations of human 

cognition according to Qoheleth are death, the future, and God (see Schellenberg, Erkenntnis, 73, and 

Schellenberg, Kohelet, 25). 

31 Spieckermann, Lebenskunst, 102–9. 

32 However, Mesopotamian antecedents about enjoying the moment date back to the beginning of the second 

millennium BCE. See Bendt Alster, Wisdom of Ancient Sumer (Bethesda, MD: CDL Press, 2005), 

26–27. 



Conclusion: A Comparison of Mesopotamian and Israelite 

Concepts 

Polytheistic Mesopotamia and monolatric/monotheistic early Israel have some commonalities: 

both proclaim a basic confidence in divine providence of balance, order, and justice to the world. 

The experience of human life, however, is that the deed-result connection does not work. Humans 

have to face evident absurdities on earth, which leads to doubts about divine justice. The tension 

between tradition and experience leads to reflection, but not to the answer that God or the gods 

were unjust. The ANE cultures (including Israel) surmised that God or the gods were unpredictable 

and that divine justice was beyond human comprehension. That divine justice is supreme was 

not questioned, so that doubts were attributed to human deficiencies. The human being committed 

sins unknowingly, 33 was unable to act absolutely ethically and to fulfill the divine will, or more 

basically, was not to be able to recognize and understand the divine will. Thus, ancient scholars 

tried to maintain and secure confidence in divine justice against all doubts and claimed that even in 

the face of doubt, the only possible behavior was to keep in touch with God or the gods, to ask for 

mercy, and to hope. However, a more detailed comparative analysis reveals differences between 

Mesopotamian and Old Testament thought. 34 

Who Is to Blame? 

Because of the polytheistic structure of the Mesopotamian religion, divine justice was part of interactive 

and inter-divine discourses and conflicts. Texts refer to personal/local gods and supreme 

gods who can decide in unison but also differently about a human’s fate. A clear hierarchy of the 

human-divine communication levels can be seen: if minor gods want to judge and punish a human, 

they need the approval of the higher deities. The higher deities can act without the approval of the 

minor ones, but they try to act together with them. Human suffering can therefore have very different 

divine sources. A human being can blame his or her personal god/s or the higher gods for 

his or her suffering. One god can blame the other gods for being responsible for human suffering. 

The theological profile (justice, responsibility for creation) of one god can be limited by the others. 

In fact, the question has a special relevance only with reference to the supreme god. The personal 

gods are typically close allies of mortals and suffer in solidarity with their protégés or act as divine 

intercessors who can convince the higher gods to change their mind or to show mercy. 

Within the monotheistic system of the Old Testament, the situation is very different. There is 

only one level of human-divine communication: Yhwh and humankind. Divine justice is by a single 

divine hand. If Yhwh is the only God, Yhwh is the only one who can be held responsible for 

human suffering. Thus, within the traditional view, the sufferer could be sure that he or she had 

33 For the concept of the unconsciously committed sins as a means to maintain the deed-result connection 

see Fink, “Frage,” 88–90. 

34 A detailed research report on the book of Job compared to ANE literatures is given in Christoph Uehlinger, 

“Das Hiob-Buch im Kontext der altorientalischen Literatur- und Religionsgeschichte,” in Das Buch Hiob 

und seine Interpretationen: Beiträge zum Hiob Symposium auf dem Monte Verità vom 14.–19. August 

2005 (ed. Thomas Krüger et al.; AThANT 88; Zürich: TVZ, 2007), 97–163. 


Berlejung 287 

damaged his or her relationship with Yhwh. But the innocent sufferer could blame only Yhwh, 

doubt God’s justice, and/or recognize divine ambiguity, and possible satanic aspects. There are no 

other gods to intervene, a situation that strengthens the need for and importance of human intercessors 

(like Abraham, Moses, and Job). Yhwh’s justice is not limited by higher gods; Yhwh is at the 

same time the supreme and personal God who is fully responsible for everything on earth. 

Discussion continues on the question of if or how far Yhwh suffered in solidarity with Yhwh’s 

people, the king, and the individual when they faced divine sanctions such as the destruction of the 

temple and exile. As the one God, Yhwh could not blame a higher deity for these events, even if 

they affected Yhwh, too. This idea seems to be discussed in Jer 9:9–10 and 12:7–13, when Yhwh 

wails over the destruction of Yhwh’s country. Yhwh seems to have suffered from Yhwh’s own 

divine sanctions, according to Ps 78:59–62. “He gave his might into captivity, and his glory into 

the hand of an adversary” (78:61). 

What Can be Expected? 

In Mesopotamian as well as in Old Testament literature, divine justice and divine retribution belong 

together. Creation is balanced, and therefore, lack of balance is always temporary, and the final 

word over humankind is divine redemption. The practical advice to the suffering and doubting 

individual is to maintain piety, communication with God, and patience. 

Many Mesopotamian texts provide an elaborate alert-system that announces to the kings and 

human beings if their human-divine communication is intact or not. Compared to this elaborate 

system, the alert-system in the Old Testament seems to be very reduced. Deuteronomistic and prophetic 

literatures explicitly exclude portents, omens, and divination (Deut 18; 1 Sam 28, Isa 8:19), 

reduce the efficacy of dreams (Deut 13), and instead refer mainly to the prophets, who were sent 

to warn selected kings, and to the people of Israel and Judah. But no prospective alert-system was 

available for the individual. 

Janowski points out that Yhwh does not automatically react to human conduct with reward or 

punishment but with the basic intention for salvation. 35 In a manner, Janowski’s conception seems to 

be in line with the idea (of Elihu in the book of Job) that divine punishment is a pedagogical means 

to educate humans. Salvation and not destruction describes the final divine plan. Mesopotamian 

literature also developed the idea that divine punishment is the means to restore the balance of 

inter-human and human-divine relationships. Ancient Near Eastern gods acted freely and did not 

punish automatically, but only in order to re-establish the balance. But the Old Testament stresses 

the point subsequently in the post-exilic works, that divine judgment over each individual is a 

theological necessity. It is the only way that the power and justice of God are finally proven: justice 

is established only if the disturbed order is re-established through punishment of sinners and the 

salvation of the righteous. In this respect the development of eschatology, with the final judgment, 

and the development of apocalyptic thought, with the expectation of a new and better creation and 

creatures, becomes for the righteous an object of hope. 

35 Janowski, Ein Gott, 58, 78.

ANET article

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?